December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Vinge reference in Moving Mars
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greg Bear's novel Moving Mars, now out in paperback, has a cute reference to Vernor Vinge's ideas from True Names. p.208: "'Don't stick on the names,' Orianna said, shaping the living room into more Regency. 'All my friends are into Vernoring. They work and play with fake names. I don't know their true ones. Not even their parents know.' "'Why?' "'It's a game. Two rules - nobody knows what you're doing, and you do nothing illegal.' "'Doesn't that take the fun out of doin crypto?' I asked. "'Wow - crypto! Hide in the tomb. Sorry. I shy from two-edged words. We call it Vernoring.' "'Doesn't it?' I persisted. "'No,' Oriana said thoughtfully. 'Illegal is harm. Harm is stupid. Stupid is its own game, and none of my friends play it. Here's Kite.'" The book is pretty good, lots of nano and other hot tech, but not much crypto (sorry, Vernoring)... A little slow in places, though. Hal

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Anonymity in Donating
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Some nice examples of the preservation of anonymity in charitable donations, both for the donor and for the recipient, caught my attention today. An article by Clare Ulrich in the December 1994 Communique (Vol.18 No.3), published by The Cornell Campaign, pays tribute to an anonymous donor to Cornell U.: "While some acts of generosity are marked by a name on a building or a plaque on a wall, others, so to speak, can be counted among the philanthropic `whodunits.' These are the anonymous gifts, and Communique would like to profile several innovative projects that one anonymous donor helped launch this year. According to the donor, anonymity provides greater freedom to `pick and choose' projects that are personally interesting. This donor is particularly attracted to programs that involve computer technology or promise to generate benefits beyond the scope of the immediate project. [...] The same donor who declined recognition for these high-tech projects also provided support for 24 high school juniors from Boys Harbor in Harlem to attend the six-week Cornell Summer College Program in 1994, as well as the two previous summers. [...] Although this anonymous donor may not be interested in getting a name on something, he certainly leaves an indelible mark on the quality of education at Cornell." Closer to home, our dept. chair Dave Stemple broadcast a request for donations to an anonymous recipient: "One of our undergrad majors lived in Amherst Crossings, which burned down last week. As a result this student, a senior who had planned to graduate this spring, is destitute and needs help or he will be unable to complete his degree. If you would like, you can contribute clothes or money (cash only please in order to maintain the student's anonymity) to him. [...]" Incidentally, I received my B&W C'punks shirt from Kevin Prigge a few weeks ago, and consider myself a very satisfied customer. I made a point of wearing it on the flights both ways for a recent vacation I took in California. On the return trip, I was delayed at O'Hare for over an hour due to a leaky window on the airplane. A man in his 50s or 60s approached me and asked, with a smirk, what a Cypherpunk was. I explained a bit, mentioning the passage of the DT bill. Noting the mention of the NSA on the shirt, the man mentioned that his son is working at Apple "with the NSA".... -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "The objective is for us to get those conversations whether they're by an alligator clip or ones and zeroes. Wherever they are, whatever they are, I need them." -FBI Dir. Freeh - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLwyA6mf7YYibNzjpAQFENAQA09JTWr501ZJliFWK4efY8py2OhgBq8gy rqYvrGX+EZ49Uq+IDU2DjiiPBHuYPOE23wb/QfouhmKaSSUMqifYTd+uau247Cot CC+CYceBvH3oK35oTr7CahSqb4JLUNs4atOkoYtpbYPG5qrR8yJkAGBKbVzQZHKt ioUFB5xhYKA= =QD4b - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLwyB+CoZzwIn1bdtAQEgkAF+OBkRShMO+Et/Kr8AkPXPz564xgNnhzfP WPSO0W0UCpkg/e7bQIliMCXiyzp7nHQr =1IBd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RSADSI Conference - Extra Passes?
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A cohort of mine is in need of a pass to next week's RSADSI conference, which, unfortunately, is sold out. So if anyone has a pass that they're not planning to use for a half-day or so, please drop me an e-mail and I will be in your debt. Thanks! -- Mark Chen chen(a)intuit.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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C-LIT: Vernor Vinge's "A Fire Upon the Deep" (was: Re: True Names)
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:48 pm 1/5/95, Angus Patterson wrote: >I've been trying to get True Names by Vernor Vinge, and have been told it's >out of print (like most good cypunk ), does anybody have it scanned? >I realize this is without permission, so does anybody have Vinge's address? >(e-mail or otherwise) or could anybody ask him? Btw, does he have any other >crypto/anonymity related stories? Thanks in advance. Amazing that you should mention this, Angus: I *just* finished reading "A Fire Upon the Deep" and it is not only exeedingly gnarly, but also features a universal net, galactic-wide relays and Netscum-like service providers and associated user kvetching, a sinister-billions-of-years-old-AI-virus, newsgroups, lists populated by aliens - and even _crypto_ as the key to the whole shebang. There's also a great futuristic "dig" on pub key encryption buried in it. Neural net stuff. A possible explanation for the existence of both God and Newt Gingrich...and I could go on. Great read, true anus-clenching adventure... and this from one who does NOT normally read anything more sci-fi than certain software manuals. :) Strongly recommended for c-punks who can last 600 pages (after the first ten, you're hopelessly hooked if you have half a brain left afdter reading this list for a year or two). I _WISH_ I had VV's email address! I'd like to send the guy a big thank-you and ask if he's writing a sequel (yet). If anyone does know it, puh-LEEze mail me. First book of his I've read, first of it's kind I've enjoyed in a very long time. I'll scan my favorite crypto-related (legal-length) excerpt and post it next week, howzat? dave _________________________ Big books small Books high books tall Just give me a good Little book, That's all. -Truman Capote (age 11) C-LIT = Cypherpunk LITerature. Gitcher mind outta the gutter there, Lancelot.

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Re: ecash trial issues explained
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Wolfgang Roeckelein <wolfgang(a)wi.WHU-Koblenz.de> > > >-> Digital cash should not be "anonymous" -- paper currency isn't. Serial > > There seems to be a misconception here what is meant with anonymous. Paper cash > is anonymous: I can't derive the person I got the note from from the note > itself. So if I meet a guy in the street, he gives me a pack of cigarettes and > I give him cash, this transaction is anonymous. It isn't difficult to make paper cash less anonymous, though, by tracking serial numbers. This is occasionally done in "law enforcement" situations - recording the notes used to pay ransom or bribes. It wouldn't be difficult to add serial-number recording equipment/mechanisms to automatic bank-teller machines, to record what serial numbers would be given out to whom. (This can be done either by adding scanners to the ATMs themselves, or by scanning the money before putting it into the ATM, and having the ATM record that transaction #43 dispensed the 105th-110th bills in the stack. Scanning can either be done by OCRs, or by replacing the human-readable numbers with bar-codes, as some of the paranoids periodically suggest the US Treasury is about to do as part of some heinous plan. However, the original posters' assertion that digital cash should not be anonymous is not a technical statement, it's a value judgement, and in my opinion it's a bad one. There are a lot of genuine social needs that anonymity can support, and a lot of bad things that can be done with traceable money. Aside from that, traceability costs money. Original gold and silver money didn't need to be traceable, though coiner's and assayer's marks were useful, and it is easier to keep track of your pile of gold bars if they're numbered. But paper money has serial numbers largely to prevent easy copying; gold is a lot harder to counterfeit, unless you've got a king who insists that coins with his face on them should be worth N times as much as anonymous coins. Bill

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Re: GIF_nip
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Watch your Cc: headers, s'vous plait? AAK! Eudora's "reply-to-all" strikes again! Grovelling in your general direction, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: True Names
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May I see copies in used bookstores often. It's in the collection "True Names and Something-or-other" and was in print until recenly. I also have the Bluejay edition, with an afterward by Marvin Minsky. .............................................................. I bought one at Half-Price Books. I don't know what edition it is, it's a dingy little paperback with a signature in it of some stranger that I wouldn't know. I keep it with my "previously owned" collection. Blanc

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DES for HP48
by SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There used to be some code on soda to do DES on an HP48 palmtop/calculator. I looked this afternoon, on ftp.csua.berkeley.edu, and I couldn't find it. Anyone know where it got to?

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Re: True Names
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Jim Gillogly > Blanc Weber <blancw(a)microsoft.com> writes: > I see copies in used bookstores often. It's in the collection "True > Names and Something-or-other" and was in print until recenly. I also ............................................................. No, No, Jim, that wasn't me saying that - that statement was made by a cpunkgod. Mine was beneath it. Blanc

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floating point crypto?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm incensed. I casually mentioned somewhere else that I saw something on this list about floating-point math being used in crypto, contrary to popular belief, and somebody had the *timerity* to call me on it. ;-). I think it had to do with factoring, but maybe even in key-generation, though that doesn't sound right at all... So, are there c-punk archives I could look in? I remember hearing something about that, too. However, if someone remembers off the top of their head, or if they have an actual copy of the posting, that would be great, too. Please send me whatever it is by e-mail. No point cluttering the list more than I already have... Of all the nerve.... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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No Subject
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[icicle.winternet.com] Login name: carolann In real life: CarolAnne Braddock Directory: /usr2/carolann Shell: /etc/scripts/tcsh-susp Last login Thu Jan 5 21:38 on ttyq5 from annex3-1.wintern New mail received Thu Jan 5 21:16:23 1995; unread since Mon Jan 2 13:18:25 1995 Plan: This account has been disabled permanently. Mike Horwath - Admin - Winternet - drechsau(a)winternet.com

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sniff passwords on PC (DOS)
by m00012＠KANGA.STCLOUD.MSUS.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a demonstration of concept, I wrote a small, simple program that replaces the keyboard interrupt and stores all keystrokes in a buffer. It was very very easy to write. It works while using pgp and windows\net. It does not work after starting windows. Not sure, but it seems obvious that MS windows installs it's own keyboard interrupt. I suppose it would be easy to enhance this simple program (I bet it's been done by others) to store passwords into a secret file on a hard drive unbeknownest to the user. I first suspected that such a program already existed after hearing, two days after his arrest, that the CIA had cracked Aldrich Aim's encrypted files. (sorry if I spelled his name incorrectly.) Think about it, the govt. could spend 50,000 to 100,000 to create a freeware gif viewer, for example, that installed such a tsr. Mike P.S. If the guy who wanted to see his gf's files writes me, I'll send you this keyboard sniffer program.

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Re: sniff passwords on PC (DOS)
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mike writes: > days after his arrest, that the CIA had cracked Aldrich Aim's encrypted > files. (sorry if I spelled his name incorrectly.) FYI, I'm fairly sure it's "Aldrich Ames". > Think about it, the govt. could spend 50,000 to 100,000 to create a > freeware gif viewer, for example, that installed such a tsr. ...most of that going to Compu$erve/Uni$y$... > P.S. If the guy who wanted to see his gf's files writes me, I'll send you > this keyboard sniffer program. Just to clarify slightly, the person who originally asked the question (Adam Gerstein aka THE MAC GURU) said he had a _friend_ who wanted to see his (the friend's) gf's files. - - -L. Futplex McCarthy - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLw0I8mf7YYibNzjpAQEF/wP9GPKLX7KifBFRenzmbvsCdbOQ7Narlm8/ qiW/nSLRr7jZUtjAyhYM71eI9GsQbO6lADfV9ncoPIATNB/eJNCqa2O0cmNa67O/ KuUSQl0NQPiUQyevkLRldllEb9hSuTNeHyJZ4SFDpMbFrGYXX4Iu/w9RYcn9ssNS 29qFs0vNK30= =Z0ZM - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLw0J9ioZzwIn1bdtAQHXVgF8CVyuTHInzoYDUZmZZXwksIosAuiP4TSh pfZJLbRcoPPP9sJ63CTfnexZXenEzhLf =zrNo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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We still don't have the mailbox.
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks Doc. Wrote Phil Dubois, Zimmy's Lawyer. It's something I'll show you a copy of when I get back to playing "catch-up". Love Always, Carol Anne On Fri, 6 Jan 1995, Thaddeus Ozone wrote: > Carol, > I DL'd the whole thang. If it was world-readable, I've got it locked up on > my hard drive. I'll have to wait until I can get my hands on some 800k > disks, it takes up 1776k on my hard drive, but should fit on 2 - 800k's > once it gets transferred. I took the liberty of taking EVERYTHING that was > readable, including what was in the main directory. Talk to you over the > weekend. > Your pal, -doc- > > >I tried again, even from my pages. > >I do believe it's the local server that's gotta do the job. > >Anyway, I'm bookmarking all the links. > >And downloading all the pages. > >Will go ftp here in a minute. > > > >Love Always, > > > >Carol Anne > >more in about an hour. > > >

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Chain letter bounced (fwd)
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A small advisory: since na166182(a)anon.penet.fi is subscribed to the c'punks list, and anon.penet.fi attempts to filter out instances of Make Money Fast, any mention of "MAKE.MONEY.FAST" on the list will likely generate an autoreply like the one below. It appears that a copy of the MAKE.MONEY.FAST FAQ (there, I've said it again :) included in the autoreply will even trigger this mechanism, which is awfully ironic at best. At worst, this self-referential property seems liable to allow some nasty email feedback loops. Offhand it appears that a message with an address @anon.penet.fi (preferably forged) in the From: line, and "MAKE.MONEY.FAST" as the message body, would launch an automatic recursive bounce process as anon.penet.fi attempts to send itself a message it considers illegal. Presumably this would crash when the disk quota on some mail spool somewhere is exceeded. If the message was forged to come From: cypherpunks(a)toad.com or another list to which an anon.penet.fi user is subscribed, I imagine the list would have the dubious privilege of witnessing all the recursive bounce messages along the way. I'm not volunteering to try to write a better MMF-recognizer for a.p.f, though.... Forwarded message: > From daemon(a)anon.penet.fi Fri Jan 6 04:22:39 1995 > To: lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu > Subject: Chain letter bounced > > You, lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu, have sent a message that seems to contain yet another > copy of the infamous Make Money Fast chain letter. > > If you want to make a complaint, please send just the headers of the > message to admin(a)anon.penet.fi - albeit as the messages have been blocked > (as you can see), the message probably *didn't* go through anon.penet.fi > but was faked (using NNTP faking or something similar). > [...] > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: "L. McCarthy" <lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu> [...] > Posting letters asking for $$$ is of course a risky venture on Usenet. We > see the PRZ Appeal as a Worthy Cause (tm), but that's just what all the > MAKE.MONEY.FAST posters think of their garbage too. If you go sticking out [...] -L. Futplex McCarthy - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLw0WJGf7YYibNzjpAQEfxAQAiA70W8v7saU4TU+0yJL4XC44uhV50Q34 rX5T1A1ADbPgKeIEX/nImyRP2h6T+V2GdYBWPMJjlVYV1Nyqpxb2kHToocQCbtjd ILyNYew0zHfpZAPeYYM4Y35ru1LoQeg9+COo9RElkS3daMB2gtUjmY2EtfPF6h4V tDei1OHtdl0= =vxjA - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLw0XKioZzwIn1bdtAQE2egF/Z5Tjg/dzt8cc/lkFXA/LMd17nNNGYv8N 7E7qlnWAhdz82+cILCVHmfVpHNIfdTUH =xtDg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: C'punks Economist Fan Club
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It's witty, politically >aware, relatively technically savvy. The articles exhibit a healthy (IMHO) >cynicism about what happens and why, yet maintain some idealism about what >should happen. It's not perfect, but it's difficult to imagine surpassing it. The Economist is fully informed and funny. What domestic news magazine would include the following in one of *their* leads (editorials): Circa 1987 "It is unlikely that Gorbachev has included an invasion of Western Europe in his next Five Year Plan but his generals *have* made their preparations. Lucky Britain is in the *Polish* Army's Zone of Occupation." DCF -- Have you registered a domain today. My template worked first time and I have since registered nine domain names. Send for a free copy.

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Re: True Names
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >--Mike, still looking for a copy himself > Boy, for people who can make the World's Governments tremble with the click of a keyboard some of you seem a bit print disabled. How to buy an Out of Print Book (c) 1995 Offshore Enterprises 1) Find an OP book search specialist 2) Ask he/she to find it for you 3) Pay for it To accomplish 1), ask at (independent) bookstores in your vicinity (those are places you may have seen around town full of processed tree carcasses), libraries, etc. DCF -- Correlation between (40 years of pack-a-day)second-hand smoke and cancer: +1.19 Correlation between having had an abortion and cancer: +1.50 Correlation generally accepted as significant for disease studies: +3.00

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Re: Remailer Abuse
by Nathaniel Borenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from mail: 5-Jan-95 Re: Remailer Abuse db(a)Tadpole.COM (1180*) > Heh. An anonymous remailer paid for by credit card... there'd > have to be an additional level of indirection for it to work, > which would make the methods for tracking those who don't pay > quite problematic. Again, this comes down to definitions of anonymity. In this case, if you start from the silly assumption that the anonymous remailer actually keeps records that correlate messages to payment mechanisms, Doug is right, but barely. To break the anonymity, you'd need collusion between the operator of the anonymous remailer AND First Virtual, because the former knows which account sent a message, and the latter knows who that account belongs to. (And before you tell me that this sounds a lot like the Clipper key escrow, I would point out that instead of two "trust us, they're independent" agencies of the US government, in this case we're talking about two independent private companies which are probably in two different countries. For my part, I figure that if the government of Finland and the government of the US can actually agree that it's so important to force the sacrifice of anonymity in a given case that they're both willing to coerce companies under their jurisdiction, they will probably have a very good reason for doing so. Maybe I'm too trusting, though.) Moreover, and perhaps most important, even THIS can only be done if the anonymous mailer keeps records of WHICH account paid for WHICH posting, and if I were to operate a for-pay remailer, I wouldn't do that anyway. It sort of defeats the whole point of the service. > Also, most remailer abuse tends to be of the hit-and-run variety, > which is still nicely enabled by FV. Only if you assume that the same people aren't responsible for multiple hit-and-run attacks. I would tend to assume the opposite. Russ Nelson saw the first point quite clearly, and wrote: Excerpts from mail: 5-Jan-95 Re: Remailer Abuse nelson(a)crynwr.com (1177) > Sure, I'll know who used it, but I'm not going to keep that > information. (Yes, yes, FV says that I have to keep records of who > bought what, but I'll label all my information with a random number, > that simply says that X bought information worth Y, not *what* > information.) And if you don't trust a remailer operator, then you > won't use it. All I'd add here is that the requirement to keep records is one that we have to pass on from the credit card world. If you didn't keep ANY records, my understanding is that all that this would really mean in practice is that there would be an extremely strong presumption AGAINST you in certain dispute-resolution situations. That's just my understanding, however, and it doesn't in any way supersede or supplement our legal terms and conditions, available from fineprint(a)fv.com. (You should try them, I find them more effective than Sominex.) Excerpts from mail: 5-Jan-95 Re: Remailer Abuse wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (2028) > I'd be worried about a couple of issues - > one is just the transaction cost - can you successfully market remailer use > at a buck a shot or whatever you'd be charging beyond FV's 29c stamp, > or would you have some convenient way to aggregate bill? Depending on how often you aggregate, you can charge almost any amount. 20 cents might be very reasonable. If you run a cron job once a month to post aggregated billings to anyone who had two or more outstanding uses, you'd make only a small amount on the two-time users, but you'd get serious aggregation from the regular users. (You might also want to bill the really-high-volume users weekly, to prevent them from going into shock at their huge monthly bills.) > Beyond that, though, are some traffic analysis problems - > remailers require a fair bit of traffic to be useful, and unless > you receive a reasonable amount of encrypted traffic, > and support encrypted email for purchasing remailer service > and other merchandise, an eavesdropper would have a fairly good source > of traffic data on your remailer users, especially since buying and using > remailer service requires two messages within an hour or so. Well, I think low-volume remailers are always a bit vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks, aren't they? One thing you could do is build a variable time-delay into the remailer, to make it harder to correlate messages coming in with those going out. To take paranoia a step further, you could allow people to encrypt their mail TO an anonymous remailer with the remailer's public key, and let the remailer send it out unencrypted. No snooper should be able to correlate the *contents* that way, and it avoids lots of key management problems by only using the remailer's key, not the user's. > An alternative billing mechanism, which wouldn't use Chaum-patented cash, > would be to sell a bunch of one-shot random-number tokens. > When you sell the tokens, you add them to the database of valid tokens, > and when one comes in on a message you delete it. > This allows you to sell more than one message or service-period per > FV transaction, and separates the purchase and use by a longer time, > without adding the need for record-keeping based on the user's ID. > It obviously does require encrypted reply messages. I think this could work quite nicely, at first glance. This is also the kind of service for which you might want to wait until after the "yes" reply to deliver the "goods". My only concern, would be the key management issues, but they might be manageable in this case by using the equivalent of a session key, instead of a permanent personal key. I think this is a promising idea. -- Nathaniel

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Re: PATNEWS: PTO accepting USENET FAQs are formal prior art
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought I'd pass this on... -Rishab srctran(a)world.std.com (Gregory Aharonian) writes: > !010394 PTO accepting USENET FAQs as formal prior art > > It seems that the US Patent Office is accepting Internet USENET FAQs > (Frequently Asked Questions - periodic postings on USENET groups with > questions and answers) as prior art. As you see in the following entry > from my software prior art database, one of the Other References is to > a cryptography FAQ. If any knows if the European Patent Office is accepting > USENET FAQs, and has an example, let me know. > > Thus if an examiner objects to your use of a FAQ as prior art, cite > this patent (NTIPAFCAP*). It probably would be helpful if the PTO came out > with a quick guideline to a consistent way of doing so. I suppose archiving > FAQs is one more thing I can add to my databases. > > It's nice to see the PTO embracing part of the Internet, even as it > rejects other parts of the Internet. Eventually, though, the PTO will have > to choose one or the other. > > Greg Aharonian > Internet Patent News Service > (for subscription info, send 'help' to patents(a)world.std.com ) > (for prior art search services info, send 'prior' to patents(a)world.std.com ) > (for WWW patent searching, try http://sunsite.unc.edu/patents/intropat.html > ==================== > > TYP[USPAT] > NUM[5371794] > ASS[Sun Microsystems] > CUN[USX] > ISD[19941206] > CLS[380/21] > ART[222] > LOC[] > GRG[] > TIT[Method and apparatus for privacy and authentication in wireless networks] > ORF[5] > ORFTXT[ > Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges, Authors: Diffie, Oorschot & > Weiner, Published by Designs, Codes & Cryptography 2, 107-125, > .COPYRGT.1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers. > The First Ten Years Of Public Key Cryptography, Author: Whitfield Diffie, > Reprinted from Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 76, No. 5, May 1988. > > Overview of Cryptology: Summary Of Internet Cryptology Frequently Asked > Questions (Oct. 1992). > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > > The Keys To Privacy and Authentication, Publication by RSA Data Security, > Inc., 100 Marine Parkway, Redwood City, Calif. 94065. (Oct. 1993). > Answers To Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography, Author: > Paul Fahn, RSA Laboratories, 100 Marine Parkway, Redwood City, Calif. 94065 > (Sep. 1992). > ] > > > ============================================================================= > > (NTIPAFCAP* = Not that issued patents are formally citable as precedent). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Sorehand mailing list
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While I was abroad, someone from this list asked me for the address for the SOREHAND mailing list, which helps those suffering from repetitive strain injuries (RSI), including carpal tunnel syndrome. I didn't have the listserve info in England, and somehow lost the request before I got back. Figuring, however, that cypherpunks write code, that writing code causes RSI, and hence this address might be of more general interest, here it is: to subscribe, send a SUBSCRIBE SOREHAND <yourname> to Listserve(a)ucsfvm.ucsf.edu A.Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) U.Miami Law School | MFROOMKI(a)UMIAMI.IR.MIAMI.EDU PO Box 248087 | Coral Gables, FL 33146 USA | It's warmish here, almost cool.

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Remailer anonymity
by Dr. D.C. Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Much has been said lately about maintaining anonymity for remailer users while providing some "pay to play" mechanism for the operator. Absent strong collusion between operators, doesn't remailer chaining ensure anonymity? Plenty of movie "bad guys" escape by getting on the subway because no one knows where they'll get off or change lines. It seems to me that knowing a person entered the system is far less information than knowing where they exited. As long as remailers have guaranteed access to other remailers, anonymity should be maintained. Re: collusion; I'd sooner believe the Macro$oft/RCC fable. In a gadda da vida, Billy. =D.C. Williams <dcwill(a)ee.unr.edu> - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLw12MioZzwIn1bdtAQH+XQF/RGe9sufCmL8KB2ARuyJNChmF+ZA4DRlf cCnAwpyUhRRtWdpDRx7wZxopjvPHUYDC =kVwM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Chain letter bounced (fwd)
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Inasmuch as I sent the prior posting the way I did, (as I can only read one letter at a time), You do not speak for all the cypherpunks, neither do I. On the time cronology you are the first to complain about the account closing notice. That doesn't constitute a WE yet. So please do not send me further personal mail. I'm glad I'm not so clueless about Stalking Laws in the State of Minnesota. Now I've go to my free.org account and get my Star-Trib address archive back. Carol Anne Braddock signed 1/6/95 11:25 A.M. On Fri, 6 Jan 1995, david d `zoo' zuhn wrote: > // come through, but for now I'm kinda clueless. > > Very very true. > > And please stop including this stuff at the end of every message. WE DON'T > CARE. > > > // From carolann(a)vortex.mm.com Fri Jan 6 01:39:29 1995 > // Date: Thu, 5 Jan 1995 21:57:05 -0600 > // From: Carol Anne Braddock <carolann(a)vortex.mm.com> > // To: carolann(a)vortex.mm.com > // > // [icicle.winternet.com] > // Login name: carolann In real life: CarolAnne Braddock > // Directory: /usr2/carolann Shell: /etc/scripts/tcsh-susp > // Last login Thu Jan 5 21:38 on ttyq5 from annex3-1.wintern > // New mail received Thu Jan 5 21:16:23 1995; > // unread since Mon Jan 2 13:18:25 1995 > // Plan: > // This account has been disabled permanently. > // > // Mike Horwath - Admin - Winternet - drechsau(a)winternet.com > // > >

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Re: All I did was properly crosspost! harrassments another story
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 6 Jan 1995, david d `zoo' zuhn wrote: > Sorry, but I don't flame in public fora. I do so in email only. > > The Michigan precedent for email stalking isn't very strong (it also > included several incidents of physical contact as well), so you threats are > not really too worrisome. The last time I checked with various folks about > the Minnesota laws, it's not exactly too clear on email (prosecution in the > situation in question was declined due to lack of confidence in > conviction), so again, I'm not very worried. > > But it doesn't matter since you've just entered my global kill files. > Anything you send to me won't be seen at all. Anywhere. Anyhow. News. > Mail. Etc. Plonk! > > And as a personal note, if your concept of 'dealing' involves making legal > threats at the first possible instance of disagreement, then I think you > need a new concept of 'dealing'. > >

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TRUE NAMES FOR FREE
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Angus Patterson wrote a short while ago: S6>I've been trying to get True Names by Vernor Vinge, and have been told it's >out of print (like most good cypunk ), does anybody have it scanned? Laissez Faire Books has a stockpile and they're giving them away! LF sends you _True_Names_ free when you buy _Solomon's Knife_ by Victor Korman (a pen-name). Order FN5136, $9.95 for both + $3.25 shipping: Laissez Faire, 938 Howard Street #202, San Francisco, CA 94103, tel 800-326-0996, fax 415-541-0597. They have their own Laissez Faire Book News list, too, with previews and samples. Ask Chris Whitten for more info at <whitten(a)panix.com>. "Capt'n Bob" Correspondents: Communications went down recently when 2 remailers shut up shop. A new address will be up and running during next week.

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Re: Your HomePage at winternet.com
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Alex, We have all the web pages. They should be moving to spring.com shortly. It's kinda sad that they bootleg off my net.web.goodwill, as My pages are are at the 200+ access count and rising level per day. The Webbittown pages will remedy this in the not too distant future. (PGP encoded HTML) They should be down by the end of the day. Love Always, Carol Anne > -- > Alex de Joode > usura(a)replay.com Hate mail appreciated, > http://www.xs4all.nl/~usura weekly contest for best death threat. > > >

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