December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Brands excluded from digicash beta
by Wolfgang Roeckelein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, paul(a)poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux) wrote: >The more I deal with Digicash, the better First Virtual looks. My technical >preference is for using Brands or Chaum cash; at present, though, there aren't >any shipping Brands servers, and the Digicash folks don't seem to be able to >get all their socks in one bag. Does anybody know how the chaum patents (I think they claimed somewhere that they had applied for some) affect Brands system? Wolfgang --- Dipl.-Wirtsch.-Inf. Voice: +49 261 6509 173 Wolfgang Roeckelein Fax: +49 261 6509 179 WHU Koblenz E-Mail: roeckelein(a)wi.whu-koblenz.de Burgplatz 2 (NeXTmail ok) D-56179 Vallendar Germany

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Re: using us crypto sw outside usa
by adam.philipp＠ties.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >I was wondering what is the legal status for using rsaref outside usa. >Is it legal or not? Depends on whether RSA has a patent in that country... I know of no countries besides the U.S.A. that have a patent on RSA. Using exact code may also violate copyright...that is a tougher matter to prove...but copyright treaties allow some level of international protection...use with care. >Also, what is the legal status of RC4 code posted to the net? It was a trade secret. It is no longer...Copyright issues still are still a problem, but ask an attorney in your country if you are going to use it in a commercial program. Adam Philipp - -- PGP Key available on the keyservers. Encrypted E-mail welcome. SUB ROSA: Confidential, secret, not for publication. -Black's Law Dictionary GJ/CS d H S:+ g? p? au+ a- w+ v++ c++ UL+ UU+ US+ P+ 3 E N++ k- W++ M-- V po- Y++ t++ 5+ jx R G' tv+ b+++ D++ B--- E+++ u** h-- f++ r+ n+ y++-- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt74TCoZzwIn1bdtAQGrwgF/WOBO0J7eZDmrYd+TrirztXE+0DPG7ODN Gj8VMHuFpWEh92FV1/wkcOlBTQ7bfxtH =DdWH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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The thread that would not die. (Mandating signatures)
by John.Schofield＠sprawl.expressnet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It is silly to talk of someone "owning" the list. The list is a community. The only possible owners are the people in the community. If we all left, Eric would still have control over the list--but the list would be worthless. It is just as silly, though, to talk about whether or not Eric has the "right" to enforce his ideas. He *CAN* make changes to the list--anything else is irrelevant. This whole discussion seems to be based on the idea that signing everything is a Good Thing. Yet I haven't seen a convincing argument for that. If I read a forged message, I haven't been hurt. If the person being impersonated doesn't exist, nobody has been harmed--and if he does, ONLY that person has been harmed. So, let's put the onus here where it belongs. If people feel their reputations are important enough that they need to sign their messages, more power to them. If they don't feel it is important, who are you to tell them the value of THEIR reputations? When signatures are easy enough to do, the scale will balance on the side of security--people will value their reputations more than the trouble it takes to sign messages. Until then, people will not sign. For me, signing is easy--even though I am ridiculously unconnected right now. So I do it, using an off-line mail-reader shell that I wrote and distributed myself. The list members who are convinced that digital signatures are valuable could do much more to advance their cause by eliminating some of the barriers to using digital signatures than by mandating them. Any type of a stick will not work very well in this situation. The people most interested in privacy and encryption are those who are by nature most individualistic and stubborn. Forcing them to do something will make most of them go the other way, or go away. I know my mind works that way. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 Comment: Call 818-345-8640 voice for info on Keep Out magazine. iQCVAwUBLt6x1Wj9fvT+ukJdAQGKcAP/TqIF6b8UEo6IWV93JdktGoYSxQ5w6wKw MR3tXicSCRI1S/tSOSqcZm45M9CExKz7W4z417Ip8iP/wzjEmAb+s0ObgRoxoHPL Xe+VFSYq6o7f5XT67eBr+lK6t+pknmkc626Z86LsjqKIZ5jBLZrpKzmOP+La2Ypv /uE1/ZckzbA= =G1kK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **EZ-PGP v1.07 --- Blue Wave/RA v2.12 -- |Expressnet: John Schofield 11:310/12 |Internet: John.Schofield(a)sprawl.expressnet.org | | Standard disclaimer: The views of this user are strictly his own.

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Re: Scalability of Ecash System / Article on Internet Cash available.
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Filched from buyinfo, where they've been talking a lot about e$ lately... >From: brands(a)cwi.nl >Original-From: Stefan.Brands(a)cwi.nl >Subject: Re: Scalability of Ecash System / Article on Internet Cash available. >To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com >Date: Thu, 1 Dec 1994 16:12:50 +0100 (MET) >Cc: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >Mime-Version: 1.0 >X-UIDL: 786299434.063 > >I noticed that the discussion is currently about the e-cash system of >DigiCash. Some good issues have been raised in the discussion, and I >would like to comment in detail about my own opinion in these matters. >As it so happens, I recently wrote an article that addresses in detail >each of the raised concerns, and for this reason it seemed easiest to >simply make this article available by ftp. So I did. The paper is >entitled "Electronic Cash on the Internet," and will appear in the >Proceedings of the Internet Society 1995 Symposium on Network and >Distributed System Security, San Diego, California, Februari 16-17, >1995. To retrieve it: log in anonymously at ftp.cwi.nl, and go to the >directory pub/brands. There you will find the paper, in both dvi and >PostScript format (and Unix-compressed formats). The paper contains >several drawings; if you want to have the complete paper, including >the pictures, then you *must* retrieve the PostScript version. I made >a particular effort to explain the concepts behind the system (many of >which are due to Chaum); see Section 3, it is about five pages with no >math. > > Short abstract of the paper: It is generally realized that the Internet > will not be able to offer full-fledged electronic marketplace > capabilities without a suitable electronic mechanism for processing > payments. The electronic payment mechanism that is presented offers a > variety of features that are believed to be particularly appealing in > this respect. > > To participate, an Internet user must interface to his computer a > tamper-resistant device with an ordinary 8-bit microprocessor, > typically a PCMCIA card, and install some software. Internet service > providers do not need special hardware. Payments can be made > completely *off-line*, and are untraceable and unlinkable. > Multi-party security is guaranteed without parties having to trust > other parties. Transaction processing speeds are such that even > modestly equipped computers will be able to meet the performance > levels required by demanding Internet payment applications. One > particularly interesting such application is click-and-pay ability > when travelling World-Wide-Web links. > >The presented approach may seem to be less attractive than many other >proposals, because it requires tamper-resistant hardware for the >users. In the longer run, though, when the use of e.g. smart cards for >electronic payments has become commonplace, the advantages in my >opinion will significantly outweigh this objection. What will remain >are the advantages: click-and-pay ability to make instantaneous >off-line payments, the ability to cost-effectively serve tens of >millions of participants, the ability to guarantee one's own privacy, >multi-party security, support for different currencies, and >portability of tamper-resistant devices to other payment platforms. > > >Some brief comments on the current discussion: > >--- Michael E. Peirce (mepeirce(a)alf2.tcd.ie) wrote: > >I've been looking at the Ecash payment system and was wondering about > >the problem of scalability if it were to become popular. > >(For anyone who doesn't already know, Ecash is an electronic cash > >solution, details of which can be found at http://www.digicash.com ) > >It seems to me that, while their bank (bank.digicash.com) will be able > >to handle the 10,000 odd users in the trial, how would it cope with the > >possibly thousands of transactions that might take place all over the > >Internet, every minute, if the system were to become popular? > >Every transaction requires that the merchant shop, connect to the bank > >to validate the customers coins, right? > >With a popular Ecash system, the bank would be swamped, or what if even > >the link to the bank went down for a few days? > > Hal (hfinney(a)shell.portal.com) wrote: > >There has to be a single common database which all the banks share in > >order to detect double spending. Otherwise I could spend the same coin > >multiple times, going to a different bank each time. Granted, shared > >databases can work, but if a machine which holds part of the database goes > >down it will take special engineering to keep things consistent and > >available. > >There are two different senses in which we can speak of multiple banks. > >One is a setup where all the banks share the same type of cash, where > >they are logically a single bank but distributed to try to get increases > >in reliability. This has the database consistency and access problems I > >described above, which modern-day bank systems don't have to the same > >extent. > > I fully agree with these comments. Btw, it is correct that the e-cash > system of DigiCash is an *on-line* *coin* system. It is interesting to > take a look at their faq, at > http://www.digicash.com/ecashinfo/ecash-faq.html, item > "Does ecash really have to be online?". There is sais: "Actually, no. [...] > We'll add some more functionality in that area as soon as the on-line > system is completely operational." Furthermore, in item "If I copy my > money, can I spend it twice," it sais: "In an off-line > situation (future) ..." From these comments of DigiCash, it seems that > they very well realize the problems associated with on-line verification > when the system is used on a large scale, and that they hope to implement > an off-line system in the future. However, a problem with this might be > the following, as noted by Jim McCoy (mccoy(a)io.com) > >[first part] > >A digital money system can do that, but the current version of Chaum's > >system does not. The disadvantage of a system that does this > >self-identification of double-spenders is that it front-loads the cost of > >the identification protocol into everyone's withdrawls and purchases; they > >must use a cut-and-choose system during withdrawl to make sure that the > >coins presented for blinding are in the proper format and must perform an > >additional protocol negotiation during purchases. > >[...] The overhead involved in the necessary machinations to make sure > >that a malicious cheater did not send in bogus coins that mis-identified > >him increases the transaction cost of such a system significantly. It also > >increases the transaction cost of purchases by requiring the merchant and > >purchaser to perform an additional transaction to reveal halves of the > >identity bits after each purchase. > >[second part] > >It is an interesting version of the > >digital coin protocols, but one that is unlikely to be used in the > >immediate future due to the increased costs it places upon the system. It > >is likely that such a system will first appear in smartcard digital cash > >systems where dedicated hardware can cut down on the increased costs. > > The first part is correct, the overhead caused by the cut-and-choose > withdrawal protocols seems unacceptable. Another problem, which > certainly should not be forgotten, is that is can hardly be said to be > sufficient if only traceability of double-spenders after the fact is > offered. It is clearly desirable that there is prior restraint of > double-spending, and ideally the traceability ater the fact should still > be present (as a second line of defense). Now, doing off-line cash with > prior restraint of double-spending, *and* privacy of payments, seems to > result in extremely inefficient systems when one uses the cut-and-choose > technique of Chaum/Fiat/Naor (just try it, and you'll see what I mean...). > Probably these are the main reasons why DigiCash has not implemented an > off-line system. (Yet a third problem is that it is really cumbersome > to use a coin system if each coin is several kilo-bytes...) > > This is not to say that efficient privacy-protecting off-line cash systems > with prior restraint of double-spending do not exist. The system that I > present in my paper mentioned above meets all these criteria. The > reason for this is that I do *not* use a cut-and-choose withdrawal protocol. > As those of you who have tried to design off-line systems will > know, the design in fact consists of two protocols, one for paying and one > for withdrawal; designing the withdrawal protocol is by far the > hardest task (which is still an understatement...). The > technique that I use for my withdrawal protocols is a new one, called > restrictive blinding, and the only one known thus far that can provide > efficient withdrawal protocols. Curiously enough, most of the withdrawal > protocols that result from this technique are *not* ordinary blind > signature protocols as defined in > literature (because only the signature is blinded---the message is not!). > The withdrawal protocol in my Internet paper is a blind signature protocol, > but for instance the withdrawal protocol that I used in my technical > report (reference 5 in the paper) is not. > >-- Hal (hfinney(a)shell.portal.com) wrote: > >I wish I could. I have applied several times for the beta test at > >digicash, starting almost three months ago. Finally I got a reply at the > >beginning of November saying that I would be hearing from them in a few > >days. Since then, nothing. I wonder if people are actually being > >allowed to join the beta trial as are implied by all of these web pages? > >I would like to see a more honest explanation of the chances of being > >able to experience ecash than the simple "click here to try it out" you see > >everywhere. > > I had exactly the same experience; I sent in the registration several > months ago. I'm still waiting for my account, which was announced to me at > the beginning of this month. > > >Stefan Brands, >------------------------------------------------------ >CWI, Kruislaan 413, 1098 SJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands >Tel: +31 20 5924103, e-mail: brands(a)cwi.nl > > > > > > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Brands excluded from digicash beta
by Paul Dinnissen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, We're sorry to hear any complaints about the handling of any requests for information regarding ecash. As you can understand, we are certaintly not planning to create unsatisied ecash users at the very start of the ecash endeavour. So at least we are happy to hear from you so we can act appropriately. DigiCash has the ambitious goal to make the ecash client software available on virtually every OS platform and/or system. Alas, our programmers crew is not that extensive that we're able to release everything at once, we has to resort to a phased release approach. For some insight in the release history of the sundry ecash versions, we refer to our WEB server pages. With this background we answer your questions and remarks, at the hand of some of quote orginating form your mail to DigiCash. > Hal said: > > I just figured that I didn't have enough clout for them to bother to > > respond to me, but today on the www-buyinfo list, Stefan Brands, who > > many think has the best ecash technology available today, posted that he > > had had the same experience! Brands himself has still not been given > > an opportunity to join the beta test. He did not sound very happy about > > this. As announced, the ecash-trial starts in phases. Currently we are completing most versions of ecash. We receive quite a lot of good feedback from the first releases. Therefore we decided to change the user-interface to get better software that is easier to use, before confronting the user of the next releases with problems already solved! We decided to first to select tester from our own timezone to facilitate easy voice communication in case extensive support issues. Contrary to our expectations we encountered relatively few problems, so we can soon release also the beta-test to tester in the remaining time zones. So as you can see our release policy is not that staight forward and involves a lot of considerations like usability and acceptance. This is one of the main reasons why Mr. S. Brands HAS received his beta-test version friday the 11th of November, together with all his collegues at the CWI. They all run Silicon Graphics International OS and before that date this version wasn't finished. > I was in the same boat-- I sent in several requests, all of which were > ignored. After Digicash issued a call for prototype shops, I signed > up. WHAM. I immediately started getting mail asking when I'd have my > shop ready-- sometimes two or three messages a day. > > Once I got everything up and running, I didn't hear further from them. Sometimes we can react very fast, but alas this is only the case for standard procedures which we did automate. More specific questions and requests *have* to be handled by humans. We think the people who are willing to invest quite some effort in setting up a shop for the beta test, are very important participants in the beta test trail. Therefore it seems *very* unlike to us that we didn't respond to *any* mail or request from you. Not trusting our own memory ( we do receive more than 100 (yes, hundred) mails on ecash *each* day, even Sundays) we dove right in to it and found a trail of DigiCash answers to your mail with the subject: 'Concerns about ecash'. > Since then, an accident on my WWW server has rendered the e-shop > inoperable. I've asked Digicash, in the form of Paul Diniessen, for > help reconstructing the bank records. No go. Sorry we *did* sent you a respons within an hour from your request by my colleague Branko. He is responsible for our bank in the trial. His respons was: -The dbm library used by Linux and FreeBSD are different, so the ecash -databases are also incompatible. If you have a password for getting an -initial balance, you can also use this password for reopening your -account (and keeping your old balance). For the server(a)fairgate.com -account you can use the password ******** (pw made invisible PD) for this. - -Branko > > Of course, it may well be a matter of incompetence rather than insult, > > but the net result is the same. The more I see of digicash's lack of > > consideration towards their potential customers and important figures like > > Brands the more I question whether they have the potential to succeed. > > The more I deal with Digicash, the better First Virtual looks. My > technical preference is for using Brands or Chaum cash; at present, > though, there aren't any shipping Brands servers, and the Digicash > folks don't seem to be able to get all their socks in one bag. We feel somewhat troubled by these comments. We strongly feel that the alleged 'lack of consideration' as unjustified. First we would like to split up your comment in to two different issues, first regarding our potential customers and secondly the issue of Mr. S. Brands. As we mentioned before we deem *all* our users, in the past, now, and in the future, as important whether it concerns "shops" or mere "customers" they all contribute to a successful new payment medium. We like you to consider this phase in the existence of ecash as a genuin beta trail. In beta test not only software is being trailed but the supporting services too! However, it should be noted that we did respond to your mail and requests. On the issue on Mr. S. Brands. As we explained before no way we even considered to exclude Mr. Brands for the beta test. As of the technical appreciation of the Chaum system as opposed to the Brands system and the alleged scalability issues , we propose you contact Mr. S. Brands and Mr. D. Chaum for details. We will give a call today to check if received this mail. We hope to resolve the problems mentioned above and to continue our co-operation. Kindest regards, Paul Dinnissen DigiCash bv.

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Re: Cypherpunks@hks.net service
by dmandl＠bear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: cactus(a)bb.hks.net > > The cypherpunks(a)hks.net service is now available. > > It will sign any message sent to cypherpunks(a)hks.net with its (currently > 384 bit) key and forward the signed message to cypherpunks(a)toad.com. No offense, but what's the point? What's next, automated key-signing services? Is this just intended to help people who can't sign easily to get around Eric's proposed requirement? If so, it seems like almost an embarrassment--someone setting up a meaningless message signer to spoof the cypherpunk server, which it does easily. Doesn't sound too good to me. --Dave.

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Re: Brands excluded from digicash beta
by pays＠faugeres.inria.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just want, in a short message, let you know that there exist some satisfied ecash testers (the system itself and the support when we set-up our digishop and our plain customers cyberwallets). The only thing I could eventually complain about is that I even received a second (unsollicited) account Id and password to retrieve ecash software because of a bug in the requests management :-) -- PAP

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Re: Paper available on new cipher
by bshantz＠spry.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hooray!!! Kudos to Matt for actually posting something outside of the tiresome "Eric Hughes is a lame-o" thread!!! (Which, by the way, I agree with Tim that it is a sign of health on the list. I would also like to say that I'm not going to post my opinion.) I intend to read and comment accordingly on the MacGuffin document. It's refreshing to see someone coding crypto. -- Brad <---- Begin Included Message ----> Bruce Schneier and I have been designing a block cipher, called "MacGuffin", based on a new variant of the standard Feistel (S-P) network structure. We are presenting a paper describing the cipher, entitled "The MacGuffin Block Cipher Algorithm", at the Leuven crypto algorithms workshop later this month. Here's the abstract: <stuff deleted> A forthcoming paper will discuss the characteristics GUFN structure in more detail. Comments and analysis greatly appreciated. -matt <---- End Included Message ----> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>INTERNETWORKING THE DESKTOP<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Brad Shantz bshantz(a)spry.com Senior Software Engineer Main #: (206)-447-0300 SPRY Inc. Direct #: (206)-442-8251 316 Occidental Ave FAX #: (206)-442-9008 2nd Floor Seattle, WA 98104 WWW URL: http://WWW.SPRY.COM ------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

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First Virtual?
by Mark Terka 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > From: "Paul Dinnissen" <paul(a)digicash.com> > > > The more I deal with Digicash, the better First Virtual looks. My > > technical preference is for using Brands or Chaum cash; at present, > > though, there aren't any shipping Brands servers, and the Digicash > > folks don't seem to be able to get all their socks in one bag. > > We feel somewhat troubled by these comments. > > As well you should. > > The facts of the matter is that First Virtual currently provides a net > benefit by moving real value (e.g. dollars) around, and Digicash does > not. Until the Digicash system can move real value, there is no > reason to use it. Ok, where do we E-Mail First Virtual to get some info to begin trying the concept out? Is there an automatic help file that can be sent or can we access it via ftp or WWW somehow? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLt9F5K+YbMzawbu5AQFo7AQAkzL2TId0Dqhqt8xnOjqgSnp8zXBFHBc0 Up356NwADzE/8/xnQlEMSMUAGjLLvnBE83KT8ko7H7RWc7HDieNxED6gtrmTO+uq HFcXi9hZMUywri4gG9vGWLQDa9bhpc5NEISQtzZCmPnbI4k+NtXnNRLDlPUvgxv8 BX+QK/trLnA= =RAiJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Terka | werewolf(a)io.org | public key (werewolf) by Toronto,Canada | dg507(a)cleveland.freenet.edu | public key server or request ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: ECO_do
by owner-cypherpunks＠hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.SOL.3.91.941202132305.8537A-100000(a)welchlink.welch.jhu.edu>, cjl <cjl(a)welchlink.welch.jhu.edu> wrote: >From the messages appearing on the list it would seem that >responding to messages sent via Masco's auto-signer needs to be done >carefully, apparently the less-than-less diligent will just respond to the >From: address instead of to the automagical response demon at >jya(a)pipeline.com No longer. I removed this last night, since MUAs don't agree on what they do with "Reply-To:". (The behavior I was trying to encourage is that of following up only to the list. Netcom lossage notwithstanding, I hate being CC'd on things that I'll see anyway.) - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt91wioZzwIn1bdtAQE2CgF9Ex2jZda0xWQmUTd/I6S6H4CoE2ONRIf3 aifw1/ILoDc1QiBkExsW+YwCD8i7dXry =tiNs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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6-hour Secure Mobile Voice
by cdodhner＠news.primenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm sure most of you have seen some of the cheap (relatively speaking) 'phone scramblers' and such sold in local "spy shops" and catalogs. I know as well as most of you that these (almost always analog) scrambler systems even with thier "10,000 code frequencies!" and such are totaly insecure against an attacker with modern resources, but I was wondering if any of these techniques would be good enough to use for real-time applications where the transmitted data is only valuable for 6 hours or less. Such a system would be usefull if you only need security 'right now' and didn't care who knew after a certain (short) timeframe. Comments, advice and product reviews are all welcome from anyone with knowledge or experience in the area. Happy Hunting, -Chris. ______________________________________________________________________________ Christian Douglas Odhner | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry cdodhner(a)primenet.com | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!" cypherpunks WOw dCD Traskcom Team Stupid Key fingerprint = 58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38 82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuAPJioZzwIn1bdtAQFjGAF/e+c8KHSfboM+JuM1GTTuQ76zzJykn5C8 xZTHrpw2/mHDKsDVVLnhb+rbFH9f7w1U =sGdw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ECO_do
by rmccoy＠mercury.interpath.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 owEBWQCm/4kARQMFAC7fVUcqGc8CJ9W3bQEBftkBgNi8riTLJAuBf/hCkbdRicFy PTPzF712eXT/MuB4TrzU97Dga24NH0ievt1kjZqZnawPYgliYWFhMTUwNzgAAAAA =7wNp -----END PGP MESSAGE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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ECO_do
by vvallopp＠eniac.seas.upenn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6.2 owEBWQCm/4kARQMFAC7fZIgqGc8CJ9W3bQEB4KoBfiMUs2jPnVVoze7+Hm0GT6mc tDTwXfvs+Wt+jhhvFql0tAC4hrVXoJ5aXlOu78g9FKwPYgliYWFhMTU2MjAAAAAA =WGc6 -----END PGP MESSAGE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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Re: ECO_do
by cjl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the messages appearing on the list it would seem that responding to messages sent via Masco's auto-signer needs to be done carefully, apparently the less-than-less diligent will just respond to the From: address instead of to the automagical response demon at jya(a)pipeline.com I would hate to see the valuable service provided by jya become a source of noise. In an ideal world everyone would be more careful about responding to the right address, but this is a far from ideal world. An appropriately Cypherpumpkin solution is left as an excercise to the reader. C. J. Leonard ( / "DNA is groovy" \ / - Watson & Crick <cjl(a)welchlink.welch.jhu.edu> / \ <-- major groove ( \ Finger for public key \ ) Strong-arm for secret key / <-- minor groove Thumb-screws for pass-phrase / )

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Easy-to-use signature software
by abostick＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN ROT13 SIGNED MESSAGE----- People who aren't yet able to securely use PGP to post to the cypherpunks mailing list, take heart. Eric has indicated that he doesn't care which flavor of encryption software you use. I have a user-friendly version of the encryption algorithm most widely used on the Internet. I haven't uploaded it to any FTP sites yet, but if you email me, I can send you a copy of the source code. -----BEGIN ROT13 SIGNATURE----- Version 2.71828 V jebgr guvf zrffntr. Abobql ryfr qvq. Nalbar jub fnlf bgurejvfr vf n yvne. Guvf uvtu-grpu qvtvgny fvtangher vf gur cebbs bs zl pynvz. nobfgvpx(a)argpbz.pbz (Nyna Obfgvpx) -----END ROT13 SIGNATURE----- | For me, to be a feminist is to answer the Alan Bostick | question "Are women human?" with a yes. abostick(a)netcom.com | finger for PGP public key | Katha Pollitt, REASONABLE CREATURES Key fingerprint: | 50 22 FB 46 41 A3 17 9D F7 33 FF E1 4E 1C 89 79 +legal_kludge=off

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pgp / passphrase / capture / yikes!
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

just wondering , if i use pgp on my pc , and lets say while on my unix connection to the net i shell to dos to do encryption or decryption , does this compromise my security in any way ? can some admin catch my passphrase, i don think so , but i'm really fucken paranoid ! thanks for any answers felloe punks ! -feast oh , msg to larry detweiler : your really looney man , cracked me up ! :*)

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Re: The thread that would not die. (Mandating signatures)
by owner-cypherpunks＠hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <9412021551.AA04657(a)snark.imsi.com>, Perry E. Metzger <perry(a)imsi.com> wrote: > >John Schofield says: >> It is silly to talk of someone "owning" the list. The list is a >> community. The only possible owners are the people in the community. If we >> all left, Eric would still have control over the list--but the list would be >> worthless. > >It is silly to talk of someone "owning" a restaurant. The restaurant >is a community. The only possible owners are the people in the >community. If the patrons all left, Chef Joey would still have control >over the restaurant -- but the restaurant would be worthless. You continue to confuse (deliberately?) a community with the place it meets. "List" is being used in two senses -- and you continue to interpret it only as the instance of majordomo on toad.com. That's a worthless interpretation as nobody disputes that Eric controls that agent. As far as I'm concerned, if a message has gone out to every address on the "cypherpunks" list, I don't give a shit whether or not it went through toad.com first: it went to cypherpunks. - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt9v/CoZzwIn1bdtAQFY6gGA0EVd9/2BIoe5ORzfPePZxxoA7WJs/jkm PEMkdRGJNpih+x6xLOnlv2+BoBTdEXgj =Qrv2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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Re: cypherpunk signing service
by owner-cypherpunks＠hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199412020736.CAA10394(a)bb.hks.net>, <sglass(a)netcom.com> wrote: >Does this look right? > >pub 384/27D5B76D 1994/12/01 Cypherpunk signing agent <cypherpunks(a)hks.net> > Key fingerprint = 85 BA D4 6D B8 9D B6 B7 EB 74 11 48 42 45 61 F2 Yes, that's correct. >| I welcome any suggestions on the format of the message and the prepended >| message. > >Why not stealth it and just appear as if the sender signed it? Because the sender didn't sign it. I don't want to misrepresent what the service does. It guarantees messages have gone through cypherpunks(a)hks.net and, by implication, cypherpunks(a)toad.com. Nothing more, nothing less. >| Thanks for y'all's comments: keep 'em coming. > >Good work. Thanks! By the way, here's the server's key, signed by me: - - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQA9Ay7eB60AAAEBgOGkDzo6mkSp3G4W3EXwMWK8SrTVSmosuN5Y7Z2FdBS5uJ3o 1O0XNAwqGc8CJ9W3bQAFEbQuQ3lwaGVycHVuayBzaWduaW5nIGFnZW50IDxjeXBo ZXJwdW5rc0Boa3MubmV0PokAlQMFEC7fdxkTYYKL6zwe3QEBq3kEAJ9WxYXnOVXb yz8bTBJpKWhEVWXzpIq7ApDTjmK6e7GoF+FFsdy7ZTsNLpsDa0huijXRZJ9Fcvcx ioAQVHfNkXr6hFVxFkttztggKMlpzYtfUGnyiR+abgUUkVvEIfn0z5mzfbvnHLSa baZE6VrDFwa8Hnf2GVLLPOBkiLAGZTB0 =CHvA - - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAwUBLt93aRNhgovrPB7dAQGRrAP9GS0HAa3zaCCKGUdpH3V+ur5i/YgF2Jxk wY8jlyXz/pazsv8GQw55Nl3bMKwGSkpng6aM9MNV1koGP5BBY1gw2gsVhzYi28QQ +ANreE32N3Rn0Kb2mH8WA88TG+bmWLH/Xs5ABGVIXO08VpLoJjrxuPaCxSBQYvGS XMBDrQ+P07o= =Cdif - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt932SoZzwIn1bdtAQFZhQGAlORDYu6ulXfhEcIm8JUIcHJHHZKfwzfN 6HP4xRr9Q/0j9HtOkdoHRZ7QoiE2iFrr =ikLM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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Re: First Virtual?
by Andrew Lowenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FV does in fact have a bunch of e-mail addresses that will auto-forward some info sheets to you. I have attached the info to this message. After having read Doug Barnes message (<9412021548.AA17294@tadpole>) I'm glad I'm not the only one who thinks FV is a joke. The entire security of the system rests on the difficulty of intercepting and forging e-mail. Forging e-mail is dead easy, intercepting isn't much harder. While the implementors are correct that an online payment-system will have to be simple to use in order to gain wide acceptance, sacrificing all security for ease of use is a grave mistake. It just begging to be ripped off, providing people actually sell something via FV worth ripping off. andrew Begin forwared message: Where can I find out more about First Virtual? The First Virtual GENERAL INFORMATION FAQ is the best place to start if you are looking for information about First Virtual. It provides details about all the FAQ documents available via email, and about additional information available from our anonymous FTP and Gopher servers and our World Wide Web database. To receive a copy of the GENERAL INFORMATION FAQ, send an email message to "help(a)fv.com"; the GENERAL INFORMATION FAQ will be sent to you by email automatically. You can also find a copy in other places: * Connect to ftp.fv.com, our anonymous FTP server, and look in the directory /pub/docs for the file called "FAQ- general.txt". * Using Mosaic, Lynx, or another World Wide Web browser, connect to our Web page using the URL "http://www.fv.com". Look for the link to the "Frequently Asked Questions" page. Here's a summary of other First Virtual FAQ documents; to receive a copy by email, send a message to the specified address: * 1-2-3 FAQ -- Steps for getting started -- 123(a)fv.com * SIGNUP FAQ -- Signing up for an account -- signup(a)fv.com * BACKGROUND FAQ -- Our company and our vision -- background(a)fv.com * BUYING FAQ -- Buying information -- buying(a)fv.com * SELLING FAQ -- Selling information -- selling(a)fv.com * INFOHAUS FAQ -- Using the Infohaus -- infohaus(a)fv.com * SECURITY FAQ -- Security issues -- security(a)fv.com * CASHFLOW FAQ -- Flow of money in our system -- cashflow(a)fv.com * PROBLEMS FAQ -- Dealing with problems -- problems(a)fv.com For information in languages other than English, send email to "international(a)fv.com". To help us provide our services to the public at the lowest possible cost, please search the FAQs before sending email to our human operators. Thanks for understanding. And welcome to First Virtual!

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Disclaimer within signed body?
by cactus＠hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It's been suggested that I put my "signature disclaimer" within the signed block. There are several pluses and minuses to this, and I wanted to see what others think (As an aside, by the way, I think the aesthetics of the output are important). As Eric pointed out to me last night, in general it's bad to modify the body of a message. I think that what I've been doing is fine, as the clear distinction betweem original message and additional stuff is maintained. However: the disclaimer should really be bound to the signature. Using the "comment" block won't do this, since PGP does not use it as part of the signature. Additionally, people whose software runs the messages through PGP will never see the disclaimer if it's outside of the signed block. What are folks' opinions on this? My options are: - Do nothing. Memory and the general appearance of the disclaimer are enough that people won't be fooled by a message with a removed disclaimer. - Put the disclaimer within the signature block. In essence, doing nothing as above, but that's what the comment block is there for and it might look nicer. - Put the disclaimer at the top of the signed body. Ugly, since it immediately forces its presence in a message, but effective for the same reason. - Put the disclaimer at the bottom of the signed body. It's still modifying the signed body, but in a much less obtrusive manner. Input? - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt+AfCoZzwIn1bdtAQF0uQF/R2+Wc4tKXs0/+Qc79ln01EUOT8seW4wC tKLa8H8CGAI33Exh/FeMvtYjnUEdPcXL =5852 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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Voice over data
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Hughes wrote: > the great voice-over-data protocols and products introduced by > Intel, Rockwell, ZyXEL and others at Comdex which will make > Voice-PGP so much easier > > As I understand these voice-over-data products, the voice goes over > analog, added to the modem signal. The modem signal is interpreted, > and then reconstructed and subtracted from the incoming signal, > leaving voice. Very clever, but insufficient for secure phones. I don't think that's how they do it. As far as I know, most methods multiplex digitized audio with the data. One system used by some people in India provides a dynamic combination of fax, (digitized) voice and data, depending on the throughput - eg vox/9.6 data if 14.4kbps, fax as well if 19.2, etc. While Intel and others are proposing standards, ZyXEL does it with software along with a voice card or possibly RJ11 input. A friend of mine saw a demo of it at Comdex, on an old 1496E (16.8 kbps zyxel to zyxel). The new v.34 does 28.8k - lots of room for clear digitized voice and high speed data. This is exactly why I thought it would make secure voice easier, if not secure phones (who wants to lug a modem and PC around as a 'handset'?). I'll be testing some Onetics Rad VFAST modems this week, which apparently do digitized voice over v.34 as well. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." rishab(a)arbornet.org Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Digicash trial
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Geoffrey Faivre-Malloy <vikram!geoffrey(a)crl.com> > DigiCash trial? Tell me more! I got my account a couple of weeks ago, I just downloaded the software. (I'm a buyer, though I was hoping to sell too.) Recent 'shops' include HotWired. I suspect one of the problems is that the software is not 'licensed for use in the US' possibly for patent reasons? It says this clearly in the pre-download license agreement. The trial gives you 100 dummy units of currency, which you can use to 'buy' from 'shops'. > Now THAT sounds cool! :) Wonder how long it will be before someone uses > PGP in a phone :) How much processing power would it take to do that on > the fly anyway? Actually not too much - PGP can process fast enough on a 486 as it is. > > Now what _I_ want is some way to integrate PGP with Netscape... > What's Netscape? The 'new improved' commercial version of Mosaic, by those who left to form a company. The freeware version of Netscape is probably the best WWW browser for a number of platforms right now. Of course, PGP wouldn't be integrated with Netscape as such, but into a local Web page - I'm looking at Web pages as simple interfaces to various ordinary, not necessarily 'netted' tasks. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." rishab(a)arbornet.org Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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VOTE NO!
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On mandatory sigs: I personally don't fathom the idea (as some of you do), I've always perceived PGP(Tm) as something I would use when I really had something sensitive to send a friend, or when I was making a public announcement to a mailing list or newsgroup. But to use it to sign EVERY single piece of mail I send to cypherpunks is asking a lot from me as my setup is very similar to Tim Mays', and I don't want to be singled out because of it! I think the list should proceed as it has since its formation, and subscribers should just sign their messages as they see fit. I know I'm not posting anything new, but considering the torrential flood of trash that Detweiler posted, it's not that much of a waste. :-)= Good evening.

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Term Emulators (was Re: public accounts / PGP / passphrases)
by JEFF LICQUIA (CEI) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > From: Adam Shostack <adam(a)bwh.harvard.edu> > Derek wrote: > > | It would be nice to integrate PGP into terminal emulators, too, like > | kermit or seyon or red ryder or whatever, so that you could easily use > | PGP locally to sign/encrypt things on the remote end. Wishful > | thinking, I guess... > > I think terminal emulators are the wrong layer for PGP > integration. PGP support is needed in document editors and viewers, > rather than in network layers. I think you misunderstood. I took Derek as saying that 'modem programs' (as in the Procomm/Crosstalk kind) should have PGP integration. If these truly provided a full-featured network, then yes, the focus would need to be on the local editors/viewers we'd all use. As it is, these programs only provide a narrow window into a far-off environment, with varying degrees of security. As a positive proposal, I noticed Greg Broiles's posts with the scripts and came up with an idea. Would it be possibly a step forward to write similar scripts to allow for local agency? I envision two stages here: 1. Scripts on the remote end substituting for your editor that actually run your editor, then ask (once you're done with the plaintext) whether you'd like to process the message locally. If so, it would send the file via sz, wait for a Enter: press, then rz the file back, substituting the rz'd file for the original. You'd still have to mess with files on the local end, though. 2. Local control of the term emulator to automate the local agency part of the transaction. > With direct ip connectivity becoming commonplace, we're seeing > PGP integrated into mail & news tools, which is a great thing. (There > is also a use for encrypting networks, but I think it is different > from the use for PGP, which is a document oriented system.) True. However, the plight of the poor user who must use dial-up to connect is still one where all the agency must happen on the other end of the wire. I don't think these are going to go away any time soon, and by the time they do, we'll probably all have moved on to some new GeeWhizBang system developed commercially (my guess is it'll come out about a year after the RSA patent expires... :-) and integrated via OLE4 into our Windows 5.2 messaging systems (whoops! sorry, Tim, I meant via AppleMindMeld into our System 9.3 messaging systems :-). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLt+VqDER5KvPRd0NAQG2JQQAk3dLJW+eoHxqJZbE8Ofcf/oNg7zOgrAJ zjpKwmM6PNFMsvsiI84jBkENHBhaItIMtuPCh+RCR6lS7JVaoAIlLOJ3e+5Kb8uM B9nrZ9BMzro275wjC1Ubmh2+hLtSVRVU0lqoGi7JiEv/fSWdlBCXdLqztiVsMvn5 fMBPqQY07o8= =InPY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Brands excluded from digicash beta
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PAP wrote: >I just want, in a short message, let you know that there exist some >satisfied ecash testers (the system itself and the support when we >set-up our digishop and our plain customers cyberwallets). > The only thing I could eventually complain about is that I even received >a second (unsollicited) account Id and password to retrieve ecash >software because of a bug in the requests management :-) I have been a beta tester since the days of the very first Ecash clients which would freeze my computer when run ;-) I am very impressed with the latest clients. They work flawlessly. The only thing missing is off-line transfer capability. Since the current beta has a (dimmed) button for this, I don't think we will have to wait much longer. -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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