December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

bad PGP signatures
by Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Yet another bad PGP signature via e$pam. Date: Sat, 13 Jan 1996 12:13:03 +0600 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: "David K. Merriman" <merriman(a)arn.net> Subject: Re: Digital postage and remailer abuse That's the third today (although the second was fixable by concatenating the Subject: onto one line.) Would everyone please get into the habit of formatting their messages to be much less than 80 columns? All Phil's travails are ill- rewarded when we can't get basic clearsigning to work via mailing lists. (Or if we don't bother to *use* clearsigning via mailing lists, but that is another topic...) On a related subject, cpunks traffic recently alerted me to how effective replay attacks can be against PGP. Don't PGP signatures include a time-stamp from the system clock? I'm going to get into the habit of including a time-stamp in the clear-text from now on. (I have sent so many PGP-clearsigned messages, and many of them quite short, that an attacker could almost hold up my end of a conversation using them. :-) ) Bryce PGP sig follows Sat Jan 13 14:48:23 MST 1996 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.01 iQCVAwUBMPgoy/WZSllhfG25AQGGlgP9HhxLLpfrsyTBc8ed9jjToJnUOl37S+3z 8zac6FJXk+3dsKhXe2UhiKQrLDx6wIodvy+6DkpBNEEWuzkaVlRkZ9QFiDIuKkm2 ixc8HaZ6yJQLKg5NX19vStpwyQGsDx9tCVAM8BtEYXHuzVqb7AuANVmS/EJWd5js yz+pz6COpxE= =PzVY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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FIN_sin
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The January 22 New York magazine, a local weekly, reports in "The Money Plane": Five nights a week, at least $100 million in crisp new $100 dollar bills is flown from JFK nonstop to Moscow, where it is used to finance the Russian mob's vast and growing international crime syndicate. State and federal officials believe it is part of a multi-billion-dollar money-laundering operation. The Republic National Bank and The United States Federal Reserve prefer not to think so. "That money is used to support organized crime; it's used to support black-market operations," says one federal official. "In my personal opinion, this is an abomination. Yet it appears that at least part of the federal government sees nothing wrong with it." FINCEN director Stanley Morris is more blunt: "Russia's banking system is a cesspool." FIN_sin

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A pooled e-cash FOIA request
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I agree with Charlie Merritt and Declan that a well-placed FOIA request would be a good thing (tm). I am less interested in the identities of low-level Customs, etc. employees than I am in what orders were given, and which political appointees gave them. This action is an entirely reasonable one to take with regard to *our* employees. As a FOIA request can get a bit expensive, I'd suggest that those of us who are interested try to pool our efforts/$ as we did with the ZLDF. This method seems to have worked, :) and ecash should make it easy... JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMPksuW1lp8bpvW01AQGzwwP+I0tKtaE22BjLbFaTNGePqjiFHwHUs3To s43nxKb8jroaCcvVM+5S5g9kl21/nTAqzPRQhk+7jntiQaCduNj7lRJ1dQiYRDgH pFq68ybG1J61zFLaYmbuiMFOjNZD1L6ZemZcd3RFXh7nx4bcnOy1piX5BH1lZTtr iXGNoHO+Xpo= =j5DH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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GNN on Crypto
by Jyri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Global Network Navigator Web Review (http://gnn.com/wr/) has their main story this week on crypto. The articles are: Spymaster meets webmaster:NSA's Fortezza: stronger encryption or Internet spy strategy http://gnn.com/gnn/wr/96/01/12/features/nsa/index.html The Seduction of Crypto AG: How the NSA held the keys to a top-selling encryption machine http://gnn.com/gnn/wr/96/01/12/features/nsa/crypto.html Familiar faces, familiar places: Look who's working to implement Fortezza in the US and Europe http://gnn.com/gnn/wr/96/01/12/features/nsa/triteal.html What's that smell: Is the NSA sniffing your email? http://gnn.com/gnn/wr/96/01/12/features/nsa/sniff.html A back door for the NSA: Balancing the need for intelligence with privacy http://gnn.com/gnn/wr/96/01/12/features/nsa/conclude.html Juri Kaljundi jk(a)digit.ee Digiturg http://www.digit.ee/

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Re: COMMUNITY CONNEXION...
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attila sez: > the SWC is a prime example of very narrow view which is trying to > "control" what we can say --unfortunately, SWC is guilty of the same > mind-control tactics as the core Nazi party which persecuted them == > a very poor example. In Germany, trading on collective guilt they > will never stop feeding, they have effectively controlled the issue > so that _any_ speech or revision against their agenda is a hate crime, > and therefore a serious felony. Sounds like you're a little weak on your history, Attila. Not that I agree with the SWC's policies one bit, but some basic dates and facts - when SW was born, when he founded his C, when WW2 was, what the Nazis did during it and what the SWC has done since, when and how the anti-Nazi and hate speech laws were passed in Germany, whether "any" speech or revision against the SWC's agenda (or do you just mean "JEWS"?), etc - would make pretty short work of your nonsense.

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Hate Speech Ban Metaphor
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saw this on news.admin.net-abuse.misc: In article <ebohlmanDL3M0I.B2J(a)netcom.com>, ebohlman(a)netcom.com (Eric Bohlman) wrote: <snip> :Banning this sort of discussion accomplishes nothing positive. It :creates the *appearance* of having fought bigotry without actually having :done so. It doesn't address the problem, it sweeps it under the rug, and :bigotry that's been swept under the rug has a nasty habit of catching :fire. Banning hate speech is sort of like sending a business card to :Craig Shergold; it lets you feel like you've done your good deed for the :day, even though you really haven't. <snip> That gets _my_ vote for metaphor of the day. Bruce Baugh bruceab(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~bruceab

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[noise] The economics of super-stars - partial cite
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This came up at the bay area cyherpunks meeting - I haven't got the full citation, but the orignal paper was by Sherwin Rosen of the University of Chicago; it was published in 1981, under the title "The Economics of Superstars" - I think it might be in: TITLE: Studies in labor markets / edited by Sherwin Rosen. PUBLICATION: Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1981. DESCRIPTION: ix, 395 p. ; 24 cm. SERIES: Conference report / Universities--National Bureau Committee for Economic Research ; no. 31 Simon (defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n" (cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n)) ((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n)) (t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))

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How to make someone else lose ecash
by Ian Goldberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't recall seeing this on cypherpunks or on ecash(a)digicash.com; it's being sent to both places, so set your replies appropriately. Dave and I were discussing the ecash protocols when we discovered what seems to be a way for Eve (a passive eavesdropper) to cause anyone to lose money. Note that she doesn't gain anything from it. Eve watches for any message that contains pcoins (a list of onl_coin). These messages are the Payment (from user to shop) and Deposit (from shop to mint). Neither of these are required to be encrypted. An onl_coin is the following: onl_coin = [ int keyversion ; low 5 bits are denomination MPI n ; coin number MPI sig ; encrypted coin signature ] sig is (f(n)^(1/h) XOR f(payment_hdr)), encrypted in the mint's public key. The reason sig is encrypted is so that the payment header can't be changed and so that Eve can't learn f(n)^(1/h). However, n is sitting there all nice and cleartext. Therefore: when Eve sees such a message, she uses the same value of n to withdraw a coin from her bank account, and then spends it (she could just pay it to herself). Eve does not gain or lose anything, but if she can deposit the coin before the original coin that she saw gets to the mint, the original coin will not clear. If Eve has the ability to drop or delay packets, she can accomplish this easily. The result is that whoever withdrew the coin originally has lost the use of that coin. Note that this is the same problem as if two users just happen to use the same value of n when they withdraw coins. We don't really care about that, since the probability is trivial. However, this attack lets Eve produce the same effect _on purpose_. How can we prevent this? Well, since a shop has no way of using the value n except for just sending it on to the mint, we lose nothing by encrypting it. Thus, an onl_coin should be: onl_coin = [ int keyversion ; low 5 bits are denomination Encrypt_with_mint_public_key( MPI n ; coin number MPI sig ; (f(n)^(1/h) XOR f(payment_hdr)) ) ] Note that it's not really necessary to have sig already encrypted if we're going to encrypt it again. Actually, I think an onl_coin should have an additional field (bankID) to the fields listed above, but that's another argument for another time. - Ian "Back from the North and ready to party!"

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Re: COMMUNITY CONNEXION REFUSES TO CENSOR INTERNET SERVICES
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:14 PM 1/14/96 +0000, attila wrote: > > an excellent statement, sameer. many of our population around the > world will voice these sentiments, but how many will care to implement > in the face of an onslaught by pressure groups, government, self- > serving news services, etc? Of the 7000+ ISPs on Earth, more than 1000. More than enough. DCF

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[Local] Portland Cypherpunks Meeting Update
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There have been no changes to the time and date of the Portland Cypherpunks meeting. For those of you who have not seen the past notices of the meeting, here are the details: Place: The Habit Internet Cafe 2633 S.E. 21st Av. Portland OR 97202 SE 21st @ Clinton (503) 235-5321 http://www.teleport.com/~habit/ Date: January 20th, 1995 Time: 5:23pm (Discordian time) Activities: There will be a general discussion of assorted topics including planned projects of the various participants, a PGP key signing, and general socializing, among other things. If you need instructions on how to get to the Habit, send mail to alano(a)teleport.com or habit(a)teleport.com and I will send you directions. It has been requested that cameras not be brought to the meeting as some who are planning on attending would like to avoid having their soul captured by the evil magic of the lens. If you are planning on participating in the key signing (and you do not have to if you do not want to), please follow these instructions: Send a copy of your public key (ascii armored) to alano(a)teleport.com. (This will also help me determine how many people are planning on attending.) I will compile all of the keys into a keyring which will be handed out on diskette. (Please tell me the format you want the disk in. Nothing too exotic, (like IBM mainframe formats and the like) please.) I can also e-mail the keyring to you as well. I will hand out a list of the fingerprints of the keys on the keyring. At the meeting we will verify key fingerprints. When you get home, you can then sign the keys at your leisure and mail them back to me. I will then send them to the key servers and the participants of the keysigning. ***PLEASE DO NOT BRING YOUR PRIVATE KEYRINGS TO THE MEETING*** For more information on keysignings, check out: http://world.std.com/~franl/pgp/how-to-organize-keysigning.html If you have any more questions, just send me e-mail at alano(a)teleport.com. My public key is: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAy9jYK0AAAEH/1nM2SOeaUJfF1iK+LlPEueZci3AIMDVDLGqjLStvwqKrD/g 8yKtw3oqrw3+bFsyW6EYAj1EFSRXO/9sFgbfQePOtyDoEHyx9jjROz+5zVmyAe4S KJwtNzmjBk6xfseR+0v7uKYcWQ2YYy4IL2d5zuUe+7HqxY+Mhr0jiViHFVvbIdXW 3Bnlob/8oprNsXl7MOqCAGMoL8WN2VIXJVU07Jm5XhEHIHVPtID5PjxCV9yT/XNV cJkSOi0/EYPG8EsCfwP8s8o1oVNya6mraDaIiAc/oPrwjb+XUrWiiELCBtInoy/8 wQYKq1GAmsnnCSk+2jTnNh7/WX195AI/e/fQJ5kABRG0H0FsYW4gT2xzZW4gPGFs YW5vQHRlbGVwb3J0LmNvbT6JAJUDBRAw3hjmZMnrupLu9OkBAYdFA/9wFA/VwaSH m46CADZNUaVuDPa6FJRIrI2cqZRxKS4Xo4mrYXfLlhDwWYRUPd65X2U32NAdO7WN TuvZL1lKNnq5Jd5WMxdzL3GEcONqIKPPWe+xbZtzaQxtKbuU1V9DlipZb+iL48Ca enhQKgYNnIiGtj5XxO/CLiSAbqju5z4pMokBFQMFEDBqUUXkAj9799AnmQEBvwQH /00LtGsFDi8Cpv3/hAyXdHDpfrzTo/Cr4UZkf6yeQjm75RyWLG2Dst10P//y52F5 Ixl/H2LDecnmYsYxZ9ij0Js1DfQqL1iu37+0O70z9I966DMizNeJ05nBNTHFOJu9 YXiHYSfLdr8OgS8rU78b+SsMdx1cufO0B5jMlW2wK9eBnNQ/V1gIl8X5dWvp5L6f nH0+g2eACPNs1TgFW9Z4Zh+cFMJPqIJ8x4LxQEqkC/174TzjM2KyDKJNMTBYeSCs apx76uAS8AlyNGgPC4jn0vOWsa++vPR/qddTLa+WZ/TEp4oYdxclgYzcR9szXn3d fE6Nn9ur2PFx7zWb5OL/GOCJAJUDBRAwagneGrGpUK3dPgUBAdMIA/9VjejKbiOe LmEcJP0yLx6xIVMzf0FcojsM4pF/rPQ2AbyNo2I8NR0XJTU8cq+8RntnYdk+GzEd l1F0pTg+vSE5mrYAFhqhjUTRmwFmyLl8DP6qeLZ1jrBbiFQzGa2ryJvFc101BLNo EH8Aw6rR0XpAGxdwAdTeizwDLxTxV8n/Eg== =NDqF - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMPitSOQCP3v30CeZAQF7Igf+JxGu1D3t33Xo9ME1w5bmQAYWIyVGCUGu OOVep+YcCxPK/xnEvul6BhyxMqAVXudw1u/U0kXvwJ366cWEts+AcTe7FdYBVt81 R/H9mJFCue9RvclyOPGL5th2fh94HtoslnqZ8Nu1CReMRjCU+kOrBsN4dZ9kMtxK fNKc8VHDQk2tYPcnhkeDvvg1CJhVQIE6Hn7IjOrkMnKn0xz7qKnsfhu+ECMGFfJH lC10iLS59BUztDtd+ye790lrEsk2Gp3OXrkBVR7ZE1QcehGUMOEspGJWq0bjsdW0 ftj4Nf+w+FVeYYCC+6XQSW7Dnvqs9tC1xV2LiSaCqdhS+KG1Iz2/+g== =K8VR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Is the operating system half NT or half full?"

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Re: Good Riddance to Wiesenthal and His Nazis
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:16 AM 1/11/96 -0800, you wrote: >At 6:26 PM 1/10/96, Adam Shostack wrote: >> The Wiesenthal center is very influential in Jewish circles. >>Attacking them directly would probably be a bad idea, and create bad >>associations for anonymity amongst Jews. (I'll come back to this.) > >I for one won't hesitate to criticize these Jew Nazis. This thread is near to the end as the "Nazi Card" has been played... It looks like "White Supremacists" are destined to become the "fifth horseman", thus preserving the "law of fives". I expect to see more uses of this horseman to attempt to reign in the internet under the yoke of Government control. There should be a story on one of the news tabloid shows any day now... OBNonSequiter: I was going through old mail and came upon a rant claiming that "the End of the Government was at hand!". It reminded me of some discussions here about a year ago where various on the anarchist side were declaring the "imminent death of the state" (GIF at 11). A quote came to mind... "The death of the state is not going to be like some old man dying in the corner. It will be like an old man in a crowded building having an epileptic seizure with lots of guns!" | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Buying Digital Postage Stamps Anonymously
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This came up in today's Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting (a very good meeting, by the way). It also has come up in a couple of the messages here, with mention made that the stamp seller may know who is using his remailer because he has records of who he sold the stamps (= numbers) to. There are several standard solutions: 1. Two-way anonymous communication, and two-way anonymous e-cash. ("Wrappers" and all that stuff, stuff I don't here us talking about much lately...) 2. "Stamp mixes," wherein users exchange stamps bought earlier. (This still depends on trust that the seller will not have kept copies of the stamps for his own use, thus wiping out the value of one's new stamps, or that he won't keep records. Anonymity techniques in the mix could help with some of these problems.) 3. Cash purchase with message pool posting. This last one I'll spend a moment describing, as it is very easy to understand, and is robust against a lot of attacks. Alice wishes to buy 100 remailer stamps, each worth 20 cents. She places a $20 U.S. banknote and a diskette containing a public key in an ordinary paper envelope and mails it from a random mailbox to Bob. She also includes a simple phrase to make it easier for her to later find the stamps, such as "Rosebud." Bob creates the digital stamps, encrypts the list of them with the public key provided, puts the name "Rosebud" on the file, and places it on his Web page which is visited by many people daily, or, for more security, posts it to a Usenet group devoted to such things (such as alt.anonymous.messages). Alice retrieves the digital stamps by either visiting Bob's Web site, with some small amount of identity leakage possible, or reads the messages in alt.anonymous.messages (with even less chance of leakage). Or, Alice could use a Web proxy to more securely visit the site. The net result is that Alice has $20 worth of digital stamps, Bob has a $20 bill and will honor the stamps he issued, and Bob doesn't know who he sold them to. This is how easily it could be done. Digital cash is not needed, at this granularity ($20 bills sent through the mail), and simple trust works. (We talk a lot about "reputations," and this is a concrete example. Protocols that "force" Bob to honor a digital stamp, instead of relying on his willingness to honor his promises, are vastly harder to design and use than are such simple, micro-trust transactions.) Different remailers would have different stamps, different rates, etc., and a remailer script (for a "premail"-like app?) could take the remailer hops planned, pull a stamp off the list of unused stamps, and put the number in a remailer-like header field, such as: :: Digital-Stamp: 5he20o#xL3p01SA29s The receiving remailer would decrypt the message with its private key, check the digital stamp field (as above, or in a real header format, whatever), and see if the stamp is in its list of "issued, but unused" stamps. And so on, in the obvious way. Seems straightforward to do. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu
by ghio＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I tried this site http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/prog/snoop.pl using Mosaic 2.7b2 and was told: Your computer is a X11;Linux 1.2.13 i486. Your Internet browser is NCSA Mosaic. You just visited the Anonymizer Home Page. With Arena it gave me: Your Internet browser is Arena/0.96s libwww/. Lynx came up with even less: Your computer is a Unix box. Your Internet browser is Lynx. I did manage to completely confuse it with: > myriad:~> telnet anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu 8080 > Trying 128.2.199.14... > Connected to LCON.PC.CS.CMU.EDU. > Escape character is '^]'. > GET /prog/snoop.pl > <HTML><HEAD> > <TITLE>I CAN SEE YOU</TITLE> > </HEAD> > > <BODY BGCOLOR="78789F" > text="#FFFFFF" > vlink="#dbdb70" > link="#FFFF00" > alink="#1010ff" > > > > <center> > <img alt="Anonymizer logo" src="ftp://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu/pub/I19"> > </center> > > <HR> > > Many people surf the web under the illusion that their actions are > private and anonymous. Unfortunately, it isn't so. Every time > you visit a site, you leave a calling card that reveals where > you're coming from, what kind of computer you have, and other > details. Most sites keep logs of all your visits. In many cases, > this logging may constitute a violation of your privacy. > > > > Here's a sampling of the kind of information that a site can > collect on you (please wait a moment): > > > > > > <BLOCKQUOTE> > > > <img src="/let/a.gif"><img src="/let/j.gif"><img src="/let/u.gif"><img src="/let/r.gif"><img src="/let/i.gif"><img src="/let/s.gif"><img src="/let/o.gif"><img src="/let/n.gif"> > > Your name is probably ajurison, and you can be reached at ajurison(a)netcom20.netcom.com. > > > Your Internet browser is [unknown browser]. This time it actually took a stab at the user name, and got it completely wrong, although the hostname (netcom20.netcom.com) was correct. I suspect it used finger and took a wild guess. The rest of the information is obvious from the User-Agent header, though I find it unusual that the new Mosaic reports the cpu/os type: User-Agent: NCSA_Mosaic/2.7b2 (X11;Linux 1.2.13 i486) libwww/2.12 modified Mosaic 2.4 reports only: User-Agent: NCSA Mosaic for the X Window System/2.4 (L10N-2.4.0) libwww/2.12 modified Lynx reports: User-Agent: Lynx/2.2 libwww/2.14 The statement "Your computer is a Unix box." seems to be just a likely guess, but it could be wrong, because there is a version of lynx for MSDOS. What suprises me is not the information this got, but what it *DIDN'T* get. It never managed to figure out my username, despite the fact that netcom runs identd, and all three web browsers give it my username when they opened the FTP connection. It only reported the hostname in one instance, and seems to be ignoring the info from the ftp session. This "snoop" script isn't getting half the information it could!

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Bignum support added to XLISP 2.1h
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many cypherpunks might enjoy programming in XLISP 2.1h because the freely available implementation of LISP now offers support for BIGNUMS. That means it is quite easy to write cryptographic algorithms that use very large numbers without adding extra support. The downside is that the language is interpretted and thus much slower than something like C. It should also be possible to write RSA in a very short XLISP program. I don't know if you can do 4 lines, but it should be quite short. -Peter

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PRETTY GOOD PHONE PRIVACY, TOO
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friends, 01 14 96 Edupage includes: PRETTY GOOD PHONE PRIVACY, TOO Now from the creator of PGP encryption software comes a new product for making your phone calls more private. Philip Zimmermann's PGPfone software scrambles phone calls made through a computer modem using a complex algorithm called Blowfish, which rearranges the digital version of your voice conversation and then decodes it at the other end. The result is an intelligible -- though not high-quality -- totally pri- vate conversation. The URL is: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgpfone (Popular Science Jan 96 p43) Cordially, Jim

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DEC's MICROCASH
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, 01 14 96 Edupage includes: MICROCASH Digital Equipment filed a patent last August for a payment system called Millicent, which enables Web-site operators to charge as little as a tenth of a cent for each customer "hit." The system relies on middle-men --credit card companies or digital banks -- to handle the transactions, but its novelty lies in its cost-effective design geared toward tracking minuscule amounts of cash. To keep disk storage at a minimum, security measures providing privacy and a trail of signed re- ceipts are not included in the system, but proponents point out that would-be cyberthieves would have to crack a lot of trans- actions -- 10,000 at 0.1 cent each -- to make just $10. "There are easier ways to make 10 bucks," says Millicent's inventor. (Business Week 15 Jan 96 p90) Cordially, Jim

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(fwd) Usenet, No Exit: A Theological Parable
by bruceab＠teleport.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: nntp.teleport.com!psgrain!newsfeed.internetmci.com!in1.uu.net!CS.Arizona.EDU!news.Arizona.EDU!packrat.aml.arizona.edu!dsew From: dsew(a)packrat.aml.arizona.edu (David Sewell) Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.misc,alt.culture.usenet,alt.usenet.kooks Subject: Usenet, No Exit: A Theological Parable Date: 15 Jan 1996 05:28:09 GMT Organization: Department of Geosciences, University of Arizona Lines: 116 Message-ID: <4dcol9$c4u(a)news.ccit.arizona.edu> NNTP-Posting-Host: packrat.aml.arizona.edu Summary: What if Boursy/Grubor/Slaton/Vulis went to Heaven... Keywords: satire spam abuse Xref: nntp.teleport.com news.admin.net-abuse.misc:35135 alt.culture.usenet:22509 alt.usenet.kooks:27121 Status: N USENET, NO EXIT A Theological Parable Once upon a time, Stephen Boursy, John Grubor, Jeff Slaton, and Dimitri Vulis were all travelling together on a bus--probably to "visit" someone, but the story doesn't say. While rounding a hairpin turn on a treacherous mountain road, the bus suddenly skidded, broke through the guardrail, and plunged two thousand feet, instantly killing everyone on board. Boursy, Grubor, Slaton, and Vulis awoke to find themselves floating on soft clouds before a massive pearly gate, where an old man with dazzling white robes and a long fleecy beard greeted them. "I am St. Peter," he said. "Tell me who you are and what you have done with your lives, to help me decide where you belong." The four eyed each other nervously. Finally Jeff Slaton stepped forward. "Saint Peter, I have aided millions of computer users by championing free enterprise and protecting the Internet from the forces of socialism and hypocritical elitism. I would be honored to offer my skills in the service of Heaven!" Next Boursy gathered courage. "I have fought evil outlaws who pretend to be other people in order to cancel their words!" Nearly elbowing him aside in his eagerness came Grubor: "St. Peter, I have valiantly rid the Internet of pushers of hard drugs, and defended the God-given American right of free speech!" Last of all Vulis came forward and flung out his chest as he said, "Like my mentor and countryman Solzhenitsyn, I have exposed the wiles of evil stukachi and the lying forger Pidor Vorobieff!" St. Peter scratched his head and sighed. "I'm afraid I'm not very up to date on computers, but Raphael surfs the Net. Please wait just a moment." Instantly there appeared a heroic archangel in shimmering armor. "What IS it, Peter?" he said. "I *finally* found a moment to install the ELF binaries on His Linux system..." St. Peter pointed to the four new arrivals, and began a whispered conference with the archangel. Finally St. Peter turned back to them, and with a wide smile said, "We have chosen accommodations for you; Raphael will show you to your quarters!" Everything faded; and when the four could focus their eyes again, they were with Raphael in a gleaming white room scented with incense and adorned with precious gems. A luxurious feather-bed stood against each wall, and next to each one a gleaming Pentium computer. "Here you are," said Raphael. "You've all got Windows 95 and Ethernet connections, plus full access to the Web." "What about Usenet?" asked Grubor, a mite suspiciously. Raphael smiled indulgently. "Would we offer an inferior product here? We who know the secrets of your hearts have designed for you a news network fit for eternity. Ten thousand newsgroups, no article cancellation, no charters, no FAQs, no vote-takers, no rules. As Augustine said, 'Love God, and post what thou wilt.'" "Do you carry heaven.admin.policy?" asked Boursy. "Yes, my child." "Heaven.is and heaven.is.too?" asked Grubor. "Of course." "You mean no cancelbots?" asked Slaton. "Goodness, no, the idea!" "Does heaven.culture.russian have a moderator?" asked Vulis. "Who but you, my dear Doctor?" "You've all got shell accounts on otherworld.org," Raphael continued. "Use trn to read news and Pnews to post. Of course our version of Pnews doesn't give you that silly scolding about how much money your post is going to cost the entire Net." The four rushed to their computers, and for some time nothing could be heard but the clacking of keys against the faint background of harp music. At length all were silent, until Slaton shouted, "Gather round, and let's see the fun!" As the others crowded about his terminal, he typed "trn", and tapped his fingers impatiently until a prompt appeared: ====== 4 unread articles in heaven.general -- read now? [+ynq] "Hmm, that's kind of odd..." Slaton murmured as he hit the + key. a Sanctified Spam 1 No more A P O L O G I E S, Suu--eeeee! b Doctor of Theology 2 Chris Lewis needs an angelic visitor! Stephen Boursy >Make that two angelic visitors! d Dr. Dimitri Vulis 1 First List of lying stukachi Seraphim (Mail) -- Select threads (date order) -- All [Z>] -- "WHAT??" the four cried, with one voice. "Where's the rest of the posts? Where's everybody else??!!" Raphael's eyes gleamed. "Who said anything about anyone else?" For the first time ever, Boursy had a clue. "Where... just where ARE we, anyway?" Raphael quickly strode to the door and turned as he passed through. "You know what Sartre said. L'Usenet, c'est les autres! Enjoy eternity!" And with that the door shut and the lock clicked with an authoritative "sneck!". And as the four rushed wild-eyed to their terminals to compose furious denunciations, eight eyes processed in horror the message that appeared there: Broadcast Message from root@otherworld (/dev/tty1) at 00:00 ... System going down in 2 minutes, back up in a few aeons --Chris Lewis, SysAdm *** *** THE END -- David Sewell * dsew(a)packrat.aml.arizona.edu | "Seekers for gold dig much Dep't of Geosciences, Univ. of Arizona | earth, and find little gold." WWW: http://packrat.aml.arizona.edu/~dsew/ | --Heraclitus bruceab(a)teleport.com - <*> - http://www.teleport.com/~bruceab/index.html List Manager, Christlib, where Christian & libertarian concerns hang out Science fiction readers: Preview S.M. Stirling's DRAKON and WORD OF NIGHT (the new Marid Audran novel by George Alec Effin ger) at my home page. New PGP key on Web key servers; old keys are toast.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: all of the "ek" tags have been verified correct. Apologies to those who were inconvenienced by incorrect "ek" tags in the past. Last update: Mon 15 Jan 96 6:48:07 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ++#+*##*---* 20:42 100.00% c2 remail(a)c2.org *-+********* 17:00 99.99% replay remailer(a)replay.com ***+******** 5:47 99.99% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org *########### 2:12:32 99.99% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++++++++++++ 52:25 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ----------- 2:12:08 99.96% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de .--.-.-*++++ 4:17:19 99.95% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ++++++++++++ 44:27 99.93% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net ++*+******** 22:18 99.89% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ***+******** 8:14 99.88% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +*+**--*+*** 12:30 99.88% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #####*##*+++ 10:33 99.85% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ----------- 10:09:06 99.83% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ###### ##+#* 2:00 99.71% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com +########+# 59:00 99.54% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net --.-* * - * 1:54:34 94.25% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com - -.----- 6:01:55 93.81% hroller hroller(a)c2.org #-#####-# # 3:50 90.56% rahul homer(a)rahul.net #####+** ### :57 99.49% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net _____.- 25:51:28 85.47% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * - 1:02:01 70.76% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Respect for privacy != Re: exposure=deterence?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:59 AM 1/14/96 -0800, Rich Graves wrote: >On Sat, 13 Jan 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> 1. Individual private citizens acting on their own deserve privacy and >> anonymity. >> 2. Government employees receiving paychecks based on tax dollars stolen >> from members of the public do not. > >Disregarding the high-falutin' diction, why not? > >Certainly, expose everything they do at work, but I don't see that >tracking someone down personally serves any purpose. Tell that to Simon Weisenthal, who (until his recentconversion to statism) was under the impression that tracking down people who did bad things for the government was not only acceptable, but in fact laudatory. >> 3. Individuals not harming others deserve privacy and anonymity. >> 4. Government employees threatening citizens with large fines and jail >> time, for doing what we consider right and good, do not. > >I strongly disagree, and the fact that it's a government is irrelevant. Since government is funded by stolen dollars, it ISN'T irrelevant. >Everybody deserves privacy: criminals, I agree, to the extent that an unconvicted person who happens to be a criminal is also an ordinary citizen. > government employees, I _Disagree_, especially after they've committed crimes for the government. > and people >you like as well. Of course, you have the right to investigate any person, >in keeping with the law. If "the law" is used to protect government-employed criminals, then the law is wrong and we should disregard that portion of it.

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Membership of list
by George Banky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please advise on how I can join. Reagards, e-mail: gpb(a)goofy.swin.edu.au

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c'punks at RSA conference
by Travis Corcoran 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Message-Signature-Date: Mon Jan 15 11:09:09 1996 Sorry if I've missed any previous posts on this topic, but... are any subscribers to this list going to be at the RSA conference this week? If so, anyone interested in doing a PGP key-signing? Please reply via email; I'm certain to read it before travelling. - -- TJIC (Travis J.I. Corcoran) http://www.openmarket.com/personal/tjic/index.html Member EFF, GOAL, NRA. opinions (TJIC) != opinions (employer (TJIC)) "Buy a rifle, encrypt your data, and wait for the Revolution!" PGP encrypted mail preferred. Ask me about mail-secure.el for emacs. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed by mail-secure.el 1.006 using mailcrypt Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.3, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBMPp8KIJYfGX+MQb5AQExzQP/dVyyr9uQcMCd7UlFMD4+TVDaFBlRM7wL MrpDarq9QlZ8vYZd0ECjC8MyxUE5Kl95yVYl1BySRPohwD6wUFFn6loemDSDdF6c gS6ku68I2+kZukHSY8MI45V5zqJ9dNWGTAgRH5eAlekRkWujUsZGwOtpW9mKCTUd RIRPyNs/9tE= =5+i5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: COMMUNITY CONNEXION REFUSES TO CENSOR INTERNET SERVICES
by Jonathan Zamick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> the SWC is a prime example of very narrow view which is trying to > "control" what we can say --unfortunately, SWC is guilty of the same > mind-control tactics as the core Nazi party which persecuted them == > a very poor example. In Germany, trading on collective guilt they > will never stop feeding, they have effectively controlled the issue > so that _any_ speech or revision against their agenda is a hate crime, > and therefore a serious felony. > > thank you for standing up to the Simon Weisenthal Center! Ok, I know better than to get into: a) Totally off topic discussions on lists and even worse b) Political, off topic discussions. However, I really do feel its my obligation to offer a counterpoint to Attila here. (Not a sanction of his own discussion, but a little debate.) I do this because I had a long talk with someone who liked to use weighted terms to speak against jews and jewish organizations, and am still a wee bit sensitive. What the SWC asked was idiotic. However, they are in no way guilty of the same 'mind-control tactics as the core Nazi party.' That is exibitionism, and is dangerous. They sent out a request asking ISPs to take an action. They did not demand it, imply any sort of economic response, or direct physical response. As for Germany, a number of different cultures were attacked in WWII. On the one hand Jews are most often discussed, because they were the most openly herded and vilified at the time. However, Russians, Poles, Gypsies, Gays and many others were also sent to camps. Germany is a very multicultural nation. The tensions, and issues of keeping a cap on racism are very important. When neonazis killed the turkish family, thousands of Germans turned out to show that they won't stand for such again. If that is the result of actions taken by the SWC in the media, and in politics then I'd say they have done a wonderful job overall. As for attempts of revision. What sort of revision? If you mean historical revision, like the groups which claim the Holocaust (again something which affected many different groups) never happened, or was a Jewish conspiracy, then I'm glad that sort of revision is seen as a hate crime. The reason I'm so sensitive about these things is that the person I had a debate with over this area before could see nothing done by Jews in a positive light. Use of the media was whining, use of the law was sneaky, actual action was nazism. Thus I'll stop now. I don't condone what the SWC asked for in this case, and those who know my postings should know I strongly support privacy and freedom of expression. I just equally feel that its my obligation when certain things are posted, to not let little loaded comments go unrebutted. (See whoever is there at the RSA conference this week.) Jonathan Sorry again for taking up the list's time.

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Above the Law
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Burnham, a distinguished journalist, has published: Above the Law: Secret Deals, Political Fixes, and Other Misadventures of the U.S. Department of Justice; Scribner; 1996. 444 pp. $27.50. ISBN 0-684-80699-1 The chapter, "Keeping Track of the American People: The Unblinking Eye and Giant Ear," nails wizard surveillance, surreptitous entry and other security-beats-privacy technotoxins: A solid argument can be made that in shaping and directing the FBI's investigative technologies from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, Al Bayse, assistant FBI director, Technical Services Division, may well be the nation's single most influential law enforcement official since J. Edgar Hoover. Burnham cogently details DOJ and NSA plots, the bull-market in federal prosecutors, the pathology of "national security" abuse, encryption nightmares, subservient politics, careerism absent ethics. He admonishes "sleeping watchdogs" complicit with the nation's leading agency for burgeoning instrusiveness.

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Re: New Puzzle Palace? Re: CAQ - Secret ...
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:08 PM 1/15/96, s1018954(a)aix2.uottawa.ca wrote: >On Sun, 14 Jan 1996, James M. Cobb wrote: > >> James Bamford >> The Puzzle Palace (with a new Afterword) >> Penguin Books >> 1983 > >Schneier's new bibliography mentions a second edition of the book published >in 1995. Is this really a substantively new edition with more material or is >it just being repackaged with a new Afterword? I'm just wondering whether >it is worth buying to someone who has the original. The new edition is supposed to be a substantial rewrite, updating the book to include a lot of the recent stuff on the NSA. Don't quote me, but I think Bamford has a co-author, though I've forgotten who it is. I paid the princely sum of $16.95 in 1982--expensive for a book back then--for "The Puzzle Palace," and read it cover-to-cover (well, I guess I skimmed the footnotes). Even before I got into crypto in a big way, I knew this stuff was important to me. I certainly plan to buy the Second Edition. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Eggs at Customs
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:32 AM 1/15/96, Brad Shantz wrote: > >I was asked if I had any eggs. I still don't know why. > Meaning you weren't cleared for expedited handling. My CIA and NSA friends had alerted me to this question and given me the special answer: Me: "Yes, I have green eggs, and ham, too. The eggs in Paris are especially fresh this time of year." This got me waved through. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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