December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: bit quiet in here lately
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:11 AM 11/24/95 -0500, futplex wrote: >sameer writes: >> I am working on a spec which myself and others will turn into >> an internet draft, for placements on the standards track. It will >> standardize remailer commands and nymserver commands, and will >> incorporate payment. Once we get a draft written up it will be posted >> for review, flames, and criticism. > >Great -- I've been toying with working on exactly that since the summer. >I never quite convinced myself that a) the general net community would really >take a remailer-related i-draft or RFC seriously, or even that b) the >remailer community would really find a standards document useful. It's >encouraging to see that some other people also think it's worth writing. > Now, if the remailer service-listing operators could agree on a standard format for their reporting (lag time, feature lists, etc), then it would simplify maintaining a list of remailers - which would increase the usability of the remailer system, and help the use and growth of remailers. Dave Merriman This is a test (3 UUE lines) of the unconstitutional ITAR - 1/713th of the PGP executable. See below for getting YOUR chunk! ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [015/713] ------------------- M=$<(&L`#*IPP",(G6(,,S,`P](<2RWU96XCW86/JBYV8A\D8@X'HB_9H#&\X MX'PCUB.,13B"X8`R?^J-:UB.M_`U\>[#)BS&5$0C,Y#^1CS>1`\T1QTXX6!3 M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/ <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> My web page: http://www.geopages.com/CapitolHill/1148

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Re: real life problems with ITAR (was Spam the Sign!)
by aba＠atlas.ex.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attila <attila(a)primenet.com> writes: > On Thu, 23 Nov 1995, jim bell wrote: > > > [US companies hiring non-US programmers to avoid ITAR] > > <attila sez> I think they have that one covered --not only is it > violation of ITAR's intent to send a programmer out of the U.S., but is > illegal to hire a foreign national to program for your non-U.S. products. Having your company legally based outside the US, with just a US office (on paper) would seem to get around this. If all your code is shipped from Sun Corp, Russia (and actually you get CDs in the mail from Russia literally if you order software from them), then it would seem to avoid the problem. They'd probably have to make sure that no programming at all occured in the US otherwise they'd be susceptible to the claim that they were violating ITAR by their US development team exporting software with a hole for crypto to their main development team in Russia. Multinationals could juggle that much easily. The other problem is that multi-nationals don't like stepping on the govts toes, because the govt might retaliate by not buying Sun, or Sun mysteriously losing contracts. Sound right? > the test is going to be with someone like Sun who "bought" a group of > Russian crypto programmers and left them in Russia. Now, the problem > with ITAR is that if you import that code, you can not then export the > code since it is now covered by ITAR. However this is the real problem, the don't want crypto no matter what. They'll do their damnest to stop it by whatever means: legal or illegal, monetary pressure, threats, FUD, overbroad ITAR, selective enforcement, etc. > secondly, it appears there is a move afoot to make it an ITAR > violation to hire the foreign nationals to circumvent ITAR --basically, > the Feds want to stop cryptography _everywhere_, including telling > Russians they can not work for U.S. companies! Just where do they think > they are getting off? > > then, when ALL hitech moves out of the U.S. and the DoD needs us, we > will not be here, will we? Something that is puzzling me is how DigiCash is doing. Their software I think is ITAR regulated (or would be if it were shipped from a US ftp site). OK, so they get around it by shipping their software from Digicash, Bv, Netherlands. But, somewhere on their pages it mentions that: "Digicash, Bv is a wholly owned subsidiary of Digicash" (which *is* based in the US). Does that make them a counter example who is currently getting away with it? Just to complicate things further David Chaum is a US citizen, right? Maybe he himself is ok because he doesn't write the code himself, the digicash development team does. Is Digicash (US) hiring (collectively) Digicash, Bv if it is a wholly owned subsidiary, in US legal terms? Reckon the long term message is for companies to just pull out of the US. Moving to a suitable jurisdiction would be possible for Netscape, and would be a coool blow against ITAR. Adam

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Re: crypto for porno users
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:17 AM 11/23/95 -0800, Jay Campbell wrote: > A common way to get around prostitution sting operations > is to ask the lady to expose sensitive portions of her anatomy > to prove her sincerity before the would-be customer commits > to any transactions; this sort of thing is also becoming > commonplace on the net for pornography or pirated software, This protects the customer against stings, but it does not protect the supplier against stings. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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crypto for porno users
by gjeffers＠socketis.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

crypto for porno users Crypto porno is a wonderful topic for Cypherpunks. Child porno people are a group that definitely needs the very best in computer security. If their computer security problems are solved, then everybodys' computer security problems are solved. COMPUTER SITE DISK SECURITY The SecureDrive 1.4 disk encryptor system solves their computer site disk storage problem. It also gives them the solution to the "rubber hose" problem. With a "damaged" key file and the use of a password, they have an effective defense against court orders demanding keys. (see the docs for SecureDrive 1.4). Also disk encryptors not only encrypt files but also solve the problem of temporary work files that are used by many software packages (They can be reconstructed). TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MIT's PGP 2.6.2 solves their problem of secure telecommunications. This assumes that the people involved can really trust each other. STATE INFILTRATOR PROBLEM Of course, one of the really big problems for non-STATE approved groups is the problem of state agents infiltrating the group. This gets worse as the group gets bigger. This is also one more thing I have against states - one of their jobs is having their agents make friends with cit- izens and then betray their friends. Has anyone else noticed? - THE STATE HAS NO HONOR! The state prides itself on its cleverness here. Also, of course, once the state has entrapped an individual, they tend to get other members of the group by having their victims get and give evidence against other members. - sort of a domino effect and the group unravels - especially with the conspiracy laws. Drug distribution gangs are famous for falling to these techniques. A possibly unbreakable defense against the above assault would be the use of a Dining Cryptographers protocol. According to Applied Crypto- graphy, PGP may be used to send messages in these protocols. Pretend that a small group of Cypherpunks are child porn enthusiasts and decide to use the Cypherpunk mailing list to exchange pictures and child porn info.. I know little of the theory of Dining Cryptographers but I would think that a good implementation of it would make infiltrators useless. I will leave it for other Cypherpunks to discuss the mechanics (specific and general) for actually doing this. A possible risk would be that this would put the general membership of Cypherpunks at risk - or would it just put the list itself to risk? Does this imply that we need FORTRESS mailing lists or what others would des- cribe as COERCION-FREE mailing lists? Would remailers that allow two way secure communication be a help here? Would they be forced to be FORTRESS or COERCION-FREE to be effective? Should they use expendable lists?:-) Generally, if you wanted to start a discussion group on a forbidden topic on the Internet, and wanted to keep it secure - how would you do it? Today this is an academic question - but tomorrow? :-) Aside from workable anonymous Internet money, the two most needed computer privacy technologies are fortress mailing lists and remailers and workable Dining Cryptographers protocols. THE UNITED STATES "FEDERAL" GOVERNMENT HAS NO LEGITIMACY. The United States "Federal" Government - We'll be even more American without it. PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYYY BBBAAACCCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE! Gary Jeffers

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Re: Junk E-Mail - Part 4
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, In its NEWS IN BRIEF summary, 11 22 95 Financial Times reports: BRUSSELS/LONDON - SELLING - A ban on telephone "cold calling" throughout the European Union was on Tuesday approved by Euro-MPs, to the consternation of direct mar- keting and distance selling organisations. In a move de- signed to spare people from what MEPs consider to be ir- ritating telephone calls, a key parliamentary committee voted to make prior consent from consumers obligatory before a seller can approach them by telephone. The proposed ban also applies to communications by e- mail, raising fears among publishing organisations that the development of the information society in Europe could be damaged. Ban fear, for we have nothing to fear but fear itself. Cordially, Jim NOTE. The URL of one Financial Times Group website is: http://www.usa.ft.com

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Re: Spam the Sign!
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:02 PM 11/22/95 -0800, Jeff Simmons wrote: > and yet the people with the [balls] > to actually challenge it aren't the big companies who stand to gain the > most financially, it's a bunch of guys (a lot of whom hang around here > sometimes) who are successfully giving away 'export controlled' software, If you have looked at court cases recently, you will notice that most juries will find a corporation guilty of anything, no matter how absurd. At a gut level they feel that the pursuit of profit is itself a crime, and that the pursuit of profit in an organized group is a flagrant and terrible crime, deserving of the most savage punishment, unless that pursuit has been thoroughly and carefully supervised and authorized by the state. They are much more reluctant to punish an individual, which is why the government wants to keep Phil in permanent legal limbo. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: crypto for porno users
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"moroni(a)scranton.com" "Moroni" 24-NOV-1995 14:52:11.13 >I wish we could get off the subject of the kiddie porn , it makes >me wonder what people on this list are doing when they are not >mailing out letters. Not to flame ,BUT it is such a serious issue >and we all as adults and approaching adults should not treat it as >an academic issue . It is the most victimizing of all crimes and >I think of speak for some of us when I say that it would be better >if we all found a way to get back to discussing the problems of >cryptography as related to we not pornographers. I can see one argument that one should not discuss such unpopular topics. That argument is that the person who brought them up may act as a (hopefully inadvertent) _agent provocateur_ for those who would condemn cryptography for protecting child pornography and similarly unaccepted practices. However, I regard self-censorship in reaction to fears of government as as evil as governmental censorship. Consequently, I would like to give two counterarguments to the idea that child pornography is not something that should be cryptographically protected. The first is that one may legitimately disagree with the government on what is child pornography. For instance, one may disagree on what minimum age should be used. Governments are known for being quite incoherent on rules on sexuality and the age of consent. For instance, Britain's age for consent depends on the type of sexuality involved; heterosexual sex receives a more lenient age (18) than homosexual (21). (There are also, of course, difficulties caused by such legal inconsistencies as simultaneously deeming someone not to be of consenting age for sex yet to be considered an adult when charged with murder; I refer to the infamous Bobbit (sp?) trials). The second is that given new image modification technologies, it is possible to produce what will seem child pornography, but with no actual harm done to children. In some ways, this product may reduce harm to children in some respects by providing a "competing product" to actual child pornography, and thus discourage its manufacture. Some will argue that such simulated child pornography is useful by pedophiles in persuading children; this argument appears similar to the one against cryptography that it can be used for purposes generally agreed to be illegitimate. I trust that the list does not find such an argument to be valid. I will mention in this regard that I have no personal want to see child pornography. However, I support the right of those who do to do so, if no harm to others is committed. Sincerely Yours, -Allen

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Re: Spam the Sign!
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Jeff Simmons <jsimmons(a)goblin.punk.net> said... >> >> >Then suppose you hand software to MIT to put on its export-controlled ftp >> >site (which would seem to follow your requirements to take reasonable >> >precautions to observe the ITAR, etc.) and you don't do the nudge, nudge, >> >wink, wink - BUT you know that it's going to be available on major ftp >> >sites in Europe within a few hours anyway. The intent to export isn't >> >there, but the export occurs anyway. Is it the intent, or the knowledge >> >that's important? > >What's important to the government is that the crypto not be exported. Actually, that's not true. What's REALLY important to the government is that it not be AVAILABLE outside the country, or perhaps even more accurately, not available anywhere. Problem is, the government doesn't have unlimited authority in this area. >> >Or, to bring it down to a practical question, what's stopping Netscape? How >> >does Netscape setting up an 'export controlled' ftp site based on the MIT >> >version lead to one of their executives going to jail? > >Maybe their executives don't want to deal with the possibility of going to >jail and are staying far from the edge of the law. Maybe they are too busy >trying to find some way to make money. > >> I very much agree with the direction you appear to be headed in. It seems >> to me that Netscape should have no problem devising some sort of scenario in >> which such a program eventually gets onto the nets, but in a way that is >> squeaky clean, at least for THEM. > >But why would they want to risk this? As squeeky clean as it is, we now >all know that they know that making it available this way is exporting >it. NO! The government doesn't even pretend to have authority over non-exported encryption, and they readily admit this. And I'm sure they are also are aware that they can't press their luck with an overbroad interpretation of ITAR. Let's look at REALITY, okay? Export controls on products have been around for many decades. Computers are a classic example. If merely manufacturing a product that (if exported to the wrong place) becomes a violation of such laws/regulations, then practically every computer company that has ever existed violated ITAR. Here's the real "problem": Export regulations were intended to MINIMIZE the number of controlled products "leaking through" the border. There was never any illusion that this could be entirely eliminated. So far so good: They were happy to minimize the number of mainframe computers 1970 (for example) USSR got. Software, by its very nature, is infinitely copiable, which means that even a single export constitutes a complete failure of the system. Thus, a system of regulation that was useful for hardware becomes totally useless for software. >> In addition, why should they even need to write the encrytion part of their >> software IN the US? It occurs to me that one way to do this might be to >> send one of their programmers to a conveniently-located place, such as >> Vancouver BC , Montreal Canada, or a few other nearby places, with a great >> deal of fanfare, and tell him to "write some crypto." He does, and brings >> it back into the US with him, leaving a copy of it "outside" the country for >> international distribution. > >This is illegal as well. No, it isn't. >The programmer is exporting the cryptosystem, No, he isn't. Exporting a book on encryption, including algorithms, for example, is entirely LEGAL. And I think you're misusing the term, "cryptosystem." The government may be attempting to use ITAR to regulate exports of fully-functioning software, but it apparently cannot touch books containing source code for such programming. Thus, "exporting the cryptosystem" is NOT always a violation of ITAR if your definition of "cryptosystem" is so broad as to include source-on-paper, and thus your statement is legally irrelevant. If you tighten up the term "cryptosystem" to include only functioning software, your statement becomes false because said programmer does not need to export same. Note that I'm assuming that the programmer GENUINELY writes the software abroad, as opposed to faking it. Of course, even "faking it" might be legal: If source-on-paper exporting is LEGAL, then taking a copy of an encryption program outside the country on paper, then scanning it into a computer and recompiling there should also be legal. >and may even be guilty of treason (probably not). If you really want >strong crypto, just buy it fom one of the hundreds of legitimate >overseas suppliers. If you want to export strong crypto Netscape, >rewrite Netscape outside the US. It's not that complex a program. That's not a satisfactory solution. The goal, I suggest, is to allow Netscape (or any other manufacturer) to sell a SINGLE product around the world, without violating (even arguably) ITAR.

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CJR_war
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SciAm, December, 1995: "Fighting Future Wars. U.S. military planners may be preparing for the wrong conflict." Policy experts, technical gurus and defense contractors have begun to study a range of other potential threats, from a newly hatched superpower to a regional power with dramatically altered fighting tactics, to legions of mercenary hackers that bring down banks and stock exchanges with computer viruses and other malevolent software. The vast array of scenarios is a measure of the speculative turn that has gripped the military-planning establishment. Debate on high-tech fighting culminates in the question of whether information technologies -- a computer virus, for one -- could make conventional military hardware obsolete and whether they would make possible a virtual invasion of the continental U.S. A battle of the bits would be fought by destroying an enemy's information assets, its financial, electrical, telecommunications and air-traffic-control networks. Direct strikes at the military would not be ruled out: cracking a government computer is already a not infrequent hacker rite of passage. In addition, more than 95 percent of military communications travel over public networks. CJR_war

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SEL_ane
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As previously noted here: SciAm, December, 1995: "Confidential Communication on the Internet." By Thomas Beth, director of the European Institute for System Security and professor of computer science at the university of Karlsruhe. Chain of certification in the author's scheme, SELANE, extends from local authorities who vouch for an individual's identity and probity up through regional, national and supranational authorities, each vouching for those below it. Digital signatures prevent tampering; anyone who recognizes one signature in the chain can be assured that a signed document is valid. SELANE is compatible with almost every commercial and academic network. It also provides a "smart" card that can carry out the necessary calculations securely for each user. And it addresses the conflicts of government and privacy interests when wire-tapping is needed. SEL_ane

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ANNOUNCE - Amnesia Remailer now public
by Scott Kenney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PGP message

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Re: real life problems with ITAR (was Spam the Sign!)
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attila(a)primenet.com said: > On Thu, 23 Nov 1995, jim bell wrote: > >> I very much agree with the direction you appear to be headed in. It seems >> to me that Netscape should have no problem devising some sort of scenario in >> which such a program eventually gets onto the nets, but in a way that is >> squeaky clean, at least for THEM. >> >> >> In addition, why should they even need to write the encrytion part of their >> software IN the US? It occurs to me that one way to do this might be to >> send one of their programmers to a conveniently-located place, such as >> Vancouver BC , Montreal Canada, or a few other nearby places, with a great >> deal of fanfare, and tell him to "write some crypto." He does, and brings >> it back into the US with him, leaving a copy of it "outside" the country for >> international distribution. >> > <attila sez> I think they have that one covered --not only is it >violation of ITAR's intent to send a programmer out of the U.S. Well, don't assume that because something's a "violation of ITAR's INTENT" it is actually a violation of ITAR. It can't be assumed that ITAR is _perfect_: That it actually prohibits every activity the government that wrote it didn't like. , but is >illegal to hire a foreign national to program for your non-U.S. products. Sure about this?!? > the test is going to be with someone like Sun who "bought" a group of >Russian crypto programmers and left them in Russia. Now, the problem >with ITAR is that if you import that code, you can not then export the >code since it is now covered by ITAR. I didn't say that the code would ever be "re-exported": A copy would be brought into the US for domestic use, and everyone else outside the border would get their own copy from an outside server. > secondly, it appears there is a move afoot to make it an ITAR >violation to hire the foreign nationals to circumvent ITAR --basically, >the Feds want to stop cryptography _everywhere_, including telling >Russians they can not work for U.S. companies! Just where do they think >they are getting off? It is for this kind of problem that I "invented" my concept of "Assassination Politics": If everybody pissed off at this situation was willing to donate $10 to a fund to reward the deaths of a few government officials responsible for ITAR, I can well imagine that this would shake them up a bit.

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Re: crypto for porno users
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: gjeffers(a)socketis.net (Gary Jeffers) The SecureDrive 1.4 disk encryptor system solves their computer site disk storage problem. It also gives them the solution to the "rubber hose" problem. With a "damaged" key file and the use of a password, they have an effective defense against court orders demanding keys. (see the docs for SecureDrive 1.4). Also disk encryptors not only encrypt files but also solve the problem of temporary work files that are used by many software packages (They can be reconstructed). ----------------------- Does anyone know of any strong encryptor systems that encrypt a MS-DOS directory with subdirectories, as opposed to a partition? Aside from convenience, this does have the potential advantage that if you did some FAT, etcetera manipulation, it wouldn't be possible to figure out what was garbage and what was encrypted without the program running properly (i.e., have an emergency hotkey combination that wiped the currently used password/phrase and removed the program and the alterations to the FAT). Also nice would be working off of a key on a 3.5" floppy, so it can be removed when not in use (thus reducing the need for typing in a password/phrase every few minutes). It should be compatible with Stacker and similar compression systems if possible, although it could also be run on the uncompressed drive- that way it'd take up more space, however. -Allen

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Fwd: Re: using ecash
by J. Kent Hastings 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: J. Kent Hastings * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- ------- FORWARD, Original message follows ------- Date: Friday, 24-Nov-95 03:38 PM From: Mark Twain Ecash Support \ Internet: (mtwain(a)netcom.com) To: J. Kent Hastings \ Internet: (zeus(a)pinsight.com) Subject: Re: using ecash > During the "play money" beta test, I saw "BEGIN E-CASH PAYMENT" messages > that looked like a PGP format. > I'd like to know if the Mark Twain "real money" US Dollar software has this > feature, too. Mark Twain Ecash does allow for ASCII email payments. > The "heavy user" personal account has a 3 percent fee to withdraw, but > verify that just to make sure. With a Heavy User account you can move a hundred USD in or out of the Mint fee of charge. For the second hundred USD the rate is 3%, but the money movement fee is counted against your monthly fee of $2, so you only pay 3$ - 2$ = 1$ for the second hundred. -- Mark Twain Ecash Support <mailto:support@marktwain.com> <http://www.marktwain.com/ecash.html> ------- FORWARD, End of original message -------

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RE: establishing trust
by gjeffers＠socketis.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RE: establishing trust Question: What's a WEB OF TRUST with STATE agents in it? Answer: - a DRIFTNET! U heard it here first. :-) THE UNITED STATES "FEDERAL" GOVERNMENT HAS NO LEGITIMACY. The United States "Federal" Government - We'll be even more American without it. PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYYY BBBAAACCCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE! Gary Jeffers

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Re: Virus attacks on PGP
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:46 PM 11/24/95, Thomas E Zerucha wrote: .... >I don't know if I mentioned, but I keep PGP and my keys on pcmcia memory >cards that aren't in the system at the same time as a network or modem >card. Moreover I can also simply use the DOS version (I use linux to >communicate) - It would require quite an effort to create a virus that >would work and pass data across the required OS problems and not break >with the twice a week kernel-level changes :). .... Yes it would be hard. When you choose your own protection as above an opponent would have to mount a significant effort just to get your stuff. .... >It takes quite an effort to create a complex virus to do this. It >reminds me of the Glomar Challenger that was used to recover the remains >of a russian sub (my memory is somewhat faulty). Such a virus would >require a great investment in time and money. What target would be worth it? >Many otherwise feasible things aren't economically pracitcal. Yes, but if your particular habits became widespread, an intelligence agency could amortize the virus effort across many victims. Here is just one such complicated virus: Sit in the OS watching for PGP to be launched. Patch PGP on the way in. The patch writes to disk the location and password for the secure key ring. Concurrently the virus watches for there to be IP service and sends the disk information as a UDP. Alternatively the virus waits for idle time, (screen saver time) and dials an 800 number having turned off the modem speaker. But don't send the same data twice! There is a significant hazard for the virus producer here if someone finds the code and learns the 800 number. I am sure that the Telco would help locate the physical phone to which the 800 number led. UDP provides more ways to pigeon drop the secret so as to protect the reader of that data. Perhaps you can send the UDP to the NY-Times (or to your favorite enemy) over a line that you are tapping. The NYT will discard it and no one is the wiser. The virus is then anonymous.

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CJR_war
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/~weld L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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Gates: Jiffy Iffy Crypto
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From "The Road Ahead," by Bill Gates, with Nathan Myhrvold and Peter Rinearson, Viking, 1995. [Paths to the Highway, pp. 106-111] Governments have long understood the importance of keeping information private, for both economic and military reasons. The need to make personal, commercial, military, or diplomatic messages secure (or to break into them) has attracted powerful intellects through the generations. It is very satisfying to break an encoded message. Charles Babbage, who made dramatic advances in the art of code breaking in the mid-1800s, wrote: "Deciphering is, in my opinion, one of the most fascinating of arts, and I fear I have wasted upon it more time than it deserves." I discovered its fascination as a kid when, like kids everywhere, a bunch of us played with simple ciphers. We would encode messages by substituting one letter of the alphabet for another. If a friend sent me a cipher that began "ULFW NZXX," it would be fairly easy to guess that this represented "DEAR BILL," and that U stood for D, and L for E, and so forth. With those seven letters it wasn't hard to unravel the rest of the cipher fairly quickly. Past wars have been won or lost because the most powerful governments on earth didn't have the cryptological power any interested junior high school student with a personal computer can harness today. Soon any child old enough to use a computer will be able to transmit encoded messages that no government on earth will find easy to decipher. This is one of the profound implications of the spread of fantastic computing power. When you send a message across the information highway it will be "signed" by your computer or other information appliance with a digital signature that only you are capable of applying, and it will be encrypted so that only the intended recipient will be able to decipher it. You'll send a message, which could be information of any kind, including voice, video, or digital money. The recipient will be able to be almost positive that the message is really from you, that it was sent at exactly the indicated time, that it has not been tampered with in the slightest, and that others cannot decipher it. The mechanism that will make this possible is based on mathematical principles, including what are called "one-way functions" and "public-key encryption." These are quite advanced concepts, so I'm only going to touch on them. Keep in mind that regardless of how complicated the system is technically, it will be extremely easy for you to use. You'll just tell your information appliance what you want it to do and it will seem to happen effortlessly. A one-way function is something that is much easier to do than undo. Breaking a pane of glass is a one-way function, but not one useful for encoding. The sort of one-way function required for cryptography is one that is easy to undo if you know an extra piece of information and very diffficult to undo without that information. There are a number of such one-way functions in mathematics. One involves prime numbers. Kids learn about prime numbers in school. A prime number cannot be divided evenly by any number except 1 and itself. Among the first dozen numbers, the primes are 2, 3, 5, 7, and 11. The numbers 4, 6, 8, and 10 are not prime because 2 divides into each of them evenly. The number 9 is not prime because 3 divides into it evenly. There are an infinite number of prime numbers, and there is no known pattern to them except that they are prime. When you multiply two prime numbers together, you get a number that can be divided evenly only by those same two primes. For example, only 5 and 7 can be divided evenly into 35. Finding the primes is called "factoring" the number. It is easy to multiply the prime numbers 11,927 and 20,903 and get the number 249,310,081, but it is much harder to recover from the product, 249,310,081, the two prime numbers that are its factors. This one-way function, the difficulty of factoring numbers, underlies an ingenious kind of cipher: the most sophisticated encryption system in use today. It takes a long time for even the largest computers to factor a really large product back into its constituent primes. A coding system based on factoring uses two different decoding keys, one to encipher a message and a different but related one to decipher. With only the enciphering key, it's easy to encode a message, but deciphering it within any practical period of time is nearly impossible. Deciphering requires a separate key, available only to the intended recipient of the message -- or, rather, to the recipient's computer. The enciphering key is based on the product of two huge prime numbers, whereas the deciphering key is based on the primes themselves. A computer can generate a new pair of unique keys in a flash, because it is easy for a computer to generate two large prime numbers and multiply them together. The enciphering key thus created can be made public without appreciable risk, because of the difficulty even another computer would have factoring it to obtain the deciphering key. The practical application of this encryption will be at the center of the information highway's security system. The world will become quite reliant on this network, so it is important that security be handled competently. You can think of the information highway as a postal network where everyone has a mailbox that is impervious to tampering and has an unbreakable lock. Each mailbox has a slot that lets anyone slide information in, but only the owner of a mailbox has the key to get information out. (Some governments may insist that each mailbox have a second door with a separate key that the government keeps, but we'll ignore that political consideration for now and concentrate on the security that software will provide.) Each user's computer or other information appliance will use prime numbers to generate an enciphering key, which will be listed publicly, and a corresponding deciphering key, which only the user will know. This is how it will work in practice: I have information I want to send you. My information appliance/computer system looks up your public key and uses it to encrypt the information before sending it. No one can read the message, even though your key is public knowledge, because your public key does not contain the information needed for decryption. You receive the message and your computer decrypts it with a private key that corresponds to your public key. You want to answer. Your computer looks up my public key and uses it to encrypt your reply. No one else can read the message, even though it was encrypted with a key that is totally public. Only I can read it because only I have the private deciphering key. This is very practical, because no one has to trade keys in advance. How big do the prime numbers and their products have to be to ensure an effective one-way function? The concept of public-key encryption was invented by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1977. Another set of computer scientists, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adelman, soon came up with the notion of using prime factorization as part of what is now known as the RSA cryptosystem, after the initials of their last names. They projected that it would take millions of years to factor a 130-digit number that was the product of two primes, regardless of how much computing power was brought to bear. To prove the point, they challenged the world to find the two factors in this 129-digit number, known to people in the field as RSA 129: 114,381,625,757,888,867,669,235,779,976,146,612,010, 218,296,721,242,362,562,561,842,935,706,935,245,733, 897,830,597,123,563,958,705,058,989,075,147,599,290, 026,879,543,541 They were sure that a message they had encrypted using the number as the public key would be totally secure forever. But they hadn't anticipated either the full effects of Moore's Law, as discussed in chapter 2, which has made computers much more powerful, or the success of the personal computer, which has dramatically increased the number of computers and computer users in the world. In 1993 a group of more than 600 academics and hobbyists from around the world began an assault on the 129-digit number, using the Internet to coordinate the work of various computers. In less than a year they factored the number into two primes, one 64 digits long and the other 65. The primes are as follows: 3,490,529,510,847,650,949,147,849,619,903,898,133, 417,764,638,493,387,843,990,820,577 and 32,769,132,993,266,709,549,961,988,190,834,461,413, 177,642,967,992,942,539,798,288,533 And the encoded message says: "The magic words are squeamish and ossifrage." One lesson that came out of this challenge is that a 129-digit public key is not long enough if the information being encrypted is really important and sensitive. Another is that no one should get too cocksure about the security of encryption. Increasing the key just a few digits makes it much more difficult to crack. Mathematicians today believe that a 250-digit-long product of two primes would take millions of years to factor with any foreseeable amount of future computing power. But who really knows? This uncertainty -- and the unlikely but conceivable possibility that someone could come up with an easy way of factoring big numbers -- means that a software platform for the information highway will have to be designed in such a way that its encryption scheme can be changed readily. One thing we don't have to worry about is running out of prime numbers, or the prospect of two computers' accidentally using the same numbers as keys. There are far more prime numbers of appropriate length than there are atoms in the universe, so the chance of an accidental duplication is vanishingly small. Key encryption allows more than just privacy. It can also assure the authenticity of a document because a private key can be used to encode a message that only the public key can decode. It works like this: If I have information I want to sign before sending it to you, my computer uses my private key to encipher it. Now the message can be read only if my public key -- which you and everyone else knows -- is used to decipher it. This message is verifiably from me, because no one else has the private key that could have encrypted it in this way. My computer takes this enciphered message and enciphers it again, this time using your public key. Then it sends this double-coded message to you across the information highway. Your computer receives the message and uses your private key to decipher it. This removes the second level of encoding but leaves the level I applied with my private key. Then your computer uses my public key to decipher the message again. Because it really is from me, the message deciphers correctly and you know it is authentic. If even one bit of information was changed, the message would not decode properly and the tampering or communications error would be apparent. This extraordinary security will enable you to transact business with strangers or even people you distrust, because you'll be able to be sure that digital money is valid and signatures and documents are provably authentic. Security can be increased further by having time stamps incorporated into encrypted messages. If anyone tries to tinker with the time that a document supposedly was written or sent, the tinkering will be detectable. This will rehabilitate the evidentiary value of photographs and videos, which has been under assault because digital retouching has become so easy to do. My description of public-key encryption oversimplifies the technical details of the system. For one thing, because it is relatively slow, it will not be the only form of encipherment used on the highway. But publickey encryption will be the way that documents are signed, authenticity is established, and the keys to other kinds of encryption are distributed securely. [Critical Issues, pp. 265-66, 270-71] This versatility will be the strength of the network, but it will also mean we will become reliant on it. Reliance can be dangerous. During the New York City blackouts in 1965 and 1977, millions of people were in trouble -- at least for a few hours -- because of their dependence on electricity. They counted on electric power for light, heat, transport, and security. When electricity failed, people were trapped in elevators, traffic lights stopped working, and electric water pumps quit. Anything really useful is missed when you lose it. A complete failure of the information highway is worth worrying about. Because the system will be thoroughly decentralized, any single outage is unlikely to have a widespread effect. If an individual server fails, it will be replaced and its data restored. But the system could be susceptible to assault. As the system becomes more important, we will have to design in more redundancy. One area of vulnerability is the system's reliance on cryptography -- the mathematical locks that keep information safe. None of the protection systems that exist today, whether steeringwheel locks or steel vaults, are completely fail-safe. The best we can do is make it as difficult as possible for somebody to break in. Despite popular opinions to the contrary, computer security has a very good record. Computers are capable of protecting information in such a way that even the smartest hackers can't get at it readily unless someone entrusted with information makes a mistake. Sloppiness is the main reason computer security gets breached. On the information highway there will be mistakes, and too much information will get passed along. Someone will issue digital concert tickets that prove to be forgeable, and too many people will show up. Whenever this sort of thing happens, the system will have to be reworked and laws may have to be revised. Because both the system's privacy and the security of digital money depend on encryption, a breakthrough in mathematics or computer science that defeats the cryptographic system could be a disaster. The obvious mathematical breakthrough would be development of an easy way to factor large prime numbers. Any person or organization possessing this power could counterfeit money, penetrate any personal, corporate, or governmental file, and possibly even undermine the security of nations, which is why we have to be so careful in designing the system. We have to ensure that if any particular encryption technique proves fallible, there is a way to make an immediate transition to an alternate technique. There's a little bit of inventing still to be done before we have that perfected. It is particularly hard to guarantee security for information you want kept private for a decade or more. [Good section on privacy protection elided] At the same time technology is making it easier to create video records, it is also making it possible to keep all your personal documents and messages totally private. Encryption-technology software, which anyone can download from the Internet, can transform a PC into a virtually unbreakable code machine. As the highway is deployed, security services will be applied to all forms of digital information -- phone calls, files, databases, you name it. As long as you protect the password, the information stored on your computer can be held under the strongest lock and key that has ever existed. This allows for the greatest degree of information privacy any individual has ever had. Many in government are opposed to this encryption capability, because it reduces their ability to gather information. Unfortunately for them, the technology can't be stopped. The National Security Agency is a part of the U.S. government defense and intelligence community that protects this country's secret communications and decrypts foreign communications to gather intelligence data. The NSA does not want software containing advanced encryption capabilities to be sent outside the United States. However, this software is already available throughout the world, and any computer can run it. No policy decision will be able to restore the tapping capabilities governments had in the past. Today's legislation that prevents the export of software with good encryption capability could harm U.S. software and hardware companies. The restrictions give foreign companies an advantage over U.S. competitors. American companies almost unanimously agree that the current encryption export restrictions don't work. -----

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Money: Back to the Future?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wall Street Journal, Nov 23, 1995. Money: Back to the Future? By Walter Wriston (Former chairman of Citicorp) Americans are about to begin using a new kind of money that may have consequences for the Federal Reserve's control of the money supply and almost certainly for the velocity of money. Over the years, people have used all kinds of things for money, from the huge immovable stones in the front yards of the residents of Yap Island to the more familiar silver and gold. All these various mediums of exchange will now be joined in our country by the "smart" card -- a piece of plastic embedded with a microchip. Smart cards combine features of the following: automatic teller machine cards that let you access your bank account and draw cash; MasterCard or Visa cards that permit you to buy now and pay later; and debit cards that charge an account at the time of purchase. Not only can smart cards do all of the above but they can also serve as an "electronic purse" independent of your bank account. These cards contain real money that can be spent at stores and restaurants. In effect, the card is an electronic traveler's check, but one that makes exact change. In addition, the integrated circuit chip allows a higher degree of security for the information stored than do the current magnetic strip cards. Smart cards are common in Europe and Asia, where some 400 million were shipped last year. The first large-scale use of smart cards in this country will occur next year at the Summer Olympics in Atlanta. Plans call for 300,000 rechargeable cards, and 700,000 disposable cards in denominations of $25, $50 and $100. These cards would fit nicely into the payment habits of Americans, since in the U.S. it is estimated that 88% of transactions are done by cash or check, and of these 83% are for less than $10. In Atlanta, electronic "purse cards," which contain stored value, could be spent at pay phones or vending machines. When their stored value is exhausted, they are thrown away. The smart cards, by contrast, can be taken back to the issuer and recharged. Their broad issuance and use could return America to something very close to the free banking of the last century, when every commercial bank issued dollar bills, backed sometimes by the skill of the management, sometimes by doubtful state bonds and sometimes by gold or silver. We have grown so accustomed to the familiar Federal Reserve note that many forget that Americans had no central bank for about 75 years -- from 1836, when President Jackson vetoed the bill to renew the charter of the Second Bank of the United States, to the start of World War I, when the Federal Reserve Act was passed. After the passage by New York state of the Free Banking Act in 1838, the idea of state-chartered banks spread across the country, and each commercial bank issued its own dollar bills of various shapes and sizes. This does not mean that the 19th century witnessed complete currency chaos. In 1863, the National Bank Act was passed to create a market in the government bonds needed to finance the Civil War and to bring some order to the private issuance of currency. The act required that bank notes issued by commercial banks be uniform in appearance and that they be backed by collateral consisting of U.S. Treasury securities. As the old Civil War bonds were paid off, the currency base of the country declined some 60% from 1881 to 1890. This inflexible system led to panics and instability. To a certain extent, the Treasury Department during this time assumed some of the functions of a central bank. All during this period a debate raged, not about whether America needed a central bank but about "free silver" and the price at which the Treasury would buy gold and silver. It was not until the eve of World War I that passage of the Federal Reserve Act finally gave the U.S. government a monopoly on the creation of money. Now we may be going back to the future. The advent of smart cards means that the Fed will lose its monopoly on issuing currency, except that this time the new money will be issued not only by banks but by all kinds of companies, from convenience stores to telephone companies. Nor is this the only trend threatening the Fed's monopoly: Information technology is about to permit the creation of both electronic token money and cash money in cyberspace. Already we have Digi Cash in Amsterdam reviving in modern guise something very close to the old American free-banking system -- issuing electronic money (backed by some depository bank holding collateral in the form of Treasury securities) and performing the clearing function. None of this is necessarily a cause for panic. There is very little, if any, evidence that government has managed our currency values any better than the commercial banks did in pre-Fed days. Indeed, the Nobel laureate economist F.A. Hayek put it more strongly: "The history of government management of money has, except for a few short happy periods, been one of incessant fraud and deception." Still these new trends do present worries for central bankers. If more and more firms issue cards for cash or credit, what will be the effect on the velocity of money? How will central banks form policies on the control of the money supply if any company can issue electronic purse cards on credit, with or without collateral? What will happen if the issuer of the card goes broke? As smart cards become more visible in America, regulators and governments will begin to wonder about control of money and credit. The Eulopean system of central banks has produced an advisory report outlining a possible regulatory response, and in this countly some Fed officials are starting to wonder if their regulations will be applicable. If one definition of money is an object that has no use except to be given to someone else in exchange for goods or services, smart cards are money -- and they are coming to your neighborhood soon. -----

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Re: [rehash] Re: crypto for porno users
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:05 PM 11/24/95, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >Watch the cpunks go round and round and round and... > >On Fri, 24 Nov 1995, Gary Jeffers wrote: > >> I know little of the theory of Dining Cryptographers but I would think >> that a good implementation of it would make infiltrators useless. I will >> leave it for other Cypherpunks to discuss the mechanics (specific and >> general) for actually doing this. > >Dining Cryptographers nets (aka DC-nets) are the whole idea behind the >type 2 anon remailers like Mixmaster, and the remailernet in general. >You'll find a lot on this in the archives, the ftp site (which has Chaum's >DC article and a good explanation by Tim May) and a few peoples' pages. >(I think they're mostly pointed to in the pages I list) > I wish this were the case. Mixmaster is not based on the "Dining Cryptographers" problem, but based on Chaum's "Digital Mixes". Digital mixes hide the fact that A is communicating with B. DC nets allow an individual A in a group of people A' to send a message so that it is impossible to tell who in the group sent it (but it is known to have been one of the members of A'). -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Junk E-Mail - Part 4
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 23 Nov 1995, James M. Cobb wrote: > BRUSSELS/LONDON - SELLING - A ban on telephone "cold > calling" throughout the European Union was on Tuesday > approved by Euro-MPs, to the consternation of direct mar- > keting and distance selling organisations. In a move de- > signed to spare people from what MEPs consider to be ir- > ritating telephone calls, a key parliamentary committee > voted to make prior consent from consumers obligatory > before a seller can approach them by telephone. > > The proposed ban also applies to communications by e- > mail, raising fears among publishing organisations that > the development of the information society in Europe could > be damaged. I think that there are significantly different standards and expectations outside the borders of the United States, than inside. Can you imagine the unmitigated "gall" of Euro-MPs in protecting the public rather than caving in to direct marketing special interest groups?? Goodness ... how archaic. The next thing those Europeans are going to do is something really strange and un-American, like having television commercials broadcast in between TV programs -- broadcast only after a show is over. Finished. Those Europeans just might not allow commercials to be woven in between scenes of a 20-minute sitcom. They might say, before and after ... and that's it. I mean this idea that advertising is "pollution" might start to catch on in certain European quarters. > Ban fear, for we have nothing to fear but fear itself. Heavens, no. Than again, I'm waiting for the day that the NY Times allows advertising on its op-ed page. Or for that matter the Washington Post in its online edition. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: PGP Distribution Site at MIT *DOWN*
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sat Nov 25th, 1995: >We apologize for the inconvenience and hope to have full service >restored shortly. > -Jeff Can you PLEASE put the .org permissions back in it! Thanks ever so much. censored.org can't get in. Love Always, Carol Anne -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMLd3ZorpjEWs1wBlAQHQXQP9EzvOuKxWs3f1gLPbhmUC7BMJcHLR8Dfz jeU0AyGsxp9KWvfeut2nNzbSYsAgzLGUwmoQcU66t8iJPCXVW/mCORo5R1tExi+p RFlPrhyfJyDxJfNT/RzRlrQT6KDj5U4AizIliaGdVh3KVHUmOiUNxX/4FAUQTKpl c+kEefbMElI= =9Y9F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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No Subject
by Albert Nanomius 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: "LadyNada" <ladynada(a)ix.netcom.com> To: snet-l(a)world.std.com Date: Sun, 26 Nov 1995 13:26:39 +0000 Subject: Post Office to approve some internet email - -- Area : AEN NEWS -----------------------------------------( M-BOARD.SU1 )---- Msg# 22280 Date: 11-18-95 19:01 From: jared(a)alaska.net Read: No Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: Oh, great. The Post Office is going to certify Internet mail. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "Jared Armstrong" <jared(a)alaska.net> Originally to: news(a)aen.org Original Date: Sat, 18 Nov 95 18:47 EST http://techweb.cmp.com/techweb/ia/18issue/18post.html > [Image] > Post Office offers Internet digital ID > Certification authority a key enabler of electronic commerce > By Gail Bronson > Side bar WASHINGTON - Come next summer, the U.S. Postal Service > expects to be up and running with a service that will identify > senders and receivers of Internet messages, a critical enabler of > electronic commerce. > Specifically, the Postal Service will operate a certification > authority for public-key certificates used to digitally sign > messages transmitted over the Internet. > The Postal Service expects the service to be of particular interest > to anyone involved in electronic commerce or electronic data > interchange, in which the ability to assure the identity of both > the sender and receiver of information can be crucial. > "Right now there is no way to figure out if messages on the > Internet have been tampered with nor is there any way to > authenticate the genuine identity of a sender," said Paul Raines, > program manager for electronic commerce at the Postal Service. "It > could be a dog on the other end of the Internet now for all you > know." > Limited beta tests of the Postal Service's system already are under > way within the federal government, at the Federal Aviation > Administration, Social Security and the Internal Revenue Service. > "We're eager to work with VeriSign [RSA Data Security Inc. > spin-off] and any other certification authorities to come up with > ways to help with cross certification," Raines said. "We're not in > this to compete with private companies, rather, we're trying to > enable [the electronic commerce] industry." > Some users may find the Postal Service certification authority > service more appealing than private alternatives because its > service will carry the weight of law - tampering with Internet > messages would be as much a crime as tampering with regular U.S. > mail. On the other hand, there is always the lingering concern of > having to deal with a federal bureaucracy. > The Postal Service intends to play two roles in the certification > business. > First, as a certifying service the federal agency will provide the > code, or public-key certificate, necessary for recipients of > digitally signed messages to identify the sender. This service will > be necessary to decrypt mail unless the two correspondents > previously exchanged their keys privately. Second, the Postal > Service will maintain a server to manage a public register of > public-key certificates accessible off the Internet, Raines said. > The Postal Service will conduct market studies to gauge demand > before deciding how much individuals must pay to obtain someone > else's public key certificate. In addition, the Postal Service will > sell for less than a dollar an electronic date-time stamp to prove > the existence of a message in a particular point in time. > "We're taking the same attributes of hard copy that make them > legally binding and transferring them to electronic > correspondence," Raines said. > The Postal Service is working with several companies, including > Premenos Corp., to develop the necessary software, Raines said. The > user agent and interface specifications for designing software to > interface with the Postal Service's server, however, are available > free to any one willing to sign a licensing agreement, Raines said. > Regardless of how such arrangements work themselves out, the Postal > Service intends to operate this business on a nonprofit, > self-supported basis. "We don't intend to have first-class mail > supporting Internet mail," Raines said. > Back to Current Issue ______________________________________________________ Jared Armstrong Anchorage, Alaska, USA Last Free Place On Earth jared(a)alaska.net http://www.alaska.net/~jared For PGP Key, Send E-Mail With Subject:Get PGP Key ______________________________________________________ PGP Key ID E2B22AD1 PGP Fingerprint 38 C7 58 C0 C3 10 E0 9D 51 B2 F4 FA 76 04 47 87 ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ - --- Reply to: news(a)aen.org * Origin: AEN NEWS Internet Gateway (1:231/110.1) ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: key for Alice as promised (not)
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 22 Nov 1995 anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > > As an incentive for Alice to generate herself a PGP key, I hereby > > place Alice on notice that if she doesn't sign her next post, and > > provide a PGP key, I will create one for her, and steal all the > > postive (?) reputation that she has developed so far. Positive reputation?? Me?? Uhhm, thanks, I guess. > > You have 24 hours Alice, otherwise a key gets posted to here, and to > > the keyservers with your nym on it. > > Well 24 hours have passed, and Alice remains unrepentant: Can you imagine?? I'm simply not willing to fool myself into thinking that I ahve security by posting a key and using PGP. I think that's irresponsible. Unless, I have a secure machine dedicated to PGP *which I don't* I don't fool myself into thinking that I have any security, at all. > On Tue, 21 Nov 1995, the old Alice de 'nonymous wrote: > > > Alice here ... > > > > No, *I* am the real Alice, and I refuse to use PGP signing. Yep ... that's right. > So here we go Alice's key: > > Type bits/keyID Date User ID > pub 1024/23292ED1 1995/11/22 Alice de 'nonymous <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> > Key fingerprint = CA 76 81 41 54 CE E7 D6 62 EE 6D 65 EE FB A3 55 Gee, it might even help if you got the address right. Since when is the list address, my address?? cypherpunks(a)toad.com?? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Cypherpunks article in The Nando Times
by ahupp＠primenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info//101095/info446_33.html Its an article about the cypherpunks, mostly bullshit and hyperbole. I especially liked the parts about "Larry Detweiler" and this quote from Jim Kallston, of the FBI: "We're not trying to stop technology," Kallston said. "We're trying to collect information on criminals and terrorists and child pornographers." What happened to the fourth horseman Jim? -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQBtAzCNppQAAAEDALhWZl7IuGZ9zZT5bACo0b/1L0Nv0C72vKHIO3IHh+cwpHHa 2Ozb9aeO0UvXGwkkZIYgUm0EvmzKh7yb1GTLvBp5kXpR3I9w+Yj4LGlBDERpUWw6 x4ED49pwDnz1Hl5FBQAFEbQYYXNoIDxhaHVwcEBwcmltZW5ldC5jb20+ =PtJK -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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