December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Use of the IV in DES & stuffing the first block w/ random stuff
by Josh M. Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have recently started writing a small pair of encription and decription programs. I was planning of gennerating the key by taking the MD5 of the text password supplied by the user. Seeing that I have 64 bits left over (MD5 gives me 128 bits, single DES needs 56, tripple DES needs 168 - so I have a bit over 64 bits left in both cases), is there anything useful that I could do with them? Does setting the IV (normally left at zero) buy me anything? Does craming it into the first data block help protect me from known plaintext attacks? (I was going to use CBC so unless they know the first block they can't use a known plaintext attack, right?) Or am I better off putting the extra 64 bits of "key" into the IV, and gennerating a strong random number to stuff in the first block - since the decoder can just ignore that block anyway. (or should I ignore the IV, and stuffing random crud in the first block?) I don't recall Applyed Crypto. addressing these issues, but if I just managed to forget can someone remind me what chapter I need to re-read?

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The Spotlight
by The Gate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry, just a brief correction to the original file > From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Phone Card Risks > > One of the plethora of TV Magazine shows featured Tim McViegh and phone > cards last week. Maybe I should post to Risks. > > According to the story, Tim McViegh bought a bunch of phone cards from "The > Spotlight" (famous Klan paper) The Spotlight is more of a rogue faction CIA/FBI Constitutionalist paper than a Klan paper, by my reckoning. Sources available on request.

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Free Life article
by Sean Gabb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The article below, about money laundering, is taken from the latest issue of Free Life, the journal that I edit. If you like it and want to read more, send a $5 dollar bill to the Editorial address at the bottom of this text. If you want to read lots more, send me $20 for a four issue subscription. Comments always welcome! Sean Gabb Editor Free Life London 25th July 1995 A R T I C L E B E G I N S ===================================================================== International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering William C. Gilmore (ed.) Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge, 1992, 335pp, 48 (pbk) (ISBN 0 521 46305 X) Money Laundering: A Practical Guide to the New Legislation Rowan Bosworth-Davies and Graham Saltmarsh Chapman & Hall, London, 1994, xii and 304pp, 49.50 (hbk) (ISBN 0 412 57530 2) The first of these books is a collection of treaties, plus other documents, concerned with the international fight against money laundering. The second explains how these treaties have been enacted into, and are enforced under, the laws of the United Kingdom. Both works will repay the closest study. In clear detail, they show the growth of what must be called a New World Order, and how, without some interposing cause, this may produce a universal slide into despotism. The fight against money laundering begins with realising that the "War on Drugs" has been lost. When goods are portable and easily concealed, and when demand for them is strong enough to bear almost any cost of bringing them to market, the main effect of prohibition will be to put a bounty on crime. For all the efforts of the past three generations, illegal drugs are available in most high security prisons. In much of the West, street prices have been stable or even falling since 1980. The official response, however, has not been to give in and legalise the trade, but to expand the War to a front where previously there had been few hostilities. While keeping up their efforts against the trade itself, the authorities have turned increasingly to confiscating its proceeds. This new approach has three alleged benefits: First, it will deprive criminals of their incentive to enter and remain in the trade; Second, it will allow the punishing of those in charge of the trade - people who never touch or see illegal drugs, but to whom the main profits ultimately flow; Third, it can make the War on Drugs self-supporting, and perhaps yield a surplus for other public spending. There is, however, one practical difficulty. Before the authorities can confiscate the money, they must find it. To do this, they must keep it from being merged beyond recall into the general flow of investment. This involves ending bank secrecy and imposing a mass of financial regulation. Now, most people - especially the rich - dislike having their lives pried into. Nor do banks like higher costs and limitations on what business they can do. And so, given the present freedom of capital markets, no government acting alone can afford a strict policy of confiscation. It would, sooner or later, cause a flight of transactions to more liberal places. The solution has been to try making everywhere in the world equally illiberal. Such was the purpose of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Narcotic Substances, signed in Vienna in December 1988 [full text in Gilmore, pp.75-97]. This is one of the most important international treaties of the past 50 years. It not merely requires its signatory states to criminalise the laundering of drug money, and to confiscate it where found, but lays down so far as possible a common wording for the criminal statutes, and a common mode of enforcement. It also requires full and prompt cooperation between the signatory states for the enforcement of these laws anywhere in the world. The Convention had little direct or immediate effect on British law. Many of its requirements, indeed, had already been met in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. Most others were only met in the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which enacts the European Community Directive of 1991 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering [full text in Gilmore, pp.250-67]. This itself derives from the Vienna Convention only through the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 1990 [full text in Gilmore, pp.177-91]. Even so, this country is fast becoming a financial police state of the kind agreed at Vienna - and where the process cannot be traced to the Convention, it can be traced to the same international pressures of which the Convention is itself a result. Let me explain. When I talk about a New World Order, I do not mean some grand conspiracy of bankers, or Jews, or Illuminati, or even - with far more probability - the American Government. There are countries where policy is largely dictated from outside. But for rich and powerful countries, the truth is more complex. Most international obligations imposed on this country, for example, were not only consented to by our rulers, but were usually proposed by them, and are enforced by agencies in which our own countrymen often occupy senior positions. Where others see conspiracies, I see public choice economics. Whenever a government tries to do something dangerous or unnecessary, like banning drugs or educating the poor, it must set up an agency through which to spend the allocated funds. Once employed, the agents will - as if directed by an invisible hand - start to find more and more justifications for expanding their status and numbers. They collect the statistics. They know which ones to publish and which to hold back. They are the politicians' first and favoured source of advice. They have their pet journalists. They trade favours with the relevant interest groups. They know exactly how to give themselves a pleasing life, and how to see off threats to it. Unless the money runs out, or the public turns really nasty, they can write their own budget cheques. By natural extension, the same is now happening at the international level - though with potentially far worse consequences. In the first place, there is limitless money: budgets would need to swell unimaginably large to reach even one per cent of gross planetary product. In the second, public anger seldom crosses borders; and, if all else fails, the politicians and bureaucrats in one country can shelter behind the excuse of treaty obligations that cannot be unilaterally be cast off - not, at least, without consequences more horrible than words exist to describe. Third, the enforcement of international treaties means the growth of what is in effect an international bureaucracy. The local enforcers of a treaty may be citizens of the signatory states, who will live and work in their home countries, and may even occupy positions in the domestic administration. Yet these are people who, by virtue of the agreements they enforce, and the contacts they make and maintain in other countries, are members of an international order. And, in at least the case of money laundering, they will share an agenda that is often deeply hostile to their native institutions. This can be seen - expressed with almost naive honesty - in the book by Messrs Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh. Both are British police officers: the latter is a departmental head at the National Criminal Intelligence Service. Both take it for granted that the world needs an international police force. Both are unable to believe that anyone can disinterestedly object to the necessary harmonisations of law, and the corresponding abolition of Common Law protections. They "know one senior clearing banker who has described this [money laundering] legislation as the nearest thing he has experienced to 'McCarthyism'...".[p.172] Of course, they see things differently. The legislation discloses, on mature reflection, a set of carefully structured laws which, with good will, due diligence and a modicum of responsible attention from the industry as a whole, should not prove too burdensome. Indeed, the authors believe that some of the regulatory requirements have been diluted too much already, in a misguided attempt to placate the sensibilities of certain sectors of the industry....[Ibid.] With people like this advising the politicians and lecturing the rest of us, little wonder the Drug Trafficking Offences Act predates the Vienna Convention by two years! Though they will hotly disagree - and even perhaps consider a libel writ - Messrs Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh cannot be regarded as our countrymen. More at home in a gathering of Bulgarian or Filipino police chiefs than with any of us, they are foreigners with British passports. Somewhat less honest, though still interesting, is the Explanatory Report of the Committee of Experts who drafted the Council of Europe Convention [full text in Gilmore, pp.192-237]. Though formally subordinate to a committee of the various European Ministers of Justice, these experts plainly saw their first duty as lying elsewhere. Call it "the international community" or their own order, their duty was collective and not to any single country. Look at their dislike of the narrow focus of the Vienna Convention. They wanted something that would also allow confiscation for terrorist offences, organised crime, violent crimes, offences involving the sexual exploitation of children and young persons, extortion, kidnapping, environmental offences, economic fraud, insider trading and other serious offences. [Gilmore, p.204] But they had to concede that not every European country might like its own laws against these acts to be written by an international committee. And so they allowed each signatory state to reserve whatever of these acts to its own legislative process. The experts agreed, however, that such states should review their legislation periodically and expand the applicability of confiscation measures, in order to be able to restrict the reservations subsequently as much as possible. [Ibid.] And this is only the beginning. As yet, the shape of world government exists barely in outline. But the tendency ought to be plain. Power is moving from national - and mostly democratic - governments to unaccountable and even invisible bureaucracies. Liberal institutions that are often the work of ages are being hammered into the transmitters of unlimited power. We are beginning to known how people in the Greek city states felt after absorption into the Roman Empire. When the American militiamen cry out that the United Nations is about to invade in black helicopters and plant microcomputers in their bottoms, I am at least sceptical. This is not the New World Order that I see. What I do see is actually worse. We can shoot the helicopters down, and dig out the microcomputers, and put the ringleaders on trial. We can go about playing the hero of our choice from Star Wars. But in the real world, there is no Death Star to blow up - no Darth Vadar to push into the void. There is just a huge, elastic network of people, all acting in what they believe is the public good, most with some degree of public support. How this kind of despotism can be resisted is another question, and I have said enough already. But I will repeat - the books here reviewed do repay a very close study. At the very least, it is useful to see the enemy's future plan laid out in such detail. Sean Gabb ====================================================================== $$$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$$ $$$$$$ $$ $$ $$$$$$ $$$$$$ $$ $$ $ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$$$ $$$ $$$$ $$$$ $$ $$ $$$$ $$$$ $$ $$ $ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $$ $ $$$$$$ $$$$$$ $$$$$$ $$ $$ $$$$$$ A Journal of Classical Liberal and Libertarian Thought Production: Editorial: c/o the Libertarian Alliance 123a Victoria Way 25 Chapter Chambers Charlton London SW1P 4NN London SE7 7NX Tel: **181 858 0841 Fax: **171 834 2031 E-mail: cea01sig(a)gold.ac.uk EDITOR OF FREE LIFE: SEAN GABB ______________________________________________________________________ How to subscribe: Send cheque for GBP10 or US$20 made out to the Libertarian Alliance. ====================================================================== FOR LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY ======================================================================

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PCryptoids
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of cryptoids from PC Mag, 9-12-95: [Review excerpts] *Network Security, Private Communication in a Public World*, review by O. Ryan Tabibian The book is grouped into three parts: "Cryptography,' "Authentication," and "Electronic Mail." There is also a "Leftover" section, which covers security with popular network operating systems such as Microsoft Windows NT and NetWare. Most books fail to cover the difficult subject of cryptography effectively. *Network Security*, however, clearly describes the different cryptography methods -- such as secret key, hashing, and public-key cryptography -- as well as a variety of other technologies, including Diffie-Hellman and RSA. The second section, "Authentication," deals with how a system or persons you are communicating with can verify your identity. Verification schemes range from simple passwords to complex digital signatures. The authors do a remarkable job of describing and analyzing the variety of authentication methods. Since the majority of your access to the outside world is through e-mail, your messages are probably most vulnerable. The book covers some of the popular e-mail security schemes, such as public key and privacyenhanced mail. A brief overview of X.400 is also included. Overall this is perhaps the most comprehensive, yet easiest-to-understand book covering network security available. Network Security, Private Communication in a Public World, by Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman, and Mike Speciner, $46.00. Prentice Hall PTR, 800-947- 7700; ISBN: 0-13-061466-1. ----------- [Then, Bill Machrone muses on the utility of an electronic business cards. Excerpts:] Some of my correspondents want a magnetic stripe on the business card, pretty much like the one on your credit cards. Others want a bar code. Assuming that you don't use the back of your card for an alternative language, you've got several square inches back there, plenty of room for data. What will we use it for? The database stuff is the easy and obvious part. Since the computer industry and IS departments are likely to be the earliest adopters, it would be a simple matter to standardize on a format that the reader spits out for easy importation into just about anything. If the software and I/O devices are cheap enough, the rest of the world will come along -- and benefit. Authentication is a potentially huge application. In some South American countries, fraudulent representation is common. Crooks collect business cards from legitimate businesspeople and then misrepresent themselves to perpetrate a variety of scams. As a result, businesspeople commonly tear a corner of their card as they hand it to you. You don't trust a card that wasn't torn in front of you. A more elegant solution lies in a new Kodak technology that can encode your likeness in as little as 500 bytes, readable by your PDA, notebook, or desktop machines. You could also include a machine-readable version of your public encryption key, making it easy for people to send you secure communications. ----------

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Smalltalk Musings
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a few musings on Smalltalk and its possible role in themes of interest to many of us. First, a comment on the "mailer" I tried last night: At 2:24 PM 8/15/95, Mats Bergstrom wrote: >> The manufacturer is apparently acting as the collection point, and any name >> can be put into the From: field. > >Then, effectively, Quasar is a new(?) kind of remailer. >There was no got.net in the headers I could see. The >next question is how they log incoming agents. I discovered that the "-- Tim May" added to the end was by them, not me. Just coincidence that I usually add "--Tim May" or "-- Tim May" before my automatic sig block. This was an experimental mailer included--"for educational purposes"--in the latest Developer's Release of SmalltalkAgents. It has a few specific things hardwired into it, such as using qks.com as its SMTP server. Not a very effective remailer, as nothing cryptographically strong is included. However, it shows that more and more languages and environments are "speaking TCP/IP" and that integration of this stuff into high level language environments is here. Java and HotJava do similar things, perhaps even more powerfully. And obviously Unix/Linux tools are the standard here. A few words on Smalltalk, an old language that is gaining in popularity. (Smalltalk is doing pretty well for large projects. Several banks and trading firms have aggressive Smalltalk programs, preferring it to C++ for large, object-oriented projects. The company behind NetBank and NetCash, SoftwareAgents, is using SmalltalkAgents. The leader in Smalltalk is of course ParcPlace, which recently merged with Digitalk. Lots of info is available on Smalltalk on the Web.) The richness of Smalltalk lies in the extensive class libraries. Everything is an object, no exceptions. (My personal interest--my asbestos suit is now on--is in looking at economic exchanges and finding the classes and methods, sort of "the ontology of money," and working on implementing them.) A few words of history. Most of you know that the current "graphical user interface" (GUI) of the Macintosh and (more recently) Windows and X, etc., goes back to two main sources: the Xerox work by Aland Kay, Dan Ingalls, and others on Smalltalk and the Xerox and MIT work on Lisp Machines. The machines from Xerox Parc in the late 70s had the features we now think of as central: bit-mapped screen, windows, menus, pop-up dialogs, mouse and movable cursor, variable fonts, etc. (And the Xerox Parc folks were of course influenced by the work of others, including Doug Engelbart at Stanford Research Institute and the object-oriented language Simula.) I'm not advocating that anyone use Smalltalk. Use what feels right, or what your companies and groups expect. C++ is without doubt the most popular. But diversity is good, so Python, Java, C+@, TCL, Lisp, Smalltalk, Perl, Eiffel, Scheme, and even REXX all have roles to play, especially in specfic situations. If Tim Berners-Lee and Marc Andreessen had dropped "hypertext" when it was "dead and buried," where would we be today? More info on SmalltalkAgents and their other products can be found at http://www.qks.com/ . The Macintosh version is currently their only supported platform, with a Windows NT (maybe Win '95, but doubtful) version due later this year, and various Unix versions due after that. They have some advances over ParcPlace's VisualWorks, but their longterm success is not assured. Nor is my longterm success assured. :-} -TCM ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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VIACRYPT =money for Phil Z ???
by kutek＠ios.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know if PKZ get's any royalties from the sale of Viacrypt- it is after all his code, isn't it?.Or is the Viacrypt source entirely different ? Speaking of which code, has Viacrypt been "verified" in any way by some independent agency?

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Re: My pseudo-anonymous dream list (fwd)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:26 PM 8/15/95 GMT0BST, Kev wrote: >> I've heard this criticism of PGP before, but I don't quite understand it. >> PGP is free. Why not just upgrade to version 2.6? > >Easy to say not so easy to do if your outside the USA/Canada. Quite easily done. ftp.ox.ac.uk has a good collection of PGP versions. (Oh, no! Somehow these crafty foreigners managed to smuggle munitions out of the country right under the nose of our intelligence services! :-) PGP 2.6.i was written to be a 2.6-compatible version for non-US use, or you can use the 2.6.2 source code with RSAEuro instead of RSAREF and not violate your government's copyright rules. The reason PGP 2.6 is incompatible with 2.4 and earlier versions is that it let MIT make PKP happier about letting them use RSAREF, which gave them patent-legitimacy in the US. (Incompatibilities between earlier versions could be blamed on gratuituous attempts at standards-compatibility...) >However my point may be underlined by a little example :- [Example deleted.] Also, the code has been set up so that new versions can read files written by old versions, and can write files in old-format when needed; I assume the developers will continue this approach any time they make incompatible changes. But the big differences in 3.0 will be libraryizing the code - one effect is that people will be able to build their own PGP-based tools more easily than before, but aren't forced to include the whole package, so people may end up building incompatible parts using the libraries. Some of this is unavoidable - e.g. an encrypted telnet won't talk to a batch file encryptor, but they should still be using the same signature code for session-keys (or DH-halfkeys). #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- Storyteller makes no choice - soon you will not hear his voice. His job was to shed light, and not to master. RIP, Jerry

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Re: VIACRYPT
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:47 AM 8/15/95 -0400, No Name wrote: >Does anyone know if PKZ get's any royalties from the sale of Viacrypt- >it is after all his code, isn't it?. Or is the Viacrypt source entirely >different ? >Speaking of which code, has Viacrypt been "verified" in any way by >some independent agency? The RSA code in ViaCrypt 2.4 is different from the PGP code; most of the rest is the same. The documentation includes a note from Phil, and I think the code is signed by him. You can trust it. As far as money goes, I don't know their financial arrangements. My copy has a pretty low serial number; I hope they've sold enough to make some bucks. The Windows version of 2.7.1 is substantially different - it's got a GUI interface, with a shell-like piece underneath that looks more like vanilla PGP. The Preface says it's using ViaCrypt's DigiSig+ RSA implementation, the IDEA implementation is licensed from Ascom-Tech AG, the compression code is from Info-Zip bt Mark Adler and Jean-loup Gailly, and they've licensed Phil Zimmermann's PGP(tm) for the remainder. They also acknowledge that lots of people contributed, including Branko Lankester and Peter Gutmann. The code is signed by ViaCrypt, and their key is signed by Phil. The documentation is substantially rewritten, mostly for the GUI part. The examples are somewhat amusing (removing a signature from a key for Bill Haydon <bill(a)5thfloor.circus.com> ....) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- Storyteller makes no choice - soon you will not hear his voice. His job was to shed light, and not to master. RIP, Jerry

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Re: Use of the IV in DES & stuffing the first block w/ random stuff
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:52 AM 8/15/95 -0400, you wrote: >I have recently started writing a small pair of encription and >decription programs. I was planning of gennerating the key by >taking the MD5 of the text password supplied by the user. A reasonable approach, but be careful in your implementation. I haven't seen the book "A Million Wimpy Passwords and their MD5s" yet, but the CD-ROM version may be out soon :-) And you can probably ftp it from dockmaster. >Seeing that I have 64 bits left over (MD5 gives me 128 bits, single >DES needs 56, tripple DES needs 168 - so I have a bit over 64 bits >left in both cases), is there anything useful that I could do with them? > >Does setting the IV (normally left at zero) buy me anything? IVs are designed to let you put random stuff in them to discourage known-plaintext attacks, replay attacks, etc. However, suppose you take a known 64 bits from MD5(password) and put them in the IV - instead of the Bad Guy needing to brute-force 168-bit-deep Triple DES, he gets to brute force MD5s of human-selected passwords instead, which makes a lot of pre-computation possible. Also, for 3-Key Triple-DES, how do you get 168 bits of key from 128bits of MD5? (for 2-Key 3-DES, you only need 112 bits...) If you do something like M1=MD5(Key), M2=MD5(M1,Key), realize you've got at most 128 bits of real key instead of 168, though that probably needn't worry you too much... >Does cramming it into the first data block help protect me from >known plaintext attacks? (I was going to use CBC so unless they >know the first block they can't use a known plaintext attack, right?) Won't hurt, as long as you remember to remove it on the decrypt-end. >Or am I better off putting the extra 64 bits of "key" into the IV, >and generating a strong random number to stuff in the first block >- since the decoder can just ignore that block anyway. Put the strong random number in the IV, if you've _got_ a source of strong random numbers... You might want to do something fancy like choose a random salt, use the salt for the IV, and use MD5(salt,human-selected-key) for the key. This makes pre-computation much less useful (unless you're careless and use MD5(key,salt) instead if MD5(salt,key)...), and means that you use a different session key for each batch of stuff you encrypt, even though you're using the same key. If you're paranoid about replay attacks, you could let some of the bits of the salt be random and some be a counter, and never accept a key smaller than the one from the previous successfully-decrypted message. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- Storyteller makes no choice - soon you will not hear his voice. His job was to shed light, and not to master. RIP, Jerry

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RC4 key search report
by Philip R. Moyer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are there any technical reports available describing the RC4 key search efforts? I am interested specifically in number of machines (compute power) and time to completion. Cheers, Phil

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Re: CoS Raid on "Copyright Terrorist"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:17 PM 8/15/95 CDT, Mike McNally wrote: >Mailboxes Etc. insists on getting a picture ID; at least they did last >time I checked. Some smaller mom&pop places will take a business card >(time to break out your Jim Rockford Business Card Fabrication Kit). I always supply picture ID these days. It's really rough getting those cold lamination-Employee ID kits from Office Depot, taking the polaroid on a blue background, trimming the photo, and assembling the employment ID. I'm one of my best employees. Don't forget to include your EMP_NO. It gives the clerk something to write down. DCF "Governments are simply not fully sovereign in the world of information; their powers within it are strangely limited....This weakness of government control within computer nets--a product of strongly protected privacy, a lack of frontiers and confusions of jurisdiction--make them natural places for subversion." -- The Economist "Softwar--A Survey of Defence Technology"

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TYM_eup
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Time magazine of Augst 21 has a breathless cover story on cyber war, infowar and farside warriors, with a piece on a Rocky Horror Rand war game. Someone who knows the URL for Time articles may want to wave it. Or, for squeamish ossifragers who do not want to be IDed at the Time stakeout: TYM_eup (about 36kb in 2 parts)

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Re: Purple Boxes
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199508152206.SAA23244(a)acmex.gatech.edu>, gt7508b(a)prism.gatech.edu (PHrEaK!) wrote: >Does anyone know of sources for des chips??? >Are there any public key chips out there??? >Has anyone ever tried putting PGP on a chip??? RSA??? (Are these too >slow for realistic real time hardware voice/data encryption??) >I know a little about digital electronics (I am a computer engineering >student) and I would love to get some data books and see if I could >come up with a secure "encryption box" that people could build. I don't know off the top of my head who makes DES and RSA chips. I am sure there are many manufactors of DES chips. Try TI, National, and Motorola. I belive that Schneier has a list of RSA chip makers. For the DSP part of a "bump in the cord" encrytion box, you want to get the "TI TMS320 Family Development Support" booklet by calling (800) 477-8924. You also want to look at Motorola's 68000 CPU, DSP, and controller on one chip. I can't recall the exact product number. Just call Motorola and ask for it. Have fun, - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMDE5iSoZzwIn1bdtAQETkgGAjfPRJ09tGSauoSSWuaQiBqeVjI0sWXWH vJ5Ft3efVPBaZTEMXh0Q4MOkH23ot3hS =FJ9y -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Purple Boxes
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199508152206.SAA23244(a)acmex.gatech.edu>, gt7508b(a)prism.gatech.edu (PHrEaK!) wrote: >Does anyone know of sources for des chips??? >Are there any public key chips out there??? >Has anyone ever tried putting PGP on a chip??? RSA??? (Are these too >slow for realistic real time hardware voice/data encryption??) >I know a little about digital electronics (I am a computer engineering >student) and I would love to get some data books and see if I could >come up with a secure "encryption box" that people could build. I don't know off the top of my head who makes DES and RSA chips. I am sure there are many manufactors of DES chips. Try TI, National, and Motorola. I belive that Schneier has a list of RSA chip makers. For the DSP part of a "bump in the cord" encrytion box, you want to get the "TI TMS320 Family Development Support" booklet by calling (800) 477-8924. You also want to look at Motorola's 68000 CPU, DSP, and controller on one chip. I can't recall the exact product number. Just call Motorola and ask for it. Have fun, - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMDE67ioZzwIn1bdtAQGdwQF+MnhFo72hoxjAzESO/MksNE1QKNys35Tp zJZJxng6FOxikLO01FjmKR32A47Pq7cK =in6Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Purple Boxes
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <SAA03565.199508152249(a)garotte.va.pubnix.com>, stripes(a)va.pubnix.com ("Josh M. Osborne") wrote: >I'm afarid it won't be $50 worth of parts untill you start buying >thousands of chips at once. For a single device, count on spending ~$400 for hardware. In large volumes, you should be able to go below $150. - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMDE7oCoZzwIn1bdtAQFxAAF/YIJPuO5siDuspQhDGf6u+nks1lXfjCj9 z/NZFxQkVsDVv/GvQnPdPKYYr144eVuE =57Vm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Purple Boxes
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 22:30 8/15/95, Dave Emery wrote: > I'm quite convinced that with a fast microcontroller and >especially a really fast DSP engine you can do both 3-DES and idea in >the same hardware that does the rest. [...] > I should think realistically there should be a lot of bandwidth >left over for the voice compression - for the encryption you might >possibly be talking 5% of the dsp cpu if you use a 50 mhz part. I agree. You can easily do encryption and compression on the same chip. There is no need for a separate DES/RSA chip. I only included some possible DES chip manufactors, because the original poster asked for them. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: An article for Wired magazine
by monty.harder＠famend.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PE> kilos of gold in it if $50,000 in cash doesn't suit your tastes. I PE> defy governments to eliminate gold as well as paper currency. Um. Didn't FDR try that? * Free will made me do it! --- * Monster(a)FAmend.Com *

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next letter...
by Ranxerox＠ajsbbs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Pl. teach me about american indians ? What would you like to know... I'll answer any questions that I can, and research any that I can't. > From Canada or a US state ? Well, the Chickasaw tribe is originally from the Southeastern US (Alabama, Kentucky, etc.) The name (in the native language) means 'Unconquered and Unconquerable' During that time, the Chickasaws were mainly farmers/traders. But if someone made them mad, they NEVER forgot or forgave until the debt was settled. Early in the war between the French and English, the English hired the Chickasaw people to fight for them. The French didn't stand a chance after that because of the Chickasaw and their allies. (When the Chickasaw were hired, they also asked other tribes to help in the war.) The Chickasaw's real name is spelled Chikasha (chi-KAH-shuh). My 'indian name' is: "Akuckma Kallo Hin-li Nita ho atuk Nutackhish". (It means 'Bad-tempered standing bear, he that has a beard.') And since I am 1.9 - 2m tall and weigh about 150Kg, it kind of fits... #:^) > I made a blizz trip to California and, when staying at the Canyon's, I had > the opportunity to visit Indian reserves but didn't want to - don't ask me > why. I'm a little disturbed by these "come-and-see-me" touristic > roundtrips. Although I saw a lot in a very very short time, I felt > uncomfortable about looking at "people" as part of the trip. Stupid? As long as you treat the people with respect and dignity, what is to be ashamed of? These displays are done to educate people. To let them know more about the tribe, it's culture and it's history. As long as you keep in mind the idea that it's there to teach, there's nothing at all wrong with it. There are some ceremonies that aren't done for show. Like (for example) the Cheyanne (shy-ANN) Sun Ceremony. This is a VERY serious thing. It lasts for 4 days (4 is an important number). During this ceremony, sacrifices are made. You can sacrifice some of your flesh by cutting it off of your own body, or you can sacrifice pain. If you choose to sacrifice pain, then there are several options. You can have bone skewers inserted under the muscles in your chest and be lifted into the air until the skewers tear free (blowing a bone whistle the whole time). Or you can have ropes attached to the skewers and the top of a pole, then you lean back until you break the ropes. (Again blowing the whistle.) Another way is to have Buffalo Skulls attached to the skewers. You then put the Buffalo skulls on your back and dance until they break free or tear out of your chest. And all of this is done in the hottest part of the summer. (At a temperature of about 38C.) > Where do you live now? How did you evolve from an Indian culture to a > US-city-bourgeois-like life ? I live about 30Km north of Seattle in a town of 75,000 called Everett. It's a nice place to live. Not too much crime except for an occasional noise complaint. All things considered, I think it's a nice place to raise my kid. > > Hobbies : Midieval Warfare (Tactics & Weapons), > Woops ! Woops? Is that good or bad? > Sorry I was late in wishing you all the best. At your age, the world's > expecting you ! Uh oh... I was hoping to sneak up on it. #:^) > I won't comment on the maths.. I really hate it, sorry ! Most people don't like math... I guess you have to be a little crazy to like math. But I've found that it actually relaxes me. I sit down and figure out a new formula, and I feel good that IU was able to do it. > Another cultural "question" : what's a "peptic ulcer"? I know an ulcer as > being something very painful on your stomac (I never had it, thanks God..) A peptic ulcer IS a hole in the stomach... I've had the ulcer since I was 9 years old. It's like a part of the family now. So I consider it a 'pet'. I know it sounds crazy, but if I worry about it, it just hurts more. It feels like having a belly full of fire as it is. I don't need it hurting any more. > Believe it or not, I've been in Washington once but on business trip for > the AIIM show (sorry, AIIM stands for Association for Image and Information > Management - a "huge" yearly show)... In fact, these business trips are a > real scandal fly in/fly out without any time for visiting whatsoever because > of time (and money) constraints.. > Forget these negative words, because I really loved all my US trips > (but was really mad not to be able to spend at least one week in each > city/state) I've been in Boston and Lowell/Mass several times, in My uncle teaches music at Berkley Music College near Boston. Some of his works have been berformed by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, and the Zurich Philharmonic Orchestra. I know NOTHING about music though... I'm a scientist, not an artist. > Canada once (the Water Falls, straight from Boston and back the same Niagara Falls? > day), Los Angeles(+ one day Disney Land), Florida(+ one day Disney World - > waw !!), in Chicago and SanFrancisco twice, in NY three times, and of course > my "see-the-US-in-10-days" tour which involved the Californian Coast > (Monterrey, Carmel, SeaWorld, LA) + all canyons, Death Valley, Arizona > Desert, Scottsdale, etc. I went down to California a few years ago to meet some friends. Haven't been back though... :( > When I re-read this, I have no right to complain : I loved it all and > won't stop coming over... Next year, I hope to conquer Canada while one > holiday. (The AIIM show will be in Chicago again in 1996). If you like being in the outdoors, you may want to consider going to Alaska (Denali National Park) or the Canadian Northwest Territories. > By the way, your US map (on my computer) is a little bubbled.. What do you mean 'bubbled'? It didn't come out right? > But don't worry, I have great maps and books and videos and whatever > on the States at home. I have even family in the Concorde/Mass. and > in the Vermont. My girlfriend is originally from Connecticut, and I always tease her about it. I tell her that if my friends knew that my girlfriend was a 'damn yankee', they'd never let me hear the end of it. > all my internet drugs, except when it's football on TV...) Football = Soccer I presume... Over here 'Football' is a completely different game. I used to play it in school when I was about 16 years old. (Ever seen/herd of 'The Dallas Cowboys'?) > I'll come back to you soon (we have a four days week-end here as from > Saturday). Hope you enjoy your weekend. > PS : Thanks for all info about the net.. Where did you learn > French? (Escargot..) I don't know French... I know food. At 150Kg, I know food... #:^) Hope to hear from you again soon... Paul ranxerox(a)ajsbbs.com

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SSL challenge -- broken !
by Damien.Doligez＠inria.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- SSL challenge -- broken This is to announce the solution of the SSL challenge posted by Hal Finney on July 17, 1995 (message-ID: <3u6kmg$pm4(a)jobe.shell.portal.com>), also found at: <URL:http://www.portal.com/~hfinney/sslchal.html> The 40-bit secret part of the key is 7e f0 96 1f a6. I found it by a brute force search on a network of about 120 workstations and a few parallel computers at INRIA, Ecole Polytechnique, and ENS. The key was found after scanning a little more than half the key space in 8 days. The cleartext of the encrypted data is as follows: The SERVER-VERIFY message is: 9C B1 C7 83 D9 BB B7 75 01 6F 19 19 03 58 EC 05 MAC-DATA 05 MSG-SERVER-VERIFY AF 84 A7 79 F8 13 69 20 25 9B 53 A0 60 AE 75 51 CHALLENGE The CHALLENGE part is a copy of the challenge sent by the client in its first message. The answer is the CLIENT-FINISHED message: 22 BB 23 39 55 B0 7F B6 1A B0 35 85 F7 DB C1 E5 MAC-DATA 03 MSG-CLIENT-FINISHED BF EB 90 F8 2C 0C E1 EA 18 AC 11 4C 83 14 21 B6 CONNECTION-ID The next message is SERVER-FINISHED: D4 CD F3 4E 38 F1 2B 1E DC FD 72 C8 34 02 CD FF MAC-DATA 06 SERVER-FINISHED-BYTE 23 1C 05 40 60 72 49 6E 83 BA D1 28 CC 9B 5F 63 SESSION-ID-DATA Then comes the data message sent by the client. This is the juicy one. I have broken the contents into its fields (the body was just one long line) 72 23 B5 98 0D D0 07 1A DA F1 C7 A4 40 41 5A 10 MAC-DATA POST /order2.cgi HTTP/1.0 Referer: https://order.netscape.com/order2.cgi User-Agent: Mozilla/1.1N (Macintosh; I; PPC) Accept: */* Accept: image/gif Accept: image/x-xbitmap Accept: image/jpeg Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 472 source-form=order2-cust.html& order_number=31770& prod_80-01020-00_Mac=1& carrier_code=UM& ship_first=Cosmic& ship_last=Kumquat& ship_org=SSL+Trusters+Inc.& ship_addr1=1234+Squeamish+Ossifrage+Road& ship_addr2=& ship_city=Anywhere& ship_state=NY& ship_zip=12345& ship_country=USA& ship_phone=& ship_fax=& ship_email=& bill_first=& bill_last=& bill_org=& bill_addr1=& bill_addr2=& bill_city=& bill_state=& bill_zip=& bill_country=USA& bill_phone=& bill_fax=& bill_email=& submit=+Submit+Customer+Data+ This order came from Mr Cosmic Kumquat, SSL Trusters Inc., 1234 Squeamish Ossifrage Road, Anywhere, NY 12345 (USA). Unfortunately, Mr Kumquat forgot to give his phone number, and the server's reply (in two packets) is: 09 12 AD FE A5 A9 BF D1 8C 8C E2 6A A3 48 B9 75 MAC-DATA HTTP/1.0 200 OK Server: Netscape-Commerce/1.1 Date: Wednesday, 12-Jul-95 05:40:30 GMT Content-type: text/html 1C CD C4 3D 80 F1 7B 94 11 AC E8 72 B1 99 BC FA MAC-DATA <TITLE>Error</TITLE><H1>Error</H1> The shipping address you supplied is not complete. The street address, city, state, zip code, country and phone number are mandatory fields. Please go back and specify the full shipping address. Thank you. This result was found with a quick-and-dirty distributed search program, which I wrote when I realized that the cypherpunks were going to be a few weeks late with their collective effort. When the program was running, it took little more than one week to find the key (it would have taken about 15 days to sweep the entire key space). I ran it on almost all the machines I have access to, summarized in the following table: type speed (keys/s) number notes - -------------------------------------------------------- DEC (alpha) 18000-33000 34 DEC (MIPS) 2500-7500 11 SPARC 2000-13000 57 HP (HPPA/snake) 15000 3 Sony (R3000) 1100-4000 3 Sun 3 600 2 Sequent B8000 100 x 10 1 (1) Multimax (NS532) 600 x 14 1 (1) KSR 3200 x 64 1 (1) (2) Notes: 1. These are multiprocessor machines 2. The KSR spent only about 2 days on this computation. The total average searching speed was about 850000 keys/s, with a maximum of 1350000 keys/s (1150000 without the KSR). Conclusions: * Many people have access to the amount of computing power that I used. The exportable SSL protocol is supposed to be weak enough to be easily broken by governments, yet strong enough to resist the attempts of amateurs. It fails on the second count. Don't trust your credit card number to this protocol. * Cypherpunks write code, all right, but they shouldn't forget to run it. I want to thank the people at INRIA, Ecole Polytechnique, and Ecole Normale Superieure for giving their CPU time. (Most of them are on vacation anyway...) You can find a copy of this text at <URL:http://pauillac.inria.fr/~doligez/ssl/announce.txt> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCSAwUBMDG4dVNZwSQVabihAQGeFAPnUZil4WlauoMke9HaULDNOVf1hLXS0i9U VJWZsPHcihDbn6nBN9T6f3sW/S08N5YJFSCmuZzqO59c0nOAKILb6a3TsXjFEcu8 W8UfwFsZa6gx7iuYqandhoHBEkkc5NSwMe1f+lPiV2MdclzQ4/VtZ7Oa1VB+RftD Am4+w/Y= =Fju1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **** This is a timestamp of the above message: -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUAMDGsOeWrvYiumrHZAQF0QwIAnDWdVVTiVmUTY5lp08yPeLRoFetczb+U E0WVgTUJ4a16tinOPaJl/6jOpPUUPWMjkDaD2N1xw8lGqm0UgZJiGIkAkgMFATAx uKJTWcEkFWm4oQEBAQ8D5ixvYrpEAQYfeNXmbB46BTTnBwBPS/JjfVFEEnC0Zsoj cyh/WELUsZf785b23vEq9JFvZB+bq1UsJTpttl335TrW344ZYof3kl6fdEF2Jf5q LxQjkuP9s/OQX5iJZpHz4LUxbb+/hOwSdZ2O3LV7ETiHs9AK1+bnKfOGDyei =qO7V -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

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Re: Purple Boxes
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:30 PM 8/15/95 -0400, Dave Emery wrote: > I reiterate my suggestion of a few months ago that >one could quite easily adapt the firmware on one of the new simultanious >data and digital voice on the same phone line modems to incorperate >encryption, and quite possibly encryption/key exhange interoperable >with some mode of PGPphone. Doing this would relieve one of the >need to develop or manufacture any hardware at all - all that would >be required to have a portable "bump in the cord" encrypter widely >available for a low price would be creating a new version of the >downloadable flash ROM image that did encryption and PGPphone >key exchange. Most modems I've seen only have one set of audio interfaces, and a bump-in-the-cord phone needs two (one for the voice side, one for the modem line side.) (Having two jacks doesn't count.) So you'd need at least two modems, one straight and one re-educated, and you'd probably need lots more flash ROM than the average modem has. On the other hand, laptops are increasingly getting multimedia capabilities like built-in sound cards, and if there's a microphone jack you're in business (uh, well, for $3K or so) Or a cheaper laptop with two PCMCIA modems, if you can re-educate one, which also lets you move the non-audio parts of your secure phone program into the PC. Of course, if you want long conversations from the airport, you'll still need to find a payphone within 4-6 feet of an electric socket and not located under a MegaMuzak speaker, but that's easier than trying to balance a TI Silent 700 under similar conditions :-) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #--- "The fat man rocks out Hinges fall off Heaven's door "Come on in," says Bill" Wavy Gravy's haiku for Jerry

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Re: Purple Boxes
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Has anyone ever tried putting PGP on a chip??? RSA??? (Are these too > slow for realistic real time hardware voice/data encryption??) We have implemented a public-key system in smartcards. The secret key is completely generated and hidden inside the card. The public key system is TESS (RFC1824). An authenticated key exchange is perform by the card in about one second. Hadmut

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PGP use in Guatemala?
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dear Cypherpunks: Could someone please send me (hopefully documented) examples of PGP use and the government reaction to it in Guatemala or point me to where to find articles (if there are any) on the subject? Please reply privately to liberty(a)gate.net Thanks. JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh iQCVAwUBMDHgEm1lp8bpvW01AQHVpwQAhS16CfDaRcqPHNkbanIWGJ1qchjsBoqZ Or4rxTLNm9LpvMjoiptR8Myo09YaEnYzm38nw4CW4YyMtEVFde99teL0VzSNyYTm YPL0COTcB6Sw5Ti1w3yjQsKEaMnX1homGRRIFmGpTP9KZfrq/nt193Jw1WySzsMe zad0RqPCgOM= =v2J6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Jim Ray Don't investigate Mena, Arkansas and contra-coke. Embarrassment is a threat to national security... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Key id. # E9BD6D35 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Support the Phil Zimmermann (Author of PGP) Legal Defense Fund! email: zldf(a)clark.net or visit http://www.netresponse.com/zldf ________________________________________________________________________

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PRZ Wins One
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PRZ is awarded a 1995 Chrysler Award for Innovation in Design, says a $40,000 full-page ad in The NYT today, with a brief citation: Philip Zimmermann is the designer of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), an E-mail encryption software. Thanks to the algorithms of PGP, which was released to the public as free software in 1991, E-mail messages can be sent securely all over the world without the risk of interception by any third party. No mention of the free-world leader's sword poised to decapitalize the public-spirited designer to protect IC hegemony.

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Zimmermann wins Chrysler Award
by dmandl＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's a full-page ad on page A9 of today's Wall Street Journal announcing the winners of the "1995 Chrysler Award of Innovation in Design." One of the six winners is Phil Zimmermann. I quote: "Philip Zimmermann is the designer of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), an E-mail encryption software. Thanks to the algorithms of PGP, which was released to the public as free software in 1991, E-mail messages can be sent securely all over the world without risk of interception by any third party." In case you're interested: "For the past three years, Chrysler Corporation has been honoring outstanding designers. By showcasing great innovations in fields such as graphic, interactive, product, architectural, and environmental designs, Chrysler strives to bring well-deserved attention to those designers whose common attribute is a passionate commitment to their vision." Among the other winners: the hip graphic design group Reverb and "carceral" architect Frank Gehry. --Dave. -- Dave Mandl dmandl(a)panix.com http://wfmu.org/~davem

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Re: Purple Boxes vs. Native Signal Processing
by Steve Bryan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:58 pm 8/15/95, Timothy C. May wrote: [snip] >The trend is away from having two chips when one will suffice. Thus, the >Macintosh 840av and 660av had a Motorola 68040 _and_ a Motorola 56000 DSP [snip] >Pushing DSP functions into the CPU can be taken too far. Apple, for >example, had/has a "Geo Modem," or something like this, which does modem >funtions in the CPU of some machines. Last I heard it was stuck at being >too slow, with no software updates, and effectively is being abandoned. [snip] My apologies if this is being too compulsive but for reasons of accuracy it should be pointed out that the DSP in the Mac 660av and also the 840av is the AT&T 3210. The other point I'd make is more a matter of opinion. The Geopod and associated software has been excellent and revisions have just recently been released by Apple and Cypress Research. The phone capability is particularly well designed. This is in marked contrast to the demo program called ApplePhone which was mistakenly treated as an attempt at a finished product when it was just intended as a technology demonstration. It took an unusually long time for MegaPhone, the finished product from Cypress Research, to finally appear. As far as speed is concerned there is impatience about the 14,400 bps limit and that remains the major shortcoming. But even that may be corrected by Apple before too much longer. Personally, I'm more than willing to accept the tradeoff in order to have the tight integration of the three capabilities (data, fax and phone). I still have a funky NuBus card from SuperMac (with three RJ11 connectors and an RS232 connector that was designed to combine these capabilities, it was a prototype) sitting in a drawer while my Quadra and PowerMac are smoothly providing the services. The next step will be to integrate PGPFone with the other three functions so that one could handle data, fax, phone, and secure phone all with the same phone line and without requiring a rocket scientist to set up and use it. +---------------------------------------------------------------------- |Steve Bryan Internet: sbryan(a)maroon.tc.umn.edu |Sexton Software CompuServe: 76545,527 |Minneapolis, MN Fax: (612) 929-1799 |PGP key fingerprint: B4 C6 E2 A6 5F 87 57 7D E1 8C A6 9B A9 BE 96 CB +----------------------------------------------------------------------

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