December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

law vs technology
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Recently there's been a great deal of discussion on this list about upcoming legislations (HR666 S314 etc.). Maybe it's time to step back a little and look at the bigger picture. I've been assuming (perhaps incorrectly) for some time that most cypherpunks hold a belief somewhat like the following: There has never been a government that didn't sooner or later try to reduce the freedom of its subjects and gain more control over them, and there probably never will be one. Therefore, instead of trying to convince our current government not to try, we'll develop the technology (e.g., remailers and ecash) that will make it impossible for the government to succeed. Efforts to influence the government (e.g., lobbying and propaganda) are important only in so far as to delay its attempted crackdown long enough for the technology to mature and come into wide use. But even if you do not believe the above is true, think about it this way: If you have a certain amount of time to spend on advancing the cause of greater personal privacy (or freedom, or cryptoanarchy, or whatever), can you do it better by using the time to learn about cryptography and develop the tools to protect privacy, or by convincing your government not to invade your privacy? I argue that since there are many more people doing the former (EFF, CPSR, etc) than latter, that you'd be more effective if you spent the time on the former. Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzvayTl0sXKgdnV5AQEBvAP+MqsGer5pg2xM6+pYG7DgCSttUyAoG8I6 Hm/atFUdRauZ1WREpi3XTXEmNgT9m+QuON5+6rnUrfkizAdjr9EPFnXxMa8am8TZ W7iQBuKb/KktbClbQyKzndeAOQ3oIOi4ahdn5eseOCWc3wX/WcjR6w9WJ6yPWoTJ 6fcglCGgo/8= =Pc1V -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- E-mail: Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> URL: "http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai" =================== Exponential Increase of Complexity =================== --> singularity --> atoms --> macromolecules --> biological evolution --> central nervous systems --> symbolic communication --> homo sapiens --> digital computers --> internetworking --> close-coupled automation --> broadband brain-to-net connections --> artificial intelligence --> distributed consciousness --> group minds --> ? ? ?

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the problem that destroyed PGP
by peace＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Return-path: <peace(a)BIX.com> Received: by bix.com (CoSy3.31.1.50) id <9502112132.memo.28092(a)BIX.com>; Sat, 11 Feb 1995 21:32:20 -0500 (EST) From: peace(a)BIX.com Date: Sat, 11 Feb 95 21:32:20 EST To: cyperpunks(a)toad.com Message-ID: <9502112132.memo.28092(a)BIX.com> Subject: the problem that destroyed PGP So finding a KeyID is the problem that destroys PGP eh? Well I would just take that as the problem to solve, not a reason to throw the baby out with the bath water. All we need to do is design a distributed, hashed database. Should be a piece 'o cake, right? Let's see, first of all the problem is the receiver of a message who gets just the KeyID. First of all, the trusted keys should be expected to be local (in some webby sense). But lets assume that the key is new, not in our local cache. Now my scheme would put a net of keyservers that ALL know each other. The local environment puts in a request to its usual keyserver. That is the keyserver that typically has the keys that the receiver is likely to trust. Now it is certainly possible to imagine a case where a key is not in the receiver's expected server, so what's next. Well the keyserver knows ALL the other servers, right, so just copy the original receiver's request to all the other keyservers. If that gets to be too big, just build a real net where every keyserver is at most two hops away from any other one, then the intermediate servers that could not honor the request would forward it to all the servers it knew. I purposely propose that only two steps would ever be necessary to limit the explosion, but I see that as no real limitation, the rule could even be modified if there was really any need. Hey look, the net supports archie and a host of other non-structured search mechanisms. Why create a search hierarchy where such things are not natural. Why create a naming hierarchy where such things are not natural. By the way, the dockmaster.ncsc.mil note is a good example of a naming hierarchy that has nothing to do with the employment of the person. Anyone working in the security field can get an address there. And any member can get acm.org or ieee.org. But I can post from any of there different net addresses which do not even agree at the very most basic level. So why would my KeyID be naturally associated with any one of .net, .org or .com? Peace ..Tom

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Re: Bernstein
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter F Cassidy <pcassidy(a)world.std.com>: > - I am a writer on assignment from the Economist writing about a > certain cryptographers' tussle with the State Department, a fellow who is > known around the beltway crypto-anarchy, privacy, > niceness-on-the-Internet advocacy crowds as Bernstein. I have the outline There are two of them in my archives: "D. J. Bernstein" (djb(a)silverton.berkeley.edu) at Berkeley who visited the list once; and E. Bernstein, the author of papers on quantum complexity along with U Vazirani. I've never heard of either of them tussling with the State Department. Apart from the name, though, several cryptographer/cypherpunks could fit the bill, from Phil Zimmerman of course to various people who've tried to extract ITAR clearance or FOIA requests. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Electric Dreams subscriptions and back issues, send a mail to rishab(a)arbornet.org with 'get help' as the message Subject. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in rishab(a)arbornet.org Vox +91 11 6853410 Voxmail 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Laws, Feds, & the Internet
by Richard F. Dutcher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following was in today's San Francisco Chronicle. BTW, quoting the entire article as I have done is probably a violation of "fair use" - but de minimis ... All under *current* law, folks. [hmmm -- encryption doesn't do much for exhibitionists and braggarts, does it? ;-] ============================== MAN JAILED FOR INTERNET MESSAGES Associated Press Detroit A college student was charged yesterday with posting computer messages describing the imaginary binding, rape, torture and murder of a woman who used to be in his Japanese class. "Torture is foreplay, rape is romance, snuff (killing) is climax," prosecutors say one of Jake Baker's messages read. The student, 20, was charged with the federal crime of transmitting a threat to injure. He was jailed pending a bond hearing today. Baker, who was suspended from the University of Michigan last week, told reporters he was within his rights to post the messages on the Internet. By posting the messages, he gave other Internet users access to them. If convicted, Baker could be sentenced to up to five years in prison. The name of the woman was not released. ================================== =================================== Rich Dutcher, San Francisco Greens P.O. Box 77005, San Francisco, California 94107 USA "That's libertarians for you - anarchists who want police protection from their slaves." Kim Stanley Robinson, "Green Mars" Greens, of course, only enslave plants - so weed-whackers work better than cops ... ====================================

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Q: ref. for DNA used to solve math. network prob. (fwd)
by root 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Message-Id: <m0rdRDS-0005iFa(a)hip-hop.hh.sbay.org> > Date: Sat, 11 Feb 95 15:27 PST > From: jwgruber(a)aol.com (JWGruber) > Subject: Q: ref. for DNA used to solve math. network prob. > Designated-To: Internet Amateur Mathematics Society > > Hi - I am looking for a reference (newspaper or popular magazine) on a > recent article that described the use of DNA and genetic expression to > solve a complex mathematical problem (linear algebra-matrix systems I > believe) regarding a network of paths or routes between cities. Does > anyone have a reference on this work ? I would be greatly obliged if I > could receive a note on this. Thank you ! > John W. Gruber > Philadelhia College of Pharmacy & Science > JWGruber(a)aol.com > Only peripheraly related to crypto but has anyone got any info on this?

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why pgp sucks
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Matt Blaze, quoting Greg Morgan, wrote: > >Doesn't having some kind of central record of keys go against > >the principle of PGP? > The only "principle" of which I'm aware (and particularly interested > in supporting) is that of having widely fielded, useful and strong > privacy and authentication tools that work properly and transparently. I think the centralization/decentralization confusion comes from PGP's decentralized approach to key generation and authentication, which has been hailed as a good thing. As long as folks can generate their own keys, sign their friends' keys, and upload their keys to servers at their own discretion, I can't see what would make a centralized or standardized distribution method harmful. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzv7I33YhjZY3fMNAQGVbAP/Sm8rXLFDXU4te0mBEhmi6CaAbvHTPqRZ kce6+auO1T/3ypEi0c0D2QCJ7mS3Xx/g/n42mHhJHzt5ClhuHlhDRyjOV2rGBpWX OElxuVFpcSIlUnnQ2cvju9k8cDtHnXN+crmmjUXxvqmUB371eyOZ6E140nxfxo2/ JqWBXLFPvpI= =AL3C -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The NSA (Was Re: Factoring - State of the Art and Predictions )
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> writes: > On the other hand, the people in the black community have > the advantage that they can read anything that the open > community produces but not vice versa, and they have at > least a 15 year edge in knowledge about the design of > conventional systems, and who knows (we certainly have no > idea) how much of an edge in the modern cryptographic arena. Such a situation does not apply solely to the NSA. There are, for instance, secret lodges of French mystics who devote themselves to higher mathematics, absorb everything the open community produces, and rarely publish anything or draw attention to themselves. They solve problems, write secret manuscripts, put them on shelves, and have been doing this for centuries. Perhaps the ultimate factoring algorithm already exists within their walls. We would never know if it did, unless they chose to tell us. The NSA is very good at solving problems that require "acres of Crays". They are crack numerical analysts and algorithm designers. They also make nice block ciphers. I do not think, however, that they have deeply profound insights into the complexity of computation that exceed those of the University community, and certainly not by 15 years. > We don't know for sure if the NSA knew about Public Key > before the open community did. Certainly they knew of > differential cryptanalysis and similar techniques, and they > must know quite a lot that we don't. Rumour has it that the NSA nearly had a collective epileptic fit when they realized the implications of Public Key Cryptography. Yes, they did invent differential cryptanalysis and some other techniques before outsiders thought of them, but I'm unsure this implies some great cabal of hidden knowlege on their part. It is more likely a case of throwing research dollars at a problem which had not yet captured the interest of researchers outside the intelligence community. > Overall, I'd say that in the long run the open community is > going to catch up regardless of what the NSA likes. That > does not mean, however, that this is going to happen > particularly soon, or that they don't still know decades > more than we do. I think the NSA has lost its edge completely in the last decade, as cryptographic research in the open community has taken off. It is much the same sort of situation experienced by IBM, when they were slow to catch on to the paradigm shift created by distributed computing and workstations, and companies like Sun rose from nowhere to become major players. If the NSA were a corporation, they would be apologizing to their shareholders, restructuring, and trying to identify a market niche they could continue to be a player in. Since they are funded by government, we don't see them doing this, but it is absurd to suggest that they are still decades ahead of the rest of the world in basic research and technology. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: So, what's it all about?
by Network Security Observations 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In response to: > In article <199502100151.RAA25844(a)sleepy.retix.com>, you wrote: > > > > > I went to a UNIX trade show yesterday, and the main speaker was a > > > security type. He talked about "the cypherpunks" among other things. > > > He said you are really scary and dangerous and ... > > > But of course he had to also project this adress (cypherpunks(a)toad.com) > > > on the screen. > > can't imagine he is much of a security stud if he is that deluded. > > what was his name? > Lance or Vance something. Rottweiler, maybe? Can anybody tell me who this ignorant twit might be ? A correct name and an email address would help to educate him a bit. Bertil

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Re: Our Ignorance....
by M00012＠kanga.stcloud.msus.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "L. McCarthy" <lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu> > ... > BTW, with an eye to avoiding rehashes of old flamewars, this does *not* > constitute an invitation to scour the subscriber list for *.gov and *.mil and > announce the results. Consult the archives if in doubt on this point. > > -L. Futplex McCarthy Even so, my guess is that 1/4 to 1/3 of the subscribers to this list are interested government employees--though the most interested are not using addresses with .gov or .mil. Mike o

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Re: Q: ref. for DNA used to solve math. network prob. (fwd)
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Adleman paper is on the web (I put it up). The url is: http://www.hks.net/~cactus/doc/science/molecule_comp.html I never completed typing the perspectives article since an article appeared in Science that implied that Science doesn't consider it kosher to reprint their articles. As a member of the AAAS, I'm a bit appalled by this position but for the moment I've stopped any progress on entering Science articles into the Web. Enjoy, - - -- Todd Masco | "Let me get this straight. You're making a crypto toolkit, cactus(a)hks.net | and you're worried about it being _obscure_?" - Eric Hughes Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLz7VORNhgovrPB7dAQHd3gQAgXnpCEQRIxzO6VQSarHhK7nH9j4kncbi IlJawMbNnCf1RD9P3OD7art0w+180luFRJW9d93C5lq3Z36XhCOCgrcHrnGausCM D87DWCEYECMxjuMa362NC1u79UGQ5MThwb4Tl6/kttYzLYyRfCiJLRwexJs5B6mX 6PaKGuNQDV4= =Vgdm - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLz8OFCoZzwIn1bdtAQFC3QGA39rHlZeQgpkQwtsTv0JUEK4UyftbMqSK I8IHti1XiwbwSGgc6zzg5ga0ChRg0B8P =pXZq -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Laws, Feds, & the Internet
by Richard F. Dutcher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Fri, 10 Feb 1995 18:17:55 -0500 (EST) > From: Dave Harvey <warrior(a)infinet.com> > Subject: Re: Laws, Feds, & the Internet > To: "Richard F. Dutcher" <rfdutcher(a)igc.apc.org> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > On Fri, 10 Feb 1995, Richard F. Dutcher wrote: > > > > > The following was in today's San Francisco Chronicle. BTW, quoting > > the entire article as I have done is probably a violation of "fair > > use" - but de minimis ... > > > > All under *current* law, folks. > > > > [hmmm -- encryption doesn't do much for exhibitionists and > > braggarts, does it? ;-] > > > > ============================== > [Article Deleted for the sake of Brevity] > And David Harvey wrote: > Now mind you, this kind of writing is demented, however, what ever > happened to fiction, free speech and such. At this rate, Steven Spielberg > should be in jail as well. I thought you had to prove intent, the saying > something or writing it is not bad as long as you didn't have the intent > or present capability to carry out such. BTW, I like all of Steven > Spielberg's writings and movies, and now HB830 from Oregon rears its head > and fangs. Did this guy intend to threaten or was it fiction? How would > they even know? > > Next thing you know they will limit all free speech. > They *do* have to prove intent -- as to how, that's what juries are for. BTW, he used her real name in the post, with no disclaimers about fiction. From what I have heard, if he had said the same thing in her presence, he could have been arrested for assault. So is saying something that would be actionable in a public space also actionable in a public cyberspace? I dunno, and neither does anyone else. But it's a well-established principle that a threat is a shout of "Fire!" in a crowded theater. The "Law" is very conservative. Not like Newt the Grinch, but like the Catholic Church -- make the least change necessary to accomodate the pressures. If you've got laws to cover telephones and cybercomm looks like telephones, get out the shoehorn. "Free" speech has always been a balancing act. The founders certainly didn't intend to provide "free" speech for blacks and women. Our current case law structure is, in large part, the results of the ACLU's 80-year struggle to prevent a repetition of the wholesale imprisonment of dissidents during WWI. Previously, people were *commonly* tossed in local hoosegows [sp?] at the whim of the local authorities for speaking out on anything [Quakers, Methodists, Baptists, temperance, free love, abolition, suffrage, pacifists, Romanists, Masons, anti-masons, anarchists, populists, free silver, etc. ad nauseum]. "They" have never liked "free" speech ... :-( Wei Dai has the right idea -- be a specialist, support other specialists. [But keep those cards and letters coming ... ;-] =================================== Rich Dutcher, San Francisco Greens P.O. Box 77005, San Francisco, California 94107 USA "That's libertarians for you - anarchists who want police protection from their slaves." Kim Stanley Robinson, "Green Mars" Greens, of course, only enslave plants - so weed-whackers work better than cops ... ====================================

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Re: MIME based remailing commands
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It doesn't matter if they disagree. If you don't have a To: >line in the header then "Apparently-To:" gets tacked on using the "To" >from the envelope. ... And all CC recipient and all BCC recipients as well. /r$

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Re: Bernstein
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

djb@silverton wrote a few crypto thinks, including a cute modification of the snefru hash that turned it into a crypto scheme called shuffle. my guess is that he put it out on the net for ftp... but i guess we'll all find out when the articles gets published. djb would make a fun addition to this list. /r$

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Privacy digest an all
by Ben 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found this on another list that I"m on. I have no connection at all with the distributor, but I thought that it would be interesting to share it with the list. Ben. ________ 1. New Publication: PRIVACY & GEMS: HOW TO AVOID THE PRIVACY INVADERS We all have something to hide, right? From nosy neighbors, burglars, our spouses, private detectives, but most of all the government and business. In this 38-page booklet, you will learn how the government and business, through the extensive use of super-computers, is compiling data on ever facet of your life. Discover exactly how they do it. The amount of information kept on you is astounding: bank statements, investments, credit histories, medical records, school transcripts, driving histories, videotape rentals, retail purchases, tax returns, legal records, and more! This booklet explains who is collecting information on you and what they are doing with it. Your dossier is compiled and sold without your permission or knowledge. Find out what technologies are available today, and their frightening implications for tomorrow. We are on the verge of a 1984 Orwellian-type Police State! How can you keep some of your life private? After you read this booklet, at least you will have some idea! Learn how to make untraceable telephone calls. Be prepared for the New Money . There are a few low-profile investments that do not generate reports to business or government. Learn what they are and how to go about protecting yourself from the privacy invaders. Once you have shifted some of your assets from high -profile assets to low-profile assets, learn how to store and conceal them so you will not be discovered. Subjects covered include: Why Privacy?, Political Persecution, High-Risk Business, Divorce, Probate, Protection from Robbery, Protection from Government Seizure, The Future: The Total Surveillance State, "Smart Cars", "Smart Cards", "Video Surveillance", "Satellite, Surveillance", "Clipper Chip", "Robot Spies", The Future Workplace: A Look At Electronic Banking System, Inc., How Profiles Are Created, Damaging Dossiers, Privacy And The Telephone, The New Be A Private Investor, An Analysis Of Low-Profile Investments, Diamonds and Precious Gems, Rare Coins, Foreign Currency, Collectibles, Cash, The Tangible Investment Philosophy, Recent DeBeers Diamond Price Hikes, Long Term Investment Gem Performance, Low-Profile Strategies In A High-Profile World, Confidential Model Portfolio For Privacy Clients, 10 Rules For Gem Investing, How To Safeguard Your Valuables. This is an excellent tool for anyone concerned with our vanishing privacy. Here is how you order: Send $9.95 ppd (includes first class postage). Illinois Residents add 6.5% sales tax. to: Superior Broadcasting Company, Box 668, Lindenhurst, IL 60046. Request #119O "Privacy & Gems: A Special Report by Bob Genis"

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Re: Laws, Feds, & the Internet
by dls＠mcs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >"Free" speech has always been a balancing act. The founders >certainly didn't intend to provide "free" speech for blacks and >women. The Founders created a larger space for free speech than had ever existed. Slaves were deprived of many freedoms including speech, of course, but women and free blacks were included in the Bill of Rights and exercised free speech, frequently compellingly. Check out Frederick Douglass' practicing oration while still a slave, and then winning his freedom to become one of the greatest abolitionist orators. Consider the appreciation of diversity of thought and speech manifested by Jefferson, Lincoln and many other American political leaders. > > . . . "They" have never liked "free" speech ... :-( Invoking poitically 'correct' stereotypes does not strengthen your argument. David Sallach -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAy8kkMQAAAEEALKOD1O8IVPKHX2qZa+iRz1gqI+uc5lnPAfGYzBSkKDGDdDO CpZEsblWUkVNdRq/ac5elFFvLAtege+pgWmIFdtPnDtJRhHRjXUjB+aYwzue5+Xb C+FoT0j5jwl356gdNiOgUxTYx1dDMcA+VotjDNDvsai3AQaJZU6BpjnLW0KBAAUR tB5EYXZpZCBMLiBTYWxsYWNoIDxkbHNAbWNzLmNvbT4= =g/d6 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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new book pre announcement
by Network Security Observations 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ISM/NSO received the manuscript of 'Cryptography: Theory and Practice' Author is Doug Stinson (Comp. Science/Eng. dept. University of Nebraska). Publisher is CRC Press Inc. Pages: 434 Chapters: 13 Format: Hardbound trimmed book 8,5 x 5,5 ISBN: not available yet Expected release: within 3 months Price: not available yet Preliminary review (a full review will be published in Internet Security Monthly) The book starts - obvious - with classical cryptography. Hopping from shift cipher, to substitution, to affine, to vigenere, to hill, to permutation, and ending in the range of simple cryptosystems with stream ciphers. A mature subchapter is devoted to cryptanalysis, covering the affine, the substitution and the vigenere. And providing a known plaintext attack on the hill cipher. The subchapter ends with the cryptanalysis of the LFSR-based stream cipher. A next chapter discusses in depth Shannon's theory. This is followed by the inevitable discussion of the DES, its modes of operation and includes an attack on a 3 round DES, and an attack on a 6 round DES. Chapter 4 discusses RSA and factoring. Touching also the not much discussed Chinese Remainder theorem.. The Rabin scheme is reviewed. And within factoring Doug pays attention to Dixon's Algorithm and the quadratic sieve. Of course other public key cryptosystems, as El Gamal, finite field, Merkle Hellman and McEliece are discussed. Doug explains signature schemes, as El Gamal and DSS and touches undeniable and fail-stop. In Hash functions, after the basics, among others MD4 and timestamping are issues of interest. In key distribution and key agreement Blom's scheme, D-H, Kerberos, station to station, MIT key agreement are noteworthy stops. Another chapter goes into identification scheme's discussing Schnorr, Okamoto, Guillou-Quisquater, and a general overview of conversion processes from identification to signature. In authentication codes a good discussion on computing deception probabilities, and combinatorial bounds. In the latter orthogonal arrays are a topic of interest. Doug also views the entropy bounds on deception probabilities. A next chapter introduces the Shamir treshold, the monotone circuit construction and Ernie Brickell's vector space, among others. A separate chapter is devoted to pseudo-random numbers, giving examples. The indistinguishable probability distributions and the Blum/Blum/Shub generator are noteworthy. Extra attention for probabilistic encryption. As common fur the subject, close to the end of the book, zero-knowledge proofs are discussed in depth. The book is basically organized in three parts: private key cryptography, public key cryptography and the introduction to four active research area's. It's comprehensive in the 'core' area's of cryptography. Although Cryptography: Theory and Practice is a text book, it certainly provides researchers and practitioners in the field with material on less discussed topics, and certainly invites for the development of new idea's. The work contains also a comprehensive reference section and the good workable index. Each chapter ends with exercise material. For the reader: It is necessary to have at least some familiarity with basic linear algebra and modular arithmetic. Compliments to Doug Stinson who sat many hours behind his terminal to get it all straightened out, and to a professional publisher that is up to the job of putting it all in print in such a layout that student, researcher and professional are encouraged. 11 February 1995 Internet Security Monthly Network Security Observations Editorial Office ------ Note: if you want to copy this short review, distribute it on the net, please do so at will. This review is not copyrighted. If you want more information on the book, consider sending us an email. ------

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Re: why pgp sucks
by alt＠iquest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> writes: >>I'll also note, yet again, that unless PGP quits this bad practice of >>identifying counterparties only by a number, it is NOT going to be >>universally deployed. Counterparties need to be identified by a name >>that can be looked up in the DNS -- meaning "joe(a)foo.com" rather than >>some key ident number. > >PGP of course looks up keys by strings in addition to numbers. A widely >accepted practice is to use <joe(a)foo.com> in the user ID which allows the >lookups to be by internet address. PGP was intended for use beyond the >internet, such as in bbs's, fidonet, corporate networks, etc., where DNS >style addresses may not be useful. I would prefer that PGP would not give out ANY info about addressees. It would seem to me that it is quite a security breach to have PGP dutifully tell you to whom it is addressed. ************************************************************ * Just your basic signature block * * * * Al Thompson * * Fidonet 1:231/110 * * alt(a)iquest.net * ************************************************************

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Re: Laws, Feds, & the Internet
by Richard F. Dutcher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Sat, 11 Feb 1995 01:41:09 -0600 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: dls(a)mcs.com (David Sallach) > > > >"Free" speech has always been a balancing act. The founders > >certainly didn't intend to provide "free" speech for blacks and > >women. > > The Founders created a larger space for free speech than had ever > existed. Slaves were deprived of many freedoms including speech, of course, > but women and free blacks were included in the Bill of Rights and exercised > free speech, frequently compellingly. > And were frequently thrown in jail for their pains - note especially the experiences of the early feminists [anachronistic label alert]. And let us not forget what happened to the Mormons ... > Check out Frederick Douglass' practicing oration while still a > slave, and then winning his freedom to become one of the greatest > abolitionist orators. Consider the appreciation of diversity of thought and > speech manifested by Jefferson, Lincoln and many other American political > leaders. > > And Douglass spent a good portion of his life as a refugee in a protected enclave [Boston] where he had powerful friends to keep him from being arrested. I'm not dissing the Founders, or the Bill of Rights -- just the simplified pap their invocation in most discourse has become. I was trained in high school as a scientist, and in college as an historian, and in both instances to value the messy contingent realities over the tempting simplicities of ideology and theory. And there are few contingent realities messier than the law ... > > . . . "They" have never liked "free" speech ... :-( > > Invoking poitically 'correct' stereotypes does not strengthen your > argument. > > David Sallach Irony-impaired, are we? There's a Polish word, used by most of the populace after the 1979 coup to refer to the army and apparat, that is usually translated as "them." I [probably incorrectly] recall it as "Oni" -- would you prefer it? My own first encounter with the term "politically [in]correct" was among 70's feminists, who used it ironically, to tell people they needed a vacation/to get laid/to get a grip. Would that Newt used it that way ... =================================== Rich Dutcher, San Francisco Greens P.O. Box 77005, San Francisco, California 94107 USA "That's libertarians for you - anarchists who want police protection from their slaves." Kim Stanley Robinson, "Green Mars" Greens, of course, only enslave plants - so weed-whackers work better than cops ... ====================================

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automatic reply to test posting (lwall)
by news＠visionware.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

STOP! Before you panic, read this message through to the end. This message has been sent to you because you have posted an article to one of the Usenet test groups (eg alt.test), and it arrived here at Visionware (visionware.co.uk) on Sat 11 Feb, 11:44 GMT. If you have not posted an article to one of these groups, then it is possible that someone else did so while pretending to be you. If you are sure that this is the case then ask your Local Help Desk to help you track down the perpertrator. It is not possible to track down forgeries from this site. Many people like to see copies of the articles that they post, so that they can see how far (and how quickly) their message has been transmitted. Accordingly, you will get at most one email message from Visionware for each article you post to a *.test newsgroup. You have *not* been added to a subscription list. It is not possible to stop the replies to other messages you may have already posted, but in FUTURE POSTINGS you can prevent this autoresponder from replying to you by including a phrase like "don't reply" or "ignore this message". This site, visionware.co.uk, is located at Visionware Ltd., which is in lovely Leeds, West Yorkshire, England (53 48 34 N / 01 34 51 W). In case you want to know, we're running INN 1.4sec. We deliberately receive the 'ba' (Bay Area) distribution; this is for our staff working from Menlo Park CA. Feel free to send your comments, suggestions, and questions regarding this auto-reply daemon to the administrator, postmaster(a)visionware.co.uk (telephone +44 113 251-2000 and ask for the System Administrator). You should get a response to email within a day or so; if not, then your message has probably not arrived. Your article, as received here, follows: > Path: visionware.co.uk!pipex!howland.reston.ans.net!agate!overload.lbl.gov!emf.emf.net!hilbert.dnai.com!nbn!miwok!news.zeitgeist.net!ack.berkeley.edu!not-for-mail > Subject: lwall > Message-ID: <PINE4545-dhfsdkjc(a)ack.berkeley.edu> > NNTP-Posting-Host: ack.berkeley.edu > Organization: cypherpunks > Lines: 2 > From: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Distribution: world > Newsgroups: alt.test > Date: 6 Feb 1995 19:34:19 GMT > > test > test --

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Privacy vs. Ubiquitous Video: NetCam; Wearable WebCam, etc
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saw this in technomads. Not necessarily crypto, but certainly privacy related... Cheers, Bob Hettinga >Date: Fri, 10 Feb 95 19:11:08 -0500 >From: Steve Mann <steve(a)media.mit.edu> >To: technomads(a)ucsd.edu >Subject: NetCam; Wearable WebCam, etc >Cc: steve(a)media.mit.edu > > >I am an amateur television (ATV) hobbyist, interested in things like >driving radio-controlled cars using a head mounted display (HMD) >(which involves putting myself into the ``usual'' perspective >of the car), or playing tennis with an HMD linked to a stand >mounted camera (which is exactly the opposite: the radiocar is >like a flight simulator from the cockpit, while the tennis example >is like switching to the ``control tower''). I've also been >interested in wearable photographic equipment (such as a wearable >2400J flashlamp I use for ``lightpainting''). > >More recently, I've become interested in sending and receiving >video (and digital stills) over the WWW (e.g. Wearable WebCam, >and WebCar -- radiocar on the WWW). > >I would like to hear from any other ATV hobbyists, people into >packet radio, and those interested in wearable cameras, and >combining wearable cameras with wearable computing. Another >application I was interested in was wearable vision (e.g. for >the visually impaired, or simply to augment the regular human >visual system). > >Therefore, I've started a new mailing list, ``netcam(a)media.mit.edu'', >to discuss issues related to wearable cameras, as well as communications >and computation issues associated with wearable cameras. I am also >interested in some of the privacy issues associated with wearable >cameras (as I touch on in http://www-white.media.mit.edu/~steve) >and the social implications of a society in which there are >ubiquitous cameras (both wearable and fixed) connected to various >high speed communications networks. > >If you would like to be added to netcam(a)media.mit.edu, please >email netcam-request(a)media.mit.edu > >--steve ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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NYT on Cybertheft and Sex Writer
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ralph Blumenthal writes on NYC conference on "cyberthieves" of ideas and intellectual property. For email copy send blank message to <jya(a)pipeline.com> with subject: TEF_ida Peter Lewis writes on the U Mich student arrested for posting fictional rough sex story. For email copy, same, with subject: RIT_xxx ---------- Also, for the famished, these not very fresh tomatoes: Negroponte writes OpEd piece supporting Newt's idea for a laptop in every cave, arguing that it will help with international economic competition, especially against those countries with the youngest population. NEG_poo Peter Lewis writes on PSI's buy of Pipeline. PSI_pip

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Four Horsemen of the Infopocalypse?
by Robert Rothenburg Walking-Owl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Terrorists, Drug Dealers, Pornography and Piracy (copyright, patent & trademarks) ^^^^^^ That's been left out... and likely it's the one some of the authorities fear most. Money can be made off of terrorists, drug dealers and pornograpy by allowing them to exist as a "threat" rather than actually stopping them. Piracy is a whole different matter (though some would argue that it applies to allow it as well...) Off the subject of crypto, though.... Rob

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Re: Not necessarily crypt
by lee.noon＠mgmtsys.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

in message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.91.950209105922.8309A-100000(a)chewy.wookie.net> slowdog(a)wookie.net wrote: SG>On Thu, 9 Feb 1995, Robert Rothenburg Walking-Owl wrote: SG>> I heard yesterday that someone in the House of Representatives proposed an >> amendment to the new crime bill which was soundly defeated it. Turns out t >> Amendment was worded exactly as the Fourht Amendment in the Bill 'o Rights >> Apparently many a congressman/woman has egg on their face... SG>Yes indeed, in response to the H666 bill. The Dems placed up for vote the >text of the 4th Amendment without attributing it to be such. It was >defeated. Dems then immediately took to the floor of the House accusing >the Repubs of tryingto dismantle the Constitution. Almost all right. The Dems did acknowledge it was the fourth amendment, they drummed on that fact during the debate. What they failed to explain was that the amendment was not offered TO the bill but IN PLACE OF the bill. Even the Republicans failed to properly explain this, instead saying it would "gut the bill." This bill is not new, people. It codifies what has been the practice in two federal district courts for several years. The boogie man raised most often it the "confidential informant." The use of a bogus CI is illegal. It is still illegal under this bill. The major problem with this bill is it does not add the penalty to law enforcement officers for "bad faith actions." This was proposed by the republicans last year and ignored by the democrats. Tis year the republicans had the power to push it through and they ignored it. Shows how really different they are. The "bad faith actions" provision would have made a LEO who knowingly generated a search warrant, searched without one without probable cause, liable for criminal charges at the federal level. In other words when cop A uses cop B as his evidence for a warrant, and cop B lies, cop B goes to jail. If cop A knew it was a lie, cop A goes to jail. If it results in a shoot out like Waco and lives are lost, he goes to jail on murder one charges. This carries the death penalty for a federal offense. Naturally the one outfit which opposed this the most was the BATF, who violates this provision as the preferred way to do business. It is now up to the senate. Hopefully Senator Byrd can stop taking about his dog long enough to bring these points to the fore. Lee Lee Noon (lee.noon(a)mgmtsys.com) * 1st 2.00b #3833 * A government can't give back anything it hasn't taken first.

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Forwarded mail....
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Linda does a good job but I frankly didn't believe this when I got it. So I checked. Unfortunately, this is true. Herr Klinton has, by executive order, suspended part of the constitution which gives him his powers. This is not logical, but if he has enough guys with guns backing him up, that doesn't matter. Good luck to you all. I may occasionally read my mail but from now on my efforts are going to be focused on getting moved out of this hellhole before they "seal the borders." (another project of Janet Reno's) Regards, Brad Dolan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 11 Feb 95 05:06 EST From: lindat(a)iquest.net To: caji(a)aol.com Please excuse any duplication to you. I have not finished sorting out my lists and only recently figured out the difference between individuals and newsgroups (and have not yet gotten the names that are already in newsgroups). This was too important to wait on me to finish sorting. *********************** ALERT ALERT ************************ WARRENTLESS SEARCHES CAN NOW BE APPROVED BY FREEH, RENO, DOD, ET. AL. AND CONDUCTED BY ANY FED AGENCY. DUE TO THE CRIME BILL, THE FED AGENCIES ARE NOW ALL OPERATING IN CONSOLIDATED "TASK FORCES." THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER ***SPECIFICALLY*** APPLIES TO ANYONE USING COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS TO GATHER INFORMATION (SEE THE UNDERLYING LAW AT 50 USC 1801.) IT MAY ALSO BE USED TO APPLY TO MILITIAS BY THE AMBIGUOUS WORDING IN 50 USC 1801 and PL 103-359 THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ___________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release February 9, 1995 EXECUTIVE ORDER - - - - - - - FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PHYSICAL SEARCHES By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including sections 302 and 303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("Act") (50 U.S.C. 1801, et seq.), as amended by Public Law 103- 359, and in order to provide for the authorization of physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes as set forth in the Act, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Pursuant to section 302(a)(1) of the Act, the Attorney General is authorized to approve physical searches, without a court order, to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year, if the Attorney General makes the certifications required by that section. Sec. 2. Pursuant to section 302(b) of the Act, the Attorney General is authorized to approve applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under section 303 of the Act to obtain orders for physical searches for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information. Sec. 3. Pursuant to section 303(a)(7) of the Act, the following officials, each of whom is employed in the area of national security or defense, is designated to make the certifications required by section 303(a)(7) of the Act in support of applications to conduct physical searches: (a) Secretary of State; (b) Secretary of Defense; (c) Director of Central Intelligence; (d) Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (e) Deputy Secretary of State; (f) Deputy Secretary of Defense; and (g) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. None of the above officials, nor anyone officially acting in that capacity, may exercise the authority to make the above certifications, unless that official has been appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. WILLIAM J. CLINTON THE WHITE HOUSE, February 9, 1995. ****************************************************************************** * Dr. Linda D. Thompson NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE. * * American Justice Federation * * 3850 S. Emerson Avenue, Suite E, Indianapolis, IN 46203 * * Telephone: (317) 780-5203 AEN News BBS: (317) 780-5211 * * Fax: (317) 780-5209 Orders (Visa/MC) 1-800-749-9939 * * Internet: Lindat(a)iquest.net * *******************************************************************************

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Re: Re: Laws, Feds, & the Internet
by jtender＠telerama.lm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Richard F. Dutcher" <rfdutcher(a)igc.apc.org> writes: > They *do* have to prove intent -- as to how, that's what juries are > for. BTW, he used her real name in the post, with no disclaimers > about fiction. From what I have heard, if he had said the same thing > in her presence, he could have been arrested for assault. > > So is saying something that would be actionable in a public space > also actionable in a public cyberspace? I dunno, and neither does > anyone else. But it's a well-established principle that a threat is > a shout of "Fire!" in a crowded theater. How do you know what was in the original post? Can you post a copy here? -- JT "From the purlieus of Pittsburgh" jtender(a)telerama.lm.com "Everything must GO"

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