December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Mathematics > NSA + GCHQ
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: >Thus, as bright as Brian Snow or Don Coppersmith or John Conway may be, the >"edge" the NSA may have once had is largely gone. Which is not to say that >they are not still a formidable technical organization, with substantial >computer resources. > >But modern crypto systems are, as we all know, based on fundamental >mathematical results ... Along this line: A few days ago we received an 8-page excerpt from "Shift Register Sequences," by Solomon W. Golomb (at USC), Holden-Day, Inc., no date, with a handwritten note: NSA has tried to suppress knowledge of this stuff. Nearly all NSA 'good' algorithms are based on this technology. IANAM, so would any of the mathematicians here give any credibility to this claim? We'll scan and put the excerpt on our Web site if worthwhile. It's composed of the book's 3 page preface and 5 pages of text and diagrams of Chapter 2 on The Shift Register as a Finite State Machine, with principal focus on de Bruijn diagrams for shift registers.

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Marc Rotenberg on Time cover story on privacy (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 22 Aug 1997 14:12:25 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Marc Rotenberg on Time cover story on privacy [My comments on privacy that I forwarded yesterday under the Subject: line "Response to Time cover on privacy" were in response to Marc's criticism, attached below. -Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 11:49:13 -0400 From: Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg(a)epic.org> To: declan(a)well.com Subject: Re: FC: Response to Time cover on privacy ---- Josh - I appreciate the excellent coverage of privacy issues in this week's Time Magazine and at the Pathfinder site, but I am concerned about three particular points made in your article and the general tenor of your reporting. First, much of your discussion of the privacy issue assumes that there is a necessary trade-off between privacy and social benefit. Give up some data, get a good parking space. I think this is a very shallow view of privacy rights. A person who lives in a prison has very little privacy and very little benefit. An affluent person in a democratic society, however, may have both. Clearly, there is something more going on than a zero-sum game. Many of the current efforts to promote genuine privacy enhancing techniques, such as anonymous cash, are based on the belief that we can obtain many of the same benefits of customized service without giving up personally indentifiable information. In this context, the discussion of cookies is critical -- a non-actual user identified cookie is very good for service and privacy, but a user-identified cookie can be good for service but bad for privacy. But your discussion of cookies glosses over this critical point. These questions come up all the time. Should intelligent highways capture actual IDs? Can medical services be delivered psuedo-anonymously? What about communication services? Web access? You substituted an old privacy cliche ("in the modern world we give up some privacy for some benefit") for coverage of the interesting, cutting edge policy issues that the net and the debate about identity has raised. Second, following Alan Westin's line, you suggest that we have generally avoided privacy legislation in the private sector. This is simply not true. We have federal privacy legislation for credit record (1970), school records (1974), bank records (1978), cable subscriber records (1984), stored email (1986), video rental records (1988), junk faxes and auto dialers (1991), and dozens more at the state level for everything from insurance and health records to library records. You can say that these laws are at times ineffective or incoherent -- why federal privacy for video records but nor medical records? -- but it is just wrong to start tearing pages from the history books and the US code to support a bias against privacy laws. Alan should know better; you should as well. Finally, you and Kevin K. take a big swing at my call for privacy legislation and a privacy agency. I appreciate that it is a cardinal rule of some to oppose any government anything, but at least understand the argument for the privacy agency "We need new legal protections to enforce the privacy act, . . ." The Privacy Act was established in 1974 to restrict the ability of government to collect information on citizens and to give citizens the right to get access to their own files. But since '74, federal agencies have shown little interest in upholding the law and privacy concerns *across the federal government* have mushroomed. Do I take from Kevin's criticism that he would prefer that there was no effort to improve enforcment of the Privacy Act, limit record sharing in the government, and ensure people get access to their own files? Is that right? Can we at least agree that the Privacy Act plays an important role in protecting citizen rights and that efforts to strengthen it should be supported? " . . . to keep federal agencies in line, . . .' So that, for example, when law enforcement agencies in the federal government press the White House and the OMB for new law enforcement authority there is a counterveiling agency in the government that requires that privacy concerns are addressed before the proposal reaches the President's desk. And if they aren't adequately addressed, maybe the proposal doesn't get to the President's desk. It is obvious after both the Clipper episode and the OECD Crypto Guidelines that governments with privacy agencys have done a better job resisting these calls for extended government surveillance. The problem is that the one-dimensional critique of government provided in the article (and Wired and Netly) simply doesn't allow for the possibility that one of the best ways to constrain government power is through checks and balances. That, btw, was the key to controlling government authority in the US Constitution. In the absence of a federal privacy agency, you can almost be guaranteed that administration proposals will always tip in favor of surveillance. And the irony of the opposition by some to a federal privacy agency is that it has made it easier over the last few years for NSA/FBI to push forward crypto standards and roll the Department of Commerce. What in the federal government should stop them? Absent an office to push back, they have a clear course to the President's desk. " . . . to act as a spokesperson for the Federal Government . . ." This is for the fairly obvious reason that privacy is one of the biggest issues today in the US and there is no office in government that can even say authoritatively what the position of the US is. (Note that this problem doesn't exist over on the surveillance side or with copyright protection. The government values both. So David Aaron was given the title and the authority to promote the Administration position on key escrow/key recovery, and Bruce Lehman did the same at WIPO for copyrights interests. Do you understand now what's going on?). The result is that there is not even a basis for trade discussion or government negotiation. . . . and to act on behalf of privacy interests." So that when SSA is putting PEBES on line there is some privacy evaluation. Or, to take a recent European example, the new German communications law encourages the development of anonymous payment schemes to promote on-line commerce and to protect privacy. Where did the idea come from? The privacy agency. So, I have to ask, what is it exactly in my proposal that you/Kevin/Declan object to? Is it the fact that there will be a government <something>? I can't argue against that. You're entitled to your religious beliefs, but it has nothing to do with reporting or policy. Is it the fact that Trustee, OPS will do all of this better? If you have been following my point, you'll realize now that doesn't make any sense. Or what if it costs taxpayer dollars? In 1993 I backed creation of a federal privacy agency. Total cost: $5 m. The industry balked. "Too expensive. We have to trim the federal budget." The following year they backed Digital Telephony and a $500 m authorization to make the phone system easy to wiretap. I am also getting a little tired of the myth of the small town where everyone knew everything about everyone else and that there was no privacy. First off, this myth runs directly contrary to another, better description of American society -- the unexplored frontier. Where exactly did all those frontiersmen come from? The answer is the small town. People were constantly picking up and moving, building new homes, and establishing new identities. Many people born in these small towns left and went to school, joined the military, started businesses, moved to the city. Mobility, more than any other characteristic, is central to the American experience. Read Tocqueville. Civic association was and is constantly formed and reformed. Finally, I do agree with Kevin that privacy is very much about social relations. In fact the tag line for the book that Phil Agre and I edited for MIT Press, "Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape" http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/book-home.tcl?isbn=026201162X begins "Privacy is the capacity to negotiate social relationships by controlling access to personal information." Privacy rules essentially establish the base lines for negotiating social relations between individuals and organizations. If you collect personal information, you take on some responsibilities. If you give up some information, you get some rights. You'll find those principles in just about every privacy law and policy in the world. Not only is this commonsense, but it has some nice benefits for an era when technology allows us to shape new forms of social relations -- we can design techniques that allow organizations and inviduals to interact without disclosure of personal information. Indeed, the web and the Net provided all of this to us, but now it could be quickly lost. I don't know what it will take to persuade some of the opinion leaders in the on-line world that law will play a critical role in protecting individual privacy in the coming years, but I'm willing to listen and learn.And I hope, whatever form this dialogue takes, we can all move beyond ideology, myth, and charicature. Marc Rotenberg. EPIC. ================================================================== Marc Rotenberg, director * +1 202 544 9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * +1 202 547 5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 301 * rotenberg(a)epic.org Washington, DC 20003 USA + http://www.epic.org ==================================================================

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Say No To Robertson (was Say No To Christ)
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> <http://apocalypse.berkshire.net/~ifas/fw/9707/update.html#aliens> > Great Barrington, MA -- In a recent > pronouncement, television evangelist and > head of the Christian Coalition, Pat > Robertson, advocated death by stoning for > UFO enthusiasts. > Robertson used the news of the July 4th > Mars landing to promote his extreme > beliefs. > "The Bible says the Earth belongs to man, > but the heavens belong to the Lord," > Robertson said. "The earth is the LORD's and the fulness thereof;" Psalm 24:1 Administration != Ownership an idea seemingly beyond all politicians -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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MAN_iax
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

9-4-95. NYPaper: "Computers Beware! New Type of Virus Is Loose on the Net." A new and deceptively simple type of computer virus, one that can sneak past security devices by hitching rides on electronic mail and other common Internet files, is causing deep concern among computer security officials around the world. Mr. Schmidt of Sun says, "There are criminals in the world and some of them are programmers. With computer networks, they have an amplifying effect that they've never had before. If I were a criminal with a gun, I might attack one person. But with a computer network, I can attack a million people at a time. It's like an atomic bomb." To avert a potential disaster, Mr. Schmidt has enlisted three of the world's top computer security experts, including Tsutomo Shimomura, Dan Farmer and Whitfield Diffie. "Cybervirus Whodunit: Who Creates This Stuff?" Ms. Gordon conducted detailed interviews, by electronic mail, Internet chat, telephone and in person, with more than 60 virus writers. "The virus writer has been characterized by some as a bad, evil, depraved, maniac, terrorist, technopathic, genius gone mad, sociopath." This, she said, "is a gross oversimplification of the situation." "Dick Tracy, Eat Your Heart Out." Move over, Captain Midnight. Heads up, Mata Hari. Now anyone can have a real-life decoder ring. The ring has a computer chip encoded with an identification number that gives the wearer access to secret computer files or locked rooms. The chip transmits your secret ID number or data at the space-age speed of 16,000 bits a second. Triplets: MAN_iax

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Re: Wearing RSA shirt to school
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Let's get real. Yes, please. The head of Sun's network security group is a foreign national. They're doing DES and public key work. :)

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:30 PM 8/22/97 +0200, A druken remailer user wrote: > To continue... > Being an anonymous coward who hides behind remailers the few times Did Patrick Oonk send this one? > Tired of being an anarchist? Tired of waiting for Jim Bell >to rat you out as being a co-conspirator in his evil plot >to overthrow the government? Tired of standing in front of your >mirror, trying to practice acting surprised when armed forces >from a dozen government agencies kick down your door to announce >that someone nuked D.C., and they'd like to "ask you a few >questions?" If someone nuked D.C., most of those bastards would probably be dead. Then again... they propably have em stuffed in capsules, to be opened when communication is lost with Washington D.C. Millions of theses bastards!!!! All located on the surface of Uranus. Upon losing the signal with D.C., they'll fly to Earth, to once again enslave the free. What's the solution???!!!??? We must send all our nuclear arsenals to the surface of Uranus, and set them off, ONLY THEN WILL WE BE SAFE!!! >Peter Trei: > "Hi. I used to be a boring guy. I was so boring that none of the >assholes on the list even bothered insulting me, or forging posts in >my name. > "Then one day, my life suddenly changed. Someone forged a post to >the list in my name, and it was exciting. It was like getting robbed >at gunpoint. What a rush! Heheheh >Kent Crispin: > "This isn't Peter's conspiracy, its MINE! I mean, get real, I >work in a secret underground lavoratory as a government shill. > "Think about it. Who would you expect to conspire against a >bunch of anarchists...the government! You all know how much I >love the government and authority. I'm Louis Freeh's secret >lover. Janet Reno is going to have my baby. > "It's me! *I* am the one behind the SECRET CONSPIRACY AGAINST >THE CYPHERPUNKS LIST. I'm a STATIST, for God's sake, why won't >you believe me? > "Because I'm not one of the elitist 'chosen?' Fuck you." Heheh, well, at least they got Kent summed up in 3 paragraphs. >TruthMonger: > "Now Hettinga is stealing Tim May's lines. What the hell is >going on, here? Has *everybody* on this list gone crazy? > "*I* am the one who is *really* behind the SECRET CONSPIRACY >AGAINST THE CYPHERPUNKS LIST. Think about it. Everyone knows >that I'm a 33rd degree Mason. No...that's Tim May. > "Fuck this shit. From now on, I'm posting as Toto." heheh > There is no conspiracy by a secret government to destroy > the Constitution, enslave the people, and rule the world. "Like them new Stealth Helicopters, equipped with devices to drown out the sound." "Dale, where the hell did you hear that!?" "Alt.conspiracy.black.helicopters" > Remember, this is just a normal mailing list with a few list > members who are a little odd. There are no spooks. Except for Kent Crispin. > Waco was just a tragic accident. Ruby Ridge was a simple error > in judgement by a government agent who really feels bad about > following his superiors orders. Heavily armed U.S. Marines are > no match for a goat-herding boy with a .22, and it is only by > the grace of God that they are alive today. Oswald acted alone. Yeah, no one's safe when those god-damn goat herding sniper kids, lucky those good soldiers hit him fast! There is, however, a secret-conspiracy by Paul Pomes to shut down remailers. ConspiracyMonger "Ahhh, look, another mutilated cow." "Musta been them aliens." "Nah, it's them damn black helicopters. Killin' all my friggin livestock."

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.taylored.com This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"crown"} = "<mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut mix ek reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> cpunk"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Last ping: Mon 4 Sep 95 4:00:26 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu ***+****--** 12:42 99.99% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ************ 11:36 99.99% hroller hroller(a)c2.org --********** 9:55 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org --++++++++++ 45:17 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .---------+- 2:49:48 99.99% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +++++-++++++ 44:09 99.99% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net -+-------.- 2:58:30 99.99% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org ----------- 1:42:59 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ***++*****-* 23:51 99.96% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++*+*++ + 1:04:53 99.93% replay remailer(a)replay.com _***+******* 17:24 99.86% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com ----- ----- 5:13:51 99.60% ncognito ncognito(a)gate.net #+**-** ** 6:07 98.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ***+** **** 5:08 98.91% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de *********** 5:15 97.26% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com .-.._._ --- 16:38:13 95.81% crown mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net --- ----- - 4:03:05 95.06% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -----. --- 6:20:56 90.88% robo robo(a)c2.org -********** 17:00 90.58% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ******++*+** 7:45 99.99% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ---++++-- ** 3:02:16 87.70% gondolin mixmaster(a)gondolin.org ---- . 5:35:11 77.43% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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None
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's not an _Onion_ satire: <http://apocalypse.berkshire.net/~ifas/fw/9707/update.html#aliens> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: bofus? Subject: Pat Robertson advocates stoning for crypto enthusiasts Date: Fri, 22 Aug 1997 07:39:49 -0800 Message-ID: <33FDB249.335F(a)mindspring.com> RuffinP(a)aol.com wrote: > > > > > > FREEDOM WRITER PRESS RELEASE > > FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 28, 1997 > CONTACT: Skipp Porteous (413) 528-3800 > > > > Robertson advocates stoning for UFO > enthusiasts > > > Great Barrington, MA -- In a recent > pronouncement, television evangelist and > head of the Christian Coalition, Pat > Robertson, advocated death by stoning for > crypto enthusiasts. > > Freedom Writer magazine, in its July/August > issue, mailed today, disclosed Robertson's > statement. Freedom Writer is published by > the Institute for First Amendment Studies, > a group that monitors the right. > > Robertson used the news of the July 25th > Senate Commerce Committee hearing to promote > his extreme beliefs. A segment on the July 27, > 1997 broadcast of The 700 Club featured news > of the Senate hearing. Employing the > historical event as a starting point, the > program delved into the possibility of the > existence of anonymous free speech on the > Internet. > > While Robertson viewed the Internet with > suspicion, on a more serious note, he > launched into a diatribe against those who > entertain the existence of uninhibited free > speech on the Internet. He said, in a > rambling discourse, that if such a thing > existed, it would simply create demons that > would lead people away from Christ. > According to Robertson, the threat is so > serious that people who believe in free > speech should be put to death by stoning -- > according to "God's word." > > "The Bible says the Earth belongs to man, > but the Word belongs to the Lord," > Robertson said. > > "He has given us the Earth. He also warned > us in the book of Matthew of the dangers of > corrupting forces such as the Internet which > can be used for evildoers: > > "'A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can > a bad tree bear good fruit. Every tree that > does not bear good fruit is cut down and > thrown into the fire. Therefore, by their > fruits you will know them. (Matthew 7:17-20)' > > "And you see, there is only one Word, and > that is the Word of God: > > "'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word > was with God, and the Word was God. (John 1:1)'" > 'For the Word of the Lord is right; and all his > works are done with faithfulness. He loveth > mercy and judgment: the earth is full of the > mercy of the Lord. (Psalm 32:4-5)' > > So there is no question about it." > > "Can a demon appear as a slanty-eyed, > funny-looking computer hacker? Of course > he can, or it can. Of course they can deceive > people. And if they can lead somebody away > from the true God, or away from Jesus > Christ, anyway it happens, it doesn't > matter, you will lose your salvation. It > doesn't matter how they get you. The > question is, did they get you, and under > what guise? > > "This is man in rebellion against God, who > refuses to take God's Law. And God says, > 'My covenant says you won't do this. And if > I find anybody in Israel,'-- "which is his > pure nation" -- 'If I find anybody in > Israel that's doing this sort of thing, > then I want you to take him out and dispose > of him." > > "It's a clear violation of God's word. > Stone them." > > Skipp Porteous, Freedom Writer publisher, > commented: "As the founder and chairman of > the Christian Coalition -- a group > dedicated to becoming the most powerful > political force in America -- Robertson's > extreme ideas need to be taken seriously, > for they not only negate pluralism, but > condemn to death those who dare to believe > differently." --------- End forwarded message ----------

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Re: Wearing RSA shirt to school
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Grumpiness warning: I have held my tongue the past few months as all of these "this t-shirt has been declared a munition!!!" messages went out, but I can hold my tongue no longer. At 4:43 AM 9/4/95, Futplex wrote: >I wrote: >> With respect to possession within the U.S., there aren't any >> laws stopping you from waving strong cryptography around wherever you like >> (at least, not yet). > >---- >...and in private email, Jim Ray pointed out that showing the shirt to a >foreign national might technically violate ITAR... Nope, no more so than letting a foreign national read Schneier's book is a violation of the ITAR. If you dispute this, ask whether Schneier's book is banned from export (the book, not the optional diskette). It isn't. Nor are other cryptography _books_ banned from export. I'm not minimizing the issue of export of machine-readable code, as in diskettes. But to claim that a blurry, printed on cotton "barcode" is even remotely in the same class as exporting a workable set of cryptographic system routines, or that letting a furriner merely "gaze upon" this blurry barcode, is a violation of the ITARs is laughable. >Yeah, I suppose I overstated it a bit. It appears that if the ITAR do cover >the shirt (unclear at present, AFAIK -- any news on the CJR, Raph ?), then >flashing it at a furriner could constitute a violation. Thanks for the >correction. No. No more so than "flashing" a copy of a crypto book would constitute a violation. > >The gist of my previous message remains: No local or state authority in the >U.S. (of which I'm aware) classifies strong cryptography as a munition, >weapon, etc. I haven't heard of any restrictions on transporting crypto >across state lines, either. Unless the Feds start cracking down on high >schools, or the Perl-RSA shirt somehow violates some school dress code, (gang >colors ? ;) the original questioner need not fret about his son wearing the >shirt to school. It was this series of posts about whether wearing the "munitions t-shirt" near schools was a crime or not that made me think the silly season had arrived. If the t-shirt is a munition, and books are munitions, then libraries must be real "ammunition dumps," ready to explode at any minute. News at 11. Let's get real. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Key attributes (was: pseudonyms & list health)
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone still has the flyer from the Crypto '95 rump session, there was a guy there talking about ANSI standards, and one of the things he mentioned in his talk was work they were doing on "key attributes." I spoke with him afterwards, and we had a lively discussion about this matter; especially with regard to the relationship between key certification and key attributes. I argued that certification is just another kind of attribute, while he is fairly hung up on certificate hierarchies, etc. (Of course, robust and well-implemented attributes couild be used to implement a hierarchical certification structure if that's what was desired, but there seems to be a deep-seated feeling among crypto folks of a certain ilk that such structure needs to be hard-coded into things.) I'll be following up on this matter with him when I am reuinited with my notes, which made an unintended trip to SF, while I only went to Mountain View. > >I could see such a system initially being piggybacked on PGP keys (the >signatures would not be understandable by PGP though), although for >Chaumian credential transfers the keys have to be specially structured >and that would require a new approach. > >Who would be willing and/or interested enough to use such a system if it >existed? > >Hal

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Re: Shooting the taggers
by John Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Here in Santa Cruz, graffiti spray-painted on the walls of businesses >is a >big, and growing, problem. And laws require the businesses to paint >over >>he grafitti, or otherwise render it invisible, in a quick and timely >manner. (The idea is that the grafitti is offensive to the >sensibilities of >others, or somesuch, and that it encourages rival gangs to counter >with >their own grafitti.) No, the idea is that the taggers do their thing in order to see the results of their work on display. Paint over the results promptly, and there is no point to tagging. >There's a solution for taggers: snipers. A punishment far out of proportion to the crime. It is a mistake to think that all crimes should be punished by the most violent means possible. Notice that most proponents have never raised children. They need to learn the importance of proportionality. "John ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: maximizing cryptographic return
by John A. Limpert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:49 PM 9/3/95 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >the question of the cost-effectiveness of phone encryption was raised by >my other message. I would like to question how cheaply good encryption >could be done on phones, with a poor quality microprocessor. It doesn't take much of a microprocessor to do real-time encryption and decryption of digitized voice, at least for DES. The problem is the vocoder. A good vocoder needs a fast DSP chip. A custom vocoder chip could cut this cost considerably, look at how cheap data pumps for V.34 modems have become with mass production. If ISDN ever becomes the mass market standard, replacing analog local loops, it would be very inexpensive to add encryption. Even with today's phone system, I can't see why a mass market secure telephone couldn't be built for less than $200. The problem is convincing enough people that they need secure telephones to get that mass market. The secure telephone also needs to be transparent to the users. It should be able to setup a secure connection without requiring the user to press any buttons or know what hardware is at the other end. The voice quality has to be much better than some of the "Donald Duck" quality systems that have been used in the past. -- John A. Limpert johnl(a)Radix.Net

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Re: pseudonyms & list health
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:13 AM 9/4/95, Futplex wrote: >Deranged Mutant writes: >> My worry is about abuse. One would prefer to save endorsements and find >> a way to remove thumbs-downs... also how to prevent one from overdoing a >> thumbs-up or -down certification for a person (either to inflate or de- >> flate a reputation). > >A few nuisance lawsuits from people who were given thumbs-downs might do the >trick, as with employment recommendations in the U.S. :[ A good point that deserves further comment. Employers have taken to _saying nothing_ about past employees, for fear of lawsuits by disgruntled job seekers. So much for free speech, courtesy of the American legal system. But as we can't changed the litigious nature of American society (and maybe European society--I don't know), the emphasis ought to be on digital systems and reputations by pseudonyms. Hal's comment about transferring credentials is one approach. Sort of an automated version of "Pr0duct Cypher says the work of Sue D'Nim is good." At this point, not enough pseudonymns to make it very worthwhile, but someday... >ObTim: As in other reputation markets, some people will spread their blessings >more liberally than others. They do this at the risk of diluting the worth of >each credential granted. It all comes out in the wash. > >A reviewer named Susan Granger, for example, is known to me as a person who >routinely lauds lousy movies. Thus it's simple for me to ignore her positive >recommendations (I've yet to see a negative review from her). In fact, when >I observe that a new film prominently features her seal of approval in its >advertising, I take that fact as an indication of the lack of praise from >more discriminating reviewers. So a nominal "positive" credential may be >interpreted as an implicit negative credential, depending upon context. Another good point. I always think: "Ah, they couldn't get either Siskel or Ebert to endorse it." As Futplex notes, endorsements by second- or third-tier endorsers are often a _negative_ endorsement. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FROM MOUNTAIN MEDIA FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE DATED AUG. 31, 1997 THE LIBERTARIAN, By Vin Suprynowicz 'Necessary to the security of a free State' J.P. recently wrote: "I agree that things like the court system can be privately funded. ... However, my greatest concern is that a military that has to run a "pledge drive" in order to provision itself would not be capable of posing a credible deterrent to any nations bent on conquering the US. If you could address this point, I would appreciate it. # # # O.K. ... First, the notion that it's all right to steal at gunpoint "some modest amount, as long it serves a legitimate public need" ignores the simple moral truth that the end cannot be allowed to thus justify the means. When I loot your paycheck without your permission to do "good works," I can't possibly know whether that leaves you one dollar short of the money you needed to buy medicine for your dying mother, or one dollar short of the money you needed to complete an experiment that might result in the discovery of a cure for cancer. There is literally no way to measure the opportunities I thus steal from you, and how their potential results might weigh against what (start ital)I(end ital) decide to do with your money. (Even assuming power won't corrupt me until I can blithely assure you that "tobacco subsidies" are "in the public interest.") But on to J.P.'s main point: the need to fund a standing, federal army. The only thing that grants the United States government any legitimacy -- that supposedly differentiates it from some gang of bandits that swarms down from the hills and extracts tribute for as long as the coast seems clear -- is the Constitution. The Constitution would have not have been ratified by enough states to take effect without solemn binding promises that a Bill of Rights would quickly be enacted. Without the Bill of Rights, the Constitution is invalid and of no force. The Bill of Rights prominently features the Second Amendment, which instructs us: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." This is a founding principle of our nation. Should the national government eviscerate or foreswear that principle, it is not only our right, but our duty, in Jefferson's words, to "alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government." The founding document does not find ANY role for a standing, professional army in preserving "the security of a free state." As a matter of fact, the founders traveled the land, preaching the EVILS of a professional, standing army. And they were right. Our domestic, professional, standing army today consists of individual legions, somewhat on the Roman model but also on the model of the personalized Waffen SS Divisions created as adjuncts to Hitler's Wehrmacht, with personal loyalty oaths sworn to the Fuhrer, and customized uniforms adopted with silver dagger or death's-head totems, etc. Currently going through precisely the kind of expansion and rearming that transformed Hitler's personal bodyguard from the scruffy SA brownshirts of 1934, to the well-armed, professional SS divisions of 1940, our own paramilitary legions are today dubbed "ATF, "FBI," "FBI Hostage Rescue," "DEA," etc. Some of these units now number in the THOUSANDS, and are authorized to deploy COMBAT AIRCRAFT. They routinely train with precisely the kinds of explosives and automatic weapons you or I could go to prison for merely possessing, and practice rapid helicopter deployment and "dynamic entry" into URBAN AREAS. These guys are not just getting ready to investigate the next Lindbergh kidnapping. Can such outfits exist in parallel with a strong citizen militia? They WILL not, and they are currently demonstrating this to us in spades, by infiltrating with agents provocateurs every legitimate citizen militia unit they can find, framing the leaders on amorphous "conspiracy" charges, and sending them away for decades. As they say in the popular sword and costume series, "There can be only one." But what is equally important, is to realize that a citizen militia is ADEQUATE to defend the security of a free state, even against the largest, most powerful, most technologically advanced power in the world. George Washington proved this in 1781. And for anyone who harbored the illusion that "conditions have so changed in 200 years" that this was no longer the case, the Vietnamese and then the Afghans successively proved it again, in our own lifetimes. Next time: Do we need a standing army, at all? Vin Suprynowicz is the assistant editorial page editor of the Las Vegas Review-Journal. Readers may contact him via e-mail at vin(a)lvrj.com. The web site for the Suprynowicz column is at http://www.nguworld.com/vindex/. The column is syndicated in the United States and Canada via Mountain Media Syndications, P.O. Box 4422, Las Vegas Nev. 89127. *** Vin Suprynowicz, vin(a)lvrj.com "A well-regulated population being necessary to the security of a police state, the right of the Government to keep and destroy arms shall not be infringed."

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RE: Key attributes (was: pseudonyms & list health)
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cman(a)communities.com (Douglas Barnes) writes: > If anyone still has the flyer from the Crypto '95 rump session, > there was a guy there talking about ANSI standards, and one of > the things he mentioned in his talk was work they were doing on > "key attributes." > I spoke with him afterwards, and we had a lively discussion about > this matter; especially with regard to the relationship between > key certification and key attributes. I argued that certification is > just another kind of attribute, while he is fairly hung up on > certificate hierarchies, etc. Did he perchance work for some US Federal Agency such as NIS&T? Or a large corporation? My small PGP key was created at the National Computer Security Conference in 1992. About half the attendees were NSA, and lots more were from assorted defense and civilian agancies. During the free time, I talked to a bunch of them about Phil's web of trust. I had a really hard time understanding with where they were comming from, and they had no clue as to why I thought hierarchical CA chains are so bad. I didn't convince anyone. But I have come to understand that if you spend your entire working life in a job that is structured from the President on down a heirarchy, you can't imagine any other organizational structure. This includes the obvious LEAs such as FBI, ATF, all the Defense folks and sppoks like CIA, DIA, NSA, and the standards "setting" folks out at NIS&T. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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CPAC/Sewer/XtatiX Continues to Brew
by Mike Duvos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fwd from alt.censorship: Another unhappy customer of CPAC. Stephen Hopkins writes: > Some time ago, an organisation called CPAC, the murky Child > Protection and Advocacy Coalition decided to crusade > against certain so-called "boy-lover" sites on the > Internet, with the aim of getting them shut down. The > organisation, headed by one Anne Cox- -who refuses to > identify the organisations comprising CPAC--identified some > black-listed sites, of which my own, > http://www.stadiou.demon.co.uk, is one of them. Actually, the Lovely and Talented Ms. Cox is far too shrewd to actually libel people on her organization's home page, so she generally links to other sites performing this function, while maintaining a discreet distance behind an appropriate disclaimer. Two months ago, I wouldn't have known CPAC from a hole in the ground. Today, quite a few people have come to know the organization and its various shills, largely because of their attempts at "Ideological Cleansing" on the World Wide Web. I had a pretty good idea what the organizational agenda was when I saw the name Debbie Mahoney, who most Usenetters remember from the Nikki Craft frivolities. Half a dozen screws short of a fully connected brain, even on her better days, and an agenda and a bag of dirty tricks that would have made Richard Nixon jealous. > I feel almost honoured that my on-line activities have > attracted this much interest, but in including it on a > list of "child molestors" and "pedophiles" CPAC attribute > far more importance to it than it deserves. Most of CPAC's visible agenda is pretty reasonable. It's the part about harrassing legal First Ammendment protected speech on the Net, based on their perception of the sexual orientation of the people engaging in it, because supposedly such people might *SOMEDAY* commit a crime, that is a bit of a civil liberties stretch. Like most Dworks, they believe in "voodoo molestation," where unnamed children thousands of miles away are vicariously "exploited" should a single stranger have "impure thoughts" about them by looking at even innocuous photographs, or should accurate depictions of childhood sexuality be permitted in mainstream media. They are getting their nonsense written into the law one tiny step at a time, the Hatch "synthetic sexual depictions of minors" smoke and mirrors being their latest accomplishment. > Jim Tradwick, a San Antonio, Texas businessman, can testify > to the tactics of vigilante censors. Tradwick runs XtatiX, > a small Texas based company offering Web space to > individuals and companies. In June he found himself on the > receiving end of hate e-mails and harassing phone calls. > The U.S. Customs threatened to confiscate his computer > systems for investigation, and the San Antonio police > threatened to take away his young son. What's really amazing is how much under the table support the anti-civil liberties agenda gets from LEAs and agencies of the Federal Government. With Civil Forfeiture laws reversing the concept of "innocent until proven guilty," and helpful government agencies attempting to apply pressure to suspected "Thought Criminals," it becomes very difficult for the typical business owner to avoid capitulating to these folks. > Had Tradwick been caught dabbling with child pornography? > Or had he perhaps allowed his systems to be used by a > pedophile ring? Twice no. His only "crime", that so > infuriated CPAC, was to host a gay site called "Free > Spirits" (http://www.ivan.net/fs) abou t attraction to > teenagers, which included articles written by gay teens > themselves. > But Cox, along with her ally--a retired police officer > called Mike Paladino obsessed with sexual perversion--and > his contingent of jackbooted thugs, decreeded that Free > Spirits was beyond the pale. And thus Tradwick found himself > on the receiving end of harassment, hate mail, and even > death threats against his son. Paladino isn't just a retired police officer, he is a retired Police Captain! We're talking management here. He doesn't just wield the ol' "Assault Plunger," he's part of the design team. :) > I made an effort to build bridges between myself and CPAC > by posting what I hoped would be considered reasoned and > reasonable debate on their discussion board. However, even > that was too much, as my access to their forum was > restricted to read-only. I can only conclude that Cox didn't > want reason to interfere with the prevailing views > expressed in the forum. Har! The only rhetorical weapon the Lovely and Talented Ms. Cox needs in her forum is the Delete Key. > So I am circulating, via Usenet, blind e-mail, and BoyChat, > the text of the message I attempted to post to CPAC's forum > under my BoyChat and IRC nickname Rob Walker. I welcome > anyone from CPAC to discuss the points herein, anywhere > they like. I know poste rs to the CPAC forum occasionally > monitor BoyChat, and Usenet groups such as alt.censorship > and others. Unlike other boards, BoyChat does not censor > messages whose sentiment its Webmaster does not agree with. Well, that's very nice, but I think this is a task tantamount to trying to convert the Ayatollah Khomeni to Episcopalianism But I wish you the best of luck in your quest. [CPAC-Censored Social Science Essay Expunged] -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ enoch(a)zipcon.com $ via Finger $ {Free Cypherpunk Political Prisoner Jim Bell}

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Acceptable NIS&T restrictions
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If we can break away from t-shirts as munitions... I'm going to the NIS&T session this week. I'm trying to figure out what, if any, part of the process can be made acceptable to those in favor of bringing US policy into the 90s. I'm not sure that this is possilbe. NIS&T published (and it has been reposted to the list and sci.crypt many times) their goals. Can we make suggestions to any that are acceptable and realistic? Here are some of their criteria: "Avoiding multiple encryption -- How can the product be designed so as to prevent doubling (or tripling, etc.) the key space of the algorithm?" CME has been suggesting DES | TRAN | DES | TRAN | DES for years. Can they really _avoid_ (i.e. prevent) this? "Disabling the key escrow mechanism -- How can products be made resistant to alteration that would disable or circumvent the key escrow mechanism? How can the "static patch" problem be avoided? How can this be tested?" This is easy in hardware. Is it even possible in software? "Practical Key Access -- How can mechanisms be designed so that repeated involvement of escrow agents is not required for decryption for multiple files/messages during the specified access period?" At least this has a chance of being real. We need to have a suggestion for expiration times for the escrowed keys. This was a huge problem with the initial Clipper. Is there a reasonable middle ground between long term keys such as PGP uses, and the ephemeral keys of a D-H exchange? "Certified escrow agents -- Can products be designed so that only escrow agents certified by the U.S. government (domestic, or under suitable arrangements, foreign) are utilized? What should be the criteria for an acceptable U.S. escrow agent?" We all know that Tim's Flakey Key Escrow Service is most likely not "an acceptable US escrow agent." But since CKE is a good thing, what are the characteristics of an acceptable service to us? I've added the discussion "topics" that NIS&T sent to participants to my WWW pages if you want to see them all, http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/nistmeeting.html But I expect that most of the criteria that I edited out are unacceptable to most on this list. Without further discussion. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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The Dangers of Caribbean Data Havens
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Bruce Sterling in "Islands in the Net" to various reports of data havens and Internet services being set up by actual people, there has been much speculation about using Caribbean islands for data havens. But the infrastructure has been lacking. Low-bandwidth inter-island links. And now yet another huge hurricane is bearing down on the Lesser Antilles, heading directly for Puerto Rico and Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican Republic). "Outages" lasting days or weeks after these islands get torn up every few years will not go too well with international commerce. Some fixes may help: * higher-bandwidth connections, e.g., undersea fiber. * satellites as primary or secondary connections * more secure on-island facilities, designed to maintain contact with satellites or fibers even with a Force 4 hurricane direct hit. The "regulatory arbitrage" aspects still make using the Islands advantageous (though they can be buffeted by political storms as well as physical ones). At least two current or past Cypherpunks are living in the Islands and working on some schemes. Something to think about. Personally, I think a distributed system based on crypto is a more robust approach, the "Libertaria in Cyberspace" view I've talked about. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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None
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:33 PM 8/22/97 -0400, you wrote: >> Great Barrington, MA -- In a recent >> pronouncement, television evangelist and >> head of the Christian Coalition, Pat >> Robertson, advocated death by stoning for >> crypto enthusiasts. Figures. I've never understood this dumb Christian overlooking of how the world actually functions. You don't "stone" people to death anymore, there's other ways to kill them. Second, this "Pat Robertson" is a fascist. >> Robertson used the news of the July 25th >> Senate Commerce Committee hearing to promote >> his extreme beliefs. A segment on the July 27, >> 1997 broadcast of The 700 Club featured news >> of the Senate hearing. Employing the >> historical event as a starting point, the >> program delved into the possibility of the >> existence of anonymous free speech on the >> Internet. Something that should be spread, rather than destroyed, but narrow minded Christians don't seem to get that. >> While Robertson viewed the Internet with >> suspicion, on a more serious note, he >> launched into a diatribe against those who >> entertain the existence of uninhibited free >> speech on the Internet. He said, in a >> rambling discourse, that if such a thing >> existed, it would simply create demons that >> would lead people away from Christ. Lead them away from opression, to freedom. According to this guy, the people who helped stike down the CDA are devils. Also, this clearly shows that this man is a Nazi. >> According to Robertson, the threat is so >> serious that people who believe in free >> speech should be put to death by stoning -- >> according to "God's word." Fuck him. God's word is fascism, hate, narrow-mindedness, and a Big Brother State. He can take his bible and shove it up his ass. >> "The Bible says the Earth belongs to man, >> but the Word belongs to the Lord," >> Robertson said. Sorry, we own earth, and God doesn't exist. >> "He has given us the Earth. He also warned >> us in the book of Matthew of the dangers of >> corrupting forces such as the Internet which >> can be used for evildoers: First of all, this also proves Christians are incabable of making real world arguments, because they rely so heavily on a 1000-page book filled with lies. >> "'A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can >> a bad tree bear good fruit. Every tree that >> does not bear good fruit is cut down and >> thrown into the fire. Therefore, by their >> fruits you will know them. (Matthew 7:17-20)' I'm not going to bother with cryptic messages sent by a god-loving Nazi. >> "And you see, there is only one Word, and >> that is the Word of God: Bullshit. >> "'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word >> was with God, and the Word was God. (John 1:1)'" >> 'For the Word of the Lord is right; and all his >> works are done with faithfulness. He loveth >> mercy and judgment: the earth is full of the >> mercy of the Lord. (Psalm 32:4-5)' Mercy? How merciful is commiting mass-murder because humans don't fit your bill, god? Second off, cryptic responses aren't worth a shit in arguments. The word of the lord is fascism. >> "Can a demon appear as a slanty-eyed, >> funny-looking computer hacker? No, but I see them all the time in tghe form of men wearing robes with crosses on them, reading from a 1000-page book of lies. >> Of course >> he can, or it can. Of course they can deceive >> people. And if they can lead somebody away >> from the true God, or away from Jesus >> Christ, anyway it happens, it doesn't >> matter, you will lose your salvation. It >> doesn't matter how they get you. The >> question is, did they get you, and under >> what guise? As i said, they don't lure you away from god, they open your eyes, and you grow up and stop the nonsense. >> "This is man in rebellion against God, who >> refuses to take God's Law. And God says, >> 'My covenant says you won't do this. And if >> I find anybody in Israel,'-- "which is his >> pure nation" -- 'If I find anybody in >> Israel that's doing this sort of thing, >> then I want you to take him out and dispose >> of him." That is fascism. Nazi fascism. >> "It's a clear violation of God's word. >> Stone them." That's a clear violation of my rights, shoot that Christian prick. >> Skipp Porteous, Freedom Writer publisher, >> commented: "As the founder and chairman of >> the Christian Coalition -- a group >> dedicated to becoming the most powerful >> political force in America -- Robertson's >> extreme ideas need to be taken seriously, >> for they not only negate pluralism, but >> condemn to death those who dare to believe >> differently." Which is fascism. Nazi fascism. This loser makes Communism sound good, considering it outlaws religion. This post has moved me considerably. Some parts of his speech requires a response that words could not adequately describe. This speech of his outlines in entirety the Christian Agenda. Enslaving, murder of those different, intolerance, fascism. If Christians try to stone anyone, they should be shot right away. Freedom-Thru-AtheismMonger "Your god is DEAD!!! And no one cares!!! If there is a hell, I'll see you there!!!!!" - Nine Inch Nails, "Heresy"

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Re: Emergency File Wipe Algorithim Re: Emergency File Wipe Algorithim
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When a running computer is seized in some sort of law enforcement raid, what are the chances someone would think to backup the contents of a RAMDISK drive prior to powering it down?

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e$: More fun with cash: Senate Bill 307
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone heard about this bill? Comments? Cheers, Bob Hettinga >From: glasgow(a)geoserv.isgs.uiuc.edu (Mary.Glasgow) >Subject: Senate Bill 307 2-tier Money System >Date: 31 Aug 1995 13:54:45 GMT >Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana >Summary: Senate Bill 307 2-Tier Money System >Keywords: Senate Bill 307 2-Tier Money System > >In the Senate of the United States, January 30, 1995, Mr. Leahy introduced >the following bill, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on >Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. > >...for purposes of brievty, I will quote only from sections (c) Currency >Exchange and (d) Domestic Use and Nondomestic Use Currency. > >(c) Currency Exchange-- > (1) Plan--Not later than 12 months after the date of enactment of this >section, the Secretary shall devedlop and begin implementation of a plan to >require the exchange of all existing $100 denomination United States currency >held within and outside of the United States for $100 denomination domestic >use and nondomestic use United States currency issued in accordance with this >sectin. > > (2) Exchange Requirements--The plan established under paragraph (1) shall >require the currency to be exchanged-- > (A) at financial institutions regulated under United States law and >subject to United States currency transaction reporting and other money >laundering deterrence requirements; or > (B) at financial institutions that the Secretary finds, because of >treaty obligations, other provisions of law, or other agreements, are >required to report significant transactions in United States currency to >the United States Treasury, and abide by such obligations. > (3) 6-Month Exchange Period-- > (A) In general--During the period beginning on the date that is 12 >months after the date of enactment of this section and ending on the date >that is 18 months after that date of enactment, the Secretary shall permit >the exchange of circulating $100 denomination United States currency for >equal numbers of the domestic use and nondomestic use $100 currency issued >in accordance with this section at institutions described in paragraph (2). > (B) Non-Negotiability--Except for claims pursuant to subsection (e), >beginning on the dat that is 18 months after the date of enactment of this >section, the United States Treasury shall not recognize $100 >denomination >United States currency issued prior to the date that is 12 months after the >date of enactment of this section as constituting a negotiable claim against >the United States Treasury, and such currency shall not constitute legal >tender for any debts, public or private. > >(d) Domestic Use and Nondomestic Use Currency--Beginning on the date that is >18 months after the date of enactment of this section-- > (1) domestic use currency, issued in accordance with this section shall >be recognized as constituting a negotiable claim against the United States >Treasury only when presented within the United States, and shall constitute >legal tender for any debts, public or private, only when presented in the >United States, but such currency may be exchanged for equal values of $100 >denomination nondomestic use currency (or other United States currency) only >at financial institutions regulated by United States law and subject to >United States currency transaction reporting and other money laundering >deterrence requirements; and > (2) nondomestic use currency shall be recognized as constituting a >negotiable claim against the United States Treasure, and legal tender >for >any debts, public or private, only when presented outside of the United >States, but such currency may be exchanged for equal values of $100 >denomination domestic use currency (or other United States currency) at >financial institutions regulated by United States law and subject to >United States currency transaction reporting and other money laundering >deterrence requirements. > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: Cyphernomicon, and a section on Escrow and Reputations
by dsc＠swcp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I finished my first release, a megabyte-sized file done in MORE, a powerful >outline processor (which enabled me to maintain notes, make >cross-references, and generally manage such a huge writing project). I >released it last year, and put it in my anonymous ftp account at >ftp.netcom.com, in the directory /pub/tc/tcmay, as the file CP-FAQ. Netcom >is often very crowded, though. After several tries I was not able to get this. Has anyone made it available in an alternate location? Dar (list newbie) =========================================================== Dar Scott Home phone: +1 505 299 9497 Dar Scott Consulting Voice: +1 505 299 5790 <--- 8637 Horacio Place NE Email: darscott(a)aol.com Albuquerque, NM 87111 dsc(a)swcp.com Fax: +1 505 898 6525 http://www.swcp.com/~correspo/DSC/DarScott.html My preference for attached files are in this order: AOL, Mime, Binhex4, PGP, UUencode ===========================================================

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Re: Breaking Legal News.... (fwd)
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The American legal system has spun out of control. I don't argue that she >should not have the right to sue...everybody does. But a judge can quickly >dismiss a case on a matter of law. According to the Mercury-News, the suit has been dismissed. <http://www.sjmercury.com/news/breaking/docs/016909.htm> -- Greg Broiles gbroiles(a)c2.net 510-986-8770 x 309 voice ** please note phone number has changed ** 510-986-8777 fax

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Re: A problem with anonymity
by terrell＠sam.neosoft.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>To: TCMAY(a)GOT.NET, CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: A problem with anonymity >From: monty.harder(a)famend.com (MONTY HARDER) > > > But if the escrow agent is anonymous, we simply recurse, moving now to >the question of whether anyone can trust the Anonymous Escrow Agency not >to take the money and run. > >TC> (I mention banks because, when you look at it closely, today's banks can >TC> quite easily claim that a customer made a withdrawal when he didn't. That >TC> they don't says more about the nature of persistent businesses than about >TC> any government oversight or security features. This is a side point, but it >TC> bears keeping in mind that the real world of banks and businesses, etc., is >TC> not fully secure, either. And yet it mostly works pretty well. The reasons >TC> for this are interesting to consider.) > > A bank has $$ invested in impressive-looking buildings, (so that >vanishing into the ether and setting up shop elsewhere is rather >difficult) and several officers whose TrueNames are registered with the >appropriate agencies, so that they may be sued if they pull this >crap. > > While individual stockholders might appreciate the anonymity (and >protection from legal action) of owning stock in a bank or escrow agency >(might just combine the functions, while we're at it), they demand >onymity of the officers with whom they entrust the keys to the >corporation. >Monster(a)FAmend.Com * > > The real secret is that for most banks the individual transaction is << than the total stream of transactions. Defaulting on a single transaction will show a profit that is miniscule compared to the over-all earnings at stake if the bank's credibility is jeopardized. When banks have gotten into trouble it is frequently when they allow one customer or one transaction to represent a significant share of their business. You have a high probability of being able to trust an escrowee with your $1 if you know he intends to collect commissions on holding $1million for others based on his "trusted" representation. Buford C. Terrell 1303 San Jacinto Street Professor of Law Houston, TX 77002 South Texas College of Law voice (713)646-1857 terrell(a)sam.neosoft.com fax (713)646-1766

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my crypto rump session abstract
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(the one that david sternlight misinterpreted to mean that we had proven that clipper has no back doors): M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, F.T. Leighton, "Master Key Cryptosystems", Crypto '95 "rump session" abstract, August 1995. Available as: ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/mkcs.ps -matt

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