December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: University logging mail to anon.penet
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jeff Simmons writes: > This just came up locally, and I'd like to have some comments on it, > especially from people who understand the law a lot better than I do: > > Our local University apparently has been logging ALL mail to anon.penet, > including faculty, students, and off-campus users. With respect to logging of student traffic, I'd look at the Family Education Rights Privacy Act ("Buckley Amendment", 20 USC 1232g) and the California analog to it (assuming one exists; Oregon's is located at OAR 571-20-005, et seq.). The release of information about individual students beyond "directory information" (e.g., name, dates of attendance, degrees granted, etc) is sharply limited without the consent of the student. Information about mail traffic sent and received is, IMHO, arguably (but not clearly) within "educational records" for FERPA purposes. To establish a Buckley Amendment violation (and I'm not saying there was one here) you'll still need to find a University employee to pin the disclosure on. If it's a University employee who posted them to the newsgroup, it's easy. If the University employee merely maintained those records in a place where an outsider was able to easily gain access to them, it seems like a bigger stretch. I had occasion to talk with a relatively high-level administrator in the University of Oregon's computer center some time ago and he explained that they've had to go to some trouble to make sure that gopher/WWW directories and other contemporary university computing practices don't fall afoul of the Buckley Amendment. Perhaps the powers that be at other places aren't quite so forward-thinking (or don't have the questionable benefit of being next door to a building full of law students with time on their hands). Perhaps an even longer stretch would be an argument that the practice of logging (and of keeping those logs in an insecure place) violates students (and others') right to privacy. Federal protection for a "right of privacy" is fickle, but California protects its citizens' right to privacy in its constitution. (I'm not an attorney (yet), don't live in California (right now) and consequently don't know much about CA law. So please think about this message as maybe a hint in (I hope) a useful direction, not necessarily the right answer. Feh.) This concrete issue seems like a good reminder of the implications of the way that we think about "cyberspace" and the things that happen when we use computers. If one thinks about a machine or a network as "public space", logging or reporting activities which happen there (e.g., Alice walks over to visit Bob, leaving footprints everyone can see in /var/adm/syslog) seems reasonable or at least not offensive, and it seems silly to talk about being angry because someone wrote down what everyone could see. But if we think about machines and networks as being private space, reporting on what Alice and Bob do seems tacky and rude at best, and horrifying (and likely to create liability) at the other end of the spectrum. As much as I dislike the "cyberspace" metaphor, its use or misuse has serious consequences. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBME6qJH3YhjZY3fMNAQHiQgP9HjqkwOzMabzXXbUKp0W7c2MAn4na5X1X UPVY8p70abNVpPoVFGQTUpgBnv3hBy40n5RFD9pNM7c2UPwq0C8Tcir9TBr+xEH7 L7iQCjsqIK5F1lv66C5yMFu8wfiRF10hMhTJYthOa04dyP10HovT2QameGw+DZHJ og1t7owgcco= =D5PV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Le Monde: "Militant Cypherpunks liberate crypto software"
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am not making this up. Le Monde, a major French newspaper, discovered that "militant" Cypherpunks aid in the spread of crypto :-) In all fairness, the article is rather favorable. [Available in French only]. http://www.lemonde.fr/multimedia/sem3397/textes/act33971.html --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/

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Collection of personal info
by David Neal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sent this to the risks moderator some time back, but I guess he didn't like it. For those of you who think that perhaps people advocating cybercash are just a bunch of paranoid lunatics. -------------- As advertised in the trade magazine "DM News" (Direct Marketing News), Apr. 24, 1997, V. 17 N. 16. I've typed the entire text of the advertisement, any typos are mine. >From the huge number of people in the database, it would seem that TRW is now marketing a subset of their credit records they keep on everyone. Does anyone else remember the flap over Lotus' product (Magellan) that was going to allow something similar? The risks? This is the perfect database if you want to red-line your offerings. I'm sure others will have more creative answers. -------------- TRW DISCOVERED Some very smart people are uncovering exciting ways to increase response rates, find profitable customers, and develop new market niches. It's been a well kept secret. Now it's out. It's TRW. It all started with the search for more creative information solutions. Solutions that help you discover hidden markets and unique ways of using ordinary data to target qualified prospects. The result: a proven and massive database in the hands of people with real data management know-how. So far the findings have revealed: o A database of 170+ million consumers o 100+ demographic, psychographic and geographic selects o A full range of computer services. o Comprehensive motor vehicle data >From this comes an array of products and services to intrigue even the most seasoned direct marketer. One of these is called the TRW Smart Targeting Tools (SM). It links 98 million households with the goods and services they are most likely to buy. Choose consumer names by 50 neighborhood or 3600 household level clusters, by 56 broad product categories or by 516 specific product or brand preferences. Looking at all the advantages, TRW may be the direct marketer's find of this century. And the next. Energize your marketing. Contact your TRW representative or call 800.527.3933 Ext 640. You have a great find ahead of you. TRW Target Marketing Services Your one source for reaching all the right people. 701 TRW Parkway Allen, TX 75002-3717 800.527.3933 David Neal <dneal(a)usis.com> - GNU Planet Aerospace 1-800-PLN-8-GNU Unix, Sybase and Networking consultant. "...you have a personal responsibility to be pro-active in the defense of your own civil liberties." - S. McCandlish

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Cypherpunks party videos
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Good stuff from HIP keeps trickling in. See Brian the HIP brain. Witness Cypherpunks dancing. Watch your's truly as a DJ. http://www.ito.com/mpeg/hip/ --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/

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Notes from NIS&T Key Escrow Export conference.
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here are my noted and remembered impressions from Wedensday's NIS&T conference on key escrow (aka GAK) export. Please note that there is a separate conference next week on creating a FIPS PUB standard for key escrow. That standard will be promulgated, just as GOSIP, POSIX and Clipper/Skipjack were promulgated. This export conference was separate from that FIPS standardization process. I got stuck in a construction traffic jam, and missed the introductory speaches. Perhaps one of the other c'punks can fill us all in on what I missed. The first item is that the export criteria will be changed. A small number of bits will be added to unescrowed crypto, and 64-bit escrow'd (GAK'd) systems will be allowed. They don't care which algorithm is used, DES, RC4, blowfish, etc. They care about key length. If it is short enough, it is exportable. The conference seemed to be an attempt to co-opt industry into agreeing that 64-bit GAK is much better than the current situation. After all, it would be too strong for a "hacker in France" to break it. When they opened the floor, there were a few comments/questions that indicated that not everyone was convinced that this was a good thing. I pointed out some graduate students don't consider "hacker" a compliment, and that I thought Damian did a great job breaking RC4-40. I also pointed out that it was broken again in 31 hours with a "bunch of commercial systems, Sun and Pentiums" with no need for suaercomputers. I then asked if the criteria were fixed, as setting criteria controls the result. The NIS&T approved board said that changes to the criteria was part of why the conference was being held. The next hour and a half was presentation from "industry." Essentially comments on the proposal. Nearly all of the spokesmen said that the criteria were flawed. Some said that they already had commercial products that met most of the real needs of the industry (key recovery) but they didn't meet the NIS&T/NSA "criteria." Probably the strongest was the condamnation by Robert Holleyman of the Business Software Alliance. Hollyman said that BSA represents firms such as Microsoft, Novell, Lotus, Sybase, SCO, Autodesk, and Intergraph. He said that current policy "directly threatens" the industry because of "The US Government's continuing refusal to adopt realistic export control policies." He went on and on. It was clear that his position is that the proposed policy is a mistake. After the presentations, there were more questions. I proposed one additional criteria (based on email that I received from the c'punks): How do we expire court approved access to encrypted data, so that once the court orders are over, the LEAs no longer have the ability to decrypt. The answer was that with clipper, special hardware is needed, and it goes away when the court order does. I asked how that model worked in a software only world. There were mumbled statements about adding it as a criteria. The conference then broke for lunch and breakout groups. The one I was in discussed criterias 5 and 6 of Topic 3, published in my URL http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/nistmeeting.html They are short enought to reproduce here. 5. The product shall be resistant to any alteration that would disable or circumvent the key escrow mechanism, to include being designed so that the key escrow mechanism cannot be disabled by a static patch, (i.e., the replacement of a block of code by a modified block). 6. The product shall not decrypt messages or files encrypted by non-escrowed products, including products whose key escrow mechanisms have been altered or disabled. After I commented that the person writing the notes has the ability to detirmine what was said, the folks from NSA and NIS&T asked me to take the notes. I love it; but I did try to be objective. In the middle of this discussion, a government-generated, but anonymnous paper was distributed. It had "Example Suggested Solutions." It suggeeted that source code not be available for products suitable for export. It also suggested other ideas, such as storing a checksum/hash and having the system "check the cryptographic code several times during its use." There was a strong reaction against these suggestions, not because they were bad ideas, but because the paper was delivered with no prior publication. This precluded any planned response to its ideas. We reworded #5 to say "want to Trust the Product." This means that it is untampered, works as expected, etc. We then hashed out ways to know this. The list ended up looking like: 1. is available only as object code 2. contains some "hash" function to check for modifications 3. contains some unique hash, with uniqueness based upon something like "site," "per copy" or "per release" 4. Contains policies against modification, such as liscense language against decompilation. 5. OS-related security, such as runs "protected mode" instead of as a wild DOS program. Of course, the software vendors went wild against "per copy" identifiers, saying it would add two orders of magnitude worth of problems to manufacturing. The items on the list were not "must have all of these" rather it was a pick-and-chose menu. We also required that the standard allow for technical innovation to keep up with the evolving state of the art. The discussion of #6 was more lively. We took a long time figuring out what it said. For instance, could ViaCrypt sell a product that was compatible with PGP 2.6.2 (non-escrowed) that also worked with the new escrowed ciphers? It seems to me, and a lot of other folks there, that such a product would be non-exportable. We simplified the criteria to: "right products won't talk to wrong products." with "right products" meaning those that are exportable, and wrong products being those that aren't, or are hacked, or ... We then developed "goals" including: 1. One version for sale worldwide 2. Allow development in the US 3. Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies want Escrowed (I almost wrote GAK :-) 4. Must interoperate with everything 5. Receiver can only decrypt if escrow agencies can decrypt. This leads to a bunch of issues and observations, including: a. Can goals 1, 2, and 4 be met simultaneously? There was a suggestion of a "friendly man-in-the-middle" who would receive a GAK'd conversation, and strip off the GAK parts, and reencrypt it, and retransmit it to a non-GAK user. Which leads to: b. Can we prohibit a friendly MITM? The big issue was: c. Startup compatibility. No one will buy products unless they have sales attractiveness. This means compatibility with existing systems. Yet the criteria #6 seems to say that approved products must refuse backwards compatibility. This was labeled a "non starter" by the group. The consensus was that companies can develop a substantial competitive advantage by developing off-shore and offering both escrowed encryption and compatibility with existing systems. There was a discussion of grandfathering in some technologies. This was to help interoperability. The conversation became fuzzy, Grandfather technologies included DES, 3-DES, IDEA, and long key RC4. One key idea was that it may make sense to allow software that encrypts with escrowed keys, but can also decrypt with any algorithm. This allows the LEA's to access outgoing messages, while allowing interoperability. The discussions frequently wandered to discuss the language of the criteria. The wording was considered simultaneously too subjective and impractical. For example, we considered the phrase "tamper resistant" to be preferable to the original "prevent tampering," because it is impossible to absolutly prevent modification to software. The issue of interoperability was raised repeatedly. It is critical that exportable products interoperate with other, existing export products. The last issue in the session was that the length of the key, 64-bits, was defined in criteria #1. There was no discussion at the conference on this criteria. It seems that the NIS&T and NSA folks believe that this is a closed topic. The folks in the session did not agree. They felt that 64-bits was not enough. Once the breakout session was over, the entire conference met together, and the "reporter" from each session reported their comments and findings. All breakout sessions had suggested changes. The group that discussed criteria #9 recommended removing it. The group that discussed criteria #2 (no multiple encryption) reported that industry was working on a general solution to the problem of key recovery, and that their solution would probably appear as quickly without the government's "help." Several groups identified that there are at least two separate problem domains: communications and data storage. Communications typically is short term, and has unique keys for each session. Data storage has far fewer keys that are used for long periods. Several speakers suggested that while communications keys were not suited to be escrowed, there was a large need for key recovery for data storage. There was no response from the government representatives to any of these points. One government speaker did say that there would be a Federal key escrow standard, period. After the combined session, there were more break-out sessions. In the one that I attended, the folks from National Semiconductor described their CAKE system. This is a smartcard/PCMCIA device that uses 2000+ bit public/private key encryption and signatures. They are hoping for export approval; it is necessary for the project to be viable. The system looks pretty interesting, but it too complicated to describe here. In short, random session keys are generated and signed with a Data Recovery Center's public key. The LEAs could then send encrypted session keys to the DRC, which would decrypt them, and return the unencrypted session keys which the LEA could then used to decrypt the messages. While this is a hardware system, its concepts could be transfered to a software implementation. One obvious problem is that NS' system doesn't meet criteria #8 (retuiring repeated involvement of the escrow agent), since it may require hundreds or thousands of session key decipherments. It also has a number of attractive features, such as never sending the private key anywhere, only the session key is escrowed. The general discussion showed concerns that in the international community, requiring government escrow may cause lose of valuable data, as some foriegn governments are not as trustworthy as the US. It was the consensus that requiring users to have 50 or more escrow centers was unworkable. Yet this could be required for large multinational companies working in 50 or more countries, if each required a local key escrow service. The NS model would allow both date stamping of session keys, and periodic rekeying. Either would satisfy my "unaccepted" Citeria #11, technical limits to the time that a court ordered decryption could be executed. There was a discussion of changing the criteria so that only the transmission of data was concerned with escrow. This would simplify the issue of multinational escrow. We did not resolve whether this would be sufficient or acceptable. Today, we will talk about suitable escrow agencies. Pat -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBME7WOLCsmOInW9opAQHbawP+PSC+9p7ll7yKTiwnkzrIf+aT/ZfuoCqj Fp6ZhykIoJQVF5YAEhz9O1t9FKOauo3baMDhaIvU4pUSm2b/hKlUFB8cwYr7KTjd MFGxTOG/D7blGuX6ZXbHlS5EkKeT1pDtfrd9GlnTKWHxfga/51ROWCG/33BWZxHR lyNLI07UPbo= =kFkC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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IDEAL FOR BEGINNERS WORK-AT-HOME
by rewards＠t-1net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Bernstein decision: image files upgraded
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you couldn't read the decision because the original image files were too fuzzy, try them now. They're wider and longer, and a lot easier to read. They're almost as small as the previous ones, because we encoded them better. We're still working on scanning it in to plain text. http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Bernstein_v_DoS/Legal/970825_decision.im… John Gilmore

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Re: What is truth?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Crypto relevance: Absolutely none: At 10:57 PM 9/6/95 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > If you want more information on my views about truth, check out > the work on "evolutionary epistemology," especially the writings > of William Bartley and Karl Popper. Popper went off the deep end because he tried to justify science without relying on the principle of induction, or its equivalent, Bayesian probability. A hopeless endeavor, like the attempt of the behaviorists to describe behavior without reference to intention, desire, and knowledge. His reasoning leads logically to the polylogism of the fascists, an outcome he imagines he avoided, but in fact he merely rephrased in language that superficially sounds more favorable to science. Bayesian probability leads us to the conclusion that some scientific theories have a probability of truth that is exponentially close to unity. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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by email＠exoticwhispers.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Growth of actions definded as crime. Which math formula?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:29 PM 9/6/95 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > I've seen figures on the "linear feet" of regulations, and how they are > growing exponentially, but I don't recall the numbers. Something like the > total number of laws doubling every 10 years or so, but don't quote me on > this one. In addition one should also consider that most of these new crimes are deliberately written to be sweeping and vague so that they can be enforced in a selective and capricious manner: For example wetlands are deliberately defined in a way to give them considerable elbow room, indeed so much elbow room that much of death valley technically qualifies as wetlands. The wetlands law was written to make it easy for bureaucrats to win lawsuits, not to reflect common sense or basic sanity. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Cryptography Technical Report Server (CTRS) needs submissions!
by David J. Bianco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Earlier this week I posted a note bemoaning the lack of a good searchable repository for cryptography related technical reports. In short, I volunteered to develop, host and maintain such a system as a service to the rest of the Internet. The system is ready, now the fun part begins... The Cryptographic Technical Report Service needs *YOU*. Specifically, it needs your technical reports (or other technical documentation). In order for CTRS to become popular, it needs to have a useful amount of data to search, so I'm currently soliciting submissions for the database. Contributing to CTRS is pretty simple. Detailed information can be found at <http://porthos.itribe.net/CTRS/FAQ.html#contribute>, but basically all that's required is to send <ctrs-submissions(a)itribe.net> a refer-format bibliographic entry which contains a URL pointing to the paper's real Net location. I'll index the entries (prettyprinting them, of course), and CTRS users will follow that URL if they want to retrieve the paper. If you don't have a URL, I'm willing to host as many papers as I have resources for. Full details can be found at the URL above, but please note that I'm only able to accept papers submitted by the authors (or copyright holder). If you'd like to know more about CTRS, you can check out it's beta version at <http://www.itribe.net/CTRS/> (<https://www.itribe.net/CTRS/> for the SSL version). The database doesn't have much (anything) in it right now, so I'm relying totally on submissions in order to build the collection. I firmly believe that CTRS can provide a useful service to the cryptographic community, so I hope you will all consider contributing your reports to CTRS. If you have questions, please check out the CTRS FAQ <http://www.itribe.net/CTRS/FAQ.html>. If you still have questions, feel free to contact me at the email address below. ========================================================================== David J. Bianco | Web Wonders, Online Oddities, Cool Stuff iTribe, Inc. | Suite 1700, World Trade Center | email: <bianco(a)itribe.net> Norfolk, VA 23510 | URL : http://www.itribe.net/~bianco/

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PGPlib-0.3 is available
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: pgplib-announce(a)cryp.to Subject: PGPlib-0.3 is available Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1997 11:10:03 +0200 From: Tage Stabell-Kulo <tage(a)ACM.org> Reply-To: tage(a)acm.org Sender: pgplib-announce-owner(a)cryp.to Precedence: list -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This mail is sent on the list pgplib-announce(a)cryp.to. It is a (very) low voulme list where announcments are made when new versions of PGPlib becomes available. Please find below a copy of the file README distributed with this new release. Instructions on how to obtain your own copy of PGPlib is included. === Welcome to version 0.3 of PGPlib. This code has not yet matured enough to reach version 1.0. However, this is probably the latest development version before 1.0. Detailed instructions for how to obtain this fine code can be found at the end. Experienced users will know that ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz is the place to look. What is here for you ===================== PGPlib is a library that lets you generate (and manipulate) PGP packets without having to run PGP. In particular there is code to generate and understand the following types of PGP packets: - Data can be signed with a private key; - Data can be encrypted with a public key; - Data encrypted with your public key can be decrypted; - You can verify signatures on public keys and on buffers (files); - Convential encrypted (IDEA with Zimmermann's context sensitive feedback). The library can both read (decrypt) and write (encrypt) convential packets (in PGP format); - Armor. You can (de)armor a buffer or a file into a buffer or a file; - UserID packets are read and written in a variety of formats; - Literal with filename, mode, etc. You can create literate packages from files, or from buffers, and create files from literate packets; - Keys can be obtained from a database (which is provided) or by parsing keyrings. Keys can be kept in buffers or on files; - You can maintain a PGP public-key database (I use this library to maintain a database with ~40.000 keys). There is code to use DBM as supplied from Berkeley. A copy of DBM is included for your convinience. In general, PGPlib operates on buffers in order for you to use it in your applications. You will find included a small program that will (de)armor anything, a parser to parse PGP files (including decryption and so on), a shell to manipulate a keydatabase, a keyserver to run on top of such a database, a program to verify signatures on keys and/or files, a program to split keyrings in smaller parts and a program that will sign files for you. You will find all these (and more) in the PGPlib/applications/ directory. None of these uses PGP, the library provides all the functionality you need. What is not there for you ========================= - Sufficient documentation. I have written this library because I need it. In order to make life less hard for my students, I will have to provide some documentation. Possibly even on-line. However, quite a few manual pages are included. What you need ============= - Unix (for some definition of "Unix"). - You must have the SSLeay library as I have not implemented any cryptographic functionality; I hope SSLeay is a good choice. I did not major in mathematics and can thus not judge the quality of their work, although it looks solid (to me). I link with their version 0.8.1. I rely on SSLeay for many things, in particular their BIGNUMs, RSA encryption and IDEA. You can obtain your copy of SSLeay from: * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSL/ - SSLeay source * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSLapps/ - SSL applications * http://www.psy.uq.oz.au/~ftp/Crypto/ssl.html - SSLeay Programmer Reference SSLeay is quite large and I only use a fraction of it. other hand, SSLeay seems to be well maintained and their crypto-library might very well shrink or become more modular as time passes. Also, work is in progress to strip out from SSLeay only thise parts that PGPlib uses. Porting ======= PGPlib has been developed on NetBSD 1.2. It should compile smoothly on FreeBSD, HP-UX and Linux. If you port PGPlib to some other platform, I would be greatful if you would send me patches. In particular, PGPlib does not compile on SunOS 4 and 5, your assistance would be valuable. Regarding PGP ============= - Work is underway to ensure that PGPlib is compliant with RFC1991. - The name PGPlib might not be final as I respect Zimmermann's "ownership" of the acronym PGP and he might not like that this library uses the name PGPlib. Thus, this library might become libRFC1991.a or something. - PGP-5.0 is available. It has several new features, such as a multitude of encryption methods. PGPlib might evolve to support them all. Your Feedback ============ Your feedback is solicited. Peter Simons <Peter.Simons(a)gmd.de> has created a mailinglist for PGPlib. To subscribe, send an e-mail to the address pgplib-dev-request(a)crypt.to and write the command SUBSCRIBE into the BODY. If you want to be subscribed under a different address than the one you're mailing from, you can also use SUBSCRIBE yourname(a)somewhere.else to do the trick. To post to the list, send an e-mail to pgplib-dev(a)cryp.to as usual. There is also (very low volume) list pgplib-announce(a)cryp.to. Subscribe by sending an e-mail to pgplib-announce-request(a)cryp.to with SUBSCRIBE in the body. Both lists are archived at URL:http://www.cryp.to/ If you write a nice application based on this library (the ultimate feedback :-), please feel free to send it to me and I will include it in the next release; Where to get PGPlib =================== ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz This file is a link to the latest version. If you obtain the file PGPlib-0.3.tar.gz instead, note that a name conflict will occur when you unpack the file (see below). What to do ========== First, uncompress PGPlib, which should give you the file PGPlib.tar. When you unpack PGPlib.tar you will get three files in your CURRENT directory. These files are README : This file PGPlib-0.3.tar : The library PGPlib-0.3.tar.sig : My signature on the above. Verify the signature by running pgp PGPlib-0.3.tar.sig and verify that PGP prints Good signature from user "Tage Stabell-Kulo <tage(a)cs.uit.no>". When you unpack PGPlib-0.3.tar, tar will create the directory PGPlib-0.3 and place all the files within it. Unless you run SunOS, running the script configure should produce Makefiles that you can use to compile everything. To verify that everything compiled correctly, you should run the script applications/test.sh. Before you do so, you must edit away the code that asks you to read this file. COPYRIGHT (yum, yum) ========= The library and included applications are all available under "Berkeley style" copyright terms. Basically, this means that PGPlib is FREE for commercial and non-comercial use, and that you can do almost anything with the code. The only thing you can not do is to say that you wrote it. See the file COPYING for details. //// Tage Stabell-Kuloe | e-mail: tage(a)ACM.org //// /// Department of Computer Science/IMR | Phone : +47-776-44032 /// // 9037 University of Tromsoe, Norway | Fax : +47-776-44580 // / "'oe' is '\o' in TeX" | URL:http://www.cs.uit.no/~tage/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: latin1 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.2, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBNAPu4wMzZ6tx+9RpAQEM2AP/Sp7REQHWSRGhscblUpX7CPoin6h9Lo5Y D0CzO/7cm9kqXqB3oQ3xPhchEcXzJEyABz8mehoAm6+D3Bqus1aI1JkcD6mVmoUE yQ3QU0X0jXdN84xcjTn6cyQx3iuu17MQ5/WKoLh2Ftq5DzBGATGlmGN6O6TRUbAW SZrCOQDN54M= =XjX4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PGP Library Announcements --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: fast modular reduction (proof?)
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In the following pseudocode, B is the radix in which the numbers are > represented (2^32 for a 32-bit machine), n is the length of modulus in > blocks, U is B^(n+1) mod the modulus, X is the number to be reduced, k+1 > is the length of X, and Y is the result. > > 1. Y = X > 2. For i from k down to n+1, repeat steps 3 and 4 > 3. Y = Y - Y[i] * B^i + Y[i] * U * B^(i-n-1) > 4. If Y >= B^i, then Y = Y - B^i + U * B^(i-n-1) To do a proof I rewrite the algorithm: n = len(modulus) // modulus < B^n Y = X // obviously Y = X mod modulus K = B ^ (n+1) - U // U = B ^ (n+1) mod modulus, // therefore K = 0 mod modulus // furthermore K > 0 for (i=len(Y)-1 ; i>n ; i--) { F = B ^ (i-n-1) * K // F > 0 // F = 0 mod modulus Y -= Y[i] * F // Y shrinking, but // Y still the same mod modulus if ( Y >= B^i ) Y -= F // again shrinking, // still the same mod modulus } This shows that Y was shrinking, but is still equal to X mod modulus. To see whether Y really shrinks enough: Y = sum(i=0..len(Y)-1) Y[i] * B^i In the step Y = Y - Y[i] * B^i the highest block of Y is deleted (what could be done fast by reducing the length of Y). Now Y < B^i Afterwards the same value mod modulus is added to keep Y constant: Y = Y + Y[i] * U * B^(i-n-1). Y[i]<B -> Y[i]+1 <= B U < modulus < B^n , therefore U < B^n -> (Y[i]+1) * U < B * B^n = B^(n+1) -> Y[i] * U < B^(n+1) - U -> Y[i] * U * B^ (i-n-1 ) < F Therefore after doing the addition Y < B^i + F Check of the last step: 0 <= U < B^n therefore B^n < B^(n+1) - U <= B^(n+1) Therefore in every loop B^(i-1) < F <= B^i -> Y-F < B^i Partial Correctness: Y = X [ Y = X mod Y < B^len(X) ] K = B ^ (n+1) - U [ K = 0 mod B^n < K <= B^(n+1) ] for (i=len(X)-1 ; i>n ; i--) { [ Y = X mod , Y < B^(i+1) ] F = B ^ (i-n-1) * K [ F = 0 mod , B^(i-1) < F <= B^i ] [ 0 <= Y[i] < B ] [ Y[i] * F = 0 mod , 0 <= Y[i] * F < B^(i+1) ] [ Y >= Y[i] * B^i -> Y >= Y[i] * F ] Y -= Y[i] * F [ Y = X mod , Y < B^i + F (reason see above) , Y >= 0 ] if ( Y >= B^i ) Y -= F // again shrinking, // still the same mod modulus [ Y = X mod , Y >= 0 , Y < B^i ] } Last i was n+1, therefore Y = X mod , Y >= 0 , Y < B^(n+1) This is not enough, Y < B^n is requested. The loop can't be done once more because i-n-1 would become negative. k+1 was the length of X, and n the length of the modulus. You walk down from k to n+1 . In every loop you remove one block of the number. This means you have to do len(X)-len(modulus) loops. In the pseudocode you do only len(X)-len(modulus)-1 loops. One loop seems to be missing. This may be a result of confusion whether your Y starts with Y[0] or Y[1]. I do understand the algorithm as: n = len(modulus) U = B^n mod modulus K = B^n - U // = 0 mod modulus, 0 < K < B^n Y = X for(i=len(X)-1 ; i>= n ; i--) // squeeze Block i in Number Y { // Y < B ^ (i+1) F = B ^ ( i-n ) * K // F = 0 mod modulus Y -= Y[i] * F // subtract Y[i] * B^i, now Y < B ^ i // add the equivalent Y[i] * B^(i-n)*U <= F // now Y < B^i + F if ( Y >= B[i] ) Y -= F // now Y < B^i } Last i was n, therefore Y < B^n , Y = X mod modulus , but perhaps still Y >= modulus. Ok, algorithm understood and agreed (after modifying the loop counter). Any more agreement or disagreements? Hadmut

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Re: Socio-Economic Cults (Re: Cypherpunk Cults)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "John Smith" <jsmith58(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >You know, there's a reason people started using judges to help settle >disputes. There's a reason the common law evolved with the idea of >proportionate response and restitution. This kind of >shoot-everybody-I-think-harmed-me approach just doesn't work. Nobody >knows what someone else will consider harm worth shooting over. If >somebody disagrees that a shooting was justified, they'll shoot back, >and feuds begin. See "The Machinery of Freedom" by David Friedman. (Sorry if this is old hat to you or other members of this list.) Friedman's legal arrangement works something like this: Say you kill somebody. If you want to protect your life from revenge, you immediately report what you did to three people nearby who were uninvolved. This keeps you inside the legal system. Afterwards, a compensation arrangement is made between your protection company and the protection company of your victim. This occurs within the legal framework. If you do not comply with the compensation agreement, you are outlawed. Outlaws receive no legal protection. You can change protection companies anytime you like. Improbable? This is very similar to the Icelandic legal system of circa 1000 C.E. Friedman claims that this worked quite well for many years. Icelanders at that time were murderous pirates, yet in Iceland they murdered each other much less frequently than Americans do now in the United States. The compensation payments were typically nontrivial - on the order of twenty years of income. Some interesting aspects of medieval Icelandic politics: no prisons, no standing army, no single political leader, and no taxes. Just Another Cypherpunk - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzQDR/QAAAEH/16yrVPsexy8QB9PVBBWYEYwdurA9pNjqPc+zSnxtt51d74Z nLsjzHUdGReLFjRM6RjG95STr6Wn0fhOPGMujNyxkV3fbgGxdupQ+9S/3eET0sNO 0NMn4YbOrHec9+3sq3J/Lb1Ds+Me4ioeWWMkgQ2MfpDbhajih0ZL6A6w6s3hkars qPxZy5/Wf3ahQ7M2M5IoujVj6G1PczaU/cUoGNg9HkB+PVZNEyVOkZfVoS3lTywx 6GfpLOEssQI8sprYr4qEOVP7TaevuGPGW5r1uTvqnbKGPxbqCrpVTEG620JwupLA OEAda0052TdZqJXm8T84aUrICloG/7WvDgiTIEUABRG0Jkp1c3QgQW5vdGhlciBD eXBoZXJwdW5rIDxmb29AZGV2Lm51bGw+ =as72 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNAOj5v+1rw4IkyBFAQGszQf9EOsOO6rZkboCTGes5IcM/co7Os5Gb7Ri YhQQTVAsMD7zQ30rrEmx9pMCPtgkaF9zesG0/EUVOogbPiv1LagFJOLOiKjiqHrI sA48lGAYB5YBBBNtGMP7kMIJDc5M7QY7RoyHzsCGKaymsFFQNzpOCmKmTIKC3LD5 jQ6a9hBe9xwzzXkS0j+sdI62zjv/2Fco2DK8PkHFOINi3+GsKLZrVSelC6htEi7W amBdi2clNYcawoc9yGXOiL6233e5/A+Usrh9fQ74EPAErSkz8EjI13Yd8+HOes8U 6CMm+SWdCGKpp6Z9DN7B6i5ybLoNek3pl5mHWGfbZOtJ8nIblrMPRA== =DiLK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Govt seeking emergency stay in Bernstein case
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1997 13:43:36 -0700 From: Cindy Cohn <Cindy(a)mcglashan.com> Hi all, Just talked to Mr. Coppolino at the Justice Department. They are filing ex parte emergency stay papers tonight or tomorrow morning to try to stay the impact of Judge Patel's ruling pending appeal. He'll be faxing me the documents when they are ready. He said yesterday that they would seek to stay the "export" of crypto source code, although not the teaching or discussion (whatever that means). Cindy A. Cohn [Update: We received the faxed papers about 8PM; images of them will be in a sub-directory of http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Bernstein_v_DoS/Legal/ on Thursday morning. The Bernstein team is opposing their motion; our filing will also be on the Web site. It was reported by C|Net that the government is "appealing"; this is not true. They are asking that Judge Patel to "stay" her own ruling -- hold it in abeyance -- to prevent Prof. Bernstein from exercising his First Amendment rights before they can appeal. But they have not filed an appeal, or formally indicated their intent to do so. --gnu]

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Re: How tO MutAte anD TaKE OVer tHe WOrld
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:28 AM 8/27/97 -0700, Alan wrote: > >On Tue, 26 Aug 1997, luciana luciana wrote: > >> I'm very interested on that. >> could u let me know anything else? > >I picked up a copy of the book a while back. > >Some of the sidenotes and off-storyline events are interesting and mildly >humorous. The ending was incredibly unbelievable and anti-climatic. (The >tacked on end-of-the-end was just plain stupid.) The main characters >spend little time involved with the revolution they claim to be bringing >about. > >It does make mention of the Cypherpunks. (One of the authors was involved >in the very beginning, but I have not seen her post here any time in my >memory. (She claims to have coined the term "Cypherpunk".)) > >If you want Cyberpunk/Cypherpunk fiction, there are much better choices. >Neal Stephenson (sp?) is a good choice. ("Snow Crash" and the short story >"Hacking the Spew" are two of my favorites from him.) > >If you do get "How to mutate...", wait until it comes out in paperback. >Then you won't feel as cheated as I did when i finished the book. > >alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | Note to AOL users: for a quick shortcut to reply >Alan Olsen | to my mail, just hit the ctrl, alt and del keys. > The author who claims that is St. Jude, AKA Judith Milton, she is a former UNIX programmer who is also absent from the MUT home page. The book itself is a little large for a paperback version, you have to read the warning about the broken "scrapbook" method and remember that these people are humor writers. I grabbed a copy probably 3 months after it was released. The dust cover is very flimsy, has it improved? There is a web site dedicated to the book, HTTP://www.onworld.com:80/MUT The site is a shambles right now but I was told that they were going to try to salvage it after the holiday weekend. When it is working it has a nice web-based bulliten board, with some threading, and way too many "how do I hack" questions. There are a few good gems and some people very much in line with those here, however. It's worth a visit, but give it a little while and see if they get the bulliten boards back on line. It is over 18 months old, I have been visiting it off and on for about a year.

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Bell
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I read that Jim Bell is now in jail, in part over his A.P scheme. Reading it reminded me that I had vowed to return at the end of the summer. Could someone fill me in on any details that the article might have missed or ommitted?

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Re: heart
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:55 PM 8/26/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote: > >On Mon, Aug 25, 1997 at 02:20:33PM -0700, Tim May wrote: >> And I think that most of what passes for "help" actually does more harm >> than good, at least in the longterm. > >There is no doubt that sometimes "help" does more harm than good. >There is also no doubt that sometimes help does more good than harm. >Platitudes like these don't really give one much real guidance. > >> For example, sending food aid to Third World countries sounds noble and >> good. But most studies show the real effect of such aid: it destroys the >> local infrastructure of food production and distribution. (Imagine being a >> poor Somali farmer bringing your grain to market, and seeing tons of U.S. >> grain being distributed freely...it wipes that farmer out, and his future >> years of production are gone, even after the U.S. food aid is also gone.) > >So the farmer can die of starvation later rather than earlier. The >problem is not with help, per se -- it's with the specifics of how the >help is implemented. What do you think the farmer would chose -- get >some food now, and take his chances with his food production at a >later time, or die of starvation immediately? > >A current case is North Korea. Of course if you give them food it >will help perpetuate an evil government. On the other hand, if you >don't give them food, lot's and lot's of people would die. Tim's >answer is that you might as well let them die, rather than perpetuate >the government that enslaves them. Others aren't quite as >cold-blooded as Tim. > I would venture to guess that very limited sustanence and more active aid to the faltering industry would be more effective. Then again I have heard of brand new tractors rusting in the field because the local farmer couldn't or wouldn't adapt to it, so even aid to the industry can be ineffective. >> For example, the welfare system. Who can argue that it produces persons >> unable or unwilling to take the available jobs, mostly at or near minimum >> wage? When a welfare mother of two or more children can collect the total >> equivalent (direct payments, food coupons, tax exemptions, day care) of $15 >> an hour, it would be foolish for her to apply for a job at Burger King for >> $6.35 an hour, and then have to pay almost that amount to put her kids in >> some day care center. The longer she is out of the job market, the worse it >> gets. > >The welfare system obviously has all kinds of problems. It's not >easy giving help without creating dependency. That doesn't mean it >can't be done. > I like the idea of reviving the WPA. We have enough county and state jobs that need to get done, and do not require any formal training. Some can even be done by the blind, deaf, mentally handicapped, and wheelchair bound individuals who might actually jump at the chance to pull thier own weight. I believe the idea is called "right to work", but I could be misinformed. >> For example, saving people from their bad choices in life. When we force >> insurers to cover those who do stupid, formerly uninsurable things, or when >> we force the providers of legally and freely-chose substances (tobacco, >> hamburger, guns, breast implants, rock climbing equipment, etc.) to pay for >> the stupid actions of others, even if only imagined, costs rise and choices >> narrow. > >Yep. I don't see this as the same category of trying to help people, >though. Rather, I think this example points out the end result of >our adversarial legal system. Pretty soon every revolver will have a warning label. "Warning, misuse of this tool can result in injury and death. By handling this item you consent to bear all legal responsibility reguarding its use." Never mind that such should be implied.

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Re: Monkey Wrench into the works
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Myron Lewis" <mrlewis(a)keygen.com> > We invite you and everyone on the list (Please send this invitation out to > them as the info on how to do that didn't come through.) to visit the KeyGen > webpage, www.KeyGen.com and learn about Automatic Synchronized > KeyGeneration(TM). If you think you recognize it as something you have seen > before, you're close but wrong. What one man knows, nobody knows. What two men know, everyone knows. Shared secrets just don't work. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Socio-Economic Cults (Re: Cypherpunk Cults)
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:23 AM 8/27/97 -0400, Anonymous wrote: > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >"John Smith" <jsmith58(a)hotmail.com> wrote: >>You know, there's a reason people started using judges to help settle >>disputes. There's a reason the common law evolved with the idea of >>proportionate response and restitution. This kind of >>shoot-everybody-I-think-harmed-me approach just doesn't work. Nobody >>knows what someone else will consider harm worth shooting over. If >>somebody disagrees that a shooting was justified, they'll shoot back, >>and feuds begin. > >See "The Machinery of Freedom" by David Friedman. (Sorry if this is >old hat to you or other members of this list.) > >Friedman's legal arrangement works something like this: Say you kill >somebody. If you want to protect your life from revenge, you >immediately report what you did to three people nearby who were >uninvolved. > >This keeps you inside the legal system. Afterwards, a compensation >arrangement is made between your protection company and the protection >company of your victim. This occurs within the legal framework. If >you do not comply with the compensation agreement, you are outlawed. >Outlaws receive no legal protection. > >You can change protection companies anytime you like. > >Improbable? This is very similar to the Icelandic legal system of >circa 1000 C.E. Friedman claims that this worked quite well for many >years. Icelanders at that time were murderous pirates, yet in Iceland >they murdered each other much less frequently than Americans do now in >the United States. > >The compensation payments were typically nontrivial - on the order of >twenty years of income. > >Some interesting aspects of medieval Icelandic politics: no prisons, >no standing army, no single political leader, and no taxes. > >Just Another Cypherpunk I got something very similar from a friend who is much higher on the technological food chain than myself. He also told me that there was this big fair/trade-show/political rally that everyone attended. Once a year I think. That in addition to stopping by three houses to report the killing the killer had to report it at the next of these events to occur. It was also suggested that the compensation was a fairly fixed amount but that a person who could afford it and really didn't want trouble from the heirs of the deceased could pay more, thus suggesting that he considered the deceased to be more valuable than the average man. Sort of a post-mortem complement by the killer. Also, according to what I remember, the "protection company" was your extended family. Pay up or face the wraith of all the deceased's cousins, nephews, uncles, neices, aunts, maybe his kids. I would love to get more information on this, however, the friend who told me this much has left this little school for the larger waters of Oklahoma State University where he is in the engineering pod.

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Study sees privacy lacking on government Web sites (fwd)
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Infobeat : *** Study sees privacy lacking on government Web sites While the Clinton administration is pressuring companies with Internet sites to respect the privacy of Web surfers, a new survey finds the government itself is far from perfect regarding this issue. Almost half the 70 Internet sites run by federal agencies collect data about visitors, but most disclose nothing about how the information will be used, according to OMB Watch. Privacy concerns arise on the Internet because whenever a person using Web browsing software visits a site, the site can collect information about the person, sometimes without their knowledge. For the full text story, see http://www.infobeat.com/stories/cgi/story.cgi?id=4638339-daf -- Vipul Ved Prakash | - Electronic Security & Crypto vipul(a)pobox.com | - Web Objects 91 11 2233328 | - PERL Development 198 Madhuban IP Extension | - Linux & Open Systems Delhi, INDIA 110 092 | - Networked Virtual Spaces

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Cypherpunks in "The Guide"
by Mike Duvos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Cypherpunks have gotten honorable mention as the only intellectually honest defenders of Free Speech left on the Net in a "Guide Magazine" article. http://www.guidemag.com/newsslant/vigilante-censors.html Apparently the author reads the list. I seem to have been quoted. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ enoch(a)zipcon.com $ via Finger $ {Free Cypherpunk Political Prisoner Jim Bell}

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Re: Socio-Economic Cults (Re: Cypherpunk Cults)
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:18 AM 8/27/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote: >It's a distributed system, it's more resilient to abuse than >governments. > >If one person becomes too much of a nuisance (real trigger happy for >ultra minor infractions -- swearing at them, daring to look at them >when they're in a bad bood) relatives, friends, or concerned citizens >will correct (fill trigger happy person with lead). > >That's how the wild west worked anyway... outlaws didn't last that >long. > >So you're relying on other peoples sense of fairness ... should easily >work out better than governments. > Ever heard of mob violence? Read up on the Salem witch trials when a bunch of people got together and murdered a bunch of thier own on the evidence of the rantings of a few girls. Don't forget hitler, who managed to swing an entire country against a ever growing list of minorities. Granted, this was from within government, but the principle is the same. Anarchy is good, as long as an us versus them mentality doesn't occur. That would require a far more homogenious population than we have now. If everyone had the same skin color, hair color, eye color, bone structure, and color of socks, war would eventually break out over who lived on which side of the river.

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<<Vitamin B>>(August 27, 1997) Back to the Future
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Lotus-FromDomain: BIONOMICS@INTERLIANT @ OUTBOUND From: "VitaminB"<VitaminB(a)bionomics.org> To: "DAILY DOSE"<DAILY_DOSE(a)maxager.com> Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1997 11:04:00 -0700 Subject: <<Vitamin B>>(August 27, 1997) Back to the Future Mime-Version: 1.0 Vitamin B: Your Daily Dose of Bionomics August 27, 1997 Back to the Future "In the pre-Civil War period, when the general ethos of laissez faire severely discouraged government intervention in the market economy, private regulations arose in the form of a variety of institutions, which accomplished much of what we endeavor to do today with our elaborate system of government rule making and supervision. In particular, scholars have noted that the period saw the development of private measures to help holders of bank notes protect themselves from risk. As the notes were not legal tender, there was no obligation to accept the currency of a suspect bank, or to accept it at par value; accordingly, notes often were accepted and cleared at less than par. As a result, publications--bank note reporters--were established to provide current information on market rates for notes of different banks based on their creditworthiness, reputation, and location, as well as to identify counterfeit notes. Bank note brokers created a ready market for notes of different credit quality. In some areas, private clearinghouses were established, which provided incentives for self-regulation. " "Banks competed for reputation, and advertised high capital ratios to attract depositors. Capital to asset ratios in those days often exceeded one-third. One must keep in mind that then, as now, a significant part of safety and soundness regulations came from market forces and institutions. Government regulation is an add-on that tries to identify presumed market failures and, accordingly, substitute official rules to fill in the gaps. " "To be sure, much of what developed in that earlier period was primitive and often ineffectual. But the financial system itself was just beginning to evolve. " "From today's presumably far more sophisticated view of such matters, we may look askance at what we have often dismissed as 'wildcat banking.' But it should not escape our notice that, as the international financial system becomes ever more complex, we, in our regulatory roles, are being driven increasingly toward reliance on private market self-regulation similar to what emerged in more primitive forms in the 1850s in the United States." --Alan Greenspan Toward Electronic Money & Banking: The Role of Government A Conference Sponsored by the United States Department of the Treasury September 19-20, 1996 --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: Is this group dead?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: alt.cypherpunks) In article <wimlEFHsur.6CE(a)netcom.com>, wiml(a)netcom.com (Wim Lewis) wrote: > In article <5togij$4he$1(a)quixote.stanford.edu>, > Rich Graves <rcgraves(a)disposable.com> wrote: > >No, nothing caused it. It's just dead, pretty much always has been. > >"Always" being only a few months, of course. > > Well, sure --- define "always" as "recently" and you won't see much > change. More than a couple months ago, it was non-dead (about ten relevant > articles a day on good days, IIRC). That's why I'm curious. > Some of us posted our articles to the Cypherpunks list(s) to this newsgroup, when it was first created. For my own part, this was partly to ensure propagation in case the new distributed mailing lists failed for some reason, and partly as a show of support for the new newsgroup, alt.cypherpunks. But alt.cypherpunks filled up with the usual spam and cross-posts. And the distributed mailing lists have done well. So most of us don't bother with it. If you or other readers are really interested, subscribe to the list. Newsgroups are just too prone to casual drop-ins, meaning, people who have no sense of history, no awareness of past issues already hashed out, etc. (Lest anyone think I'm being "undemocratic," sure. I cop to that. Anyone who wants to use alt.cypherpunks for discussions is free to. But if nobody does, so?) --Tim May -- There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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