December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

HUMOR: The Train
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Train Author Unknown A few days after Christmas a mother was working in the kitchen, listening to her son playing with his new electric train in the living room. She heard the train stop and here son said, "All you sons of bitches who want off, get the hell off now 'cause this is the last stop And all you sons of bitches who are getting on, get your asses in the train 'cause we're leaving." The mother went in and told her son, "We don't use that kind of language in this house. Now, I want you to go to your room for two hours. When you come out, you may play with your train, but I want you to use nice language." Two hours later, the son comes out of the bedroom and resumes playing with his train. Soon the train stopped and the mother heard her son say, "All passengers who are disembarking the train, please remember to take all your belongings with you. We thank you for riding with us today and hope your trip was a pleasant one. We hope you will ride with us again soon." "For those of you just boarding, we ask you to stow all of your hand luggage under the seat. Remember there is no smoking except in the club car. We hope you will have a pleasant and relaxing journey with us today." "For those of you who are pissed off about the two hour delay, please see the bitch in the kitchen."

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Re: properties of FV
by Nathaniel Borenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from fv: 17-Dec-94 Re: properties of FV eric(a)remailer.net (2015) > The argument I see here is like this: "Not very many people have it, > so we can't use it." Under this rule, FV shouldn't worry about > support for smart front ends, because most people don't have them > already. FV shouldn't try to deploy mechant software, because most > people don't have it already. Now I know that you're not claiming any > of these ridiculous things, that is, outside of cryptography. Interesting analogy. But there's a number of other tradeoffs here. The work involved for us in the case of a smart front end is relatively minimal -- whipping together a safe-tcl-based front end for metamail-enabled mail tools didn't take me very long at all, actually, and it makes for very sexy demos, which as you know is important to marketing types. (Ever tried giving a sexy demo of cryptography? It's sort of like demoing a new kernel. Ooh, how exciting.) So while I am certainly NOT claiming that sexy demos are more important than cryptographic freedom, it is simply true that there was a far larger perceived "bang for the buck" in building the sexy front end. And as for deploying merchant software, well, that IS clearly more essential than cryptography -- you simply can't have a commerce mechanism without sellers! The work involved in adding optional cryptography is much more than you might think, particularly because of our internal security architecture. Basically, without going into a lot of details, the FV crypto-engine would have to live on the non-Internet machines that are not in our direct control, and this would enormously complicate the limited (batch!) communication we facilitate between the Internet and non-Internet machines. Trust me, it isn't trivial by a long shot. That doesn't mean we won't do it, but it does affect our priorities. (It's interesting that in our case, security gets in the WAY of crypto, given the non-cryptographic security mechanisms we've already sete up!) > What I am suggesting is that FV _allow_, not require, the use of > encryption. Your main concern with cryptography, it seemed, was theft > of secret keys. As you agree, that concern can be disposed of. Now > the reason not to use crypto rests on paucity of existing sites which > use it. If FV were to _require_ crypto, there would be grounds for > concern. Yet neither of us think that a crypto requirement is > appropriate for the current FV mechanism. I think we're completely in sync here with regard to everything except the timing: we're a small company and we have to choose our priorities carefully. The crypto option is one we're very interested in adding eventually, but at this point it would be a major strain on our resources. Moreover, frankly, if we did it, that would only serve to mix our message in many peoples' perception. It's hard enough explaining to reporters that "we've discovered that crypto isn't needed for commerce." Their chance of understanding our message would NOT be enhanced if we then added "but we're providing crypto as an option anyway." At this early stage, we have to keep our publicity message as simple as possible. (In fact, I think it's already too complicated, so making it even more complicated is a very hard sell.) > So why, then, will not FV lead for crypto rather than follow? Well, mostly because we're leading for commerce, and we can't lead for everything. Trying to do too many things at once often causes you not to succed at any of them. We do, however, put our money where our mouth is when we say that we believe in the importance of universal access to cryptography -- that's why, even as a startup, we are a significant sponsor of Phil Zimmerman's ongoing work. (We paid for the development of a PGP-encrypted telnet, which will be publicly available soon if it isn't already, and we send monthly checks in support of work related to the development of PGP 3.0.) I think I could argue that this makes us more of a "leader for crypto" than most other companies in the world. We just don't want our belief in the importance of privacy, which is real, to become on obstacle to the success of our business plan, which does not require cryptography, and which in fact REQUIRES making people realize that crypto is not a prerequisite for commerce. > It might be for saving face. Having argued against crypto so > publicly, changing positions so rapidly might be seen to look bad. Heck, no. I will *enjoy* the day when we add cryptographic support, and as I hope I've made clear above, I won't regard this as "changing positions" at all. To be perfectly clear, our position is that crypto would be a valuable future enhancement to our system because it will enhance our users' privacy, not because it will enhance the system's security. We think the system is quite sufficiently secure today, without crypto. I am sorry if we have alienated some crypto-enthusiasts with our "crypto is not needed" argument, but this fact is critical to our business strategy. It is NOT the same as saying "crypto is bad". So if we've been unclear, let me try once more to be crystal clear: 1. Cryptography is a Good Thing. 2. Universal access to cryptography is critical to the future of human freedom. 3. First Virtual has discovered that cryptography is not NECESSARY for Internet commerce, and is trying to use that discovery to stimulate real commerce on the net and to grow our business. 4. Nearly every technology has positive and negative effects. If our discovery sets back the progress of freedom of cryptography, that was never our intent, and we recognize it as a NEGATIVE effect. Just because crypto isn't necessary for commerce doesn't mean it isn't vitally important to the future of humanity. 5. As a social responsible corporate citizen of the net, recognizing the special responsibilities that stem from our invention of crypto-free commerce, First Virtual is proud to sponsor ongoing PGP development, and is open to other opportunities (within our still-limited resources) to help promote the cause of free and universal access to cryptography. > So, I'm confused. What _is_ still the problem? Mostly that there's not enough hours in the day. (To give you an idea of how I spend MY time: In the 36 hour period that ended Saturday morning, during which I was briefly out of town, I received 760 email messages. No kidding. We're a tad busy these days....) The bottom line: First Virtual is not the enemy of cryptography. However, our invention is certainly cause for concern for those among us who thought that commerce would be the "killer app" for making cryptography universally available. We believe that on balance our invention is a very good thing, especially given its democratizing properties (anyone in the world can be a merchant, unlike standard credit cards). We want to work WITH the advocates of crypto to make sure that cryptography remains avialable for privacy, even though we have demonstrated that it isn't necessarily a prerequisite for commerce. -- Nathaniel

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Doomsaying, development, and deployment
by Amanda Walker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A number of people have been saying things that amount to "imminent death of the Cypherpunks mailing list predicted, film at 11." Well, folks, if it dies, it will be the fault of those who just pick up their toys and go home. There's been a fair amount of discontent here in the the last year. I don't think it's a matter of any one flameful discussion (of which many have gone by recently). Rather, I think it's a matter of frustration. PGP has acheived a fair amount of recognition in the user community at large, and lately even in the mainstream press. However, beyond PGP and some anonymous remailers, there's not a lot else out there. There won't *be* anything unless we build it. No one's going to come riding in on his white horse to hand us crypto-security. We all agree we need better tools, and that everyone else needs better tools before they'll start adopting the technology we so fiercely believe can save us from the erosion of our civil liberty and personal privacy. So let's build those tools. Strange as it may seem, I actually have to weigh in on the side of Netscape in some of the arguments that have come by in the last week or so. They are building stuff, after all. That's better than most of the people on this list, from what I can tell. To put my money where my mouth is, I'll shut up completely until I can post an announcement of some useful crypto tool. It might be commercial, but it might be free--my employer does occasionally agree to give stuff away for the good of the Internet. Amanda Walker InterCon Systems Corporation

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Re: properties of FV
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:55 PM 12/17/94, Nathaniel Borenstein wrote: [...] >Well, mostly because we're leading for commerce, and we can't lead for >everything. Trying to do too many things at once often causes you not >to succed at any of them. We do, however, put our money where our mouth >is when we say that we believe in the importance of universal access to >cryptography -- that's why, even as a startup, we are a significant >sponsor of Phil Zimmerman's ongoing work. (We paid for the development >of a PGP-encrypted telnet, which will be publicly available soon if it >isn't already, and we send monthly checks in support of work related to >the development of PGP 3.0.) [...] >So if we've been unclear, let me try once more to be crystal clear: > >1. Cryptography is a Good Thing. > >2. Universal access to cryptography is critical to the future of human >freedom. Hmm. Does everyone that previously flamed the hell out of First Virtual feel kind of stupid now? Dont' get me wrong, I don't have anything wrong with discussing the limitations of First Virtuals protocols or software on the list, that's what the list is for. But it seems kind of counter productive to be viciously flaming people like First Virtual and Mosaic, especially when both have said that they remain committed to cryptography. Heck, if they hadn't said this, it would probably be even more important not to flame them, cause we'd want to convince them to change they're minds. And being rude rarely convinced anyone of anything. I'm just issuing a plea that people try to be a bit less rude on the list in the future, especially with Real Live Commercial Developers. Not that commercial developers are better then the rest of us, but I'm sure we all agree that it would be really nice if commercial software supported strong crypto, and it's really important to get commercial developers to do so. If some of them are listening in on the list, it seems a good opportunity to try to rationally and reasonably explain why crypto is good (if not neccesary, as FV claims), and what sorts of crypto are strong enough and well suited for their applications. Without calling them names.

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QUERY: S/Keyish PGP?
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A quick question: Has anybody considered the possibility of hacking something into PGP's password protection to allow an S/Key like access? IE, I'm sitting here in FL on a 2400 bps modem, telnetted through Netcom's dialup to hks.net, so I'm not bloody likely to be typing my passphrase in and thus am barred from using PGP (without hideous contortions, that is). My questions: - Has anybody done any work on making an S/Key-like mechanism with the assumption that the machine running PGP is (somewhat) secure? This I'm certain is technically possible. More complex: - Has anybody put any thought into a mechanism based upon one-time passwords for regulating PGP private key use on shared, insecure machines (strength == quality of password, of course)? If people could have a widget very much like the Macintosh S/Key widget on their Mac fom which they could cut-n-paste their one time password, it seems like we'd be one step closer to addressing concerns like Tim's. Just a thought... A GUCAPI would make such a mechanism easier, of course (I haven't abandoned the GUCAPI thought: I'm just gestating). - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLvOEUSoZzwIn1bdtAQGRSgF8DAt6/1WjmiU3clMy0E+EU4RDmcF0JaGC Y+pNb8dgOzWXEr9b5EyWM0BS4uqw13mK =Xsa9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: FV & PGP (was Re: First Virtual email security)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sat, 17 Dec 1994 nsb(a)nsb.fv.com wrote: > Once more, with feeling: > > It is NOT an either/or. In the First Virtual system, the credit card > number NEVER GOES OVER THE NET AT ALL, which means that it doesn't go > over the net in the clear AND it doesn't go over the net encrypted. > I got your point from your first response. The remaining 5 were not necessary. I do not continue to question this point. But I might point out that companys doing business on the net might not like having the details of their day to day transactions sniffable, as you can build quite a good business intelligence profile from that type of info. As can the IRS, FBI, etc. Nor would they appreciate being spoofed... I strongly suggest you take another serious consideration of implementing encryption *now* rather than later, as your current scheme is not thorughly protecting the privacy of individuals or organizations until you do. - -NetSurfer #include <standard.disclaimer> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.7: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " o " |P. O. Box 15432 | finger for full PGP key > " " / \ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ G \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLvPiKioZzwIn1bdtAQEBVAGAhjULtzChTtOy5zY0L+kjuzzXXNLfeYAL jJqKiETK5l8GqqGPXr/I+yx3z7PSu3zN =bcUC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Automated Witchhunt: I've been slandered by a script.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On checking my mail early this morning I found this: > Received: from access4.digex.net by nfs1.digex.net with SMTP id AA24362 > (5.67b8/IDA-1.5); Sun, 18 Dec 1994 02:10:05 -0500 > Received: from nfs2.digex.net by access4.digex.net with SMTP id AA23077 > (5.67b8/IDA-1.5); Sun, 18 Dec 1994 02:10:03 -0500 > Received: from netcom17.netcom.com by nfs2.digex.net with SMTP id AA06122 > (5.67b8/IDA-1.5); Sun, 18 Dec 1994 02:10:02 -0500 > Received: by netcom17.netcom.com (8.6.9/Netcom) > id XAA04015; Sat, 17 Dec 1994 23:09:54 -0800 > Date: Sat, 17 Dec 1994 23:09:54 -0800 > Message-Id: <199412180709.XAA04015(a)netcom17.netcom.com> > To: unicorn(a)access.digex.net, cert(a)cert.org, emmanuel(a)well.sf.ca.us, > postmaster(a)access.digex.net, postmaster(a)access.digex.net > Subject: Re: Police & BBS...Sundevil revisited in Florida > From: unicorn (Black Unicorn) > > If you are not aware of the nature of the group alt.2600, I will explain it. > It is a hacker/cracker newsgroup, containing many illegal messages. A great > deal of its posters ask questions about or give advice on compromising > system security, even that of the system they are on. Phone "phreaking" is > freely discussed, and they explain to each other how to cheat the long > distance telephone carriers. Pirate ftp and fsp sites are often traded by > these people, and you should verify that one has not been set up on your > system, and that the user does not have pirated software in his directory. > Such could get your entire site shut down. Other verified topics that people > explain how to do and admit to doing are disrupting irc, spamming, > mailbombing, shoplifting, disrupting public transportation, and similar > dangerous and illegal mischief. > > This automated message is sent for two reasons: > > 1) To alert you of a potential threat to your system's security, in the > cases of users asking about or being told how to attempt to exploit security > vulnerabilities. Also, the poster may be using a stolen account. > > 2) To alert you that there are crackers on your machine. The account used to > post from may not be legitimate, or may be stolen (it is _extremely_ common > with alt.2600 posters to use fraudulently obtained accounts). Or, a post of > its nature may likely be a violation of terms of a membership agreement. > And, the user making this post may be preparing to break into yours or > another system, if they have not done so already. It is suggested that you > keep a close eye on users who have posted to alt.2600, and to inspect their > files and email if the posting warrants such and you can legally do so. > > All headers and complete text of original message follow: > *************************************************************************** > Xref: netcom.com comp.org.eff.talk:42937 alt.cyberpunk:43019 alt.cyberspace:8271 alt.wired:15428 alt.2600:40781 can.infohighway:2284 alt.pagan:82507 alt.bbs:37526 > Path: netcom.com!ix.netcom.com!howland.reston.ans.net!news1.digex.net!access4!unicorn > From: unicorn(a)access4.digex.net (Black Unicorn) > Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.cyberpunk,alt.cyberspace,alt.wired,alt.2600,can.infohighway,alt.pagan,alt.bbs > Subject: Re: Police & BBS...Sundevil revisited in Florida > Followup-To: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.cyberpunk,alt.cyberspace,alt.wired,alt.2600,can.infohighway,alt.pagan,alt.bbs > Date: 12 Dec 1994 20:56:36 GMT > Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA > Lines: 42 > Distribution: inet > Message-ID: <3cide4$e5n(a)news1.digex.net> > References: <D0FFII.BM4(a)freenet.carleton.ca> <gradyD0G6xu.A13(a)netcom.com> <3c94ll$p9t(a)potogold.rmii.com> > NNTP-Posting-Host: access4.digex.net > X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] > > Tommy Watt - G.W. Technologies (gwtek(a)rmii.com) wrote: > : Damn.. . all this reminds me of the bust the local police department did > : on my BBS system.. > > : Under alligations of hacking, they took ALL my computer equipment, > : anything that looked like a computer, anything that couldda been turned > : into a computer, and misc. stuff.. > > : The warrant is pretty much invalid, on the blank where it says "things > : that if found may be seized" is "-- SEE ATTACHMENT 'B'" . . I didnt even > : SEE attachment B, and when I asked for it, they said they dont even have > : to show me this. > > > It's typical to seal this document. > > Unfortunately it's also a tool used for harassment, as you have to go to > a hearing to get the document opened, or looked at by a judge who will > make a determination as to the legitimacy of the sealed materials and > their seizure. > > Guess what the result in your case will be. > (Left as an exercise to the reader.) > > > : This bullshit pisses me off. . . And now they are saying that if > : anything is damaged I can't do shit because my computer equipment was > : "laying out unprotected".. > > Also typical of the type of computer seizures I have seen in past. > > The common practice is to keep the equipment long enough that it's > obsolete when you get it back. Easy to do now-a-days. > > > : Andy Goodwin > > -uni- (Dark) > > -- > 073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est > 6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa - wichtig! > ** end quotation. ** Obviously, I did not post the portion claiming to be an "automated message" and a warning to whomever will listen. Yet, the post claims to be from me. It seems then that someone is running a process which looks for posts to alt.2600, and then automates the above response, original post attached, to warn off system admins, fight crime, save the day, etc. etc. Either that or Lance is bored again. Does this disturb anyone besides me? Most obviously, the misattributation is concerning. Clearly the threat of misattributed automated posting is merely one more argument for digitally signing each and every message and post. Less obvious, but perhaps more ominous is the concept itself of automated postings that amount to censorship chain letters. "System Administrator A didn't pay attention to this message and refused to snoop into his users directories and three weeks later his system was shut down. System Administrator B headed this letter's warning, and saved his access provider from certain doom!" Look carefully at what this letter says, what it urges system operators to do. 1> Because alt.2600 is occasionally used to trade pirate ftp sites, those who post to alt.2600 are probably pirates. ergo, System Admins. should check the directory of any users who post to alt.2600. If you don't snoop, your system will be shut down. 2> alt.2600 is used to promote shoplifting, and irc disruption. (No relevance is even attempted by the message on this point.) And the purpose of the letter? 1> To alert you that this user is probably posting from a stolen account. That the named user is probably a security risk, a troublemaker, a political dissident, or whatever else comes to mind. 2> "To alert you that there are crackers on your machine." Not that there MAY BE crackers, not that crackers are known to be on alt.2600, and therefore may be on your system, but that crackers ARE ON YOUR MACHINE. If the bald misrepresentation of this statement evades anyone who reads this, I simply give up all hope. 3> That the post may be a violation of the access provider's membership agreement. (As if the automated or manual sender of the message has any idea what the membership agreement of my particular provider might be) 4> The user making this post may be preparing to break into [your machine] or another system, if they have not done so already. 5> To suggest that system admins. "...keep a close eye on users who have posted to alt.2600, and to inspect their files and email [if it's legal]." For those recipients of this message that do not know me, I am an attorney, a member of the D.C. bar, and a law abiding person. The allegation that I, by replying to a message crossposted to alt.2600, am a hacker, a cracker, a shoplifter, a vandal, or whatever other villan of the week you might choose to insert is absurd. The above message constitutes slander, defamation of character, and is entirely untrue in any regard to me other than in so far as it indicates my words might have reached alt.2600 at some time or another. The content of my original quoted message alone should indicate to any reader how absurd the "automated posting"'s allegations are, and demonstrate the pure uselessness of such an approach as of means of accomplishing anything more than to annoy, accuse, threaten, and waste bandwidth. The fact that the automated posting proports to be sent from me almost makes whatever hacking I am supposed to have done seem tame. >From a legal standpoint, the automated posting is entirely lacking in any basis whatsoever for increased scrutiny of my, or any other account address which it slanders. Directing scrutiny to accounts posting at one time or another to "questionable" newsgroups should prompt one to ask one's self about the state of free speech in cyberspace, and increasingly, in this country. What has become of our system that discussion forums, be they on "questionable" topics or not, become probable cause for investigating system users, or rummaging through accounts. I hereby inform the system administrators on my provider, as well as others, that I would consider increased attention to my account, or any other based on this sham of an "automated posting," harassment, invasion without cause, a violation of several electronic privacy acts, and simple witch hunting. Should I come by any indication that such attention is directed to my account, I shall immediately terminate my account with Express Access, and pursue what legal action is available to me to the full extent possible. System administrators would do well to inform themselves of the requirements for intrusion into users accounts, the protections provided those accounts both by statute, and constitution. hile anonymous writings, political speech and literary products have a long and sacred history in the United States, baseless accusations leveled by anonymous finger pointers do not. I find the tactic and tone of this automated posting distasteful and offensive in the extreme. I urge system admins at my, and other providers, to discourage the use of such automated witchhunts, and expose the party/parties responsible for the distribution. I, for one, would be very interested in talking to the individual/s responsible. -uni- (Dark) [unicorn(a)access.digex.net] 073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est 6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa - wichtig!

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alt.2600 spam
by dfloyd＠io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [Post deleted about auto-reply to one's system adminstrator if (s)he posts on alt.2600 by Black Unicorn] FWIW, the person doing that crud on Netcom has had his/her account yanked permanently. (note new PGP key...) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBLvQTJ1LUeLjqSiixAQFJugf+L3Ri8JGMYJ9Mwn1O+mVbR4Hwz4l1grpV KfhBg46jjlypQ4/9SGn+OsEq9JVb2nF4VySzbsS2hV4RW42WIMkv4F23AqDVbusT 1L7dxZIGC8MZB+XdYMHTxf7AaNmSfyTzSHxGPWhVyvaC8D6+DKmrpZS0Md/lqdiF zG/MQgOkwfln0MDk1D3UN6ExUz+HkSFHvd4jGtNQtP4ufps404MTEuCbFPc36bqY V+btOmzDJs4gwGaXk0Bmal59xYaygn3CWlbNM5zOhS1IjShLEo3Re9/Yb7U25Fr+ /Qxg5kd084CE5svclXKxG/963UKQHY1ovv7kfATMIMF37M0mT1lpBw== =pDsV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Kibo recommends PGP to Bob Rae (fwd)
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For those who don't know, Kibo is a fairly famous Usenet personality. I've no idea whether he uses PGP, but it's encouraging to see him recommending it to Bob Rae.... - - -L. Futplex McCarthy Forwarded article: > Newsgroups: ont.general,alt.religion.kibology > From: kibo(a)world.std.com (James "Kibo" Parry) > Subject: Re: Thanks > Message-ID: <D0t4Aq.LE9(a)world.std.com> > References: <1994Dec9.222452.21478(a)govonca.gov.on.ca> > Date: Wed, 14 Dec 1994 15:28:02 GMT > > [ont.general] > In <1994Dec9.222452.21478(a)govonca.gov.on.ca> premier(a)govonca.gov.on.ca (Premier of Ontario) writes: > > Many thanks to those of you who flamed the PC pranksters. I knew > > when I went online that I would have to deal with fake posts and related > > chaff. > > Might I suggest looking into using a PGP signature to prevent this from > happening again? [...] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLvQZVGf7YYibNzjpAQEsUgQA1Nm6MZtxFub2lvx3QE70sht2dQyvR9iC 1PXdNhImVm5/Wlu6+xJbEQBIBB229+F4NOrs8E4T9f5/ZjEyZQnW9AsRQ4KQwThz ShUAf//6RIOcOWj9qc5YZWjAXxFaaq9nud7bAbZ+sTwiw+2/5y1lZSWhcF8nfeXw UesP86rCjKw= =oNiJ - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLvQahyoZzwIn1bdtAQGuugGAmrWYvSpkE9IGBm9+DrxU4Mn0XKPT5ovm D+3A6cSINGhiEY2EAg/YV0RUxXYMz2yY =30UW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by bryce＠cybernet.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Well thats 2 replys, Man it`s going to be packed! :) > >When a meeting happens what do we discuss?/do? > - an obvious one would be NZ crypto! > - New crypto ideas? > - NZ Anon remailers & Repositorys > - Patents??? (maybe not) > - Cryptanalasis (Hopefully, oh please-oh please) We haven't heard from Peter Gutmann yet (probably because he is so busy), but if he turns up it would be interesting to hear about any future plans for SFS. I don't mind explaining a little bit about some areas of cryptanalysis, maybe the various sieves. Chris might want to talk about some hardware ideas. >PS: Why do we need a workstation? (probably a dumb question) To try stuff out, play with programs, broadcast the nonsense worldwide over the net <grin> ... We don't need one, we just need people who have a common interest and something to say about it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 Comment: Please note my current address is bryce(a)cybernet.co.nz iQCVAwUBLvJtYtXxuu4HpwwBAQF9PgP/ZLORHZjtNqchFHZSuhHfqQIFqrfdJIyI C7J7jCSnpt8cEqdZKJf2xSU6oeITg8oL388KwqY+O0em2O0QyiWqNZZcv4oJItFs 4R/lECvtrO9a5YbNyT4tgzFXWM2muULoYbSog2FhUlFOkNAfwRaJCqIghQceOrzF apRh15/AH1I= =3/2q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bryce Boland <bryce(a)cybernet.co.nz> Finger for PGP Public Key

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NYT on Pentium
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Markoff writes today on Intel's mishandling of the Pentium flaw. Mr. T May quoted. For email copy send blank message with subject: 585_999 Here are few excerpts: In recent weeks, evoking memories of Richard Nixon at the height of the Watergate crisis, Mr. Grove has retreated to his "war room" inside the company's corporate headquarters in Santa Clara. *** 'Righteousness' How did a sporadic arithmetic error that was not detected for months, in the chip that Intel insists is its most heavily tested microprocessor in history, become the heart of such a debacle? The answer is rooted in Intel's distinctive corporate culture, and suggests that Intel went wrong in much the same way as other big and unresponsive companies before it. Intel has traditionally valued engineering over product marketing. Inward-looking and wary of competitors (from experience with the Japanese), it developed a bunker mentality, a go-for-the-jugular attitude and a reputation for arrogance. "There are certain elements in Intel's culture, and one is righteousness," said Federico Faggin, a former Intel engineer and co-inventor of its first microprocessor. "The attitude at Intel is, 'We're better than everyone else and what we do is right and we never make mistakes.' " *** But the technologist's mind-set did little to prepare Intel for the consumer marketplace. Although it spent hundreds of millions of dollars on its "Intel Inside" and Pentium ad campaigns, the consumer-oriented strategy unraveled last month when Mr. Grove dismissed customers' requests for chips to replace the Pentium. *** "What Intel clearly should have done is issued a bug report as soon as they found out it was a reproducible problem," said Timothy May, a former Intel semiconductor engineer. "Instead, by keeping it mum, they backed themselves into a corner." But although he has issued a public apology for the flaw, Mr. Grove has been unwilling to personally come forward in an effort to restore customer confidence. "The test of a great company is in how they handle disasters," said James F. Moore, head of Geopartners, a high-tech consulting firm. "This is one where you can't behave like a paranoid. This is one where only the compassionate survive."

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cypherpunks mentioned in Z Magazine
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was an article in Z Magazine about the RC4 disclosure, and IP and information in general on the internet, in which the cypherpunks were mentioned. They got a lot of information confused about cypherpunks, but over all it was an interesting article. Here's the first portion of the article, in which cypherpunks were given prominence. If anyone wants to write them and clear up their confusion between anonymous remailers and mailing lists, or other errors about the 'punks (which generally cast us in a worse light then we should be), their address is: Z Magazine 18 Millfield St Woods Hole, MA 02543 ******** Pandora's Mailbox; RC4 a secret no longer by Mark Chen On September 9 there appeared on the Cypherpunk's Internet mailing list a short piece of computer code purporting to be RSA Data Security's secret RC4 cipher algorithm. RC4 is one of the most widely used commercial ciphers, but its internals have for years been a guarded trade secret--a status that changes within hours, as the program fragment, which simple tests revealed to be the genuine article, traversed the the farthest corners of the Net via e-mail, bulletin boards, and file transfer. State Department export regulations, as well as intellectual property laws, were smoothly rendered moot. As Cypherpunks founder Tim May says, "National Borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." Soon after RC4 hit the Net, RSA Data Security (RSADSI) issued a statement that read in part: "It has come to RSA Data Security's attention that certain RSA trade secrets, in the form of confidential and propietary source code, have been misappropriated and disclosed..." "...Not only is this act a violation of law, but it's publication is a gross abuse of the Internet. RSA has begun an investigation and will proceed with legal action against anyone found to have violated its intellectual property rights." Setting aside the questionable legal basis of these threats, why doesn't RSADSI bring charges against the person who originally released the code? The answer is that they don't know who did it. The code was distributed through a mechanism called a "mailing list," a system that distributes e-mail to people who have signed up to receive messages on a given topic. For example, if you were interested in fish, you might sign up for an aquarium hobbyists' list. People could then send email to the list server, and the e-mail would be forwarded to everyone on the list. RC4 was posted to the Cyperpunks "anonymous remailers" list. When an anonymous remailer receives a message, it strips off all of the sender information and remails the message under an anonymous pseudonym. Thsi effectively breaks the link between sender and recipients, and makes tracing impossible. The intended purpose of these remailers is to allow free distribution of various intellectual "commodities" whose distribution is ordinarily discouraged by law or custom. A Cypherpunk faction called the Information Liberation Front has long used anonymous remailing to distribute inaccessible, expensive, copyrighted literature. Moreover, the remailers serve as technological guarantee of the right to free speech. They allow unpopular opinions to be voiced, while protecting the authors of those opinions from retribution. Far from being a "gross abuse of the Internet," as RSADSI maintains, the distribution of RC4 was a case of the Internet doing what it does best--propogating ideas. While this act may or may not have been a violation of human-made laws, it was a faithful exercise of the natural laws of information flow... [etc etc]

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No Subject
by pgut01＠cs.aukuni.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>We haven't heard from Peter Gutmann yet (probably because he is so busy), but >if he turns up it would be interesting to hear about any future plans for SFS. >I don't mind explaining a little bit about some areas of cryptanalysis, maybe >the various sieves. Chris might want to talk about some hardware ideas. I seem to have been dropped in at the tail end of the discussion, so if you can let me know what it's about I'll be able to disagree with you about it. Peter.

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PGP-Pine Scripts?
by Jason Burrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Are there any scripts out there to set Pine 3.91 up to use PGP for message encryption and signing? I would prefer to stay away from installing a 1MB+ executable, since I have neither the root privlidges on this machine or the disk space for such an endevour. Thanks. - -- Jason Burrell | PGP 2.6 public key available by finger. Geek Code (V2.1): | GCS/CM/S/M d++ H s:+ !g !p+ !au !a w+++ v+\(---)>!v San Antonio, TX | C++ UC+ P+>++++ L+ 3 E+ N+++ K--- W--- M-- !V -po+ | Y++ t++++ 5+++ jx R+ G tv++ b++ D- B-- e u++>+++ h* f+ | r* n---->+++ y? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLvSZaCoZzwIn1bdtAQHYvgF9GlGCfkFh9I/RMyRdXyuR55ELZQ6kHkiP MKf5XzOXt3S+bMs7uF12S/O3xaHCTVWf =jqpA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Remailer at myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu??
by Mark Terka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I take it the above remailer has bitten the dust? I didn't see it in Ralph's last list.

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2048 bit keys
by Tony.Gurnick＠nzdairy.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw a thread here a couple of weeks ago about generating 2048 bit keys after the 15-dec. I cant remember how to do it, can somebody please enlighten me??? T

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Name that phone
by Philip Zimmermann 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm trying to come up with a name for the secure phone software I'm planning on releasing. The software would turn any multimedia PC into a secure phone. I'm open to suggestions for the name. Some names that have been suggested: 1) Voice PGP 2) Pretty Good Secure Phone (PGSP) 3) PGP Phone I like 2 or 3. Does anyone want to suggest other names, or vote for which of these is better? Send your replies to prz(a)acm.org, with the subject line of "Name that phone". The winner will get a free copy. But then, so will a lot of other people.

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Re: Remailer at myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu??
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mark Terka writes: > I take it the above remailer has bitten the dust? I didn't see it in Ralph's > last list. I asked about this on the remailer-operators list the other day. It seems Matt G. asked Raph to remove it from the list temporarily; I think he's just gone on vacation for a little while. - - -L. Futplex McCarthy - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLvT2d2f7YYibNzjpAQEPTAQAt5nqYycS//ebW9ZsISwshdUtYmMHlGox 6WdkaU0x27whC08ppk3MULMVERXmRRAxs7yUcFUeea/nmjQFGqnITprWGW0h2ONl CqL1XNvp7miky/L0ESbM1H+fm1e2bWObn1mh57LQuzuX5pW01EB+g7pw8L8yJgs3 qqH747EZfaM= =vz9F - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLvT5AioZzwIn1bdtAQG8SgF/UK/GUXDynLdM3hv0sHs1ev75lPIKFRPz Yvv3BdJg8B9jlhf9nfIgfPaTnrmfPtn+ =h8gc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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freedom+diversity=noise
by mkj＠october.ducktown.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This list appears to be going through some sort of crisis. Tim May has quit, others are threatening to quit, and the messages criticizing the list itself threaten to outnumber those on all other topics! Frankly, I don't get it. What's everybody so upset about? A few arguments, some bad manners? Can we afford to be so sensitive? Now, I admit I don't read every message posted here (who has the time?), but I read a fair sampling, and I haven't seen anything half as bad as what I face every day on the subway. At least on this list, nobody has ever pulled a weapon on me! Personally I don't understand why some people are so bothered by the noise here and elsewhere on the nets. Sticks and stones and all that, you know? But a number of people here have even suggested that the Cypherpunks list, at least in its present form, is near the end of its useful life. I would like to go on record as strongly DISagreeing with that suggestion. Sure, I wish we were making more progress faster, but I think we are doing better than many of us realize. The job is not an easy one, and in my experience, I have found that difficult jobs demand perseverance above all other virtues. However, it seems that every time a forum, list, newsgroup or whatever becomes too popular, it reaches a "critical mass" at which people start complaining that everything is ruined, and soon thereafter the forum splinters and/or switches to a moderated format. Thinking about the phenomenon, I came up with the following brilliant (ahem) generalization, which I humbly dub "mkj's law": FREEDOM + DIVERSITY = NOISE Where "noise" is defined as any behavior(s) which a significant portion of the group finds undesirable. The above law appears to apply not only to network forums, but equally well to other types of social groups. (Note for example that mkj's law is inextricably linked with the old amateur-radio principle, "One Man's Signal is Another Man's Noise".) Mkj's law has disturbing implications, in that "noise" (which is normally considered a Bad Thing) is shown to be an inevitable consequence of the combination of freedom and diversity (which are normally considered Good Things). Mkj's law also states that there are only two ways to reduce the noise in any group: (1) Crack down on freedom (impose controls on behavior, the job of police in the physical realm or moderators/censors in the informational realm); or (2) Crack down on diversity (usually by restricting group membership, or perhaps by other means such as strong charismatic leadership). Note that this "mkj's law" stuff is a first-draft, brand-new idea for me; I'm not taking a firm position, just soliciting comments. ObCrypto-Philosophy: Clearly, at the root of the Cypherpunks agenda -- or any pro-privacy agenda -- lies a presumption that freedom and diversity are Good Things, whereas "noise reducers" like censorship, prejudice, and intrusive law-enforcement are Bad Things. I share this presumption. But it might be an interesting exercise to ask: If we can't accept with good grace the current noise on the Cypherpunks list, how are we going to like real life in a global society where freedom and diversity have been greatly increased by "crypto-anarchy"? Will the "global village" fragment into isolationist cliques? Even sooner, will the Cypherpunks? --- mkj P.S. Since I don't recall posting my public key to this list before: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi3q+mcAAAEEAOKHMopu6yj57rtwamGwh79bpxAzcbysIJ17PNc/D902WEHG m81FyrcjZaWgj2jX+JYPKqPrOmy72arHJjP5wkAFd2VG5p+WdQjkwXtObOoJ5qfd l+twaRqZVvl4gDiBoFrdrwVSGxXGqAMLOP3VvcQk3uH4y6GmdF11Wd4tm8clAAUR tC5NYWhhdG1hIEthbmUtSmVldmVzIDxta2pAb2N0b2Jlci5kdWNrdG93bi5vcmc+ =Eb3a - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLvYFdl11Wd4tm8clAQH20AP9ESKpTtl3C926QDOzUZXISQLWDWY6hsxd 1i3g29cePDDfb29D4LweXp5GTJTpGwHE5saXpPuveFrsWUN8KUOBlJRG0g+Sj1JP ZR3QAb/hRlEJBoi7bgpZJQOijXdJIV2oevO5Q9CinRP56CEudCnAhi3xqX5dfMeL ikAwokXsB44= =Nl3X -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 2

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.30.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.bsu.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer(a)jpunix.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric post"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)replay.com> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"desert"} = "<remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"xs4all"} = "<remailer(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"q"} = "<q(a)c2.org> cpunk hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. Last ping: Mon 19 Dec 94 6:00:03 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- usura usura(a)replay.com +***++*+**** 7:47 99.99% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *+*****+**** 4:24 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org +++-+++++-++ 41:24 99.99% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi *****+*+**** 29:39 99.99% nately remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu ++++++.+++++ 1:29:04 99.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ************ 2:19 99.99% flame tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org ***+-++**+* 8:57 99.99% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com *-*++**+**** 11:44 99.97% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu -**++******* 5:59 99.96% mix mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu **+++*.+++++ 1:26:32 99.96% desert remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl .--------.-- 14:21:48 99.99% jpunix remailer(a)jpunix.com ** +-++**+* 8:35 99.78% q q(a)c2.org *-+--++ 49:41 99.79% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl --..-----. 17:07:50 99.99% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ****** ****+ 10:59 99.50% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu ._........ 10:05:18 99.41% xs4all remailer(a)xs4all.nl ****+ +**** 8:09 99.10% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org *---___..-.- 30:10:54 82.77% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -.-+ 5:00:06 27.26% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. ek Encrypt responses in relpy blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. Comments and suggestions welcome! Raph Levien

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Secure Phone software
by xpat＠vm1.spcs.umn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 18 Dec 1994, Philip Zimmermann wrote: > I'm trying to come up with a name for the secure phone software I'm > planning on releasing. The software would turn any multimedia PC > into a secure phone. OK, how about: IronClad StonePhone BuzzOff SpeakEasy SpeakFreely BlackHole BlackPipe SecurePipe MYOB (Mind Your Own Business, in the spirit of PGP) Wall To Wall (WTW) <--this gets my vote ---------------------------------------------------------------------- P M Dierking xpat(a)vm1.spcs.umn.edu |

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Name that phone
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MMPCPGPVSP ( MultiMedia PC PGP-Voice-Secure Phone ) PGVEPCP ( Pretty Good Voice Encryped PC Phone ) Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Ho Blanc

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NONE
by nobody＠rebma.rebma.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matthew Ghio, You've done a great job in the past and continue to do so, but for the past week some (all?) of your users have not been getting any mail. What happened? Post to cypherpunks, remailer-operators, alt.privacy or alt.anonymous.messages, alt.abuse.recovery (either one. You choose). Thanks. END

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MacPGP
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now I have something nice to say about MacPGP: It can take its input and output from the clip board. This makes it about half as much work as it was before. Look in "Dialog Shortcuts" under the "Options" menu.

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Name that phone (fwd)
by skaplin＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <m0rJY60-0002N6C(a)maalox.ppgs.com>, you wrote: > I like 2 or 3. Does anyone want to suggest other names, or vote for > which of these is better? Send your replies to prz(a)acm.org, with the > subject line of "Name that phone". The winner will get a free copy. > But then, so will a lot of other people. Hi Phil, How about S.P.I.T. S ecure P hone I mplementation or interphase T erminal or technology Then you could S.P.I.T. on the government as they tried to listen to your conversations or S.P.I.T. on your employer as they tried to monitor your phone usage. Or you could S.P.I.T. in the wind if you have no one to call. ;) More names will probably follow. Sam ============================================================================== If you think education is expensive, try ignorance. - Derek Bok, 1978 ============================================================================== skaplin(a)skypoint.com | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard | outside a Roman brothel. PGP encrypted mail is accepted and | preferred. | Change is the only constant in the | Universe..."Four quarters, please." E-mail key(a)four11.com for PGP Key or | Finger skaplin(a)mirage.skypoint.com | Smile!! Big brother is watching. ============================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: This message digitally signed to verify the identity of the sender iQEVAwUBLvU19clnXxBRSgfNAQESywf/RAZpscfhMJiJhb61GxMc9ar4tC0WiuJu NOhgLd+hGoNfuue3byCjFz5OScsfmYKyr2mpmLi4a/38UPvOV1ZXc5jqxYv0mI0b uqsIKf+YJQvxRQi9uXlFf03SPs/Omx6hYVjpkEjbHSIj+YiNB9eBuxV/3lBWLjHg mJ1Ul/nYJv6106DGbE5wrBVxUX7N2UBKLn7B8785vJGTHPz1aa1xl6VJtCIm3E3C HQN3F0joR4H6iPoAgo7qyRPvPIed9yk/Rnj5nyR7kRiFnAEJQ8DZuke/xLHKsXo7 OoB5fqPxD9Se6vFewql8JccW1fsakExTpO9YpcptXnkhXZrfo5/1bw== =wQO2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0