December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(fwd>>)309,485,009,821,345,068,724,781,056
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: "John Hemming - CEO MarketNet" <JohnHemming(a)mkn.co.uk> Date: Thu, 17 Aug 1995 08:39:37 AM PDT To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Subject: 309,485,009,821,345,068,724,781,056 Like .. er ... a big number maan. "SSL" has not been cracked "EXPORT SSL" has been cracked. Then if someone in the next few years can crack SSL with a confidential master key of 128 bits with 2^88 as many required key checks (say half the keyspace at 2^87 as our mate Damien did) then that will be a much bigger story. Then again it was not me floating last week .... In the mean time we encounter the usual inane US government's export restrictions. Can someone put in a word for me please ... Please Please Please Mr Clinton .... keep those export regulations It gives people like myself a major commercial lead in provision of encryption software. So what can we do. Well not being a very trusting soul at times I tried out sending the 01 (SSL 128 bit confidential) message to an export Netscape browser and lo and behold it came up with a cipher conflict. Well that would have been an easy way out. Realistically my internal browser is almost at beta test level and we will put cipher 01 in our selection of ciphers as well as cipher 2. We will also make available our browser to link securely to our servers. If anyone outside US/CA wants work done to bring their systems up to 128 bit confidential ciphers please email jane(a)jhc.co.uk (JHC plc - JHC Internet Services - yes it does mean John Hemming & Co) In the mean time: My credit card number is 5434 8012 0900 2563 expires 3/97 My name is John A M Hemming My address is 15, Chantry Road, Moseley, Birmingham B13 8DL Who loses if you use that: Firstly, I now have to check my credit card statements for items that are not mine. This will be a pain, but it makes a point clear. Secondly, if you use it you will be breaking the law. Thirdly, when the merchant has to refund up to 6 months of trading turnover on any duff orders the merchant will be seriously upset. My name and address are a matter of public record in the UK. I have only made the job easier by putting all of the information in one place. The card number and expiry date are available in any one of a number of places. (As a City Councillor in Birmingham my address has to be available to the public). 1. Export SSL is good enough for credit card numbers. 2. My bank account is protected by export SSL (I mean that you need to crack export SSL to look at the balances) Alternatively you can phone up the bank and pretend to be the police/head office/inland revenue and ask them. 3. Export SSL or even import SSL is not good enough for entering into contracts. Digital signatures are needed for that. In the mean time ..... I have managed to implement PGP into my workhorse program (which is gradually coming up to beta standard). It seems interoperable with the PGP.exe file in Europe. (As long as you keep the message reasonably short) This allows two interesting additions <A HREF="mailto:abc@def.com"> has been extended to <A HREF="mailto:abc@def.com" PGPKEY="abcddbdb etc"> When you click on that it does a mailto, but also loads the PGP key (public key and userid packets). The program saves both the plaintext and encrypted version and then mails out the encrypted version. The PGP key packet has to have the same email address as that in the mailto otherwise the program will freak. see http://mkn.co.uk/ Which uses that. Similarly <FORM HREF="mailto:banana@orange.com" PGPKEY="asdfj"> allows the encryption of a form before it is mailed. I do have a test form somewhere try the pages in http://mkn.co.uk/help+dir+test\*.* This is quite a nice solid way of ensuring high level encryption for passing around confidential information from forms. Sadly the program that does it ftp://193.119.26.70/mktnet/pub/horse.zip is still a little flaky. Once I have finished off getting 128 bit confidential SSL built into my program I shall be putting in the extensions for electronic cheques (probably today or tomorrow, but I won't be putting that on release even as alpha for the moment). see http://mkn.co.uk/help/policy/htmlext for more details. John --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: SSL challenge -- broken !
by Damien.Doligez＠inria.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Joe Buck <jbuck(a)Synopsys.COM> >However, I disagree with your conclusion: [...] >There's plenty of stuff that *does* need protection, but I'm not sure >credit card #'s head the list. You're right, of course, if you discount the hassle of getting the transactions cancelled whenever your credit card number is used fraudulently. I have much a better example (and a real one, too): I have an account at Wells Fargo Bank near San Fransisco. They recently started offering web access to their customers. That would be great for me because banking by phone is pretty expensive when I'm in France, and it's not always easy for me to understand American accents. So they would give me a password that I can use for some set of operations. I don't know which one exactly, but I would expect it to include electronic transfers from my account to anywhere else. The password is protected by the SSL connection. That would be fine if I had the full SSL security, but in France I can only get the exportable version of Netscape. As a result, I won't be using this service. There's the beginning of a market for full-SSL clients and servers outside the US. Maybe Netscape should go multinational right now. -- Damien

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UK Independent on SSL crack
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

from the "ukpipeline" :-) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> UK Indpendent newspaper, 17/8/1995 Internet's 30bn Pound Secret Revealed Charles Arthur Technology Correspondent A French student has cracked the most commonly used encryption system used to pass financial transactions over the Internet, threatening a business forecast to be worth billions of pounds worldwide. Damien Doligez, 27, a PhD student at the Inria research centre near Paris, broke a software "key" used by the Netscape browsing program, which lets users navigate the World Wide Web. With Netscape, Internet users can visit shopping "sites" on the Web and order goods by sending their credit card and address over the network to the site. To prevent anyone picking up those confidential details as they pass through the network, they are encrypted first using a software "key". This is the system used for example by Barclays Bank's "BarclaySquare" project, launched in May, which offers access to eight major retailers. Market research companies forecast that money transmission over the Internet will be worth more than 30bn pounds by 2005. At the launch of BarclaySquare, Roger Alexander, managing director of the unit said: "The encryption method has been rigorously tested by us". But Mr. Doligez has compromised that security by decoding a test example of an encrypted transaction, posted on a number of Internet discussion groups in July. The transaction was scrambled using a digital key 40 bits long, which offers about 1,000 billion ( a million million) possible combinations. Mr Doligez harnessed spare time on 120 workstations and parallel computers. The computers turned up the answer after eight days. "I wouldn't trust my credit card number to Netscape," Mr Doligez told the Independent from Paris yesterday. Netscape Communications, whose flotation on the New York Stock Exchange raised more than $1bn, said "We have always said this would be theoretically possible." [end]

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Predicament Again
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just because I love beating a dead horse... Back in June we had the argument over whether or not Phil Z should be worried because of the threat of prosecution hanging over him. And a prosecutor (?) by the name of Brian Davis as well as Tim and others thought that I was wrong to say that I would enjoy the process because of the opportunities for verbal abuse and point scoring that I would have were I under threat of prosecution in a case the government couldn't win. (Mostly pure 1st Amendment cases.) The reason that this is important is a big fat tactical fact. Defeat is a process that takes place in the mind of the enemy. It is well known to military types that it is possible for the weaker force to overcome the stronger force if the stronger force can be convinced that it has lost. People are rapidly becoming the stronger force in conflicts with governments because of technology, but governments are trying to use intimidation where they lack the capabilities. They are trying to psych us (and particularly the more credulous) out. We can fight this weapon by constant hammering at the fact of the government's weakness and its failure to intimidate us. Since most of what we do on the nets is speech and since speech enjoys a great deal of protection in the US, it is important to hit the opposition hard in speech cases where we have a strong hand. I certainly don't advocate abuse of prosecutors in other cases (taxes and drugs) where conviction is likely. But in pure speech cases, we should really heap on the derision. I happen to think that the prosecution of the award-winning Phil Zimmermann is one of those kinds of cases. Another similar case surfaced in Connecticut. The "Greenwich 5" had conspired so that nonsense syllables in their high school yearbook photo captions spelled out "Kill all the [African Americans]." (Note the cypherpunk significance of code use.) There was a bit of controversy of course and the young scholars volunteered to attend a "Civil Rights Boot Camp" run by the now neo-conservative CORE. Some weeks later, local and state prosecutors announced that they would not prosecute the 5 under CT's civil rights laws because of "lack of evidence." Calls to The Butcher of Waco for federal prosecution followed but have as yet had no results. This is the sort of case in which I would advocate that the "object of prosecutorial interest" be as aggressive and abusive as possible. The reason the prosecutors declined to prosecute was not lack of evidence but lack of law violation. The prosecutors were too cowardly to state that the Greenwich 5's action was perfectly legal. Since the public servants won't, it is up to those who are attacked to do so. The benefits of cutting through the exon in a case like this is that prosecutors are less likely to proceed in similar cases in the future and the public is educated as to the true state of the law. It is recreational as well. DCF "Few generals have ever been defeated because they had too many soldiers under their command."

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Another SSL breakage...
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- All hell seems to have broken loose whilst I was lazing on the beach yesterday. SSL breakings, big name newspaper newsreports (of varying degrees of accuracy), and much ITAR bashing (yay!) or perhaps that should be nooooh! 'cos I might be doing myself out of work as a UK crypto hacker (as John Hemming said in the article Robert Hettinga forwarded) if we loose the fun advantage of being in the free world, and not having to follow the ITAR nonsense. Anyway, congratulations Damien! As Hal said, another group was working on the SSL challenge (albiet just for software testing purposes). Here's the story.... on Tue, 15 Aug 1995 10:43:15 +0200 I recieved this from David Byers <davby(a)ida.liu.se>: > Eureka! > > Encrypted Master Key: 7ef0961fa6 > > [...] So who was first? David hit it Tue 10:43 GMT+2. Doesn't matter, the more the merrier, and the better to demonstrate the silly ITAR export restrictions. This was a trial run at breaking it which two people had done just to check if their respective software was working correctly. It appears that it was :-). This testing was some of the reason for the slowness in getting the group effort started, we were very keen to ensure it really would work, and that the software was working perfectly. Disappointment with the RC4 bruting demonstrated the importance of checking first. On with the story, Davids eureka arrived Tuesday, I tinkered with it some, but was interpreting it wrongly and left it for that day, then I was away yesterday (at the beach with wife and kids, nice weather over here), and figured out how to apply the key this morning (with a bit of prompting from Hal as to what I was doing wrong), just after reading Damien's announce on cpunks, where he independently bruted it on a farm of workstations. Here's the output, with the "Mr Cosmic Kumquat" from "SSL Trusters Inc": > PPOST /order2.cgi HTTP/1.0Referer: https://order.netscape.com/order2.cgi > User-Agent: Mozilla/1.1N (Macintosh; I; PPC) > Accept: */* > Accept: image/gif > Accept: image/x-xbitmap > Accept: image/jpeg > Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded > Content-length: 472 > > source-form=order2-cust.html&order_number=31770&prod_80-01020-00_Mac=1&carrier_code=UM&ship_first=Cosmic&ship_last=Kumquat&ship_org=SSL+Trusters+Inc.&ship_addr1=1234+Squeamish+Ossifrage+Road&ship_addr2=&ship_city=Anywhere&ship_state=NY&ship_zip=12345&ship_country=USA&ship_phone=&ship_fax=&ship_email=&bill_first=&bill_last=&bill_org=&bill_addr1=&bill_addr2=&bill_city=&bill_state=&bill_zip=&bill_country=USA&bill_phone=&bill_fax=&bill_email=&submit=+Submit+Customer+Data+ (I won't bother formating it more cleanly as Damien has already done the honors). I think a group effort ought to be done now that we are confident of the software, just to see how darn fast we (cypherpunks as a group) can knock off SSL keys. (This one was done by 2 people for testing purposes, and independently by Damien (who we didn't know was working on it)). I'd really like to work up to a really meanly few hours breakage, as it looks that much more impresive. The next media release ought to be of a steady offer, of the form, cpunks break keys in x hours, where x is a very small number. And not just break one key, but will break lots of keys, as required, until something is done about it (ITAR) :-) Eric Young is currently away on holiday, but I have his machine stats from earlier email, where he explained the hardware he was testing on. Eric swept 8000 - FFFF, and David 0000 - 7ef0 (where he hit the key) Machine stats for this bruting: 1 x 16k processor MasPar MP-1 - 1.5M keys/sec 4 CPUs of R4400 200mhz - 24000 keys/sec 4 CPUs of sparc 60mhz - 17500 keys/sec 2 CPUs of sparc 50mhz - 14800 keys/sec 1 CPU of Pentium 75mhz - 10200 keys/sec 1 CPU of Alpha - 10000 keys/sec 2 CPUs of 88100 - 8000 keys/sec 1 CPU of 88000 - 3500 keys/sec 1 CPU of R3000 36mhz - 3800 keys/sec 49 CPUs of 486DX 50mhz - 3780 per src The workstations total: - 424,320 keys/sec, and the Maspar 1.5M keys/sec on it's own. The 0000 - 8000 sweep was finished Aug 11 (he might have finished a day or two earlier, that's when he replied to my question as to how he was getting on. He left for his holiday after that email. The MasPar sweepings were going fast, swept 0000 - 795d (this was sometime before the 11th Aug) but someone else wanted the machine, so a pause ... and then (presumably Tues morning) 795d - 7ef0 and bang he hit it. We were getting worried about the possibility of software failure by then as we'd already swept 8000 - FFFF and 0000 - 795D accounting for 97.4% of the key space. It was hiding away in the last bit of unswept keyspace. Luck of the draw... A few quick calculations: The maspar alone could do the entire keyspace in 8 1/2 days, or an expected average time of ~100 hours. I believe I'm right that there would be lots of organisations which would sell you idle maspar hours for a lot less than $100 / hr. Heck you could do it with PC's, if they (WSJ article) think it's worth $10k all I can say is "give me the $10k", and I'll do it and make a handsome profit. The workstation farm, at 424k keys/sec could do the job in 30 days, or 15 days average. The workstation farm was only used to sweep half the key space, and was used overnight (12 hours) and weekends (61 hours) only as people were using the machines during the day. Could it have been done with out anyone knowing? Hell, yes - it was in fact, no announce was made as it was just testing etc. Adam - -- HAVE *YOU* EXPORTED RSA TODAY? --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ - --rsa--------------------------8<------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2) - -------------------------------8<------------------------------- TRY: rsa -k=3 -n=7537d365 < msg | rsa -d -k=4e243e33 -n=7537d365 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMDNbnSnIuJ1VakpnAQHe9AP8DJBhZ8LyRNx7PO1GY076Cap+xzdS0/ys WE/tdm0GBfjqxvjtar85mmc1hZVPCn1m5Swsflk2ZpieLbwUzHz+g1ciW3IiZu1Y 8Qc2HJxWRrez3J5CeiMHgMJl6Bj6vF5XAWLW0v6NpujbOR9XuIjsKnH3jKvkhLF5 z0u7Oui0AX0= =nkmn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: SSL challenge -- broken !
by goedel＠tezcat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 04:39 PM 8/16/95 -0500, you wrote: >>> I haven't seen any news stories about this on the wire >>> services. Someone would have to write a story about it first before >>> people would know... >> >>I've suggested this to a few reporters I know.. > >It's worth suggesting this _carefully_ so the spin's right. >For instance "Oh, no, Netscape lets Hackers suck all the money >out of your credit cards" would be bad :-) On the other hand, >"The US Government's Evil Plans to block encryption are limiting >Netscape's export products to an encryption system already broken >by a French university. This means you can send credit card numbers >safely to American web sites, but not to foreign ones - like the >airline or hotel reservations you were making for your vacation, >or those Irish handcrafts or bottle of Scotch you were ordering, >or that Hong Kong magazine you were subscribing to, or the CD from >that band in Budapest that had the great sound samples out there. >And when you were donating to that Amazon rainforest conservation >group, the NSA's arbitrary export rules may have just helped the >Colombian drug cartels rip off your credit card." Thats pretty much the spin on page B3 of the WSJ. I'll type it in when I get the chance. Dietrich J. Kappe | Red Planet http://www.redweb.com/ Red Planet, L.L.C.| "Chess Space" /chess 1-800-RED 0 WEB | "MS Access Products" /cobre Web Publishing | E-mail: RedPlanet(a)redweb.com

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Re: Another SSL breakage...
by Damien.Doligez＠inria.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: aba(a)atlas.ex.ac.uk >on Tue, 15 Aug 1995 10:43:15 +0200 I recieved this from David Byers ><davby(a)ida.liu.se>: > >> Eureka! >> >> Encrypted Master Key: 7ef0961fa6 Then David beat me by about two hours. My program found the result at 12:23 +0200 on the same day. I was not at work (aug 15 is a holiday in France), so I saw it a few hours later, and I wrote my announcement yesterday. I will happily redirect all the journalists to David... -- Damien

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Netsacpe's Offical Response
by Glenn Powers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Originally From shank(a)netscape.com Thu Aug 17 11:42:39 1995 Received: from lydia.bradley.edu (root(a)lydia.bradley.edu [136.176.5.15]) by spectrum.bradley.edu (8.6.12/8.6.9) with ESMTP id LAA02511 for <gpowers(a)spectrum.bradley.edu>; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 11:42:36 -0500 Received: from bradley.bradley.edu (daemon(a)bradley.bradley.edu [136.176.5.10]) by lydia.bradley.edu (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id KAA02851 for <gpowers(a)lydia.bradley.edu>; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 10:39:21 -0500 Received: (from daemon@localhost) by bradley.bradley.edu (8.6.12/8.6.12) id KAA01320 for gpowers(a)lydia.bradley.edu; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 10:39:18 -0500 Received: from neon.netscape.com (neon.netscape.com [198.93.92.10]) by bradley.bradley.edu (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id KAA01310 for <gpowers(a)bradley.edu>; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 10:39:12 -0500 Received: from [198.93.94.118] (Shank.mcom.com [198.93.94.118]) by neon.netscape.com (950215.SGI.8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id IAA26102 for <gpowers(a)bradley.edu>; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 08:38:34 -0700 X-Sender: shank(a)pop.mcom.com Message-Id: <v02110107ac5914142373(a)[198.93.94.118]> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Thu, 17 Aug 1995 08:44:45 -0700 X-PH: V4.1@bradley To: gpowers(a)bradley.edu From: shank(a)netscape.com (Peter Shank) Subject: Netscape security Glen, We're sending this response to the press and interested parties; it may also get posted on home.netscape.com. Best regards... -Peter Late Tuesday evening a person from France posted a news article to the hacker community claiming success at decrypting a single encrypted message that had been posted as a challenge on the Internet sometime on or before July 14, 1994. His response to the challenge is described in an email that has been forwarded widely across the Internet. What this person did is decrypt one encrypted message that used RC4-40 for encryption. He used 120 workstations and two parallel supercomputers for 8 days to do so. As many have documented, a single RC4-40 encrypted message takes 64 MIPS-years of processing power to break, and this roughly corresponds to the amount of computing power that was used to decrypt the message. Important points to understand: 1. He broke a single encrypted message. For him to break another message (even from the same client to the same server seconds later) would require *another* 8 days of 120 workstations and a few parallel supercomputers. The work that goes into breaking a single message can't be leveraged against other messages encrypted with other encryption keys. 2. The standard way to determine the level of security of any encryption scheme is to compare the cost of breaking it versus the value of the information that can be gained. In this case he had to use roughly $10,000 worth of computing power (ballpark figure for having access to 120 workstations and a few parallel supecomputers for 8 days) to break a single message. Assuming the message is protecting something of less value than $10,000, then this information can be protected with only RC4-40 security. For information of greater value, currently available RC4-128 security should be used. 3. Inside the US, software can support a range of stronger encryption options, including RC4-128, which is 2^88 times harder to break. Meaning that the compute power required to decrypt such a message would be more than 1,000,000,000,000 (trillion) times greater than that which was used to decrypt the RC4-40 message. This means that with forseeable computer technology this is practically impossible. So in conclusion, we think RC4-40 is strong enough to protect consumer-level credit-card transactions -- since the cost of breaking the message is sufficiently high to make it not worth the computer time required to do so -- and that our customers should use higher levels of security, particularly RC4-128, whenever possible. This level of security has been available in the U.S. versions of our products since last April. Because of export controls it has not been available outside the U.S. We would appreciate your support in lobbying the U.S. government to lift the export controls on encryption. If you'd like to help us lobby the government send email to export(a)netscape.com. Finally, we'd like to reiterate that all this person has done is decrypt one single RC4-40 message. RC4 the algorithm and products which use the algorithm remain as secure as always.

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Re: Out of state gambling
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:02 AM 8/17/95, Anonymous wrote: >Hello C-Punks: > >(nb This is posted anonymously because I had this idea the implementation >of which would be (probably) illegal. I'm not sure whether putting my It's being done. Many of us have talked about the implications of this. Writing about it is not against the law in the U.S., at this time. A little matter of the First Amendment, don't you know. See for example the Cypherpunks Web site archives, http://www.hks.net/cpunks/index.html, or grep/search for "gambling" in my Cyphernomicon FAQ (in my ftp directory at Netcom: ftp.netcom.com, /pub/tc/tcmay/CP-FAQ, and in a couple of Web sites, including http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles/cyphernomicon/CP-FAQ) My point? Not a bad idea, but also not one you should have any fear of discussing publically (unless you believe certain conspiracy theories!). I've been talking and writing about the implications of this stuff since late 1987, and have not yet been "disappeared." I don't happen to like a lot of what's going on in Washington, but I doubt that Louis Freeh or Dorothy Denning are going to silence or threaten me! >name to the idea would be a good idea for the reason that I can't be >sure that I wouldn't be implicated under the overbroad "conspiracy" or >"Rico" powers which are oh so popular as a way of putting people away >for thought crimes. This message will in any case have appeared via I'm not a fan of RICO either, but we need to be careful not to impute to RICO things which just don't happen. So far as I know, no "thought crimes" have been prosecuted under RICO. Prosecutors--and I am not one, but I watch them all day on t.v.!--have certain procedures they have to follow. They just don't have the time, budget, and mandate to try to prosecute writers and speakers, especially when the words and speech are clearly protected under the First Amendment. The _potential_ prosecution of Phil Zimmermann--and I say "potential" because at the time I'm writing this, no indictment has been made--is not because Phil was writing inflammatory stuff, but is related to the circumstances surrounding the appearance of PGP 1.0 in foreign countries. These would be ITAR issues, not "thoughtcrime." Or at least this is what most people believe is the issue, as the Grand Jury has not said anything publically. (By the way, I'm not being critical of Anonymous here. I, too, have used the term "thoughtcrime," as shorthand for what I think are the implications of certain trends in the U.S. and elsewhere. Criminalizing "hate speech" fits the Orwellian definition, in my opinion. But we all have to be careful not to use this metaphor too broadly.) >a couple of foreign remailers on it's way. I am proud of the idea, but >I appreciate those of you who know who I am keeping quiet about it, as >I'm just being prudent, and extra cautious. > >The idea.....Out of state gambling, Internet style - lets give them a >taste of whats to come. As you note, the Internet Casino does this (they claim), becoming operational "soon." Also, various sports books are accessible in offshore locations, such as Costa Rica. Phone calls. And the idea of betting on events and outcomes is already extant. Lloyd's of London used to take such bets. But more germane to the Internet, there are several groups working on "idea futures." Robin Hanson, at Caltech, is working on this. And a Web page exists with various odds on different situations, such as "Windows '95 will be delayed 3 months" and "Strong crypto will be banned by April 1996." Try a Web search on "bet" and "gambling." I did one on "bet" and got a hit on "Proposition Wagering": http://www.netaxs.com/people/sportbet/prop.htm. (I couldn't get into it, so your mileage may vary.) >The aim in writing this short missive to cpunks is to encourage >someone who is more able legally to help this idea happen. It'll only happen when someone makes it happen. Thinking about it can also be useful, as the actual programmers may not have the same focus, but actual examples carry more weight. We saw betting schemes on the Extropians list, a couple of years ago. Fairly primitive, but an example. >Any comments on the practical and legal issues (such as exactly what >laws I'm violating) or on getting publicity for such a scheme? This >might be easier than we think, as the media [at least the WSJ] is well >aware of the bookie's superior accuracy & lower cost. First, don't worry too much about remaining anonymous. Discussing an idea, even building a system, is not the same as operating it. Folks publically discuss and build remailers, but operating them is another matter. (Yes, folks here also operate remailers....). Second, check out the "idea futures," "proposition wagering," and "betting" references. Third, build on what these folks are doing. Or do it differently, but only if your approach is superior. Good luck! --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Over 350 RSA/Perl 'Munitions T-shirts' Shipped
by Ferreira, Ben 296-4158 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 15 Aug 1995 14:17:36 -0600 From: Don Henson <dhenson(a)itsnet.com> To: libernet(a)Dartmouth.EDU Subject: Over 350 'Munitions T-shirts' Shipped We have thus far shipped over 350 of the RSA/Perl Munition T-shirts. Orders are still pouring in. Don't be left out. Order your's today. Now you can wear a TSHIRT that has been classified as a MUNITION by the US Goverment. That's right! The US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) makes exporting cyrptographic materials illegal. ITAR further defines export as providing cryptographic information to a non-US/Canadian citizen even if you are inside the US at the time. Providing information is further defined as telling or showing information to a non-US/Canadian citizen. The Munitions Tshirt has a Perl implementation of the RSA algorithm (the one used by PGP) printed on the front along with a bar-code of the same algorithm. What all the above means is that if you wear the Munitions Tshirt where a non-US/Canadian citizen can see it, even if it is inside the US, you have just exported cryptographic material (which is already freely available outside the US) and have become a criminal in the eyes of the US Government. Now you too can become an international arms dealer for the price of a tshirt (US$15.95 - US$19.95, depending on size) and the guts to wear it. If you are a non-US/Canadian citizen, you can still own a Munitons Tshirt by ordering the tshirt from a source that is outside the US. The email response to a request for info (see next paragraph) includes full instructions for ordering the tshirt no matter where you live. For more information on how to own this classic example of civil disobedience, just send email to dhenson(a)itsnet.com with the subject of 'SHIRT'. (You don't have to be a US/Canadian citizen to request the info.) Or, if you have WWW access, just point your Web browser to: http://colossus.net/wepinsto/wshome.html By the way, 25% of the profits from the sale of the tshirt (in the US/Canada) goes to the PHIL ZIMMERMANN LEGAL DEFENSE FUND to help defend the author of PGP from harassment and possible prosecution by the Fedgoons. And if you get arrested for wearing the Munitions Tshirt, we'll refund your purchase price. :-) Get your Munitions Tshirt now. Who knows how long they'll stay in production! Don Henson, Managing Director (PGP Key ID = 0X03002DC9) West El Paso Information Network (WEPIN) Check out The WEPIN Store at URL: http://colossus.net/wepinsto/wshome.html -- ------------------------------------------------------ | A L B E R T A Advanced Computing | | R E S E A R C H & Engineering Dept. | | C O U N C I L | | | | Mailing Address J u l i a n B r o m w i c h | | 3rd Floor Junior Research Officer | | 6815 - 8th Street NE bromwich(a)skyler.arc.ab.ca | | Calgary, Alberta | | Canada T2E 7H7 | ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ | R A D S S | | Technologies | | | | Mailing Address J u l i a n B r o m w i c h | | Alberta Pool Software Specialist | | Box 2700 JBromwich(a)awp.com | | 505 Second Street SW | | Calgary, Alberta Ph: (403) 290-5491 | | Canada T2P 2P5 Fax: (403) 290-5550 | ------------------------------------------------------

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Message from a nobody...
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm kind of a nobody..... I can't write elaborate code. I can't even crack keys, unless it's plug & play cracking. But I do know SOMETHING important was done here. And once it's been done, it only gets easier each time. Congratulations to all of you! Love Always, Carol Anne Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - WWW Page Creation ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Carol Anne Braddock <--now running linux 1.0.9 for your pleasure carolann(a)censored.org __ __ ____ ___ ___ ____ carolab(a)primenet.com /__)/__) / / / / /_ /\ / /_ / carolb(a)spring.com / / \ / / / / /__ / \/ /___ / ------------------------------------------------------------------------- A great place to start My Cyber Doc...

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Breaking RC4-40 for less
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since messages sent with netscape are fairly standard for the first so many bytes, why not make a 2^30 element table, store it on a few gigabytes of disk space, use a hash table on the message, and find the keys to one in every 1,000 messages about 1 time per second. If this code is being used to send millions of credit transactions per day, we should be able decode thousands of credit card numbers per day for a one-time cost of about $5,00. The $10,000 estimate of the cost of computing time is far too high for a production-based attack on the netscape codes. -- -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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Re: Netsacpe's Offical Response
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In this case he had to use roughly > $10,000 worth of computing power (ballpark figure for having access to > 120 workstations and a few parallel supecomputers for 8 days) to break > a single message. Hmm, I don't know about anyone else around here, but my workstation is idle 99% of the time. I could almost certainly get access to all the spare CPU cycles on 120 workstations for free, and I suspect that a lot of people (particularly hackers) could do so as well. There's no need to spend $ 10,000 on renting them. Mark

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First known purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Feel free to forward to anywhere you feel is appropriate] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For some time now, Adam Back has been offering to sell RSA T-shirts for cyberbucks (DigiCash's experimental anonymous digital cash system), but no-one has had enough available to take him up on it. However, thanks to the success of the ecm mailing list (ecm(a)ai.mit.edu) and WWW site (http://www.c2.org/~mark/ecash/ecash.html) today I finally managed to collect enough c$ to buy one. It was something of a feat to gather that many c$ in one place, as the number of sellers is limited. There are many more buyers than sellers, everyone wants c$, but few people are selling at a realistic price. As it stands, we have managed to take a worthless currency (c$ are not backed with anything) and give it value based solely on what the market is willing to pay for it, due to its security, anonymity and ease of use advantages compared to the other digital payment systems on the Net. Once a DigiCash licensee starts offering to sell (and buy) ecash via VISA/MasterCard and chequing account, I could see ecash getting very popular very quickly. Using ecash once you've got the c$ in your ewallet/DigiCash bank account is near instant. If used through the WWW forms interface as provided by the Windows and X-windows user interface, the transaction is as easy as clicking on a button. Instant buy, much more convenient than filling in credit card forms, talking to people on the phone, sending things in snail mail, etc, and anonymous too. Now you can even use the beta-test currency to buy and sell physical goods as well. Anyway, if anyone knows of an earlier transaction of cyberbucks for physical goods than this (at 15:00 GMT 17th August 1995), then please let me know. Also, if you have c$ that you wish to sell, or have run out and want to buy some more, come along and join in the fun on the WWW site or mailing list... Mark P.S. If anyone in the UK wants to buy a rusty but reliable FIAT X1/9 convertible, it's yours for only 5,000 cyberbucks... (For the record, I have no connection to DigiCash other than as an ecash beta tester, and the ecash market is not supported by them in any way.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQEVAgUBMDN1YFVvaTo9kEQVAQE4Bwf/WYTlYShkIyP0jOLyDmOpG/Bzdya5q+Xp QY60CS8Po/cSIEPy26cDs62Yn5HIEq0g+afw0NZS4BiH2xanqDFnwrumNE78q2iW 03AlX/RuDkGFabpxUfFoYRkf2qgsDI1wnt7vzryKlxgBSGzoEGS7j7UKesEtASIl 3iw3EgINnX+BN7nSWsLcpyN3BHUPKxLSKWUg/hduS7D8AlVqMFq8JUu2wDKxJwJV 1FJ5oN8dF5bSa+VQINA4LXK9Nx/DVqMGAedg37E3/CGuassGBfW1YtTiRwauaj6q cV7D2zg52hvoq7qeQdesWHLUeqBbK9U/7Xbb80SP87eny+1XkIsgig== =M1jD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: First known purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks
by Marcel van der Peijl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Anyway, if anyone knows of an earlier transaction of cyberbucks for physical > goods than this (at 15:00 GMT 17th August 1995), then please let me know. As far as I know, the first transaction took place when I (while testing) bought a postcard from GlobalX, the first ecash store to open besides our own (and mine). It is stored in the 'DigiCash museum' next to early prototypes of all kinds of smartcards, emulators, wallets etc. This must have been around October last year (or August? Can't make out the postmark). Hundreds of cards were shipped by several shops, and stickers, lotteries, etc. Check the 'physical objects' section on http://www.digicash.com/shops/categorical.html Maybe you should restrict the 'first known' claim to 'first known purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks traded at the ECM'. Sorry! // Marcel van der Peijl, DigiCash bv, http://www.digicash.com/~bigmac/ // The hottest instruction on a P90? JMP $ @ 2.633A or 52C (with fan)

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Denver area meeting, SUNDAY, 8/20, 2 pm
by adwestro＠ouray.cudenver.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This one is on SUNDAY, 2 pm, at the Tivoli Food Court (at least initially). Send email for directions, etc. Alan Westrope <awestrop(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu> __________/|-, <adwestro(a)ouray.cudenver.edu> (_) \|-' 2.6.2 public key: finger / servers PGP 0xB8359639: D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43 7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Exon blows goats...but I suspect you already knew that. iQCVAwUBMDOBpVRRFMq4NZY5AQEnVAP8CLg9z5AwjIw0ouJtxPPr6CUytFOeVPrt cMrEm8MRUt0ay0S4F+TGMq1npcF8pxdU0jwWk9EBj+1XvTOKVpEED+kp8shafsVj qlWGplAVUHMTF19H1VAByoz7j3VGMB2zmdNDm2ifDMNzR5Di81o7CeyvQT0sZ6zt 5XGWmHkoX3g= =GD3W -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Idle compute cycles [Re: Netscape's Offical Response]
by Damien.Doligez＠inria.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Jim Gillogly <jim(a)acm.org> >and one thing that seems to miss the point. As usual, I agree with all Jim has to say, but there's another problem with Netscape's response: they UNDERestimate the cost of breaking RC4-128 (by brute force) by a factor of about 300 trillion. If someone know of an URL for Netscape's response, I'll be glad to include a pointer in my virtual press conference. I would have to ask for permission before I put a copy on my disks. Copyrights, you know... -- Damien

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Breaking DES anyone? (was: Breaking RC4-40 for less)
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fred Cohen <fc(a)all.net> wrote on cpunks: > Since messages sent with netscape are fairly standard for the first > so many bytes, why not make a 2^30 element table, store it on a few > gigabytes of disk space, use a hash table on the message, and find > the keys to one in every 1,000 messages about 1 time per second. If > this code is being used to send millions of credit transactions per > day, we should be able decode thousands of credit card numbers per > day for a one-time cost of about $5,00. Nice idea and one which works for pure RC4, but unfortunately not for 128 bit, 88 bit known + 40 bit unknown "export" SSL. Netscape's SSL uses "40 bit keys" that are composed in a strange way: you are given 88 bits of known key, and this is combined with the 40 bit key, to give a 128 bit key. That key is used to do the encryption. The problem is that this has a unix password salt like effect, only this time there are 88 bits of salt rather than 12 bits. So this means that you can't precompute anything on the 40 bits as the 88 bits are randomly generated, and likely vary with each session. > The $10,000 estimate of the cost of computing time is far too high > for a production-based attack on the netscape codes. Agreed, it's too high for the other reason that lots of people have spare compute cycles. Idle cycles have low to non-existant incremental cost, and there are plenty of them around in the world. Back to breaking crypto systems. There are a couple of things you can do, there is your pre-compute some proportion of the key space - so that you get some of them, this would work well for straight 40 bit RC4 - and there are quite probably such products around - microsoft has a number of "secure" [sic] things around the Microsoft Access we were looking at earlier, another system for doing remote access (modem) and having the sessions encrypted. The problem with micro$oft is they are a darn closed system, and no-one so far has invested the time to decode what they're doing with a debugger. That was the reason for the failed brute RC4 a while back - no specs. So precompute regions of keys would work on pure RC4-40 as you describe. It would be fast too - a disk seek time being the bounding factor - per key! Another approach is to do lots of keys simultaneously - so you set up this distributed effort which is continually re-sweeping the 40 bit keyspace, say every couple of days or whatever. You can sweep for more than one key at once at very low incremental cost, an extra key costs close to nothing. So say you are searching for 1000 keys at once - a dragnet approach - well keys just pop out at random as they are hit, maybe straight away maybe at worst case the sweeping roll-over time, but on average a key will fall out every 3 minutes. The same approach is applicable to 1 guy with 1 humble PC, it'll sweep the full keyspace it in a year or two, but what does he care if he gets a couple of keys a day, and they're all nice transactions he can pilfer / make nefarious use of. DES breaking schemes... Something similar applies to DES, I mean what's a piffling 56 bit keyspace if you don't really care *which* key of several thousand that you actually want. There are bound to be a large enough supply of DES encrypted banking transactions flowing around the various financial networks in the US to make a nefarious breaking of them emminently possible. It moves on the time for a complete sweep as you now have 56 bits to contend with - but I think with a team of say 1024 workstations like the one I am typing on (an SGI Indy ~$5k workstation) in a distributed effort, and a large supply of DES keys, you could get a workable break on *one* of those keys in a shortish time how long? Well I'm not sure how fast DES can be made to go for these purposes, but 60k keys/sec is a figure I have for DES set_key (Eric Youngs code on a Sparc 20) I'm not too sure of the details of what you'd need to brute a DES key, but setting up the key, and presumably a small additional cost to test the first byte and every 256 tries to test 2 bytes etc. Anyone know if 60k keys/sec sounds reasonable for a DES brute? Anyway working on that, 1024 workstations, 60k keys/sec = 60 M keys/sec = 37 years! But (here's the saving bit) if you try say 64k keys *at once* so you've hoovered up a stack of keys (hypothetically - technically plausible too a tap on a banking network should yield you a whole load of them) *then* you can get much nicer figures: A DES key every 5 hours! I'm thinking 1024 workstation equivalents shouldn't be insurmountable to organise - lots of people have faster / multiprocessor machines, and farms of workstations / PCs etc. Perhaps 64k keys is a bit generous, and 1024 keys would be a more sensible figure, even then that translates to 13 days expected. As some one said a while ago (breaking) Netscape is the big win! Breaking DES is *the* big win! Adam -- HAVE *YOU* EXPORTED RSA TODAY? --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ --rsa--------------------------8<------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2) -------------------------------8<------------------------------- TRY: rsa -k=3 -n=7537d365 < msg | rsa -d -k=4e243e33 -n=7537d365

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Re: Netsacpe's Offical Response
by Doug Hughes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>So in conclusion, we think RC4-40 is strong enough to protect consumer-level >credit-card transactions -- since the cost of breaking the message is >sufficiently high to make it not worth the computer time required to do so .... .... >Finally, we'd like to reiterate that all this person has done is decrypt >one single RC4-40 message. RC4 the algorithm and products which use the >algorithm remain as secure as always. > > > I disagree with the cost assumptions that it costs $10K. These are "relatively" imaginary costs. If you already have the machines (like a lot of universities and corporations) then the marginal cost of breaking the key is practically nil. The person doing the cracking certainly doesn't incur any costs. So what if it takes 2 weeks. An evil student/hacker/whatever would be willing to wait two weeks for a credit card with a $5-$oo limit if he could just use the machines at night when people might not notice. Just my $.02 Re: security of RC4 - agreed completely.

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Cost to Crack Keys
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:45 PM 8/17/95, Rev. Mark Grant wrote: >> In this case he had to use roughly >> $10,000 worth of computing power (ballpark figure for having access to >> 120 workstations and a few parallel supecomputers for 8 days) to break >> a single message. > >Hmm, I don't know about anyone else around here, but my workstation is >idle 99% of the time. I could almost certainly get access to all the spare >CPU cycles on 120 workstations for free, and I suspect that a lot of >people (particularly hackers) could do so as well. There's no need to >spend $ 10,000 on renting them. But, Mark, estimates of the cost to crack a key _must_ be based on market prices, not on opportunistic access to machines. Such access is good for occasional, or one-shot, deals, but not for routine use. For example, one doesn't say "Hey, I don't see how Hertz can charge $40 a day to rent a car...my friend lets me use his for free." The technical issues of whether there are faster ways to break the keys, or how fast and far MIPS prices will drop, is a separate issue. "Standard accounting practices" dictate the way to estimate production costs. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RC40 and what we still need to do
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have been watching the backlash of the cracking of RC40 and am quite impressed with the fact that it is being used as a positive reason for repealing ITAR. I expected the media to jump on the "hacker" bandwagon and denounce the efforts. However, I think there is still value in writing the software that will allow cooperation amoung hundreds or thousands of people. That way, we could harness the space CPU of machines all over the globe and make the cracking of this kind of stuff routine. So instead of taking 8 days, it takes only a day or so, further eliminating the idea that it "takes too long to be worthwhile". Maybe there would even be value in going at a 128-bit key (granted, it would take a year). I'd anticipate with proper advertising, easy-to-use software, and little programming knowledge require, we could easily harness 10,000+ machines and a few dozen parallel machines. I know we have a 99.9% idle MasPAR I can contribute to the effort, which should be able to do 1million+ keys/sec. It's just dying to have a purpose.... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 iQCVAwUBMDNwmDokqlyVGmCFAQEzTQQAtkDhi0XD1L1PGJgSYA0XcxMXOIszjtB0 sQcHdSqeVHBpIn7K0/F4JE0tiIgXFhmaKsU8FaIaf/5sbDpRj/cTZXnvE/evt4G0 GKploXjcqXQ/dBpSWakCzsKLJvqvhKEyZyAnF/5VHgSI5WChMKYm68qiuDNyN05Q He6bvbZGbBs= =oPni -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GED/J d-- s:++>: a-- C++(++++) ULU++ P+ L++ E---- W+(-) N++++ o+ K+++ w--- O- M+ V-- PS++>$ PE++>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++ e++ h r-- y++** ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: First known purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:39 PM 8/17/95, Marcel van der Peijl wrote: >> Anyway, if anyone knows of an earlier transaction of cyberbucks for physical >> goods than this (at 15:00 GMT 17th August 1995), then please let me know. > >As far as I know, the first transaction took place when I (while >testing) bought a postcard from GlobalX, the first ecash store to >open besides our own (and mine). It is stored in the 'DigiCash >museum' next to early prototypes of all kinds of smartcards, >emulators, wallets etc. > >This must have been around October last year (or August? Can't make >out the postmark). Hundreds of cards were shipped by several shops, >and stickers, lotteries, etc. Check the 'physical objects' section >on http://www.digicash.com/shops/categorical.html > >Maybe you should restrict the 'first known' claim to 'first known >purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks traded at the ECM'. > >Sorry! Also, there are other potential claims for this sort of thing. Based on varying extents to which the "electronic money" is really secure, is cryptographically interesting, etc. For example, more than two years ago on this list (I think it was spring of '93, but it could've been spring of '94) there were a flurry of transactions involving the "MagicMoney" and "TackyTokens" of Pr0ductCypher and others. I recall Black Unicorn and others talking about transactional exchanges involving sixpacks of beer or soft drinks. I could check my archives, but you get the point. And before that, there were "HExmarks" being used on the Extropians list. There was a nominal conversion rate to real dollars, and at the time I left that list, I had more HExmarks than anyone else. And dozens of token-based systems, coupons, LETS systems, etc. Not to mention the various commercial smartcards and "e money" systems. Granted, most of these are not "Chaumian," which is what most of us think of us as digital cash. Claiming credit for being first is a tough issue. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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The Official Cypherpunks Screen Saver?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:11 PM 8/17/95, Jim Gillogly wrote: >I would hazard a guess that 90% of the compute cycles in the world are used >running screen savers... this gives a <lot> of slack for people who would >like to harness them to perform productive work like making points about >the strength of security. It would really be cool to have a screen saver that did useful work while displaying pretty pictures. Imagine a screen saver, maybe with code modules running in "After Dark," that updates the screen with keys tried...could be a nice demonstration of bignums in crypto, etc. Every now and then the user would get lucky and alarms would go off... (Details: getting the modules to automatically divvy-up keyspace...or maybe just let user pick his own key, or from a list, or whatever. A la the "Chinese lottery" keycracking scheme, where set-top cable boxes (containing computers) crunch on keys and try to match to signals sent over the air...Schneier may have something on this in his book.) Just a thought. The "Official Cypherpunks Screen Saver"? I'd rather have this running on my Mac than have a t-shirt. --Tim May (Berkeley Systems, makers of "After Dark" for Macs and Windows, supports third-party modules. Maybe the "Flying Toasters" could swoop down, pick up a "key" laying on the "ground" and proceed to munch on it...the mind boggles.) ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: First known ... (stop this thread please)
by Marcel van der Peijl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Also, there are other potential claims for this sort of thing. Based on > varying extents to which the "electronic money" is really secure, is > cryptographically interesting, etc. Sorry, I think we should kill this thread while we're still on top of it. The discussion was CyberBucks, not electronic payments or anything like that. I _KNOW_ what the first transaction was, since I made it, I saw it at the bank, I received the goods, and got an email from the sender saying it was the first transaction. I do not wish to take claim for any of that other stuff, whether it is Chaumian or not. No doubt somebody traded some baseball cards for a few bits somewhere back in the fifties. Let's not dig up any other dead bodies. My claim (which was only to show the incorrectness of the other) is a very restrictive one, and is only for the CyberBucks trading. // Marcel van der Peijl, DigiCash bv, http://www.digicash.com/~bigmac/ // The hottest instruction on a P90? JMP $ @ 2.633A or 52C (with fan)

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Cost to Crack Keys
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> writes: > >Hmm, I don't know about anyone else around here, but my workstation is > >idle 99% of the time. I could almost certainly get access to all the spare > >CPU cycles on 120 workstations for free, and I suspect that a lot of > >people (particularly hackers) could do so as well. There's no need to > >spend $ 10,000 on renting them. > > But, Mark, estimates of the cost to crack a key _must_ be based on market > prices, not on opportunistic access to machines. Such access is good for > occasional, or one-shot, deals, but not for routine use. > > For example, one doesn't say "Hey, I don't see how Hertz can charge $40 a > day to rent a car...my friend lets me use his for free." > [...] > "Standard accounting practices" dictate the way to estimate production costs. Agreed. *But* the real cost to a particular organisation, is subsidised by the amount of idle compute cycles they have. You can't take this into account very easily or accurately for a general figure, where raw $ are probably the best figure. For instance I know someone who works for a large UK newspaper (he's admin for their unix workstations), and he says there are acres of RS6000s just sitting there idling most of the time. They are used for document preparation only (what a waste all that lovely silicon just burning cylces, and being occasionally used as a glorified word processor). Anyway point being to that particular organisation, if they for some reason (I dunno but say a big scoop - they need to nefariously break something to get the low down on a politician - unofficially of course), their real cost is quite a bit lower than the raw $, perhaps 0 cost even if they can wait long enough for their impromptu farm to do the job. This doesn't really affect the raw $ cost as such, people just need to estimate the amount of wasted $ equivalent of idle compute they already have in their personal calculations. It would sound better if various news papers would care to print something along the lines of "with idle compute powers as many typical organisations have in abundance". Papers printing high sounding $ figures is though technically accurate (perhaps not too sure about the accuracy), mis-leading to general public who probably don't realise that there is a few $100 tho of idle compute lying around in the accounts department already! In summary, yes but it doesn't sound as good, and folks don't equate idle CPU to $ intuitively. Adam -- HAVE *YOU* EXPORTED RSA TODAY? --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ --rsa--------------------------8<------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2) -------------------------------8<------------------------------- TRY: rsa -k=3 -n=7537d365 < msg | rsa -d -k=4e243e33 -n=7537d365

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