December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A Warning Re: Hardware RNG support for PGP 2.63
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- rngaugp(a)alpha.c2.org wrote: > Here is the README file that comes with the modifications. > - ------------------------------------------ > Hardware Random Number Support for PGP. > PGP 263 international version > > Ever get tired of typing in keyboard timing strokes while generating a > PGP key? Ever want to use PGP unattended, but be foiled because there is > no one there to type the keyboard timing strokes? > > Ever wonder if PGP's method of generating random number might have some > subtle flaw which would expose it to cryptanalysis?[..] Ever wonder that a random number device driver or hardware will have a subtle flaw??? Relying on the /dev/random NOISE.SYS driver now while it's still in beta isn't nec. a good idea. For experimentation, sure. I'm also rather concerned as to how this version of PGP handles it. Very much so. The current and latter versions of NOISE.SYS parallels the Linux random.c driver in that there are two devices, /dev/random and /dev/urandom... the older versions (pre version 0.4) will return as many bytes as are requested (from /dev/random) whereas the current version returns only as many bytes as are conservatively estimated to be "truly random". If you are using the older NOISE.SYS /dev/random or the newer version's /dev/urandom for key generation then essentially you're using a pseudo-RNG based on SHA rather than real random data. The implementation should try to get as many bits as are needed from the driver and then request some keystrokes, collect more data, etc. until you have enough bits (advantage over older PGP method? You only need to sample from driver, and not worry about processing raw samples yourself; driver also samples from other sources than keystrokes as well...) I'd be wary of relying on NOISE.SYS or any similar driver for PGP-key generation until the driver gets more thorough examination; I'd also be VERY wary of an improper use of the driver. - --Rob (who wrote NOISE.SYS). - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMRjSNSoZzwIn1bdtAQEn+wF/ZxQKqOCRyKrJjmdtYtE2kVG6v+3NkOOb 84JMpWkpzkMVe8L7LHr7bLdgzkVxDB+8 =m54+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [noise] the individual and the tribe
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Rob said: >> ... in the sense that >>tribal societies are individualist. Jean-Francois Avon (JFA Technologies, QC, Canada) wrote: >I absolutely don't agree. The subordination of the individual to the tribe >is fundamental of their vision of the world. Some tribal societies are individualist, some are not: Most of the myths and legends of the Australian Aboriginals have a lone ranger character as the hero or villain, or at least most of the ones that I have read feature a person whose life is dramatic or heroic in part because he is tribeless, perhaps for the same reason as most heroes in Disney cartoons are orphans. Individualism is not about the >personnal opinions, it is about the vision of Man as an entity in itself, not >a type of cattle that owe his service to the collectivity of the tribe. > >Crypto makes the tribe (and it's sorcerers) loose their grip... :) > >JFA > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Strong Crypto Weak
by A. Padgett Peterson, P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The seven experts who wrote the new paper -- "Minimal Key >Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate >Commercial Security" -- say the achievement by the >students at the Ecole Polytechnique was trivial. For this they needed "designated heros" ? Have been saying the same thing for two years. Warmly, Padgett

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Re: Fair Credit Reporting Act and Privacy Act
by Peter Conrad 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi, Duncan Frissell wrote: >At 08:25 AM 2/5/96 -0500, Frank Willoughby wrote: > >>If the Privacy Act were rewritten to be as strict as the BDSG, businesses >>would have a (mandatory) legal requirement to: >> [...] >Unfortunately, it would also: > >* Require government registration of computers and databases containing >information about people (whether these computers are used by business or >individuals). This eases regulation of computers and future confiscation. This is not true. Individuals are not required to register anything, the BDSG simply does not apply do them (see. Par. 1 Section (2) ). Businesses are required to register (besides their address and the kind of business they do) a person who is responsible for any personal information they want to keep and a general description of the kind of data they intend to keep (see Par. 32 Sect. (2) ). Computers are hardly mentioned anywhere in the BDSG, in fact, most of it applies to any method of processing personal information. It doesn't matter if a business keeps data printed on paper or stored in a computer. >* Reduce market efficiency by making it harder to match buyers and sellers >(because neither could easily find out about he other) thus causing higher >prices and poorer people. Oh well. In the past buyers and sellers have always found each other without keeping large databases. Most buyers are quite capable of finding appropriate sellers (that's what advertisement and commercials are good for). The goal of the BDSG is to give the individual control of information kept about him. An example: The Deutsche Bundesbahn issues so-called 'BahnCards'. If you buy a BahnCard you can use the Bundesbahn-trains for half the normal price. Until a couple of months ago, the Bundesbahn gave all the information they got from their BahnCard customers to the Citybank AG. The Citybank AG sent their junkmail to all Bahncard customers and tried to make them get a credit-card. This was in violation of the BDSG. And I still know where to get a credit-card if I want one. >* Do nothing to protect personal information from the government which >would get to collect more of it than ever in the course of enforcing data >protection laws. Oh yes it does. The same rules (or even stricter ones) that apply to businesses apply to all government organizations. If any government organization (even the police) violates the BDSG you have the right to file a lawsuit against the organization (or the individual who violated your rights). >If you don't want people to know things about you, don't tell them. You sometimes have no choice. Those of you capable of understanding german might take a look at http://www.fh-ulm.de/bvd/gesetz.html Bye, Peter NB: I subscribe to this list through a digest only. Please CC: me on followups. - -- Peter Conrad | "They say time is the fire in which we burn." Am Heckenberg 1 | Dr. Soran, Star Trek - "Generations" 56727 Mayen Germany Email: p_conrad@informatik.uni-kl.de,conrad@unix-ag.uni-kl.de -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAgUBMRiPe7FFskV8RCVHAQEMwQP7B6/QSo0E8bAiPcusg9+Etzx+WdIi6nuP WVvnJ7RWrwoScnPkRJs7uaBfCpedFu3TZX7RyOm6bVAX4mwFe/dtqhBxcy8U3lQg fqa3WUAhyBNPcr6tF38sVocKs6hWRiw+KckzvnCx9grJpqVHz6kvimAcVOIg027O Zzk8jyopYDw= =PBa7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CypherPunks as Teachers; source material [Re: Hey,we are quaint! , (Was: A Sign of the Future)]
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"attila(a)primenet.com" "attila" 6-FEB-1996 02:05:25.34 > Jefferson certainly would role over at the degeneration of "his" party which began in the 30s as liberal news, particularly radio, demagougues discovered they could fan the riff-raff and control the direction of government. --------------- An interesting example of Jefferson's thoughts on the subject of the "Natural Aristocracy" can be found at http://ils.unc.edu/~vreer/aristoi.txt -Allen

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Re: Telecoms Bill
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> >Encrypted/truly anonymous ftp would be nice (though some folx would understandably have problems with truly anonymous uploads, and crypto export restrictions in the US could be problematic legally). I think there is already work on encrypted telnet (stel) by the CERT/IT people. ---------------- If a completely encrypted http method (ssl) is indeed available, a (clunky) solution to both of the above would be a web proxy on an encrypted server that would act like a ftp or telnet proxy. I'm not sure about the limits of the html language for doing this (updates, et al)- it may have to be graphics to the user and form input back, which would take a while. -Allen

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Re: Assassination Politics--isn't it gambling?
by banelaw＠med.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim: as to "Assassination Politics." Isn't the structure you describe gambling? Placing money on a prediction, with the correct predictor winning? And if so, isn't it illegal if done over the wires, i.e., federal commerce? I'm not looking for a way to declare your scheme illegal, I'm just pointing out that there are other angles, especially if done over the wires. I guess you could move the structure off shore--pity the poor country hosting such an entity! If you were at all succesfull, the server accepting digital cash would be moving from place to place--remember pirate radio? Philip BaneLaw Suite 210W 1800 112th Ave NE Bellevue, WA 98004 206.455.5537 Fax:206.812.2032

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RE: Why am I wrong?
by A. Padgett Peterson, P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Was referring to the govs ability to control communications *with them*) >Perhaps I do not understand your point. They can perhaps >control the communication between them and me, but not between me and >everyone else. Ok please view my three points fromn the standpoint that so much of the total traffic would be affected by at least one, that "uncontrolled" communications would be minimal. >>2) communications using someone else's equipment/network (university, >> employer, etc) >Employers nor universities have any jurisdiction over whether you use >encryption in your transmissions while using their networks unless it >specifically does not allow it when you first agree to have an account with >them. I think you had better review the concept of "property rights". Unless you have a contract that says you can, or can establish "expectation", the property owner who allows you to use their equipment may control how it is used. >>3) communications with anyone (Internet merchant, etc) who says "this >> is not what <MasterCard|Visa|AmEx> approves..." >I don't quite understand your meaning. I am a merchant and I encourage my >customers to use PGP when they send information over the internet, whether >to me or to anyone else. That is fine but what if MasterCard refuses to accept this method ? (Not saying they will, just "what if" ? You are free to use digicash if you want but is not "legal tender for all debts public and private". >Comments? Bring 'em on! :-) I dood it. Warmly, Padgett

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Internet Passports, Identity Escrow, and Back Doors
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

lmccarth(a)cs.umass.edu risks violating the terms of his PC probation by writing: >I just sent this to the remailer operators' list, but it may be of interest >here too. I think Tim or Lucky or someone suggested something like GAI >(Government Access to Identities) here a while back.... > >Forwarded message: >> Lance writes: >> I hypothesize that the Strassmann & Marlow paper is meant to lay the >> groundwork for some sort of eventual Government Access to Identities proposal >> (which would more likely be termed "identity escrow" by the Feds). It's >> about the only way I can reconcile statements like the following >> (juxtaposed by me, not them): Indeed, several of us have written extensively about the rationales for "is-a-person" credentialling by government, what I have quipped is a kind of "identity escrow" (further abusing the term "escrow"). I lack the time to write a concise summary, so will instead mention a bunch of points. Searching the archives for mentioned terms may yield more comprehensive articles. * "Internet Driver's License." This is not just a joke, although the reported systems are not called this. But the idea is the same. A credential, probably a signed key certificate, that is granted after proof of age is presented. (For example, one might show a passport or conventional Driver's License at a Post Office and they'd issue a signed key....something they'd like to get into the business of doing, from various reports.) * An age credential such as this is essentially going to be necessary, in the worst case, for accessing the Net and Web. If the CDA is upheld--which may take several years to decide for sure--then sites will probably have to take positive steps to verify that users are not minors. Unless they carry only G-rated Barney material (but no Barney jokes, as children might be traumatized). * This age credential obviously cannot be just the "I swear that I am old enough to view adult images" sort of click button. (Although it mostly works with ordering adult material through the mail to immunize a provider, except in this case there is the additional "check" of mail delivery, where a postal carrier may may informal inquiries about the age of the recipient. Plus the parents can intercept the subscription to "Hustler" that 14-year-old Johhny ordered.) * The various schemes for signature authorities, which I admit to not following very closely, all the stuff about Verisign and whether Netscape will or will not accept signatures of rogue signers....all this suggests a worrisome situation in which all messages must be signed by the True Name (see above) of the message originator. (For a good fictional treatment of this, see John Brunner's "The Shockwave Rider.") * Remailers and Web proxies obviously represent an end-run around the CDA and key escrow, in various ways, so I think it likely that these will come under attack. The legal means of attacking them may be one or more of the following: - holding the remailer site operator legally responsible for what can be traced back to his system, especially if in plaintext. (This would make the last site in a chain of otherwise-encrypted messages especially vulnerable if the message is delivered in plaintext to the recipient. Of course, with wider use of crypto, the message can be delivered in encrypted form. I see more and more remailers insisting on encrypted (high entropy) messages.) - for sites that charge any kind of fee for remailing, extensions of the business laws to require that logs be maintained ("so that customers can dispute bills"!!). These logs could then be subpoenaed to aid in tracing messages back to origins. (Sure, it gets hard when hops outside the country are involved...I'm not saying this'll be easy or effective, just a possible avenue of attack on remailers.) - finally, outlawing of remailers and proxies. Or extensive registration of them. (We've had this debate a couple of times, about whether mail-forwarding services really have to register, get proof of ID, send records along to the government, etc.) * Identity Escrow obviously fits in closely with key escrow in general. In closing, I think the next couple of years will see increasing pressure to require some kind of "Internet Driver's License," at least within the U.S. Other countries will jump at this (Germany, China, France, the usual suspects). Call it an "Internet Passport." For some interesting insights into the thinking of some in the crypto community, go back to around 1986-8 in the "Crypto" Conference Proceedings and you'll find some papers, by Fiat and Shamir I believe, on the "problem" of "rogue governments" (they cited Libya for their example) issuing "false passports." (I have commented in the past that the U.S. government has a reported 50,000 or more people in the Witness Security (aka Protection) Program, under the U.S. Marshal's Service, and reserves the right to create completely fake "legends" (dossiers) for these people, including false credit records, false education records, and false employment records. Not to mention their various secret agents. Clearly the government would want "back doors" into any Internet Passport system!) --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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strong cryptography for Java
by Jyri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found today a Java package, implementing some cryptography (MD5, DES, RSA and Diffie-Hellman). Seems quite interesting. It is called JCrypt alpha release 0.1. The information is on: http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/achou/JCrypt/packages.html Sorry if this has been on this list already. Jüri Kaljundi jk(a)digit.ee Digiturg http://www.digit.ee/

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POTP gets good press
by Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Sun Observer -- "An Independent Journal Devoted to the Sun and Compatible Markets" -- ran an article in the Feb 96 issue entitled "New technology eliminates need for keys to encrypt e-mail messages". Byline: Bob Harvey. About the author: "Bob Harvey is vice president of the Internet Security Corp., a Lexington, Mass.-based network security solutions provider." Content: includes diagrams entitled "Link Level Encryption" in which sender transmits keys to receiver, and "Packet Level Encryption" in which sender transmits key sto certificate authority which transmits them to multiple receivers, and "Synchronized Random Key Generation (SRKG)" a la "Power One Time Pad" in which no keys are transmitted and multiple recievers magically decipher messages via built-in encryption devices. Am I right in thinking this is utter unmitigated bullsh snake oil? Does anybody have any other dirt on this Bob Harvey guy and his Internet Security Corp? What is his relationship with the POTP folks? An Alta Vista search revealed several Bob Harveys, but none who matched with "Internet Security". I'm Cc'ing this to the editor in chief of The Sun Observer. If he doesn't know about the cypherpunks he might want to request some explanation... Regards, Bryce "Toys, Tools and Technologies" the Niche New Signal Consulting -- C++, Java, HTML, Ecash Bryce PGP sig follows -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.01 iQCVAwUBMRkD8/WZSllhfG25AQESBgP8CmmKb0+VMqs14FNQ2YoAllXcaqAtc09Y 99KljeM0gHpm19x14Tj011bngS59EyUCDvoFaY6HtOmOPNqR2SpQxoHp9IBWNJmS dGEGwuqCLEB2gxMwgtjrwCNWyJmXk6Wp8UTRPcoG/woXWBCkyllbc62dV/RbILva OeKJR5FpQ9Y= =YT6V -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Windows PGP mail reader
by Ted Garrett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:56 PM 2/3/96 GMT, you wrote: >In article <4eaksb$6i9(a)recepsen.aa.msen.com>, jims(a)conch.aa.msen.com says... >>Hi. Can anyone recommend a Windows based email/POP3 reader that can decrypt >>content? Please reply via email: > >Have a look at Pegasus Mail. It handles PGP very nicely with a recent >addition. by John Navas, both are free: >http://users.aimnet.com/~jnavas/winpmail.htm > I recently picked up "PGP Windows Shell". I have found it to be an excellent utility for encrypting and decrypting messages as easily as cutting to and pasting from the clipboard. All operations are automated, you can use whatever mailer you want, and it's freeware. The URL is http://iquest.com/~aegisrc/utils2.shtml Also, if you want something to automate usage of the cypherpunk style remailers, check out Joel McNamara's Private Idaho. It's an excellent tool, also freeware, and is available at URL http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/pi.html Another utility you might like to look at (of course it's freeware too) is PGP WinFront. While it's a little more cumbersome than PGP Windows Shell, it has all the same functionality. There is also a shareware utility available from the same URL, called PGP QuickFront. The combination of QuickFront and WinFront make using PGP under windows almost pleasant. It can be found at http://netaccess.on.ca/ugali/crypt/ .

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How to prevent a virus infection :-)
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just watched an "expert" on Bay TV (SF Cable). He stressed that websites without firewalls pose the risk of spreading viruses when downloading files from them. A GIF was being downloaded in the background... LOL. I only wonder who the fuck is hiring such idiots. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I (fwd)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"ravage(a)ssz.com" "Jim Choate" 6-FEB-1996 21:15:10.47 >If the intent is to motivate others to kill or otherwise harm others simply because you don't agree with them or their actions is reprehensible and moraly or ethicaly undefensible. ------------------- So you don't believe in self-defense, or the defense of another? While I'm not as sure as Jim whether such a system would just be used by the good guys, if someone has taken action to seriously violate the rights of another I can see the death penalty as being appropriate. -Allen

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Re: Need a "warning" graphic of some kind for CDA
by Gordon Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:48 PM 04/02/96 EST, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: > >Either the 'no' sign (red crossed circle) or a wide red cross over one of: > rattle > baby bottle / pacifier > disposable diapers (with contents visible) > safety pin? I've file-attached a first attempt at something like this to Robert Hayden (the original poster.) It's the international 'no' sign superimposed over a drooling baby. If he likes it and is able to post it somewhere, he's free to do so. I'd post it myself, but I have no web access (not yet, anyway). ----- Gordon R. Campbell, Owner - Mowat Woods Graphics P.O. Box 1902, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 5J7 Ph: (613) 542-4087 Fax: (613) 542-1139 2048-bit PGP key available on request.

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Re: Electronic Grille Cipher?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com" 6-FEB-1996 03:23:01.15 >An idea occurred to me the other day, for hiding multiple texts in one file using multiple keys. The gist of it is to take a reasonably large file of random data and then to hide the bytes of a message in scattered locations. The method of determining where each byte is would be based on a good cipher which for each iteration would return a relative offset from the last location in the file. ----------------- I had a similar idea a bit back, and Lewis/Futplex kindly referred me to some parts of the Archives discussing it. However, the main objection to this idea was that the cops would just do a search warrant for the second group of information. My solution to this is to have quite a few groups of information, which would admittedly make the spacing problem a bit hard. The following might be an example for someone of such a scheme: A. Accounting information that you give the IRS (and the cops if they come) B. Your collection of vanilla, heterosexual alt.sex.stories (give to cops) C. Your collection of digitized playboy centerfolds (give to cops) D. Your collection of, say, homosexual bestiality stories (don't give) E. Your collection of digitized photos of the above (don't give) F. Your _real_ accounting information (don't give) G. Your plans to violently overthrow the government (don't give). You'd just reveal the top two at first; if they asked if there was anything more, you'd reveal the third. All three are things that you can easily justify wanting privacy for- and some of them are ones that you'd want different people to have access to (your accountant vs your lover, for A & B). -Allen

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Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 6 Feb 1996 21:43 EDT > From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.rutgers.edu> > Subject: Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I (fwd) > > >If the intent is to motivate others to kill or otherwise harm others simply > because you don't agree with them or their actions is reprehensible and > moraly or ethicaly undefensible. > ------------------- > So you don't believe in self-defense, or the defense of another? While > I'm not as sure as Jim whether such a system would just be used by the good > guys, if someone has taken action to seriously violate the rights of another > I can see the death penalty as being appropriate. > -Allen > What is described is not self-defence by any stretch of the imagination. It is a pre-meditated act which causes any plea of self-defence to fail. If it is wrong for an individual to kill another except in immediate self-defence then it is wrong for any group of people to kill another individual or group unless there is an immediate threat to the group. Capital punishment by governments is wrong under any conditions. If you seriously believe it is ethical for a government to kill another then please answer me a simple question. How many people have to decide that another should be killed for it to be ethical? In short, how many people does it take to decide it is a legitimate act to take your own life? Jim Choate

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Re: paper on remailers in the intelligence community
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:41 AM 2/7/96, sameer wrote: >http://www.strassmann.com/pubs/anon-remail.html > > A friend at Hotwired (yes, he's still my friend even though he >works for Hotwired) pointed me to some FUD which led Futplex to the >above paper. > It's an interesting viewpoint.. salient quotes: > >"By far the greatest threat to the commercial, economic and political >viability of the Global Information Infrastructure will come from >information terrorists. " > >"Anonymous re-mailers are here to stay. Like in the case of many >virulent diseases, there is very little a free society can do to .. The affiliation of the authors is interesting: ---- by Paul A. Strassmann, US Military Academy, West Point; and Senior Advisor, SAIC and William Marlow, Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) ---- Now, what were people saying about SAIC and its role in intelligence matters saying again? (Not to mention the Inter-NIC stuff.) --Tim May, "wanted for information terrorism" Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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DES for HP48 - found & thanks
by stainles＠bga.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Public thanks to The Cunning Artificers who sent a response (by the ECafe anonymous remailer) pointing to ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/ciphers/des.hp48sx.gz for the HP48 DES implimentation. Apologies to everyone else for the extra noise. ==Dwight -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6ui iQCVAgUBMRlUdIY4AzhdF11FAQETEgP6AhqRO6tMGAIpJNTdvuO/qqknpIpwI7fD PW/yH4LAXCpqWkjUXJYmx2IXCFU4todUkxV4ZaTf62OzYfCrLeyZ5VRmBqFUhI3V SjanPGq7v6gKX/ZNkpundvjGfBg9XqHLeafTaIarAcNI/73aNT/VgJwPu0lsB7Wq 7AdYiKFWI8A= =e1C0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I (fwd)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"ravage(a)ssz.com" "Jim Choate" 6-FEB-1996 22:50:35.24 >What is described is not self-defence by any stretch of the imagination. It is a pre-meditated act which causes any plea of self-defence to fail. ------------------ If someone has comitted serious enough violations of rights in the past, then I would call killing that person justified. First, it prevents any future violations of rights by that person. Second, it serves to discourage people if they know they can get killed if they do so. (I realize that capital punishment by governments doesn't appear to do much good, but the people in question- government agents, etcetera- are generally a bit different than the gang members who so regularly ignore prison sentences and the death penalty.) Third, and getting away from the self-defense argument, it is justice. The job of a government, if it has one, is to defend individual liberties. It is given privileges in order to enforce that. The abuse of such privileges should be met by death. (Yes, I would be in favor of changing current laws to remove sovereign immunity and institute a death penalty for governmental rights violations. Unfortunately, among the people subject to such a law are the ones making the laws.) ------------------------ >How many people have to decide that another should be killed for it to be ethical? In short, how many people does it take to decide it is a legitimate act to take your own life? ---------------------- Why should "how many people" make a difference? If I violate someone's rights enough to justify such a course of action, then I should be dead even if everyone except the victim is cheering. Yes, I realize that Jim Bell's system does depend on a group of people. But so, in the end, do all such systems- whether they call themselves governments or anarcho-capitalist societies. If the Christian Coalition got too many people with guns in the latter, they'd rule. Any further discussion would appear to belong in private email; I suspect that Jim Bell would appreciate a cc. -Allen

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Re: free speach and the government
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric, On 02 03 96 you say: In the US the media is by and large controlled by huge media con- glomerates with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and delivering up their audience to their advertisers in tidy packages. The government is along for the ride, being part and parcel of the same system. They won't rest until net-speech is by and large con- trolled by huge media conglomerates all busy delivering up the net- public to advertisers in tidy packages... I'm not saying that there's a Black Heliocopters type conspiracy, or any other for that matter. There doesn't have to be, there are huge political forces moving things this way. So there might as well be a conspiracy, as the end effect on us is the same. Your analysis is excellent. Thank you. Often "anti-statist" conspiracy theorists have the bare facts right, but explain those facts from the same point of view as statists: the State is all-powerful; it is THE conspirator! "The" State tends to the monopoly of force; but THIS State is dependent on taxes, for it exists in THIS capitalist economy led by huge "conglom- erates" (the word may not be exact but it will do) that tend to control the supply of taxes (by splitting up, by dumping loyal workers, by crea- tive accounting, by moving away, by influencing the bureaucracy through a maze of advisory panels, by directly staffing the upper reaches of that bureaucracy, by timely contributions to journalism schools, by...ingenu- ity). In its preeminent meaning, politics refers only to the State. However, if we gracefully relent, ...there are huge political forces moving things.... Generally, this overall movement is not a conspiracy. Specifically, the movement involves an unbreakably large number of "per- manent" and temporary alliances, coalitions, blocs, nods and winks, in- siders, cliques, rings, gangs, and...you name it. Cordially, Jim

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Re: free speech and the government
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dmitri, On 02 03 96 you say: I believe that any exception to unlimited free speech, be it libel, or copyright violation, or child pornography, or Nazi propaganda, or Chinese dissident materials, just isn't com- patible with the cpunk agenda. No censorship is acceptable. That's an absolute. Censorship is founded on prying; and pryers have THEIR absolute: On 2 January 1992, it was decided by the German Federal govern- ment to open these [East German police] files...at 15 offices throughout the former East Germany. It is worth pointing out the extensive nature of these files. It was discovered that husbands spied on wives, girlfriends spied on boyfriends, Cath- olic Church confessionals were bugged by the 'Stasi' both with and without the knowledge of the parish priest, Lutheran parish- ioners spied on their pastors, telephone calls of both East and West Germans were heavily monitored and the most innocent event, such as going shopping or visitng the library, was included in the files. --Wayne Madsen [co-author of the upcoming new Puzzle Palace]. Handbook of Personal Data Protection. Stockton Press. 1992. Page 4. Pryers agree! No censorship is acceptable. A*N*Y*T*H*I*N*G goes. But let's be scientific about it: Some 30 miles from Boston is a radio telescope called Beta, run by the Harvard-Smithsonian Centre for Astrophysics, that day and night searches the northern sky for artificial radio signals as it makes continuous swathes through the heavens. It must pick up all the naturally-caused radio sounds as well, which engineers call "noise" as opposed to "signal". This means that it collects an enormous quantity of information that can be processed only by a specially-built supercomputer. Every second it captures enough data to fill a CD-Rom, which every day adds up to 22 trillion bytes of data, the equivalent of 52 million novels. --Adrian Berry. "Watch This Space." File: nspace04.html. Home News. 02 05 96 The Electronic Telegraph. A USEFUL gadget, isn't it? Censorship of even 1 byte of the 22 tril- lion is unacceptable. E*V*E*R*Y*T*H*I*N*G goes. Between two absolutes, what decides? Cordially, Jim PS: I can't help wondering whether "all the naturally-caused radio sounds" are really all the artificially-caused microwave signals within range. Of all the intercept stations built during the 1950's boom, the ultimate in both ambition and failure was in the remote Allegheny hollow of Sugar Grove, West Virginia.... Since its beginnings in the mid-1950s, the secrecy surrounding Sugar Grove has been intense. The cover story throughout the entire life of the project was that the six-hundred-foot dish was purely for research and radio astronomy, permitting scien- tists "to tune in on radio signals as far as 38 billion light years away".... --James Bamford. The Puzzle Palace. Penguin Books. 1983. Pages 217f, 220. Supposedly, the only person allowed to look into each of the East German police files was the "data subject," the person who had been looked into.

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Re: PGP-Scape
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >No. SSL doesn't encrypt everything, just certain transactions (or am I > > WRong. Ok.... that part's settled. --- "Mutant" Rob <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) for a copy of my PGP key.

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Digital watermark
by A5113643667＠attpls.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Cypherpunks, Has anyone heard any news lately about digital watermarks, that is, changes to the image that can be used to identy the source of the document? Peace ..Tom

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Re: paper on remailers in the intelligence community
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>http://www.strassmann.com/pubs/anon-remail.html > It's an interesting viewpoint.. salient quotes: ^^^^^^^^^^^ Surely you jest. It's one of the weirdest hodgpodges of inane free association I've ever read. The authors are a couple of regular Jack D. Rippers. Highlights: >Since biblical times, crimes have been deterred by the prospects of punishment. >In many respects, the avoidance of technical discussions about some of the >pathological aspects of the Internet remind me of the state of medical >diagnosis prior to the recognition that bacteriology, prophylactics and >inoculation can be only applied following the acceptance of rigorous, >analytic and experimental disciplines. >One of the most prominent anonymous re-mailers is <anon.penet.fi> is in >Finland. It is frequently used by the Russian (ex-KGB) criminal element. When is a troll not a troll? When it's a_gnom_inous(a)c2.org.

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