December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Leaving the Country
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:04 AM 7/21/94 -0400, Linn Stanton wrote: >I agree of the inheritance tax question, but there is still a problem. The only >stock markets that I know well enough to be comfortable investing in are in the >US. That will not magically change just because I get citizenship somewhere >else, and that still leaves me liable for US tracking and taxes. US stocks are now traded overseas. Non-residents of the US can execute trades on US exchanges. Learning to feel comfortable in different countries and investing environments is very important for diversification even without the independence it gives you. Remember the one major advantage that you have over the nation state -- you can move and it can't. >I respect your efforts in this area, and don't want to give the impression that >I do not take your advice seriously. However, it is too bleeding edge for >someone with a family, IMHO. I have a family too. We shipped the kids out first (so they would learn to read and write). They are very transnational these days. DCF "I think I'll set up a Conformity Consulting Firm. It will teach "diverse" employees how to get along with white males in the workplace."

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Re: No more Cantwell amendment? was Re: Clipper Chip retreat
by solman＠MIT.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> You wrote: > > | So does anybody actually know of a case in which the government attempted > | to jail somebody for knowingly transmitting cryptographic programs from the > | US? > There was a case where someone was jailed for shipping cable > boxes that do DES out of the US; they didn't know it was illegal & > went to jail. They were in Florida, 1991 or so. I'm not concerned with physical equiptment. Clearly the government has the authority to regulate the export of physical items under munitions laws. But I don't think they should be (or can be under the first amendment) allowed to regulate the flow of information, whether it be via nets or paper. I would suggest that this distinction is why the US is allowing the export of applied cryptography, but not applied cryptography disks. Even if the government believes that distribution of the book is harmful to national security, they clearly can't regulate the expression of ideas on paper. Now most of us have come to think of email as something in between paper and phone calls, but there is no legal precedent (To my knowledge). So I suppose the government could make that argument and defend it. But its really hard for me to imagine the government cracking down on somebody for posting source code via the internet. I'll test that when I'm ready for alpha though. Anybody know a constitutional lawyer interested in taking on a precedent setting case pro bono? :-/ JWS

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The Clipper Chip Proposal
by rittle＠comm.mot.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Mr. Vice President, I am glad to hear that the Administration is willing to back down on some of the highly unfavorable aspects of the Clipper Chip Proposal. I strongly support mandated encryption key escrow for all government employees, such as yourself, but none whatsoever on private individuals or private-sector companies. You all should be accountable to the public. Encryption key escrow of all government employees' keys would help allow the public to hold rogue government employees accountable for their inappropriate actions while in office and hold great power over the public. Get rid of the idea that would place mandatory key escrow on all private users of your encryption standard and, in my opinion, you will go down in history as the first person in government to actually help make this country *more* free and *more* open. I also support completely voluntary (i.e. no outside government coercion) encryption key escrow for all private individuals and private-sector companies, if they themselves so chose it. I cannot see why a private individual would ever want to have their encryption key in escrow, but the private-sector company could gain many benefits. As employee turn- over occurs (by death or disgruntlement), a company would be insured continued access to its information if it had an escrow plan in place. Until the, so called, National Security concerns that are often alluded to, yet never discussed, are bought fully to light on this matter, it is very hard for me to swallow the real need for key escrow for private citizens. Given the low number of legal wiretaps that are authorized each year, it just doesn't make sense to spend the kind of money key escrow would require to implement it on the wide scale you propose. I understand that the White House has already conducted one study on this issue of National Security as it relates to the key escrow issue. Why don't you release this study in full instead of starting another study? I also understand that you have held up the FOIA request to have this study released. Why? In a free society, it is just as important to discuss the National Security issue in the open as the citizen's privacy issue. I leave you with a quote that describes the situation fairly well for me: ``You can have my personal encryption key when you pry it from my cold, dead hands (and even then you can't have it because it has been memorized and my brain is now dead).'' Sincerely, Loren -- Loren J. Rittle (rittle(a)comm.mot.com) Ripem-1.2 MD5OfPublicKey: Systems Technology Research (IL02/2240) D2CE4A0F2BABF33AEF10C8C669DD782D Motorola, Inc. PGP-2.6 Key fingerprint: (708) 576-7794 6810D8AB3029874DD7065BC52067EAFD

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FW: "dumb incompetent sex bimbos"
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sue D. Nym ".....She's asking you to show respect and courtesy to everyone in the forum and the forum because we think of ourselves as part of humanity." You are so kind to speak up for the cause of womanhood and civil demonstrations of respect & courtesy (and for this forum, as well). "Why is everything in our society in terms of "Us vs. Them"?" One reason is because some people are looking more for heat than light. "This can't even be called a society. It is a battlefield." However, somewhere in the heat of ideological battles some productive conclusions are reached; such as that some people will not be influenced by other's opinions and that it is useless to attempt to make conclusions for everyone without their expressed consent. "Here's hoping the positive vibrations of the Jupiter-trumpet will beam into OUR lives and wreak a positive transformation." I think Jupiter is suffering from problems of its own, at this time, being bombarded by a string of meteors. Let us hope we (on planet Earth) don't receive the same. Blanc

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Re: Who Detweiler is *really* posting as
by nobody＠ds1.wu-wien.ac.at 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cyphertentacles: Maybe I missed something here, but I thought what the original writer was implying was that Perry Metzger may indeed be a real human being, but that he was actually working as a *double agent* for Detweiler. That is one of the connotations of the word "tentacle" that Detweiler loves to toss around. I think there is a plausible case for this. Remember, just because you see mail coming from perry(a)imsi.com doesn't mean that the "Perry Metzger" you met in person actually wrote it. It is possible that Detweiler and Metzger are both posting from that account. In fact, looking at the text styles, it seems reasonable. Sometimes Perry writes some very interesting posts related to cryptography, stock trading and other subjects. But in other cases he just rants in a few terse lines, particularly when Detweiler is the subject. Maybe the "orders" to Perry from Detweiler are to "improve your reputation on the list as much as possible". In the meantime, Detweiler is occasionally using the same account to instigate dissension. Haven't you ever noticed an eerie, strange, sort of Jekyll-and-Hyde personality to what comes out of that account at times? Almost to the point of wondering if the same knowledgable person would spew such fervent vitriol? But anyway, I think all of this is plausible enough that Perry should broadcast a denial to everyone on the list again, just to assuage anyone's unconscious fears of secret conspiracies all around them in cyberspace. Heh. These conspiracy theories are kind of fun to imagine. Maybe on the other hand EVERYONE on this list is a tentacle of Detweiler, and YOU are the only one who doesn't realize it. Hee, hee. By the way, I found some records of another person posting from Denver at Netcom that seems to match Detweiler's patterns. It's pretty obvious when you look at the records. I'll let you figure it out for the fun of it. <g> When Detweiler is dead, you won't be seeing me at his funeral. Although you might catch me dancing on his grave.

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Re: Clipper Chip Retreat
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Carl Ellison writes: >I don't care about Skipjack. If they want to publish, I'd read the paper, >but I'm plenty content with triple-DES for routine stuff and DTDTD But if the government is going to push key escrow and they are going to use an unclassified system, then they have to 1) Use a relatively weak cryptographic system in order to keep people from using the unclassified system for fully secure communication with their own non-escrowed keys, and 2) Outlaw using any other (more secure) encryption. This fits right in with Gore's not backing down on export controls. Combine that with his talk of using unclassified, exportable encryption, and he has to be talking about replacing Skipjack with a weak or key-size restricted system (which would not be subject to export controls). And as Mike McNally pointed out, that just increases the likelihood that the government would attempt to make use of other encryption illegal, because with the algorithms known and in software there would be no other way of controlling (or attempting to control) what people do. -- sidney <sidney(a)apple.com>

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Re: Who Detweiler is *really* posting as
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Cyphertentacles: > >{bait, elided} > >Hee, hee. Cut it out, Larry. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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"Key Escrow" --- the very idea
by Mike_Spreitzer.PARC＠xerox.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(1) I'm not an anarchist. Does that make me out of place here? I'm willing to live with some amount of government, as long as us owners stand a chance of controlling or overthrowing it. My biggest problem with Capstone is that it changes the balance of power too much. (2) I think crimes can be committed in cyberspace. Substantially, if not entirely, in cyberspace. Maybe not so many now. But I think it's intellectually dishonest of us who understand the growing importance of cyberspace to claim there won't be any social contracts there that could be violated. I accept the terms of the 4th ammendment: search and siezure allowed when due process followed. "Key escrow" is an attempt to implement the cyberspatial analog of search. (3) The Feds must know they can't prevent modestly well funded, educated, and motivated folks from using unbreakable cryptography amongst themselves. The argument for doing key escrow anyway is that by installing a breakable infrastructure, they'll make enough investigations cheaper and more effective to be worth it. Note that's a comparison of their money and success rate against our privacy; no wonder they got it so wrong. (4) If you accept points (1) and (2) above, you're left wanting a way to implement searches in cyberspace when due process is followed. I hope anarchists won't be the only people opposing changing the balance of power greatly in the government's favor (by poorly designed key escrow). What are the rest of us left to answer with? Perhaps a much better key escrow design. One that integrates the search with the due process in a cryptographically strong way; one that can't be subverted by a few people in a few organizations. For example, who says an escrowed key must have only two parts? Why not a whole lot of parts, distributed to a whole lot of people/organizations? If there are only 1000 legal wiretaps in a year, and they're already fairly expensive, we can add a fair amount to the cost before it gets significant. And again, remember where we're weighing money against freedom. It may be that we just have to spend more to stay a reasonably free society. Also, it's worth debating just how strong the protections have to be. Will we need them to be stronger than those against physical searches? How few people does it take to subvert the current protections against illegal searches? Do we feel that needs to be changed? How much are we willing to spend on it?

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Re: No more Cantwell amendment? was Re: Clipper Chip retreat
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Now most of us have come to think of email as something in between paper >and phone calls, but there is no legal precedent (To my knowledge). So I >suppose the government could make that argument and defend it. But its >really hard for me to imagine the government cracking down on somebody for >posting source code via the internet. I'll test that when I'm ready for >alpha though. Anybody know a constitutional lawyer interested in taking >on a precedent setting case pro bono? :-/ Might check with EFF/ACLU/CPSR - *one* of them should be interested :-| Dave Merriman Wherever you go in Life - there you are!

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comeon**
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lefty says I don't have the wit to speak for him. It would take no wit - just a person with the tastes of a bottom feeder. Lefty, aren't you the little shit who brutally flamed Nobody for using a pseudonym? Lefty? is that your first or last name? Do you have a last name? Are you sure? Say, hero, what is your true name? Lefty, do I have you all wrong, or are you one of those guys who hang back from a fight till you see your opponent is outnumbered? PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE!

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Re: "Key Escrow" --- the very idea
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike_Spreitzer writes: > (1) I'm not an anarchist. Does that make me out of place here? I'm willing to Yes, you are out of place. We took a vote a while back and the anarchists won by 173 votes. The detailed rules of discourse we adopted can be found at the csua.berkeley.edu site. > (2) I think crimes can be committed in cyberspace. Substantially, if not > entirely, in cyberspace. Maybe not so many now. But I think it's I know of no one who disagrees. Of course crimes can be committed in cyberspace, whatever one's definition may be of crime. From forwarding copyrighted material to posting GIFs of children being raped to contracting for hits on one's enemies. (Personally, I treat very few things as being criminal, and thus see few things in cyberspace that could possibly be criminal.) > intellectually dishonest of us who understand the growing importance of > cyberspace to claim there won't be any social contracts there that could be > violated. I accept the terms of the 4th ammendment: search and siezure allowed > when due process followed. "Key escrow" is an attempt to implement the > cyberspatial analog of search. Nope. "Key escrow" is far broader. It is telling people they must "escrow" their house keys with the cops, just in case the cops have a need to enter. It is the requirement that all photographs be "escrowed" with the cops, just in case some dirty pictures need to be looked at. It is the requirement that diaries and journals be written in "approved languages," in case authorities need or want to read them. (By the way, your tacit assumption, that key escrow will become mandatory, is probably accurate, but is in fact not the Administration's proposal. They claim it will forever remain voluntary, though they are then silent on just how this will help with the criminals they seek to catch this way.) The remaining points I'll leave for others to critique. Mandatory key escrow is like telling people they have to use special curtains that can be made transparent if the cops think they need to aim their cameras in our houses. Not exactly what I have in mind for my future. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: "Key Escrow" --- the very idea
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:49 PM 7/21/94 -0700, Mike_Spreitzer.PARC(a)xerox.com wrote: >(1) I'm not an anarchist. [snip] I'm a congenital republican. [snip] >(2) I think crimes can be committed in cyberspace... [snip] So do I. [snip] >(4) If you accept points (1) and (2) above, you're left wanting a way to >implement searches in cyberspace when due process is followed. [Plea for better key escrow removed] I've never gotten into the Clipper discussion before now. I've assumed (somewhat lazily, I might add) that market forces would kill it, if nothing else. I am much more in other consequences of strong-crypto and global public-access computer networks; e$ and all that... I'm not so sure that wiretapping was ever a good idea, but the "private life" of the technology which enabled it ensured its use. Like machine guns, nuclear weapons and semi-automatic firearms, weapons (wiretapping is as surely a weapon as any of the above) will be used. Fortunately, counter-weapons arise. Gentlemen didn't read each other's mail because they couldn't do it practically. Telephony and signals intellegence changed that. People found that they could, and they did it. Now the technological pendulum has swung back to the days where letters were sealed in wax with unique seals. I would like to propose, probably not the first time on this list, an acceptable, time-honored method of determining the contents of a secure conversation. Snitches. That's they used before wiretaps, and it seemed to work well enough then. A contempt of court citation for refusing a warranted search seems strong enough to handle the rest of a government's prosecutory urges. Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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(Fwd) RE: Computer snoopers
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarding mail by: DBURK(a)gmuvax.gmu.edu ("DAN L. BURK") on Thu, 21 Jul 7:50 PM ------------------- Yeah, "snooping" indeed! According to Federal Computer Week, July 11, 1994: The hacker attacks have reached such a scale over the past few months "that on any give day DOD literally does not have control of five or six of its computer systems; the hackers do," one former government official said. Bob Brewin & Elizabeth Sikorivsky, "Hackers storm DOD nets," Federal Computer Week, July 11, 1994 at 1, col. 3. Want to play a game? Dan dburk(a)gmuvax.gmu.edu

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Re: "Key Escrow" --- the very idea
by Rick Busdiecker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 21 Jul 1994 16:49:01 PDT From: Mike_Spreitzer.PARC(a)xerox.com I accept the terms of the 4th ammendment [sic]: search and siezure allowed when due process followed. The 4th amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. One problem with what you've said is that the fourth amendment is not phrased in the sense in which you refer to it. Specifically, it proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures. It does not require the people to actively facilitate the government in `reasonable' searches and seizures. Essentially, you've turned the 4th amendment on its head in your effort to rationalize key escrow. In any case, it's a purely academic question given the dissociation of the `Bill of Rights' from reality. Rick

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Re: "Key Escrow" --- the very idea
by solman＠MIT.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> (1) I'm not an anarchist. Does that make me out of place here? I'm > willing to live with some amount of government, as long as us owners > stand a chance of controlling or overthrowing it. My biggest problem > with Capstone is that it changes the balance of power too much. Simple solution for people like you: Secret split your key into eight pieces, such that six or seven are required to reconstruct it. Create a mechanism whereby people can anonymously distribute their keys. Have the govenment escrow keep just the names of the people with the other pieces. Periodically require everybody to prove that they still have the same piece by sending hashes. When the government wants your key it presents a warrant to the people holding your pieces. But I find this sort of system to be silly. its only purpose is to eavesdrop in on my conversations. Why would I want somebody doing that? I like my privacy so I'd rather not participate. > (2) I think crimes can be committed in cyberspace. Substantially, if not > entirely, in cyberspace. Maybe not so many now. But I think it's > intellectually dishonest of us who understand the growing importance of > cyberspace to claim there won't be any social contracts there that could be > violated. I accept the terms of the 4th ammendment: search and siezure > allowed when due process followed. "Key escrow" is an attempt to implement > the cyberspatial analog of search. This is total bullshit. In the physical world, the ideal set up would clearly be one in which each individual negotiated with each other individual what the contract between them would be. "I don't want to die and you don't want to die, so lets both agree not to kill each other and put some money towards a system of police that guarantees this. I want property rights so I can enjoy the fruits of my labor..." This scenario is, of course, absurd. It takes time to negotiate things like this. Negotiations also require the possibility of no agreement, allowing the parties to re-examine the strength of their respective positions before going back to the table. The cost of conducting these negotiations in the physical world is enourmous. The cost of conducting these negotiations in the real world is negligible. People who like their freedom can negotiate on their own. The stupid and the insecure can purchase agents from other people that do the same thing. LAWS CAN EASILY BE MADE OPTIONAL IN CYBERSPACE WHILE STILL MAINTAINING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. Enforcement of a law is a natural part of the agreement to participate in it. There is absolutely no reason why one set of laws with one set of enforcers needs to be adopted simply because the transactional cost is negligible and the results of non-agreement can be determined nearly instantaneously. I will be introducing the paleolithic analog of an information society in the next few weeks. You had better believe that by the time the information superhighway takes off, complex systems that enforce complex rules will be available to those who want them. > (3) The Feds must know they can't prevent modestly well funded, educated, and > motivated folks from using unbreakable cryptography amongst themselves. The > argument for doing key escrow anyway is that by installing a breakable > infrastructure, they'll make enough investigations cheaper and more effective > to be worth it. Note that's a comparison of their money and success rate > against our privacy; no wonder they got it so wrong. It absurd to think that the Feds can control anything in cyberspace without some sort of physical world police state. Its just not feasible, entropy is dominant. JWS

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Re: Come On
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy: >Yikes, Ray, let's not give anybody ideas! In reality, though, I think the >perceptive women on this list know my heart is in the right place. Isn't >it clear to everyone what I'm making fun of? ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Channeling alt.syntax.tactical and alt.flame (Ohm!), Lefty writes: > Heh. > > It's not clear to Ray. Implying of course that it's clear to him. As I so eloquently stated: > > Well, I can certainly say that I am impressed that you've progressed >to telepathy, but humor a poor student for once. > > {long, irrelevant diatribe, elided} I'm glad you liked it. Atleast you kept the best line. Continuing my masterfully written piece: > I hope I "got it" Answering back from the astral plane: > Er, no. Not at all. In fact, I think you demonstrated what I was saying > quite clearly. Meaning that the answer I supplied to Sandy's question was the wrong one. If he knows it's wrong, then he must know the correct answer, well what is it? Otherwise, I'm waiting for a retraction. <contemplate the correct answer to the following question for 3 nights: "What is the sound of one hand clapping?"> Alert, an alt.syntax.tactical gambit move is about to be attempted: > But not to leave you hopelessly adrift, what's the fundamental difference > between the actions of the subject of your oh-so-sad story, and Sandy's > actions? Take your time. Uh oh, do I detect a change of subject? You see, my last post was directed to supply an answer to Sandy's question "Isn't it clear to everyone what I'm making fun of?" (my answer, the campiness of the show) with an added commentary on assuming a receptive audiencce. All of a sudden, we have a diversion here into how Sandy's H.E.A.T. posts on a mailing list compare to my brother-in-law's showing of vacation pictures during a break at work which is irrelevent to the original line of questioning (if you could call "Heh. It isn't clear to Ray." questioning or discussion) A well timed change of subject, and a barely subtle attempt to bait me of course. I'm not going to fall into the trap, so I won't bother responding. I'm still waiting for your answer to Sandy's question, oh great oracle. > Off by a millimeter at the arrow's point; off by a mile at the target. You shouldn't think out loud. But your reflections on your own behavior are quite on the mark. > -- > Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) > C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:. O:.H:.M: Really Lefty, isn't it about time you stopped baiting people? Scan the last twenty messages you posted to cypherpunks. At best, they were nothing but a bunch "witty" 3-liners designed to start a flame with somebody you thought you could obviously outwit. Almost zero discussion or information content. The only post of yours which contained atleast five full sentences was a forward of some Sue D. Nym message. I'm honored that you respect my intellect enough to dedicate more than your usual quota of 3 short sentences (I know it must be quite taxing on your creativity), but maybe it's time for you to take a vacation. -internet highway patrol, assault speech division.

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WWW> Cryptography/PGP/Privacy Web page (fwd)
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had never heard of this group, so though I'd forward the notice. The page looked pretty good too at first glimpse. Forwarded message: > From: franl(a)centerline.com (Fran Litterio) > Newsgroups: comp.infosystems.announce > Subject: Cryptography/PGP/Privacy Web page (via Centerline Software) > Date: 16 Jul 1994 18:36:38 GMT > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > I've put together a World Wide Web page containing some interesting > information for PGP users (and anyone else who's interested in crypto > and privacy). Some highlights: > > o A link to the PGP FAQ (in hypertext form) maintained at > Quadralay Corp.. > > o Links to forms for looking up public keys from the public > keyserver network (and for submitting your own key). > > o PGP 2.6 and 2.3a documentation and quick reference pages. > > The URL is: > > http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/crypto.html > > Let me know if you like it or have suggestions for how to improve it. > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6 > > iQCVAgUBLfeFJneXQmAScOodAQF3WgP8D8PyrasDkpBbUmK5yiL2+vmLhsAmyzdx > LlM1cYrYmjbr9Fp7hfyvTiB5tT7mK9+wEC1PXQZNw+mV7asbd2GA9ZrbHV6wLYU7 > Hi14KMN4aPawneWRaZGGRmXNRh/kY+UaRTpCw8xNsw2dzMfD/xL5yLp9eNulHOXk > a1tWLIM+210= > =eSHm > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- > Fran Litterio franl(a)centerline.com (617-498-3255) > CenterLine Software http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/ > Cambridge, MA, USA 02138-1110 PGP public key id: 1270EA1D > > > > >

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remail
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BSA Business software Alliance NEWS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Wednesday, July 20, 1994 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Diane Smiroldo, 202.872.5500 BSA PRESIDENT ROBERT HOLLEYMAN REACTION STATEMENT TO VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S LETTER TO REP. CANTWELL ON ENCRYPTION "On behalf of the leading American PC software companies, BSA commends Rep. Maria Cantwell for her success in convincing the administration to change its policy on encryption. Following extensive negotiations with Rep. Cantwell, today Vice President Gore announced that the administration will work with industry to develop a new key escrow encryption system. This new encryption system has the potential for wide-spread use because it will be practical, affordable, and trustworthy. "The administration has recognized that Clipper Chip will not be used for computers. It has been recognized that the information security system for personal computers must be privately developed and controlled. The administration has agreed that the new encryption system must be voluntary, software implementable, based on a non-classified encryption formula, exportable, and employ private sector agents to hold the keys. "The administration also agreed to support periodic studies assessing the availability and impact of foreign encryption programs on American companies. Recognizing the economic importance of the software industry, the administration pledged the active participation of the National Economic Council and the Department of Commerce in the studies. The Vice President agreed that the studies will lay the groundwork to reassess existing export controls. "Today's agreement is a significant victory both for U.S. software companies and the future of the global information superhighway. U.S. software companies must be permitted to compete on a level playing field with foreign vendors who already provide security on software programs. High tech industries are indebted to Rep. Cantwell for her leadership in convincing the administration to adopt a new approach and potentially end the disruptive war on encryption policy." # BSA promotes the continued growth of the software industry through its international public policy, education, and enforcement programs in the U.S. and more than 55 other countries throughout North America, Asia, Europe, and South America. BSA represents the leading U.S. publishers of PC software including Aldus, Apple Computer, Autodesk, Intergraph, Lotus Development, Microsoft, Novell, and WordPerfect. ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 7 lines: :: Response-Key: ideaclipper ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%-S^P;+]AB?X9TW6\8WR:&P&2'K1RX_1#HL&P@GW&U6W_:A2N?I86=* K404T##68_(;5YO()D7.H.%@%L*"][5<DF\.P,/H9EE?>#D6V_FT>:$,!0``` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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True Lies
by Russell Nelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quite clearly, the bad guys in True Lies used a Capstone unit to do their encryption. Too bad they didn't make a point of it -- after all, catching terrorists is putatively what escrowed encryption is aimed at. -russ

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Clipper Chip retreat
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Congratulations! I consider the "Clipper Chip retreat" a victory for the Cypherpunks, EFF, and inhabitants of cyberspace. We have succeeded in a tactic often used by three letter agencies... Stall! The "stall" tactic lets you re-supply, regroup and plan the next attack . This event slows the government down and will provide the inhabitants of cyberspace more time to develop a defacto encryption system (PGP, RIPEM, PEM, etc) that will overshadow any scheme deployed by government. It also gives us time to continue the fight against "Key-escrow" and government back doors. This message may be a little premature but if true, we should be ready for the next offensive. (yes offensive). This bit of information also makes me wander what their next move might be. It could be... "NEWS FLASH... Drug lord goes free because he is using non-key-escrow crypto..." ... __o .. -\<, chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server.

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HR 3937 now a dead end; House Rules Comm results
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[updated July 21, 1994 shabbir] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Introduction Result of House Rules committee vote Status of the bill 1994 Voters Guide ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please contact vtw(a)vtw.org so they can be added to this list. General questions: vtw(a)vtw.org Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request(a)vtw.org Press Contact: stc(a)vtw.org Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/11/vtw WWW URL: We're working on it. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT OF THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE VOTE ON HR 3937 Based on information gathered by volunteers, we've been able to piece together some of the positions of the House Rules Committee as to how they voted for/against opening up HR 3937 to amendments on the House floor. [This is now somewhat moot, as is explained in the next section.] Extensive kudos go to Joe Thomas <jthomas(a)pawpaw.mitre.org> gaj(a)portman.com (Gordon Jacobson) who both did extensive work to help find this information. Here are the results we were able to obtain: [The committee voted 5-4 to open the bill] HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone ==== == ======================== ============== 9 MA Moakley, John Joseph (D) 1-202-225-8273 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 3 SC Derrick, Butler (D) 1-202-225-5301 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 24 CA Beilenson, Anthony (D) 1-202-225-5911 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 24 TX Frost, Martin (D) 1-202-225-3605 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 10 MI Bonior, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2106 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 3 OH Hall, Tony P. (D) 1-202-225-6465 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 5 MO Wheat, Alan (D) 1-202-225-4535 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 6 TN Gordon, Bart (R) 1-202-225-4231 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 28 NY Slaughter, Louise M. (D) 1-202-225-3615 Voted "open" 22 NY Solomon, Gerald B. (R) 1-202-225-5614 Voted "open" 1 TN Quillen, James H. (R) 1-202-225-6356 Told a constituent he would vote for "open". 28 CA Dreier, David (R) 1-202-225-2305 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 14 FL Goss, Porter J. (R) 1-202-225-2536 UNSPECIFIED POSITION It is probably not worth the trouble to ask the remaining legislators how they voted unless you happen to chat with their staff often. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILL (updated 7/21/94) If you read the appropriate newsgroups (or any major newspaper) you've seen the news about the Gore/Cantwell compromise. Since everyone has reprinted it already, we'll not reprint it again, though we'll happily send you a copy should you have missed it. The upshot of this is that Rep. Maria Cantwell will not be offering her amendment and therefore HR 3937 is a dead end this year for liberalizing cryptography exports. Since VTW is an organization dedicated to working on legislation, and there is no longer a piece of relevant legislation, we will be concentrating on other projects. The "cantwell" section of our archive will be reworked, and the records of legislators that voted will be kept there for future reference. [NOTE: these voting records will also be rolled into our 1994 Voters Guide] Here is the final schedule/chronology of the bill Jul 21, 94 Rep. Cantwell and Vice Pres. Al Gore compromise on seven principles, retreating on the Clipper chip; Rep. Cantwell chooses not continue to press the legislation or the amendment (see relevant articles in today's NY Times and Washington Post) Jul 20, 94 HR3937 comes to House floor; a "good" amendement will be offered Jul 11, 94 House Rules Committee marks HR3937 "open"; allowing amendments Jun 30, 94 [*** vote postponed, perhaps till the week of 7/11/94] House Rules Comm. decides whether to allow amendments on the bill when it reaches the House floor Jun 14, 94 Gutted by the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 20, 94 Referred to the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 18, 94 Passed out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18 attached to HR 3937, the General Export Administration Act Dec 6, 93 Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Nov 22, 93 Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1994 VOTERS GUIDE Voters Telecomm Watch believes that you should be informed about your legislators' positions on key issues. We will be developing a survey to give to current legislators and their challengers that will gauge their positions on key issues involving telecommunications and civil liberties. These results will be made publicly available on the net for you to use in casting your vote in November. We'll be depending on you to help get legislative candidates to fill out and return their surveys. Please watch this space for the announcement of survey availability in the coming weeks. If you wish to participate in the development of the survey, feel free to join the working list by mailing a note to that effect to vtw(a)vtw.org -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: GUT and P=NP
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

James A. Donald writes: > I was referring to the proposed quantum computers. > > > Since such machines do not operate algorithmically > > > > This statement is exactly wrong. Such machines *define* a class of > > algorithms. > I recommend that you read the following paper. > E. Bernstein and U. Vazirani, {\it Quantum Complexity > Theory}, Proc. 25th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computation, pp. 11--20 > (1993). James, without reading the paper, can you tell me why the following argument is incorrect? 1) By definition, if something can be computed by a turing machine, then it is an algorithm (Lewis and Papadimitriou) 2) a quantum computer can be simulated by a TM with exponential slowdown. (claimed by you on the Extropians list, but also claimed by Feynmann I believe, not about qm computers, but qm systems in general) then by (1) and (2), it follows that 3) quantum computers are algorithmic (if not, it would contradict 2) and possibly 1) It doesn't matter how slow the turing machine runs the simulation because we allow an arbitrary time along with the infinite tape to complete the computation. -Ray

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RE: Come On
by cyber1＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Connie Sadler <sadler_c(a)hosp.stanford.edu> writes: <I find lines like the above very offensive/non-professional. I >won't let it stop me from continuing on, but what's the >point? I really don't get it. CypherPUNKs is an offshoot of the cyberpunk paradigm, which can be stated as "high tech/lowlife". There are no claims of professionalism as far as I know. If cypherpunks share a common attribute, it is probably their enjoyment of the _practice_ of encryption and related disciplines. I did not notice anyone insult you personally. Surely if you find the language offensive, the solution is to filter your mail, or else unsubscribe. -- Alex Brock

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Re: Voice/Fax Checks
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:33 PM 7/21/94 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >All existing substitutes are either insecure (credit cards) or involve >excessive labor and transaction costs. > >Electronic transactions will take off like a rocket once they >*undercut* existing methods. > >As yet, our mail encryption interface is still bad. Convenient >crypto cash must come after convenient crypto mail. Chaum's going to do a full-blown internet demo real soon now, but the topic of this thread (faxed account, ABA#, etc) is being done right now, right out of the box. There are the various "net.malls" on the net out with secure mosaic credit card transactions. A guy just said he made his first sale (encrypted receipts and all) and we pooh-poohed him 'cause he didn't tell us anything we didn't already know. (We gotta be nicer to these guys, maybe???) To mutate what I said in the previous post in this thread, 85% of the people will settle for 75% privacy. If there's something to buy, and they can do an honest transaction and get the stuff they buy without being ripped off, then they probably don't care who's looking over their shoulder. Privacy will probably never be a selling point. Privacy will probably be an outflow of the need for e$, not vice versa. At this point I may have a quasi-religeous faith that the key to the adoption of e$ is that e$ reduces transaction costs, but we don't have any data to back it up. As someone who's been thrashing this a little bit, I've gotten stuck on exactly how to "*undercut*" the transaction costs of existing methods. Got any ideas? Are those transaction costs as a percentage of total cost meaningful enough to embue digital cash with the rocket-like competitive advantage we hope for? I don't have answers to these questions. I challenge you to come up with that analysis without a working system to benchmark your assumptions against. Mr. Solman, who seems to have pre-announced an agent based system with e$ "ticks" like in telescript, has my devoted interest at this point, but until there's some actual data, we're only speculating. BTW, I agree with you that Crypto mail isn't convenient. I still don't use PGP because it's way too much trouble to screw around with, and I bet doughnuts to dollars (Perry can hold the stakes. He's a wagering man ;-)...) that the Mac PGP I have is easier to mess with than any version on any other machine. <MacBigotMode(off)> But, as I said above, you don't need secure email to move e$ around. Secure mosaic will do just fine. I used email in the section you quoted because it's the simplest protocol conceptually, and I'm sorry you got tripped up in it. Light dawns on Marblehead. (Massachusetts joke). Isn't the point of digital cash that you *can* send it through unsecure mail and buy things? Perry, I want my bag of doughnuts back. No need to have a "mine is better than yours" bet after all. I really should just go to sleep now... Good Night, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Who Detweiler is *really* posting as
by Peter Murphy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have deleted most of the blather from "Nobody" on this subject. However, this line was _very_ interesting... > BTW, I don't like what has been going on the list where there are anonymous > attacks on people in the list. This, of course, comes after about 60-80 lines of insinuations that Perry Metzger is really L. Detweiler. Isn't the world a funny place? Peter.

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