December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

URGENT - MS hack of FFS
by solman＠MIT.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could somebody here please give me the reference for the full version of Micali and Shamir's hack of the Fiat-Shamir family of authentication schemes. I need it to make sure that what I've put in the class notes for an IAP course I am teaching is correct. I have the short paper (An improvement of the Fiat-Shamir Identification and Signature Scheme) from Crypto '88 (I think), but I need the full version. If anybody here can get me the reference before the libraries here close tonight, I'd really appreciate it. Thanks, Jason W. Solinsky

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Z-Mail
by jltocher＠CCGATE.HAC.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone please email me with details about obtaining and configuring Z-Mail for use with PGP? Thanks, John John L. Tocher THE CITY-a bounded infinity. A labyrinth where JLTocher(a)ccgate.HAC.com you are never lost. Your private map where every PGP: CE 72 1A 11 07 47 35 block bears exactly the same number. Even if you 35 9A C1 DE EA 64 21 BC 94 lose your way, you cannot go wrong. --Kobo Abe

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Re: AT&T and VLSI Encryption device
by Michael Sattler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:55 1/31/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Michael Sattler says: >> >> How does this device conform with the legislated requirement that it must >> deliver plaintext to the government upon court-approved demand? > >There is no such requirement. I was under the impression that "the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act requires equipment manufacturers and telecommunications carriers to develop network technologies that are readily wiretapped" (from Garfinkel's book). Doesn't a "hardware encryption device for use in lots of communications devices, including cell phones, PDAs, etc." seem to fall into that category? If it doesn't then I have no idea what CALEA is supposed to do. -----------------------------------------------------------------------+ Michael Sattler <msattler(a)jungle.com> San Francisco, California | Digital Jungle Consulting Services http://www.jungle.com/msattler/ | | And so these men of Indostan/ disputed long and loud/ each in his own | opinion/ exceeding stiff and strong/ though each was partly right/ and | all were in the wrong! - John Godfrey Saxe |

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Re: Better living through better `procmail'
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In reponse to quite a few people asking, Procmail can be found at ftp.informatik.rwth-aachen.de as pub/packages/procmail/procmail.tar.gz safe-tcl, which some people prefer, is at ftp.ics.uci.edu:mrose/safe-tcl/safe-tcl.tar.Z Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Re: PFF's Magna Carta and the new netserfs
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ed Carp wrote: > > Unrestrained economic powers (companies, corporations, whatever) have > > the same property. This seemed to me to be a fundamental point that > > Rishab was making -- and one that is often ignored in discussions of > > economic libertarianism. > > Agreed, but I don't see that that was the point Rishab was making. Oh, well.. It was, actually. "Corporations can be at least as bad as governments" - the examples of extreme circumstances were extraneous. BTW the original analysis of the PFF thing by Richard Moore was posted here on the 25th by him, though he seems to think that I got it from elsewhere and volunteered to post it... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Electric Dreams subscriptions and back issues, send a mail to rishab(a)arbornet.org with 'get help' as the message Subject. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in rishab(a)arbornet.org Vox +91 11 6853410 Voxmail 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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the moderation principle
by rkmoore＠iol.ie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: alt(a)iquest.net (Al Thompson) If strong government resulted in liberty and freedom, then the most intrusive, all-encompassing governments would result in its citizens having the most liberty. Is this the case? I would look at the (former) Soviet Union, Iran, Cuba, East Germany, etc., for your answer. In all things, moderation. If I like salt on my steak, that does not mean the most salt is the best. Thinking in fundmentalist extremes severely limits your room for creative problem solving. You don't do that when you discuss cypers -- you don't take rigid sides of "subway" vs "mixmaster", and paint the other side as fools becauase their system would be silly if taken to its extremes. You learn from one another. Be as creative about political possibilities. -rkm _____________________ Richard K Moore > cyber scribe < citizenships: USA ; cyberspace homes: Ireland ; <rkmoore(a)iol.ie> _____________________

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Economist Article on Ecash
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The article from the Nov. 26, 1995 of The Economist "So much for the cashless society. (Electronic Money)" is available at: http://www.ios.com/~lroth/clips/emoney.html The WWW disabled can apply to Al Gore for a subsidy or send me an emailed request. DCF -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLy6XVYVO4r4sgSPhAQEJTQP/W9VI76LRPHopmk9eT5FPqpjry9L+PSwM cdbMMCyy4lFWjt+KuS2ca9QCtoxNYT3F7k0RvmI5YwlvbhXYbpiSG999inbZZIv5 vcR3iu5CEGum4yQCW3luWojvlKL8fxsZ6ucnTeAJacxmTlO9uqpg43+2uvzapBBe q5/YsIGB9Dw= =jTuA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cypherpunks CD-ROM
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am putting together a CD-ROM covering cryptography, privacy, remailers, etc.. essentially the whole cypherpunk bit. Please send contributions/suggestions/comments/flames to sameer(a)c2.org. Thanks. -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-549-1383 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Economist Article on Ecash
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NO CARRIER RING CONNECT 14400 NO CARRIER RING CONNECT 9600 NO CARRIER RING CONNECT 9600 ATH NO CARRIER RING CONNECT 9600 NO CARRIER RING CONNECT 14400 NO CARRIER RING CONNECT 14400 t} t}t}t}t}t} NO CARRIER

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Frothing remailers - an immodest proposal
by kevin＠elvis.wicat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me that the current remailer web suffers a fundamental flaw. It is simply too static. When a remailer disappears, service is disrupted and messages are lost. Humans have to statically route their messages through the web either by hand or using relatively primitive tools such as the chain script (not to belittle the useful work that has been done, but it is by no means idiot proof yet). Basically, the current web of mailers shows nothing of the dynamic nature that has kept the internet alive and has offered us a decent chance at truly anonymous communications, nor is it easy to use to its full potential. Consider a more dynamic web of remailers. I envision remailers that actively advertise their presence on the web so that all active remailers are aware of all other active remailers. This advertising is to have very low latency so that a new mailer can be known to the web within minutes (I will address the implementation of this later). Thus, remailers can constantly be appearing and disappearing without impact on the web as a whole (I refer to this dynamic web of remailers as a "froth"). Imagine also that remailers are allowed to dynamically perform the routing functions that are currently done statically offline (for reasons I will discuss shortly). Now, given all this, what do we gain? First, consider my situation (which is what started me on this line of thinking); my company has a leased 56K internet link. I cannot consume this valuable bandwidth with a remailer during business hours. However, if remailers could pop up and announce their presence to the web, I could run a transient remailer for several hours in the wee hours of the morning when the line use is minimal. Another benefit would be the possibility of remailers with no fixed physical location. A remailer can shift from host machine to host machine daily, as long as there is a decent mechanism to locate it. The use of such transient routers implies allowing dynamic routing. If any given remailer may go down or move at any point, it is impractical to expect users to keep track of which are up at the moment and create static routes in the current manner. The only reasonable solution I have come up with is to allow the remailers themselves to choose routing, given that they have full knowledge of the current state of the froth. This also confers additional benefits. It has been pointed out that most traffic across the web is currently unencrypted. It seems to me that any such message should be fair game. The remailer should be allowed to encrypt the message and pick a pseudo-random path through the web, incorporating transient remailers along the way. This adds greatly to the encrypted traffic on the net, as well as making sure that the transient remailers are used. It even provides some degree of privacy to originally non-encrypted messages. We could of course still allow users to statically route their messages through the web, or allow combinations (I want this message routed through remailers A and B to endpoint C; however, remailers are granted authority to route this message through a maximum of three additional, randomly chosen remailers between each step). This has the added advantage of taking the work of routing messages off the user (unless they really want it). Think about the proposed extension to MixMaster to allow separate parts of a multi-part message to be routed separately, and consider whether you really want to have to do this by hand. I strongly suspect that most messages are currently routed via boilerplate scripts, which has to make the job of traffic analysis much easier for our good friend Eve. By the way, a brief rant on a related topic; people speak of not trusting remailers any further than necessary, while I am clearly suggesting granting more authority and trust to the remailers. This notion of not assigning trust is simply nonsense. When you send a piece of mail to a remailer, encrypted or not, you are assigning complete trust in that remailer to keep you anonymous and not to forward your mail to the NSA immediately. This does lead to a related problem, however; if we allow remailers to pop up at random and join in the froth, how do we know that Deitweiller won't set up a number of black hole remailers that take your mail and throw it away, disrupting the froth, or forward it to nphard(a)nsa.gov? Fortunately, we already have the PGP web of trust model in place and can use it to good effect in this case. Remailers should simply not route mail through any remailer whose public key is not trusted unless explicitly ordered otherwise. This requires remailer operators to cooperate to some extent to validate one another's remailer keys, but does confer the great advantage of portable remailers as mentioned above; if I run a trusted remailer on one machine, I can move it to another machine, and as soon as I advertise the new address and the PGP public key, it is a trusted and useful part of the froth. While we are advertising a PGP key and internet address, we might as well incorporate other useful information. For instance, remailers could advertise their maximum latency. This would allow us to send messages into the froth with the instructions "Keep this message moving for at least one hour and at most three hours and then deliver to endpoint C" and allow remailers to make informed decisions about routing this message (there are some interesting issues in making routing decisions; if we can assign a cost to the link between each pair of remailers, do we want to attempt to optimize the route for least cost? Or stick with random routing to attempt to hinder traffic analysis?). I'm sure that we can come up with other useful information to assist routing decisions (available bandwidth, cost per letter, protocols supported, etc.) Now, the question of implementing remailer advertising. If there is an existing internet protocol for advertising entities with sufficiently low latency, I am not aware of it (my background is in Novell and OS/2, so I'll happily be corrected!) DNS is the closest model to what I want, but is excessively tied up in bureaucracy and has horrific propagation times. Thus, we will have to roll our own. I can think of two reasonable solutions to this problem. The first is a central authority model: there exist well known servers that each remailer has to report into when starting up and shutting down. This model has obvious benefits (ease of use and implementation, minimal bandwidth usage) and obvious drawbacks (a single point of failure, or at best very few, distinctly against the cypherpunk philosophy, requires high-bandwidth, stable servers (read expensive)). The second solution involves a broadcast model; each remailer periodically broadcasts its presence to the entire net (say every T minutes). Any process wanting a full list of all remailers simply has to monitor the broadcast channel for T minutes to get at least a good approximation. The problem here is one of delay (to locate a remailer, I might have to wait T minutes) and bandwidth choking. Obviously, spamming the entire internet with UDP packets advertising remailers would earn us no friends (I'm not even sure that it's technically feasible). What we need is a net of machines to carry the broadcast messages with numerous well known access points. By happy coincidence, there exists just such a network (actually, several of them) that we can subvert for our twisted purposes. It's called IRC. We can create a dedicated channel that carries the remailer broadcast messages (to be honest, I have no real idea how to do this, but one of the wonderHackers out there surely does? otherwise I might actually be forced to read the RFCs (oh horror!)). I doubt that any remailer operator will have trouble finding an IRC host to attach to in order to monitor the broadcasts. This is obviously a stopgap solution, but provides a method for jumpstarting the froth without requiring a froth to advertise the froth. With regard to the bandwidth concerns, I can't imagine that less than a hundred remailers generating <1K messages every few minutes (about ten minutes feels like a good value for T) can bring IRC to its knees. When we get more than a hundred or so remailers up, we'll worry about bandwidth! And to the inherent latency problem of the broadcast model, the easiest solution is to have well known servers cache the advertising information for immediate access. Not too coincidentally, these caching servers look a lot like the central point of authority servers in the first solution. Thus, we can have both the convenience of a central authority model with the dependable broadcast model to fall back on if it becomes necessary. Unsolved problem, by the way: it would obviously be nice to have human-readable names for remailers (the PGP key becomes the true unique identifier, but I'd much rather pick "Soda remailer" from a list than four lines of armored ASCII). How can we guarantee unique names and/or prevent problems resulting from collisions? Obviously, this process hasn't reached more than the pipe-dream stage yet. I am very interested in comments and proposals before I start trying to create some trial implementations. Be gentle, though - it's my first time. -- Kevin

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Re: ESP Unix encrypted session protocol software
by Marc Horowitz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matt, why did you choose to implement your own protocol instead of adding a DH authentication/encryption type to telnet? Marc

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Re: ESP Unix encrypted session protocol software
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Matt, why did you choose to implement your own protocol instead of >adding a DH authentication/encryption type to telnet? > > Marc I've got one of those, too (it won't be ready for release too soon, though - telnet is big and ugly). An encrypting telnet and telnetd almost always provide a more appropriate way to do session encryption. However, there are some situations where ESM is really the only option. One is when you can't or don't want to install a daemon (e.g., for very occasional use). More importantly, by running within the session, ESM can provide end-to-end encryption across an untrusted application-layer firewall (like the one I go through to get between home and work). Since part of my motivation for working on these tools comes from wanting to use them myself, I'm building the stuff I need the most first. -matt

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Re: Frothing remailers - an immodest proposal
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:55 PM 01/31/95, Robert Rothenberg wrote: >Without quoting the entire message, I think I better solution, in terms of >ease to implement as well as conserving bandwidth would be to have a >sophisticated remailer script-language. Yeah, this is really an excellent idea, that I don't see happening any time soon. Although of course if anyone wants to write code for such a beast, that would be really excellent. If someone gets around to writing it, it'll happen, but it would be a fairly big project, so I wouldn't hold my break. Safe TCL, anyone?

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Re: Z-Mail
by Chris Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would be interested also. How about cc this list... > Can someone please email me with details about obtaining and > configuring Z-Mail for use with PGP? > Thanks, > John > >John L. Tocher THE CITY-a bounded infinity. A labyrinth where >JLTocher(a)ccgate.HAC.com you are never lost. Your private map where every >PGP: CE 72 1A 11 07 47 35 block bears exactly the same number. Even if you >35 9A C1 DE EA 64 21 BC 94 lose your way, you cannot go wrong. --Kobo Abe > > > > > ... __o .. -\<, Chris.Claborne(a)SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome!

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CD-ROM [brief addition]
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I forgot to mention that the CD-ROM in development will be export restricted. It isn't going to be sold outside the united states and canada. -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-549-1383 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Re: Frothing remailers - an immodest proposal
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <9501312152.AA10208(a)toad.com>, <kevin(a)elvis.wicat.com> wrote: >It seems to me that the current remailer web suffers a fundamental flaw. >It is simply too static. Agreed, of course. I also don't really want to quote your entire article but want to throw some points into the discussion. In general, I think you've got a good approach but might be a little too tied to instant-gratification use of IP. I touched on some of this a while ago, in the thread "Broadcast and the rendezvous problem," and have thought about it a bit more after getting others' comments: 1. Broadcasting every couple of minutes isn't necessary and is undesirable due to the real limitations of the Internet. A remailer could broadcast its location with a time-out on the location without a constant stream of availability announcements. In your position for example, you'd broadcast a message at 5 pm with a 16 hour valid time. 2. This is actually unnecessary for your situation: All you need to do is advertise your location as a "real" remailer and then have a cron job that kill sendmail at 5pm on your remailer machine (assuming you have a spare machine that doesn't need to run sendmail). The mail network is flexible enough that things will Just Work. Mail won't go through instantly during the day, of course, but that just helps to muddy up the mix. 3. Broadcasting over live IP isn't all that great a model. Ideally, you'll use a mechanism that doesn't require instant communication among hosts. I favor USENET for this: messages have a naturally long life- time and the network is self-adjusting. If a direct route is temporarily unavailable, an indirect one will often manifest itself. I also favor using USENET store-and-forward for the messages themselves for the same reasons: traffic analysis is impossible inside the web and direct routes are not necessary. 4. Using a PGP-style web-of-trust is important. In the ideal situation, one human in an extended web can certify individual remailers and all other remailers close enough on the same web of trust would pick up the message immediately. Just some thoughts, - - -- Todd Masco | "life without caution/ the only worth living / love for a man/ cactus(a)hks.net | love for a woman/ love for the facts/ protectless" - A Rich Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLy6+ThNhgovrPB7dAQHoDQP/UDn2GV7Jq8C3nQyN9IhvGMUTGnBjcL+k zCPgTOLjANMrMN791VdeoNs9rR3QKFdFR9y0p39lka0p+9n1I3hDuEKyAX8Cicub h0/eyr54bEzC6Q2L06VlIzDac9K7kILUkIf2ypgeXTrFuMSZITy+z0ugDeq3NA7B W+gkl82hJZk= =69b2 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLy73lyoZzwIn1bdtAQG/8wGA1kS3RyqBsxOZgniuxZqGySeybSJQuVp4 3zsxH545MqhBXmh16Gh4LvBlkre+9JYT =Evbh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Z-Mail by Web
by jltocher＠earthlink.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Can someone please email me with details about obtaining and >> configuring Z-Mail for use with PGP? >> Thanks, >> John >> >I would be interested also. How about cc this list... ... __o > .. -\<, >Chris.Claborne(a)SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/(*). Z-Mail info available at: ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/be/berliner/readme.html http://www.kaiwan.com/~mckinnon/readme.html I called the company to get a demo key (unlocks the software for a trial period of 30 days), and inquired of the price. It's $165 for a single user license... ouch! I'll check it out, but can anybody suggest alternative windoze/PPP/PGP interfaces? John - John Tocher THE CITY-a bounded infinity. A labyrinth where JLTocher(a)Earthlink.net you are never lost. Your private map where every PGP: CE 72 1A 11 07 47 35 block bears exactly the same number. Even if you 35 9A C1 DE EA 64 21 BC 94 lose your way, you cannot go wrong. --Kobo Abe

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remailers and multiple recipients
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can the remailers handle multiple recipients? If I list several addresses in the "Request-Remailing-To:" line, seperated by commas, will the remailer do what I would think, and send off to all of them? Anyone who knows the answer (either from experience, or because they run a remailer, or wrote the software), please tell me. I've been trying experimentally, unsuccesfully so far, but I'm not sure if that's just because I'm using the wrong syntax, or the wrong remailers.

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VoicePGP cracked in 10 minutes?...
by root 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I heard a rumor hear in Ctl. Tx. that the VoicePGP project was cracked in the last couple of days in approx. 10 minutes. Anyone have any info on this other than one of those wild rumors that occur? Thanks and take care.

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Re: remailers and multiple recipients
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: jrochkin(a)cs.oberlin.edu (Jonathan Rochkind) > Can the remailers handle multiple recipients? If I list several addresses > in the "Request-Remailing-To:" line, seperated by commas, will the remailer > do what I would think, and send off to all of them? We had some concerns here a while back that someone was trying to exploit such a feature to create an exponentially-growing message that would totally overload the remailers. A message of the form: :: Request-Remailing-To: <list of remailers here> :: Request-Remailing-To: <list of remailers here> <repeat about 20 times> was sent. If all remailers had observed and honored the multiple requests, there would have been uncounted trillions of messages flying about. So I would caution anyone considering implementing this feature. Hal

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Re: CD-ROM [brief addition]
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I forgot to mention that the CD-ROM in development will be > export restricted. It isn't going to be sold outside the united states > and canada. :-(

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Re: Frothing remailers - an immodest proposal
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have some concerns about Kevin's frothing remailers. Like so many of the proposals we see to put more responsibility into the remailer net, this opens vulnerability to a single bad remailer. If I trust the first remailer in the net to choose my path for me, as I might be tempted to do with a froth, then if that remailer is corrupt my anonymity is lost. With user-supplied chaining I am secure unless all of the remailers on the chain are corrupt. I also do not like the kind of close-knit, cozy cooperation among the guild of remailer operators which seems to be envisioned in this and similar proposals. Do you like the idea of messages on the remailer operators list saying, I am getting objectionable messages from your remailer, would you mind dropping in a log so we can see who is sending these messages which violate the Politically Correct Speech Act? I do like Kevin's ideas about a dynamic remailer net, but I think another approach would put more smarts into the client program used by the originator. Granted, his information will be somewhat more out of date as the message makes its way through the network. But depending on thie time scale at which the froth, um, froths, this should still allow a lot more dynamism among the set of remailers. Using either IRC or, as Todd suggested, Usenet to maintain an active remailer list might work. We could also have a distributed set of sites which provide the information by finger like the pinging sites we have now. A few notes about Safe-TCL. I posted some ideas on using this as a basis for remailing some time back. Safe-TCL defines three times at which messages could be activated (scripts in them run). One is on message sending, one on message reading (so it can put up dialog boxes and interact with the recipient in other ways), and the third on receipt, which is when it enters the user's mailbox. The actual safe-tcl implementation does not include support for this third mode, but it would be pretty easy to add. If you had that, messages could come to your machine and activate to do various things that you allow them to do. If you allowed them to send mail as one of those things, this would be a start towards a remailer. What you need then is some way for various messages to interact with each other, so that, for examle, a message could wait until there were a certain number of other messages inside the machine before it sent itself out. You would also want a way for a message to suspend itself until some future event, such as having a certain amount of time passing, or waiting until some message with desired properties arrived. There has been intermittent discussion of similar topics on the safe-tcl mailing list. The motivation there is not supplying remailers, of course; rather there is a desire to have something with similar functionality to the much-ballyhooed Telescript, but less bound by proprietary constraints. Telescript scripts can move through the network and interact with other scripts (at least, they will supposedly be able to, but the exact manner is apparently secret for now). Providing the simple act of motion to mail agent scripts without stamping them with a record of everywhere they have been is really all a remailer would do. (I wonder if Telescript agents have to carry around with them a record of every path they've taken?) Sending a message through a safe-tcl based remail network might be more cumbersome than our current techniques. You might have to precede the message body with a safe-tcl program a few lines to a couple of pages in size depending on the complexity of remailing you want. But again with proper clients this can be hidden from the user. I think emphasis should be on smart mailer clients rather than more cooperation among nodes in the remailer network. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBLy8O8hnMLJtOy9MBAQHMjwIA40ZIvNtOvMN/mWtY4bSN0MYMravR9bNr zhZ519K+g6w5ZsW71c/kM7BFz15BjB9pIcTMjUQv/C8YJNGrdFEzhg== =1okU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Scientology Petition v2.1
by Homer Wilson Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Church of Scientology PETITION Version 2.1 I have undertaken on my own determinism to rewrite the petition according to criticisms that I have received. This version below is short and sweet. Since I have no authority whatsoever from those who wrote the original petition to do this, this is certainly not official. However if enough like it, perhaps we can talk the original petition writers into considering it. I will be posting this to news.admin.misc,alt.current-events.net-abuse,alt.privacy.anon-servers alt.censorship, alt.cyberpunks, and comp.org.eff.talk If you think it is worthwhile, please post it to other groups as well. Homer We the undersigned deplore 1.) The Church of Scientology's recent apparent (unproven) efforts to rmgroup alt.religion.scientology. 2.) The Church of Scientology's recent apparent (unproven) efforts to cancel non copyrighted postings. 3.) The Church of Scientology's overt and apparently covert plans to spam both alt.religion.scientology and the rest of usenet with 'success stories' and testimonials, in order to drown out the 'graffitti' and negative testimony and commentary. 4.) The Church of Scientology's legal efforts to shut off anonymous remailers to alt.religion.scientology and alt.clearing.technology, and their legal threats against the remailer operators for postings, copyrighted or not, coming through them. 5.) The Church of Scientology's legal efforts to clamp down on ANY copyrighted postings or quotations at all, even when clearly Fair Use. 6.) Any open or covert declaration by Church of Scientology Officials against anyone on the internet declaring them to be a Suppressive Person, and any open or covert declaration of anyone on the internet as Fair Game whether or not it is to be called that. We the undersigned eschew any efforts on the part of anyone to render alt.religion.scientology a moderated group. We the undersigned implore the Church of Scientology 1.) To work closely with the Electronic Freedom Frontier to solve what it perceives to be its problems with the internet, and to endeavor to join the internet community as a respected citizen in the forums of two way communication with anyone at any time on any subject. 2.) To help formulate guidelines for, and accept fair use excerption of the works of L. Ron Hubbard for the purpose of non commercial criticism and educational commentary. Homer Wilson Smith United Free Zone Alliance

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Re: How the cypherpunks nearly got me fired (long)
by Michael Sattler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 22:10 1/31/95, David Mandl wrote: [really horrid story about true life at a corporate dinosaur deleted] >I just thought >you might enjoy this little story, and would want to keep it in mind if >you're ever considering employment at Bear-Stearns. Part of my job-interviewing procedure has become grilling a would-be employer (or whoever is asking for a contractor) about their net connections. I've been very pleasantly surprized that most [techie] places are okay on a perspecive employee being interested in the tech grunge of net access, and considering it part of the working environment, a benefit, like gourmet coffee. On the other hand, HP (that god-awful backwards cesspool of bureacracy) had full net connections to the outside world (when I was there, since turned off) but in a pathetic attempt to show due diligence searched our briefcases and backpacks (but not the contents of the laptops, floppies, or tape cartridges therein). Someone's going to have to explain to their legal counsel that taking paper versions out isn't the most efficient way... :-) -----------------------------------------------------------------------+ Michael Sattler <msattler(a)jungle.com> San Francisco, California | Digital Jungle Consulting Services http://www.jungle.com/msattler/ | | And so these men of Indostan/ disputed long and loud/ each in his own | opinion/ exceeding stiff and strong/ though each was partly right/ and | all were in the wrong! - John Godfrey Saxe |

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ESM
by Mark Rogaski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just want to know where I can get a copy of ESM to test on some Linux and Solaris boxes ... Please reply directly, thanx - ----- Doc doc(a)phobos.lib.iup.edu aka Mark Rogaski http://www.lib.iup.edu/~rogaski/ Disclaimer: You would probably be hard-pressed to find ANYONE who agrees with me, much less my university or employer... [finger fllevta(a)oak.grove.iup.edu for PGP Public Key and Geek Code v2.1] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLy877B0c4/pqJauBAQH4HwP+MCfRBEebhvIGxmlCIAUwEjACbYOlkdmd 5NL7+8zZ7wsXOS5/HxUIxtzM55WysA21SMWh0F2e9sabMqwfqM0j0WxdDJWmA5gg oaJlttwHmNpneDcbNBKjKGBivWM2Byibk/1R7usqKjPwYL1qCN1ORvr87G6fNqxX txpt8mts+bo= =cF94 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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