December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Frothing remailers - an immodest proposal
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:55 PM 01/31/95, Robert Rothenberg wrote: >Without quoting the entire message, I think I better solution, in terms of >ease to implement as well as conserving bandwidth would be to have a >sophisticated remailer script-language. Yeah, this is really an excellent idea, that I don't see happening any time soon. Although of course if anyone wants to write code for such a beast, that would be really excellent. If someone gets around to writing it, it'll happen, but it would be a fairly big project, so I wouldn't hold my break. Safe TCL, anyone?

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Re: Z-Mail
by Chris Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would be interested also. How about cc this list... > Can someone please email me with details about obtaining and > configuring Z-Mail for use with PGP? > Thanks, > John > >John L. Tocher THE CITY-a bounded infinity. A labyrinth where >JLTocher(a)ccgate.HAC.com you are never lost. Your private map where every >PGP: CE 72 1A 11 07 47 35 block bears exactly the same number. Even if you >35 9A C1 DE EA 64 21 BC 94 lose your way, you cannot go wrong. --Kobo Abe > > > > > ... __o .. -\<, Chris.Claborne(a)SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome!

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CD-ROM [brief addition]
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I forgot to mention that the CD-ROM in development will be export restricted. It isn't going to be sold outside the united states and canada. -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-549-1383 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Re: Frothing remailers - an immodest proposal
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <9501312152.AA10208(a)toad.com>, <kevin(a)elvis.wicat.com> wrote: >It seems to me that the current remailer web suffers a fundamental flaw. >It is simply too static. Agreed, of course. I also don't really want to quote your entire article but want to throw some points into the discussion. In general, I think you've got a good approach but might be a little too tied to instant-gratification use of IP. I touched on some of this a while ago, in the thread "Broadcast and the rendezvous problem," and have thought about it a bit more after getting others' comments: 1. Broadcasting every couple of minutes isn't necessary and is undesirable due to the real limitations of the Internet. A remailer could broadcast its location with a time-out on the location without a constant stream of availability announcements. In your position for example, you'd broadcast a message at 5 pm with a 16 hour valid time. 2. This is actually unnecessary for your situation: All you need to do is advertise your location as a "real" remailer and then have a cron job that kill sendmail at 5pm on your remailer machine (assuming you have a spare machine that doesn't need to run sendmail). The mail network is flexible enough that things will Just Work. Mail won't go through instantly during the day, of course, but that just helps to muddy up the mix. 3. Broadcasting over live IP isn't all that great a model. Ideally, you'll use a mechanism that doesn't require instant communication among hosts. I favor USENET for this: messages have a naturally long life- time and the network is self-adjusting. If a direct route is temporarily unavailable, an indirect one will often manifest itself. I also favor using USENET store-and-forward for the messages themselves for the same reasons: traffic analysis is impossible inside the web and direct routes are not necessary. 4. Using a PGP-style web-of-trust is important. In the ideal situation, one human in an extended web can certify individual remailers and all other remailers close enough on the same web of trust would pick up the message immediately. Just some thoughts, - - -- Todd Masco | "life without caution/ the only worth living / love for a man/ cactus(a)hks.net | love for a woman/ love for the facts/ protectless" - A Rich Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLy6+ThNhgovrPB7dAQHoDQP/UDn2GV7Jq8C3nQyN9IhvGMUTGnBjcL+k zCPgTOLjANMrMN791VdeoNs9rR3QKFdFR9y0p39lka0p+9n1I3hDuEKyAX8Cicub h0/eyr54bEzC6Q2L06VlIzDac9K7kILUkIf2ypgeXTrFuMSZITy+z0ugDeq3NA7B W+gkl82hJZk= =69b2 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLy73lyoZzwIn1bdtAQG/8wGA1kS3RyqBsxOZgniuxZqGySeybSJQuVp4 3zsxH545MqhBXmh16Gh4LvBlkre+9JYT =Evbh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Z-Mail by Web
by jltocher＠earthlink.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Can someone please email me with details about obtaining and >> configuring Z-Mail for use with PGP? >> Thanks, >> John >> >I would be interested also. How about cc this list... ... __o > .. -\<, >Chris.Claborne(a)SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/(*). Z-Mail info available at: ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/be/berliner/readme.html http://www.kaiwan.com/~mckinnon/readme.html I called the company to get a demo key (unlocks the software for a trial period of 30 days), and inquired of the price. It's $165 for a single user license... ouch! I'll check it out, but can anybody suggest alternative windoze/PPP/PGP interfaces? John - John Tocher THE CITY-a bounded infinity. A labyrinth where JLTocher(a)Earthlink.net you are never lost. Your private map where every PGP: CE 72 1A 11 07 47 35 block bears exactly the same number. Even if you 35 9A C1 DE EA 64 21 BC 94 lose your way, you cannot go wrong. --Kobo Abe

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remailers and multiple recipients
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can the remailers handle multiple recipients? If I list several addresses in the "Request-Remailing-To:" line, seperated by commas, will the remailer do what I would think, and send off to all of them? Anyone who knows the answer (either from experience, or because they run a remailer, or wrote the software), please tell me. I've been trying experimentally, unsuccesfully so far, but I'm not sure if that's just because I'm using the wrong syntax, or the wrong remailers.

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VoicePGP cracked in 10 minutes?...
by root 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I heard a rumor hear in Ctl. Tx. that the VoicePGP project was cracked in the last couple of days in approx. 10 minutes. Anyone have any info on this other than one of those wild rumors that occur? Thanks and take care.

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Re: remailers and multiple recipients
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: jrochkin(a)cs.oberlin.edu (Jonathan Rochkind) > Can the remailers handle multiple recipients? If I list several addresses > in the "Request-Remailing-To:" line, seperated by commas, will the remailer > do what I would think, and send off to all of them? We had some concerns here a while back that someone was trying to exploit such a feature to create an exponentially-growing message that would totally overload the remailers. A message of the form: :: Request-Remailing-To: <list of remailers here> :: Request-Remailing-To: <list of remailers here> <repeat about 20 times> was sent. If all remailers had observed and honored the multiple requests, there would have been uncounted trillions of messages flying about. So I would caution anyone considering implementing this feature. Hal

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Re: CD-ROM [brief addition]
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I forgot to mention that the CD-ROM in development will be > export restricted. It isn't going to be sold outside the united states > and canada. :-(

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Re: Frothing remailers - an immodest proposal
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have some concerns about Kevin's frothing remailers. Like so many of the proposals we see to put more responsibility into the remailer net, this opens vulnerability to a single bad remailer. If I trust the first remailer in the net to choose my path for me, as I might be tempted to do with a froth, then if that remailer is corrupt my anonymity is lost. With user-supplied chaining I am secure unless all of the remailers on the chain are corrupt. I also do not like the kind of close-knit, cozy cooperation among the guild of remailer operators which seems to be envisioned in this and similar proposals. Do you like the idea of messages on the remailer operators list saying, I am getting objectionable messages from your remailer, would you mind dropping in a log so we can see who is sending these messages which violate the Politically Correct Speech Act? I do like Kevin's ideas about a dynamic remailer net, but I think another approach would put more smarts into the client program used by the originator. Granted, his information will be somewhat more out of date as the message makes its way through the network. But depending on thie time scale at which the froth, um, froths, this should still allow a lot more dynamism among the set of remailers. Using either IRC or, as Todd suggested, Usenet to maintain an active remailer list might work. We could also have a distributed set of sites which provide the information by finger like the pinging sites we have now. A few notes about Safe-TCL. I posted some ideas on using this as a basis for remailing some time back. Safe-TCL defines three times at which messages could be activated (scripts in them run). One is on message sending, one on message reading (so it can put up dialog boxes and interact with the recipient in other ways), and the third on receipt, which is when it enters the user's mailbox. The actual safe-tcl implementation does not include support for this third mode, but it would be pretty easy to add. If you had that, messages could come to your machine and activate to do various things that you allow them to do. If you allowed them to send mail as one of those things, this would be a start towards a remailer. What you need then is some way for various messages to interact with each other, so that, for examle, a message could wait until there were a certain number of other messages inside the machine before it sent itself out. You would also want a way for a message to suspend itself until some future event, such as having a certain amount of time passing, or waiting until some message with desired properties arrived. There has been intermittent discussion of similar topics on the safe-tcl mailing list. The motivation there is not supplying remailers, of course; rather there is a desire to have something with similar functionality to the much-ballyhooed Telescript, but less bound by proprietary constraints. Telescript scripts can move through the network and interact with other scripts (at least, they will supposedly be able to, but the exact manner is apparently secret for now). Providing the simple act of motion to mail agent scripts without stamping them with a record of everywhere they have been is really all a remailer would do. (I wonder if Telescript agents have to carry around with them a record of every path they've taken?) Sending a message through a safe-tcl based remail network might be more cumbersome than our current techniques. You might have to precede the message body with a safe-tcl program a few lines to a couple of pages in size depending on the complexity of remailing you want. But again with proper clients this can be hidden from the user. I think emphasis should be on smart mailer clients rather than more cooperation among nodes in the remailer network. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBLy8O8hnMLJtOy9MBAQHMjwIA40ZIvNtOvMN/mWtY4bSN0MYMravR9bNr zhZ519K+g6w5ZsW71c/kM7BFz15BjB9pIcTMjUQv/C8YJNGrdFEzhg== =1okU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Scientology Petition v2.1
by Homer Wilson Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Church of Scientology PETITION Version 2.1 I have undertaken on my own determinism to rewrite the petition according to criticisms that I have received. This version below is short and sweet. Since I have no authority whatsoever from those who wrote the original petition to do this, this is certainly not official. However if enough like it, perhaps we can talk the original petition writers into considering it. I will be posting this to news.admin.misc,alt.current-events.net-abuse,alt.privacy.anon-servers alt.censorship, alt.cyberpunks, and comp.org.eff.talk If you think it is worthwhile, please post it to other groups as well. Homer We the undersigned deplore 1.) The Church of Scientology's recent apparent (unproven) efforts to rmgroup alt.religion.scientology. 2.) The Church of Scientology's recent apparent (unproven) efforts to cancel non copyrighted postings. 3.) The Church of Scientology's overt and apparently covert plans to spam both alt.religion.scientology and the rest of usenet with 'success stories' and testimonials, in order to drown out the 'graffitti' and negative testimony and commentary. 4.) The Church of Scientology's legal efforts to shut off anonymous remailers to alt.religion.scientology and alt.clearing.technology, and their legal threats against the remailer operators for postings, copyrighted or not, coming through them. 5.) The Church of Scientology's legal efforts to clamp down on ANY copyrighted postings or quotations at all, even when clearly Fair Use. 6.) Any open or covert declaration by Church of Scientology Officials against anyone on the internet declaring them to be a Suppressive Person, and any open or covert declaration of anyone on the internet as Fair Game whether or not it is to be called that. We the undersigned eschew any efforts on the part of anyone to render alt.religion.scientology a moderated group. We the undersigned implore the Church of Scientology 1.) To work closely with the Electronic Freedom Frontier to solve what it perceives to be its problems with the internet, and to endeavor to join the internet community as a respected citizen in the forums of two way communication with anyone at any time on any subject. 2.) To help formulate guidelines for, and accept fair use excerption of the works of L. Ron Hubbard for the purpose of non commercial criticism and educational commentary. Homer Wilson Smith United Free Zone Alliance

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Re: How the cypherpunks nearly got me fired (long)
by Michael Sattler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 22:10 1/31/95, David Mandl wrote: [really horrid story about true life at a corporate dinosaur deleted] >I just thought >you might enjoy this little story, and would want to keep it in mind if >you're ever considering employment at Bear-Stearns. Part of my job-interviewing procedure has become grilling a would-be employer (or whoever is asking for a contractor) about their net connections. I've been very pleasantly surprized that most [techie] places are okay on a perspecive employee being interested in the tech grunge of net access, and considering it part of the working environment, a benefit, like gourmet coffee. On the other hand, HP (that god-awful backwards cesspool of bureacracy) had full net connections to the outside world (when I was there, since turned off) but in a pathetic attempt to show due diligence searched our briefcases and backpacks (but not the contents of the laptops, floppies, or tape cartridges therein). Someone's going to have to explain to their legal counsel that taking paper versions out isn't the most efficient way... :-) -----------------------------------------------------------------------+ Michael Sattler <msattler(a)jungle.com> San Francisco, California | Digital Jungle Consulting Services http://www.jungle.com/msattler/ | | And so these men of Indostan/ disputed long and loud/ each in his own | opinion/ exceeding stiff and strong/ though each was partly right/ and | all were in the wrong! - John Godfrey Saxe |

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ESM
by Mark Rogaski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just want to know where I can get a copy of ESM to test on some Linux and Solaris boxes ... Please reply directly, thanx - ----- Doc doc(a)phobos.lib.iup.edu aka Mark Rogaski http://www.lib.iup.edu/~rogaski/ Disclaimer: You would probably be hard-pressed to find ANYONE who agrees with me, much less my university or employer... [finger fllevta(a)oak.grove.iup.edu for PGP Public Key and Geek Code v2.1] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLy877B0c4/pqJauBAQH4HwP+MCfRBEebhvIGxmlCIAUwEjACbYOlkdmd 5NL7+8zZ7wsXOS5/HxUIxtzM55WysA21SMWh0F2e9sabMqwfqM0j0WxdDJWmA5gg oaJlttwHmNpneDcbNBKjKGBivWM2Byibk/1R7usqKjPwYL1qCN1ORvr87G6fNqxX txpt8mts+bo= =cF94 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Minnesota Cypherpunks Get Together and Bull Session
by skaplin＠mirage.skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well folks, I've been on the list over a year and haven't seen a get together for those of us in MN. So being the masochist that I am, I'm going to try to put one together. Granted it won't be nearly as elaborate as those in the Bay area, but it'll be a start. Tentatively: Date: Saturday March 4, 1995 Place: Applebees - Calhoun Village Shopping Center, Minneapolis Time: 5:00pm 'til they throw us out. This may change, depending on how many (or how few) respond. Let me know if you are interested or have suggestions. This also will be a good opportunity for some key signing too. Sam -- ============================================================================== skaplin(a)skypoint.com | Finger skaplin(a)infinity.c2.org for | a listing of crypto related files PGP encrypted mail is accepted and | available on my auto-responder. preferred. | (Yes...the faqs are there!) | Finger skaplin(a)mirage.skypoint.com for | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard PGP public key. | outside a Roman brothel. | Fax Number +1 (612) 928-9771 | An UZI beats five aces every time... ============================================================================== Architecture is the art of how to waste space.

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Surety (authentication)
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to all of you who replied to my request. I have what I needed. Keith

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A proposal....
by Homer Wilson Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 1 Feb 1995, Remailer Operator wrote: > I'll not block addresses based on information supplied here. You forget > that there is no -formal- system, just a loose collection of operators. > There is no single policy, that operators use. Certainly, each operator is responsible for his own site and must act or not act as he sees fit, accepting the full consequences of those decisions. That is as it should be. No one is DEMANDING that anyone block an address, except the complainer's of course. :) However there is no harm in global reporting of spams or abuse, as each operator can choose to act or not act on the data as he will. > > Perhaps there could be a blocking mailing list, and all remailers > > could advertise that list in their headers, and anyone who wants to > > be blocked can send mail to that list and we would all get it. > > Perhaps. But I think it is a matter between the operator of a specific > site and the to be blocked address, not something for the world to know. Well in general I would guess that complainers WANT all reops to know about the complaint, they only complain to the one they got the abuse from, but they figure the abuser will just go to the next remailer and start there. They would prefer a way to contact all reops immediately to stop this sort of thing from happening. Complainer's are often so mad at the abuse that they not only write the remailer operator but also his sysadmin. Rahul for example has gotten at least two things 'on his desk' in the last two days, because of stuff going through my remailer, and that's two two many for me. That doesn't include all the ones he's gotten that he didn't forward to me because it was already handled. Further various and sundry turkeys are going to be complaining both to ME and possibly to Rahul for the next month about the Valentine's spam, as late readers come up to it in their news. I am STILL getting complaints and the guy was hung out to dry 10 hours ago. The complainer almost always wants ALL remail to that address stopped, and he certainly doesn't want to have to send repeated messages to various remailers as the abuser keeps jumping around. That would infuriate me no end if I were a postmaster. I would suggest that those of us who are interested, provide such a common list for complainers, it would make them feel one hell of a lot better about remailers, and keep the borderline cases on the side of free speech. A lot of people would like to see remailers shut down, but for many of them its mainly because remailers make them feel hysterical when things go out of control. THEY DON'T KNOW WHERE TO GO TO BRING THINGS BACK INTO CONTROL, AND THEY ARE NOT SURE THEY WILL BE PAID ATTENTION TOO. This leads to cc's to sysadmins and things, which I for one find INTOLERABLE. If we can bring a sense of immediate (even if partial) response and control to the remailer network, then this hysteria may subside a bit. I would distinguish between two kinds of abuse. Individual abuse, and spams. On the individual abuse I would agree that personal data should probably be kept confidential. Certainly one does not give away the complainee to the complainer so of course one does not post the complainee's name here or elsewhere. I have taken to posting the letters that I write them however, to show newbies possible ways of dealing with these things. However I see nothing wrong with posting the complainer's name. Some complainer's might object, but I think they understand the need to widely distribute, at least to the reop's, their address so that we can all effectively block them IF WE CHOOSE. In any case, such individual abuse is usually from one person to another, and its easy to block the TO: line without revealing the From: line, so there is no need to post the complainee's name. In the case of spams, its different. Spammers usually spam from one address (forged or not), but post to many sites. Blocking the To: line is impossible, but the From: line is easy. In this case I am for posting the From: line, not only here but as far and wide as possible. If I am wrong, I am sure you will let me know. I propose a mailing list, public or not, which those of you who wish to can subscribe, and which we advertise in the headers of all outgoing mail, saying that complaints should be sent to the mailing list. That way we all get to see spammers and complainers at once, making for much more effective action. This reduces the wear and tear on the postmasters, who surely do not deserve the brunt of the abuse. Like the Credit Card reporting agencies, one call is all it takes to report all your cards gone, one mail is all it takes to inform all operators of a spam or abuse. I am not suggesting that all reops join this list, or act on the data posted to it if they do, or advertise the list in their headers. I propose that THOSE OF US WHO WANT TO DO THIS, do it. Sort of a loose coalition or alliance amongst reops to show solidarity and personal responsibility towards the net. I KNOW people would appreciate it. How say any of you? Homer P.S. groupname(a)bull.com went down after the Valentine spam. Not very nice. I have already gotten warm mail commending US on how fast we nuked the guy. I say have no mercy for spammers. Homer

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Re: CD-ROM [brief addition]
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199502010224.SAA24809(a)infinity.c2.org> sameer stated: : I forgot to mention that the CD-ROM in development will be : export restricted. It isn't going to be sold outside the united states : and canada. Why not produce it outside the US and import it ? Regards, -- Alex de Joode usura(a)replay.com Hate mail appreciated, http://www.xs4all.nl/~usura weekly contest for best death threat.

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PGP Question
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there any simple way to glue a binary file and its detached pgp signature together into a single pgp file (as produced by non-detached signing) ? thanks Hadmut

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Re: CD-ROM [brief addition]
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Why not produce it outside the US and import it ? :-)

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your membership renewal letter
by ssteele＠eff.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

February 1, 1995 Dear David, We received your response to our membership renewal reminder and would like to thank you for taking the time to actually write a letter explaining why you have chosen not to renew. We are sorry that you are unhappy with the role EFF played in the Digital Telephony negotiations. We were not totally comfortable our role, but we do believe we did the right thing and that there would be a much more intrusive bill if EFF had done nothing. However, I'm sure that you've heard the arguments by now, and I'm not writing to change your mind about our role in Digital Telephony but, instead, to let you know about a lawsuit we're about to file against the State Department and others claiming the ITAR listing of encryption as a munition is unconstitutional. Our plaintiff wanted to post an encryption algorithm he developed to sci.crypt. The State Department informed him that he would need an export license before he could post the algorithm on the Net and then told him that he would be denied the license because the algorithm was too strong. We see this as a critical First Amendment challenge to a regulation that undermines secure communications on the networks. The suit should be filed before the end of the month. We don't expect to please all of the people all of the time, and it is clear that we didn't please you with Digital Telephony. But we really are trying to make Cyberspace a better place to be, and we hope you'll reconsider your decision regarding your renewal. You can earmark your contribution to be applied only to litigation or some other particular function, if that would make you feel more comfortable. Take care. Sincerely, Shari ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shari Steele, Director of Legal Services ssteele(a)eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation 202/861-7700 (voice) 1667 K Street, N.W., Suite 801 202/861-1258 (fax) Washington, DC 20006-1605 202/861-1224 (BBS)

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Mystery files in the incoming/ directory
by Eric Hughes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm doing some archive maintenance at long last. Be warned, you can't upload right now because of some mystery configuration error that I can't fix myself. What I'm asking about are some files that were not uploaded with descriptions. I'll delete them in a week or so if I haven't got mail indicating what they are. This list is at the bottom of this message. (Yes, some of them are quite old.) Note that the archive maintainers have their own address now (see header). Please use it for all archive maintenance mail. And please read README.UPLOAD if you're going to upload in the future. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -rw-rw-r-- 1 hughes remailer 119940 May 16 1994 contrib.zip -rw-rw-r-- 1 hughes remailer 16360 Jun 23 1994 cpremailer.tar.gz -rw-rw-r-- 1 hughes remailer 68968 Dec 16 09:07 dc-irc.alpha.tar.gz -rw-rw-r-- 1 hughes remailer 14946 Dec 1 15:29 mkpgp.txt.uu.gz -rw-rw-r-- 1 hughes remailer 75424 May 16 1994 pgp10.zip -rw-rw-r-- 1 hughes remailer 233854 Jul 16 1994 pgpw26.zip -rw-rw-r-- 1 hughes remailer 58033 May 7 1994 pwf11.zip -rw-rw-r-- 1 hughes remailer 2913 Dec 1 15:27 signtools.tgz

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Re: "bad" government
by alt＠iquest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> If strong government resulted in liberty and freedom, then the >> most intrusive, all-encompassing governments would result in >> its citizens having the most liberty. Is this the case? I would >> look at the (former) Soviet Union, Iran, Cuba, East Germany, etc., >> for your answer. >Unrestricted individual freedom leads to unrestricted freedom of >`private' corporations. Private corporations uncurbed by society's law are >autarkies: internally totalitarian, externally predatory, as amoral as >amoebas. > >Is this the shape of the future you seek? 'Tis better to err on the side of liberty. To suggest otherwise would indicate that the origin and true meaning of "rights" or "liberty" is not understood. You can NOT restrict someone's rights simply because they MIGHT harm another (prior restraint). If they do cause actual harm to someone, they should be brought to justice. To place restrictions on someone based on the possibility that may may cause harm introduces restrictions based solely on the authorities' opinions (political philosophy, religion, race, etc). That that the shape of the future YOU seek? ************************************************************ * Just your basic signature block * * * * Al Thompson * * Fidonet 1:231/110 * * alt(a)iquest.net * ************************************************************

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What's with anon.penet.fi??
by Robert Rothenburg Walking-Owl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject says it. Every message I post to the list gets a reply saying that I am abusing the remailer by posting chain letters etc. All replies to admin(a)anon.penet.fi are also getting bounced back too.

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Fundamental Question?
by Anthony Ortenzi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Although I understand the need for remailers for anonymity, is it not true that the whole idea of encryption (good encryption, that is) is that no matter who gets the encrypted text, it really doesn't matter? Does this not mean that something like USENET is *perfect* for this? -Anthony

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Re: Remailer Unreliability
by jordyn＠alinc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Date: Thu, 2 Feb 95 18:00 EST >> From: nobody(a)myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu (Anonymous) >> >> What if it was possible to specify an alternate remailer? In the case that >> a remailer went down, you could specify an alternate. For example: > > Well, *I* think it is a good idea. But how does remailer1 know that >remailer2 is both a remailer and down? The issue of whether or not the alternate address is a remailer seems to be largely irrelevant. It doesn't really hurt anyone to be able to specify an alternate address, and the feature would even seem to have some practical value as you could specify alternate addresses for an end-recipient if you suspect an address might be unreliable. As long as the alternate address is only invoked if the first mail delivery fails, the problem of the exponentially-growing message is avoided as well. Jordyn ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jordyn A. Buchanan Environmental Studies (B.U.S.) jordyn(a)alinc.com University of Utah -- '95 (hope) PGP Public Key: 0xADEEC1 ED 3D 36 5A 98 CE 9D B4 4B 37 0B 9B B5 D6 F3 4B

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