December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: WSJ on Netscape Hole 3
by jsw＠neon.netscape.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199509252300.QAA29812(a)infinity.c2.org>, sameer(a)c2.org (sameer) writes: > He's -asking- for an exploit. Tshirts to Ray and the person who > does the exploit, if it gets written. Maybe I should just ring up 8lgm and > have them do one. > > > > > > On Mon, 25 Sep 1995, John Young wrote: > > > > > The Wall Street Journal, September 25, 1995, p. B12. > > > > > Marc Andreessen, vice president of technology at Netscape, > > > said the company will issue fixes for the recent glitches > > > later this week. He added that it's unclear whether > > > anything other than temporarily crashing a user's computer > > > could result trom the recent flaw. > > > > Oh Marc, you didn't really want to say that, did you? > > > > -Thomas > > I asked Marc about this one, since it bothered me too. Apparently Jared asked Marc if he was aware of specific examples of how this bug might be exploited. Marc replied that we had not seen anything other than what was already posted on cypherpunks. Since the original article did not use quotes, I assume that what was written was a paraphrase, and as such it has been interpreted by the author. That said, we take this problem seriously, and have taken steps to fix it. The patch that will be released tomorrow will include fixes for this buffer overflow, and others that we found during a review of all of our code. I think it would be more constructive to pound on the new version than one that is known to be busted, and will be patched by tomorrow. --Jeff -- Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Netscape Communication Corporation jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw Any opinions expressed above are mine.

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Internet draft on MIME/PGP
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Don't want to start another MIME war, but thought some on the list might be interested in this. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 26 Sep 95 15:10:57 -0400 From:Internet-Drafts@CNRI.Reston.VA.US To: IETF-Announce: ; Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-elkins-pem-pgp-00.txt A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. Title : MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Author(s) : M. Elkins Filename : draft-elkins-pem-pgp-00.txt Pages : 3 Date : 09/25/1995 This document describes how Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) can be used to provide privacy and authentication using the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) security content types described in RFCXXXX (draft-ietf-pem-sigenc-03.txt). Internet-Drafts are available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-elkins-pem-pgp-00.txt". A URL for the Internet-Draft is: ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-elkins-pem-pgp-00.txt Internet-Drafts directories are located at: o Africa Address: ftp.is.co.za (196.4.160.8) o Europe Address: nic.nordu.net (192.36.148.17) Address: ftp.nis.garr.it (192.12.192.10) o Pacific Rim Address: munnari.oz.au (128.250.1.21) o US East Coast Address: ds.internic.net (198.49.45.10) o US West Coast Address: ftp.isi.edu (128.9.0.32) Internet-Drafts are also available by mail. Send a message to: mailserv(a)ds.internic.net. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-elkins-pem-pgp-00.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ds.internic.net can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e., documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. For questions, please mail to Internet-Drafts(a)cnri.reston.va.us. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft.

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weak links in DigiCash system
by Bryce Wilcox 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jerod, I'm forwarding your message to a couple of lists. I thought you made good points. Of course DigiCash is only running a demo, but still-- why demo poor security? I think it doesn't make a good impression. Bryce, signatures at end - ------- Forwarded Message To: ecash-feedback(a)digicash.com cc: netherto(a)taussky.cs.colorado.edu, wilcoxb(a)taussky.cs.colorado.edu Subject: Security in your ecash project. Date: Tue, 26 Sep 1995 17:00:15 -0600 From: Jerod D Netherton <netherto(a)taussky.cs.colorado.edu> I have a couple of problems/complaints with your ecash project. When I was sent my Acct ID and Passwd they were sent to me plain text instead of being PGP-encrypted first. This means that some malicious hacker could have intercepted the e-mail message and stolen the free cyber-bucks you were so generous as to give me. Second, on the WWW-page where one downloads the software it does not seem to do a secure connection between my browser and your server (on netscape there is a small key in the lower-left hand corner that is supposed to show when one is securely connected to a secure server). So someone could sniff my password from the transaction when I GET the software. Also When I'm buying/selling things it would be smart for all parties involved to be using PGP, and I think you should stress this point more in your page. Otherwise this is another vulnerable point in your system IMHO. Thank you for your time. /\ The Scottish Claymore of All CyberSpace UgradLab DumpMeister /\ Watcher of Anime. Addictor to Muds. WebMaster of OAA at CU! < E A N O R JaDuN Comes. Shade and Sweet Water \/ Yuri, Miyu, Nene, Ranma-chan, Ryoko, B-ko! \/ Anime, Chivalry, and Physics Forever!!!! Finger for PGP Key Email:netherto@colorado.edu Phone:(303)786-8311 Pager:(303)610-1203 http://ugrad-www.cs.colorado.edu/~netherto/Home.html Lab:(303)492-6207 - ------- End of Forwarded Message signatures follow To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield. bryce(a)colorado.edu http://ugrad-www.cs.colorado.edu/~wilcoxb/Niche.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Automatic PGP clearsigning under Unix with Bryce's Auto-PGP v1.0 iQCVAwUBMGiNz/WZSllhfG25AQHFMAQApc6Td8e6bQsBqpCU+EnfbYhueJthyYPS rkHfFrenHNwG/MCEFtwXBBxEQP3yyvnY2qD9RrrhC3cN0HcFw2jE8r++2Y3Z9H7u dJuIKodi2LP8POoW6dJPlW93N5E/+LhuCZvfqe78T2bIl20GIYQ5x0UUTm+APo2f MLu6wUEAHTE= =ofwj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Windows MixMaster Client
by Brian Gorka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone out there have a windows mixmaster client? (or a pointer to one?) Also, I am having a LOT of grief trying to get the alpha.c2.org remailer to work for me... (yes, I have the help files) Could someone walk me through it?

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Re: Netscape Stock Prices
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:45 PM 9/26/95, Jeff Simmons wrote: >Date High Low Close Volume > >950809 75.000 53.750 55.500 3851.8 : : >950925 69.000 62.250 67.000 684.0 WSJ article re: overflow bug Yup. Looks like the old "wall of worry" trick to me. Stand back and let the train go buy folks, madness of crowds and all that. Actually, Netscape is still the only game in town as far as Wall Street goes. What the market needs is a foregone alternative, and some lucky sailor to mistake a tulip bulb for an onion... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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(fwd) FBI COMPUTER FRAUD WEB SITE DIVISION
by imschira＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: mnemosyne.cs.du.edu!uunet!in2.uu.net!noc.near.net!das-news2.harvard.edu!oitnews.harvard.edu!newsfeed.rice.edu!news.sesqui.net!news.concom.com!news From: Rick Casimir <rikkkk(a)concom.com> Newsgroups: misc.forsale.computers.pc-specific.misc Subject: FBI COMPUTER FRAUD WEB SITE DIVISION Date: 21 Sep 1995 17:47:42 GMT Organization: Connections.Com Lines: 9 Message-ID: <43s8fu$r4t(a)carbon.concom.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: dial139.concom.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Mozilla 1.1PE (Windows; I; 16bit) HELLO, If you or someone you know who has been scammed or did"nt ship you products after you prepaid or for whatever reason who screwed you. REPORT THEM TO THE FBI: <http://www.fbi.gov/compcrim.htm> -- -- http://yakko.cs.wmich.edu/~frogfarm ...for the best in unapproved information To be a skeptic is to refuse to be a victim. "This is my .sig. There are many like it, but this one is mine." Freedom...yeah, right.

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CHA_cha
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Worth Magazine, October, 1995, has a longish, easy-reading, supportive article on David Chaum and digital cash. Virtually alone among E-money thinkers, Chaum insists on creating anonymity for all transactions -- building a tamper-proof system that works just as "real" cash always has, from cowne shells to $100 bills. The key, he says, is this: Without the spender's say-so, no one should be able to trace who paid whom for what, whether a transaction takes place online or in a swipe of a card at a coffee shop. It's a libertarian approach in tune with Chaum's roots in freewheeling communities such as Berkeley and Amsterdam -- but it is anathema to control freaks like the FBI, the IRS, and corporate information marketers. Chaum says every digital-cash system but his has the potential to be abused or compromised -- and the math seems to bear him out. His competitors, however, insist their plans will prove plenty secure in practice. They dismiss Chaum as an incorrigible purist, a brilliant mathematician and innovator whose political views are hindering his chances of success. Like many in the digital elite, Chaum, an unabashed utopian, does want to create a new world. To him, electronic money is just the first consumer use of an arcane field he hopes will transform society: cryptology, the science of secret codes. In cyberspace, these codes can prove a powerful way of shielding a person's identity -- or of verifying an identity without giving away extra information. Armed with personal computers and good software, says Chaum, ordinary people will finally have the power to do and say things without being tracked by Big Brother. CHA_cha (31 kb in two parts)

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Re: cypherpunks press releases/contact list: YES!! DO IT!!
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Perry E. Metzger" There is this widespread and wholely misplaced affection for "cypherpunks". We aren't a company or an organization. This is a mailing list, and occassionally a seminar series in places like NoCal. It isn't a "group". .............................................. And you of all the cpunks, Perry, are the most affectionately considered. :>) Actually, those who want to become official spokewheels should consider that the cypherpunk agenda is to promote anarchic (i.e. individualistic, self-responsible) action. That is, that the individual who chooses to act in a 'cypherpunkish' mode does so at their own risk by their own motivation by their own decision and their own discretion. Not everyone on the list subscribes to this ideal of complete independence; furthermore, for anarchist types to identify with a "group" would be inconsistent with the philosophical attitude of the "members", who come-&-go as they please. However, it would be an amazing event to see VZ Nuri-logical (Cypherpunk Extraordinaire) on TV, saying something like, "Yes, I fully and completely subscribe to the Cypherpunk agenda: black markets, anarchy, overthrow of governments. National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." <g> (It would be a *cold* day in Hell!) .. Blanc

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Status of Netscape Bug Exploit (suggestions needed)
by Ray Cromwell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok Folks, here's what I got so far... 1) a URL that can place a specific value in the program counter (gdb) select-frame 2 (gdb) info frame Stack level 2, frame at 0xefbfbc30: eip = 0xefbfbc30; saved eip 0x90909090 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ called by frame at 0x90909090, caller of frame at 0xefbfbc14 Arglist at 0xefbfbc30, args: Locals at 0xefbfbc30, Previous frame's sp is 0xefbfbc1c Saved registers: eax at 0xefbfbc2c, ecx at 0xefbfbc28, edx at 0xefbfbc24, ebx at 0xefbfbc20, ebp at 0xefbfbc18, esi at 0xefbfbc14, edi at 0xefbfbc10, eip at 0xefbfbc0c, ps at 0xefbfbc08 2) A piece of exploit code on the stack near the PC (gdb) disassemble 0xefbfbc10 0xefbfbc40 0xefbfbc27: nop 0xefbfbc28: nop 0xefbfbc29: nop 0xefbfbc2a: nop 0xefbfbc2b: nop 0xefbfbc2c: nop 0xefbfbc2d: nop 0xefbfbc2e: nop 0xefbfbc2f: nop 0xefbfbc30: nop 0xefbfbc31: nop 0xefbfbc32: nop 0xefbfbc33: nop 0xefbfbc34: nop 0xefbfbc35: nop 0xefbfbc36: nop 0xefbfbc37: nop 0xefbfbc38: nop 0xefbfbc39: nop 0xefbfbc3a: nop 0xefbfbc3b: nop 0xefbfbc3c: nop 0xefbfbc3d: nop 0xefbfbc3e: nop 0xefbfbc3f: nop 0xefbfbc40: nop 3) exploit code that calls the kernel syscall() with SYS_exit (benign exploit, causes your browser to exit) The problem? To make a syscall under BSDI2.0, I have to execute an lcall 0x7,0x0 with 1,0 on the stack. However, to exploit the netscape bug, you can not embed 0x0 in the URL. No problem I thought, I searched Netscape's executable for any kernel calls, and found an lcall 0x7,0x0 at 0x257fee. But I can't do a 32-bit direct jump without a zero, in the instruction (the 32-bit address is 0x00257fee), and I can't do a relative jump from 0xefbfbc30+ If you can come up with some 386 assembly under BSDI2.0 which can invoke syscall() in the kernel without any embeded 0x0 bytes in the code, you can share a Hack Netscape T-Shirt with me. If it turns out to be too hard under BSDI, I'll gladly assist in producing exploits for Windows or another operating system. One trick I thought up for embeding zeros in the code is to self-modify the code using XOR ADDRESS,ADDRESS where ADDRESS is a byte on the stack within the code. Anyone have any better ones? -Ray

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Time Keys, Some Secure Ideas (by Alias: Jay Hyden)
by Anonymous Remailing Service 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Time Keys, Some Secure Ideas << The weakest attack on a time key based system is to spoof the computer that keeps track of time into releasing encryption keys i.e. change the clock. Perhaps this could be avoided by hardware inaccessability, say a computer system taken to, and setup on the Moon by those corporation that are already planning to place VR rovers on the lunar surface. Any Earth bound system would be vulnerable to physical attack. Here are some ideas for such a system: o 7 clocks with absolutely no way of reseting them. Perhaps a system that will only let you tell it which clock is the most accurate, and only if you prove you are the proper authority and only if 4 other clocks are on the same minute. o Redundant hardware and power collection and data transmit /receive systems, flash ROM hard drives for storing secret keys and neccesary programs and files. Built to last several centuries if possible. o Key pairs could be generated on Earth, a time of release instruction and perhaps an optional other public key a (return at future date encrypted with this key option.) The package is then encrypted with one of the lunar systems keys, then transmited to the Moon. A verification could be encypted and sent back to insure data integrity. o Other security checks in place would insure that the data was transmited to the Moon by the proper authority, i.e. the Corp. charging for this service. Additional backup logic that would insure that proper power and protocol exist for transmitions from the lunar system. o The key pairs are witness generated, then sent to the lunar system, then the secret key is destroyed on Earth. The public keys become a one way hash to the future until the time designated by the key's owner has elapsed. Then the lunar system would transmit the owners secret key to Earth. o Upon time released instructions the lunar system would transmit the secret key, (encrypted if optioned) upon demand by a known packet radio method. So if the Corp. authority did not exist in say, 100 years, the data could still be retrieved by standard packet radio. People who want to write to ONLY their great great grand- children or the future world in general would have a forum. Jay /"""""\ ~~ ,--------------------------------------------, ~~ /"""""\ /__ - _-\ ~~ ( End HEMP Prohibition! This is an open chal- ) ~~ /-_ - __\ :@ (*)~(*) ~ ( lenge to Historians. Name examples of where ) ~ (*)~(*) @: :%/--~ ))~: ~ (& when the cultivation of legal hemp was harm-) ~ :~(( ~--/%: \__"-==-===* ( ful or destructive to a society in any way! ) *===-==-"__/ (:"\_)_/ (<jay.hyden(a)alpha.c2.com> PublicKey on Servers) \_(_/":) .//:%:%:\. '---------------------------------------------' ./:%:%:\\. =000o====o000===================================================000o====o000= | | | | | | | | | | | - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | | | | | | | - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMGiLha7iRhcfEZiZAQEn0QP6A8cUmI0MHs866Mu/Ao4mFqr89F8tT3oP KeafNdSWJt8/pOlVZzQxV8P8S8dCkXwBgJJQaQ6tigqtD2+9fK1HEaWi3ZBAVgB+ CwLhqouwds2A5+l9riQfqAT+4yrSbeNR+bH3xyYa8zZSTzp5DB1tJEbWls6Kjr/w hxmFYrf6oSk= =oHrR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PGP and FBI?
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's some sort of documentary on WBAI 99.5 FM out of NYC now. They're talking about PGP and right wing militias... the guy being interviewed called PGP a "one time pad system" and doesn't understand it... *sigh*

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chaos cryptography
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all - saw this in New Scientist and thought you might be interested (I guess it's more stenography than cryptography): ========== "Secret signals hidden in chaos ...John Hogan of the Engineering Mathematics department at Bristol showed the BA how such unpredictable systems can be used to protect sensitive information. His team mixed the information with chaotic electrical signals, transmitted the result, and then extracted the hidden message. Hogan and his team modified simple electrical circuits to generate unpredictable signals and hid within them a recording of "Land of Hope and Glory". When the two identical circuits are connected, said Hogan, the outputs instantly synchronise so that anything added to the transmission stands out. "It's like magic." he said. If anyone intercepted the signal and fed it through a loudspeaker all they would hear is a loud hiss. This makes the system suitable for hiding confidential information - once, that is, the system is perfected. At present, a decoded message sounds like a scratchy 78 recording although it is still recognisable, said Hogan. So far the researchers have succeeded only when the two circuits are connected by wire a few cm long. They are now trying to replicate the results in circuits that are seperated by long distances and connected by a radio link. They also want to see if it can be modified for use with digital equipment." ============ Sherry ps I wonder how close to real noise the "hiss" is.

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Fax encryption software
by Jonathan Blake 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw this article in alt.privacy. Anybody think the described encryption actually is worth looking at. Xref: netcom.com alt.privacy:29325 Path: netcom.com!ix.netcom.com!howland.reston.ans.net!EU.net!uunet!in2.uu.net!news.deltanet.com!lkf0166 From: clav(a)deltanet.com Newsgroups: alt.privacy Subject: Re: FAX Encryption Software Date: Mon, 18 Sep 95 12:39:53 GMT Organization: Delta Internet Services, Anaheim, CA Lines: 59 Message-ID: <43k3nv$m9(a)news1.deltanet.com> References: <43hvft$n2b(a)news1.deltanet.com> <43ii1t$210(a)nntp.crl.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: lkf0166.deltanet.com X-Newsreader: News Xpress Version 1.0 Beta #3 Dear Mr. Chaos, We are talking about a 72 bit engine that is more than sufficiently strong for time sensitive general business purposes. In addition it does not rely merely on simple factoring but a process called graphical encryption that adds additional difficulty to an attack. I would like to see if your cracking abilities are anywhere near your abilities to return an uninformed answer. I invite you to try your skill. David _________________________________________________________________ _____________ In article <43ii1t$210(a)nntp.crl.com>, acollier(a)crl.com wrote: >clav(a)deltanet.com wrote: > >>ANYONE FOR A CRYPTO-STRONG, YET EASY TO USE FAX/EMAIL SECURITY >>SOFTWARE PACKAGE FOR BUSINESS OR OTHER USE??? > >>Aliroo Ltd. has developed a Windows, eye-to-eye fax/email >>encryption package called PrivaSoft. > >>Unlike any previously devised system, this method protects, with >>only 4 mouse clicks, fax and email transmissions in electronic >>and even paper form - FROM THE TIME YOU CREATE A MESSAGE UNTIL IT >>IS READ - NOT JUST WHEN YOUR FAX IS BEING TRANSMITTED. > >>You can encrypt a message, and then fax or email it (via plain >>old standard fax machine or fax modem), print it to paper or save >>to a disk file. > >>It is fully licensed, without restriction for export, by the U.S. >>Department of Commerce. NO PGP WORRIES. > >Also no worries about security - if DOC says you can have it, you can bet >that NSA has seen to it that it is cryptographically weak, or else uses a >key escrow system (where sombody else can get to the keys), and as insecure >as any other non-published method. For all we know, they may be using a >cereal box decoder ring set up. > >>Email me for a free copy which will be sent to you via email or >>snail mail post. It is fully functional (not crippleware) and >>enables you to try our system out before purchase with 8 free >>page scrambles. It retails for $130 per installed computer. >>Looking for end users and distributors. > >>Thanks, >>David > > -- To subscribe to Graphology-L send e-mail to: listserv(a)netcom.com / subject: leave blank message: subscribe graphology-l(a)netcom.com <your internet address> To get the Graphology-L FAQ send e-mail to grafolog(a)netcom.com / subject: hwafaq / no message ^

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Re: Yet Another Alarmist TV Show About Child Molesters on the Ne
by James Caldwell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 25 Sep 95 at 0:06, Hroller Anonymous Remailer wrote: It's called the Hegelian Diclectic(sp?) first postulated by William Hegel (an ass) in Germany approx the 1600's as a method for social change when none could otherwise be achieved. > And the trashing will continue. It is the classic scenario. > Feed the media negative press clips about the entity you wish > to discredit (here, the Net), e.g.: > 1. All those pedophiles out to lure your children; > 2. Big coverage on catching some of those pedophiles; > 3. First page coverage on breaking Netscape's code with the > headlines that your sensitive information such as your > credit card numbers, etc. can be retrieved (ignoring that > the reason was to show Netscape's poorly structered code > would allow this and, therefore, preventing it before it > could happen); > 4. Expect cryptology to crop up in the Oklahoma bombing trial. > There already has been articles of those involved having > allegedly used that *damned* Net to correspond.

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Re: chaos cryptography
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Hi all - saw this in New Scientist and thought you might be interested >(I guess it's more stenography than cryptography): ^^^^^^^^^^^ Yes, chaotic communication is preferred by secretaries around the world. They follow their dictates. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Coercion-proof remailers (solved?)
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For a while I've been talking about the importance of a robust infrastructure for anonymity, including coercion-resistant remailers. Here is an approach that appears to eliminate the problem of after-the-fact coercion. Existing remailers chain messages by using a fixed public/secret key pair in each remailer. This leaves them open to after-the-fact compromise from the sender end. If you capture a message as the sender sends it, you can later get the key of the first remailer, and decrypt the first layer. You can then proceed on down the line to the recipient. This creates a motive for an attacker to coerce remailers, and it means the value of the remailers' keys continually increase as more messages are sent. Instead of using a fixed key, the sender can perform a Diffie-Hellman exchange with the recipient at each point in a message's passage. This eliminates the coercion problem, since there is no permanent key to steal, but allows a corrupt remailer to see where the message is going. If the first remailer is corrupt, the whole path is compromised. The next step is to make sure there is no first remailer. The sender S generates a message and header requesting mailing S to the recipient R. The sender splits it into two pieces using / \ a method that requires both pieces to recover any data. Then he 1 2 adds a header to each piece requesting remailing to remailer 3. \ / He sends one piece to remailer 1 and one piece to remailer 2. 3 The transmissions are protected by DH exchange and encryption. | Remailers 1 and 2 each send their pieces to remailer 3. These R transmissions are also protected by DH exchanges. Remailer 3 combines the two pieces, recovers the header requesting remailing to R, and sends the recovered message to R. This approach is secure against after-the-fact coercion or key theft, because there is no persistent key to recover. It is also secure against any one of the three remailers being corrupt. If 3 is corrupt, it sees both pieces as it combines them, and knows they came from 1 and 2, but does not know where 1 and 2 got them from. If 1 is corrupt, it knows that a message from S went to 3, but it has only half of the split message, so it can't find out where 3 sent it to. If any two of the three are corrupt, the path is exposed. It is possible to add more levels. This one uses seven remailers, /S\ and can survive any two being corrupt. Some questions I don't / | | \ know the answers to: What is the best possible arrangement of 1 2 3 4 remailers, so that the highest percentage of them have to be \ / \ / corrupt before the path is revealed? If any continuous line 5 6 from S to R is corrupt, the path is revealed. And if any two \ / remailers in a 'triangle' are corrupt, the whole triangle is 7 corrupt. For example, 1 and 2, 1 and 5, or 2 and 5. | Is there a better arrangement, reusing some remailers, that R allows the message to remain secure with a higher number of corrupt remailers in the path? Mike

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Re: Fax encryption software
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:34 PM 9/26/95 -0700, Jonathan Blake wrote: > > I saw this article in alt.privacy. > > Anybody think the described encryption actually is worth > looking at. > > We are talking about a 72 bit engine that is more than > sufficiently strong for time sensitive general business purposes. Since David does not know the difference between CPU word width and an encryption algorithm, I think it is safe to ignore him. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Wild Idea for RNG
by Ray Cromwell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, so I'm reading a message somewhere and I see a message about algorithmic information theory. Cryptography was recently on my mind and I thought of Chaitin's quote "arithmetic is random" So, why not construct a turing machine with a large state transition table, input a random program, and get a 1 or 0 bit depending on whether it halts in X number of cycles. You could even get more than 1 bit out of it by measuring how many cycles it takes to halt (if it halts before X) and use the LSB. Is it as secure as the halting problem? (intractable to devise an algorithm used to predict a bit with more than 50% confidence if you knew the state table?) Ok, so it's impractical. So how about this: Grab a picture of the current bitmap on your screen. Run it through a good compression algorithm (say, an arithmetic/Q-coder or one of the LZ schemes). Grab the LSB of every 4th byte or so. If the screen is size 1024*768*8, that's 786432 bytes. Let's assume a 10 to 1 compression ratio = 78643 bytes. Let's assume you take 1 bit from every 10 byte, that's 983 bits of entropy. The screen will often contain data like: random placement of icons and windows current time current applications running, and the data in their windows If Netscape was running for instance, part of the random bits would come from the bitmap representation of the data in Netscape's window which would depend on the URL being displayed. -Ray

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Hack Microsoft At Work Fax?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been helping a client install Microsoft Windows for Workgroups, which comes with Microsoft At Work Fax. The fax software, in addition to doing normal stuff, lets you encrypt faxes with passwords or public-key encryption for sending to other people who use the same software. The manual has minimal technical information, so I don't know the algorithms it uses; it mostly talks about what GUI buttons to push. I was hoping the section on taking your software overseas would say something about Export Laws and International Arms Traffickin' (and creatin' a disturbance...) but all it said was how to set the international-direct-dialing phone codes so you can get your fax to go where you want. Because of that, I'm guessing it's something like RC4/40 and RSA-512 with some sort of user name as part of the public key field, but I'd like to know more, and I'm also guessing that they've got some sort of general export license permission from the Feds. The public-key system uses a public key file with "154 computer-generated characters", and recommends exchanging public keys by floppy disk. I don't know if that's 154*8 bits, or 154*6 or *4, or if there's a user-name string using up some of those characters; probably the latter since it's probably 512 bits because of export. I called the usually helpful Microsoft Technical Support phone number, and they were friendly and will try to get back to me, but this is way out of the scope of the kind of questions they're used to :-) And the stuff I could find from the Web page or ftp.microsoft.com on encryption had less than the manual, plus some stuff on password encryption, plus some stuff on their RAS remote network access stuff which apparently uses DES as well as standard PPP handshaking or Shiva handshaking. Does anybody have any more information? It'd be fun to hit up Microsoft for the next crack if it's weak enough; the fax stuff can also be sent by MSMail so there is eavesdropping potential. #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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testab
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

testab

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testab
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

testab

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HP KEscrew
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Wall Street Journal, Sept 27, 1995 Hewlett Lobbies for Its Encryption Plan That Would Satisfy Tough Export Rules By Don Clark Hewlett-Packard Co. is pushing an unusual plan to protect electronic transactions around the world without running afoul of U.S. export laws. The Palo Alto, Calif., computer maker said it has been lobbying government agencies for more than a year to gain support for its proposal, which uses a data-scrambling technology to protect transactions from tampering or theft of data. Strong encryption technologies ordinarily fall under tough export rules that limit technologies which could impede U.S. wire-tapping capabilities, a source of continuing friction between the government and high-technology companies. H-P, in a plan developed with the French company Gemplus SCA, wants to split the code-making technologies into two pieces that would be approved under different government standards. One device, which could fit in a standard computer, would contain a basic encryption capability that is designed to be broadly exported without the need to seek a separate export license for each foreign user. Would Help Industry That device, dubbed an encryption engine, would be useless without the addition of another tiny piece of hardware that contains a code-making formula set at a specific strength. The second device, called a policy card, would be separately reviewed by the U.S. State Department for each customer. Government agencies, including codebreakers at the National Security Agency, would still have a say over the strength of encryption exports. But customers could build commercial applications around the proposed encryption engine, knowing that it will work with any code-making formula that governments might adopt in the future. Now they run the risk that their work will become obsolete amid policy changes in Washington, D.C., and other countries. State Department officials weren't immediately available for comment. Stewart Baker, a former NSA general counsel who now practices law in Washington, D.C., termed the H-P plan a clever answer to the problem of shifting government policy. "There was a lot of skepticism when H-P first proposed it," said Lynn McNulty, a former encryption specialist at the National Institute of Standards and Technology. "But it looks to me that they are well on the way to the next step." H-P Confident of Approval Doug McGowan, an H-P manager involved with the project, said he expects to receive U.S. approval by next year to begin shipping the encryption engine freely to Western Europe and Canada. "We believe we will receive relaxed export controls," he said. H-P's plan fits some of the NSA's objectives. For one thing, its technology embeds encryption technology in microchips that can't easily be modified by computer hackers or terrorists. H-P's policy cards also could be adapted for a controversial Clinton administration proposal called key escrow, in which mathematical keys to break codes could be stored for later use by law enforcement or intelligence agencies, Mr. McGowan said. The plan complements a parallel H-P effort to develop a new generation of "smart" data cards to let consumers buy goods and services around the world electronically. Gemplus, a huge supplier of credit and debit cards in Europe, is supplying technology to that effort along with Informix Corp., a database software maker in Menlo Park, Calif. Jeff Hudson, an Informix vice president, said the partners' proposed cards could store money and a database worth of personal information, such as medical records. That approach could eliminate the need to connect to multiple companies or agencies to manage such information, since it would be stored on each card, the companies said. [End]

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SSTarget
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Wall Street Journal, Sept 27, 1995 Microsoft and Visa Expected to Unveil Internet Technology By a WSJ Staff Reporter New York -- Microsoft Corp. and Visa International are expected to disclose details today of their technology for protecting commerce on the lnternet. The software company and bank clearinghouse have been working since last November on a plan for protecting creditcard numbers and other financial data from crooks, a major obstacle to the widespread use of computer networks for buying goods and services. As the largest players in software and credit cards, Microsoft and Visa wield considerable clout among a crowd of companies vying to set electronic-security standards. Their proposed specifications, calied Secure Transaction Technology, or STT, is partly based on a data-encryption technology popularized by RSA Data Security Inc., a closely held company in Redwood City, Calif. Other key players in the Internet-security race include MasterCard International Inc., the other name in bank cards, and Netscape Communications Corp., a leader in Internet software that has suffered some highly publicized security lapses lately. MasterCard announced plans to collaborate with Visa on security technology in June, but isn't expected to take part in the latest Visa-Microsoft announcement. [End]

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Re: Wild Idea for RNG
by Herb Sutter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Warning: I'm no expert, my response is just a semi-informed opinion (emphasis on "semi-"). At 02:19 1995.09.27 -0400, Ray Cromwell wrote: >So, why not construct a turing machine with a large state transition >table, input a random program, and get a 1 or 0 bit depending on ^^^^^^ >whether it halts in X number of cycles. You could even get more >than 1 bit out of it by measuring how many cycles it takes to halt >(if it halts before X) and use the LSB. Is it as secure as >the halting problem? (intractable to devise an algorithm used >to predict a bit with more than 50% confidence if you knew the >state table?) Your randomness will depend on the prior randomness of your original input... and if you already have that, the TM won't give you any additional randomness (rather, this approach will just take all the randomness you give it and reduce it to 1 bit of randomness, losing all the rest). On the other hand, if the 'random' program is not already truly random, then you may well have patterns in the bits generated by the halting observation. For instance, if you use a known PRNG to get your "random" programs, then given the same seed you will end up with the same programs (and therefore the same resulting 'random' bits from the TM halting output)... which, in other words, gains you nothing AFAICS over simply using the PRNG's output directly, except of course that it exercises your CPU. :-) The attacker still only needs to figure out the seed. >Grab a picture of the current bitmap on your screen. Run it through >a good compression algorithm (say, an arithmetic/Q-coder or >one of the LZ schemes). Grab the LSB of every 4th byte or so. >If the screen is size 1024*768*8, that's 786432 bytes. Let's assume >a 10 to 1 compression ratio = 78643 bytes. Let's assume you take >1 bit from every 10 byte, that's 983 bits of entropy. > >The screen will often contain data like: > >random placement of icons and windows Not on my machine (or most others, I'd wager)! I thought about this, and whenever I'm running Netscape (for instance) my screen is probably identical over 50% of the time because I tend to have the same things open when I run a given program. Even in the general case, consider that most people have a preferred desktop layout (in Windows, they have ProgMan sitting in one place on the screen with usually the same groups visible/open)... not only will that piece of the screen bitmap not give you any randomness from one run to the next, but unless you go looking for "things that haven't changed since last time" your program won't even know what's reducing your randomness. >current time Better, but be careful how you use it; that's what Netscape thought too. :-) >current applications running, and the data in their windows > > >If Netscape was running for instance, part of the random bits >would come from the bitmap representation of the data in Netscape's >window which would depend on the URL being displayed. This sounds a bit better... except, of course, that when you initiate a secure session in Netscape with a specific party/server, your screen has a very good chance of looking the same each time you connect with that entity because it is the same URL. :-) Would someone who's more informed please correct my analysis? Thanks in advance, Herb ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Herb Sutter 2228 Urwin, Suite 102 voice (416) 618-0184 Connected Object Solutions Oakville ON Canada L6L 2T2 fax (905) 847-6019

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NO weak links in DigiCash system!!!
by Marcel van der Peijl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I have a couple of problems/complaints with your ecash project. > When I was sent my Acct ID and Passwd they were sent to me plain text > instead of being PGP-encrypted first. This means that some malicious > hacker could have intercepted the e-mail message and stolen the > free cyber-bucks you were so generous as to give me. Second, on the > WWW-page where one downloads the software it does not seem to do a secure > connection between my browser and your server (on netscape there is > a small key in the lower-left hand corner that is supposed to show when > one is securely connected to a secure server). So someone could sniff my > password from the transaction when I GET the software. Also When I'm > buying/selling things it would be smart for all parties involved to > be using PGP, and I think you should stress this point more in your page. > Otherwise this is another vulnerable point in your system IMHO. Let's get this straight before spreading more of these vicious rumours that can easily get misinterpreted. DigiCash is an R&D company developing ecash. We license out our technology to banks. We are running the trial, but only have limited resources to do so. This may result in long waiting time for accounts or no answer on a tech support mail. (We are of course trying to prevent this). In a real-money system, the password can of course not be sent out in plain mail. Either it has to be transferred out-of-band (phone, paper) or PGP'd. But that would require at least ten people answering the phones, sending snailmail, etc. We do not have the resources to do so, so we send out the password plain. A malicious hacker may snatch the password and open the account for you and steal your cb$100. This, however, is not related to the security of the transactions once you open the account! The password is only for starting up the account. And of course downloading on a secure server is not relevant. The software is the same for everyone! It is just not put out for public downloading because it would mean a hundred times more people asking for tech support. It would be more secure if we used different passwords for downloading and for opening the accounts but again, that would give a LOT more problems. PGP does not add any security in the payment system. Ecash is already secure. Feel free to ask us the questions before publicly posting. It will prevent misunderstandings and libel lawsuits. // Marcel van der Peijl, DigiCash bv, http://www.digicash.com/~bigmac/ // "If you had to tell the Whole Truth, you'd never shut up."

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