December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Timing RSA and Certificates worth ??
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:50 PM 12/13/95 +1100, lyalc(a)mail.mpx.com.au (lyal collins) wrote: >I meant that on-line certificate issuing, notary and similar services where >data is submitted to a system for processing/RSA encryption are subject to >this for of attack. >Parts of the SEPP/STT protocols appear to require this of merchants and >customers. >I retract my comments about ecash/echeques - I'm not sure of the >implications there yet. >As for SEPP/STT - another nail in the coffin, me thinks. For large environments like this, it's possible to work around the attack by methods like queueing up all the signature jobs and doing them serially; this makes it difficult for the Bad Guy to know whether the server is taking time doing his multiplications or Alice's or N other customers', so he can't control timing very well by picking otherwise-informative numbers. On the other hand, your smartcard or PC is still at risk, since it's _not_ doing a lot of them, unless it's doing them just sort of at random when it's got nothing better to do and throws the real work in the middle. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Question about the Timing Attack
by James Black 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I have looked over the paper, but I will look more closely this weekend (finals going on right now). The main question I have, since my programs run over a network with dumb terminals is this: If someone can get the timing information why would they need it, since they can read the message. So how can this attacker get the timing info without being able to read the message (unencrypted)? Thanx. ========================================================================== James Black (Comp Sci/Comp Eng sophomore) e-mail: black(a)eng.usf.edu http://www.eng.usf.edu/~black/index.html **************************************************************************

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ADDRESS DATABASE?
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Something of privacy interest happened to me yesterday. I phoned a company to ask for a copy of their catalog. The phone clerk asked for my last name and zip code. After receiving that info, the clerk asked me, "Is this your full name and address?" and then gave them both correctly. I was taken aback. I have been at my new address for only a couple of months. Prior to that, I have been couch surfing for a year and a half. Though I called an 800 number, ANI had nothing to do with it since I was calling from work. It may have been from a database associated with a credit reporting agency, a bank or a utility company, but I am not aware of any of these being available on-line for something as mundane as requesting a consumer catalog. The clerk had no idea where the info came from (or so he said). Does anyone know how this trick was done? S a n d y P.S. If anyone is interested in helping to make an adult film, drop me a note. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Attacking Clipper with timing info?
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Without having the details of the algorithm, I suspect > the answer is 'remotely possible, at best'. > > However, to extend what I suspect you were getting at: > > It would be very interesting to determine if the NSA knew > about this crypto-design problem... > That was indeed what I was wondering. I expect we wont have to wait too long before we hear whether Clipper chips require the same or a different amount of time to encrypt/decrypt. Should be interesting. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Kocher's Paper
by Connie Sadler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi... Can someone tell me where I can get a copy of Kocher's paper? I haven't read it yet. Thanks! Connie

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Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
by hoz＠univel.telescan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:42 PM 12/14/95 +0100, Lars Johansson wrote: >>Does the attack work for existing smartcards? >At first glance, smart cards would seem to be the most critical target >to Kocher's timing attack since they usually operate in on-line >environments. Not just on-line, they also operate in untrusted (hostile?) environments. >...the terminal could get a (noisy) measure of the time by > repeatingly use this command to see when the result is available. Might a terminal also be able to monitor power consumption or electromagnetic emissions to obtain a more precise time estimate? >Most smart cards does nevertheless require that the user must first >specify a PIN code before the RSA algorithms are operationable. If I used my RSA card every day, (at a toll booth, for instance), and the "bad guys" pilfered an "exact" timing upon each use, how long before they could forge a signature? >This implies that even if the card gets stolen can't it be attacked >with Kocher's method. That is useful, but if I know my card is stolen, I can presumably limit my liability by reporting it. If I still have my card, but my secret key is stolen, then damage might be greater. On another note, timing attacks would not seem to work against most DES implementations, hardware or software. The time to execute each round does not seem to depend on the plaintext or the key. It could be made to, of course, but unless I'm missing something, the "natural" way to code it, or to construct hardware for it, is not time dependent. Rick F. Hoselton (who doesn't claim to present opinions for others)

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PGP Interoperability?
by marina kats 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone out there vouch for the interoperability of PGP 2.6 ui with versions of PGP available in USA from MIT & Viacrypt. What about the legal issue ? Is it legal for a US citizen to encrypt or check signatures with a 2.6ui public key ? Would sending a public key out of the US be reagarded as export by ITAR? Thanks Geoff Klein.

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Digital Sigs and the Bar Committee
by William McVey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was found on Netwatchers (http://www.ionet.net/~mdyer/front.shtml) and I figured there would be people on this list willing to comment. -- William McVey BAR COMMITTEE PROPOSES DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES The Information Security Committee of the Science and Technology Section of the American Bar Association has promulgated proposed Digital Signature Guidelines, and is inviting comment through January 15, 1996. You can download the compressed ASCII file at the NetWatchers site, subject to the copyright notice below, or you can download the text in various formats from the ECL site at http://www.intermarket.com/ecl/.

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sandy Sandfort 7:51 AM 12/14/95 (not completely in this order): >Something of privacy interest happened to me yesterday. I phoned >a company to ask for a copy of their catalog. The phone clerk >asked for my last name and zip code. After receiving that info, >the clerk asked me, "Is this your full name and address?" and >then gave them both correctly. I was taken aback. That is the correct response. >Does anyone know how this trick was done? What trick? For ~$150, you can buy a CD-ROM-set DB with every listed phone number in the U.S. on it, faxes too; the info's rife with typos and has a lag of ~6-7 months, but what do you want? If you're willing to pay more, you'll get more -- more accurate, more timely, more aggressively correlated, more thorough info. >I have been at my new address for only a couple of months. Prior Where's your new address, under a rock? ;) >to that, I have been couch surfing for a year and a half. Though Ironically, NFA status will get you on some very aggressive lists. >I called an 800 number, ANI had nothing to do with it since I was >calling from work. It may have been from a database associated >with a credit reporting agency, a bank or a utility company, but [x] all of the above >I am not aware of any of these being available on-line for They are. >something as mundane as requesting a consumer catalog. The clerk ^^^^^^^ Are you being serious? Ever heard of "information markets"? What, are you a libertarian just because you don't like taxes? There are other reasons for being one... :) >had no idea where the info came from (or so he said). Detweiler L Detweiler L S Detweiler Larry 8525 E Hampden Ave 3704 S 2nd St 2884 Ww Ave Denver CO Austin TX Parnell IA 80231-4826 78704-7073 52325-8825 303-695-0497 512-448-1750 319-628-4461 Detweiler Lynn Detweiler Lynn Detweiler Lynn Teenline 1724 N Alabama St 1045 W Forevergreen Rd North Liberty IA Silver City NM North Liberty IA 52317 88061-4302 52317-9717 319-626-6272 505-538-2776 319-626-8216 <etc.> PS. Unless your postscript (in the classical sense) about getting help making an adult film was a pickup line, maybe you could talk to one of Detweiler's neighbors about it... Allen Michael L 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-6855 Allerheiligen Shane & Robin 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-5250 Ambrosino Greg 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-5723 Anderson Michael W 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-696-1057 Armour Lyles 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-743-0933 Auslen James 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-5129 Baker Barbara 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-751-4451 Banks Mark 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-9228 Banner K 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-4587 Barison Joseph 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-743-9661 Becker Michelle 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-0320 Beckler Barbara 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-8793 Belloni Beecky 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-5114 Bennett Tim 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-2903 Berlin T A 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-0541 Berthonnaud Jon 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-751-7496 Biery Timothy 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-755-5589 Bond H M 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-369-5513 Bosworth Lisa 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-743-8447 Budd Edward K 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-752-9749 Chlopek Joanna 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-752-4647 Coleman Warren 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-695-4761 Cormier Keith 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-1783 Cox R 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-5744 Dayton C 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-5281 Dietz Scott 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-6657 Dillon C 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-5495 Donaldson Jennifer 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-7681 Dooley Patricia F 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-5443 Duke Alison 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-7286 Elizondo Arthuro 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-0348 Erfman Jeff 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-755-7570 Farris J 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-696-1283 Faulkner Theresa 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-6341 Fernandes Roland C 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-1650 Fouse Sue 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-0015 Fox J 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-5960 Gaffney Walter R 8525 E Hampden Ave 1513 Denver, CO 80231 303-368-9245 Goodell Brooke 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-755-5765 Graham Calvin 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-5853 Grant Dallas 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-7792 Grosskreutz Vicki 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-1905 Hewett Vern 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-751-5786 Higgins Scott 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-696-8126 Howard W 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-9591 Howe Josh 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-6322 Huggins Scott 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-6627 Hunt Derek 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-755-7306 Hunter Lisa 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-5505 Jackson J C 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-2418 Jensen J A 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-1906 Kiolbasa Mike 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-9216 Klein Misty 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-3986 Leiker Ron 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-9558 Lenard P 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-751-3253 Lopez Jennifer 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-1765 Marinella Michelle D 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-751-3645 Mclane William T 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-6035 Mcqueen Mike 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-7483 Milbrath Jeff 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-7925 Moffit S L 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-369-2964 Murchison Rob 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-368-1260 Nash Jesse H 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-752-1141 Nichols Keith 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-0062 Palesch Mindi 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-5177 Parker L 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-4587 Peterson N C 8525 E Hampden Ave 720 Denver, CO 80231 303-752-4807 Plunkett Lisa A 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-5986 Plybon Jonathan 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-0681 Reynolds Robert 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-3489 Richey Robert 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-9074 Sabourin William & Tasha 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-6005 Sanborn Bruce E 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-752-1838 Schroeder Paul 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-5231 Sears Marc & Denise 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-2958 Shaw R 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-696-7014 Short Maynard P 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-5647 Shriner Christopher S 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-695-0806 Sicles T A 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-5744 Sinks Curt E 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-8118 Smith J H 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-338-5438 Smith Marc G 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-8531 Sorrell Larry W 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-695-4778 States Michael W 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-7416 Steward E C 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-3259 Sullivan K 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-755-9989 Sunburst Apartments 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-750-0124 Terry Robert D 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-745-4287 Triplette J 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-369-7795 Vestal Patrick J 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-671-0245 Whaley Leigh 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-755-1915 White Epsie 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-337-1368 Williams Myrtle M 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-695-1074 Winfield Kurt 8525 E Hampden Ave Denver, CO 80231-4826 303-755-4306 Zullo Marie J 8525 E Hampden Ave 117 Denver, CO 80231 303-368-1057 - ------------- That took about 15 seconds, but I'm a fast typer. YMMV. Hieronymous (*not* one of LD's neighbors) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMNBgWr3g0mNE55u1AQEugwH8DKWGsVXd9tfK97RICTeddGJUuQFFwrP3 WoQXrrxNcvGRQ8bzZ3ANH1FPAAiCt7WB+8OF3MA20H/Ma1XuiU8ljw== =QTb4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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EMF loopholes and [Re: Kocher's RSA attack]
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >A conclusion which might be reached is that smartcards should >in future contain >contain a timer which is started at the beginnin of every cryptographic >operation and a delay loop introduced to ensure that the time taken is always >the same. The alternative of attempting to ensure that equal processing is >spent on each cycle threatens an infinite regress into second and third order >effects, eg frequency of page faults. Covert channel analysis is bad enough >as it is. > I remember the first computer I built had a neat wireless "sound card" built in. The radio waves generated by the processor could be modified by choosing the instructions executed. So you could get sound for your computer games by putting a radion next to the machine! The delay loops for the games contained multiple paths for different sounds. It was actually pretty good for the time. This leads me to believe that a delay loop might not be good enough. The leakage from the smart card could be enough to identify when the card entered the delay loop. The difference between the signal could be significant. Just a thought. -Peter

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Re: e-mail forwarding, for-pay remailers
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com" "Bill Stewart" 14-DEC-1995 03:22:12.75 >There are two different sets of relevant rules in the US - Post Office and state. The PO's primary interest is making sure you don't mind if they don't forward your mail once you stop using the Commercial Mail Receiving Agent (CMRA) and secondarily that you aren't committing fraud by using the mailbox, sending people change-of-address notices, ripping off your creditors, and skipping town. California has a hopelessly dishonest law that just went into effect in 1995, which pretends to be designed to protect consumers from fraud by the 7 million small businesses in CA that uses mailboxes, and actually requires that _anybody_, business or not, who wants to rent a mailbox must fill out the Post Office form and also appoint the PO or CMRA as their agent for service of process and give them up-to-date True Addresses. The PO, meanwhile, "usually wants" a California Driver's License plus another ID to rent a box from them. (I didn't have such a thing when I last rented a box, and the PO hassled my mailbox company into asking for one when the new law came out.) After many attempts at calling the PO to get anybody who knows the _official_ rules for what ID is required, I found a PO lawyer who told me the rules are in the "Domestic Mail Manual", which any Postmaster has, so my next step is to look up one of those before I next get a mailbox. So maybe a random photo ID will work, such as your FooBar Consulting Employee ID, and maybe it won't, depending on what state you live in and how clueless your local Post Office bureaucrats are. ----------------- The more critical question is likely to be what the people at the local MBE/whatever _think_ the rules are. When I last got a box (under my real name, in case anyone's wondering), I seem to recall that they'd accept credit cards. Once one has one box under a given name, this opens up the possibility of getting a secured credit card to make future access easier. However, I believe that they do want at least one form of photo ID; I can't remember just off what their specifications were. -Allen

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RE: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by Robichaux, Paul E 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Another "best way" is to make all calls that you want to be personal with >a cellular phone. Most cellular systems don't send ANI and do not provide >any type of billing information to the phone company. The number is also by >nature unlisted and the only way to get it is by you or the cellular >carrier. If the cellular carrier gives your number out without your >permision or a court order they are in BIG trouble.. Not. As of 12/1/95, the FCC requires all cellular carriers (and IXCs for that matter) to transmit ANI & CLID information, even on cellular calls. BellSouth thoughtfully put a notice in my last two monthly bills, but then again I think the FCC required that too. -Paul -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | perobich(a)ingr.com Intergraph Corporation | http://www.intergraph.com Be a cryptography user. | Not speaking for Intergraph Co-author, "Building Internet Appls With Visual C++", Que Books (0-7897-0213-4)

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[NOISE] Re: Netscape announces position against GAK
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 14 Dec 1995 08:20:46, amp <Alan.Pugh(a)internetMCI.COM> writes (in part): >i'm not entirely satisfied with netscape's response, but then, i >didn't expect to be. i _expect_ weasling from corporations that have >made the 'big time'. this is the way life is i suppose. what i'd like >to see would be more companies that have an interest in the security --snip-- >amp ><0003701548(a)mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) ><alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com> >Current PGP Key = 57957C9D >December 13, 1995 18:51 i cannot fault you too much for not using capitals, since it is a well know fact that network mci charges extra for their use. however, i do believe that your posts might be taken more seriously were they easier to read. maybe it is time to shell out the extra $$ and buy some capital letters. hooker

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:32 PM 12/14/95 -0600, turner(a)TeleCheck.com wrote: > >Just think, with new and improved "interactive TV" you will be able to >get commercials tailored to your purchasing habits (A doctor would get >an commercial for an expensive car, while Joe Sixpacks would get the Ford >Fiestiva). > > I'm doing it now - software.net serves distinct ads to Mac, Windows, Text and Unix based browsers. On the name database side the PO runs somthing called National Change of Address which tracks who moved where and allows direct marketing companys to clean their lists. Almost everybody sells address change data (utilities, the PO, credit companys) - I'm getting tons of "welcome to the neighbourhood" mail since I moved. John Pettitt jpp(a)software.net "why not, and who said so?"

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:32 PM 12/14/95 -0600, you wrote: >sandfort(a)crl.com said: >> Something of privacy interest happened to me yesterday. I phoned a >> company to ask for a copy of their catalog. The phone clerk asked >> for my last name and zip code. After receiving that info, the clerk >> asked me, "Is this your full name and address?" and then gave them >> both correctly. I was taken aback. > > Taken aback? Its only going to get worse in the future. As Telcos, credit >card companies, etc., start looking for new ways to make money I think >selling information about you will increase dramatically. I'm in the process of moving and getting new phones, and Pac Bell asked me if it was ok to send my Social Security Number to my long-distance carrier. I told them "no, but you don't have my SSN anyway" "Oh, you're right, we don't; can we have it" "No" "OK. Would you be willing to give us your driver's license number or another form of ID? We've just started asking for this recently." "Is it required?" "No, it's optional, but I have to ask" "No, thanks" Sounds like you're right about them getting into the info-selling business. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: Jim Quinn interview of James Norman
by Ed Carp (ecarp＠netcom.com) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 09:49:56 -0800 > From: Martin Janzen <janzen(a)idacom.hp.com> > To: ecarp(a)netcom.com > Subject: Re: Jim Quinn interview of James Norman > > This is the third time you've cross-posted this long and completely > irrelevant message to Cypherpunks. Please stop it! No, sorry, I only ACCIDENTALLY cross-posted it *ONCE*. Any other posts you are seeing are NOT MY DOING.

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Potential defense against timing attack on Diffie-Hellman
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The timing attack on Diffie-Hellman depends on assumptions about what multiplications are being made, and in what order. But you don't need to do them in order. The standard approach to calculating Y**x mod m is to calculate Y[1] = Y, Y[2] = Y**2, Y[3] = Y**4, .... Y[logx] = Y**(logx), and while you're doing this keep a running total r[i], where r[i] = (bit[x,i]) ? (r[i-1]*Y[i]) : r[i-1] all arithmetic modulo m (and all indices possibly off by one :-) This may be a bit memory-intensive for a smartcard, but there's no need to calculate these partial products in order; precompute the Y[i], pick a random permutation of 1..(logx), and compute the partial products in that order. This still leaks the number of 0 and 1 bits in x, but it doesn't say what they are. You probably still should multiply r[i-1]*Y[i] whether you're going to need it or not; I don't think the method hides enough information otherwise, but that needs more analysis. Cost - mostly administrative, plus the memory, since keeping track of permutations of small integers is cheap relative to bignum multiplication and modulo calculations. You also need a random number generator of some sort; LFSRs seem to be an easy way to do permutations on the fly, so seed them with something decent. How effective is it? I'm not sure - I'd need to do a lot more analysis than I've done so far, and the long version of Paul's paper would help :-) But at first glance it looks like it makes it much harder; no two calculations are in the same order, so feeding the system related Y = g**y mod m each time doesn't tell you much. As a further annoyance to the listener, split the permutation at random into two or three pieces, compute their products separately, and then multiply those partial products together. (Don't try this at home without analyzing whether it may leak more information than it conceals...) At very minimum, take two numbers you've got lying around and multiply them every once in a while :-) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: e-mail forwarding, for-pay remailers
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich Graves wrote: [ about AOL ] > >They didn't check it very thoroughly last week. I think they just do some >kind of checksum or maybe an assigned-numbers list lookup; it's too fast >to be anything else. It takes 6 seconds to to pre approve a card for $1 and do an AVS (Address Verification). If you don't have a dedicated line to your accepting bank it takes ~25 secods with the dial up. Well within the time it take AOL to validate an account. John Pettitt, jpp(a)software.net VP Engineering, CyberSource Corporation, 415 473 3065 Favorite quote: "Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of man as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than outright exposure. Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing." - Helen Keller

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The best way to circumvent something like the below occurring is to have your home phone number listed under a pseudonym with no street address listed - and block out *69 and caller-id. If some entity wants your phone number, give them your business number. >>Something of privacy interest happened to me yesterday. I phoned >>a company to ask for a copy of their catalog. The phone clerk >>asked for my last name and zip code. After receiving that info, >>the clerk asked me, "Is this your full name and address?" and >>then gave them both correctly. I was taken aback. >>Does anyone know how this trick was done? > > What trick? For ~$150, you can buy a CD-ROM-set DB with every listed >>phone number in the U.S. on it, faxes too; > ******************************************************* Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; E-mail: | - Survive; lharrison(a)mhv.net | - Go to bed." *******************************************************

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Thu, 14 Dec 1995, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >> Yeah, maybe, but my original question was, "does anyone KNOW how >> the trick was done? ^^^^ Sandy, The phone companies sold the information as soon as you moved. ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ It's called the Blue Book, any library has one for your area. Welcome Wagons and the like buy them. You can buy lists by address, sequential phone #'s, types of services people order, etc. A recent real-life example is this: I ordered caller-id on my phone in Nov. I already have had three direct mailings for security devices. It is assumed by being a girl, and ordering caller ID I am in fear. -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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And the standard continues to lower...
by The user formerly known as Leslie Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- If the misuse of "One Time Pad" wasn't enough for ya, check out this ad that I was e-mailed. And the chair of a CS department, no less. - ------- start of forwarded message (RFC 934 encapsulation) ------- Subject: Secure No-overhead Online Order System for Publishers Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 12:24:03 -0800 (PST) A secure no-overhead online title-ordering system is now available. It may be viewed in operation at the home page for Blue Water Publishing, a publisher, software developer and distribution company, at http://www.bluewaterp.com/~bcrissey/ or from the online bookstore area of ISCNI, the Institute for the Study of Contact with Non-Human Intelligence at http://www.iscni.com Blue Water's innovative online ordering system is called SimplySafe. It is a needle-in-the-haystack approach to online security. It requires no encryption or secure servers, yet the probability that a dedicated hacker scanning 100 internet messages a second will intercept a usable credit card number sent via SimplySafe is less than the probability of picking our Sun out of the Milky Way. That is less than 1 in 200 billion. Safe enough for most folks. There are easier ways for a hacker to pick up credit card numbers than to waste time with SimplySafe transactions. Try it out! SimplySafe currently supports secure online orders from Blue Water Publishing, Wild Flower Press, Swan-Raven & Co., and ISCNI. Direct inquiries to SimpleSafe(a)aol.com ***Dr. Brian L. Crissey, Chair CS Dpt, Linfield Col., McMinnville, OR 97128 (503)-434-2426 brianc(a)linfield.edu Professionals built the Titanic, amateurs built the Ark... - ------- end ------- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMM9LGSoZzwIn1bdtAQEtqwGAnH6mMxeUPhVn/js6zJKocvMwKnN5+VHv 95Zwe2qL3cZOycluLA4Qxl20buL8PApy =VS5o -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Secured RM ? (source) (bounce-fwd)
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From MAILER-DAEMON Thu Dec 14 21:05:20 1995 > > ----- Transcript of session follows ----- > 550 hellspawn.gate.net (tcp)... 550 Host unknown > 554 <root(a)HellSpawn.gate.net>... 550 Host unknown (Authoritative answer from name server) > > ----- Unsent message follows ----- > Subject: Re: Secured RM ? (source) > To: root(a)HellSpawn.gate.net (root) > > Have you considered using "pgp -w filename" ? It doesn't take wildcards, > but that's arguably a feature :) -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

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PAY-OFF TIME FOR BUG-BUSTERS, NETSCAPE PLEDGES "DOGFIGHT"
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Fri, 15 Dec 1995, Alice de 'nonymous wrote: > Can anyone tell me whether Ian Goldberg and David Wagner got their $25,000 > from Netscape for finding the HUGE security flaws in Netscape's existing > product line?? > > Alice de 'nonymous ... <an455120(a)anon.penet.fi> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Heh, hey Alice, you know this discussion a short time ago where you claimed that you wouldn't use PGP for signing because it wasn't secure or something, what's with the use of the penet address? Surely a penet address offers even less protection for your id? Or have you done something nifty like create the penet address with a nymserver address? (the real) Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMNHFeIbu8OQjKS7RAQFsmAP/SKKz7XCVmTxUQhLL+IEQaleMaTgp+rCO GAsCDcESY6DBDd3NLR07fkNxZufGxyTFqOeL8SFlH5fMGYvwuLrytLwc9guqkr5I aAXiq+hz13GHhoCkr0SnK+ti1M8ERj8EwTvyUWHnUy4b3Nb4K8oD0OzgZwcHVMkP jvdsCUnQQfo= =z2td -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[NOISE] The Enquirer
by Mr. Boffo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THE CYPHERPUNK ENQUIRER "Encyphering minds want to know." The Podunk, Idaho Cypherpunks chapter held its annual meeting this past weekend at Buffalo Jim's Bar and Grill, where the sole attending member, Frank Semalo, was promptly arrested by local authorities for wearing a "munitions" T-shirt. He was released the next morning when the NSA confirmed that the T-shirt was probably legal to wear in Podunk as long as Mr. Semalo did not enter the local Mexican or Chinese restaurants. By a 17-13 vote today, the Remailer Operators Association decided to start sending out ALL anonymous remailer e-mail with a header entry of: From: Alice de 'nonymous. Surgeons at Netscape Communications successfully removed Jim Clark's foot from his mouth today. The foot was reported to be doing fine, but a little wrinkled and in need of a good pedicure. Company spokespersons reported that the reason the foot was in there so long was that Mr. Clark was in Washington, D.C. discussing the future of government regulation of the Internet with 'top government officials', and could not return to Mountain View for surgery until recently. In related medical news, proctologists at Bethesda Naval Hospital reported that Louis Freeh's head was still firmly stuck. Spam of the month: Friend The International Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals announced today that it was investigating the Blue Wave Corporation to determine if any of the snakes were harmed or killed in the production of its signature product, SimplySafe. Just a coincidence? Immediately after Tim May announces that he will not be discussing Netscape anymore because he's making some financial plays on the stock (hinting that he's probably shorting it), it drops 30 points?

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by andr0id＠midwest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The best way to circumvent something like the below occurring is to have >your home phone number listed under a pseudonym with no street address listed - >and block out *69 and caller-id. If some entity wants your phone number, >give them your business number. Another "best way" is to make all calls that you want to be personal with a cellular phone. Most cellular systems don't send ANI and do not provide any type of billing information to the phone company. The number is also by nature unlisted and the only way to get it is by you or the cellular carrier. If the cellular carrier gives your number out without your permision or a court order they are in BIG trouble..

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