December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: "Junk E-Mail"
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sten wrote: > They (as in, the government) has used the RICO laws against >Operation Rescue, an anti-abortion/pro-life (pick your term) group for >protesting/picketing abortion clinics and doctors who perform abortions. And for successfully encouraging the murder of doctors. >If they had prosecuted under statutes which applied to everyone, I >wouldn't have had a problem, but they are going after OR and similar >organizations for using tactics similar to those used by civil rights >protesters in the 60s. Who were systematically arrested, beaten, teargassed, wiretapped, and even occasionally shot at. I *know*--I got firehosed, beaten, arrested, and wiretapped for what I did. That's why I'm a Cypherpunk now. OR has received far better treatment than the civil rights protesters ever did--or did I miss the news items reporting that Terry Randall and Ralph Reed had been assassinated, and that their lieutenants had been bumped off in black-bag jobs, and that their colleagues were chained down to chairs *in court*? > 'Course, civil rights is Politically Correct. >Abortion rights is Politically Correct. Protesting abortion is >Politically Incorrect, therefore illegal. Do you usually send nursery rhymes to mailing lists?

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Re: LACC: DEA Agents Accuse CIA of Tapping Phones
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brian B. Riley, CIA friend wrote wrote: >>[...] We've known for years now that >>the jackbooted thugs of the DEA are by far the most law-abusing, >>disrespectful, rights-sneering, down-and-dirty, life-threatening, >>hair-raising agents of the entire US Government. Bar none. They've >>got to be watched, because they're a nasty threat to individual >>liberty, and because they routinely interfere with the legitimate >>work of other American intelligence agencies. (And they've been >>monitored, by the way, since at least 1984, to my knowledge.) ........................................................ Well, there's watching, and then there's Just Watching. I would think that if some agency known to be so untrustworthy that it requires "watching", that it also deserves some action against its unacceptable activities immediately as they are discovered. It's rather ineffective to just passively monitor/watch what someone is doing, and keeps doing. This becomes more like voyeurism. Which recalls to mind the difference in the effect of surveillance upon different kinds of people: to those with personal standards for self-control/self-government, it is highly disturbing; to those with none, it is not even annoying. Just a comment on surveillance in general.

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Proving I'm not Bob.
by s1113645＠tesla.cc.uottawa.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had an idea for an advertising based net-payment scheme that has a particular security flaw making it totally untrustworthy unless it is possible to prove that you are not a particular person (the publisher receiving the ad money) when consuming (viewing or otherwise) the ads. All its other flaws seem to based on the same sort of identity denial problem. Damn! Any protocols, cryptographic or otherwise? TIA

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Re: Are there enough FBI agents to handle Digital Telephony?????
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:05 PM 11/21/95, Peter Wayner wrote: >Has anyone ever done the math on the FBI's new wire tapping >proposals and determined whether they'll have enough agents to >do all of the listening? Doesn't a court ordered wire tap >require that people listen in and screen the recordings. Does >this have to be in real time? I can't remember, but I think >there is a fairly onerous evidentiary chain required to use this >technology. ... The manpower shortage can be solved by moving the listening step offshore, perhaps to one of the Carribbean islands that processes credit card slips. Even cheaper would be to subcontract out the listening to the relatively impoverished, but well-educated and English-trained, former Soviet bloc nations. For example, Romania or Bulgaria, or even Russia. They may still have the old listening infrastructure in place, although I hear that Stasi headquarters in the former DDR is now an acupuncture clinic. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: politics aren't all or nothing
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark Hedges wrote about our reps in government: >They're really well educated people, for the most part --- >somewhere along the line they must have gotten that stuff about >"considering that you are incorrect" and the rest. .................................................... Most Senators & Representatives have been educated to know the answers to questions like: 5. How many branches of the federal government are there? 6. How many senators are there in the U.S. Congress? 7. How many years are there in a Senate term? rather than the answers to questions like: 3. What are the reasons for each of rights enumerated by the Bill of Rights? 4. What are the rights of the government? Does it have any? 5. What is the difference between rights and powers? So part of the problem is that conversations don't necessarly proceed along the same lines; that is, towards achieving the same end. A philosopher I read stated that the difference in certain controversies is that the parties are not aligned towards the same goals because they do not hold the same *values* (even before getting into a consideration of the means used to support those values). But I have noted that it is much easier to discuss anything with anyone who, regardless of their political or philosophical inclinations or past education, has an open, rational state of mind; i.e., someone who *thinks* about things, who is fearless about introducing facts into their mental content and will not back away from seeing the whole picture. Otherwise they will be moved to make decisions based on convenience, rather than on a wide perspective of what it will do to one's way of life in the future. Harried Congressmen who have too many decisions to make and inadequate background preparation and too little time to make those decisions, are not going to be as eager to reason on the meanings and significance and consequences of many of the bills and requests for government action which they receive, even if they *are* bright and educated. If I was in their position, I would think it would be imperative to know very quickly what to eliminate from serious consideration, even more than of calculating what sort of governing action to take. But they are elected to govern, and by jove, that is what they set themselves to do, regardless. Try to convince them that we don't need them all that much. <g> .. Blanc

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toolkits?
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alice here ... No, *I* am the real Alice, and I refuse to use PGP signing. Alice de 'nonymous ... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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toolkits?
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

|Alice here ... | |No, *I* am the real Alice, and I refuse to use PGP signing. | |Alice de 'nonymous ... | | |P.S. This post is in the public domain. | C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E. No, *I* am the real Alice, and *I* refuse to use PGP signing. Alice de 'nonymous ... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: New Computer Security Act
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: >Blanc, >I believe the less we know about Tim's intentions for that fateful day, >the better we are off. :-) ................................................ Well, somebody please take notes, and maybe a camera for pictures for a web site (in case things get very exciting). Inquiring minds want to know! .. Blanc

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Re: ecash protocol: Part 1
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From what I gathered from Doug's posts a little while back, the _client_ >stuff is perfectly fine; only the _bank_ stuff is Chaum-patented. > This is exactly backwards. Also, it is entirely possible that they have structured the protocol to make sure that both sides have to practice some element of Digicash intellectual property. What I said was "it is possible to create an anonymous digital cash system where the bank does not infringe and the client can optionally infringe or not infringe (sacrificing anonymity)." (See: http://www.communities.com/paper/agnostic.html)

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Israeli authorities censor book, confiscate copies (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 18 Sep 1997 17:20:52 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Israeli authorities censor book, confiscate copies [Shame on the Israeli government. I suspect this would be an interesting case for web-based mirroring. --Declan] --- TEL AVIV, Israel (AP) - A Tel Aviv court on Thursday temporarily banned the sale of a book about a missing Israeli submarine after state prosecutors claimed it endangered national security. Hundreds of copies of the book were ordered off bookstore shelves. Author Michael Eldar said police searched his house and confiscated several copies of the book as well as other documents. [...] The case is unusual because the manuscript had been approved, as required of all security-related material, by Israel's military censor. [...] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 18 Sep 1997 11:49:20 0200 From: "Eviather H. Ben-Zedeff" <evi(a)research.haifa.ac.il> To: declan(a)well.com Subject: Israeli authorities endangering freedom of the press hi, I am a journalism teacher and an editor in Israel. A friend of mine, Captain Mike Eldar, Israeli Navy (Ret) asked me 18 months ago to edit an autobiography and a book he wrote. During 1997, both books were published and suppressed by the Israeli military. Please, help us to fight brutal censorship in Israel. Support freedom even in this remote part of the Middle East. Eviathar H. Ben-Zedeff Department of Communication Haifa University Mt Carmel, Haifa, Israel <evi(a)research.haifa.ac.il>

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Re: Are there enough FBI agents to handle Digital Telephony?????
by ethridge＠Onramp.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In addition to the large quantity they want, they also want to be able to deliver the conversation from a mobile suspect to mobile agents who are following the suspect. So even if you use a digital set with "voice privacy" activated that government car behind you might still be listening to you. The FBI's "requirements" present an entertaining set of logistical problems. Simply equipping the switches to handle the extra capacity, especially during busy hour, is problematic. allen

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Re: Java & Netscape security [NOISE]
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 21 Nov 1995, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: > Hmm... If it looks remotely like marketing, it'd better carry the usual > disclaimers that past returns are no indication of future returns etc. :) > > >In the first case, the poster is not commenting about anything to do with > >their work, -- it really is just one man's opinion -- while in the second > >they are actually commenting upon something their employer is selling. What I'm trying to say is that if someome posts from watson.ibm.com, and IF they are talking about OS/2, we will not accept that they are not speaking independantly of the knowledge they have garnered from watson. It just doesn't work that way. In the same way, someone who writes from Netscape.com or AT&T, or Sun and tries to disclaim that they are speaking for the company, when they step out as an employee of a company is deluding themselves. When in the press have you seen a reporter claim as a source, an "unnamed Senator"? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E. P.P.S. I just sent email to Steve Bellovin from AT&T. I thought I'd settle the question once and for all, as to whether he IS reading this mailing list or not.

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Subscription sites for CDR...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 18 Sep 1997 11:44:24 -0700 > From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Re: New Computer Security Act > (Toad.com address changed to algebra.com. Hugh Daniel confirmed to me that > about 130 subscribers are still using the toad.com address. And he > confirmed that none of them are getting the traffic sent to the "real" > Cypherpunks lists, those at algebra.com, cyberpass.net, and ssz.com. I > again urge folks to get with the program. Toad.com is going to vanish > someday, at least as any kind of distribution site for CP traffic.) There is also cypherpunks-e(a)htp.org now... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: NSA, ITAR, NCSA and plug-in hooks.
by ahupp＠primenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Tue, 21 Nov 1995 02:10:02 +0100 >From: Tatu Ylonen <ylo(a)cs.hut.fi> >To: ahupp(a)primenet.com >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: NSA, ITAR, NCSA and plug-in hooks. > >> PKZIP allows encryption (other's ?). How about a hook to that? > >PKZIP "encryption" is self-deception. A program for cracking it, >PKCRACK, is widely available on the internet. See e.g. >ftp.funet.fi:/pub/crypt/analysis. > >[For information about internationally available cryptographic >software, see http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto.] > > Tatu Ylonen <ylo(a)cs.hut.fi> PKCRACK uses a dictionary attack. Anyway, my point was that you could use PKZIP's encryption as an excuse for passing a password.

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towards a theory of reputation
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Many of the topics discussed on this list are economic in nature. Unfortunately cypherpunks haven't attracted the attention of professional economists who might be willing to apply their analytic tools to these issues. Reputation is one of these issues that is especially important. I'm not an economist, so I hope these ramblings do not discourage real economists from tackling reputation as a serious research project. The first step toward a theory of reputation is defining what reputation is. The definition should correspond closely enough to our common sense notion of reputation so that our intuitions about it are not completely useless. I think a good definition is this: Alice's reputation of Bob is her expectation of the results of future interactions with Bob. If these interactions are mainly economic in nature, then we can represent Alice's reputation of Bob by a graph with the horizontal axis labeled price and the vertical axis labeled expected utility. A point (x,y) on the graph means that Alice expects to get y utils in a business transaction where she pays Bob x dollars. Given this definition, it is natural to say the Bob's reputation is the set of all other people's reputations of Bob. A reputation system consists of a set of entities, each of whom has a reputation and a method by which he changes his reputation of others. I believe the most important question for a theory of reputation to answer is what is a good method (reputation algorithm) by which a person changes his reputation of others. A good reputation algorithm must serve his self-interest; it must not be (too) costly to evaluate; its results must be stable; a reputation system where most people use the algorithm must be stable (i.e., the reputation system must be an evolutionarily stable system). In a reputation based market, each entity's reputation has three values. First is the present value of expected future profits, given the reputation (let's call it the operating value). Note that the entity's reputation allows him to make positive economic profits, because it makes him a price-maker to some extent. Second is the profit he could make if he threw away his reputation by cheating all of his customers (throw-away value). Third is the expected cost of recreating an equivalent reputation if he threw away his current one (replacement cost). Now it is clear that if a reputation's throw-away value ever exceeds its operating value or replacement cost, its owner will, in self-interest, throw away his reputation by cheating his customers. In a stable reputation system, this should happen very infrequently. This property may be difficult to achieve, however, because only the reputation's owner knows what its values are, and they may fluctuate widely. For example the operating value may suddenly decrease when his competitor announces a major price cut, or the replacement cost may suddenly decrease when he succeeds subverting a respected reputation agency. One way to answer some of these questions may be to create a model of a reputation system with a simple reputation algorithm and a simplified market, and determine by analysis or simulation whether it has the desirable properties. I hope someone who has an economist friend can persuade him to do this. Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMLI9Ujl0sXKgdnV5AQECCQQAiHq+s3PfsEOJmk0ng9aETQwHVe5EvrA0 +0wimcO2IGf+Bix8J/bLtAlW2eEcXM90pMvBgv+Q4jTkvI5RvGyuMf5cvOgj6rTz wj9aCqoltjHm/l1dfoWWCn4VSIU8OAJ6wKN/HRANQ5B56TPOgEkS2EDSM2C3w4m9 BgwcG5rBeA8= =taTA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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On crypto -- "The Grand Compromise is Coming"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim wasn't entirely correct in June. McKain-Kerrey isn't the most extreme, reprehensible bill: That honor goes to the Oxley amendment and the SAFE version that Intelligence approved. (They would ban the manufacture, distribution of non-backdoored crypto.) This is the danger of entrusting our civil liberties to legislatures, which are inherently anti-civil libertarian. No new legislation is better than bad new legislation. Something close to McCain-Kerrey could well emerge as the "Grand Compromise." -Declan ------- Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 20:52:55 -0400 To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: FC: On crypto -- "The Grand Compromise is Coming" [A House international relations subcommittee this afternoon approved Rep. Goodlatte's SAFE bill by a 14-1 vote, with some amendments. Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-Neb.) voted against it on "national security" grounds. Details to follow. --Declan] ***************** Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 12:33:38 -0700 To: cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: The Grand Compromise is Coming At 11:43 AM -0700 6/24/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Yeah, I'm going to the markup later this afternoon. I ran into Goodlatte in >the Capitol this morning; he seemed cautiously optimistic. > The terrible, terrible S.909 McCain-Kerrey bill is probably a negotiating card in the coming Grand Compromise. When even editorial writers for the Establishment Papers are against it, when industry is against it so vocally, it won't pass the full Congress. But it will have served its purpose. It will make many groups _satisfied_ to reach "a compromise we can all live with." The various cyber-rights [sic] groups will probably trumpet this as a victory, as "the best we could get." Somewhere between SAFE, a bad bill, and McCain-Kerrey, a reprehensible bill, lies the Grand Compromise. I reject it all. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." ***************** From: Eric Murray <ericm(a)lne.com> Subject: Re: The Grand Compromise is Coming To: tcmay(a)got.net Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 14:02:11 -0700 (PDT) Cc: cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM Tim May writes: > > The terrible, terrible S.909 McCain-Kerrey bill is probably a negotiating > card in the coming Grand Compromise. Yes. The tactic will be to use S.909 in negotiation to represent a 'fair' government-oriented solution. Then 'compromise' with a 'balanced' deal which includes all that the government really wants, with a few of the more onerous bits taken out of S.909 as 'compromise'. As Declan notes, Congress is driven to compromise. The government side can propose ever more draconian laws in order to engineer the 'compromise' to whatever it wants. On the other side, we are stuck, because we have been asking for things that we really want, not bargaining chips. Even if we were to ask for bargaining chips that are more than we really want, how much further than completely free crypto can you go? The government wins any game of compromise because it can push its side as far as it wants, then demand that we meet halfway. > It will make many groups _satisfied_ to reach "a compromise we can all live > with." The various cyber-rights [sic] groups will probably trumpet this as > a victory, as "the best we could get." They will make it out as a victory ("send us more money") but in reality it'll just be a little less of a defeat. The rejectionist stance has the presumption that, if unwatched, the government will pass a law so onerous that the people will rise up in protest. Unfortunately I don't think Americans will rise up in protest over _anything_ any more. Certainly not over basic freedoms. -- Eric Murray ericm(a)lne.com Network security and encryption consulting. PGP keyid:E03F65E5

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"The Right To Privacy" by Caroline Kennedy, et. al.
by Erik E. Fair 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In an EPIC Alert on 10:46 10/23/95, Dave Banisar wrote: >"The Right to Privacy," November 9. Authors Caroline Kennedy and Ellen >Alderman discuss their new book on privacy. Lizner Auditorium, George >Washington University, Washington, DC. Contact 202/357-3030. Did anyone here go to this event, or has read the book yet? There is a review of it in TIME magazine at this URL: http://pathfinder.com/@@iEPVLuF5EgMAQChZ/time/magazine/domestic/1995/951106/ publishing.html thanks, Erik Fair

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Re: ALERT: On Monday, call Congress to stop Big Brother amendment!
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh wrote, citing an industry lobbyist: >The answer: "I don't think compromise is the right word. But we need to >give something to law enforcement." ...................................................... They could be given the idea that it would be of practical use to us Citizen-Units if they would help us to help ourselves. Of course, they want to be the knights who slay the fire-eating dragons, who consummate all the power and the glory, amen.

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Re: Virus attacks on PGP
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:34 11/21/95 -0500, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N wrote: >> Certainly having PGP run from a CDROM or other read-only device would be a >> big help. Even better would be to have all the privileged code also run >> from a read-only device. > >Seeing as PGP is quite small the simplest and cheapest read-only device >would be a write-protected floppy disk. But do remember that your copy of PGP could be infected as it is loaded from the disk. You really need to protect your privileged code too. Bill

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The Congressional Mailbot
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's your chance to protest ITAR and whatever other CPUNK thing you feel worthwile. Enjoy! CONGRESSIONAL MAILBOT SERVICE This service is provided to make it easy for you to get your message to all members of the House or Senate that have E-Mail mailboxes. By sending a single message to the service addressed at HOUSE(a)MAILBOT.COM and/or SENATE(a)MAILBOT.COM, your single message will be expanded and resent to all members of those specified houses as if YOU had E-Mailed each and everyone of them yourself. Any E-Mail responses to your inquiries will be sent directly back to your own E-Mail box. WHERE DO I SEND MY E-MAIL TO MAKE THIS HAPPEN? In order to use this service, you need to address your E-Mail to one or both of the addresses listed below. FOR MEMBERS OF TU House(a)Mailbot.com FOR MEMBERS OF THE US SENATE: Senate(a)Mailbot.com WHO WILL RECEIVE THIS E-MAIL? Your incoming message is sent to all currently known members of congress that have E-Mail mailboxes. The Congressional Mailbot System updates it's list of members of both the Houses every 30 days. At that time, new email addresses are added to the Mailbot Server. WHAT TO INCLUDE IN YOUR MESSAGE? Most members of congress do not have the staff to deal with replies via both regular mail and E-Mail. Most would prefer to reply to your specific request by way of regular postal mail. In order for them to do that, you need to include your NAME, ADDRESS, CITY & STATE so that they can send you a response. WHAT NOT TO INCLUDE IN YOUR MESSAGE? Basically, your message should be short and to the point. It is not wise to include large amounts of text from other sources. If you want to point out to them about such sources, simply tell them where you saw it. Imagine getting hundreds of email messages containing the same material over and over. The meaning gets lost. Make your message clear and easy to read. WARNING Each member of the House or Senate which receives a message from you via the Mailbot, will respond with a reply message. THIS CAN GENERATE A LOT OF EMAIL INTO YOUR MAILBOX. If for example, at the time you send your request to the Mailbot, there are 130 members of the specific house you select, you will get back 130 reply messages from those members when they receive your message. Currently, the automatic replies are about 750 bytes in size and only contain a header with no message body. These replies are sent to let you know that the Congress Person you sent the message to, has received it in their E-Mailbox. Some users use systems that only allow so much email per month for free and then charge for email sent/received after that! IF YOU CANNOT HAVE THIS AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC IN YOUR MAILBOX PLEASE DO NOT USE THIS SERVICE! WHAT IF I WANT TO SEND A MESSAGE TO A SPECIFIC Congress Persons? THEN YOU SHOULD NOT USE THIS SERVICE! This service is for E-Mail intended for ALL members of the House and/or Senate. Individual messages to specific Congress Persons should be sent by other means. LIMITATIONS: This is a very popular tool.... Several rules need to be enforced to ensure that this service does not overburden the systems that are connected to it. The following rules are in place... 1 The Mailbot will reject any message that is larger than 5,000 bytes in size. This provides you with a total of 66 lines of 80 columns per line for your message which is a whole page of information to make your point. 2 Please limit usage of the mailbot to no more than one message per 72 hour period (one each to HOUSE and SENATE is ok). 3 Abusive and obscene messages violate the purpose and spirit of this service and WILL place the originator of such messages on a rejection list. Users who cannot abide by the above limitations will be placed permanently on a rejection list and all further attempts to use the service will result that user's messages being rejected by the service. PROBLEMS OR QUESTIONS? If you have any problems or questions about this service, please direct them to the following E-Mail address: Mailbot(a)Mailbot.Com TELL A FRIEND? If you should tell a friend or colleague about this service, PLEASE INCLUDE THIS MESSAGE. This will save them time in knowing what is permitted and will keep questions about the service down to a minimum. This Service is Provided By: MAILBOT SERVICES OF ARIZONA (c) 1995 Mailbot Services of Arizona. -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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[NOISE] Interesting statement by Alameda County DA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by iang(a)cory.EECS.Berkeley.EDU (Ian Goldberg) on Tue, 21 Nov 1:50 PM >One of the speakers was Don Ingraham, Assistant >District Attorney, Alameda County. In responding to a >question from the audience, he said: > >"You're making a distinction between criminals and big >business. > That is not my experience." Assistant Devil's Angel Ingraham cites two out of three, the other is the omnipresent public safety racket -- his temp job in train to future peace by salubrious punishment of the other two overtense sinners. Often, a backlasher rep in one leads to a pretend- thrasher slot in the others. RICO, for instance, is an ingenious selective-caning law for flyswatting one conspirator by another but to not go so far as to bruise flesh and foreclose franchises for prosecutorial "shiatsu." This ancient soft-drubbing by one of the others is meant to conceal their common-origin ritual of corporeal writhings, manipulations, strokings, caresses and digitizers to debase from upright to bent to kneeling to prone succeeding down ladder, applying lubricants, linguants, unguents, balms, dental whiteners and body hair to head, to rest six under. Criminal, financial, legal -- indistinguishable from any other mortality-salving levitationism. -- From The One Outback Truth. > "Hey, Ian _said_ it was noise."

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Re: Design proposal: crypto-capable generic interface
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Sat, 18 Nov 1995 00:42:21 -0800 (PST) >From: Raph Levien <raph(a)c2.org> > First, a few words about what I consider to be good interface that >can support plug-in crypto. [...] > I propose that the new interface lives as a sort of daemon, rather >than a static collection of command line script pieces. Danger, Will Robinson! (see below) [...] > Once the negotation has been established, the application can send >the daemon MIME objects that the app does not understand but the >daemon does (for example, an image/fractal). The daemon can return a >MIME object that the app does understand (for example, an image/ppm). This part sounds good...a sort of master translation service. > Alternatively, the daemon may request an authentication. This is >useful when resolving external bodies that require authentication, >including non-anonymous FTP, and standard authenticated HTTP. In this >case, the daemon sends a message to the app requesting the >authentication. It specifies whether it needs both username and >password, or just password. In the latter case, it hands a username to >the application. > The application can then query the user for the authentication >data. It hands this back to the daemon. In reply, the daemon indicates >success or failure. In case of success, it hands the object back to >the app. Now I get worried. This communication with the demon is via some IPC -- maybe even via a LAN. Some things can't be distributed safely and authentication is #2 on my list. > Encryption is a bit more tricky, but in essence you just hang a >premail-alike off this kind of protocol. The hard part is specifying >the key, but you just call it a "parameter" and put in hooks for the >daemon to ask for whatever parameters it needs. Crypto keys are #1 on my list of things you can't distribute (unless they are wrapped, of course). > This requires that >keys have some nonforgeable names, which is unfortunately not a >feature of PGP 2.6.2. S/MIME will do it just fine, if you buy into the >Certifcation Authority (<wink> at Nick Szabo). Public keys, if that's what you're talking about, have perfectly good nonforgeable names -- themselves. They are unique. They are the proper name which can collect all the attributes of that key which are of interest (e.g., permission to spend $, name of a human who knows the private key, attributes about that human, etc.). > One final aside: I've been fairly frustrated with this mailing list >as a forum for talking about real design proposals and implementation >issues. Ignorant posts by the likes of Dr. Fred and Alice d'Clueless >tend to attract far more attention than real crypto work. I want a >forum for, and just for, cypherpunks who write code. If I had just a >smidgen more free time (as if), I'd be trying to start one >myself. Anyone else? I've seen this happen several times. As a list gets popular, it diversifies. You might try sci.crypt.research -- since it's moderated. - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)tis.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |Trusted Information Systems, Inc. http://www.tis.com/ | |3060 Washington Road PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2| |Glenwood MD 21738 Tel:(301)854-6889 FAX:(301)854-5363 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: Pedophiles use encoding devices to make secret use of Internet
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I guess they moved the URL. Try this one. http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info/112195/info429_4.html Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/ L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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Pedophiles use encoding devices to make secret use of Internet
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Story in Nando Times http://www2.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info/info429_4.html Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/ L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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Re: Spam the Sign!
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[...] > Do you have a legal opinion to support this statement? Our lawyers >tell us that executives of netscape could go to jail if we make the >128bit version of netscape available from an "export controlled" >ftp or http server. We are working to clarify the situation with >the government or figure out an alternative distribution scheme that >will remove us from the grey area. No legal opinions here, but perhaps you give it to someone who you know is legally entitled to have it and give them permission to redistribute it. For example, MIT, RSA, and c2.org already distribute export-controlled software via FTP, so if they're willing, you could give copies to people there and publish MD5 checksums. > Getting the US version of netscape widely available is one of my >highest priorities, but I can't tell Barksdale that he should go to >jail over it. I'm constantly pushing from within the company to keep >things moving forward. It's appreciated as is your participation here. > In the mean time I appologize to the linux users who can't even >buy the 128 bit version. If something changes on this front I'll >be sure to let people know. | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: Frank Stuart | It always takes longer than you expect, even fstuart(a)vetmed.auburn.edu | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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