December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Big Brother wants the shirt off your back
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Although not exactly crypto-related, I couldn't forego the opportunity to pass this along - From: risks(a)CSL.SRI.COM (RISKS Forum) Newsgroups: comp.risks Subject: RISKS DIGEST 16.14 Message-ID: <CMM.0.90.1.771548444.risks(a)chiron.csl.sri.com> Date: 13 Jun 94 23:00:44 GMT Sender: daemon(a)ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: risks(a)csl.sri.com Distribution: world Organization: The Internet Lines: 644 Approved: risks(a)csl.sri.com ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 13 Jun 94 16:16 EDT From: Lynn R Grant <Grant(a)DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL> Subject: Big brother wants the shirt off your back Here's another risk on the horizon. We may have to wait a few years, though. From the June 1994 issue of Bobbin, "The premier news and information source of the global sewn products industry": Groups such as the American Textile Partnership (AMTEX), a research consortium that links the sewn products industry with the Department of Energy's national laboratories, also are looking at RF technology as a means to improve the production process. In a research project called the Embedded Electronic Fingerprint, long-term work is underway to develop a computer-type device the size of a grain of wheat that could be attached to a garment and used through the entire product life cycle. "A manufacturer could program into the device information unique to a garment, such as the size, color, style, line, or plant of manufacture, care instructions, etc.," explains Jud Early, director of research and development for the Textile/Clothing Technology Corp, [TC]**2. "There also would be a large amount of blank memory that could be used for anti-counterfeit tracking and more." Since each tag would have a unique identity, in-process inventory could be tracked easily using RF units--without ever touching garments or having to open shipping boxes. For example, a carton could be passed through a reading system, which would verify the contents against the packing list. So, all that is needed is for the clerk at the store to capture the identity of the shirt, perhaps through a barcode on the tag (so they wouldn't have to install the special shirt readers), and they already know your identity from your credit card number (unless someone else buys your shirts for you), so they can track your movements by setting up shirt readers in various places. But that might take more collusion between government and the stores than we want to speculate. So try this: a crime is committed. A few days later, you walk past a hidden shirt reader, and are immediately approached by an officer of the law, who arrests you for the crime. "But I was nowhere near the scene of the crime," you protest. "On the contrary," the officer counters, "one of our hidden shirt readers detected you shirt in the vicinity of the crime. You must be guilty." One would hope that the manufacturers of these devices don't accidentally program duplicate serial numbers in them. And you should think twice about lending your shirt to your girlfriend. Lynn Grant Grant(a)DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL ------------------------------

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Traffic Analysis papers, where?
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The pointer to oml(a)eloka.demon.co.uk died due to bounced mail (bounced after 32 days!). Does anyone have other pointers to papers on traffic analysis? Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com

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URGENT Action required (NJ folks only) (fwd)
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message:

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UPDATE 2: Crypto export campaign - more fax numbers
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

YOUR letters, faxes and calls are needed now to ensure that the cryptography, privacy and security provisions of the Cantwell Export Administration Act are preserved in bill HR3837 - help strike a blow against Clipper and for freely distributable software like PGP and RIPEM. If you can't fax directly, you can send your message to glickman(a)eff.org. EFF will fax or hand-deliver it for you to the Committee Chair, Rep. Dan Glickman. Updates on the Fax numbers of the House Intelligence Committee. Subcommittee fax: +1 202 225 1991 Sometimes does not answer. Keep trying! it IS a working fax number. Rep phone fax D KS Glickman, Daniel +1 202 225 6216 +1 202 225 5398 Chair Rep. Glickman's staff has finally released his fax number. D TX Coleman, Ronald D. +1 202 225 4831 +1 202 225 4831 This fax number is also a voice line. Staff manually switch to fax if they hear fax tones. You may wish to call by voice to make sure they do this if your fax attempts fail. If you don't get thru, call the Committee, and ask for the voice number, it may have been changed. D AL Cramer Jr, Robert (Bud) +1 202 225 4801 +1 202 225 4392 Rep. Cramer's staff has finally released his fax number. D MO Gephardt, Richard A. +1 202 225 2671 +1 202 225 7414 Rep. Gephardt has changed his fax number. The correct one is given here. R NE Bereuter, Douglas +1 202 225 4806 +1 202 226 1148 Sometimes does not answer. This IS a valid fax #, keep trying. R CA Dornan, Robert K. +1 202 225 2965 Rep. Dornan has disconnected this fax number. His office does have a fax, but it has been made non-public. Constituents may wish to describe to Rep. Dornan how they feel about such manouvers. R IL Michel, Robert H. +1 202 225 6201 +1 202 225 9249 Try again if you don't get an answer. This is a working fax number. Many thanks to Janet E. Harrison <tat(a)well.sf.ca.us> for doing the footwork for this update. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist F O R M O R E I N F O, E - M A I L T O: I N F O @ E F F . O R G O P E N P L A T F O R M O N L I N E R I G H T S V I R T U A L C U L T U R E C R Y P T O

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RSADSI "Terisa" venture
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A (very) brief blurb on the inside cover of Network Worl this week (p.2, June 13, 1994; vol. 11, number 24): "That secure feeling. RSA Data Security, Inc., which sells public-key cryptograpgy software, and Enterprise Integration Technologies Corp., product manager for a $12 million Internet marketplace, are teaming up to sell tools that build secure Internet applications. Their joint venture, Terisa Systems, will market tools for creating World-Wide Web clients and servers that incorporate cryptography and digital signatures for ensuring the privacy and validity of transactions over the Internet. Shipping is scheduled for late 1994. Terisa: (415) 617-1836" _______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson US Sprint Managed Network Engineering tel: 703.904.2437 Herndon, Virginia USA internet: paul(a)hawk.sprintmrn.com

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RE: DNA
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message Mon, 13 Jun 1994 18:54:10 +0200 (METDST), Mats Bergstrom <matsb(a)sos.sll.se> writes: > Databases of fingerprints and retina-images might still have a future > for specialized applications but DNA-typing (why not on a simple blood > sample at birth) combined with a fixed social security number valid for > life will probably become a widely used method for governments to control > the identity of their serfs. > [good stuff elided] > > Unfortunately there is no known method of encrypting one's DNA code > in situ but hopefully they will safely (in escrow?) encrypt it in > the databanks. This issue came up at the CFP-2 conference (Computers Freedom and Privacy, March 92 edition). There were speakers there claiming that the audience, when getting up from their chairs, would leave sufficient hair, skin flakes, sweat, etc. behind that DNA mapping would be easy. Of course, this mapping would be without the "suspect" having any knowledge of when the map material was gathered. I don't know if this was factual then, but no one rose up to claim that the speaker was in error, and there were lots of folks in the audience that could have challenged it. None did. This speach was a major motivation in my interest in these topics. That, and a chance to listen to Bruce Stirling, DED, and Jim Bidzos... Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Matt Blazes paper
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone tell me where the apaper Matt Blaze wrote on Tessera can be found? preferably in a non postscript form. Thanks, Reuben Halper

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Re: Anon posts (was irrit
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com B >Sternlight wars on Usenet. Ironic that a group calling themselves B >"punks" should be civilized, intelligent, scholarly, altruistic, and B >basic good 'net citizens, while sci.crypt is often little more than a B >bunch of people playing "did so!" games. And the PGP group! B > B >>--Tim May USENET vs mailing list. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Sunday NY Times anti-Clipper, FBI bill editorial
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a brief quote from a NewsBytes copyrighted article. You can surmise the rest, or go get a copy of last Sunday's NY Times. There are no new arguments in the Times editorial, but the fact that they wrote it is what's interesting: WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.A., 1994 JUN 13 (NB) -- In a Sunday editorial, the influential New York Times has criticized both the Clinton administration's Clipper encryption scheme and the digital telephony legislation backed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). -- sidney markowitz <sidney(a)taurus.apple.com>

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Re: DNA
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In my country we are all issued a unique software agent at birth i the format: YYMMDDxxxy where y is a check for authenticity (to make it harder faking a number I guess) No. The purpose of check digits like that is to detect innocent errors in data entry.

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Was the list"wiped" Sunday afternoon
by Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw a note and havent received any e-mail today

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Re: DNA
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Along the lines of Big Brother and your genomic heritage: No, the few cells left on your chair are not enough to provide a genomic map. Hair does, indeed, contain cells capable of being analyzed, in the follicles. PCR (polymerase chain reaction) is capable of analyzing a variety of genetic polymorphisms (genes that vary among the general population) from only a single cell. Thus you could be typed in a limited fashion and identified but not mapped. Small comfort, however, and PCR is becoming easier every day. For escaping DNA typing tests, I suggest carrying along some HeLa cell DNA (that will really screw up the test ;->. Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfvO9j2paOMjHHAhAQElBAQA2Q+NCsYT/RxcFzIaDyWh6jRpP1672BZW MvmRccSGKUyhIz54mC19cAaS6LuB1CxyMd2L52hn3eFwaxGbg1J/G3hIrJyCJ+Da ocJGG0cmdnl1Pg7coA3vT3IWDvv58/UHeZeKYgCEbckIQEGCmvKqqMdHd6yxz+K3 TYH75tQW6bU= =HWaa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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As I delurk, a question... (Clipper)
by roy＠sendai.cybrspc.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The thought occurs... the NSA doesn't seem particularly distressed that Clipper's LEAF can be spoofed and rendered unusable. Could this indicate that the LEAF isn't really necessary to retrieve the session key after all? - -- Roy M. Silvernail -- roy(a)sendai.cybrspc.mn.org will do just fine, thanks. "Does that not fit in with your plans?" -- Mr Wiggen, of Ironside and Malone (Monty Python) PGP 2.3a public key available upon request (send yours) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3c iQCVAgUBLf0dkRvikii9febJAQFEGQP+JUs/Z67WyE2Xgd6dwwcarHrGUqN7Gl5l IlypdV2dX1McvuREj4WT6w13ljwe8kstLanyZxc2vHxiiEx+49D/wXG985pVNKRr ylJVWYremrtPz4/p4Ibcdy/9Cvh7V0GYtIIVCDzTCsaF8LVXzWQeqlcEiwG5G57D sC/4Ylwhp/U= =b7h/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Current Remailers
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- After testing several remailers this weekend, three have given no reply. remail(a)c2.org (does this remailer support Request-Remailing-To:?) has not gotten back to me, nor has catalyst(a)netcom.com or remailer(a)rebma.mn.org. anon(a)cyberspace.org mailed me back from its mail daemon to tell me no such account, as did nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu. The following worked: remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at very fast remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu very fast rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu very fast hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu very fast hfinney(a)shell.portal.com very fast remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com took a couple of hrs. ghio(a)kaiwan.com very fast remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl took overnight but it's not in this country :-) Does anyone know if catalyst and rebma are still on line? Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfvT4z2paOMjHHAhAQEwiQQA1o9hj0Ip/pWYRcOnveS54Qigfx/cuSKb uLJNW/8qvBCvmWvBabnL8Y3612HCkhyqajgiziQa4cglB/ALALyIZYkJH23xNwfp dv/o/Cn22RQvcFITRxPaMCcjZJUdJZGpDdP11vP1UboNdQHPMIFN54Nq/5XdFFgL 6AE3/hkjG+E= =UBu2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: As I delurk, a question... (Clipper)
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>NSA doesn't seem particularly distressed that >Clipper's LEAF can be spoofed and rendered unusable. Could this >indicate that the LEAF isn't really necessary to retrieve the session >key after all? Not necessarily. First of all, why would the NSA let it be known if they are distressed? I'm amazed that they have started talking to the public at all! Secondly, what do they hope to achieve with this whole Clipper thing? Given that they are aware that strong crypto exists and is publicly available around the world, what can they gain by pushing Clipper? Is it some type of political influence in the U.S. that they'll get by winning this round, or do they want the ability to spy on ordinary civilian and U.S. government activity, or what? Whatever it is, if it isn't hurt by people having PGP available, it isn't hurt by the small number of people who would spoof LEAFs. As I read the official pronouncements of representatives of the U.S. government and especially the NSA, I can't figure out what they do hope to achieve. Can anyone else on this list make sense of it? -- sidney markowitz <sidney(a)taurus.apple.com>

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NSA technology transfer
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following was posted on the list in the middle of May. Being curious I called the number list at Ft. Meade. The person on who answered was real shaken, for lack of a better term, that I called, it seems that this was the second inquiry that day. He wanted to know various things, like where did I get the information, was my name Bruce.... After a few minutes he finally took my name and said, to call him in a week to 10 days if I did not here from him. A few day later he called and said I needed to send a letter to expressing my interest in the technology. About 10 ten days after that I called to inquire if he received my letter and what was the next step. It seems that there had been quite a few requests and that they were trying to determine whether or not they were going to allow the technology to be transferred to individuals. The person said to call back in 4 or 5 days. I called today and they said in essence that they were not going to let individuals have a shot at it. They said that they were going to charge stiff license fees, that you would need to show a plan of how you were going to develop the product..... You get the point. It is obvious that they really don't want to transfer the technology. And if they do it will be to someone with deep pockets and who they like. I wonder where the fees that they want to charge will go, to the general treasury or to their own budget? More later. Dan Harmon On Thu, 19 May 1994, Anonymous wrote: > > > Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.privacy > From: schneier(a)chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) > Subject: "Interesting Stuff" Checkers at the NSA > Message-ID: <Cq2934.q0(a)chinet.chinet.com> > Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX > Date: Thu, 19 May 1994 17:40:15 GMT > > This is from a flyer that NSA people have been distributing: > > NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY -- TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER > > Information Sorting and Retrieval by Language or Topic > > Description: This technique is an extremely simple, fast, > completely general mathod of sorting and retrieving machine- > readable text according to language and/or topic. The > method is totally independent of the particular languages or > topics of interest, and relies for guidance solely upon > exemplars (e.g., existing documents, fragments, etc.) > provided by the user. It employs no dictionaries keywords, > stoplists, stemmings, syntax, semantics, or grammar; > nevertheless, it is capable of distinguishing among closely > related toopics (previously considered inseparable) in any > language, and it can do so even in text containing a great > many errors (typically 10 - 15% of all characters). The > technique can be quickly implemented in software on any > computer system, from microprocessor to supercomputer, and > can easily be implemented in inexpensive hardware as well. > It is directly scalable to very large data sets (millions of > documents). > > Commercial Application: > > Language and topic-independent sorting and retieval of > documents satisfying dynamic criteria defined only by > existing documents. > > Clustering of topically related documents, with no > prior knowledge of the languages or topics that may be > present. It desired, this activity can automatically > generate document selectors. > > Specializing sorting tasks, such as identification of > duuplicate or near-duplicate documents in a large set. > > National Security Agency > Research and Technology Group - R > Office of Research and Technology Applications (ORTA) > 9800 Savage Road > Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 > (301) 688-0606 > > > If this is the stuff they're giving out to the public, I can only > imagine what they're keeping for themselves. > > Bruce > > ************************************************************************** > * Bruce Schneier > * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 > * schneier(a)chinet.com > ************************************************************************** > >

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Massive ITAR Violation!
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I mailed this about 5 minutes before the news of list death arrived, so it didn't make it. Conspiracy! Anyway, I posted this to comp.org.eff.talk and so far it has generated no interest. The Cypherpunks have been mentioned in various articles in the mass media as a group that would at least toy with the idea of civil disobedience concerning ITAR violation. Imagine yourselves trying to topple ITAR by publically exporting PGP to many countries, every day, for over a year. Yet do any of us really want to push our luck this way? Phil Zimmermann is out a lot of cash paying for a legal team. He can hardly afford taking his family out for dinner. That's why discovering this, I feel it should make *news*. As it turns out, the internet's largest Macintosh ftp archive has been exporting MacPGP2.2 every day for the last year! This to Singapore and China and God knows where else. Every country on Earth with an internet connection, likely. Here is a satirical essay, explaining what anyone who takes ITAR at face value might do if they discovered this situation.... -----BEGIN ROT13 SIGNED MESSAGE----- Fellow citizens of the United States of America, I wish to inform you of a great and ongoing catastrophe of most serious consequence. It is organized crime, by definition. Below is the header for the MacPGP2.2 file on sumex-aim.stanford.edu, archived with dozens of other utilities, as /info-mac/util/pgp.hqx, which has been there for *over a year*, many times a week being *exported* onto info-mac mirrors around the world. This is the most massive and organized absolute violation of the USA's ITAR munitions export laws (regulations) we have ever witnessed. For an entire year, weekly if not daily, the notorious encryptor PGP, right under our eyes, exported! I hope this is cleared up as soon as humanly possible, but we are all of us left with the guilt of not having noticed this before. All this talk of ITAR and there you are, your largest communal Mac ftp site pumping out PGP across the border like a huge demonic machine bent on destroying our beloved society. If the moderators cannot be contacted immediately, I suggest military force be used. Or cooperative shutdown of the US internet connections. Please begin this at once, as it *must* be stressed that PGP is classified as a MUNITION, right along with rocket launchers and tanks!!!!!!!! This is as serious as it gets. I didn't even know what the internet *was* back in April of '93, and I am but one in a million (literally) who has access to sumex-aim.stanford.edu and all its mirror sites. It must have been my destiny to save the world, for none of *you* seem interested in doing so. It has only been an hour since I discovered this NATIONAL SECURITY DISASTER, and I immediately set myself in action to save my country from destruction. *I*YoU*mE*We*OiwIE*wE*yOU*Me*I* P.S. Here is the evidence: >From: macmod(a)SUMEX-AIM.Stanford.EDU (Info-Mac Moderator) >Date: Sun, 25 Apr 1993 23:22:58 PDT > >PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) ver 2.2 - RSA public-key encryption freeware >for MSDOS, protects E-mail. Lets you communicate securely with people >you've never met, with no secure channels needed for prior exchange of >keys. Well featured and fast! Excellent user documentation. > >PGP has sophisticated key management, an RSA/conventional hybrid >encryption scheme, message digests for digital signatures, data >compression before encryption, and good ergonomic design. Source >code is free. > >Keywords: PGP, Pretty Good Privacy, RSA, public key, encryption, > privacy, authentication, signatures, email > >(This file must be converted with BinHex 4.0) > >:$8eKBe"(8$)Z-LjcC@%!39"36'&eFh3J!!!$@3X!!%DFIea6593K!!%!!eN,FNa .... And upon downloading it and starting it up, the console window faithfully displays: >Pretty Good Privacy 2.2 - Public-key encryption for the masses. >(c) 1990-1993 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Mar 93 >Date: 1994/06/12 16:10 GMT I further suggest that all of the following sites (but a sample) immediately remove this file from their archives and stop mirroring sumex-aim till they too remove the file. To keep this from happening again, I suggest *all of us* in the USA delete our copies of PGP from our hard disks, lest our children export it into the hands of such enemy nations as these. It is time we put an end to this scourge, for look what will happen if we do not. Pornographers and terrorists are coming for our children if we do not act. Death to PGP users!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Where is our government in all of this? Our tax dollars are not being used to protect us from the EXPORT OF MUNITIONS TO ENEMY NATIONS!!!!! I suggest full prosecution of all users and maintainers of sumex-aim, as they have all obviously conspired to maintain this treachery. I suggest they all be searched for other weapons as well including land mines, automatic machine guns, poison gases, biological weaponry and mind control devices of all sorts, as it is my firm belief that the only reason they are interested in PGP is to forward their agenda to export other munitions, drugs pushed on *our* children to pay for them!!! This will culminate in the obvious acquisition of *nuclear bombs* by every Tom Dick and Harry gangster. Little boys and girls in the getto with *neutron bombs* and *poison gas missiles*! I shutter to think we could have stopped it but, alas, we may have failed ourselves. Here are the target sites. I suggest immediate offensive attacks to destroy these evil ports of death and destruction.... Australia (Melbourne): archie.au//micros/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Austria (Vienna): ftp.univie.ac.at//mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Canada (Vancouver): ftp.ucs.ubc.ca//pub/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Finland (Espoo): ftp.funet.fi// pub/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Finland (Jyvaskyla): ftp.jyu.fi//info-mac/util/MacPGP2.2.sea Germany (Hannover): ftp.rrzn.uni-hannover.de//pub/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Japan (Tokyo): ftp.center.osaka-u.ac.jp//info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Japan (Tokyo): ftp.iij.ad.jp//pub/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Japan (Tokyo): ftp.u-tokyo.ac.jp//pub/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Netherlands (Wageningen): ftp.fenk.wau.nl//pub/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Republic of Singapore (Singapore): ftp.nus.sg//pub/mac/util/pgp.hqx Sweden (Lund): ftp.lth.se//mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx.Z Sweden (Uppsala): ftp.sunet.se//pub/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Switzerland (Zurich): nic.switch.ch//mirror/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Taiwan (Hsinchu): ftp.edu.tw//Macintosh/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx UK (London): src.doc.ic.ac.uk//packages/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx.gz -----END ROT13 SIGNED MESSAGE----- -----BEGIN ROT13 SIGNATURE----- Whar fvkgu avargrra uhaqerq avargl sbhe. Sbhegubhfnaqgra punenpgref va frirauhaqerqrvtuglrvtug jbeqf bs baruhaqerq yvarf. -----END ROT13 SIGNATURE-----

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(None)
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) writes: > One has already been created: alt.numbers.random > You may post factorizations of peoples public keys to > alt.numbers.prime, as well. I can't seem to find any newsgroups on Netcom containing "numbers" in the name. Should I complain? -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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The NEXUS-Berkeley is now on-line
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Note: you haven't been subscribed to nexus-berkeley(a)c2.org without your permission.. you're on a list that this message has been Bcc`d to, if you are not subbed to nexus-berkeley(a)c2.org] -- Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley is now on-line -- -- Please distribute widely. After many months of planning, thinking, frustration, and hard work, Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley is now on-line and ready to begin its work. We've been thinking and dreaming about this for the past two years. Finally we've made it into a reality. Community ConneXion (c2, c^2, or c-squared) has been founded in order to build up a strong community in the internet both locally and globally. We are linked into the worldwide NEXUS-Gaia movement which is building up a worldwide community of like-minded network-oriented individuals. We've realized that the internet is not about the protocols nor the universities nor the corporations nor the politics which form the basic infrastructure. All these things are merely the facilitators, the parts which come together to produce the whole; the internet is about people communicating and making connections with each other-- forming the social infrastructure. We've appeared in order to facilitate these connections. We've setup shop here in the SF Bay Area and we will integrate virtuality and reality. It is possible for virtual communities to merge into, supplement, and sometimes even create "real" flesh communities. In order to build up this community we've put some computers on the internet and have started offering services. These are quality services provided at a low cost, with an emphasis on community involvement. We emphasize privacy because there can be no strong community where people fear their neighbors. By allowing people to selective reveal themselves, we make easier for them to break down the walls of prejudice which come between people in social interactions. We're offering mailboxes, shell accounts, anonymous remailing services, ftp space, domain names, mail exchanging, strong psuedonymous identities, and more as time goes on. We're building up a barter-coupon system so that volunteers who help our community can earn credits to use to buy more services from our system or, as the NEXUS-Gaia project grows, from Nexi around the world. The barter-coupon system is implemented using a secure and private anonymous digital cash scheme. We're asking for help from people to build our community. It can't be done with only a few people. Everyone involved can help out to build the system. A community is a group effort. As we build the community we improve our lives. For more information and to sign up, use your favorite World-Wide-Web browser to look at http://www.c2.org or, if you don't have access to a WWW browser, telnet to c2.org and login as "guest". Most services are offered with an initial two week free trial period. In order to subscribe to our mailing list, send the message "subscribe nexus-berkeley" to majordomo(a)c2.org. (From a UNIX prompt: "echo subscribe nexus-berkeley | mail majordomo(a)c2.org") If you have any questions, send mail to info(a)c2.org. -sameer Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Voice: 510-841-2014 (not yet active) Pager: 510-321-1014 Email: info(a)c2.org

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Opportunity to Earn NexusBucks (a MagicMoney currency)
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are a few user interfaces and client programs I'd like to have written, but I lack the time, so I am making an offering of NexusBucks for those who would like to write the user interfaces and put them into the public domain (or GPL-- any freely redistributable liscence will do.) Terms: Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley will pay a negotiated sum of NexusBucks to identities who write software for the NEXUS-Berkeley. The author of the software may retain full copyright of the software as long as the software is made freely redistributable under the GPL (GNU Public License) or a similar system. For more details about NexusBucks, look at http://www.c2.org/nexbucks What I'd like written: 1) A client program for the blind anonymous server. I've already written a very rudimentary client program but it lacks dynamic checks to see which remailers are up (I'd imagine it could do this by fingering one of the "active-remailers" lists and parsing that output-- one such list is running on remail(a)c2.org) and error checking. It's very possible that someone might just want to take my work and improve upon it. 2) A front-end to the MagicMoney client and server. Again, I've written a rudimentary user interface to work with the perl wrapper that I've put around Pr0duct Cypher's server, but it is still a rather clunky interface. It could use improvement. If you have any other ways you might be able to help out, by writing code or in some other fashion, please send mail to volunteer(a)c2.org. Also look at http://www.c2.org/nexbucks/earn.html -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley sameer(a)c2.org

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How many on cypherpunks?
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It was at about 700 subscribers for several months, then the first big > "outage" a month or so ago caused the number to drop way off. Last I > checked (send the message "who cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)toad.com) > there were about 400 subscribers. (It is likely that many of the > original "700 Club" were casual subscriber, dormant accounts, > gateways, whatever.) > > And the list just suffered a second wipe-out of the subscriber list, > so I don't know right now how many are even seeing this. My week-old 'who' shows 450; yesterday's shows 180. I see this second outage as an omen - the cypher gods want less traffic ;-) So I'm _not_ going to send a mailer to the differential list of users I have, this time! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh They came for the Jews, and I was silent because I was not a Jew; rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in They came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not protest, because I did not Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 belong to a trade union; Voicemail +91 11 3760335 They came for the Catholics, and I said nothing because I was not a Catholic; H 34C Saket And then they came for me. New Delhi There was no one left to say anything... INDIA ----Father Niemoeller

2 1

ALERT! *one day* to save crypto-privacy provisions of export bill!
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ONE DAY DEADLINE! The House Intelligence Committee will probably make their decision on this vital issue tomorrow afternoon, Wed. June 15, 1994. If you've not had your say on whether the State Dept. & NSA will be allowed to continue to restrict the flow of public cryptographic products, write, call and fax *today*. Updated fax information for the entire Intelligence Cmte. is below. The Committee seems receptive to hearing alternatives to the extreme position held by the National Security Agency - what you have to say does matter! From: gnu(a)eff.org (John Gilmore) Subject: URGENT: Please Tell Congress to Allow Encryption Export Reply-To: ask(a)eff.org (rather than send us email please fax +1 202 225 1991) House Intelligence Committee holds key to Crypto Export ask(a)eff.org June 14, 1994 *DISTRIBUTE WIDELY* Today, the U.S. State Department controls the export of most encryption, working closely with the National Security Agency (NSA) to limit products that provide real privacy, from cell-phones to PC software. A bill introduced by Rep. Maria Cantwell would instead give authority over non-military crypto exports to the Commerce Department. Commerce has much more reasonable regulations, with "First Amendment"-style unlimited publishing of publicly available software, including PGP, Kerberos, RIPEM, RSAREF, and mass-market commercial software. The bill also prevents the Commerce Dept. from tightening the regulations even if NSA somehow gets its tentacles into Commerce. A few months ago, you-all sent over 5600 messages to Rep. Cantwell in support of her bill, H.R. 3627. As a result, on May 18, the bill passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by being incorporated into the Export Administration Act of 1994, H.R. 3937. Now the battle has become more intense. This portion of H.R. 3937 has been referred to the House Intelligence Committee with the intent to kill or severely maim it. We need your help again, to urge the Intelligence Committee to keep crypto export liberalization intact. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the only watchdogs for the NSA, tend to follow the agency's wishes when they wave the magic "national security" wand. They need plenty of input from the public that tells them that the nation will be *more* secure with good encryption, even though the NSA will be less happy. Not just computer users, but all users of telephones, cable TV, health care, and credit information systems would benefit from this change. The security of these applications is built on the foundation laid by the operating systems and network protocols on which they run. If this bill is passed, you will see high quality encryption built into Microsoft Windows, into the MacOS, into major Unix workstations, into the Internet, into cellular phones, into interactive television. The software already exists for confidentiality, privacy, and security of local and networked information, but it's not built-in to these systems because of the export ban. Today, each company could build two operating systems, one gutted for international use, but this would be costly and confusing for them and their customers, and would not allow international networks such as the Internet or telephones to be made secure and private. With this bill, these limits disappear. Furthermore, the Clinton Administration plans to permit high volume exports of Clipper products, while continuing to require tedious paperwork for truly secure encryption products. The bill would give Clipper and other crypto software more even-handed treatment. The bill also eliminates a senseless situation on the Internet. Today, crypto software can only be freely distributed from non-U.S. archive sites. It would eliminate that problem as well as the threat of prosecution against U.S. freeware authors of crypto software. This is the dream we've all been working toward. Here's how you can help to make this dream a reality. The Intelligence Committee must make its decision on the bill before June 17, so time is critical: 1) Fax a short letter TODAY to the chair of the Intelligence Committee, Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS). Ask him in your own words to leave the encryption provisions of H.R. 3937 intact. Use a positive tone ("Please support...") rather than a flame or a rant. One paragraph is fine. State your title and organization if you will look more important or better informed than the average citizen. Rep. Glickman's committee fax number is +1 202 225 1991. This is the best option, since individual letters are given the most weight by members of Congress, particularly when sent on letterhead paper. 2) If you are unable to fax a letter, send an e-mail message to Rep. Glickman at glickman(a)eff.org. Software or staff at the Electronic Frontier Foundation will either fax it in, or print it out and hand-deliver it for you. 3) Send a copy of this message to everyone you know in Kansas, and personally urge them to write to Rep. Glickman today. Letters from constituents get a lot more weight, since they are from people who could actually vote for or against him in the next election. 4) If your own Representative is on the Intelligence Committee, send him or her a copy of what you sent Rep. Glickman. There's a list of all such Reps. below. Even if we lose this battle, you will have started educating your own Rep. about crypto policy. 5) Become a member of EFF. Our strength comes from our members' strength. Send a note to membership(a)eff.org asking how to join. Thanks again for your help! You can check at any time on the current status of the campaign at the location below. Send any comments on this campaign to campaign(a)eff.org. John Gilmore Chairman, EFF Crypto Committee EFF Board of Directors Member of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Member of International Association for Cryptologic Research House Intelligence Committee Members ------------------------------------ Subcommittee phone: +1 202 225 4121 Subcommittee fax: +1 202 225 1991 <== send your fax HERE <== p st name phone fax ___________________________________________________________________________ D KS Glickman, Daniel +1 202 225 6216 +1 202 225 5398 Chair [Glickman fax number just released] D WA Dicks, Norman D. +1 202 225 5916 +1 202 226 1176 D CA Dixon, Julian C. +1 202 225 7084 +1 202 225 4091 D NJ Torricelli, Robert +1 202 224 5061 +1 202 225 0843 D TX Coleman, Ronald D. +1 202 225 4831 +1 202 225 4831 [Coleman's staff manually switch line to fax if they hear fax tones. Preceeding your fax with a voice call might help] D CO Skaggs, David E. +1 202 225 2161 +1 202 225 9127 D NV Bilbray, James H. +1 202 225 5965 +1 202 225 8808 D CA Pelosi, Nancy +1 202 225 4965 +1 202 225 8259 D TX Laughlin, Gregory H. +1 202 225 2831 +1 202 225 1108 D AL Cramer Jr, Robert (Bud) +1 202 225 4801 private [Cramer's fax number just released] D RI Reed, John F. +1 202 225 2735 +1 202 225 9580 D MO Gephardt, Richard A. +1 202 225 2671 +1 202 225 7452 R TX Combest, Larry +1 202 225 4005 +1 202 225 9615 R NE Bereuter, Douglas +1 202 225 4806 +1 202 226 1148 R CA Dornan, Robert K. +1 202 225 2965 private [Dornan's public fax disconnected; office refuses to divulge a fax number] R FL Young, C. W. (Bill) +1 202 225 5961 +1 202 225 9764 R PA Gekas, George W. +1 202 225 4315 +1 202 225 8440 R UT Hansen, James V. +1 202 225 0453 +1 202 225 5857 R CA Lewis, Jerry +1 202 225 5861 +1 202 225 6498 R IL Michel, Robert H. +1 202 225 6201 +1 202 225 9461 The full text of this alert is stored at: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export.alert gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export.alert http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export.alert BBS (+1 202 638 6120, 8N1): "Alerts" file area, export.alt The actual text of this part of H.R. 3937 is at: ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export, hr3937_crypto.excerpt http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt BBS: "Privacy--Crypto" file area, hr3937.crp For current status on the bill: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export_alert.update gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export_alert.update http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export_alert.update BBS: "Alerts" file area, export.upd A general Web page on crypto export policy is at: http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html ***************************************************************************** -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist F O R M O R E I N F O, E - M A I L T O: I N F O @ E F F . O R G O P E N P L A T F O R M O N L I N E R I G H T S V I R T U A L C U L T U R E C R Y P T O

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Cantwell Bill
by perry＠imsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those who haven't been paying attention, the Cantwell Bill could die in the intelligence committee. Please pay attention to Stanton McCandlish's alert from EFF and act on it TODAY. Call up those congressmen! When I called, most of them indicated they hadn't heard from people. Make the phone ring off the hook with concern that this measure pass! As always... Be polite when speaking to congressional staff. Realize that they don't know anything about what you are talking about and are just going to record names, addresses, and "supports HR XXXX" when you call. Be clear and fairly quick and always be nice to them. Perry

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Where to get the latest PGP
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) (Last modified: 13 June 1994 by Mike Johnson) WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION? Platforms | Released | Version | Notes & restrictions | by and for | | Other restrictions may apply. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- DOS & Unix | Viacrypt | 2.4 | 100% Legal for both personal and | for use in | | commercial use. Not for export from | North | | the USA and Canada. It is commercial | America | | copyrighted software, prices below. | | | Source code not available. | | | Viacrypt will soon release version 2.7 | | | that will be compatible with MIT's 2.6 | | | Max RSA key: 1264 bits. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dos, Unix, | MIT | 2.6 | Uses RSAREF. Not for use in any Macintosh | for use in | | application that you get paid for. | North | | FREE. Complete source code available. | America | | Patents licensed for personal use only. | | | Not for export from the USA or Canada. | | | Not fully compatible with PGP 2.3a or | | | Viacrypt PGP 2.4. | | | Max RSA key: 1024 bits. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dos & Unix | mathew@ | 2.6ui | Does NOT use RSAREF. No RSA patent | mantis.co | | problems outside the USA. | .uk for use| | FREE. Complete source code available. | outside | | IDEA licensed for personal use only in | the USA | | countries where the IDEA patent holds. | | | RSADSI claims this product would | | | infringe on its patents if used in the | | | USA. Compatible with all current PGPs. | | | Contact mathew(a)mantis.co.uk if you have | | | contributions or suggestions for the | | | coming version 2.7ui, which will feature | | | a longer RSA key length limit. | | | If imported to the USA, don't export. | | | Max RSA key: 1264 bits. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Macintosh | | 2.3aV1.1 | Use extremely limited by patents in USA. | | or | | | 2.3aV1.2 | - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- DOS & Unix | David | 2.3b | Use extremely limited by patents in USA. | Cosenza | | RSA key modulus lengths up to 4080 bits | | | supported. Compatible with PGP 2.3a and | | | PGP 2.6. Not for export from the USA | | | and Canada. Max RSA key: 4080 bits. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Amiga | | 2.3a3 | Use extremely limited by patents in USA. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note: there are other version numbers floating around on the net from code that has been altered by individuals for their own use. WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications, and may be used in corporate environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license, ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or write to them for the latest information. The latest version number for their version of PGP is 2.4. Prices shown include release of version 2.7 if you buy your copy after May 27, 1994 (otherwise the upgrade will be about US$10). Viacrypt's licensing and price information is as follows: ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 1 user $ 99.98 ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 5 users $ 299.98 ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 1 user $ 149.98 ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 5 users $ 449.98 ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 1 user $ 119.98 ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 5 user $ 359.98 ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt If you wish to place an order please call 800-536-2664 during the hours of 8:30am to 5:00pm MST, Monday - Friday. They accept VISA, MasterCard, AMEX and Discover credit cards. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact: Paul E. Uhlhorn Director of Marketing, ViaCrypt Products Mail: 2104 W. Peoria Ave Phoenix AZ 85029 Phone: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 Internet: viacrypt(a)acm.org Compuserve: 70304.41 WHERE CAN I GET THE FREEWARE PGP FOR USE IN THE USA AND CANADA? MIT-PGP is for U. S. and Canadian use only, but MIT is only distributing it within the USA (due to some archaic export control laws). 1. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/mitlicen.txt and agree to it. 2. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt and agree to it. 3. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu and log in as getpgp. 4. Answer the questions and write down the directory name listed. 5. QUICKLY end the telnet session with ^C and ftp to the indicated directory on net-dist.mit.edu (something like /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-????) and get the distribution files (pgp26.zip, pgp26doc.zip, pgp26src.tar.gz, MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx, and MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx). If the hidden directory name is invalid, start over at step 3, above. You can also get PGP 2.6 from: ftp.csn.net/mpj ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.tar ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ mac/MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ mac/MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj//I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26.zip ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj//I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.tar ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. TO GET THESE FILES BY EMAIL, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message for instructions. You will have to work quickly to get README.MPJ then the files before the ??????? part of the path name changes again (several times a day). ftp.eff.org Follow the instructions found in README.Dist that you get from one of: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/README.Dist gopher.eff.org, 1/Net_info/Tools/Crypto gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Net_info/Tools/Crypto http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/ Colorado Catacombs BBS Mike Johnson, sysop Mac and DOS versions of PGP, PGP shells, and some other crypto stuff. Also the home of some good Bible search files and some shareware written by Mike Johnson, including DLOCK, CRYPTA, CRYPTE, CRYPTMPJ, MCP, MDIR, DELETE, PROVERB, SPLIT, ONEPAD, etc. v.FAST/v.32bis/v.42bis, speeds up to 28,800 bps 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, as fast as your modem will go. Use ANSI terminal emulation, of if you can't, try VT-100. Free access to PGP. If busy or no answer, try again later. Log in with your own name, or if someone else already used that, try a variation on your name or pseudonym. You can request access to crypto software on line, and if you qualify legally under the ITAR, you can download on the first call. Download file names: pgp26.zip (DOS version with documentation) pgp26src.tar (Unix version and source code) pgp26doc.zip (Documentation only -- exportable) macpgp26.hqx (MacPGP executables, binhexed .sea) macpgp26.src (MacPGP source, binhexed .sea) (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado number - 2 lines. (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number intended for use by people in the Denver, Colorado area. Verified: This morning. Other BBS and ftp sites do have these files, as well. I noticed that PGP26.ZIP is being distributed on FIDONET. WHERE TO GET THE FREEWARE PGP FOR USE OUTSIDE OF THE USA The freeware version of PGP is intended for noncommercial, experimental, and scholarly use. It is available on thousands of BBSes, commercial information services, and Internet anonymous-ftp archive sites on the planet called Earth. This list cannot be comprehensive, but it should give you plenty of pointers to places to find PGP. Although the latest freeware version of PGP was released from outside the USA (England), it is not supposed to be exported from the USA under a strange law called the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of this, please get PGP from a site outside the USA if you are outside of the USA and Canada. Even though the RSAREF license associated with PGP 2.6 from MIT no longer prohibits use outside the USA, it still carries the not-for-profit restriction that the original RSA code in PGP 2.6ui doesn't have. On the other hand, patents on the IDEA cipher may limit PGP use in your country to nonprofit applications, anyway. Indeed, I understand that there are some countries where private electronic mail is not legal, anyway. These listings are subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me know so that I can update this list. Source code (gzipped tar format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig.gz * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig.gz Source code (zip format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uis.sig * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uis.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp26uis.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp26uis.zip * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26uis.zip Executable for DOS (zip format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uix.sig * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uix.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp26uix.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp26uix.zip Other sites to look for the above mentioned files at: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de /pub/virus/crypto ftp.ee.und.ac.za /pub/crypto/pgp soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC) ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/amiga/pgp /pub/archimedes /pub/pgp /pub/mac/MacPGP ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10) wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga) /aminet /amiga-boing ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de /pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2) black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165) /src/security/pgp23A.zip (MS-DOS executables & docs) /src/security/pgp23srcA.zip (Unix, MS-DOS, VMS, Amiga sources, docs, info on building PGP into mailers, editors, etc.) /src/security/pgp23A.tar.Z (Same as PGP22SRC.ZIP, in Unix tar format) /src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx (Macintosh version) iswuarchive.wustl.edu pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga) ftp.csn.net /mpj/public/pgp/ contains PGP shells, faq documentation, language kits. ftp.netcom.com /pub/dcosenza -- PGP 2.3a and PGP 2.3b (pgp23b.zip) /pub/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered. /pub/qwerty -- How to MacPGP Guide, largest steganography ftp site as well. PGP FAQ, crypto FAQ, US Crypto Policy FAQ, Steganograpy software list. MacUtilites for use with MacPGP. Stealth1.1 + other steganography programs. Send mail to qwerty(a)netcom.com with the subject "Bomb me!" to get the PGP FAQ and MacPGP guide if you don't have ftp access. nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca (192.48.234.1) /m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23A.zip /m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23srcA.zip ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95) qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97) pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3) leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55) goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2) tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20) princeton.edu (128.112.228.1) pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207) StealthPGP: The Amiga version can be FTP'ed from the Aminet in /pub/aminet/util/crypt/ as StealthPGP1_0.lha. Also, try an archie search for PGP using the command: archie -s pgp26 (DOS & Unix Versions) archie -s pgp2.6 (MAC Versions) ftpmail: For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send the following mail message to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi: ENCODER uuencode SEND pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip SEND pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip This will deposit the two zipfiles, as 15 batched messages, in your mailbox with about 24 hours. Save and uudecode. For the ftp sites on netcom, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message. World Wide Web URLs: (Thanks to mathew(a)mantis.co.uk) UNIX PGP 2.3a Compiles best with GCC 2.4.x or higher. A straight port from DOS, so hardened UNIX users find it a bit chatty. * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp23A.tar.Z * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp23A.tar.Z * _NL:_ ftp://svin02.info.win.tue.nl/pub/misc/pgp23A.tar.gz * _SE:_ ftp://ftp.sunet.se/pub/security/tools/crypt/pgp23A.tar.gz * _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/pgp23A.tar.Z * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp23A.tar.Z _________________________________________________________________ MS-DOS PGP 2.3 Program * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp23A.zip * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp23A.zip * _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/pgp23A.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp23A.zip * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp23A.zip Source code Designed to compile with Turbo C; compiles fine with Microsoft Visual C++ also. * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp23srcA.zip * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp23srcA.zip * _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/pgp23srcA.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp23srcA.zip _________________________________________________________________ MACPGP 2.3 Program * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.3.cpt.hqx * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx.gz Source code Requires Think C. * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx -- version 2.2 only * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3src.sea.h qx.pgp Documentation PGP is rather counter-intuitive to a Mac user. Luckily, there's a guide to using MacPGP in ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/qwerty/Here.is.How.to.MacPGP. _________________________________________________________________ OS/2 PGP You can, of course, run the DOS version of PGP under OS/2. Program * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp22os2.zip -- version 2.2 only, native binaries * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2 A.zip Source code * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23src A.zip _________________________________________________________________ AMIGA PGP * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_3.lha * _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_3.lha Source * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a3_src.lha * _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a3_src.lha _________________________________________________________________ ARCHIMEDES PGP * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/archimedes/ArcPGP23a _________________________________________________________________ DOCUMENTATION ONLY * _US:_ ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/pgp26doc.zip * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp23docA.zip _________________________________________________________________ LANGUAGE MODULES These are suitable for most PGP versions. I am not aware of any export/import restrictions on these files. German * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/PGP_german_docs.lha Italian * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz Japanese * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-msgs-japanese.tar.gz Lithuanian * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp23ltk.zip Russian * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26ru.zip (MIT version) * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26uir.zip (ui version) * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26ru.zip Spanish * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.umimi.it/pub/security/crypt/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz Swedish * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_swedish.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_swedish.txt _________________________________________________________________ OTHER SITES Some cryptographic software is available from ftp://van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca/pub/crypto/software/. Read the README file and proceed from there. BBS sites: Colorado Catacombs BBS (See also the entry above for PGP 2.6) (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado (2 lines) (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado (free call from Denver CO, but 1 line) For free access: log in with your own name, answer the questions, then select [Q]uestionaire 3 from the [M]ain menu. Verified: This morning. Hieroglyphics Voodoo Machine (Colorado) DOS, OS2, and Mac versions. (303) 443-2457 Verified: 5-2-94 For free access for PGP, DLOCK, Secure Drive, etc., log in as "VOO DOO" with the password "NEW" (good for 30 minutes access to free files). Exec-Net (New York) Host BBS for the ILink net. (914) 667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us> If you find a version of the PGP package on a BBS or FTP site and it does not include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always be included in the package. If it isn't, the package is suspect and should not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so that it does no further harm to others. ARCHIE WHO? There are many more sites. You can use archie and/or other "net-surfing" tools to find a more up-to-date listing, if desired. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.4 mQCNAi0aFSUAAAEEAOCOKpaLepvJCFgIR4m+UvZe0IN8g7Guwc+6GH4u6UGTPxQO iAhk/MJ7E8LE4c55A1G8to2W4y3aKAHvi9QCYKnsLV8Ag0BYWo3bGGTPEfkS7NAI N+Zy6vSjuF1D6MUnbvrQJ5p4efz7a28iYRKoAdan2bfnvIYWUD9nBjyFM+vFAAUR tDdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajQgW2V4cCAz MSBEZWMgOTRdiQCVAgUQLTqfXj9nBjyFM+vFAQGU7wP/ZuuHfdAnCIblNCtbLLG8 39CSg6JIVa3KWfe0WIz6dXFU3cvl2Wt094kJgZ+Nmq01INWlib2lTOznbkA9sV1W q0aJSBHFWQH29qGmIdEqThs7A5ES2w8eRjJD80lxHodRIkBcC5KI6x4Mxo8cib5V BrwsvtG0+81HD6Mrpvc+a0GJAJUCBRAtJc2rZXmEuMepZt0BAe4hA/9YANYPY4Z3 1pXv2mT6ReC09cZS5U3+xxC5brQdLsQGKuH6QVs/b5oc6NV84sh8A9tZyHG2067o 3XIEyN7PPQzRm2UUnHHqw9lBCNhMiFQsAJi4W+m8zXrVrpJWK0Wv61eV2/XIQl0V d4lxu0r+MNRP6ID6FBzA4C9rO+RYEZmwOIkAlQIFEC0aGRzb/VZRBVJGuQEBfaUD /3c2h//kg843OIcYHG4gMDqdeeZLzGlp3RVvh0Rs3/T0YylJZGjPL2L/BF/vfLlB 9E2Urh9mDG/7hiB5FncrUnkmN63IkSj+K9YyfPyYxBVx06Srj8ZzYynh0N+zledd 6cnwxRXhaD3Wc4EfSNR7BH9M2rjkGzyb5to9cgBb0ng+ =BLg5 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLfzSNT9nBjyFM+vFAQGndQQAkJsi8jX29qyLlEJV8IyIP9UTyYLKvGMq mRDXSymke0kEyV1oc/bjNQT2GQJ7bBWKV0FpC2toNuKyRo+oXKkkOfW4+0A34U65 HKuL+lybezhaTt4CR9MUD4W8MfMA5W8uHl5r0kPMiejdt9DjP6O3tCZl6SNZI8N5 fFCHPWUOnR4= =0EQB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: NSA technology transfer
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:21 AM 6/14/94 -0500, Dan Harmon wrote: >The following was posted on the list in the middle of May. Being >curious I called the number list at Ft. Meade. The person on who answered >was real shaken, for lack of a better term, that I called [. . . .] That's a lot better than I got when I just tried to call: no answer, not even a machine. "No Such Agency"? >Dan Harmon b& PS--Sorry for posting that last note, about the S/N ratio; it was meant to go just to Tim May, and I *do* know better...*sigh* -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key.

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