December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Unofficial transcript of Bernstein hearing published
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EFF has published an unofficial transcript of the hearing in front of three judges at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco on December 8. The hearing discussed whether the export controls on cryptography are an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication. See http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/Legal/ There is no news on the judges' decision from that hearing. John Gilmore Electronic Frontier Foundation

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Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Since documents placed on eternity by specification last forever (assuming, > of course, that > eternity will too) and assuming that computational power and cryptanalysis > will always > get better (say for arguments sake that moore's law continues to be held) - > doesn't that > mean that it will be feasible (in time) to break all eternity documents? :) Documents by specification last only as long as someone is willing to pay to keep them up. This is not necessarily forever. Once your DBC escrow "account" runs out, the data is worthless -- someone could then choose to store it on their own, and potentially charge others for this in a recursive model, but there is no reason why a piece of data must remain in Eternity forever if no one cares enough about it to pay to have it stored. > > Of course "in time" may very well be a very long (or astronomical) time, > but dependent on the crypto > used who knows what rate "feasible" breaking of a particular algorithm > might progress at, say > in d(key length)/d(year)? Can we assume that using Moore's law this is at > least 1 bit every > 18 months for symmetric crypto? Perhaps we might see this relationship > through the RSA challenges > over time. I am designing Eternity DDS with IDEA/3DES/Blowfish level private-key crypto and an equivalent level of DH/RSA public key crypto. These will be strong (provided back door attacks, fundamental breakthroughs in cryptography, etc. are not made...a bet I'm forced to make, even though I don't like it) well into the future. How far? I think unless Quantum Cryptanalysis becomes a reality, the underlying hard problems will not be solved through anything but a fundamental change in mathematics. As Prof. Micali said, "Gauss (Karl Friedrich Gauss, the reknowned mathematician/physicist/general smart guy) worked on these problems. The test of whether a problem is sufficiently hard to be a basis for a cryptosystem is if Gauss tried to solve it and failed." or something similar. > > [If Wiener's $1m DES machine in '93 took 7 hours, in today's technology $1m > in 1998 dollars should > be able to do this in less than 100 minutes, shouldn't it?] I don't think anyone would argue that 56bit is secure enough for anything but ephermeal channel authentication. I'd make the same argument for 64bit -- if you had a purpose-built machine with an intelligent key distribution system, a well nigh unlimited budget (read: US Military), and PE's which contained either ultrahigh performance GaAs logic or massively parallel on a single chip silicon logic, you could probably brute force a 64bit algorithm. Do the math, though, for 128bit. There are traditional analyses which include the amount of silicon on the earth, the number of atoms in the universe, etc. The general consensus is that traditional techniques are not feasible for brute forcing 128bit ciphers before the heat death of the universe. > > Since documents cannot be retracted or re-encrypted you really have to > assume that someday they > will be broken. This really turns the notion of what crypto to use for > encrypting eternity documents > into an upfront question of "how long do I want this information to be > secure?". 20 years? 50 years? > 100 years? > > matt Actually, Eternity is no different than emailing a file, given a SIGINT capability at the attacker which allows all internet traffic to be monitored. If the data is still relevant and worth breaking in 50 years, they could just intercept the encrypted email, store it in a government vault for 50 years, then attack it (even more amusingly, they could simply post it to Eternity themselves, encrypted with their own key :), a true turn about). If you do not postulate that level of signals collection capability on the part of the attacker, yeah, Eternity is a bit different than email. But I think that would be an unreasonable model of the attacker. - -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNMISuKwefxtEUY69AQFB1Qf9GWDn6bwhWyJcDY0Liypo21ntpH5yzORu RXwkPSI8pbmqhVZAVGXC1WbcqY0pYn7vPRFq5AKszFsjpTOOYiHwsugmVKjrxVww GRKSBqn308aAjMogNtPwEfohJrQxOED/Hy7ykV6gHV76pUFoMazQ4OdUL2iM1hLF cCMzwtpfJM5eWvyLeQcQq307998epJ9hF1e3Sn4v6ZKEPIlr0yqr5tvM7/XWxC2s 6t82EUPmOZIbn75QQqLBIFK5MlOLuvalFr0xR3u7fYltOczAMC23hx7Tjk65e9a4 6XSeEXyMp2j2GWqcE5lUZp4OnewZvSoFhEj0rDo5PEN9ce0mJEKMow== =7IBY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[horrible line wraps btw. 100 chars to the line! I reformatted.] Matt Barrie writes: > Since documents cannot be retracted or re-encrypted you really have > to assume that someday they will be broken. This really turns the > notion of what crypto to use for encrypting eternity documents into > an upfront question of "how long do I want this information to be > secure?". 20 years? 50 years? 100 years? There are 3 distinct threats. 1. communications crypto used by the author in submitting the document is broken 2. the eternity architecture contains encrypted documents to frustrate attempts to locate documents, and to hide the contents of documents from individual servers 3. communications crypto used to request and deliver documents is broken thus revealing the readers identity For threat 1. the attacker needs archives of old communications which could potentially be eternity submissions. (I say potentially because they could be steganographically encoded). It is probably reasonable to assume that the NSA has a full historic archive of USENET. Also it is probably reasonable to assume they have a historic archive of all inter remailer traffic. For threat 2. it seems feasible to upgrade this security over time, in that documents could be super encrypted with newer ciphers when vulnerabilities are found in older ciphers. No protection for historic access requests, but at least we can adapt to protect new requests. For threat 3. again newer ciphers can be used as attacks are found. So it is useful to design upgrade paths for ciphers into the protocols where possible. Other approaches we could take are to use very conservative cipher key sizes and protocols combining multiple ciphers in ways which gives us the security of the best of the ciphers. For example: R = random, C = 5DES( R ) || blowfish-484( M xor R ) Where 5DES is say E-D-E-D-E with 5 independent DES keys. Constructs to combine in strong ways hash functions, macs, symmetric and asymmetric ciphers would be useful. Is there much research in this area? Adam

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Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium > Date: Sun, 18 Jan 1998 09:33:30 EST > From: Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)mit.edu> > Documents by specification last only as long as someone is willing to pay > to keep them up. This is not necessarily forever. Admiral Hopper used to give a talk about the worth of data and she had a very nice chart that would demonstrate the worth of data over time. Initialy it is worth a lot because it is hard to reproduce, obtain, or distribute. As time goes on it becomes less and less important. In her particular context it was related to the economic decision of when to move data offline in large database applications. > Once your DBC escrow > "account" runs out, the data is worthless That's a jump of logic. The data may infact be quite popular even though you don't offer it anymore (might even do this in order to increase its worth, say some sort of insider trader newsletter). It's probably not in the best interest of the data haven model to speculate on exactly why a particular source decides to quit sourcing. > remain in Eternity forever if no one cares enough about it to pay to > have it stored. Then again, if it was really important I might intentionaly want to attack the ability to provide long-term income. A better model might be to charge for the access and let the actual submission be no charge. A portion of the retrieval charge could then be piped back to the source. Consider the case of say nuclear or biological information for a weapon. That sort of data would be accessed only infrequently (unless you're giving something this expensive to obtain and verify away - a d-h operator error, no.) but should be quite expensive to retrieve. > If the data is still relevant and worth breaking in 50 years, they could > just intercept the encrypted email, store it in a government vault for > 50 years, More realisticaly they would have somebody just add it to a batch job and let the spare cycles of the machines crank away at it. Or perhaps set up a key challenge and get people all over the world to work on it in their spare cycles. Who knows, perhaps the source of the data woudl be intriqued enough to provide spare cycles unknowingly. > If you do not postulate that level of signals collection capability on the It's not just their sig-int capability but their complete processing resource capability that must be considered as well as their psychological motivation. Granted, all of these are extremely difficult to measure let alone verify. Perhaps a little paranoia might be a good thing. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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diplomacy
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sure hope the following was diplomatic enough. NSA exhibited NO SENSE OF HUMOR when I pointed out 'deficiencies' in its crypto algorithm work. But, too, the agrieve Islamic fundamentalists may not have too good senses of humor. But with that experience, my sensitivities are hightened. Later, guys. Back to POSTCARD COMMUNICATIONS! Sunday 1/18/98 6:24 AM Jim Allen Thanks for the call on Friday night. You said that there might be a problem in the way the interrupts were turned on. I told you I would give this some thought. Here is the routine to turn on the interrupts ;* Call DasIntOn(IoPointer&, ErrorFlag&, SystemState&, IoData&(0, 0), ;* IoParm&(0, 0), LgradThres) from Visual Basic. DasIntOn PROTO FAR, VBIoPointer:dword, VBErrorFlag:dword, VBSystemState:dword, VBIoData:dword, VBIoParm:dword, VBLGradThres:dword DasIntOn PROC FAR EXPORT, VBIoPointer:dword, VBErrorFlag:dword, VBSystemState:dword, VBIoData:dword, VBIoParm:dword, VBLGradThres:dword Prolog ;* Stage 1 Get addresses of IOPointer, ErrorFlag, SystemState, ;* IoData, IoParm, LGradThres which point back into VB static array. mov eax, VBIoPointer ; get VB IoPointer address mov IoPointer, eax ; move it to asm mov eax, VBErrorFlag ; get VB ErrorFlag address mov ErrorFlag, eax ; mov it to asm mov eax, VBSystemState ; get VB SystemState address mov SystemState, eax ; move it to asm mov eax, VBIoData ; get VB IoData address mov IoData, eax ; move it to asm mov eax, VBIoParm ; get VB IoParm address mov IoParm, eax ; move it to asm mov eax, VBLGradThres ; get VB LGradThres address mov LGradThres, eax ; move it to asm ;* Stage 2 zero the interrupt counter and system state mov IntCount, 0 mov LocalSysState, 0 ;* Stage 3 install dummy interrupt vector call SetDummyIntVector ; Set dummy IrqLevel interrupt ;* Stage 4 make sure interrupt is masked on the das board call DisableDasInt ;* Stage 5 Set up Irq level in bits 4-6 of register 9 call SetDasIrqLevel ;* Stage 6 set up counter 0 with number of rows AND enable ;* hardware trigger. This is done in Counter0SetUp. call Counter0SetUp ;* Stage 7 Enable interrupt on 8259a call EnableIrqMask ;* Stage 8 Set Irq 5 highest prority in 8259a - didn't seem to ;* make any difference in performance ; call Irg5HighestPriority ;* Stage 9 Burst length set-up call EnableDasBurstMode ;* Stage 10 - clear fifo call InitDasFifo ; read and discard 256 fifo words ;* Stage 11 Set application interrupt vector call SetDasIntVector ; Set IrqLevel interrupt vector ;* Stage 12 Set LocalIop to DataRows - 1. MOV ax, DataRows - 1 ; set LocalIop = DataRows mov LocalIop, ax ; les bx, IoPointer ; get address IoPointer% mov es:[bx], ax ; also set VB IoPointer% = 0 ;* Stage 13 Set hardware trigger call SetHardwareTrigger ;* Stage 14 Clear flip-flop on Pin 25 call ClearDasPin25 ;* Stage 15 Enable interrupt on das board call EnableDasInt Epilog ret 24 DasIntOn ENDP This got a bit complicated. The ComputerBoard clone of the Keithly-Metrabyte a/d converter powers-up in an UNKNOWN state. Or at least partially UNKNOWN. One of the random states includes triggering spurious interrupt. So a dummy handler had to be inserted to possibly field bad data. The attempt was made to interface directly to hardware without a microcontoller buffer was partially successful. Sampling at the 1 Khz rate revealed that Windows occasionally did its own thing as a result of a task switch and, therfore, interrupts were missed. To detect when this happened we modified the ComputerBoards das 1400 board so that a hardware count of interrupts received could be compared to the software count. Since the a/d values were buffered a FIFO, the FAST Pentium could catch up. But this caused the interrupt handler to increase in size from about 1 K lines, including white space and comments, to 2 K lines. Naturally we wish to be in the problem solving, as opposed to problem creating, or assignation of blame. I think we have to consider all possible problem sources. I am looking at the AC POWER INTERFACE LS SOV Schematic dated 11-8-96. I see that the power to the analog and digital cards was run via a serial port db 25 cable and connector. Pin assignment are Pin Function 1 -15 G 2 +15 GS 3 +5 G 4 +15 G 5 5 GS 6 tied to pin 7 7 +15S 8 15 S 9 5 10 tied to pin 10 11 +15 12 tied to pin 11 13 15 S 14 tied to pin 1 15 +5 GS 16 tied to pin 3 17 nc 18 tied to pin 5 19 +24 ground 20 tied to pin 19 21 +5 S 22 tied to pin 9 23 tied to pin 22 24 +24 volts 25 tied to pin 24 The +24 volts runs to solenoids. The remaining power runs to both digital and analog Ics. While some are left wondering why engineers had not thought of running analog, digital and solenoid power down an inexpensive 24 pin PC serial port cable before, perhaps, we might all guess, other engineers lack sufficient innovative audacity. One engineer opined last summer, when I was working in the shop on the digital FX, that the PC Data System boards may have to be redesigned. Lets hope that such a major revision is not required. Naturally, me being a TOTAL CONSERVATIVE [as evidenced by Morales and my genocide court filing], I plan to physically separate the analog and digital IC s on the digital FX. And I am thinking about on-board power regulation to keep the 80c32, analog, and digital chips super-happy. In the field, of course. I will leave in several hours. In my grey rabbit. Air travel safety worries me more now. Especially after publication of last book. Just in case, I will bring my passport. The thought of two machines located 180 miles NW of Edmonton not working well is, of course, chilling. I sure glad the 8051 version of PC Data System is working fairly well. And is MAKING money for Metriguard. See you on Tuesday, Allah willing. Later bill Title: Payne/Morales v. NSA -- Defendant's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment 16 January 1998 Source: William H. Payne See related files: http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney District of New Mexico __________________________________________________________ Post Office Box 607 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103 505/766-3341 505/766-2868 FAX 505/766-8517 January 5, 1998 W.H. Payne P.O. Box 14838 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87191 Re: Payne & Morales v. Minihan USDC NM CIV 97-0266 SC/DJS Dear Mr. Payne: Enclosed is a court-endorsed copy of Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Evidence from Admissions. Sincerely, JOHN J. KELLY United States Attorney [Signature] JAN ELIZABETH MITCHELL Assistant U. S. Attorney JEM/yh Enclosure cc/enc: Arthur R. Morales [Stamp] FILED United States District Court District of New Mexico 98 JAN -5 PM 3:46 Robert M. Marsh District Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO WILLIAM H. PAYNE ) ARTHUR R. MORALES ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) CIVIL NO. 97-026 SC/DJS ) LT GEN KENNETH A. MINIHAN ) USAF Director, National Security ) Agency, ) ) Defendant. DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS Defendant Minihan responds to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Based On Evidence From Admissions1 as follows: 1. Commencing in October, 1997, Plaintiffs served numerous sets of Requests for Admissions on various employees of the National Security Agency and on current and past employees of the Sandia National Laboratory. 2. Counsel for Defendant was not served with copies of any of said Requests for Admissions until sometime after the individuals had been served.2 ____________________ 1 It should be noted that the instant Motion for Summary Judgment constitutes Plaintiffs' second motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed an initial Motion for Summary Judgment on June 4, 1997 to which Defendant responded on June 19, 1997, and Plaintiffs filed a Reply on July 1, 1997. Said initial Motion for Summary Judgment has not been ruled upon. In addition, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Arthur R. Morales on September 23, 1997, and a Motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff William Payne's Freedom of Information Act action on October 3, 1997. All briefing by all parties has been completed on those Motions. 2 On October 13, 1997, Plaintiffs mailed a First Set of Admissions to Kenneth Minihan. However, not until November 3, 1997, did Plaintiffs mail a copy of said First Set of Request for 3. Upon becoming aware that Plaintiffs had served Requests for Admissions on a number of individuals, on October 23, 1997, Counsel for Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum To Strike Any And All Of Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests For Admissions To Various Employees Of The National Security Agency And To Various Employees Of Sandia National Laboratory, (hereinafter "Motion and Memorandum.") 4. As grounds for the Motion and Memorandum, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs had blatantly disregarded this Court's Order pertaining to the conduct of discovery and the deadline for discovery in this Freedom of Information Act action. 5. In Defendant's Motion and Memorandum, Counsel for Defendant also objected to Plaintiffs' sua sponte decision to modify the Court's June 11 Order to reflect the delay of the Court's October 7 Order and the establishment, without leave of this Court, of new deadlines for discovery, motions practice, and the filing of the PreTrial Order. (Motion and Memorandum ¶ 9, at 4.) 6. In the Motion and Memorandum, Defendant requested that this Court strike any and all "First Set of Request for Admission" propounded by Plaintiffs. (Motion and Memorandum, at 5.) 7. Plaintiffs responded to the Motion and Memorandum on November 5, 1997, specifically seeking that this Court "take no action in this case until Supreme court takes action on writs on ____________________ Admissions to Counsel for Defendant. Counsel for Defendant was not provided with copies of any other Requests for Admissions sent to employees of NSA or employees of the Sandia National Laboratory. 2 mandamus, prohibition, and criminal complaint affidavits filed against judges Svet and Campos and US Attorney Mitchell." (Plaintiffs' Response to Motion And Memorandum To Strike Any And All Of Plaintiffs' First Set Of Request For Admissions To Various Employees Of The National Security Agency And To Various Employees Of Sandia National Laboratories, ¶ 11, at 10.) 8. To date, no order has been issued by this Court on the matters raised in the Motion and Memorandum, nor has any other court issued any orders concerning Plaintiffs' cause of action and various complaints. 9. By their own request, Plaintiffs sought to stay a ruling on the Defendant's Motion and Memorandum. Absent any ruling on either the Motion and Memorandum or Plaintiffs' Response, Defendant Minihan, employees of NSA, and employees of Sandia National Laboratory, were not obligated to respond to the Requests for Admissions as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 36.3 For Plaintiffs to now assert in their "Motion for Summary Judgment On Based On Evidence From Admissions" that because the individuals have not responded to the Requests for Admissions they are deemed admitted, flies in the face of their own prayer to this Court to stay a ruling on the Defendant's Motion to strike the Requests for Admissions until the Supreme Court takes action. ____________________ 3 Despite the fact that Defendant's employees and other individuals are not required to respond to the Requests for Admissions based upon the outstanding pleadings which have yet to be ruled on by this Court, Plaintiffs characterize that all admissions are admitted and then publish those admissions on the Internet. 3 10. Defendant requests that this Court either rule upon Defendant's Motion and Memorandum granting the request to strike the Requests for Admissions, or grant Plaintiffs' request to stay this action pending the issuance of the order sought by Plaintiffs in another forum. Should this Court deny Defendant's Motion and Memorandum, Defendant respectfully requests that the individuals to whom Requests for Admissions are appropriate in this action be given the thirty days to respond to said admissions as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 11. Plaintiffs requested a stay. Absent a ruling from this Court denying their request, they cannot proceed to assert that the Requests for Admissions are deemed admitted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' "Motion For Summary Judgment On Based On Evidence From Admissions" must be denied. Respectfully submitted, JOHN J. KELLY United States Attorney [Signature] JAN ELIZABETH MITCHELL Assistant U.S. Attorney P.O. Box 607 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103 (505) 766-3341 I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing pleading was mailed to PRO SE PLAINTIFFS, this 5th day of January, 1998. [Signature] JAN ELIZABETH MITCHELL Assistant U. S. Attorney 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO William H. Payne ) Arthur R. Morales ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v ) CIV NO 97 0266 ) SC/DJS ) Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF ) Director, National Security Agency ) National Security Agency ) ) Defendant ) REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS 1 COMES NOW plaintiffs Payne [Payne] and Morales [Morales] [Plaintiffs], pro se litigants to exercise their rights guaranteed under the Constitution, Rules of Civil Procedure, and Local Civil Rules to respond to Defendant's MOTION filed on 98 JAN-5 within the 14 days allowed by local rule 7.3(b)(4). 2 US Attorney Mitchell [Mitchell] writes, Counsel for Defendant was not served with copies of any of said Requests for Admissions until sometime after the individuals had been served.2 Mitchell WAS SERVED PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR ADMISSION TO NSA DIRECTOR KENNETH MINIHAN I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing request for admissions was mailed to Jan Elizabeth Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday November 3, 1997. Michell was not served with any other admissions since Mitchell is not representing others. Plaintiffs' served Defendant Minihan properly. And Minihan failed to respond to Minihan's admissions within the time allotted by law. 3 US Attorney Mitchell writes, As grounds for the Motion and Memorandum, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs had blatantly disregarded this Court's Order pertaining to the conduct of discovery and the deadline for discovery in this Freedom of Information Act action. Judges Svet and Campos willfully violated Plaintiffs' right to Discovery. And thereby earned criminal complaint affidavits filed with judge Scalia of the Supreme Court. 4 US Attorney Mitchell writes, In Defendant's Motion and Memorandum, Counsel for Defendant also objected to Plaintiffs' sua sponte decision to modify the Court's June 11 Order to reflect the delay of the Court's October 7 Order and the establishment, without leave of this Court, of new deadlines for discovery, motions practice, and the filing of the PreTrial Order. (Motion and Memorandum 9, at 4.) Judge Svet and Campos attempt to deny Plaintiffs' right to Discovery, again, earned Svet and Campos criminal complaint affidavits. Plaintiffs exercise their right under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Constitution to conduct Discovery WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT! 5 US Attorney Mitchell writes, By their own request, Plaintiffs sought to stay a ruling on the Defendant's Motion and Memorandum. Absent any ruling on either the Motion and Memorandum or Plaintiffs' Response, Defendant Minihan, employees of NSA, and employees of Sandia National Laboratory, were not obligated to respond to the Requests for Admissions as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 36.3 For Plaintiffs to now assert in their "Motion for Summary Judgment On Based On Evidence From Admissions" that because the individuals have not responded to the Requests for Admissions they are deemed admitted, flies in the face of their own prayer to this Court to stay a ruling on the Defendant's Motion to strike the Requests for Admissions until the Supreme Court takes action. Plaintiffs' have REPEATEDLY asked judge Svet and Campos to disqualify themselves from any rulings on this case because Campos and Svet do NOT obey the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Replace judges Svet and Campos because these judges have demonstrated, IN WRITING, they do not follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs' pleas are directed a replacement judge[s]. Not Svet and Campos. Therefore, Svet and Campos' failure to remove themselves does not stop the legal process. Mitchell cites NO law to support her claim that time constraints imposed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 36.3 are inapplicable as a result of Svet's and Campos' failure to remove themselves. 6 US Attorney Mitchell writes, Defendant requests that this Court either rule upon Defendant's Motion and Memorandum granting the request to strike the Requests for Admissions, or grant Plaintiffs' request to stay this action pending the issuance of the order sought by Plaintiffs in another forum. Should this Court deny Defendant's Motion and Memorandum, Defendant respectfully requests that the individuals to whom Requests for Admissions are appropriate in this action be given the thirty days to respond to said admissions as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. REPLACEMENT JUDGES of the Court should realize the outcome of the lawsuit has attained international interest as a result of the 1 bungled NSA spy sting on Iran 2 US government agencies NSA, NIST, and the FBI's attempt to control cryptography. Mitchell's DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS was posted on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome nsasuit8.htm USA/NSA Responds to Payne/Morales Motion January 16, 1998 Importance of this posting is summed-up in the Toronto Sun, Jan. 11, 1998 US, Iran Need Each Other by Eric Margolis Iran launched a surprise charm offensive last week, throwing Washington into serious confusion. In a lengthy interview on CNN, Iran's new president, Mohammad Khatami, skillfully analyzed the bitter relations between the two nations and cautiously extended an olive branch to Washington, calling for an end to their 19-year cold war. Khatami's diplomatic ju-jitsu flummoxed the Clinton administration, which was busy trying to rally international support against Tehran - and to overthrow Iran's elected government. Both capitals are split over the question of relations. In Washington, the military establishment and conservative Republicans have inflated Iran into a bogeyman to justify military budgets and keep U.S. forces in the Mideast. ... America incited Iraq to invade Iran in 1980. They did this to crush the Islamic revolution, then provided massive war aid to Saddam Hussein. Half a million Iranians died. The US got caught involved in genocide. Using high tech. This is one subject of this lawsuit. Albuquerque Journal Tuesday 1/13/98 carried the editorial. Khatami Move Is Profile in Courage Richard Reeves Syndicated Columnist LOS ANGELES - If an American leader had done what Iranian President Mohammed Khatami did last Wednesday, it would have been hailed as a profile in courage. ... Miscalculation! We armed and pampered Saddam Hussein in the hope that Iraq would destroy Iran. Now that's policy and behavior to think about. Here is something to think about: If Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had pursued any kind of sensible policy toward Cuba and Fidel Castro - opposed to the policy of trying to assassinate him - there never would have been a Cuban missile crisis. I think Iranians have financed and encouraged terrorism against the interests of the United States and Israel. I would not be surprised at all if something like proof emerges soon, perhaps anonymously, from the CIA and other government agencies, where many officials have built their careers on sanctioning and isolating Iran, to try to straighten the backbones of the president and people of the United States. If they succeed, America fails. What would be more effective in closing down Iranian terrorism? More hostility, sanctions and charges? Or beginning the process toward more normal relations with a country positioned and born to be great? ... Clearly genocide fits into Now that's policy and behavior to think about. The wired world is watching what this Court, hopefully minus judges Svet and Campos, will do. What is there to be? A series of possibly unfortunate events? Or does this Court order release the lawfully requested documents to help settle this American tragedy? WHEREFORE. 7 Have replacement judges of this Court DENY Mitchell's Plaintiffs requested a stay. Absent a ruling from this Court denying their request, they cannot proceed to assert that the Requests for Admissions are deemed admitted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' "Motion For Summary Judgment On Based On Evidence From Admissions" must be denied. for reason that Mitchell's request to subvert both the Discovery processes and its time limits have no basis in law. And appears to plead to judges who do not obey the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 IMMEDIATELY ORDER Defendant to release the requested documents in the interest of national safety so that this matter can be settled. Aggrieved victims of US genocide are reading these pleadings. Respectfully submitted, _________________________ William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias NE Albuquerque, NM 87111 _________________________ Arthur R. Morales 1024 Los Arboles NW Albuquerque, NM 87107 Pro se litigants CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing memorandum was mailed to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director, National Security Agency, National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 and hand delivered to John J. Kelly, US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Tuesday January 20, 1997. 5 Title: Model 7200 HCLT High Capacity Lumber Tester The Metriguard Model 7200 High Capacity Lumber Tester was introduced in 1993. This machine is now certified by grading agencies in the United States, Canada and UK. Also in use in Japan and Austria. Speed capacity is unknown. We have run tests in excess of 2,000 ft/min, and have not seen any limitations or indications that it would not run faster. We expect this machine to keep up with planer developments and run in the neighborhood of 3,000 ft/min sometime within the next ten years. The machine is available with a number of options, including the recently introduced PC Data System, which adds new capability in marking options, shift reports, and internal error checking. Yet to come in Metriguard's program of continuous improvement are automatic wood temperature compensation, automatic zero tracking, scanner inputs. Please contact Metriguard Sales office for further information about how this machine can improve your lumber grading and mill profits. Return to home page

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*** OFF-SHORE INVESTMENTS ***
by ForInformationVisitUs＠OurWebSite.Now 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Signed document - a thought...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I was pondering the security issues regarding signed documents and key security. It occured to me that in all the discussion it is assumed that the document is transmitted after the key is transmitted. It seems to be that a higher level of security could be obtained by submitting the signed document first and then submit the signing key. This way when the document goes out Mallet has no idea what key to replace and any fudging of the document will destroy the sign. Then when the key goes out if it is replaced the document won't pass testing either since the server already has a unmod'ed copy. In short, instead of having each author have a signing key, have each document have a signature key and always submit the signed document prior to the signing key. After all it's the document and not the author (who we assume is already using an anonymous submission mechanism) we wish to verify from the end users perspective. The mechanims provides a means for the data haven server to verify the authenticity of the document and this allows them to pass that trust on to the end user in the same sort of way. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Eternity - an alternative approach
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Kay Ping) writes: > It occured to me that the equivalent on the net would be to receive > packets with invalid source addresses. They are just there, coming dowm > the phone line to your modem. It takes significant resources and snooping > on a massive scale to locate where they are coming from.. All this is > assuming you can find some way to send a request with your address to the > server. I've looked at this idea for a while. It's great right now once you get away from the first couple of subnets, though. However, I've recently become aware of "IDIP", or "Intruder Detection and Isolation Protocol" through potentially questionable sources (my source is mostly NDA-wary). He assumes it will be implemented by having each router cache IP address, received interface tuples. Then, after the fact, one could go back and track someone router by router. The technical solution to this is to flood a router with forged packets while using it to transfer your own data, overflowing the cache. This presents the problem of being tracked by leaving a cloud of flooded routers in your wake. But it's possible. I get the impression the system is far from deployment, but that it is being worked on is a sign that potentially someone sees the rise in forged source address attacks and wants to curtail it. -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/

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Signed document - a thought... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> > Subject: Signed document - a thought... > Date: Sun, 18 Jan 1998 10:31:36 -0600 (CST) > document have a signature key and always submit the signed document prior > to the signing key. After all it's the document and not the author (who we > assume is already using an anonymous submission mechanism) we wish to verify > from the end users perspective. One other assumption that I left out after I sent it was that the data haven and the key server are not the same machine. Sorry, I hope it makes a tad more sense with that proviso included. Sorry for sending an incomplete suggestion. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium (fwd)
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Jim Choate) writes: > Ryan Lackey writes: > > Once your DBC escrow > > "account" runs out, the data is worthless > > That's a jump of logic. The data may infact be quite popular even though you > don't offer it anymore (might even do this in order to increase its worth, > say some sort of insider trader newsletter). It's probably not in the best > interest of the data haven model to speculate on exactly why a particular > source decides to quit sourcing. True. But in an Eternity model without copyright, someone could be one of the first customers to download the data, then upload it again under a different name. The only thing the original uploader would have as an advantage would be indexing information, potentially -- it's easier for me to download ms word by going to the eternity equivalent of http://www.microsoft.com/ than to go to http://www3.pop3-167.adhoc.warez.location.ai/edf3/filez1.zip. There's no real way to put the genie back into the bottle unless you can send people with guns to beat people up who store your data as a third party. Data disappears from Eternity once no one cares enough about it to pay to have it stored. That could mean someone doesn't pay in advance for the data, or no one is willing to invest disk space in the hope that it will in the future be downloaded. Providing eternity service costs money. Anything which lets users circumvent this opens up the potential for denial of service through consumption of resources attacks. Even if billing is fundamental, you still have the potential for the NSA to spend $100m to buy all the eternity space available at any point. This is why you also need market mechanisms -- if the NSA is willing to pay a premium for eternity service just to keep it out of the hands of the populace, then running eternity servers is a great investment, so capacity will increase until the NSA can no longer afford to buy all of it. A difficult part of designing a working Eternity service is to keep people from "stealing service", in terms of consumption of resources, during set up, indexing, etc. Basically, you need to make sure that to the greatest extent possible, anything which is a potentially scarce resource is sold, not given away. > > > remain in Eternity forever if no one cares enough about it to pay to > > have it stored. > > Then again, if it was really important I might intentionaly want to attack > the ability to provide long-term income. A better model might be to charge > for the access and let the actual submission be no charge. A portion of the > retrieval charge could then be piped back to the source. Consider the case > of say nuclear or biological information for a weapon. That sort of data > would be accessed only infrequently (unless you're giving something this > expensive to obtain and verify away - a d-h operator error, no.) but should > be quite expensive to retrieve. You then are vulnerable to someone spamming the system, unless you give the server operator some way of knowing if this encrypted data is likely to be valuable. I think both payment models should coexist. But there's no reason that the server operators are the only people able to speculate -- it could be just another random user. You can have arbitrarily complex payment models, since the enforcement agents can exist (must exist?) as eternity objects in their own right. > > > If the data is still relevant and worth breaking in 50 years, they could > > just intercept the encrypted email, store it in a government vault for > > 50 years, > > More realisticaly they would have somebody just add it to a batch job and > let the spare cycles of the machines crank away at it. Or perhaps set up a > key challenge and get people all over the world to work on it in their spare > cycles. Who knows, perhaps the source of the data woudl be intriqued enough > to provide spare cycles unknowingly. No, the most feasible attacks for a resourced attacker are custom ASICs optimized for key testing, as were recently described. Distributed workstation cracking is a parlor trick if you have a billion dollar budget for key cracking. The NSA has general purpose HPC resources for purposes like signal processing, AI, etc., not for brute forcing people's keys routinely (although perhaps for a weak and nonstandard cipher, it would make sense to use general purpose machines). Even a corporation would be better off using FPGAs or ASICs for key cracking once you get past 56 bits. > > > If you do not postulate that level of signals collection capability on the > > It's not just their sig-int capability but their complete processing > resource capability that must be considered as well as their psychological > motivation. Granted, all of these are extremely difficult to measure let > alone verify. Perhaps a little paranoia might be a good thing. I assume the attacker is evil and rational. I also assume that the entire legal system has been subverted, and that extralegal operations of any size too small to make the new york times front page are possible. And, any entity which deals with the government (just about any) can be subverted. Thinking that the major internet gateways between providers are bugged by the NSA isn't really too unreasonable if you accept those assumptions. > > > > ____________________________________________________________________ > | | > | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | > | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | > | | > | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | > | | > | _____ The Armadillo Group | > | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | > | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | > | .', |||| `/( e\ | > | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | > | ravage(a)ssz.com | > | 512-451-7087 | > |____________________________________________________________________| -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/

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Re: Eternity - an alternative approach
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ryan Lackey wrote: >However, I've recently become aware of "IDIP", or "Intruder Detection >and Isolation Protocol" through potentially questionable sources (my >source is mostly NDA-wary). Ryan, Any chance you could get more info on this and pass it along? Or maybe your source could spec it through a remailer if you can persuade that the cutout is truly inviolable. Thanks, John

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Fastest & Easiest way to make money
by 97565462＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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I made merciless fun of her, and was ready to lay the old "I told you so" on her when the thing didn't work... well, the laugh was on me! Within two weeks she had received over 50 responses. Within 45 days she had received over $147,200 in $5 bills! I was shocked! I was sure that I had it all figured and that it wouldn't work. I AM a believer now. I have joined Doris in her "hobby." I did have seven more years until retirement, but I think of the "rat race" and it's not for me. We owe it all to MLM. Frank T., Bel-Air, MD I just want to pass along my best wishes and encouragement to you. Any doubts you have will vanish when your first orders come in. I even checked with the U.S. Post Office to verify that the plan was legal. It definitely is! IT WORKS!!! Paul Johnson, Raleigh, NC The main reason for this letter is to convince you that this system is honest, lawful, extremely profitable, and is a way to get a large amount of money in a short time. I was approached several times before I checked this out. I joined just to see what one could expect in return for the minimal effort and money required. To my astonishment, I received $36,470.00 in the first 14 weeks, with money still coming in. Sincerely yours, Phillip A. Brown, Esq. Not being the gambling type, it took me several weeks to make up my mind to participate in this plan. But conservative that I am, I decided that the initial investment was so little that there was just no way that I wouldn't get enough orders to at least get my money back. Boy, was I surprised when I found my medium-size post office box crammed with orders! For awhile, it got so overloaded that I had to start picking up my mail at the window. I'll make more money this year than any 10 years of my life before. The nice thing about this deal is that it doesn't matter where in the U.S. the people live. There simply isn't a better investment with a faster return. Mary Rockland, Lansing, MI I had received this program before. I deleted it, but later I wondered if I shouldn't have given it a try. Of course, I had no idea who to contact to get another copy, so I had to wait until I was e-mailed another program...11 months passed then it came...I didn't delete this one!...I made more than $41,000 on the first try!! D. Wilburn, Muncie, IN This is my third time to participate in this plan. We have quit our jobs, and will soon buy a home on the beach and live off the interest on our money. The only way on earth that this plan will work for you is if you do it. For your sake, and for your family's sake don't pass up this golden opportunity. Good luck and happy spending! Charles Fairchild, Spokane, WA ORDER YOUR REPORTS TODAY AND GET STARTED ON YOUR ROAD TO GETTING EXTRA CASH DAILY! NOW IS THE TIME FOR YOUR TURN DECISIVE ACTION YIELDS POWERFUL RESULTS

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Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium (fwd) > From: Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)mit.edu> > Date: 18 Jan 1998 12:45:02 -0500 > True. But in an Eternity model without copyright, someone could be one of > the first customers to download the data, then upload it again under a > different name. So in your model there isn't any form of check on the data for redundency? > The only thing the original uploader would have as > an advantage would be indexing information, potentially -- it's easier > for me to download ms word by going to the eternity equivalent of > http://www.microsoft.com/ than to go to > http://www3.pop3-167.adhoc.warez.location.ai/edf3/filez1.zip. Not if it's: http://ww.microsoft.com/software/commercial/wordprocessing/msword/x.y/ \ msword.zip This is a specious point. The fact is that from the users perspective the index would automagicaly provide the actual resting place for the server to find it, even if it were on a different server. The whole point is to make the software do the druggery. The length of the pathname or URL is irrelevant at that point. > There's no real way to put the genie back into the bottle unless you can > send people with guns to beat people up who store your data as a third party. The point being that if we take the average user of a data haven model they don't have the resources (money, technical skill, bandwidth, etc.) to set up a data haven of their own. Further, the storing of the data by other parties isn't the issue, it isn't the data havens data. This is one of the primary reasons that really important data should be expensive to get initialy. It goes back to what I was saying in a previous post about Grace Hoppers worth-v-time model. > Data disappears from Eternity once no one cares enough about it to pay to > have it stored. What this over-looks is the potential for that data to become relevant to some currently unknown situation in the future. While I agree that the data should not necessarily be in a fast medium storage after a certain time period it should not simply be thrown away. If nothing else at some point it will have historical (inexpensive, it's still money) relevance. > Providing eternity service costs money. Life costs money, that is one of the reasons that you don't want to throw stuff away that may bring in income down the road. > Anything which lets users circumvent > this opens up the potential for denial of service through consumption of > resources attacks. There simply isn't a way around that except to out bandwidth the attacker. > Even if billing is fundamental, you still have the > potential for the NSA to spend $100m to buy all the eternity space available > at any point. > This is why you also need market mechanisms > -- if the NSA > is willing to pay a premium for eternity service just to keep it out of > the hands of the populace, then running eternity servers is a great > investment, so capacity will increase until the NSA can no longer afford > to buy all of it. I like it when you write my own rebuttal for me...:) The bottem line is that the market mechanism *is* the willingness of some party to buy that space. Nothing more, nothing less. Further, Mallet ain't stupid or he'd have starved a long time ago. > A difficult part of designing a working Eternity service is to keep people > from "stealing service", in terms of consumption of resources, during > set up, indexing, etc. Basically, you need to make sure that to the > greatest extent possible, anything which is a potentially scarce resource > is sold, not given away. The point is that *nothing* is given away for free, though you might want to let people *give* you resources for free. Which is the point I was making. > You then are vulnerable to someone spamming the system, unless you give > the server operator some way of knowing if this encrypted data is likely > to be valuable. The point is that the system can *always* be spammed. You *don't* charge the source of data a million dollars to put it on your server. It's gotta be source cheap or else it isn't worth their time to bother with it. If you *really* want to promote such servers what you need is a model that allows submitters free access *and* a share in the subscribers fees. Then everyone wins. If the source has something they know is worth god awful sums of money they aren't going to submit it to the data haven anyway, they'll set their own haven up and reap the benefits directly. There is an economic issue here that is at parity with the technical issues. > You can have arbitrarily complex payment models, since the enforcement > agents can exist (must exist?) as eternity objects in their own right. Not really, at some point the complexity works against itself - you should study a little chaos theory. The final point is to make the system (ie the logical linking of black box operations that themselves may be quite technical or complex) dirt simple. > No, the most feasible attacks for a resourced attacker are custom ASICs > optimized for key testing, as were recently described. Distributed > workstation cracking is a parlor trick if you have a billion dollar budget > for key cracking. Tell that to the NSA and their Cray-acres. The point is that even if you have customer ASIC's or FPGA's or whatever these are still computers and you can't seriously be suggesting that the resources to create customer hardware for specific goals is any less complicated or more inexpensive than using general purpose hardware when looked at from a global scale. If that model were so generaly applicable then we should move all our processing jobs to ASIC's and reap the benefits. There is also the issue that even if you use customer chips to develop customer key cracking hardware (which I agree is being done as we speak) there is still the inescapable fact that you will need lots(!) of them. So the result is that whether they are custom or general purpose devices the sheer quantity becomes a hinderance. > The NSA has general purpose HPC resources for purposes like signal processing, > AI, etc., not for brute forcing people's keys routinely (although perhaps for > a weak and nonstandard cipher, it would make sense to use general purpose > machines). Even a corporation would be better off using FPGAs or ASICs for > key cracking once you get past 56 bits. That would depend on the economics of startup and what kind of footprint that would leave in the industry. This is one of the reasons that the NSA builds their own chips. > I assume the attacker is evil and rational. My, my. Moral stipulations are probably no more relevant than psychological classifications. The issue is one of emotion. Mallet wants it because it benefits Mallet and hinders Mallets enemies. This is an emotional reason and most definitely outside the bounds of simple rational/irrational action classification. When I was speaking of psychology earlier in my submissions I was not the least bit implying any comment on rationality, goodness, or other relative classifications. I was refering to greed, pride, honor, self-respect, etc. as motivations. The interactions of those in individuals and organizations doesn't depend on classifications. > I also assume that the > entire legal system has been subverted, and that extralegal operations of > any size too small to make the new york times front page are possible. And, > any entity which deals with the government (just about any) can be subverted. Any government can be subverted as well, happens on a regular basis. The legal system may not need to be subverted for the simple reason that more than one legal system may be involved. The front page example you are so fond of is a instance that would take, my guess, probably in the neighborhood of $10k to have a full page for a single day. To make the participants investment in that sum worth it, what is their pay off in your system? Just having their name in the paper probably isn't worth it. The wide public advertisment, and hence notoriety is probably not a big plus either. Especialy considering that it would guarantee the participant a nice bug-for-life experience. > Thinking that the major internet gateways between providers are bugged by > the NSA isn't really too unreasonable if you accept those assumptions. Whether the providers themselves are bugged are not is really irrelevant, its the backbone infrastructure providers who are providing the access points. You tap the satellite transfer point, for example, not the 300 organizations sending data down it. You tap the telephone switch in each neighborhood, not the individual lines on their subscriber end trunks. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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to Anonymous
by Young iVillian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Right on, man. E-Mail me... I'd like to have a conversation w/ you. Technological takeover... we bring it on ourselves. We have no one to blame.

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Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 18 Jan 1998 12:02:34 -0800 > From: Kent Crispin <kent(a)songbird.com> > Subject: Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium (fwd) > There are alternative ways of paying for the service that do not in > any way depend on ecash, and after thinking about it a bit, they seem > more robust, as well. > > The basic idea is as follows: The fundamental eternity service is > free to readers, and is financed entirely by writers. The writers > supply the disk space, the network bandwidth, and possibly pay for > the software to support all this. It is clear that there are two diametricaly opposed models of payment mechanisms and who those costs should fall on; producers or consumers. I personaly have no faith in systems where the producers bear the burden of the costs since they have no clear mechanism to obtain the funds to finance the enterprise in the first place. Imagine for a moment that a couple of persons come into possession of a set of documents which would cause considerable political embarassment and legal difficulties for a head of the local government. Why should these two individuals pay to have their data dissiminated to anyone who wants it? It certainly isn't going to improve their social, political, or professional standing since the server will anonymize the data. They then have two options, release it themselves and hope for the best (and hence reap the benefit of any economic benefits that might acrue) or do nothing with it. How about information to build man portable atomic bombs? It doesn't make sense to take all those chances and the data haven operators to take the chances when they will get at most the monetary input from a *single* party. It is clear that these resources are clearly inferior to many parties paying to get the data. I guess the question boils down to why the individual operator in running the server in the first place. I assume a priori that the goal of both the submitter and the operator is to make a reliable income from the users of the service since there are clearly many more consumers of information than producers of it. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

4 3

Other c'punk lists?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi are there any other cypherpunk lists? With all due respect this list has a *lot* of noise <g> Perhaps something with- out the anarchy. I enjoy the wild side of this list but I would also like something more targeted. Thanks in advance

3 3

Eureka! Mon Jan 19 '98
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17 Dec '03

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Re: how to release code if the programmer is a target for (fwd)
by Uhh...this is Joe [Randall Farmer] 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Choate said he wouldn't "address" my message if I didn't post it to the list, so...] > > Eternity delivers data. It's up to the user to verify that the data is > > what they want > > > The original question was how to verify the eternity server source code. > > Assume for a moment that as a user of an eternity server the source is the > data I want. Ok... [...] > > * A random user who has the public keys of at least (thresh) number of the > > cypherpunks, optionally the key of the author of the document/product before > > the system becomes questionable, perhaps by looking in the NY Times > > for 1 Jan 1999 which has a full page ad taken out by Cypherpunks Anonymous > > with the PGP public keys for the 100 leading cypherpunks. > > Pretty expensive and rather unrealistic I suspect. The NYT ad? I think that was at least partly a joke (besides, if some cypherpunks did take out an ad, I'd predict propaganda in 2/3 of the page and fine-print PGP-key fingerprints in the rest :). > Where does this random user come from? Why does it matter? As long as she's competent enough to choose good verifiers and verify that those verifiers verified the code in question, it all works out in the end. > What is '(thresh)'? What good would an anonymous key signature provide? Thresh is the number of signatures from trusted people/keys required to trust a section of code, a value set by the user. An anonymous sig would be very little good but I think he was talking about including the author's sig if he's not anonymous. > [...] How do we know that some number of these cypherpunks aren't turned? We don't. There is no way to operate without *some* trust; this reduces it from the code being shown to be secure if the author is not spookized AND The author is capable to check his/her code AND the key he signed it with is good to the code being good if those conditions are true for one (or a few) of the many cypherpunks on the user's trusted list who signed the code. > Are you proposing that the user test all 100 of the signatures? Well, I think he's proposing to have a script check them and the user personally make sure the script is doing what it should. > Which realistica[l]ly is the only way to verify any given one of them. Not > very many people will go to that extreme simply for grins and giggles. > > > * The piece of code to be verified is bloody long, that is, longer than > > any one cypherpunk can afford to verify alone (shooting practice, > > installing the minefields and poison gas sprinkler system, etc. take > > lots of time) Not to mention churning out that propaganda for the NYT ad, becoming tolerant to pepper spray, preparing various fake identities for use, proving Blowfish secure and then breaking it, constructing a doomsday weapon using only a straightedge and compass, etc. > > The standard is programs over ~10k lines is not comprehensible by a single > individual on a line by line basis. Might be, but this code has to be more than just understood -- it must be painstakingly checked for subtle flaws and bugs. Welcome to the world of adversarial quality control. > > > * The user can tell by visual inspection that a small compilation > > system does what they want it to do, and can understand basic logic > > enough to tell what signatures imply. > > 'small compilation system' of what? What who wants it to do? The author? > Mallet? The end user? The C/Java/whatever compiler, I suppose, and also the signature checker, and she's checking that they carry out their stated purposes. ... > > 2) The user wants to run the code, because it's Just That Cool. > > We're talking here about users who want to get data that is illegal or > otherwise incriminating or dangerous to one group or another. In particular > let's consider the situation of a Lebanese freedom fighter in Isreal or > perhaps a 'Free Burma' revolutionary in China. I think the issue was one of users who want to get eternity server source they can trust -- not necessarily getting it *from* Eternity. > > > 3) No one can verify the entire code. So, Cypherpunks begin signing > > small sections of the code with their own previously-established key. > > Their keys are established as their reputation is established on > > the list, or perhaps by personally meeting these people, in the > > traditional PGP web of trust scheme. There is no central Cypherpunks > > Registry, just a decentralized mesh. > > Which doesn't effect the ability of Mallet to resign that code at the users > end in order to break the users local security. Unless you're exposing a new weakness in the trust model PGP uses, Mallet can't do that, providing the user has done good key authentication and hasn't listed one of Mallet's goons as a trusted code-verifier. > > > 4) The user executes the compilation script. > > [material describing script verification deleted] > > Mallet can re-write said script [...] Yup, that's why the user has to check it by hand. Lots easier to check a script and a compiler for doing their functions than to check an eternity server for subtle bugs. > > > I fail to see how the specifics of Eternity are relevant -- it's > > just basically a PGP web of trust issue. The transport is irrelevant -- > > it's untrusted code until it's been verified by people the user > > trusts. > > The end user may not have people available to trust is the point. Well, if you can't verify it yourself and you can't trust other people to verify it, my advice is to give up; you cannot be sure of *any* public keys in that case, so any message you encrypt might be encrypted to one of Mallet's keys; any sig you check might be signed by one of Mallet's keys. > The reason the transport mechanism is relevant is that it is much easier to > spoof a verification script if the user is not going to be surprised with 24 > hour turn around on requests, whereas a responce time measured in minutes > lessens the window of opportunity to Mallet significantly. If Mallet is a NSA spook who's half as good as my hacker buddy Phat Atta and knew about the script ahead of time, the user can't trust the script without verifying it herself, whether it takes milliseconds or millenia to get the response. > > It may come as a surprise to you and others but not everyone in the world > can pick up a phone and call a 100 people all over the world and not raise > some suspicion. Ah, but either I am more mistaken than usual or you only need a few of the signers to be trusted, not all of them. > > > Implementing a keyserver in Eternity has the same issues > > While it is perfectly permissible to design Eternity or any data haven with > inherent key servers, I believe it is a bad idea from a design perspective > because it makes the code even larger, decreases the potential for monetary > motives for indipendant key servers to appear, and if the server is > compromised then the key server is also. Not sure, but I think he's talking about putting up a key server in Eternity (i.e., the rolling hills where data can roam without fear, as opposed to putting it in the Eternity). > It is more expensive if Mallet can be forced to deal with two [independent] > operators then a single monolithic operator. > > [rest deleted] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Randall Farmer rfarmer(a)hiwaay.net http://hiwaay.net/~rfarmer

2 1

Fwd: Internet security (VERY LONG)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Subject: Fwd: Internet security (VERY LONG) Date: Sun, 18 Jan 98 12:34:36 -0500 From: Somebody To: "Robert Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 ---------------- Begin Forwarded Message ---------------- Date: 01/17 3:25 PM Received: 01/17 5:24 PM From: Richard Fairfax, richard_fairfax(a)compuserve.com Reply-To: CSA Talk, csa(a)blueworld.com To: CSA Talk, csa(a)blueworld.com The following forwarded mail may have implications for clients with sensitive data. The field encription features in Troi FM Plug-in could prove to be a valuable asset. Richard Fairfax Oakwood Designs ---forwarded mail START--- From: gp-uk(a)mailbase.ac.uk,Net ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Aus: z-netz.datenschutz.spionage: A GLOBAL electronic spy network that can eavesdrop on every telephone, email and telex communication around the world will be officially acknowledged for the first time in a European Commission report to be delivered this week. The report - Assessing the Technologies of Political Control - was commissioned last year by the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament. It contains details of a network of American-controlled intelligence stations on British soil and around the world, that "routinely and indiscriminately" monitor countless phone, fax and email messages. It states: "Within Europe all email telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the United States National Security Agency transfering all target information from the European mainland via the strategic hub of London then by satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North York moors in the UK." The report confirms for the first time the existence of the secretive ECHELON system. Until now, evidence of such astounding technology has been patchy and anecdotal. But the report - to be discussed on Thursday by the commit- tee of the office of Science and Technology Assessment in Luxembourg - confirms that the citizens of Britain and other European states are subject to an intensity of surveillance far in excess of that imagined by most parliaments. Its findings are certain to excite the concern of MEPs. "The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system (see 'Cooking up a charter for snooping') but unlike many of the electronic spy systems developed during the Cold War, ECHELON is designed primarily for non- military targets: governments, organizations and businesses in vir- tually every country. "The ECHELON system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of communications and then siphoning out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids like MEMEX to find key words". According to the report, ECHELON uses a number of national dictionaries containing key words of interest to each country. For more than a decade, former agents of US, British, Canadian and New Zealand national security agencies have claimed that the monitoring of electronic communications has become endemic throughout the world. Rumours have circulated that new technologies have been developed which have the capability to search most of the world's telex, fax and email networks for "key words". Phone calls, they claim, can be automatically analysed for key words. Former signals intelligence operatives have claimed that spy bases controlled by America have the ability to search nearly all data communications for key words. They claim that ECHELON automatically analyses most email messaging for "precursor" data which assists in- telligence agencies to determine targets. According to former Canadian Security Establishment agent Mike Frost, a voice recognition system called Oratory has been used for some years to intercept diplomatic calls. The driving force behind the report is Glyn Ford, Labour MEP for Greater Manchester East. He believes that the report is crucial to the future of civil liberties in Europe. "In the civil liberties committee we spend a great deal of time debating issues such as free movement, immigration and drugs. Technology always sits at the centre of these discussions. There are times in history when technology helps democratise, and times when it helps centralise. This is a time of centralisation. The justice and home affairs pillar of Europe has become more powerful without a corresponding strengthening of civil liberties." The report recommends a variety of measures for dealing with the increasing power of the technologies of surveillance being used at Menwith Hill and other centres. It bluntly advises: "The European Parliament should reject proposals from the United States for making private messages via the global communications network (Internet) a ccessible to US intelligence agencies." The report also urges a fundamental review of the involvement of the American NSA (National Security Agency) in Europe, suggesting that their activities be either scaled down, or become more open and accountable. Such concerns have been privately expressed by governments and MEPs since the Cold War, but surveillance has continued to expand. US intel- ligence activity in Britain has enjoyed a steady growth throughout the past two decades. The principal motivation for this rush of development is the US interest in commercial espionage. In the Fifties, during the development of the "special relationship" between America and Britain, one US institution was singled out for special attention. The NSA, the world's biggest and most powerful signals intelligence organisation, received approval to set up a network of spy stations throughout Britain. Their role was to provide military, diplomatic and economic intelligence by intercepting communications from throughout the Northern Hemisphere. The NSA is one of the shadowiest of the US intelligence agencies. Until a few years ago, it existence was a secret and its charter and any mention of its duties are still classified. However, it does have a Web site (www.nsa.gov:8080) in which it describes itself as being respon- sible for the signals intelligence and communications security activ- ities of the US government. One of its bases, Menwith Hill, was to become the biggest spy station in the world. Its ears - known as radomes - are capable of listening in to vast chunks of the communications spectrum throughout Europe and the old Soviet Union. In its first decade the base sucked data from cables and microwave links running through a nearby Post Office tower, but the communi- cations revolutions of the Seventies and Eighties gave the base a capability that even its architects could scarcely have been able to imagine. With the creation of Intelsat and digital telecommunications, Menwith and other stations developed the capability to eavesdrop on an extensive scale on fax, telex and voice messages. Then, with the development of the Internet, electronic mail and electronic commerce, the listening posts were able to increase their monitoring capability to eavesdrop on an unprecedented spectrum of personal and business communications. This activity has been all but ignored by the UK Parliament. When Labour MPs raised questions about the activities of the NSA, the Government invoked secrecy rules. It has been the same for 40 years. Glyn Ford hopes that his report may be the first step in a long road to more openness. "Some democratically elected body should surely have a right to know at some level. At the moment that's nowhere". See also in this week's issue: Pretty good Phil bounces back (a report on the consolidation of the reputation of Phil Zimmermann, creator of PGP). 14 October 1997: Europe's private parts to expand * * * * * ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hilfe zu den BvD Mailinglisten? An- oder Abmelden? Mail an bvd-majordomo(a)ibh.tfu.uni-ulm.de, Subject: egal, Text: help ODER: http://www.fh-ulm.de/bvd ---forwarded mail END--- ----------------- End Forwarded Message ----------------- <Somebody's .sig> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

1 0

CAD Stego (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 18 Jan 1998 19:31:38 -0500 > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Subject: CAD Stego > This repeats a suggestion from 1994 about using computer > assisted design programs to conceal text or other data: > 3. The scale feature is useful to reduce, say, a text > of any length, or any digital object, to the size of a pixel. Assuming your color palate is deep enough to support the compression. > 4. Or, the text can be distorted by scale and dimension > to appear to be a line serving another function. Don't you think they are going to wonder why *that* line is so varied in color? Or assuming deep color pallettes, why so many colors are selected when only a few dozen are actualy used in the drawing? > Then the message could be distorted or hidden as > described above, for piggy-backing on an innocent- > looking document issued, I suspect they'll wonder why that particular file is so much larger than the other graphics files with the same number of layers. > 7. Big shortcoming: how to securely transmit the location > (virtual coordinates) of the hidden message and what Look for the pixel that has the unique color mapped onto it. > 8. Medium shortcoming: Full-featured CAD programs are > expensive, however, the popular lite versions are cheap > and can usually read the pricier output. And can't handle more than a few dozen colors and limited layering. This suggestion is unworkable in application. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0

Voice Coding Controls
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DM notes of the BXA Wassenaar rule for voice coding: After looking at some of the Wassenaar docs, I was surprised to see that the CCL wants to regulate speech encoders that operate at less than 2400 bps. Surprising because it was encoding, not encryption, that was being regulated. This is disturbing. This at first seemed to put some of the Nautilus development team's software in jeopardy, but I believe that by the letter of the law (or regulation) that all coders in Nautilus are not subject to the CCL, as they only go as low as 2400 bps and not less than. For citations of voice coding in Category 5 - Telecommunications: http://jya.com/bxa-wa-cat5.htm#5A001b10 http://jya.com/bxa-wa-cat5.htm#5A991b6a

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Re: non-transferable signatures (Re: Crypto Kong penetration.)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- At 10:48 PM 1/16/98 +0000, Steve Mynott wrote: > SMIME of course despite bad cypherpunk karma is easy and > maybe even works between mailers. Easy indeed, if all the keys from Verisign are correct and secured. It is indeed very easy to use SMIME. To use it so that it actually accomplishes the intended result is not so easy. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG Np4QfrajG+6u2ZHUc2AFBH0uTX9nCJxCUi7E2bpk 3CGDysj2FaqaZYBM4bRe6dvLCkbb0ltwLns5aFPQ9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/

1 0

Re: CAD Stego (fwd)
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate wrote: >This suggestion is unworkable in application. Why the focus on color, the easiest thing to avoid using, or layers, ditto? Superfluous for serious CAD, these dainty decorations from Martha Stewartville. Most messages could be concealed in "hatched" objects, bit-bloated as they are, indistinguishable from the elements used to hatch. All black and white; maybe a dot of red for cashmere dupe. In fact, CAD is so bloated with dumb cad-jockey features, and sleazebag work-monitoring logs, it puts most ordinary programs (even air-boss MS) to shame, and could hide a herd of rustled Mex longhorns as easily as the Bush family hides dryhole oil reserves, without any more trickery than sandpapering new boots to look worn. Anyway, Jim, I gather from your remarks that you've not fiddled for endless low-paid months and years to figure out how to cheat the evil bosses and automatic work-snoop feature, while onion-siphoning the Net for horny fare under guise of urgent file transfer to foam-mouth ne'erpays. Underground (so to speak) swapping of digital work avoidance tips is a huge use of global bandwidth riding on the backs of big fat docs for globular structures for maggoty thugs. (Although not nearly as gigantic as the porn trade stego-supporting Net infrastructre growth -- over 50% of Net traffic and rocketing.) Who knows how much illicit info is riding the porn river in and out of the most secure sanctums of tyrants?

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let's do it: NYT ad with hash of fingerprints (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 18 Jan 1998 23:21:38 GMT > From: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> > Subject: let's do it: NYT ad with hash of fingerprints > I would have thought you would take out a cheap personals section > advertisement and print one hash output and a URL. The hash ouput > would be the hash of the hashes of a chosen set of public key > fingerprints. This doesn't provide the same sort of protection the original full page ad is supposed to provide. That full page ad will be accessible as a referenc a hundred years from now in just about every library in the country. The link to a webpage won't be. Distinctly different security animals. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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No Subject
by wabe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is an e-mail which I am intentionally muddling by making it have very long lines and stuff. I plan on saving this too, to analyze later and try to recreate using some sort of silly "delete the misplaced carriage return" later. I'm not going to sign it though. So Bill Payne has the black box to sneakers but he won't publish it for fear the NSA will use it to read his e-mail and also because they pissed him off by trying to silence his critisisms of the way they handled something with Iran or something? I don't read legaleze very well.... -wabe

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