December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Junk E-Mail - Part 4
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alice: >Heavens, no. Than again, I'm waiting for the day that the NY Times >allows advertising on its op-ed page. It does and has for years and years, every day. Maybe you meant the editorial page?

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Re: Elliptic curves, current status?
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:07 PM 11/25/95, James A. Donald wrote: .... >Can someone tell me the true story? Not with any assurance. I don't trust my own knowledge yet. I think that the opinion is that the discrete log problem is harder with elliptic curves than for prime modulus arithmetic for numbers of a given size. That is why you can use fewer bits. The inner loop in some elliptic curve systems is not multiply-add (as is the case with number fields) but other operations that are as efficient with gates but less efficient with normal machine instructions. There are probably an order of magnitude more people that have studied and published about the problems of breaking prime modulus crypto than elliptic curves. Perhaps progress will be faster should elliptic curves be studied by more people. There are a lot of tricks to speed up discrete logs in for prime modulus schemes that don't seem to work for elliptic curves. There are many parameters to an elliptic curve crypto system. I haven't seen any taxonomy of which kinds are good and which have been shown to be week. In contrast there seems to be a consensus about how to pick primes for RSA or Diffie-Hellman. I am certainly no expert. Perhaps this will prompt comments from someone who can point to real information.

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Cyberangels
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some may have already seen this, but the Guardian Angels are trying to intrude onto the net... and are doing so in typical clueless newbie fashion. See the CUDigest web site for more information; the links to the most significant issues are: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest/CUDS7/cud786 and http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest/CUDS7/cud791. Some interesting commentary is also in http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest/CUDS7/cud787. Incidentally, one way in which they are displaying cluelessness is in taking L.Detweiler seriously. -Allen

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No Subject
by Instituto Latinoamericano de Computacion 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey What's up,my name is Herbert Salas,I live in Costa Rica,I would like to know everything you can about hacking.I've tried to find here something,but I can't find anything here,how they do to encrypt things,and how can you crack it,what do I need,Software,Hardware,Where can I get it.??Help. Thanks. Herbert Salas

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For sale: your secret medical records
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Sunday Times, Top page one, 26 Nov 1995 For sale: your secret medical records for L150 by Lois Rogers and David Leppard Confidential medical records of politicians, celebrities and millions of other National Health Service patients can be bought on the information black market for L150. The contents of the files comprising patients' most personal health details dating back 30 years, are being sold to order by high-street detective agencies advertising in the Yellow Pages. The Sunday Times has discovered that GP practices across Britain are failing to safeguard files which contain sexual, mental and physical histories of patients. Files on sale last week revealed how named patients had vasectomy operations, or had a family history of Alzheimer's disease and precancerous growths. They also included the type and dose of medication prescribed, visits to casualty units, and injuries suffered in road accidents. The disclosures have prompted calls by opposition MPs and doctors' leaders for urgent laws to protect the security of the health records of Britain's 56.5m patients. Alan Milburn, a Labour health spokesman, said he would be asking Stephen Dorrell, the health secretary, to conduct an urgent inquiry. "This is a violation of the special relationship between doctors and their patients," said Milburn. "I find it disturbing and deeply sinister. Patients will be horrified to learn that their records can be accessed by unknown organisations." Alex Carlisle, the Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman and a lay member of the General Medical Council, said: "It is ethically and morally outrageous that organisations of any kind should obtain details like that without consent. It is contrary to everything we are told about the confidentiality of medical records. This should be a crime punishable by imprisonment." Milburn and Carlile were among more than a dozen people who last week allowed The Sunday Times to expose the security failures in the NHS records system by giving the newspaper permission to access their confidential files through commercial agencies. The problem first came to light when one agency said it was receiving more and more commissions from big employers who wanted it to carry discreet checks on the medical backgrounds of their employees. The agencies, many of which advertise "private searches" in the Yellow Pages, offer their services for fees ranging from L150 to L800. They offer to provide a written summary of anybody's complete medical files within three hours. All they require is the name, address and date of birth of the patient they are investigating. They are thought to be able to obtain the records by impersonating medical staff and persuading them to disclose contents of the NHS files over the telephone. Last week a Sunday Times reporter posing as a prospective client contacted 10 private detective agencies chosen at random from the Yellow Pages. "Most of this stuff is on manual records," said one employee of a London agency. "It is pretty well protected. We're not officially allowed [to do this] but it's perfectly possible." A second private investigator said: "It's just a question of knowing who and what to ask." However, most declined to discuss the methods they used. "What we are doing is illegal, and I'm not going into the details over the telephone," said another agent in Robertsbridge, East Sussex. Dr Sandy Macara, chairman of the British Medical Association council, which represents 105,000 doctors, was among those who agreed to take part in the exercise. Details of his medical and surgical history were provided after a brief telephone call by a reporter to a private agency. The information was faxed to the newspaper within three hours, after a price of L150 was quoted. "This is incredible. I cannot imagine how they have got this information," Macara said. The ease with which the health files could be obtained posed a threat to the Electronic Patients' Records, a new computer database which will soon contain the files of all NHS patients in England and Wales, Macara said. "We will have to ensure the new nationwide computer network is as secure as humanly possible, and press for a statutory right to confidentiality of patient information." Elizabeth France, the data protection registrar, said the Criminal Justice Act had recently tightened the law regarding information obtained by deception. But the penalties apply only to information held on computer, rather than medical notes, which at present are held mainly on hand-written files. "This is something we take very seriously," France said. "We are actively pursuing it. It doesn't mean the problems have been solved." John Wadham, director of Liberty, the civil rights group, called on the government to introduce a new criminal offence of obtaining information by deception. "Such information can obviously include material about sexually transmitted diseases and material about an individual's physical and mental health," he said. "There clearly needs to be a right to privacy so the courts can act against this." Baroness Cumberlege, the junior health minister, said confidentiality remained a cornerstone of the NHS. "We are about to issue strengthened guidelines for security of records within hospitals and new measures for unauthorised access from external sources," she said. "We are having discussions with the BMA and the Data Protection Agency specifically about these issues." -----

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Re: MED_vac
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 16 Nov 1995, Adam Shostack wrote: > If you have some personal data that includes your patient > number, why not have a card that instead lists your important data? > "This patient is diabetic, alergic to amoxicillin, and has Gold Cross > insurance." I'm confused. Are you saying that the answer is hardware?? Why I think someone already thought of that. It's called a MEDIC-ALERT bracelet. As someone who's blood type is rare, I can appreciate this. > At Defcon, Bruce Schneier was talking about the value stored > in casino chips. Its sttaggering. Its an alternate cash system, with > a huge float, astounding velocity, and very little fraud. Transaction > costs are low, clearing is instantaneous. The comparison is fairly > clear. I don't see the comparison. High value "chips" have additional security precautions engineered into them, over and above low-value chips, hopefully Schneier realizes this. There are also regular "counts", in fact perpetual "counts" in all casinos. I mean pit bosses and managers have to do something to earn their keep. (other than handing out comps, I mean.) There's also an "eye in the sky" lording over you in a casino, and the "chips" aren't actually "cleared" until you cashout. I'm not sure how Schneier got the idea that it was instantaneous clearing, but it isn't by any stretch of the imagination. But then what do I know ... I don't even sign my posts with PGP. > | So, what if my records were available on the net, but encrypted with a > | an key known to my physician and an escrow agency? (Equivalently, they > | could be on that smartcard, but encrypted.) If an emergency occurs, the > | hospital fetches my encrypted records from my physician's server, then > | sends a message (signed with the hospital's key) to Keys R Us, the escrow > | agent, saying "This is Dr. McCoy at Frobnitz Memorial Hospital, we need the > | key for FooBar Medix, Inc., patient number 147258369." (My FooBar Medix, > | Inc., insurance card lists my physician's server, the escrow agency, and my Why bother with having records on the "Net". What if the net goes down, then what?? Where are you left then? Relying on technology, simply because something CAN be done is very bad practice, when its not needed. When I travelled in the States, I simply kept a copy of my travel documents in my wallet. I never had any problem. And I had a copy of my pertinent medical data, attached via a MEDIC-ALERT bracelet to my body. Then again, the amount of information that you want a doctor reading over when you do have an emergency is minimal. You really want the doctor to act, not to get to know all of the details which aren't relevant to your treatment. There's no need to overload someone, you simply have to give someone the resources they need in order to get the job done. And that is the critical point, isn't it?? Getting the job done, and giving someone what's needed to do so. > -- > "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." > -Hume Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: establishing trust
by cme＠clark.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greg, >Subject: Re: establishing trust >Date: Mon, 27 Nov 95 12:20:47 +1000 > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Did you intentionally not provide the same key that this was signed with? I added the key you provided, but PGP still couldn't find the right key for this signature. > from the same person. I even know who they came from: the person who > is capable of signing with key 0xXXXXXXXX. > >I hate to point this out, but that isn't true. >Anyone can create a key with any chosen keyid and >attach the same publicly known name to it. Of course -- sloppiness on my part -- trying to minimize my own typing. Pardon me. One must use a hash of the key or the key itself to identify it -- not merely some portion of the modulus -- and the ID field has to be large enough to rule out a brute force search on the spoofer's part. The PGP KeyID problem has merely to do with PGP's own access mechanisms. Successful verification of a signature by some key is linkage enough to that key. If multiple messages/files verify by the same key, they are linked together no matter how the key is identified. The problem you identified comes from the fact that PGP doesn't let us know with enough certainty that the same key was used for two different signatures. In fact, PGP just tells you the UserID of the key which verified the signature -- as if that UserID were (a) unique and (b) meaningful. The keyID isn't displayed. For a version of PGP to suit my tastes, the unique UserID would be assigned by me alone -- and the file of those assignments (called "aliases" in TIS/MOSS) would be protected under my own signature (or, equivalently, encrypted under my own conventional key -- the same one protecting my private keys, perhaps). - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +---------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+

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Re: Bitbux could eliminate some domestic currencies?
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:21 11/23/95 -0800, John Gilmore wrote: >>From a letter in [My dog, I mean my software, ate this part of the msg -- gnu] >... >"The importance of e-money replacing cash is greater than possible effects >on exchange rates. Rather, it might make certain currencies to all intents >and purposes disappear." Gresham's law says that the bad money drives the good money out of circulation. Does this mean that real cash is better than ecash ;-). Bill

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spooky URL
by an197098＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

while visiting http://www.mcs.com/~candyman/http/boom.html, I noticed that my Netscape's status line mentions an attempt to connect to: g1.internet-audit.com a little spooky... any ideas what is happening?? I prefer e-mail. reply (anonymously) to an197098(a)anon.penet.fi reply (NON-anonymously) to na197098(a)anon.penet.fi --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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Re: spooky URL
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nothing spooky about it. They are an audit-sevice for web pages that is sponsored. Anytime you access a page this tell them you were accessed. Love Always, Carol Anne ps. you can get an acct. there if you want it. > >while visiting http://www.mcs.com/~candyman/http/boom.html, I noticed that my Netscape's status line mentions an attempt to connect to: > >g1.internet-audit.com > >a little spooky... any ideas what is happening?? > > >I prefer e-mail. >reply (anonymously) to an197098(a)anon.penet.fi >reply (NON-anonymously) to na197098(a)anon.penet.fi > > > > > > > > >--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** >Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. >Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi >For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi >If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi > > -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: Register
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Mar 95 at 22:46, Robert East wrote: > Register > > I'd like to sign up for email > > Bob You got it, Bub! Er, Bob.

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ETH_ic?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-27-95. NYPaper: "An Intel computer security expert runs afoul of the law. So much for the 'hacker ethic'?" Regardless of whether one sees Randal Schwartz as a white knight with questionable judgment or a computer criminal who deserves jail time, his tale contains valuable lessons for anyone who uses or manages a corporate computer system. On the Internet, computer programmers and systems administrators have debated whether Mr. Schwartz was a hero or a criminal. The on-line jury is divided. Most concluded that he was guilty of poor judgment, not criminal intent. Some say the case has killed the hacker ethic. "If I saw someone on the Internet with a security weakness, at this point I would be reluctant to act the Good Samaritan and report it," said Jeffrey Kegler, an independent software consultant in Sunnyvale Calif. "If I saw weakness in Intel's machine, I'd keep it to myself." ETH_ic? (7 kb)

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reorder"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (robo syrinx c2) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Last update: Mon 27 Nov 95 6:46:42 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hroller hroller(a)c2.org +*#####---## 46:11 99.99% robo robo(a)c2.org + ####--*## 39:57 99.75% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com *+ 39:12 99.66% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -- ---_.--. 6:36:54 99.37% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl +* **** *** 8:47 98.47% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*. *** *** 6:20 98.31% c2 remail(a)c2.org + ++++- +** 1:12:49 97.94% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org +* .-- # ### 46:27 97.81% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +* ** *** 17:41 97.50% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++ +++ +++ 39:47 97.23% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com +*#*# # *## :28 96.79% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ** *** *** 28:42 96.76% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu + * +* 3:02 96.68% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * *** ** 13:11 96.44% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net * *** * * 8:55 95.93% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ------- -- 5:04:15 95.47% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ---- -- -+ 6:23:22 95.06% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com -- - -_ .- 11:42:46 95.01% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu * ## # # :29 90.69% rahul homer(a)rahul.net +* +** +*- 21:04 98.77% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net + +*+ 24:54 85.54% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de * +++ ++ 6:56:02 80.39% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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EXH_ume
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-27-95. NYPaper, Lead story: "U.S. Will Deploy Its Spy Satellites on Nature Mission. A Huge Environmental Study Gives a New Lease on Life to Intelligence Systems." The new program is directing spy satellites to study about 500 ecologically sensitive sites around the world. The data will be archived for future generations of scientists and will remain secret for now to conceal the abilities of the nation's reconnaissance systems. The monitoring effort is led by Medea, an avaricious group of about 60 scientists in academia and industry who advise the nation's intel clubhouses on the use of secret data to "study" the environment. The new reconnaissance effort is run for Medea by agony aunt NRO and is coordinated by dead-baby CIA. The program is very different from the related effort to mine old spy-satellite photos for environmental data, a wallet-rip the Clinton Administration recently began. So too, the program is different from recent intelligence gathering that studies natural phenomena for clues to ingenious tax milking. The Federation of American Scientists said the environmental reconnaissance was "potentially a watershed in the reform of intelligence," adding, "It reflects an expanding teat of national insecurity." EXH_ume (11 kb)

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Re: Virus attacks on PGP
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:40 11/26/95 -0800, Thomas E Zerucha wrote: >That woudl be interesting - even with the speaker "off" the power surge >causes clicking and other signs. Not to mention that the interrupt count >would start moving (of course the virus could replace the entire OS and >would only have to find 300K chunks to hide in). I looked at the memory usage on my 1meg Mac and 5meg is used for the system. I have no idea what it is all being used for. A lot can hide there. Bill Frantz

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[NOISE] Chi Sun Times SS# Sweepstakes
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Chicago Sun-Times is running a contest in which readers are asked to send in their social security numbers. Someone will win a cash prize after a random drawing. I can't figure out the angle on this. If they simply want to run a promotional contest, why are they asking for ssn's? If there's an ulterior motive, what is it? Are they going to sell the list? Would they have a use for it themselves? The frustrating thing is that there are probably many millions of Americans who will give away the keys to the store for next to nothing. The feds probably made a tactical error: instead of trying to force mandatory key escrow down our throats, they ought to have offered everyone who is willing to submit to voluntary escrow a chance to win a Chrysler Minivan. -- Alex Strasheim, alex(a)proust.suba.com

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Re: Elliptic curves, current status?
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:48 PM 11/26/95, Wei Dai wrote: .... >The IEEE p1363 group's working draft on elliptic curve standard may help >you here. You can find it at ftp://ftp.rsa.com/pub/p1363/draft/ec.ps > >One reason for confusion about the speed of elliptic curve cryptosystems is >the small number of implementations. A paper in Crypto 95 claimed that >for doing key exchange, an elliptic curve algorithm takes about the same >time and has about the same level of security as DH with 512 bit modulus, >and that elliptic curve has a speed advantage if greater security is >desired. > >Wei Dai Thanks much! I will look at the paper.

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New Mixmaster
by John Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lance's new Mixmaster 2.0.3 is also available on vishnu.alias.net via the normal methods. John Perry - KG5RG - perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com - PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Packet Radio - KG5RG(a)WA4IMZ.#SETX.TX.USA.NA WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMLo5iaghiWHnUu4JAQGTogf/XdW+U3MPg668h7oofd2IYkP4dQNv8m3r TUTKnmUuQP6JqJV2Y2QC9oF2A6VobNC7Q1EP3s6xbMIP8a20hMsvvJbWYRDfIBWH ydTBGMk8JZvDXHVlok5eVD99Krrl51pQskWjxBuZKJMTZSTL7TmJYxX+JHWFViAh qPOVOImZfyKlInra36EHO1M7bptMjc0pwEQQ6tOrnPbBzlUYLm/xWtWXyvXjH7QJ WxAiLHTS55Y3UMhTBoqMtOViWXOaW8nY14mzEnN2B2byoXMiSsDWGhpr0wWDJ5CC oYWQWZPyHB0H6T5MWNT95/GO7wxfxj3+nx1MyPKcjg8efShwWEOVfg== =d6hk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Cypherpunk Certification Authority (fwd)
by Rev. Ben 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sun, 26 Nov 1995, Robert Hettinga wrote: > >Is this another one of those LD tentacles? ;) > > Must that or a spoof of somekind... "She" didn't sign it, and "she" claims > to have issued a signature... Methinks some of us need to read up on undeniable interactive signature systems. Ben. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed with Bryce's Auto-PGP v1.0beta3 iQB1AwUBMLn/J75ALmeTVXAJAQGL5QL9HE+t0zKGVni03w4DvV2W1lj1807eaNRp xD4IJcEUJ+JVk4lUJQ+zNvOf81FMPG+0QNq9tqOEDNqiG9vemD7B8C7et5PH0pFb ktOeAw5WywsnwSeRleId1ukBktDdZR4v =QueN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Encrypted Email
by Connie Sadler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anybody briefly summarize for me some options for encrypting email that are secure? I know about PGP but I need something for (my environment) with an easy to use interface (PC-Windows) - for use by people who really aren't very computer literate. Any ideas? Thanks! Connie

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re: [NOISE] Chi Sun Times SS# Sweepstakes
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Lynne L. Harrison" <lharrison(a)mhv.net>: > There may be *an ulterior motive* of getting the person's ssn, i.e., for >the purpose of the newspaper (and the winner) reporting winnings to IRS. In >addition, the newspaper may also feel that, in selecting a 10-digit number, >it probably will not repeat such as someone's birthdate. Personally, I lean >towards the former. Why not just make giving up your SS# a condition of receiving the prize *if* you are a winner like lotteries do? I think the real reason is they need a unique number and are lazy and uncreative about generating one from the info people send in. Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/~weld L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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The future will be easy to use
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a quote from Bill Gates' book: The mechanism that will make this possible is based on mathematical principles, including what are called "one-way functions" and "public-key encryption." These are quite advanced concepts, so I'm only going to touch on them. Keep in mind that regardless of how complicated the system is technically, it will be extremely easy for you to use. You'll just tell your information appliance what you want it to do and it will seem to happen effortlessly. (Thanks to the anonymous person who typed it in) We may not all like Bill Gates, and some of us even boycott his software, but we must admit he is a very shrewd businessman and knows which side of his toast is buttered. I think this paragraph is right on the mark. The competition for which cryptographic protocol wins will be decided on the basis of usability. The "dark forces" are no doubt aware of this fact, and have already made some advances in this area. One example is the Fortezza card. If cypherpunks are to have any hope of getting their vision of strong crypto implemented and deployed, it has to be in the context of usable systems. Form this perspective, let's take a look at the recent thread on "establishing trust." Carl Ellison advocates the MOSS alias system. My understanding of this system is that individual users associate "aliases" with public keys. If done right, it can work well. However, from a usability perspective, it is just one more trouble spot. First, on what basis will users decide which keys are worthy of being assigned which aliases? Public keys are big hunks of base64 encoded gibberish. They are difficult to present in a user interface, difficult to communicate in alternate, known secure channels (such as telephone calls and face to face communication). There is no way that a person could memorize one. The other issue is how much time and energy the user has to spend keeping the alias database up to date. There is no way to communicate securely with anyone who's not in the database. If the user is communicating with a large number of people, then it's very tempting to get sloppy. There's no way around it. This kind of system will not make it in the big time. As I see it, any system that does must have the following properties: * Some variant on the Web of Trust. * Online key-servers for getting keys in real time. * A clean mechanism for validating keys through alternate channels. There are three possible outcomes: we build it, the NSA builds it, or Microsoft/Netscape builds it. This last outcome might not be so bad, but only in the first one can we rely on our principles being advanced. Raph

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Re: GOST for sale
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:43 AM 11/24/95 +0100, Mats Bergstrom <asgaard(a)sos.sll.se> wrote: >According to a short article in a Swedish newspaper (DN) >with the title 'Spy Code of KGB can make computers safe', >JETICO INC., located in Finland (Tammerfors), introduced >a new crypto system on the world market last week. It's >based on GOST, the Russian federal standard algorithm. >This product, called BestCrypt, is implemented at least >partly in hardware. Alledgedly it uses 'GOST 28147-89', >whatever that stands for. > >GOST is probably very secure - a huge keyspace (256 bits) and >KGB would not have left a trapdoor for NSA to take advantage >of, would they? >From what I've read of GOST, it's really a family of cyphers with different sets of S-boxes - routine military gets one set, top secret gets another, civilian govt another, etc. Aside from possible differences in security level for the S-boxes, one motivation is that you can't take civilian govt decryptors and use them to read or forge top secret military crypto, etc. If this is correct, then some sets of S-boxes probably do have trapdoors (at least susceptibility to differential cryptanalysis_; how good are the ones that Jetico is selling, what credentials do they have to convince us their cryptanalysis is good enough, and why are they doing parts of it in hardware? #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: Cypherpunk Certification Authority
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:20 AM 11/25/95 -0800, you wrote: >At 01:53 AM 11/26/95 -0800, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >>You'd rather sign before encryption?? >>Doesn't that give you "known plain-text" to attack? > >The signature is not known unless the whole message being signed is >known. Signatures often have known, or easily guessed, plaintext in them, like the signer's name or ID number, or various header fields such as X.509's equivalent to ----- BEGIN PGP .... >And any encryption scheme that is vulnerable to known plaintext attack >where only a part of the message is known, is worthless anyway. DES isn't worthless. It's a bit weak, but not worthless. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by Jonathan Zamick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:06 AM 11/27/95, Raph Levien wrote: .. stuff.. >The competition for which cryptographic protocol wins will be >decided on the basis of usability. .. stuff.. > If cypherpunks are to have any hope of getting their vision of strong >crypto implemented and deployed, it has to be in the context of usable >systems. .. stuff.. > There's no way around it. This kind of system will not make it in the >big time. As I see it, any system that does must have the following >properties: > > * Some variant on the Web of Trust. > > * Online key-servers for getting keys in real time. > > * A clean mechanism for validating keys through alternate channels. > > There are three possible outcomes: we build it, the NSA builds it, or >Microsoft/Netscape builds it. This last outcome might not be so bad, but >only in the first one can we rely on our principles being advanced. This is a very important period. The technology is young enough that a window is open for a non-giant to produce a dominant product. On the other hand, it takes actual coordination of resources. I'm not sure that it is within the range of Cypherpunks to take advantage of this window. There is still no agreement whether the group can be said to have a single vision, nor whether people within it want to be bounded by another's view. If people really wish to take advantage of this and really push things, it means forming a group, made up of Cypherpunk members perhaps, but much smaller, and capable of working together. Also capable of handling not only the theory, but good solid code, GUI, PR, meetings, talking to the government, etc. It is an open window yes, but not a simple one. I'd love to see widespread use of secure encryption, however I don't think the potential exists within the Cypherpunk framework to reach it as 'Cypherpunks'. The question then is, whether Cypherpunks should change, or whether a smaller group will be formed. Jonathan ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ..Jonathan Zamick Consensus Development Corporation.. ..<JonathanZ(a)consensus.com> 1563 Solano Ave, #355.. .. Berkeley, CA 94707-2116.. .. o510/559-1500 f510/559-1505.. ..Mosaic/WWW Home Page: .. .. Consensus Home Page ..

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