December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet
by Steve14571＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-01-03 00:34:25 EST, you write: >CompuServe is not location-dependant. The network operates exactly the >same regardless of calling location (indeed, the system doesn't even know >where you're calling from I believe). It is a worldwide CompuServe >Network that people use to access it. This network just allows dialups >and then gets the users connected to the CompuServe computers. The main >computers handle all traffic. They don't are location-independant, >making it impossible to block access based on location. I see two possible ways to censor German users only (but I still believe censoring anyone is wrong). First, the "main computers" could be told where they are, and "censored" material could be filtered at that level before it is sent to individual users. Or CompuServe could release a software update for German users. The software would not recognize banned newsgroups. How difficult could that possibly be?

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd)
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:08 1/3/96, Steve Gibbons wrote: >I'd be interested in seeing your numbers and cost breakdowns. I'd really be >interested in the up-front costs that would be associated with the equipment >and set-up time/training that will help "insure" data privacy over wideley >broadcast media. The up-front costs for ~T1 capable tranceivers isn't >insignificant either. I figure ~$10K up front (maybe half of that, maybe twice >when you include management overhead) Amortize over 3 years, and compare. You can get by with one base station per five remote receivers. This is no different than the 5/1 to 12/1 oversale ratios common to the T1 ISP business. As long as you prohibit resale of bandwidth and specialize in hooking up business lans you'll have no problems with this layout. Latency, which really is more important than bandwidth in many cases, is actually better using wireless than using traditional T1s. The set-up costs are also less to the customer than if they used a regular ISP. Only difference is that by paying the set-up fees they are buying the equipment for _you_. So once they leave your ISP, you still have all the hardware :-) >All of this is assuming that the bandwidth is available on the airwaves to >handle ~200 ~T1s. (If we're talking $200.00/mo. for T1, sign me up tomorrow, >and my neighbor, and his, and hers, and... *poof* no more bandwidth in a >"decently" populated metro area or even a downtown. 900MHz spread spectrum can get a bit crowded, but you don't need to sell 200 connections to make money. Breakeven based on competitive montly fees (in my original calculations that ment less than the lowest priced local ISP) is about 10 customers. Of course this is not at <$200 per customer. That figure is the lowest possible if you max out a T3, but still, no landline based ISP will be able to deliver bandwidth that cheap. Remember that the fees _include_ the cost for the pipe. Breakeven based on the set-up fees (meaning zero dollars investment by you) is about 18 customers. >I apologize if this is off topic, but the crypto part still applies (moreso, >even!) to broadcast over the airwaves. All major wireless vendors offer DES encryption at about $300 per node. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: New Mitnick Book
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Also please note that you are inaccurate in stating that > Tsutomu requested immunity before testifying before > Congress on April 1993. I don't know anything about the accuracy of the rest of the post, but I was there at this hearing. Immunity was granted, but it wasn't the same type of immunity granted to someone like Oliver North. My recollection is that the immunity was granted to allow Tsutomu Shimomura to convert an ordinary cellular phone into a scanner by typing in the magic combination of numbers. Ordinarily, this would break the law. The immunity prevented this from happening. The act was simply done to demonstrate just how easy it is to do this. They quickly switched channels several times and then turned off the phone. Nothing salicious or interesting came over the air, alas. It would have been funny if some bribe deal involving the chairman of the committee filled the room, but that only happens in movies. I don't know who requested the immunity. It could have been John Gage of Sun Micro who seemed to be running the show. There were probably transcripts made of the session and for all I know the Government might even have them around. That would allow us to get to the bottom of this important detail. -Peter

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RE: crypto (semi-)export issue
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

m5(a)dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) writes: > Isn't it the case that there are loopholes or explicit exceptions in > crypto export regulations that allow American businesses to supply > their overseas operatives with tools for secure communication back > home? We were discussing today some stuff about our web server, and > there's some desire to provide secure access for our sales people to > internal junk. Nobody was sure whether it'd be OK for our people in > the Evil Empire (Europe) to have the 128-bit-RC4 Netscape for that > purpose. At the December NIST Key Escrow/GAK export meeting, Mike Nelson said that there are rules that allow US companies to "easily" export strong encryption to their overseas operations. The important (key :-) idea is that the export is to protect the corporate assetts of US companies. He seemed to imply that exporting, say PGP, for internal corporate use was fine and easily done. Other folks later claimed that this wasn't quite as easy as he claimed. For more, see, http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/nist/pdf.nist2.html Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: New Mitnick Book
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the Littman book: > Shimomura likes his computer-controlled cellular phone, but > its use for tracking is limited. Its main purpose is to > lock on a call and eavesdrop. It is illegal to use it to > eavesdrop on calls. That's why Shimomura needed immunity > from prosecution when he demonstrated his Oki scanner > before Congress a couple of years ago. (p. 6) > Well, here's another minor error. At the hearing, Shimomura just used a new, shrink wrapped cell phone. I think it was an AT&T model, but my memory is faint on these details. I'm pretty sure it wasn't an off the shelf Oki 900. Half the point was to show just how easy it was. He didn't even bother to hook the cell phone up to a laptop or palmtop. Just a few button pushes and instant scanner. I tried to get him to tell me the right buttons afterwards, but he was too busy and didn't answer. Sigh. But aside from the brand name of the phone, Littman's sentence seems accurate according to my recollection. The transcript should settle all of this. -Peter

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Re: New Mitnick Book
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by pcw(a)access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) on Wed, 3 Jan 7:39 PM Here's Littman on immunity for Shimomura (describing telco tracking Mitnick): Shimomura's brought along his own hacker's scanning rig. It's pretty basic, just an Oki 900 cellular phone and a hardware interface to his tiny HP Palmtop. One of Shimomura's friends -- who happens to be under federal indictment for illegal hacking -- cooked up the interface and helped write the software. Shimomura likes his computer-controlled cellular phone, but its use for tracking is limited. Its main purpose is to lock on a call and eavesdrop. It is illegal to use it to eavesdrop on calls. That's why Shimomura needed immunity from prosecution when he demonstrated his Oki scanner before Congress a couple of years ago. (p. 6) ------ [Still reading ... ]

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd)
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>As I understand the physics, the whole process could be made FAR FAR FAR >more efficient if the rocket was boosted to about 40000 feet with a subsonic >airplane, a' la' X-15 and such. It's above 75% of the earth's atmosphere >(dramatically reduced drag), is already going 600 mph in the correct >direction, and is 8 miles closer to the ultimate goal 250 miles up). This >might not sound like much of an advantage, but if you've ever worked out the >mathematics of the Saturn V (or space shuttle, etc), the VAST majority of >the fuel was used up in the first 20,000 feet, maybe even the first 5000 >feet. It would be even better if the first stage could be an air-breathing >supersonic ramjet, but that's not my field of expertise. Orbital Sciences Corp in Virginia do exactly that, but with a B52 and a 60 foot long rocket. They launch relatively small payloads for relatively cheap and have done it successfully on many occasions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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AP Story: "Germans: Was CompuServe's Call
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CPers may want to examine this Associated Press story: "Germans: Was CompuServe's Call" 02 Jan 1996, 14:30 clari.news.censorship Message-ID: <Agerman-compuserveURyaQ_6J2(a)clari.net> -- -- tallpaul -- Visualize HappyNet!

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Experience teaching cryptography and computer security at NYU
by rubin＠faline.bellcore.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last semester, I taught a graduate course called "Cryptography and Computer Security" at NYU. I have written up a summary of the experience. You can find it at ftp: thumper.bellcore.com in /pub/rubin/fall95.ps or fall95.ps.Z web: ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/fall95.ps.Z and there is a link to it from my home page: ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/rubin.html I will be teaching the same class next semester at NYU, and there are plans for a sequel next fall. Avi ********************************************************************* Aviel D. Rubin Email: rubin(a)faline.bellcore.com Research Scientist Adjunct Professor at NYU Bellcore (MRE-2M354) 445 South St. ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/rubin.html Morristown, NJ 07960 Voice: +1 201 829 4105 USA FAX: +1 201 829 2645

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test
by Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

test, please ignore

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test
by Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

test, please ignore - 1 copy sent.

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Kocher timing attack in RISKS
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reproduced here from RISKS digest: ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 Dec 1995 17:23:09 -0100 From: Saso Tomazic <saso.tomazic(a)fer.uni-lj.si> Subject: Re: Timing cryptanalysis of RSA, DH, DSS (Kocher, RISKS-17.53) The timing attack presented by Paul C. Kocher in his extended abstract of the paper "Cryptanalysis of Diffie-Helman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems Using Timing Attacks" (ftp://ftp.cryptography.com/pub/kocher_timing_attack.ps) is really worth consideration, however I would like to stress there is no need for panic, mainly for two reasons: 1) Security of practical cryptosystems do not rest solely on security of crypt algorithm. In fact, cryptoanalysis attacks are rare, due to strong crypto algorithms that are presently known. More often cryptosystems are broken using other weak points of cryptosystems as insecurity of keys, bad key management, easy to guess passwords, computer screen radiation, monitoring the keystrokes of computer in network, ... The timing attack can be considered just as one of them, not the most dangerous one. For practical cryptosystem, it would be extremely difficult to measure exact timing of encryption process, at least much more difficult as to monitor keystrokes or to capture entire message from the screen. The intruder, who would be able to measure the exact timing of encryption in a multitasking environment, would probably also have access to everything else (i.e., secret message, secret key, passwords, ...) and thus no need to measure timing. 2.) It is not so difficult to rewrite algorithms to be resistant to timing attacks, i.e., to have execution time independent of secret key. For example, the algorithm to compute R = y^x mod n given in the Kocher paper can be simply rewritten as: Let R = 1. Let A = 1. Let z = y. For i=0 upto (bits_in_x-1): If (bit i of x) is 1 then Let A = (R*z) mod n Else Let B = (R*z) mod n Let y = y^2 mod n. Let R = A. End. to be resistant to timing attacks. ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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Re: NYT's _Unmuzzling the Internet_
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Vlad" wrote: <snip> >I am all for helping congressmen "get a clue" at this moment in time. >the Digital Telephony bill is not a declaration of war. when they try >to tax Cyberspace or get the FCC to regulate it, or outlaw cryptography, >*that* will be a declaration of war. I hate to be the bearer of bad news, and I try to resist forwarding messages from other lists, but on cyberia-L, Mr. Nick Keenan wrote: <snipped, forwarded message follows> ____________________________________ The FCC is now proposing a tax on ISP's -- in the name of "universal access" !?? :O(. They claim that since voice can be transmitted over the Internet, it falls under the jurisdiction of the FCC. Read about it in the Dec. 18 issue of Interactive Week ( http://www.zdnet.com/~intweek/print/951218/upfront/doc11.html) >From the article: >FCC Chairman Reed Hundt provided the tip-off earlier this year during a >speech he gave in Washington at the Networked Economy Conference. Hundt said >the commission would issue a Notice of Proposed Rule-Making sometime this >year in order to re-examine how access charges are assigned and universal >service is funded, said Mark Corbitt, Hundt's main technology adviser. > >The Internet community "should wake up [and] pay attention," Corbitt >said. "This issue could hit them before they know it. I don't think >most of them are even aware" that this is bubbling up through the agency. ____End forwarded message____ I would hope that we would flood them with comments during the period after the "Notice of Proposed Rule-Making" appears, not that it will help, as they have already made up their minds. The FCC (like the FDA) should be defunded, not just "cut," whatever that word means anymore. There are good economic reasons why this won't help "universal access" any more than peanut subsidies help minority farmers, despite lies to the contrary by various self-interested bureaucrats. As Republicans said (before they became the majority party) "Cut Their Pay and Send Them Home." JMR Regards, Jim Ray http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray "Hooters GUYS? Washington -- GET A GRIP!" _______________________________________________________________________ PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Public Key id. # E9BD6D35 <liberty(a)gate.net> IANAL _______________________________________________________________________ Help Phil! e-mail zldf(a)clark.net or http://www.netresponse.com/zldf _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMOtDhm1lp8bpvW01AQHwXQP/XLPjBtLj55FUCTIY+F5Jz6+q9Y3a6Ies qLKoMcGbSMZfNxqzS7nenBCwGgyajl2kxea7zjPJkVZiKgAMPTyOYQ7inrIMyLp3 G7OgmroqnqT7NqXJuAzpOVO86QrbT29kJhsTs9HgiD3dBjHLEGZX5uCAhiAxVS/A ZraKvoyZ1ao= =3NjK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 03, 1996 14:47:35, 'anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com' wrote: >My original post, "US calls for measures against Internet porn" was a >satire. The entire point was that, by changing a few words in the >"China calls for measures against Internet porn" story, a statement by >a totalitarian communist regime could be made to look like official US >policy. Obviously, the project was a success, as people are taking it >seriously in spite of the fact that it had telltale clues, and that >the original source was revealed. > I was going to post on this topic, especially on a paraphrase of the (ostensible) original. I still want to, but let me play either the skeptical or responsible journalist (reader's choice of adjectives). Anonymous has *not* revealled the original source as he/it/she claimed. They have asserted it came from Xinhua news agency. Will Anonymous post a pointer to where we can access on the internet the original? News feed, date, and time of posting, as well as message ID should suffice. -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong.

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Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 03, 1996 20:54:01, '"Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+(a)CMU.EDU>' wrote: >Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 3-Jan-96 Re:US calls for measures >ag.. by tallpaul(a)pipeline.com >> Anonymous has *not* revealled the original source as he/it/she claimed. >> They have asserted it came from Xinhua news agency. Will Anonymous post a >> pointer to where we can access on the internet the original? News feed, >> date, and time of posting, as well as message ID should suffice. > >It's been on the AP and Reuters wires, as well as on the CNN web site. > >-Declan > > "newswires" and "web sites" are not pointers to exact quotations. my question remains unanswered. -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong.

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Re: Windows Eudora and PGP
by Douglas F. Elznic 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:27 PM 1/3/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >At 10:24 AM 1/3/96 -0800, you wrote: >>At 09:43 AM 1/3/96 -0800, Jim Bell wrote: >> >>>(BTW, I use Eudora, and I have PGP. Could somebody explain how to PGP-sign >>>messages, ideally EASILY?) >> >>I use Eudora as well. It is not as easy as I would like. You have a couple >>of options: >> >>1) Use cut-and-paste into Private Idaho. Private Idaho will allow you to >>paste back into Eudora. (Or you can send out from Private Idaho directly.) >>This option is useful becuase it supports nyms and chaining of remailers. >> >>2) Get one of the standard Windows PGP shells and paste into that. After >>signing, you will have to repaste into Eudora again. >> >>These seem to be the only options. I am not certain if there is a standard >>DDE or OLE interface that could be used to feed message information back and >>forth between Eudora and some other app. There have been a number of >>promises of Eudora/PGP integration, but nothing has materialized yet. > >[sigh] Just what I thought, no easy solutions. Well, for now I'll just >skip signing; I haven't had any problem (that I know of...knock on silicon) >with forged messages, and my normal posts are so enthusiastically anarchical >and inflammatory that the only way anybody could really embarrass me is to >forge a message, ostensibly from me, saying I agreed with some governmental >activity somewhere. > > >>There are no easy answers I know of... >> >>If you need a copy of Private Idaho, I can point you to a web site or bring >>a copy along to the meeting on the 20th. > >Please do... > > > I have heard that their are alpha releases currentky geing worked on at quest/qualcomm. But i would have to say before they come out your best bet to pgp and eudora is either pidaho or just use it in dos. pidaho is a great front end. A lot better than any others out their. I have also heard that ViaCrypt is a good alternative. But I am not sure. Has anyone else out there heard anything good/bad about ViaCrypt? -- ==================Douglas Elznic=================== delznic(a)storm.net http://www.vcomm.net/~delznic/ (315)682-5489 (315)682-1647 4877 Firethorn Circle Manlius, NY 13104 "Challenge the system, question the rules." =================================================== PGP key available: http://www.vcomm.net/~delznic/pgpkey.asc PGP Fingerprint: 68 6F 89 F6 F0 58 AE 22 14 8A 31 2A E5 5C FD A5 ===================================================

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AOL security letter
by Corey Bridges 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Looks like AOL is being dragged, kicking and screaming, into the world of security. This is a note that AOL subscribers are receiving today: >>>> bj: ALERT: Password Security Date: 95-12-31 07:27:13 EST From: Steve Case Sent on: America Online (using Stratus) Dear Friend of America Online, I want to raise your awareness about an issue that affects us all: the importance of never revealing your password. Recently there have been a few incidents where computer hackers have tried to gain access to passwords by soliciting individuals online. These hackers have increased their level of sophistication so much that they have begun to correspond in a style to make you believe they are representing America Online. Here's an edited excerpt from a recent e-mail attempt: "Dear AOL Community Member: AOL is experiencing major problems...Due to a virus that was recently loaded...onto our main user database, containing most of our member registration information, we are currently experiencing widespread system failure. The problem originated...when our system was illegally breached by a former AOL employee. We believe the employee, who is currently being questioned by authorities, loaded a virus into our database. Because we identified the problem quickly, we were able to stop the problem before the entire database was deleted. The files that were deleted, however, happened to be the database link files...that link a user's password and screen name to the rest of their account. We are currently...working with McAfee Associates (Anti-Virus), to replace the lost files... ...Some of the effects as a result of not having the database link files include: random log-off's, AOLnet runs slower, and Email may accidentally be deleted. These problems are MAJOR inconveniences to our users, so we need your help to fix the problem." The letter continues, outlining the steps you must take to keep your account active, and awarding you free online hours for your troubles. Sending e-mail is just one tactic. Another approach is by using IMs (Instant Messages), where a hacker will notice you are online and try to pass himself off as an employee. Hackers sometimes scan chat areas and the member directory for screen names. Simply put, your passwords are like items in your safety deposit box. They're confidential. YOU are the only person who should know your password. Giving someone (even unintentionally) your password -- especially online -- is like handing over your wallet, keys, and other valuables to complete strangers. There is absolutely no reason why America Online would ever ask you for your password! Be aware: NO EMPLOYEE OR REPRESENTATIVE OF AMERICA ONLINE WILL EVER ASK YOU FOR YOUR PASSWORD, YOUR CREDIT CARD NUMBER, OR TO VERIFY YOUR BILLING INFORMATION ONLINE. IF THEY DO, BE SUSPICIOUS AND TAKE ACTION--REPORT IT IMMEDIATELY. Here are some quick steps to keep your passwords secure: 1) Immediately change your passwords (at keyword PASSWORD) to at least 6 alphanumeric characters -- combination of letters and numbers -- for all of your sub-accounts. Delete unused sub-accounts. 2) NEVER use your screen name, first or last name, town, street, etc. as a password. Do not use a common word. Add a few digits to a word, or misspell it. Hackers use all kinds of programs that search for common words. 3) Inform spouses, children, and others who have access to your account to take the same safety measures, and to NEVER give out passwords. 4) Report suspicious behavior at keyword STAFFPAGER immediately. Computer hacking on America Online is not widespread. But it's an activity -- and an illegal act -- which hinders our ability to conduct business and ensure a safe online community. AOL will pursue all legal action and law enforcement protection within our right to protect the security of our service. We also rely on our members, partners, remote community leaders, and others with overhead accounts much like a neighborhood watch program -- to help crush hacking, to maintain confidentiality of the simplest personal belonging (your password), and to report activity of this kind to AOL immediately. If you have any questions, please discuss them with your contact at AOL. Thank you, and have a Happy New Year. Regards, Steve Case Corey Bridges Security Documentation Netscape Communications Corporation home.netscape.com/people/corey 415-528-2978

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Will the real Anonynous please stand up
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Herewith is where my confusion developed by Anonymous #1, posted as Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 18:34:56 -0600, Message-Id: <199601010034.SAA07422(a)tjava.com>: The story as presented by Anon #1, while supposedly from Reuters quotes the Associated Press, something that rarely if even happens. Another story, posted by Anonymous #2 (presumably the same entity as Anonymous #1), posted as Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 01:25:12 +0100, Message-Id: <199601010025.BAA04537(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> is slugged "BEIJING (AP)_ " and quotes Xinhua News Agency; A reference by Anonymous #3 (presumably the same entity as Anon #1 & #2), posted as Date: Wed, 3 Jan 1996 14:47:35 -0800, Message-Id: <199601032247.OAA00603(a)jobe.shell.portal.com> states that the faked story changed the words "Xinhua news agency" to "the Associated Press." Looking down the list of posts to the cp list for past posts by "Anonymous" the first one I came to was titled "first germany, now china" and not "US calls for measures... " as Anonymous #3 wrote in the referencing post. There were at least two wire service stories: Reuters: China calls for measures against Internet porn Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 9:20:13 PST Message-ID: <Rchina-internetURelN_5DV(a)clari.net> clari.news.censorship Associated Press: China to Block Internet Porn Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 15:10:29 PST Message-ID: <Ainternet-pornURTH5_5DV(a)clari.net> clari.news.censorship Add to this is the confusion that several entities are posting to the cp list using the same name -- "Anonymous" -- without differentiating their posts from any of the other posts by (inferentially) other entities with the same name. I have no problem with people (dolphins, whales, or space creatures, etc.) posting anonymously. I do have *significant* problems with their lack of seriousness that we see in their willingness to be confused by others of the same name. I have even more significant problems with their seeming willingness to expect me to straighten out this confusion that they are either too lazy or too chaotically-oriented to do themselves. Even English monarchs, in centuries past when monarchs like Anonymous only had one name, were given some additional signifier to keep them separate (e.g. "Donald the Fat" vs. "Donald the Terribly Ugly" vs. "Donald the Wonderful With A Really Good Ad Agency"). Scientific discussions to which people wish to contribute anonymously are OK with me; the same discussions that are starting to resemble the confusion of a Month Python skit are not. -- -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong.

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Duplicate messages
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has everyone else been getting two messages for the price of one? (Maybe Tim May is getting back at me for the semi-plagerized sig quote...) Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay

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Re: Guerilla ISPs
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:07 PM 1/3/96 -0800, you wrote: >Thomas Edwards writes: > >> [ microcellular nets ] >> >> But how can these things compete with @Home, which is promising 10 Mbps >> in and 128 kbps out of homes with cable modems? > >I'm skeptical about cable modems---few cable providers have adequate >return paths, and everyone competes for the downlink bandwidth. >Broadcast is not the right architecture. > Even admittedly with no evidence, I tend to disagree. I think the world needs cable-driven "mostly-one-way" Internet access for the same reason we need both: 1. Magazines/books (few to many) vs. snail-mail (1-to-1 communication). 2. Television/radio (few to many) vs. telephones (1-to-1 communication). If, as I've heard, you could broadcast 28 mbits per second down a 6-megahertz cable line, that's a lot of "news, weather, and sports" to be broadcast to EVERYONE, similar to newspapers. Imagine the entire contents of USENET, plus a goodly supply of (encrypted) individual mail, etc. The contents of every newspaper in the country, transmitted a few times every day, etc. >Any systems in actual operation? How many users do they support? No idea. Wish I knew.

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Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:17 AM 1/4/96 +0000, you wrote: > >> Why is there a limit to the size of the key anyway? It's too bad PGP >> doesn't support any size key (within reason). > >Within reason is the Key Phrase. Even with a Pentium 90, I notice a >considerable lag in decrypting messages that have been encrypted with >a key larger than 2047/8. > >Even if you have a fast machine, if the person recieving the message >could wait a long time to decrypt you 4096 byte encrypted message. It seems to me that the best argument AGAINST supporting (and using) keys greater than 2048 bits is the false sense of security created. Even 1024-bit keys will probably be safe for decades if just the algorithm is concerned. Far more threatening are various other attacks, including RF snooping in combination with specialized viruses, as well as black-bag jobs on hardware. Why build a castle with a front wall a mile high when the back wall is a 5-foot chain-link fence?!?

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Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work
by dmandl＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Ed Carp wrote: Duncan Frissell wrote: > > It used to be said that no country would be allowed to move from Communism > > to Capitalism. It can now be said that it is inconceivable that a modern > > country will move from a Market to a Command Economy. Market discipline is > > strong. > > Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old > Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying > that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free > market economy. > > Never underestimate the value of human stupidity and shortsightedness. In other words: If people dump communism for capitalism, it shows how the free market will always triumph, and if people dump capitalism for communism, it shows how stupid and shortsighted humans are. Hmmmm... --Dave. -- Dave Mandl dmandl(a)panix.com http://www.wfmu.org/~davem

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Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:29 AM 1/2/96 -0600, Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] wrote: >Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old >Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying >that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free >market economy. I said "modern" country. Even so, Russia and the rest are much more market dominated than they used to be. Transition will not be easy but I doubt if they'll go back. As for an eternity of slavery being superior to too rambunctious freedom -- we won't let them be that stupid. The "cancer of Anglo-Saxon values" is pretty powerful. >> Where are the pressure points where regulation can be applied? > >How about on the backbone itself? Since everyone goes through the htree >major backbones, all one would have to do is control access at those >points. Of course, that would lead to clandestine use of >store-and-forward LEOsats, s&f UUCP sites, etc. UUCP might even make a >comeback ;) That would require outlawry of crypto over the backbone and some way of convincing the backbone to run government approved code. Quite a bit of resistance would ensue. Have the Feds ever successfully mandated that large numbers of people run government code? DCF

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers
by Mark Grant, M.A. (Oxon) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 2 Jan 1996, Jay Holovacs wrote: > Commercial satallites have land based corporate owners. Remember the > success that Alabama had a few years ago pulling the plug on a New York > based softporn tv satellite distribution system. They simply went after the > assets of the satellite companies and got quick cooperation. About ten years ago a group I was involved with were thinking about putting something into space as a publicity stunt. One company we talked to claimed they could put 1 kg into orbit on one of their sounding rockets for about $ 30,000 (that's a 1 kg satellite, not $ 30,000 per kg). How small can you build a "data haven" satellite ? Looking a few years into the future, you could probably stick a stripped-down Linux laptop with solar cells and a stripped-down satellite telephone as a Net link on top of a slightly larger rocket and charge for on-orbit storage using ecash... Using remailers it should be pretty-much untraceable. Mark

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Re: AOL security letter
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>bj: ALERT: Password Security >Date: 95-12-31 07:27:13 EST >From: Steve Case >Sent on: America Online (using Stratus) >"Dear AOL Community Member: >...Some of the effects as a result of not having the database link files >include: random log-off's, AOLnet runs slower, and Email may accidentally be >deleted. These problems are MAJOR inconveniences to our users, so we need >your help to fix the problem." Are you guys really sure you need me to send in my AOL password? I don't use my AOL account very often, but if you really need it, here it is: Username: Tim May, tcmay(a)aol.com Passphrase: 42trollsrus I hope this helps. --Tim May, tcmay(a)aol.com

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