December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: alt.anonymous.messages considered harmful
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I will feed alt.anonymous.messages to ANYONE who asks. I will accept a feed of that one group from any news server which is used by a remailer. -Lance At 1:13 PM 11/2/95, Futplex wrote: >Name Withheld by Request writes: >[re: problems with the Usenet newsgroup model of pseud/anonymous message pools] >> Denial of service attacks could be made somewhat less feasible by >> making the pool accessible as a mailing list and via http. > >Mailing lists of course suffer the problem of strictly limited participation. >The web approach might work better, in some future with better privacy- >protecting infrastructure in place. Specifically, if HTTP transactions with >a popular web server were routinely encrypted, then all reasonably long >visits to that site would act as cover traffic for a message pool on that >server. As a bonus, you could have a spiffy form on the web page that >searches the pool for you. > >In any event, the server could log your exploration. This returns us to the >issue of strongly anonymous web proxies. (And we could imagine >countermeasures, like daemons that search for randomly selected pseudonym tags >to muddy the waters. As Tim might say, lots of issues.) > >Also, the mention of "as a mailing list _and_ via http" is significant. Making >the pool available in multiple forms seems to be an unconditional benefit. > >-Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: The great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible)
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This seems to ignore a possible worst-case scenario, in which the only products which are ultimately approved wrap the key using a special law enforcement key, for example. If the Powers that be can mandate "escrow" --- really GAP, Gov't Access to Plaintext --- then it can be mandated to take a particular form that is defined to be tractable. At 05:25 PM 9/15/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > >At 8:41 AM -0700 9/15/97, nospam-seesignature(a)ceddec.com wrote: >>If I have to GAK my keys, and there then exists a pgp-gak, then we simply >>recruit the same CPU power that generated the millions of DES keys to just >>run pgpk-gak with the shortest keylength and send billions of keys to the >>GAKserver each week. Many from out of the US if pgp-gak becomes available >>there. >> >>My test software uses a loop that generates a new pair every few seconds >>on a pentium (and found some very obscure bugs). I would be required to >>send all those to the gak.gov. If they really want them... >> >>What it probably means is the govenrment will issue keys or have to >>license people to create them. > >"There ain't no such thing as free escrow." > >Some fee will be collected to register keys. "To defray costs" (never mind >that the government is the party _requiring_ the damned escrow!). > >This will stop the "flooding attacks" which a free key escrow system would >generate. It will also, sadly for us, put an end to many applications where >keys are generated quickly, transiently, and on an ad hoc basis. There >simply will be no time to register the keys, and the $10 (or whatever) >processing fee will be unacceptable for these applications. > >--Tim May > >There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. >Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" >---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- >Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, >tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero >W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, >Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. >"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > > > > >

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[political NON-noise] Re: Crypto & Taxes
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:03 AM 11/4/95, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >Not that I want to get into a big political discussion, but David Friedman >has a nice, calm and rational book called The Machinery of Freedom, 2nd ed, >which argues anarchism/libertarianism from an economist'spoint of view. >The argument is not cased in terms of ethics and morals but rather >economic efficiency and utility. Slim, easy to read and cheap. He also >has a good sense of humor. Unfortunately the book is currently on back order. >I'm holding on to my library copy until they ship one to me. David Friedman is now teaching law at Santa Clara University, over in Silicon Valley. We've been in contact, and expect to meet for dinner sometime soon. (He attended a special Cypherpunks meeting a few years ago.) >You can butt heads with him and Tim on the cyberia list (I don't remember >the address but they have it at news://nntp.hks.net ) Ah, but the Cyberia list is a _law_ list, and political discussion is discouraged. >I gather from the cyphernomicon that someone recently converted him to >cryptoanarchy. His "Machinery of Freedom" and many other articles clearly establishes him as a leader in this area. He didn't previously know a lot about strong crypto, but now he sees that this makes many of the abstract ideas of "Machinery" near at hand. Vernor Vinge believes the same thing. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Many Topics are Appropriate for Discussion Here
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:35 PM 11/3/95, hallam(a)w3.org wrote: > Just a calibration point. The libertarians on the list do not seem >to shrink from expressing their political views. Indeed the entire discussion >on the NSA is a political thread pure and simple. My post related directly >to the question of personal privacy rights in a democratic, plural society. >I do not regard that it was off topic in any sense. I was not aware that >any agreement was in effect as to the method by which goals might be >achieved. I chose to persue goals by the means most likely to succeed. In >that I am a pragmatist. Government regulation often provides social benefits >it is not by definition an evil to be avoided. In any case regardless of the >rhetoric government regulation increases, I prefer to press for some >regulations I like rather than dream about there being none whatsoever. I for one have no problem with left-leaning (that is, nonlibertarian :-}) folks expressing views. That libertarians tend to be the most vocal and perhaps most articulate advocates of strong crypto is only a trend: I know of several left-leaning folks who strongly push crypto. We happen to disagree on some points, but agree on others. On this list, Dave Mandl and Rich Dutcher (probably no longer subscribed) have represented somewhat leftist views. The late John Brunner was a particular favorite of mine, whose "Stand on Zanzibar" was an utter masterpiece, and whose "The Shockwave Rider" was of course a major influence on many cyberspace privacy advocates. And yet he called himself a leftist and was strongly opposed to the corporate state. As I am, by the way. Much of the power of very large corporations comes from the power of the State enforcing certain franchises and monopolies granted to them. (Intellectual property laws are largely such franchises---if one doubts this, imagine a return to the era of the guilds, where the silversmith's guild could physically block other people from smithing silver, and so on for all of the guilds. Modern intellectual property law works mostly the same way, giving to Apple or Sun or Intel the control a "truly free" market certainly would not.) > I do not separate the question of politics from technology. My >reasons for working on the Web have from the start been explicity political. >I regard the persuit of technology without consideration of the political >consequences to be unethical. I agree. And though I have been called an "ethical monster" for pushing my agenda for crypto anarchy, I agree that one must always consider ethics and politics in technological matters. (I suspect we disagree about many conclusions of this view, however.) > I am only in a position to influence the political process if I >understand the position of the administration and can demonstrate an >appreciation of their concerns. As Sun Tsu said "you must build a golden >path along which your enemies may retreat". The problem with government >is not that it is a conspiracy, it is an interlocking series of >beuraucracies which all seek to avoid responsibility. I view governments as just another example of an organism or system which perpetuates itself. It's in the genes. Evolutionary game theory, etc. > If you want to get Phil Z. off the hook or foul up the governments >escrow scheme plans you have tobe prepared to step into their mindset >and walk about on the inside a bit. somewhere inside the government there is >a jobsworth who is deciding to hassle Phil Z., this person will be a civil >servant, not a political appointee. Ie the dregs which get left behind each >time there is a new administration. What we need to do is to identify that >person and nail their ass to the wall. It has to become apparent to the >administration that that individual has created an unnecessary source of >embarassment. This I think we have been already been doing a pretty good job at. I have been on panel discussions with Stewart Baker, former chief counsel of the NSA (and now with Steptoe, a D.C. law firm, and still active in pushing crypto legislation), and Ron Lee, the current chief counsel. And I spotted Dorothy Denning's deep involvement several years ago. Ditto for key escrow. And of course John Gilmore, Phil Karn, and others have been very active in "nailing their asses to the wall," so to speak. > If somone makes contiuous political spiels themselves but object when >I make one they disagree with (as one person has done) I am not going to take >their objection as indicating anything other than an inability to argue their >case. As this post should make clear, I certainly don't object. I doubt I'll have any energy to argue things I argued for the first time almost 30 years ago, but I'm very interested in the nuts and bolts of how strong crypto will affect institutions and policies. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Sources of randomness
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:04 AM 11/4/95, Peter Monta wrote: >Perhaps there ought to be a couple of standard random-bit-source >implementations, say at the CMOS-standard-cell and board-subsystem >levels, that are widely vetted and trusted (and used!). But it's >mostly a solved problem, seems to me. This is something John Gilmore called for when he wrote: At 9:50 PM 9/20/95, John Gilmore wrote: >Software-generated random numbers are likely to be of poor quality. >There just isn't that much true randomness visible to computers. >Several ways to build good hardware random number generators are >known. But before hardware random number generators can be >incorporated into common desktop computers, someone will have to put >them into a small fraction of a chip. > >Currently, random number generators are chips or larger circuits. >Nobody will pay to put these on a motherboard. But if a random number >generating circuit occupied 1/1000th of a CPU chip or "multi-function >I/O" chip, cost would not be a reason to leave it out. > >You probably can't build a hardware random number generator out of >existing "gate array" gates or "standard cell" cells, because all the >existing gates and cells are designed to behave completely >predictably! It will take designing a new circuit structure. > >Do we know any solid state physics / circuit design experts who think >this might be a fun thing to do? I bet you could get a paper out of >it. And probably improve the world a few years later, when companies >used your paper to close another hole in their computer security. > > John There were several other posts in this thread, so interested folks might want to check the archives for this time period. Continuing on with Peter Monta's post: >A radioactive source might be okay at the board level (though probably >costlier than its electronic counterpart), but it'd be a pain to >integrate, and it might disturb the rest of the chip. (I'd like to >have a get_random_bit instruction as part of a microprocessor, for >example.) Also if you want a high rate of random bits, you need many >decay events, whereas for electronic sources the corresponding >bandwidth is free---Johnson and shot noise are flat to 1 THz or so. I agree, for several reasons. First, I agree that electronic noise sources are easy to build, easy to get licenses for use (basically, no licenses, unless the ITAR boys decide random number generators are munitions--maybe the "This t-shirt is a munition" could have "export-controlled dice"? Second, the ease of integration as a standard library module. However, getting the chip companies to do this will not be easy. They generally don't see the need (hey, even _we_ don't, given the diverse opinions on what is needed). This is why many of us favor an external dongle that plugs in somewhere. Then it could be sold cheaply and not have to get "buy-ins" from industry and committees. One idea is something that superficially looks like a modem, as everyone has modem software and ports (though I suppose many people use internal modems and so can't easily access it.) One would attach the "RNG-modem," a little dongle, and grab noise into a buffer for processing (hashing, filtering, etc.), or as ASCII garbage. (Before anyone jokingly asks about "1-800-RANDOMS," I've thought of it. Not practical, for obvious reasons.) A purer approach would be just a noise source dumped into dev/random, or whatever one wishes to call it. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: alt.anonymous.messages considered harmful
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Specifically, if HTTP transactions with > >a popular web server were routinely encrypted, then all reasonably long > >visits to that site would act as cover traffic for a message pool on that > >server. > > Qua? The "length" of the visit is just the time to download a document. > Leaving a page in the browser window doesn't generate traffic... You're absolutely right. I wasn't thinking sensibly about HTTP. I wanted to make an argument about the time it would take to search the pool and serve a results page. But upon reflection, I don't think that even holds up under my HTTP delusions of yesterday, let alone a realistic view. Please ignore the "reasonably long" part of my previous statement. Thanks for pointing that out. -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

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Re: FBI Wants to Wiretap One of Every 100 Phones in Urban Areas
by clarkm＠cnct.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks for this item! Two little excerpts jump out at me. They follow: > Last year, federal and state courts authorized 1,154 wiretaps, of which 48 > percent [snip] > "People are starting to say that seems awfully high," Dempsey said, noting > that > the overall level of such surveillance activity is now a total of 20,000 > to 25,000 > intercepts nationwide over an entire year. So what is it? 1,154 wiretaps? Or 20,000? FBI Director Louis Freeh testified under oath to 1,157. The FBI was asked for the data to support those numbers. The FBI refused to release them until the year 2002. The FBI is being sued under FOIA to support Freeh's sworn testimony. (Of course, he used different numbers at different times....) One last thing. What's so special about the year 2002? .---. .----------- * :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: / \ __ / ------ * clark.matthews(a)paranet.org / / \(..)/ ----- * :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ////// ' \/ ` ---- * //// / // : : --- * PERMISSION TO \\/ / * / /` '--* COPY / REPOST \*/ * //..\\ x-x-UU----UUx-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x '//||\\` N E M O..M E..I M P U N E..L A C E S S I T x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x

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Re: Crypto & Taxes [WAS Re: Cybersecurity]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of weeks ago, Michael Froomkin <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> wrote: >> > fully applied crypto (e. g. fully anonymous digital cash) >> > makes it essentially impossible to base a tax system on income. >Hold on. This is more "factoid" than "fact": recall that income is PAID >by people as well as EARNED by people. Most payers have easily >detectible physical presence and assets that can easily be attached by >regulators. It will be a cold day before, e.g., my employer agrees not >to report my earnings. And the same is true for most employers in most >industries. Unfortunately, this is true, at least for people whose employers are subject to income tax somewhere. Taxing businesses doesn't make sense economically - you could collect almost as much money with far less disruption to the underlying economy by taxing it as wages for workers and dividend or interest payments to owners* rather than inside the business itself, substantially reducing the accounting workload of businesses**. But it's still very attractive to governments, not only as a lever for implementing social policy and extracting cooperation, but as a critical tool to force businesses to report wages payed to employees - I don't know if law.miami.edu is a taxable business, but for most employers, if they don't report the wages they paid to their employees, but do report all their revenue, they get taxed on the additional profit, instead of the employee getting hit with the tax; most people I know who've been paid "under the table" have been working for small businesses that are also not reporting cash revenues. Of course, if a business isn't _spending_ money on employees, but is just contracting for work performed by an Anguillan corporation, they still have receipts for expenses, and the financial arrangements between the Anguillan corporation and any of its US employees aren't really their concern.... >And if it ever stops being true, we'll just get VAT, and VAT inspectors. >So the line about death and taxes remains as true as ever, crypto or no. Value is really hard to measure in a service economy. Most of my work over the last N years has been talking to people, typing on keyboards, going places on airplanes to talk to other people and type on other keyboards, and occasionally handing people piles of collated and stapled dead trees, a racket for which people pay my employer lots of money***. Where's the value? When was it added? If the Tax Collectors don't see people handing my employer lots of money, can they demonstrate how much money they can confiscate? - - - - - - * this misses payments to foreign owners and taxes on foreign customers, but any government foolish enough to discourage investment by foreigners and sales to foreign customers deserves to be blamed heavily for lost jobs.. ** US businesses spend approximately 40% as much calculating taxes as they do _paying_ them... *** My previous employer was very good at taking metal, sand, and fermented dinosaur parts, and shaping them into boxes and strings that people would give them money for; they were extremely optimistic that they could get lots of people to also pay them money for sending them people to talk about boxes and strings and getting other people to pay _them_ for talking and banging on keyboards. They shouldn't have been quite so optimistic, and now I'm in the racket on my own, having not yet acquired overseas corporations to shelter my income through :-) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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The Crypto Applications we would rather not talk about
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous remailer and PGP Unusual applications I dont know if anyone else caught it last year but High Times discovered anonymous remailers and PGP for an article last year for anonymous remote control of grow rooms. PGP Wins again? and lately the thule people(bigoted and racist Nazis) have been learning to protect themselves also according to news reports from germany. Crypto and Privacy tools protect everyone from the hero to the anti-hero... the technology itself is neutral I wonder how long it will be before we hear news reports of some of the governments people being caught using internet casinos from the white house network. On other notes CCCF(the chaos computer club France) was shown to have had a high level plant from the french intel services, The founder of the CCCF himself. this story seems to repeat itself over and over when you are doing something of which the authorities DONT approve they WILL attempt to infiltrate and subvert from the inside. The answers are there and have been published in most books on tradecraft, 3 person cells organized as pyramids. Anonymous remail tech and crypto make this system possible with out Face to face contact. When does this lesson finally get learned? anon

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Cypherpunks Santa Cruz Meeting/Party, 95-11-11
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have sent out a detailed announcement of a "Cypherpunks Santa Cruz" meeting/party at my house in Corralitos, California, on Saturday, 11 November. This was sent to the mailing list of interested folks I maintain. If you are on this list, you already got the detailed message. If you are interested in getting on the list, drop me a line. I can also send the detailed announcement to anyone who is interested. As background, the Cypherpunks Santa Cruz is for folks in the Santa Cruz, Monterey, Carmel, Boulder Creek, Watsonville, Salinas, Big Sur, etc. area, or for anyone else on the Central Coast. Or anyone else, for that matter. At the last (and first) party we had Greg Broiles down from Eugene, Oregon, and Jeff Simmons up from San Luis Obispo, plus a bunch of folks from "over the hill" in the Silicon Valley/Bay Area. All told, 25 people. I'm not sure if there is a Bay Area meeting that day. If so, attend one or the other, or both, as my party starts late afternoon (of course, it may be a long drive, depending on where the Bay Aryans are meeting). --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Crypto++, Cpunk Icons, list noise
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> writes: >I am still talking to RSADSI's lawyers, but it's taking a lot longer And the efforts are appreciated. Of course, your original efforts can still be appreciated at utopia.hacktic.nl. I don't know about everyone else, but that TCP encryption sounded interesting. Any plans to discuss it on the list? - ----- An anonymous complainer writes: >Well, Perry, my opinion is that there is far too much noise on this list >as it is. I have already seen my words drowned out by bellyaching over >next to nothing. POT-KETTLE-BLACK. Also, since nothing you've written (in your commentary, as opposed to anonymous announcements or releases that most people use anonymity for here) indicates that you're using anonymity for any particular reason, please stop so people can killfile you. Or send it from a nym at alpha.c2.org. I mean, the NSA has your real name anyway, what's the point... - --------- Jay Campbell <edge(a)got.net> writes: >>masquerade as Injuns in the 1800's and waylay Pony Express riders in order >> ^^^^^^ >>I think you'll find the NSA was not in existence in the 1800's. >I'm disappointed at the sheer number of similar pieces of email I received >on this. You'da thought the Capn Crunch reference was silly enough that >people would give me a funny look and trash the original message. Hmm, I guess most of them at least had the sense to not send it to the list. The list still sees FAR too many personal queries and rebuttals. TO THE GUILTY: take your bonehead replies to email please. Jay: I had a similar experience when I mentioned elsewhere that all the primes under 1000 digits were really invented by the NSA over 20 years ago. I recommended wearing garlic around the neck for protection... Everyone: This 1% wiretap thing is getting old. Hint hint hint - ---- Lastly, regarding cpunk icons, the only ones I was able to find were at the BAP site. I've been drawing a few of my own, one of them is done. It's a yellow diamond that says Cypherpunk on Board. And it has the anarchy-A- inside-a-C symbol. It's interlaced and transparent, so it doesn't look too bad. You're all welcome to steal it at http://students.cs.byu.edu/~don. Also working on a PGP icon. BAP has an envelope with PGP being the seal. I was thinking maybe a deadbolt ("PGP") with the inscription "Mommy said to lock the doors at night" or some kind of safety lock-your-doors or lock-your-data reference. For the time being I'm working on a simple PGP/ZLDF icon, it will be on my page Real Soon Now[tm]. If you like my icons please tell me. Don -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMJvC7sLa+QKZS485AQFrIgL/VuRfkh7i+K3W3bLyep26riXdZgIVC557 RRcHf9VcacXOGyVvT03JESqNxV/XRcW2k8WDQ+fwhMDEHbHjkzWT5fUxXm6knRGc K0drBF8WlW0ZobEaiU7SgEnVjus5kFj4 =iAr6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- <don(a)cs.byu.edu> fRee cRyPTo! jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY PGP key - http://students.cs.byu.edu/~don or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39) June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed. Junk mail to root(a)127.0.0.1 * This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company *

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Photuris Primality verification needed
by William Allen Simpson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks, I was somewhat disappointed in the response to our previous requests for verification of the strength of the prime moduli. Recently, someone asked for a smaller prime of only 512-bits for speed. This is more than enough for the strength of keys needed for DES, 3DES, MD5 and SHA. Perhaps this would be easier to have more complete and robust verification as well. Here are two "important" primes for Photuris use. If you have some spare cycles, it would be beneficial for in-depth verification of these strong primes. Implementation Optional. A 512-bit strong prime (p), expressed in hex: da58 3c16 d985 2289 d0e4 af75 6f4c ca92 dd4b e533 b804 fb0f ed94 ef9c 8a44 03ed 5746 50d3 6999 db29 d776 276b a2d3 d412 e218 f4dd 1e08 4cf6 d800 3e7c 4774 e833 The recommended generator (g) for this prime is 2. Implementation Required. A 1024-bit strong prime (p), expressed in hex: 97f6 4261 cab5 05dd 2828 e13f 1d68 b6d3 dbd0 f313 047f 40e8 56da 58cb 13b8 a1bf 2b78 3a4c 6d59 d5f9 2afc 6cff 3d69 3f78 b23d 4f31 60a9 502e 3efa f7ab 5e1a d5a6 5e55 4313 828d a83b 9ff2 d941 dee9 5689 fada ea09 36ad df19 71fe 635b 20af 4703 6460 3c2d e059 f54b 650a d8fa 0cf7 0121 c747 99d7 5871 32be 9b99 9bb9 b787 e8ab The recommended generator (g) for this prime is 2. > From: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> > I've used the mpz_probab_prime() function in the Gnu Math Package (GMP) version > 1.3.2 to test this number. This function uses the Miller-Rabin primality test. > However, to increase my confidence that this number really is a strong prime, > I'd like to ask others to confirm it with other tests. > Bill.Simpson(a)um.cc.umich.edu Key fingerprint = 2E 07 23 03 C5 62 70 D3 59 B1 4F 5E 1D C2 C1 A2

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re:using PGP only for digital signatures
by James Black 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I am in a discussion (during the week) with a system administrator about seeing if we can just make PGP publically available to everyone, but now the discussion seems to be to just allow PGP to do digital signatures, and I don't think that is the best choice, then. They are not against PGP being used, but there are legal issues as to whether they can offer it to everyone, as some students are international students, and are not allowed to use the version for the US, or so I have been informed, so now I need to see if we can have the international version, so these students can use it. :( Is there any good programs (for the Unix, SunOS) that just does digital signature encryption? What they are trying to do is make certain that no one can send a message to anyone, claim to be in the faculty, and cause problems that way. My position is just a student programmer, but I am trying to learn as much as I can, to answer questions and deal with problems. Thanx. James Black black(a)suntan.eng.usf.edu

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Re: video as a source of public randomness
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:08 PM 11/3/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Timothy C. May writes: >> I don't plan to belabor this point. Radioactive decay sources are >> certainly fine, though not likely to be purchased by most people. > >Video digitzation equipment connected to TV tuners turned to dead air, >your suggestion, are equally unlikely to be purchased by most ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >people. The geiger counters are very simple and cheap, too. It is not correct to call this my "suggestion." I was responding to a previous post by Andrew Isaacson who said: "How useful would it be to use a video stream as a source of random input to something like /dev/random? I'm thinking along the lines of a Connectix QuickCam (sp?) or the cool videocam that comes with the Indy...." I was commenting on the sources of randomness, such as atmospheric RF variations, antenna configuration, tuner sensitivity, amplifier noise, etc., that would make prediction of snow bits very difficult. As to suggesting setting the tuner to dead air, this was just one facet of the discussion. I have no brief with any of the proposed schemes: nearly any are better than what we have now, if widely deployed and suitable used. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Credentials Without Identity
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich Graves makes some very good points, but he said something I want to riff on. (And as a measure of how apologetic some folks are getting about discussing anything not on Perry's List of Approved Topics, Rich unfortunately labeled his post "[ID point semi-off-topic]..." In fact, the issue of credentials and identity is NOT off-topic, not even semi-off-topic. It is central to the themes of our list. I urge all to read Chaum's seminal work on "credentials without identity.") At 1:05 AM 11/5/95, Rich Graves wrote: >Proving legal residency requires a combination of two documents, one each >from specified lists. Most commonly a driver's license, green card (which >is actually pink), or birth certificate from list A, and a social >security card from list B. > >Chris Hibbert's SSN FAQ talks a little bit about how this works, and why >it's a Good Thing. Basically, for privacy and security reasons, it is a >very good idea to separate the issues of identity and authorization. > >I don't care how securely you can authenticate who I am -- by PGP, retinal >scan, whatever. I do not want a single digitizable token to be the key to >my identity. Even if that identity cannot be forged (and everything can be >forged), it can be used to track me, by the government, by the Direct >Marketing Association, by the private investigators of certain wacky .... Chris's (or Chris') points are admirable, but getting more and more irrelevant by the day. The notion of unlinking identity and authorization by separate pieces of identification is another form of "security through obscurity." The two forms of credentials can be linked in data bases. Just because one piece of ID has citizenship or voting status and another has other stuff is meaningless, provided the ID forms can be linked. As they can, in multiple ways. The credit tracking agencies can do this trivially, with names, social security numbers, driver's license numbers, addresses, phone numbers, etc. All are pointers into the cloud of numbers that constitutes one's dossier. Happily, Chaum's work on "credentials without identity," based essentially on the kind of "blinding" used in digital cash (with some differences, of course), allows for one to display a credential showing one is old enough to enter a bar or library (in 2005), without revealing a name (which is just another credential). --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: consumer products that make nice sources
by mhkohne＠discordia.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:34 PM 11/3/95, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 5:46 PM 11/3/95, Brad Dolan wrote: > >>The tag on my Montana Sunshine Radon Mine radon pillow is a little blurred >>I think the following is the right phone number. >> >>Sunshine Mine is an amusing concept. People pay money to go breathe radon >>there, while others are spending much money avoiding radon. >> >>Anyway, the pillows make nice sources and good conversation pieces. > >I'd say they make poor sources. Far too large. A smaller source has better >access to the detector without adding much to the overall background the >user is exposed to. (I'm not saying low-level uranium or thorium sources >are much of a hazard, but the fluence presented at the detector is very low >for such an extended source.) If it's a cheap source of higher-than-background radiation, try a smoke detector. They are getting darn cheap these days, and my First Alert Model 83R says it contains 1.0 Microcurie of Americium 241. This should raise the count rate significantly over background. And if one isn't enough, you could always get several, remove the module with the radioactive materials in it (it's a sort of black cylinder in mine) from several, and put them all in a box with the radiation detector. As I remember, I bought 2 or three of these detectors in a single package for about $15 3 years ago. They should be quite cheap by now. Although, I don't think it has the same sort of humor value as the pillow. (What's that hooked to your computer Mike? It's a pillow Bob. Don't ask.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMJvmh4P3Pba7OSlRAQEDlwP8Cm4vryVejfJZoSd/amwFLxJZWYnPHNxS 3KCmw8jSKjFk4iF+wTvWAHbFIjjkKFGBLt6+BMbDt2eUM6R87mNay1nMASsCoweL syDr4D39XDUGF6sw7TDulLTW62u7JKaCIGoBQU5+uU4Qxs3YA4QVVR+sLi885ngt o0GEIeVgLw8= =hNXr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---- Michael Kohne mhkohne(a)discordia.org or mhkohne(a)moberg.com "Quantum mechanics is your friend" Key fingerprint = EE 22 9D 9B 32 5E F1 37 D2 B3 DC 78 19 24 D1 E8

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Re: FBI seeks huge wiretapping system
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What is very odd however is the FBI request for $500 million. > [to tap phones] What is odd about that? -- when I visited Cuba a couple of years ago it looked to me as if a major chunk of the GNP went into watching people. (I hear the situation has improved since then, perhaps thanks to their continuing bankruptcy.) At 12:09 PM 11/2/95 -0500, hallam(a)w3.org wrote: > When the NSA are being asked to comment on an export license they > are being asked "is this thing dangerous", not "should it be exported". > But when the response comes back to commerce "its dangerous" you can > hardly expect the person on the other end to put their neck out on the > line and risk allowing [...] This of course is the basic evil of government regulation: Bricks are dangerous. Two by fours are dangerous. Water is dangerous. Playgrounds are dangerous. Everything is dangerous, because everything could be used to cause harm, deliberately or accidentally. Therefore every action needs to be supervised, controlled, and directed by your wise and benevolent government, and any attempt to avoid the benevolent observation of the all seeing eye shows that you must be a child pornographer-terrorist-drug-trafficker-money-launderer. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Telephone switch capacity -Reply
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:43 PM 11/3/95 -0800, Rich Graves wrote: > Of course the FBI doesn't have the staff to listen to all these lines, and > they need an individual court order to authorize each individual > interception, so this numbers game is a bit of a joke. This is false: The FBI is legally authorized to intercept phone lines by court order "or other lawful authority". >From the money it would seem that "other lawful authority" intercepts vastly exceed court ordered intercepts. You will recall the vast outcry in the liberal lapdog press when this vast new power was given to them -- You don't recall it?! Neither do I. This is one of the many vast extensions of government power that we see come down at a steadily increasing rate, to the accompaniment of total silence from a compliant and submissive mass media. > There is no controversy about the number of wiretaps that have been > authorized, except as manufactured by the Spotlight folks and other > conspiracy loons. If the only taps are court ordered wiretaps, it would seem we are paying about half a million to a million dollars per wire tap, which is a shade expensive even for government work. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Version 2 Elliptic Curve Crypto
by Mike Rosing 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Howdy, I blew it the first time, but the correct elliptic.2.tar now sits on ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/ciphers. This version is twice as fast as eliptic.tar. A newer version of the elliptic.2.doc is being fixed right now, the only difference with what is posted is a correct reference to the CRYPTO '95 article on polynomial basis inversion. Enjoy. For a compiled version on Sun or under Borland C++ contact Steve Albrecht (eh(a)mcs.com) He is in the process of setting up macros to get this to compile under just about any unix system. He's also fixed quite a few bugs and is cleaning up a bunch of uninitialized data structures that I didn't notice. Last I heard it was working, so if you want to play on a specific platform, contact Steve directly. Hilarie Orman from U. Arizona (one of the authors of the CRYPTO '95 paper) thinks that calling elliptic curves "strong crypto" may be over selling it. I'm not enough of a mathematician to know how to argue, but it seems to me that almost perfect random output is about as close to strong crypto as one could get. Security thru obscurity doesn't work, elliptic curves are obscure and so far not studied to the same extent as RSA or DES. However, I'll make the claim that elliptic curves are "strong crypto" until proven otherwise. Along those lines, does any one have a classic text to encrypt for a plaintext/ciphertext challenge? I'll put something together and post it in the next few weeks. I'll use the symmetric encryption subroutine. If there is any interest, should I put out a public key challenge as well? Note, I ain't rich, so only token prizes (like $50 ecash and $50 real for each challenge). The point is to check if this is credable crypto, that's all. E-mail replies to cryptech(a)mcs.com. Thanks for reading this! Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike

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Re: using pgp to make an otp
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:58 AM 11/5/95 -0500, amp <Alan.Pugh(a)internetMCI.COM> wrote: >i want a source of data for use as a otp. .... >i'd like to know if there was a reason not to use the output of pgp Either PGP is a strong enough cryptosystem that you don't need to use a one-time-pad, or it's not, in which case you need better randomness than PGP will give you (I doubt it), or you have special applications for which PGP is impractical (like decrypting small amounts of data on a very wimpy machine in an environment that you can easily distribute OTP keys (for using ONCE ONLY)). Or you're just doing it for fun. A OTP can give you provably secure cryptography, given that the pad is only used once, and has real randomness behind it. If it's only pseudo-random numbers (e.g. generated from some algorithm), then it's as crackable as the source of random numbers, and therefore no longer provably secure. And of course, if you use it more than once, or your pad distribution isn't secure, you lose. >i still need a program to make use of the otp i've produced, Two alternatives - spend 5 minutes writing it in a language you know well, or pick a language you don't know very well and use it as an excuse to learn the language. It's slightly more complex than "hello, world", since you need to input data from two files and use XOR. >what are the holes in this? why would it be unadvisable to do it? The big problem with OTPs (other than getting people to use the pads ONLY ONCE, since they're otherwise hosed) is shipping them around; the traditional method is guys with briefcases handcuffed to their arms.... >otoh, would it be a good basis for a otp? Large quantities of good random numbers are hard to find. Small quantities can come from dice or throwing darts at the stock market pages; the zener diode or radioactivity methods people have been discussing will produce larger quantities if you've got the equipment. If you've got one of those new radio-tuner boards for your PC, tuning it to an unused station might be quite decent, and we've just been discussing whether video is any good. With many of these sources, it's probably worth grinding the numbers through some sort of compression or encryption algorithm just to smudge over any periodicity or other structure to it. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: Telephone switch capacity
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Please be aware that the current capacity of the >telephone system in the United States (and for that matter, >most of the developed world) is only capable of supporting >between 15 and 20 percent simultaneous telephone >conversations. If the FBI wishes to set up a system that is >capable of monitoring 1% of the total number of lines, that >equates to a ability to tap 5%, not 1% of all calls in progress. The FBI now says they only want to tap 1% of simultaneous capacity, not 1% of total number of lines. On the other hand, the actual utilization of the telephone network is also much lower than the number of lines - back when I was a voice-telephony geek, our estimates for busy-hour phone utilization were about 1/12 for residential and 1/6 for business (3 and 6 hundred call-seconds per hour); that was before widespread use of fax machines, modems, or LANs, so business utilization has probably increased. Equipped trunk capacity was typically enough to have a maximum of 1% blocking during busy hour, which means a certain amount of margin over average calls in progress, and switch capacity depends radically on technology - some kinds of switches are non-blocking, while others have various capacity limits. "One Bell System - It Works!" #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: Video as a source of randomness
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>How useful would it be to use a video stream as a source of random input >>to something like /dev/random? I'm thinking along the lines of a >>Connectix QuickCam (sp?) or the cool videocam that comes with the Indy. >>It seems to me that the picture recieved by a camera sitting atop a >>monitor would be quite unpredictable. (relatively) High bandwith, too. Depends on what the camera's looking at - the first frame you grab may have a lot of entropy, but if there's nothing much going on in the room, one frame's going to look a lot like the next. Of course, pointing the camera at your keyboard and taking a video of you typing in lots of random numbers will probably produce better randomness than just timing the keys while you do so... But do move it away before typing in your passphrase... Pointing the camera at a snowy TV or out the window or at a cat playing with catnip can generate much more randomness if you need it. Somebody was saying that of course not may computers will have video capture devices on them, but it was probably one of those parochial PC or Unix geeks who forget that Mac users get all the cool video/audio gear long before the rest of us :-) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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/dev/random - using up entropy?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The discussions of what to do when /dev/random has handed out all of its available entropy have assumed that entropy gets used up; I'd like to propose that maybe it doesn't, at least in the computational-complexity sense that says that you don't have the computational power around to calculate the information inside /dev/random from the output, giving a sort of "computational entropy" that reflects not only the uncertainty you have because of randomness but also the uncertainty you have because of your computational limitations. Most of the designs I've seen look like this: A Reservoir of entropy R = R1....Rn, where n is large, 1024 or 4096 An input stream I = I1....Ik, which is mixed into R A mixing function F which is used to mix R <= F(R,I) for some chunk of I, possibly empty. A hash function H, typically MD5. An output O = O1...Om = H(R), and E gets mixed after every output. (These are capital-o, not zero...) The entropy E of the reservoir E before an output is -SUM(all X) p(X) log p(X) where X is an event R1=x1, R2=x2 ... Rn=Xn which is equal to n, assuming the Ri are iid equiprobable 0 or 1. After an output, the entropy is - SUM p(X | H(R)=O) log p(X|H(R)=O) which works out to n-m, since p(X) is zero if H(R)!=O, and 2**m/2**n if it does. So that says you use up m bits of entropy if you get m bits of good output. However, what I'd like to suggest is that you don't, from the perspective of a user who doesn't have direct access to the reservoir R of random bits. For that user, p(X|H(R)=O) is the same as p(X) or P(X|H(R)=O'), because the user is neither able to invert H, nor to enumerate all possible R, nor to calculate anything useful based on multiple outputs, since the reservoir R is shuffled between outputs; even a simple circular shift may be enough. This doesn't apply to the case where n is 32 or 48 and the hash function produces n-bit outputs, or even m<<n bit outputs, because that maybe be inverted or brute-forced, but it seems to apply for the case where n is sufficiently large and the hash is good. If the hash is simpler than MD5, it may apply anyway, since the hash produces far fewer bits than its input, as long as the hash and the mixing function don't give away any information about the reservoir between successive outputs. This would suggest that /dev/random ought to have a mode that says "give me output of whatever quality you have available", and that it ought to be OK to use it, as long as the reservoir has been seeded with sufficient high-entropy input to have decent randomness. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: using PGP only for digital signatures
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pop Quiz: If you are a citizen of the U.S., prove it. At 11:33 PM 11/4/95, Simon Spero wrote: >On Sat, 4 Nov 1995, Derek Atkins wrote: > >> student from coming to the US. By allowing the student into the US, >> the gov't is implicitly giving them the right to use PGP within the >> US. > >This is kind of a risky policy to take. The general feeling I get that >allowing non green-card holders access to strong cryptography is sort of >decriminalised, in that the police aren't likely to break down your door >and have your AFS server accidentaly fall down stairs. However, it is >still against the law, and could be used against the university in other >unrelated circumstances. > >It seems that licences allowing foreign nationals access to cryptographic >software within the US are pretty easy to get, and especially for >something like PGP on a central machine. We really need to put this one to bed. As has been said several times recently, for the purposes of law, non-U.S. citizens who reside in the U.S are effectively "U.S. persons." Subject to U.S. law and generally having the same legal rights. (Can't vote. Can be drafted. Must pay taxes. Must have a SSN. Must obey traffic laws. Must not discriminate against the differently clued, etc.) All of the nonsense about wearing a "munitions shirt" in front of a "foreigner" seems to miss this essential point. Ditto for PGP use. Consider this: most people in the U.S. do not have a "credential" that shows them to be U.S. citizens. (Hint: most people in the U.S. do not have passports.) They have driver's licenses, which say nothing about citizenship (at least California and Virgina licenses do not). Social Security cards are the same. (Second hint: most people are hard-pressed to locate a birth certificate for themselves. Many people take the easy way out and simply buy a new one for the $25 a good one costs.) Therefore, there are few ways that citizenship can be "checked." Period. A foreigner who wishes to "prove" his non-U.S. status could, of course, show his green card. But this is different from proving citizenship. As to the USF--or was it SFSU?--student worried about "allowing" PGP to be used...I despair at this outlook. Why not simply ignore the issue, not "give" them PGP, but instead have a few pointers to where PGP may be gotten. As to the point about students impersonating faculty, if the faculty starts signing their messages (doubtful), then no one can impersonate _them_. (Except that it sounds like all this PGP stuff is to happen on campus computers, in which case there are several ways their private keys and passphrases can be snarfed.) The issue of a "credential" for faculty members, something that says "This person is a member of the Foo U. faculty," well, this is a different kettle of fish; such credentials are not part of the PGP system, though webs of trust could in principle be used in a klugey kind of way. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Video as a source of randomness
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:51 PM 11/4/95, Bill Stewart wrote: >Pointing the camera at a snowy TV or out the window or at a cat playing >with catnip can generate much more randomness if you need it. Which would make that "dev/cat," right? --Klaus!

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