December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Message Havens, Pools, and Usenet
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree with Tim May that Usenet newsgroups can do the job of a global message pool. However, it takes too damn long to get a reply. It typically takes 3 to 4 days before I see replies to messages I post to Usenet. I wouldn't want to use Usenet for one-on-one communication. I'd prefer a network of indexed message pools like I described in an earlier post. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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In defense of paranoia in cryptography
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, excessive paranoia is inefficient. For example, assuming that NSA is godlike could lead people to choose 4K-bit RSA keys, with the associated penalty, when 700 bits or so would be plenty for the near term. However, a successful cryptographer must be cautious at a level that would be judged paranoid in more civilized communities. A trusting cryptographer would accept arguments about how many more keys this new system will accept than there are atoms in the universe (like simple substitution, for example, which allows for 26! different keys). A non-paranoid user of PGP would use a shared UNIX system for all business, since only trusted users and the very rare cracker have access to that system. A non-paranoid cryptographer would put her password into her autoexec.bat file. If you need cryptography, it's because you have enemies. In a world of sweetness and light, it doesn't matter if everybody knows everything about you, because they won't take advantage of that knowledge. In the real world, your data and identity have value, and people may be willing to expend resources to acquire some of that value. You need to estimate how much exclusive use of your data is worth to you, how much your hypothetical enemies are willing to spend to get access to that data, and how cheaply you can defend against that attack. It's been observed that a good programmer will look both ways when crossing to a one-way street. I'll observe that a good cryptographer will not only look both ways, but will also look up and down. Jim Gillogly Trewesday, 23 Thrimidge S.R. 1994, 23:05

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Re: Message Havens, Pools, and Usenet
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:> I think this is the way to go, and I don't think we need special :> groups for it either. Tim, just as an experiment, post a message :> to any group you like (except netcom ones!) with 'gtoal' in it :> somewhere (innocuously, like in a .sig), and I'll show you how easy :> it is to find stuff that's addressed to you. :Mass kibozing is certainly an option for the receiver, but I think :this scheme is going to provoke loud complaints from most sysadmins :if it ever gets off the ground. I agree with Karl's comments re Heh. I'd never contemplate such a thing. In practice if I were using such a scheme I'd probably stick to *.test - I was just pointing out that Tim doesn't need to create an alt.w.a.s.t.e group specifically for the traffic. In fact, we *can't* create any such group specifically for the traffic because it wouldn't be carried, and you could trace recipients easily because all the people who talked to each other this way would have to arrange for their own feeds to take the group and get it from each other. (Actually I *had* been giving serious thought to such a scheme for an anonymous fax service I've been thinking about, but thought better of it, because, as you say, the net would want my head for posting 100's of K's of encrypted binaries in alt.test :-) ) G

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Forward of sci.crypt web of trust.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Re: Announcement: Mac Crypto Interface Project I thought I would forward this to try and provoke discussion: ++++ In article <199405140507.AAA23861(a)indial1.io.com>, Terry Ritter <ritter(a)indial1.io.com> wrote: > In <strnlghtCpr6DE.7C6(a)netcom.com> strnlght(a)netcom.com (David > Sternlight) writes: > >>[...] >>Thus PGP will either have to be modified to conform to the PEM Certification >>heirarchy, Apple will have to add web-of-trust provisions to Digisign and > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >>the core system utilities, or PGP Mac users will have to generate their key >>pairs for PGP separately and use them separately from their certified AOCE >>key pair used to sign and authenticate. > >>[...] >>Ripem may shortly be adding the new "web-of-trust" addendum to the RFC on > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >>PEM certificates. Whether Apple will do so or not remains to be seen. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > > I am aware of no formal analysis of "web-of-trust" as a secure > cryptographic protocol. Strangely, sci.crypt has held many huge > discussions on the strength of RSA and IDEA, but few if any on > the relative difficulty of defeating "web-of-trust." > > Failure of "web-of-trust" to identify a "spoofed" invalid key > leaves the PGP design open to "man-in-the-middle" attack. While > many consider such attack unlikely, I wonder just how unlikely > this cheap and easy method would be when compared to the capital > and time required to attack even a 512-bit RSA key. Note that > the Network itself seems almost the ideal resource for the > automatic re-routing of messages needed in such an attack. [...] > "Web-of-trust" is almost certainly the weakest part of the PGP > design. [...] One of the biggest problems I see with the web of trust in PGP, at least in the MAC version, is the difficulty in verifying signed messages. It's just too complicated to be done on a regular basis. This is why it is easy to forge usenet messages now-a-days on the net, no one checks. The other flaw here is characterizing the web-of-trust as a secure cryptograhpic protocol for your analysis. Indeed the social aspects of the web-of-trust model are what your really referring to. If a messages is signed by me, and the signature checks out, the public key having been verified by some physical exchange or a trusted key signature, validity is no longer a cryptographic question. There is little doubt that the message was: 1> Signed by the public key in question. 2> Not altered since. The real question is does the key belong to who it claims to belong to, and has it been compromised? This is a social question, and makes key signatures a shade and not a bit (on/off black/white) question. It now comes down to judgements about the key management practices of the user, and the key signature policy of the key certifiers. A key certificate is not really a cold "certificate of authenticity," it is a voucher, and it's only as good as the authority it comes from. The reason I prefer this over a centralized system is because the potential for compromise of the thousand potential signators on the net is minimal. Because a central authority takes each potential certification application as a blank slate, it has basic unreliabilities that to me are more disturbing. All it takes to compromise a central authority is a forged identification document. If you've been to college you know this is a joke, if you live in LA you have more experience. Why this is more trustworthy than several signatures from diverse, respected net or other personalities is beyond me. What's wrong with the web of trust right now is that it takes a boolean approach to a non-boolean process. Signatures should instead bear some qualifying information, like "know personally" or "physical exchange of key information" or "life long friend." In addition I would like to see a reputation signature as well, a signature that says "not only is this a person who I know personally, but I respect this person's judgement and perspective in intellectual matters." This in conjunction with the strong signature method would make the web-of-trust model much more effective. Regardless, the greater problem is transparency of operation. Once that is accomplished, it will be a trivial matter for forged usenet posts to be rebuked by readers realtime. In short, you need to ask not just: "Is it signed." But: "Is it signed by a public key bearing a key certificate from a user I trust to make good decisions." -uni- (Dark)

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AT&T and Saudi Arabia
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> in alt.news-media: >From: Publications-Admin(a)Whitehouse.Gov (The White House) >Subject: CLINTON: 1994-05-11 President Names Mabus as Ambassador to Saudi Arab >Date: 14 May 1994 08:29:23 -0400 > THE WHITE HOUSE > > Office of the Press Secretary >________________________________________________________________________ >For Immediate Release May 11, 1994 > > PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES INTENT TO NOMINATE RAYMOND EDWIN MABUS > AS AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA > The President today announced his intent to nominate Raymond >Edwin Mabus, Jr., of Mississippi, as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi >Arabia. > "Ray is a good friend who I had the honor of serving with as a >fellow governor. As Governor of Mississippi, he represented the people >of that state with distinction," the President said. "He brings the >leadership and vision he has demonstrated throughout his years of public >service to this critical assignment. I am pleased to nominate him as my >personal representative to Saudi Arabia. " > > Mr. Mabus served as Mississippi's Governor from 1988 to 1992. He >also served as State Auditor of Mississippi and on the staff of a >previous governor. For the past two years, he has managed his own timber >business, worked as a consultant on job training and telecommunications, ---------------------------------------------------------<bingo!> >and was the Chairman of the Commission of the Future of the South. ... Someone want to bet how much money is in whose pocket?

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No Subject
by Cyber City 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: BOYCOTT AT&T Date: Sat, 14 May 1994 20:07:37 -0400 Reply-To: cyber1(a)io.org In-Reply-To: <199405131541.IAA24220(a)well.sf.ca.us> Lines: 40 > sure it didn't hurt. In the May 13 New York Times: > > >The AT&T Corporation's winning bid for a $4 billion contract to > >modernize Saudi Arabia's phone system ,WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPORTED > >BY HEAVY CLINTON ADMINISTRATION LOBBYING , was hundreds of > >millions of dollars higher than other bids [...] The huge-scale In a column written for the Toronto Sun today, former Canadian Defense Minister Perrin Beatty went on record as opposing the Clipper chip. His reasoning: "1) American policy can't apply around the world, and foreign companies will build equipment without the chip. Criminals will have ready access to scramblers without trap doors. 2) The code the chip inserts makes it easier to identify information from a particular source. Instead of simply being part of a computerized stew, each piece of data is more recognizable and can be readily decrypted by the electronic key. 3) If Canadian industry must include the chip in products sold in the U.S. and Canada, it will lose business to less buggable equipment from Asia or Europe. 4) The chip could open our diplomatic and commercial secrets to U.S. snooping. The Americans are our best friends and our interests are usually similar. But shouldn't we at least be cautious? 5) The requirement for a court order is fine if procedures are followed and no one breaches security, but what if the system breaks down? Should we rely on only one means of protection?" ..................................................................... My comments: Canada used to have that Saudi Arabia contract, so there may be some economics involved. On the other hand, Mr. Beatty is especially well informed and has shown an interest in privacy issues for some time. -- Alex Brock

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re: havens, pools, usenet
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > To wit, what happened to the idea of posting anonymously to > newsgroups? This is how folks apparently communicated with BlackNet, Nothing happened to the idea of posting anonymously to usenet! It's just that it usually draws complaints from people, which at times threaten the existence of the remailers involved. And the fact that the haven doesn't send mail out is an attempt to solve this problem. Besides, the advantage the haven would offer is that it could allow you to pay for more time - say by default messages get tossed out after a day or two, but you could pay for yours to stay around a while longer. Maybe commercial services operate differently, but here at Rice, newsgroups (especially in the alt.* hierarchy) expire lightning fast. Well, all except the rice.* and clari.* heirarchies. Which would pose a difficulty in using certain groups. Like I said, most of the objections I see to anonymous mail are the fact that mail actually arrives at another person mailbox or in a newsgroup. I mean, I was involved in a flame war on comp.admin.policy a while ago, and after exchanging posts and email with a few people, it became clear their only objection to anonymous posts/mail was that mail actually went somewhere or it was a breach of "nettiquette". Tim, I agree with your assessment of "nettiquette"; there are plenty of worse abusers, but all the same, it draws fire which is harmful. If nothing else, lots of other people get irritated. For instance, Serdar Argic seems to survive despite net.abuse, but it irritates hundreds. Karl Barrus klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdWHFIOA7OpLWtYzAQHOiQP8CQF5Sdj/nf+YbDNuyWgNB8bFrZTW7f1q 3oPsfjdXiJsrmpkb53YeM1iPZr3THAJYX9M8wPOopZOvU9LDVRQhGXOUa7FuIAww 6+lk13ys/1RWFNLhycOmIErz+0+prwp1bBMbxQ7s4Ok5lecXjM8Qkaz356gUhJDc lYHrQkcNN2c= =krV1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List Filtering.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been thinking lately about list filtering, and the moderation methods that have been tossed around on the list of late. I come down against any kind of "negative" moderation. What strikes me as more effective and efficient is a reputational system. Interestingly this ties into my concept of how the "web-of-trust" should work as well. If somehow, the list server could be made to keep track of reputational signatures on some sort of a point scale and tack the result into a header like "X-Posters-Reputation-Grade: A-." The result would be easy filtering, a lack of active censorship, and less user work overload to make the system work. Of course this is by no means a new idea. If I could remember who has suggested this point on the list before, I'd credit you... sorry. I don't have a firm idea of how reputational signatures would be "valued" but it seems to me that positive systems are a better idea the negative ones for a few reasons: Negative systems allow blacklisting. In any system, if I have three or four accomplices, it's easy to spoil whoever I have personal conflicts with. Negative systems just aren't "nice." If you can't say something good about someone.... :) Negative systems don't account for perspective as well: While anyone can find something poor to say about someone, it is probably more instructive of a poster's "worth" if a few people can say something good. Additionally, in a hybrid system where negative systems and positive systems are balancing (one users positive vote of reputation is offset by anothers negative one) the filtering tends to be content based rather than merit based. For example, just because I post about political and distractingly political issues occasionally, a list user like, oh I dunno, let's call him Mr. M., might give me and F or a D. While someone who particularly likes my posts, even when they are distracting, and approves of my ability of analysis and perspective, no longer has much impact on my rating. Simply, in a positive system: If your a complete idiot, you'll never get any real reputational certificates. If your a poster of worth, and you just tend to annoy some of the regulars, you'll still get some positives. It would be nice if PGP had a system to account for a reputational rating of a users key management and security practices as well. -uni- (Dark)

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Public Key Servers
by Matthew Cable 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm looking to set up a public key server at phantom.com, supporting both 2.3 and 2.5 keys. Who should I contact for information and source to work from? With the moving of BAL's server to 2.5, i figure we could use another server here on the east coast. Thanks! *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=* mcable(a)[jade,emerald,cs].tufts.edu \|/ wozz(a)wozz.ext.tufts.edu Matthew Cable <0-0> wozzeck(a)mindvox.phantom.com MTUC Jackson Labs ----o00-O-00o----- http://www.cs.tufts.edu/~mcable/ Tufts University GCS/MU -d+ -p+ c++++ l++ u++ e+ m++(*) s++ !n h+ f* g+ w++ t+ r- y+ *=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*

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Magic Money on a port
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote a little perl script to put the magic money server on a port. This should help in writing a client program which doesn't require the user to deal with sending repeated messages to the bank. Most of it I just took from the perl manpage. It requires shlock.pl. Please send bug reports. #!/usr/local/bin/perl ($port) = @ARGV; $port = 1992 unless $port; $magicserver = "/home/infinity/nexbucks/s"; $waitlock = "/home/infinity/nexbucks/waiter.pid"; $processlock = "/home/infinity/nexbucks/processor.pid"; require 'sys/socket.ph'; require './shlock.pl'; # First check to see if the process is running unless(&shlock($waitlock)) { print "Process already running\n"; exit; } $sockaddr = 'S n a4 x8'; ($name, $aliases, $proto) = getprotobyname('tcp'); ($name, $aliases, $port) = getservbyname($port, 'tcp') unless $port =~ /^\d+$/; $this = pack($sockaddr, &AF_INET, $port, "\0\0\0\0"); select(NS); $| = 1; select(stdout); socket(S, &PF_INET, &SOCK_STREAM, $proto) || die "socket: $!"; bind(S, $this) || die "bind: $!"; listen(S, 5) || die "connect: $!"; select(S); $| = 1; select(stdout); # Ok the socket has been setup. Fork, wait for the parent lock to die # and then lock again if(fork) { exit; } # Wait for the old process to die sleep 10 unless(&shlock($waitlock)); for (;;) { # print "Listening again\n"; ($addr = accept(NS,S)) || die $!; unless(fork) { # print "accept ok\n"; ($af,$port,$inetaddr) = unpack($sockaddr,$addr); @inetaddr = unpack('C4',$inetaddr); # print "$af $port @inetaddr\n"; $tmpin = "/tmp/mmin." . $$ ; $tmpout = "/tmp/mmout." . $$ ; open(TIN, ">$tmpin") || die $!; print NS "Submit to the Nexus Bank:\n"; while (<NS>) { print TIN; last if /^-----END/ ; } close(TIN); # Wait for the process lock to stop unless(&shlock($processlock)) { print NS "Please wait for other requests to finish."; do { print NS "." ; sleep 10; } until(&shlock($processlock)); } print NS "order processing."; # Run magic money open(MM, "| $magicserver > $tmpout"); open(TIN, $tmpin); while(<TIN>) { print NS "." ; print MM; } close(TIN); close(MM); print NS "done.\n"; open(OUTPUT, $tmpout); print NS <OUTPUT>; close OUTPUT; exit; } }

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Magic Money Client/Server using IPC
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I posted only a few hours ago, I have been working on improving the Magic Money interface. I've written a server application for the Magic Money server which allows the server to sit on a port and wait for connections. When a connection comes in it forks and processes the request, by just taking the input, passing it to the 's' server released by Pr0duct Cypher, and then returning the server's output. The client is a front end to Pr0duct Cypher's 'c' program, which handles the communication between the 'c' client and the server running on a socket. I have written the client so that it can be run from any directory, but it looks in ~/.bank for the bank.asc, rand.dat, and other files that the program uses. I just wrote this code today, so I'm sure it lacks many safety checks. If you'd like to point out where it goes wrong, I'd appreciate it greatly. To invoke the server: Edit server.pl and give it the port number you want. Run 'server.pl' in the directory which has the 's' program and the files that the 's' program uses. server.pl will fork and wait on the port specified. To run the client: Create the ~/.bank directory, and put rand.dat and bank.asc in that directory. Edit the client.pl to reflect the port number and the hostname of the server, as well as the location of Pr0duct Cypher's 'c' binary. client.pl -initialize Generates your account. client.pl -incoming [filename] Takes in incoming coins (which someone has given you) either from filename or stdin (if the filename argument is missing) and adds their value to your wallet. (Doing the communication with the server that is necessary) client.pl -extract [filename] Extract coins that you own into filename, or if filename doesn't exist pgp ascii-armor the coins and send them to stdout. client.pl -exchange Exchange your old coins for new ones. server.pl: #!/usr/local/bin/perl # Perl script to attach a Magic Money Server to a port # Sameer <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> ($port) = @ARGV; $port = 1992 unless $port; $magicserver = "s"; $waitlock = "waiter.pid"; $processlock = "processor.pid"; require 'sys/socket.ph'; require './shlock.pl'; # First check to see if the process is running unless(&shlock($waitlock)) { print "Process already running\n"; exit; } $sockaddr = 'S n a4 x8'; ($name, $aliases, $proto) = getprotobyname('tcp'); ($name, $aliases, $port) = getservbyname($port, 'tcp') unless $port =~ /^\d+$/; $this = pack($sockaddr, &AF_INET, $port, "\0\0\0\0"); select(NS); $| = 1; select(stdout); socket(S, &PF_INET, &SOCK_STREAM, $proto) || die "socket: $!"; bind(S, $this) || die "bind: $!"; listen(S, 5) || die "connect: $!"; select(S); $| = 1; select(stdout); # Ok the socket has been setup. Fork, wait for the parent lock to die # and then lock again if(fork) { exit; } # Wait for the old process to die sleep 10 unless(&shlock($waitlock)); for (;;) { # print "Listening again\n"; ($addr = accept(NS,S)) || die $!; unless(fork) { # print "accept ok\n"; ($af,$port,$inetaddr) = unpack($sockaddr,$addr); @inetaddr = unpack('C4',$inetaddr); # print "$af $port @inetaddr\n"; $tmpin = "/tmp/mmin." . $$ ; $tmpout = "/tmp/mmout." . $$ ; open(TIN, ">$tmpin") || die $!; print NS "Magic Money Bank: " . $bank . "\n"; print NS "Feed server\n"; while (<NS>) { print TIN; last if /^-----END/ ; } close(TIN); # Wait for the process lock to stop unless(&shlock($processlock)) { print NS "Please wait for other requests to finish."; do { print NS "." ; sleep 10; } until(&shlock($processlock)); } print NS "order processing."; # Run magic money open(MM, "| $magicserver > $tmpout"); open(TIN, $tmpin); while(<TIN>) { print NS "." ; print MM; } close(TIN); close(MM); print NS "done.\nServer response\n"; open(OUTPUT, $tmpout); print NS <OUTPUT>; close OUTPUT; exit; } } client.pl: #!/usr/local/bin/perl # Perl script to make dealing with the magic money oh so much easier # Sameer <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> require 'sys/socket.ph'; $mmclient = "/usr/local/bin/mmclient" ; $pgp = "/usr/local/bin/pgp" ; $port = 1992; $host = "localhost"; sub connectgrab { local($them, $port, $infile, $outfile) = @_; $sockaddr = 'S n a4 x8'; chop($hostname = `hostname`); ($name, $aliases, $proto) = getprotobyname('tcp'); ($name, $aliases, $port) = getservbyname($port, 'tcp') unless $port =~ /^\d+$/; ($name, $aliases, $type, $len, $thisaddr) = gethostbyname($hostname); ($name, $aliases, $type, $len, $thataddr) = gethostbyname($them); $this = pack($sockaddr, &AF_INET, 0, $thisaddr); $that = pack($sockaddr, &AF_INET, $port, $thataddr); socket(S, &PF_INET, &SOCK_STREAM, $proto) || die "socket: $!"; bind(S, $this) || die "bind: $!"; connect(S, $that) || die "connect: $!"; select(S); $| = 1; select(stdout); # Wait until we get the prompt to start while(<S>) { last if /^Feed server$/ ; } # Send the stuff to the server print "Sending to server.\n"; open(INPUT, $infile) || die "can't open $infile: $!"; while(<INPUT>) { print S; } close INPUT; # Wait for the server to finish processing.. tell the user it is processing print "Waiting for server to process.\n"; while(<S>) { last if /^Server response$/; } # Now grab the server's response open(OUTPUT, "> $outfile") || die "can't open $outfile: $!"; while(<S>) { print OUTPUT; } close(OUTPUT); close S; print "Finished with server.\n"; } ## Main ## Deal with user requests # Process incoming money sub processincoming { if($ARGV[0] ne '-') { $ARGV[0] = &expandfile($ARGV[0]); } open(FILE, "> temp.dat") || die "can't create temp.dat: $!"; print FILE <>; close FILE; system("$mmclient temp.dat"); unlink("temp.dat"); &deal; } # Initialize client sub initialize { system("$mmclient -i"); &deal; } # Exchange coins sub exchangecoins { system("$mmclient -x"); &deal; } sub deal { &connectgrab($host, $port, "output.asc", "serverreply.asc"); system("$mmclient serverreply.asc"); # unlink("serverreply.asc"); # unlink("output.asc"); } sub extractcoins { # if($ARGV[0] eq '-') # { # # Error # print "Must specify a filename to extract coins to\n"; # exit; # } if($ARGV[0] ne '-') { $file = &expandfile($ARGV[0]); if( -e $file ) { # Error print "File already exists\n"; exit; } # Check if the file can be made open(FILE, "> $file") || die "Can't create $file: $!"; close FILE; unlink($file); } system("$mmclient -p"); # Now move coins.dat away so that another extraction doesn't mean money # is lost # Send it to another file or stdout if($file) { rename("coins.dat", $file); print "Coins moved to $file\n"; } else { print "Coins going out, ascii armored.\n"; open(COINSDAT, "coins.dat"); open(ASCII, "| $pgp -af 2>/dev/null"); print ASCII <COINSDAT>; close ASCII; close COINSDAT; # unlink("coins.dat"); } } sub expandfile { # If a file has a leading / don't add the startdir # otherwise prepend $startdir local($fname) = @_; if(index($fname, '/') == 0) { return($fname); } else { return($startdir . "/" . $fname); } } ######### # THE MAIN ######### # This bit of the program takes the cmdline arguments, etc. $startdir = $ENV{'PWD'}; chdir($ENV{'HOME'} . "/.bank") || die "can't chdir to ~/.bank: $!"; $command = $ARGV[0]; shift; unless($ARGV[0]) { unshift(ARGV, '-'); } &processincoming if $command eq '-incoming'; &initialize if $command eq '-initialize'; &exchangecoins if $command eq '-exchange'; &extractcoins if $command eq '-extract';

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PGP 2.5 Warning
by jkreznar＠ininx.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This should be obvious, but probably bears repetition anyway: FREEMAN BEWARE: By switching to PGP 2.5 you would commence to affirm with each message you send that you are a subject of the U.S. State. John E. Kreznar | Relations among people to be by jkreznar(a)ininx.com | mutual consent, or not at all. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdX6JsDhz44ugybJAQG6jAQAhl1UPAH2PjJGOKu75z9Fs398ZKvfOhk4 kGchqD0vCnS0TclVlUErcuCoO39E60tyEVVZKcZ/DQBqf1VpXJ6Or7zi9TaWmBGk 426H3OFKytX3QlMRuEY83+HVLzS6gY0xGYnmVoXjkhNtnQYmZUxkYynQAWezh5yR ef9dv96AsCI= =xW/u -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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CJR, FOIA and non-US citizens
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I asked various things about non-US citizens and ITAR violations earlier, but haven't seen my post on the list. Anyway, those questions have been answered, more or less, by the discussions on the topic. A related question: can a non-US citizen file a commodoties jurisdiction or FOIA request? Directly, through a US attorney, etc? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Short-Sleeved Shirt Association says: Support your right to bare arms! -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Baker Rebuke (LONG! BASIC, Vet's Ignore)
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here is my assesment of the arguments Mr. Baker presented on the pro- Clipper side. Feel free to post it to usenet if you think it's worthwhile. - - -uni- (Dark) - - ------- Forwarded Message Copyright and distribution policy attached to the end of document. FYI. X-within-URL: http://www.wired.com/Etext/2.06/Features/nsa.clipper.html NSA'S CHIEF COUNSEL TO APPEAR ONLINE Stewart A. Baker, Chief Counsel for the National Security Agency and featured writer in WIRED 2.06 will host a Q&A session on the Clipper Chip. He will appear on America Online in Center Stage (from AOL type keyword: "center stage") on Thursday May 26, 1994, from 7-9 p.m. EST. Baker is the NSA's top lawyer and supports the Clipper Initiative. He worked briefly as Deputy General Counsel of the Education Department under President Jimmy Carter. His article "Don't Worry Be Happy" refutes seven myths of key escrow encryption and is a WIRED Exclusive. _________________________________________________________________ DON'T WORRY BE HAPPY Why Clipper Is Good For You By Stewart A. Baker, Chief Counsel for the NSA _________________________________________________________________ With all the enthusiasm of Baptist ministers turning their Sunday pulpits over to the Devil, the editors of WIRED have offered me the opportunity to respond to some of the urban folklore that has grownup around key escrow encryption -- also known as the Clipper Chip. Recently the Clinton administration has announced that federal agencies will be able to buy a new kind of encryption hardware thatis sixteen million times stronger than the existing federal standard known as DES. But this new potency comes with a caveat. If one of these new encryption devices is used, for example, to encode a phone conversation that is subject to a lawful government wiretap, the government can get access to that device's encryption keys. Separate parts of each key are held by two independent "escrow agents," who will release keys only to authorized agencies under safeguards approved by the attorney general. Private use of the new encryption hardware is welcome but not required. That's a pretty modestproposal. First off, notice the characterization here. The methods used for access to the keys are approved by the attorney general. An administrator appointed by the Executive branch, who has the greatest interest in lax standards, perhaps a greater interest than anyone else in government might. Its critics, though, have generated at least seven myths about key escrow encryption that deserve answers. MYTH NUMBER ONE: Key escrow encryption will create a brave new world of government intrusion into the privacy of Americans. Opponents of key escrow encryption usually begin by talking about government invading the privacy of American citizens. None of uslikes the idea of the government intruding willy-nilly on communications that are meant to be private. But the key escrow proposal is not about increasing government's authority to invade the privacy of its citizens. All that key escrow does is preserve the government's current ability to conduct wiretaps under existing authorities. Even if key escrow were the only form of encryption available, the world would look only a little different from the one we live in now. His argument here hinges on the definitions of expand and preserve. Right now, the government has (it seems) little ability to eavesdrop on electronic messages sent with PGP or RIPEM. Preserving the status quo would preserve the abilities of individuals to maintain unobserved conversations. If indeed the abilities of the government are only to be preserved, why is additional legislation required? Do we fund bold advances in police spending to "preserve" the abilities of the police? Or to expand against some new threat? It's important to distinguish exactly what is being preserved. Is it the "capability" of the government? Or the effect of that "capability?" Consider an example. The government has little trouble looking through blinds with thermal scopes. Citizens begin to use lead based blinds. The government wants to sell blinds that are transparent to thermal scopes and drive lead blinds out of the market. The government is trying to expand the effect here. They only want the ability to see through the blinds, but they will soon have the ability to see through blinds DESPITE the presence of lead blinds. The concept of expansion or preservation is simply moot here. Ask this question instead: Are they REGULATING? Are they LIMITING? In addition, there is no doubt at all that the "transactional data" provided by the LEAF envelope is a new capability. In fact, it's the proponents of widespread unbreakable encryption who want to create a brave new world, one in which all of us -- crooks included -- have a guarantee that the government can't tap ourphones. Yet these proponents have done nothing to show us that the new world they seek will really be a better one. In fact, even a civil libertarian might prefer a world where wiretaps are possible. If we want to catch and convict the leaders of criminal organizations, there are usually only two good ways to do it. We can "turn" a gang member -- get him to testify against his leaders. Or we can wiretap the leaders as they plan the crime. Now were this my position, that law enforcement NEEDS to have wiretap ability, how does Clipper help us? There is no dispute that Clipper will not catch those criminals who use other "commercial" encryption. The NSA answer to this is a petty "Well, we'll catch stupid criminals." It amazes me they even have the audacity to assert this position. Anyone who is going to shell out ~ $1000 for a encrypted phone, is hardly a stupid criminal. I once did a human rights report on the criminal justice system in El Salvador. I didn't expect the Salvadorans to teach me much abouthuman rights. But I learned that, unlike the US, El Salvador greatly restricts the testimony of "turned" co-conspirators. Why? Because the co-conspirator is usually "turned" either by a threat of mistreatment or by an offer to reduce his punishment. Either way, the process raises moral questions -- and creates an incentive for false accusations. Wiretaps have no such potential for coercive use. The defendant is convicted or freed on the basis of his own, unarguable words. As an attorney, I really wish it were this simple. The NSA is trying to insulate this argument from the Constitution. Apparently the courts have other ideas about the pitfalls of wiretapping considering the rather strict rules they have imposed on it. In addition, the argument is not merely about the value of wiretapping. It is the methods employed that are a concern. If the methods are unsound, why are we pouring thousands, millions of dollars (billions if you include DigiTel) into this project? "Stupid" criminals are not the type that need a project like Clipper to get caught. In addition, the world will be a safer place if criminals cannot take advantage of a ubiquitous, standardized encryption infrastructurethat is immune from any conceivable law enforcement wiretap. Even ifyou're worried about illegal government taps, key escrow reinforces the existing requirement that every wiretap and every decryption must be lawfully authorized. The key escrow system means that proof of authority to tap must be certified and audited, so that illegal wiretapping by a rogue prosecutor or police officer is, as apractical matter, impossible. I agree the world would be a safer place if criminals could not take advantage of a standardized encryption structure, but how much better if they can take advantage of a non-standard encryption structure? How does Clipper assure us they cannot take advantage of either? Perhaps it keeps criminals from taking advantage of a standard encryption structure, but so would a 20 bit encryption standard. Mr. Baker's assertion then holds true even if the government creates a secret standard that is never released. The creation of this standard has prevented criminals from taking advantage of a standardized encryption system. Instead they have to resort to non-standard methods, which are more secure anyway. Mr. Baker's statement is thus, entirely without meaning. Regardless, even with Clipper there is no showing how criminals will not be able to take advantage of strong crypto. Even the statistics that the various pro-clipper agencies like to tout show us that the primary focus of wiretapping falls in to some distinct and demonized categories. 1> Drug dealers 2> Terrorists 3> Organized crime "gangs." All of these targets are those most likely to have the resources and organization to purchase non-escrowed cryptography, and the intelligence to use it. Who is honestly going to assert that some drug organization that builds a semi-submersible craft out of an aircraft nose at an expense of millions of dollars to smuggle drugs into the United States is going to just be careless and buy a Clipper phone? That a terrorist organization will continue to use Clipper phones because a lackey tried to get his deposit back at a rental car agency? It is clear that Clipper will do none of these things. Instead it will prevent (assuming only clipper phones are available) only the small time and less resourced offenders from evading capture. Despite all the hype and rhetoric, Clipper is basically an auto thief catcher, a small time dealer working out of his home catcher. MYTH NUMBER TWO: Unreadable encryption is the key to our future liberty. Of course there are people who aren't prepared to trust the escrow agents, or the courts that issue warrants, or the officials who oversee the system, or anybody else for that matter. Rather than rely on laws to protect us, they say, let's make wiretapping impossible; then we'll be safe no matter who gets elected. Note the portrayal of the opposition. All of them are radicals, none are those concerned about the economic consequences, or the international markets, or the potential for United States espionage. None of them are simply worried about the effectiveness of the program, they are all anarchists. This sort of reasoning is the long-delayed revenge of people who couldn't go to Woodstock because they had too much trig homework. It reflects a wide -- and kind of endearing -- streak of romantic high-tech anarchism that crops up throughout the computer world. I won't even dignify this character attack with a response. The reader will judge the value of this argument him or herself The problem with all this romanticism is that its most likely beneficiaries are predators. Take for example the campaign to distribute PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") encryption on the Internet. Some argue that widespread availability of this encryption will help Latvian freedom fighters today and American freedom fighterstomorrow. Well, not quite. Rather, one of the earliest users of PGP was a high-tech pedophile in Santa Clara, California. He used PGP toencrypt files that, police suspect, include a diary of his contacts with susceptible young boys using computer bulletin boards all over the country. "What really bothers me," says Detective Brian Kennedy ofthe Sacramento, California, Sheriff's Department, "is that there could be kids out there who need help badly, but thanks to this encryption, we'll never reach them." And Clipper will help this problem by? Encouraging smart pedophiles to use it? It's clear this argument either has no merit, or foreshadows a more sinister regulatory action. There are good and bad sides to every technology. This pedophile argument is akin to demonizing baseball bats because they might cause harm. Or forbidding computers with accounting software because bookies might use them. It is in the American tradition to legislate this way. Look at the speed limit, the trends in Tort law. The assault weapons ban. Everything is geared to the worst case. The good or bad of this argument depends on how effective the legislation really is at accomplishing its goal. Here it looks like Clipper, as it stands now, would have done no good. This pedophile knew what was good for him in the face of the law, and Clipper wasn't it. Unless the administration is prepared to put their cards on the table and call for a ban on encryption, this argument has absolutely no place here. If unescrowed encryption becomes ubiquitous, there will be many more stories like this. And perhaps many more freedom fighter stories as well. This argument is based on speculation that the author has assumed in order to prove. Encryption will make the world better because it will be better, in effect. We can't afford as a society to protect pedophiles and criminals today just to keep alive the far-fetched notion that some future tyrant will be brought down by guerrillas wearing bandoleers and pocket protectors and sending PGP-encrypted messagesto each other across cyberspace. Nor then, can we afford as a society to protect the rights of the accused, and privacy in any form to keep alive the far-fetched notion that some future tyrant will be brought down by people with the romantic and old fashioned notion that some two hundred year old document might have some merit. So I propose the Clippered Constitution. This argument relies on your willingness to balance the rights of the people against the need for law enforcement in this particular case. Essentially what Mr. Baker is doing here is asking you to find that the prospect of catching pedophiles (a prospect that is by no means a certainty) is worth the sacrifice in privacy, and the expenditure in cost. The most efficient law enforcement known is a dictatorship, and if we were to carry Mr. Baker's line of argument to it's conclusion, it is only some old fashioned notion that people have rights that stops us from eliminating all or nearly all crime. By Mr. Baker's standards it seems that the exclusionary rule (which forbids the admission of evidence wrongly obtained under the 4th amendment) might as well be removed. Afterall, the guy is obviously guilty, we found him with 6 kilos of coke, so why let him go because our MEANS were not sound? C'mon judge, this is some old fashioned and antiquated notion that the right against unlawful search and seizure is important. The fact is the problem is not approached this way in the United States traditionally, and this argument is really a question of degree, not one of yes or no. MYTH NUMBER THREE: Encryption is the key to preserving privacy in a digital world. Even people who don't believe that they are likely to be part of future resistance movements have nonetheless been persuaded that encryption is the key to preserving privacy in a networked, wireless world, and that we need strong encryption for this reason. This isn't completely wrong, but it is not an argument against Clipper. If you want to keep your neighbors from listening in on your cordless phone, if you want to keep unscrupulous competitors from stealingyour secrets, even if you want to keep foreign governments from knowing your business plans, key escrow encryption will provide all the security you need, and more. I suppose this is provided you trust the government's ability to preserve the security of the escrow, the ability of counterintelligence to catch those who would steal it, the integrity of the government in not exchanging the keys for whatever reason, the likelihood of the government notifying the public if there has been a breach of security, and the procedures of notifying the Clipper user after a warrant has been issued for the key and then no crime has been discovered. This is at the core then, a legal process argument. As long as we give the keys to the right administrator, everything will be just fine. The problem with that is you have to trust the government first, trust a government to set the right standards for the release of keys, trust a government that will never fall into another McCarthyism, never look at another passport file for political reasons, and trust a government that generally has an interest in compromising the system. Even if you trust government as a whole, can you trust the segments of the process? DES is probably more than you need under many of these arguments, the fact is its not everything you need in others. But I can't help pointing out that encryption has been vastlyoversold as a privacy protector. The biggest threats to our privacy in a digital world come not from what we keep secret but from what we reveal willingly. For example, if we give our encryption keys to the government? We lose privacy in a digital world because it becomes cheap and easy to collate and transmit data, so that information you willingly gave a bank to get a mortgage suddenly ends up in the hands of a business rival or your ex-spouse's lawyer. Restricting these invasions of privacy is a challenge, but it isn't a job for encryption. Encryption can't protect you from the misuse of data you surrendered willingly. Why is this so? If there is a standard that is secure from everyone, including the government, why can't I exchange my banking information, my medical information, my whatever? This is a societal question, what encryption CAN be used for is limited only by what the government will allow it to be used for and market forces. All of these applications could conceivably be protected by encryption. All of these applications are thus, victims of potential government intrusions by Clipper. What possible use could the government have for my transactions with my Doctor? This argument also has a ring of, "Since most people are killed with bats, we need not limit guns." Personally, I'd like to see the killings by BOTH reduced, but that doesn't mean I'm going to resort to banning either one, or that I will ignore the one that kills "less." Just because people do their taxes openly, I should be concerned that the government might listen to my phone because I have bigger problems to deal with? Part of this has to do with the lack of "transparency" in encryption systems as well. A completely transparent encryption method would increase privacy as much as any system, be it escrowed or not. Why this mandates Clipper, or somehow makes strong encryption less of an option, is beyond me. What about the rise of networks? Surely encryption can help prevent password attacks like the recent Internet virus, or the interception of credit card numbers as they're sent from one digital assistant to another? Well, maybe. In fact, encryption is, at best, a small partof network security. Currently perhaps, but again, this says nothing of potential does it? Some people, I agree, do not need a high level of privacy, others do. The real key to network security is making sure that only the right people get access to particular data. That's why a digital signature is so much more important to future network security than encryption. I would like to see a digital signature that does not use encryption of some sort. If everyone on a net has a unique identifier that others cannotforge, there's no need to send credit card numbers -- and so nothing to intercept. "If everyone [] had a unique identifier...." "If everyone had a social security number...." And if everyone has a digital signature, stealing passwords off the Net is pointless. That's why the Clinton administration is determined to put digital signature technology in the public domain. It's part of a strategy to improve the security of the information infrastructure in ways that don't endanger government's ability to enforce the law. Digital signature technology can be put in the public domain without the help of the government thank you very much. Curfews don't endanger the government's ability to enforce the law either, but they aren't without drawbacks. MYTH NUMBER FOUR: Key escrow will never work. Crooks won't use it if it's voluntary. There must be a secret plan to make key escrow encryption mandatory. This is probably the most common and frustrating of all the mythsthat abound about key escrow. Mostly because there is no effective counter argument. I do feel sorry for Mr. Baker here, a little. The administration has said time and again that it will not force key escrow on manufacturers and companies in the private sector. In a Catch-22 response, critics then insist that if key escrow isn't mandated it won't work. Again, this presupposes a trust in government. If you look at the words in the original announcements, this is NOT what the government says either. They insist that their program will be voluntary, and there are "currently no plans" to enforce a ban on other encryption. If press releases from the White House are per se reliable, then we have no need of privacy at all since government can be completely trusted. That misunderstands the nature of the problem we are trying to solve. Encryption is available today. But it isn't easy for criminals touse; especially in telecommunications. Why? Because as long as encryption is not standardized and ubiquitous, using encryption means buying and distributing expensive gear to all the key members of the conspiracy. Up to now only a few criminals have had the resources,sophistication, and discipline to use specialized encryption systems. Yes, it is expensive, the cost of an old IBM and a 300 baud modem for example. Certainly no petty thieves will use it. Mr. Baker only points out the counter argument himself here. Clipper is aimed at those who can afford encryption, and those people will have the best there is to offer, namely, not Clipper. What worries law enforcement agencies --what should worry them -- isa world where encryption is standardized and ubiquitous: a world where anyone who buys an US$80 phone gets an "encrypt" button that interoperates with everyone else's; a world where every fax machine and every modem automatically encodes its transmissions withoutasking whether that is necessary. In such a world, every criminal will gaina guaranteed refuge from the police without lifting a finger. And Clipper will solve this how? If anything it hurts the goal of making non-escrow encryption expensive because it generates a market for it, and forces manufactures to undercut government subsidized manufactures. The effect is a drop in cost as the non-escrow manufactures try to keep competitive. This is classic Clinton administration logic, the market will cease to function for as long as it takes for us to implement our policy. The purpose of the key escrow initiative is to provide an alternative form of encryption that can meet legitimate security concerns without building a web of standardized encryption that shuts law enforcement agencies out. If banks and corporations and government agencies buy key escrow encryption, criminals won't get a free ride. They'll have to build their own systems -- as they do now. And their devices won't interact with the devices that much of the rest of society uses. As one of my friends in the FBI puts it, "Nobody will build securephones just to sell to the Gambino family." Your friend in the FBI clearly is a graduate of the Clinton/NSA school of economics. People will build secure phones to sell to who is paying. If that's the Gambino family, I promise some manufactures will be lining up to the promised 2,000 phone order that will result. What a market plus it would be to be the phone the Gambino family uses. Anyone who really wanted security would be impressed; and the sales agents would love the chance to look over their shoulder in the showroom and look about before whispering in the prospective purchasers ear, "The Gambino family just bought 2,000 of these, THAT'S how secure they are." In short, as long as legitimate businesses use key escrow, we can stave off a future in which acts of terror and organized crime are planned with impunity on the public telecommunications system. Of course, whenever we say that, the critics of key escrow trot outtheir fifth myth: And what then, do you make of the legitimate businesses who oppose Clipper, of which there are many? What of the businesses who do business internationally? What of the international fears that Clipper causes. You might look at a recent article in the Toronto (Sun?) which bears the opinion of the former Canadian Minister of Defense on the subject to get a feel for how other countries would welcome such a standard. MYTH NUMBER FIVE: The government is interfering with the free market by forcing key escrow on the private sector. Industry should be left alone to develop and sell whatever form of encryption succeeds in the market. In fact, opponents of key escrow fear that businesses may actually prefer key escrow encryption. Why? Because the brave new world that unreadable encryption buffs want to create isn't just a world with communications immunity for crooks. It's a world of uncharted liability. What if a company supplies unreadable encryption to allits employees, and a couple of them use it to steal from customers or to encrypt customer data and hold it hostage? As a lawyer, I can sayit's almost certain that the customers will sue the company that supplied the encryption to its employees. And that company in turn will suethe software and hardware firms that built a "security" system without safeguards against such an obvious abuse. The only encryption system that doesn't conjure up images of a lawyers' feeding frenzy is key escrow. I fail, as an attorney, to follow this argument. It is clear that it would be hard to hold responsible a software company liable for the "damage" the software causes. It is further hard to see how one could win a suit that can't prove that data is held hostage, and not just random garbage. I don't know many judges that would be interested in holding liability to extend this far for exactly the reason that Mr. Baker cites, it would make business impossible to do in many contexts, not just encryption. Telegraph companies are not, for example, per se liable for a loss in communication that causes thousands, or even millions of dollars in damage. I suppose PGP is somehow responsible for the pedophiles crime? As an accessory? I suppose gun manufactures are responsible for their liability? I suppose we could sue the manufactures of cars used in get- aways? I don't know where Mr. Baker got his law degree, but he doesn't seem to understand the liability limiter of supervening cause. In any event, the company could easily secure itself from liability in the context Baker describes by instituting a company policy that requires users of company lines for company business to turn a copy of their key over. Even father, the company could provide pre-generated keys and keep copies. Why is it that we must constantly rely on government to do that which we can easily accomplish ourselves? But there's a second and even more compelling reason why the key escrow initiative can't fairly be characterized as interfering with private enterprise: The encryption market has been more or less created and sustained by government. Much of the market forencryption devices is in the public sector, and much of the encryptiontechnology now in widespread use in the private sector was funded, perfected, or endorsed by the federal government. I would like to see some evidence here. Indeed the security market is a classic in free markets right now. There are several software vendors, several private buyers, and the costs are driven lower by the very extensive availability of public domain software for strong encryption. Even aside this, Baker himself argues that the need for network security is growing and getting more and more important in the private sector, which Clipper is supposedly designed for. And not by accident, either. Good encryption is expensive. Not PGP, not RIPEM, not IDEA. Good encryption is cheap, and getting cheaper, even in hardware implementations. Patents are on the road to expiration, and licensing agreements are getting looser. If it were so expensive, and if the market is so driven by the public sector, why are you so concerned with: "[A] world where anyone who buys an US$80 phone gets an "encrypt" button that interoperates with everyone else's;" Again we see the Clinton/NSA school of economics in action. There is no market for encryption in the private sector, so us regulating the market in the private sector is really not market regulation. It isn't just a matter of coming up with a strong algorithm, although testing the strength of an algorithm can be enormously time-consuming. The entire system must be checked for bugs and weaknesses, a laboriousand unglamorous process. Generally, only the federal government has been willing to pay what it costs to develop secure communications gear. That's because we can't afford to have our adversaries reading our military and diplomatic communications. That's led to a common pattern. First, the government develops,tests, or perfects encryption systems for itself. Then the private sector drafts along behind the government, adopting government standards on the assumption that if it's good enough for the government's information, it's good enough to protect industry's. A pattern that is fast vanishing, and even gone. A pattern that burned every 3rd world nation that bought into post war encryption distributed by the USA, and every nation that thought DES was ok for diplomatic encryption. As encryption technology gets cheaper and more common, though, weface the real prospect that the federal government's own research, its own standards, its own purchases will help create the future I described earlier -- one in which criminals use ubiquitous encryption to hide their activities. How can anyone expect the standard-setting arms of government to use their power to destroy the capabilities of law enforcement -- especially at a time when the threat of crime and terror seems to be rising dramatically? There is implicit in this statement, a notion that the private sector is screaming out loud for escrowed, and government approved, encryption. I have seen quite the opposite. By adopting key escrow encryption instead, the federal government has simply made the reasonable judgment that its own purchases will reflect all of society's values, not just the single-minded pursuitof total privacy. And this indicates that the government is not engaged in market regulation how? So where does this leave industry, especially those companies that don't like either the 1970s-vintage DES or key escrow? It leaves them where they ought to be -- standing on their own two feet. Companies that want to develop and sell new forms of unescrowed encryptionwon't be able to sell products that bear the federal seal of approval. They won't be able to ride piggyback on federal research efforts. And they won't be able to sell a single unreadable encryption product to both private and government customers. And so they have doubled the market, and twice the variety in product line with the ability to ride out the storm when government cutbacks are in order? Clinton/NSA economics again I suppose. Only this time the markets won't be seperated in terms of export/domestic markets. There can be a price disparity adjustment within the market that serves the manufacturer. Well, so what? If companies want to develop and sell competing, unescrowed systems to other Americans, if they insist on hastening a brave new world of criminal immunity, they can still do so -- as long as they're willing to use their own money. That's what the freemarket is all about. Government subsidizes the manufacture and distribution of a "standard," buys thousands to create a market for them where no market before existed, and then that's what free market is all about? Funny, last time I checked, the United States has been trying to serve DeBeers (For the last five years at least) for doing about the same thing in the diamond market. Of course, a free market in the US doesn't mean freedom to export encryption that may damage US national security. As our experience in World War II shows, encryption is the kind of technology that winsand loses wars. With that in mind, we must be careful about exports of encryption. This isn't the place for a detailed discussion of controls, but one thing should be clear: They don't limit the encryption that Americans can buy or use. The government allows Americans to take even the most sophisticated encryption abroad for their own protection. Nor do controls require that software or hardware companies "dumb down" their US products. They merely have to "dumb down" all their products. Software firms have complained that it's inconvenient to develop a second encryption scheme for export, but they already have to make changes from one country to the next -- in language, alphabet, date systems, and handwriting recognition, to take just a few examples. And they'dstill have to develop multiple encryption programs even if the US abolished export controls, because a wide variety of national restrictions on encryption are already in place in countries from Europe to Asia. And so we will keep the current and highly effective export regulations in place and there will never be a market for strong encryption in either the U.S or abroad. Pure fantasy. MYTH NUMBER SIX: The National Security Agency is a spy agency; it has no business worrying about domestic encryption policy. Since the National Security Agency has an intelligence mission, Read: is a spy agency. its role in helping to develop key escrow encryption is usually treatedas evidence that key escrow must be bad security. In reality, though,NSA has two missions. It does indeed gather intelligence, in part by breaking codes. But it has a second, and oddly complementary,mission. It develops the best possible encryption for the US government's classified information. With code breakers and code makers all in the same agency, NSA has more expertise in cryptography than any other entity in the country, public or private. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that NSA had the know- how to develop an encryption technique that provides users great security without compromising law enforcement access. To say that NSA shouldn't be involved in this issue is to say the government should try to solve this difficult technical and social problem with both hands tied behind its back. Then the super smart NSA shouldn't need to classify the method used in Clipper as no civilian could ever possibly find a weakness in it. MYTH NUMBER SEVEN: This entire initiative was studied in secret and implemented without any opportunity for industry or the public to be heard. This is an old objection, and one that had some force in April of 1993, when the introduction of a new AT&T telephone encryption device required that the government move more quickly than it otherwisewould have. For those not in on the argument, AT&T had a (DES?) based hardware encryption product that looked much like a caller I.D. box which encrypted phone conversation quite well. AT&T was about to market the device, and had produced a large lot ~8,000 units. NSA expressed disapproval, bought the lot up almost entirely and destroyed the units so AT&T wouldn't ruin the upcoming market regulation by flooding the market with "real" encryption. In return (probably) AT&T got the Clipper contract, and one might look at the recent support AT&T has received in contract negotiations with Saudi Arabia from the administration and draw your own conclusions. Key escrow was a new idea at that time, and it was reasonable for the public to want more details and a chance to be heard before policies were set in concrete. But since April 1993, the public and industry have had many opportunities to express their views. The government's computer security and privacy advisory board heldseveral days of public hearings. The National Security Council met repeatedly with industry groups. The Justice Department held briefings for congressional staff on its plans for escrow procedures well inadvance of its final decision. And the Commerce Department took publiccomment on the proposed key escrow standard for 60 days. And despite strong corporate rejection government jumped on the project anyhow. I have not heard any support from the private sector at all, except maybe AT&T and those companies that smell a total ban and are promising to support the new hardware to hold their place in the market. I would like to hear from anyone who has heard otherwise, that is a glowing review of Clipper by a private sector entity. After all this consultation, the government went forward with key escrow, [anyhow] not because the key escrow proposal received a [] warm reception, but because none of the proposal's critics was ableto suggest a better way to accommodate society's interests in both privacy and law enforcement. Read: Public input was meaningless because we are much smarter. Unless somebody comes up with one, key escrow is likely to be around for quite a while. That's because the only alternative being proposed today is for the government to design or endorse encryption systems that will cripple law enforcement when the technology migrates -- as it surely will -- to the privatesector. And that alternative is simply irresponsible. How about stay out of the commercial markets all together? Private sectors are at least as effective at developing standards. Let me summarize Mr. Bakers arguments: 1> Clipper doesn't create any new capability, because we have the ability to do the same intrusive things we could do before. 2> Wiretaps are ok because they are not coercive 3> The radical civil libertarians, who are the only real resistors her, want us to fall into anarchy, so they cant have any good points. 4> Because criminals cannot use standardized encryption, they cannot use encryption 5> Because the keys are escrowed, threat of irresponsible government is reduced. 6> The anti-clipper people are just geeks who missed woodstock, so they can't have any perspective here. 7> Because a pedophile once used PGP, we have to have Clipper. 8> We can't let silly notions that the government might one day exceed its bounds stop us from effective law enforcement. 9> The need for privacy isn't about Clipper, because Clipper provides privacy. 10> Because we reveal so much about ourselves willingly, we don't need encryption anyway. 11> The need for digital signatures mandates Clipper. 12> We are just trying to make strong encryption more expensive for criminals, and just catch the stupid ones. So Clipper will limit crypto to those with big resources, because one would have to be an idiot to want to sell anything to criminals. 13> Government is not interfering with the market because government is and will be the only market provider. 14> Companies won't use strong encryption because there is to much liability in it. 15> The NSA is the best developer of crypto, and no one would ever think of buying anything that does not bear the NSA seal of approval. 16> Because the purchase of escrow encryption by the government is merely an imposition of values on the public, its not market regulation. 17> Software companies have been bemoaning the need to make different standards for exporting crypto so we are going to impose a crippled standard for all crypto and that will solve the problem. 18> The NSA is so good at making codes, we are exactly the people to be doing it, and the other developers aren't as good at screening their methods. Even so, we still need strong encryption because however bad the private developers are, they are threatening to flood the world with encryption we can't break. 19> Since we held pet hearings that looked like a show trial, the public got to choose. 20> Since the public was too stupid to like escrow encryption, we're going to go ahead with it anyhow; but this doesn't mean the public wasn't involved! (This last one rings right up there with, if you don't agree with me, I'll make you agree.) For more information on the Clipper standard you can access WIRED's Clipper archive via the following WIRED Online services. [...] _________________________________________________________________ Stewart A. Baker is the National Security Agency's top lawyer. He worked briefly as Deputy General Counsel of the Education Department under President Jimmy Carter, and he practiced international law at Steptoe & Johnson, in Washington, DC. He has been at the NSA since 1992. _________________________________________________________________ WIRED Online Copyright Notice Copyright 1993,4 Ventures USA Ltd. All rights reserved. This article may be redistributed provided that the article and this notice remain intact. This article may not under any circumstances be resold or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from Wired Ventures, Ltd. If you have any questions about these terms, or would like information about licensing materials from WIRED Online, please contact us via telephone (+1 (415) 904 0660) or email (info(a)wired.com) WIRED and WIRED Online are trademarks of Wired Ventures, Ltd. - - -uni- (Dark) unicorn(a)access.digex.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLdZaMhibHbaiMfO5AQGtgQQAx4OpCeGcqGAwbZyKVIcOC2EkX/IVYl0V wXUss+02Cgm8vbYlwJDQkLNuIcBN6Ij4Vnt55j/zhhLXPXMyqGuunDa+kcUM9ajn 6fiJ78tQC0GZ1ID6WhjMtYfXgMsy0dhadRNvkMUmmjo6j+uQozRnZoIkjkdA32XC oFDNDSXk78Q= =bavc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

U.S. Card
by David Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've come up with a little .GIF (16K) that equates the U.S. ID card proposal to 1939 Germany (Germany 1939 on top, Star of David under; below that USA 1994, with guesstimate of what a US ID card might look like underneath). I'm hesitant to post it here, so is there an FTP site I can leave it for those who might like to have a look at it? Or would the cypherpunks FTP site be acceptable? Thanks. Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTICE: At my sole discretion unencrypted Email may be deleted without a reply being made. PGP preferred. Finger me for PGP 2.3/5 & RIPEM Public Keys.

1 0

Canada/Newbie correction
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A little while ago I responded to Mr. Brock's forward of the Toronto Sun article about Canada's position on Clipper. I responded that it was surprising and a testimony to the list that most of the arguments made by the policy maker (Former Canadian Defense Minister) were issues we had been discussing from early on. I commented that as issue spotters the 'punks seemed to be 3 months to 1 year ahead of the game on most subjects. I then went on to explain that this might create part of the unfriendly feel of the list for new users, who get on wanting to discuss "current" events that have by this time already been tossed out and around on the list by the 'punks. I fear Mr. Brock was mildly offended by my post. Just to be clear, I never meant to imply that Mr. Brock's post was "behind the times" or in any way unwelcome. Quite the opposite I assure you, the post was a good insight into the mind of a foreign official and a valuable perspective on the arguments in general. Most of my posts are fairly "as they come to my fingers," and as a result structure is often lacking. Hence, I fear the impression that I was persecuting or poking at Mr. Brock somehow. Not so. Please continue to forward such posts Mr. Brock, your taste gets a positive reputation certificate from me! -uni- (Dark)

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anon.penet.fi errormessages
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I too have fallen victim to the mysterious anon messages. I however get a bounce indicating that my password is wrong. I suspect the following: Somehow someone on the list is asking the list to forward to a penet.fi blind account (anXXXX). Everytime cypherpunks sends a message to this account, the penet site tries to either assign or verify the password on the senders alias. In my case, as I have a long unused account on penet, is this: Message 2:

1 0

Anonymity, Journalism, and the Legal System
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's an interesting case involving the use of the anon.penet.fi remailer for journalistic purposes, in a sensational trial in Canada that the the Canadian goverment has declared a press ban on. (You may recall that issues of "Wired" were seized because a short article dared to mention the press ban.) The Karla Homolka-Paul Teale case allegedly involves Karla and her husband killing her own sister during forced sex, kidnapping and rituallistically torturing and murdering at least one other woman, videotaping the tortures to show later victims, and--some say--cannibablism. Karla Homolka (known to some as Karla the Kannibal) confessed. The judge in the Teale trial declared a press ban a year or so ago. Since then, several major Usenet newsgroups have--it is said, though I have no way to verify this-been barred in some or all parts of Canada. Ditto for newspapers and magazines. But "information wants to be free," and information is reaching Canadians via many other routes. This is causing calls for crackdowns on the Net. Of direct interest to Cypherpunks. (There are those who talk about Teale's need for a "fair trial." A press blackout for over a year, and the threat that anyone who seeks information or discussed the case will be thrown into the Bastille is not consistent with the ideals of even a semi-free society. In my personal opinion, the evidence against Teale is so heinous, so overwhelmingly convincing, etc., that the trial could and should have been completed in about 2 weeks after their arrest. I favor decriminaling almost everything, of course, and then swiftly and decisively pursuing and punishing murdereres, rapists, thieves, and child molestors. Sounds fair to me.) Anyway, as many of you may not be reading alt.fan.karla-homolka (which is banned in Canada as I hear it...any of our Northern readers want to confirm or refute this?), here's an excellent summary of how some amateur journalists are using Julf's anonymizing service to get the truth out: (Note that the article was also posted via anon.penet.fi) Message-ID: <233332Z11051994(a)anon.penet.fi> Newsgroups: alt.fan.karla-homolka From: an52708(a)anon.penet.fi (Neal the trial ban breaker) X-Anonymously-To: alt.fan.karla-homolka Organization: Anonymous contact service Reply-To: an52708(a)anon.penet.fi Date: Wed, 11 May 1994 23:27:33 UTC Subject: Id Article Lines: 253 This was a particularly well written article that gives some interesting background to the the plight of yours truly and a couple of collegues :> The Electronic Ban Breakers How three computer users are getting information out about the Karla Homolka trial - and why the government can't do a thing about it. by Chad Skelton Word count : 1896 The day after Gordon Domm was arrested for distributing information about the Karla Homolka case, "Abdul" sat in the Ontario legislature, listening intently to the MPPs discuss the publication ban. As Attorney General Marion Boyd fended off criticism about the ban, Abdul sat quietly in the gallery. No one in the legislature that day could have known that while they were discussing a man who had distributed information on the trial to 50 people, Abdul, who is responsible for sending some of that same material to almost a thousand individuals, was watching them all from above. Abdul is one of a hand-full of computer users dedicated to getting information about the Karla Homolka trial out to the public, in a manner which is more quiet, and much more efficient, than anything the many other trial ban breakers have done. With the help of a computer system in Finland, three users known only as Abdul, Neal, and Lieutenant Starbuck, are becoming the most influential players in this illicit trade of information. While newspaper pages are filled with stories on the printed ban breakers, like Gordon Domm, and Frank magazine - the story of these electronic ban breakers hasn't been told. Interviewed for the first time, by any member of the media, the three men gave detailed accounts of their connections to the case, their methods of distribution, and their reasons for getting involved. The first person to tell the electronic community about Karla Homolka and Paul Teale was Neal, who posted information on the case before any of the international press stories broke. Neal, self described resident of cyberspace, and, "freedom fighter", claims to have several direct or indirect connections to the case. These contacts, he claims, include the pathologist's office, a nurse at a Southern Ontario Hospital, and a police officer. Based on the information he received from these sources, Neal posted one of the first notable messages in the "alt.fan.karla-homolka" newsgroup. His message contained details about the killings, the evidence, and the accused - all in sickening detail. Neal delights in the freedom of the electronic network. Asked why the courts instituted a ban, Neal concludes the decision was "wishful longing (on the part of the courts) to be back in the 19th century before the days of the electronic medium." Asked if he thought his actions were criminal, he replied, "There comes a time when you have to resist the tyranny of the state. Did the Americans holding the Boston Tea Party think they were criminals? In the eyes of the British law they were - but in their own, they felt they were fighting to uphold some basic freedoms. And that's what I'm doing!" Neal says he decided to tell the network what he knew to, "get the snowball rolling downhill - if I could post some details, others could perhaps tell what they [knew] as well." And others did. Several people posted rumours and speculation on the case into the Homolka newsgroup. Soon the rumours required some sort of organization, so Lt. Starbuck decided to make a FAQ. FAQ stands for "Frequently Asked Questions". As somewhat of an institution on the network, FAQs serve as useful information files on a given topic. They exist for sex, atheism, movies, and television, just to name a few. But in September of 1993, a different kind of FAQ was created. September saw the debut of, "The Paul Teale/Karla Homolka Frequently Asked Questions List". Lt. Starbuck, the moderator of the FAQ, is a student of Science at a Southern Ontario University. In his mid 20s, Starbuck updates the FAQ regularly as new rumours and information are made available. The latest version, "Version 2.1", was released on February 1st, 1994. Starbuck posts the FAQ on several newsgroups, and sends it out in electronic mail to those that request it. Asked to estimate how far his FAQ has reached he said it was, "impossible to know how many people have seen the FAQ posts in newsgroups like `alt.censorship' and `alt.true-crime', in addition to people who regularly access (other computers that have it available)." Starbuck doesn't claim that all, or even most, of the rumours are true. In fact, even while widely distributing the FAQ, Starbuck believes the rumours may be harmful. "The existence of the ban", he says, "And the speculation that followed it, are just as dangerous as not having (a ban)." Abdul, known as, "the Electronic Gordon Domm", is unquestionably the most influential of the electronic trial ban breakers. In the first few months of the "alt.fan.karla-homolka" newsgroup, Abdul (still using his real name) was one of the most active rumour posters. A student at a Toronto University, in his early 20s, and living in Scarborough - Abdul found himself hearing plenty of rumours about the case, which he quickly posted to the newsgroup. In addition to the rumours, however, he also knew people with connections to the case, including someone he met at a party that knew Karla Homolka's sister Tammy, and a friend whose father was the Durham Region Staff Sergeant. In the beginning, Abdul posted the information he had on the case to as many newsgroups as possible - but this led to mainstream groups, such as "soc.culture.canada" being banned from network sites, angering many people. So, as an alternative, Abdul decided to begin an electronic mailing list, by compiling the electronic mail (e-mail) addresses of people that wanted to be sent information on the case. Newsgroups are like newspapers, and electronic mail is like a private letter. Very few network sites will search e-mail, as they consider it private and confidential. This allowed Abdul a method of getting the information about the case out - even though "alt.fan.karla-homolka" was rapidly being banned at universities and network sites all across the country, including the University of Guelph, Toronto, and Waterloo - and Canada Remote Systems, a computer bulletin board. As he worked out the logistics of the electronic mailing list, Abdul was, as he put it, "getting tired of reciting the FAQ at every party." So he decided that in addition to his electronic efforts to get information out, he would also help to distribute facts about the case in more conventional ways. This led Abdul to collect all the articles and rumours he had on the case, and organize them into one large file he called the, "Teale Tales Digest". Using three printer ribbons, and a full box of computer paper - he printed over 50 copies of the digest. "(I) gave them to everyone I knew, and some I didn't," Abdul recalls, "I left five on the TTC and three in the washrooms of a Toronto university." Talking to people he gave the digest to, he says, "some of their copies have been photocopied up to fifteen times." And while his conventional methods of distributing information match those of his namesake, Gordon Domm, Abdul's most notable breach of the ban was, and is, electronic. When interviewed, Abdul's electronic mailing list was growing at an incredible rate. He claimed to have over 800 e-mail addresses, with 200 of those having signed up within the last week. Having directly given the information to at least 800 people, Abdul believes that he has already been indirectly responsible for giving information on the case to about 10,000 people. A number that is increasing every day as the electronic articles and rumours are printed out, photocopied, and distributed - over and over again. In addition to sending regular updates to interested individuals, Abdul is also equipped to provide computer users with exactly what they want. With computerized copies of everything from the Washington Post article on the trial, to a transcript of the tabloid show "A Current Affair", Abdul has virtually everything that has ever been printed or broadcast in the foreign press about the case. And each article can be requested individually from his electronic mail address. Abdul promotes these articles, and the mailing list, by posting messages in over 30 newsgroups, telling people how to get them. Although what Abdul is doing is on a scale much larger than that of Gordon Domm, or any of the other trial ban breakers, Abdul insists he isn't afraid of being arrested. In fact, all three electronic trial ban breakers said they don't feel they will ever be arrested for what they're doing. This is due mainly to the common link of the electronic trial ban breakers - a computer service in Finland and a Finnish computer user named Julf. Julf is a self-employed businessman living in Helsinki, who runs what is called, "The anon.penet.fi Anonymous Server". The server, originally intended for Scandinavians, allows computer users to post messages and send electronic mail anonymously - by bouncing it off the Finnish system. Traceable electronic mail addresses are replaced with generic anonymous accounts, which conceal the location and name of the sender, making it next to impossible for the messages to be traced back to their original source. Julf's service has existed for over a year. He says his intentions with the server are to, "provide a means for discussion on sensitive topics without having to fear repercussions from peers, employers, totalitarian regimes and fussy mothers." Julf hasn't actively been involved in distributing information on the trial, even though his service is involved in cloaking the information sent by others. Julf, for whom English is a third language, isn't even particularly interested in the case. He only learned about it when computer users complained that his service was being used to post information on the trial. However, as Julf puts it, "it is impossible, and unethical, for me to monitor the over 4000 messages handled by my server every day." Julf says the only way that investigators in Canada could possibly track down Abdul, Neal, Lt. Starbuck, or any other user posting information on the trial, would be to seize his computer, in Helsinki, which contains logs of where mail has been sent. However, Julf isn't concerned. "It would definitely take a Finnish court," he stresses, "And involve a fair bit of international jurisdiction juggling." However, that may all be irrelevant, as it's not even clear as to whether the police, or Attorney-General's office, are actively pursuing the electronic ban breakers. While Abdul, Neal, and Lt. Starbuck are very hard to identify and locate, they are easy to contact through the Finnish server. And all three say they haven't received anything in electronic mail from law enforcement or government agencies. Barbara Krever, of the Attorney-General's Office, refused to comment specifically on the electronic trial ban breakers, saying all potential breaches of the ban brought to the attention of the Attorney General's office are reviewed. Asked whether there were people qualified to deal with the electronic breaches of the ban, Krever refused to "talk about specifics". She also refused to comment when asked why the people mentioned in this article hadn't been contacted. In the meantime, Abdul's electronic mailing list continues to grow. When asked if he had a message for those trying to enforce the ban, Abdul had this to say: "There is no way you can stop us. For years you have tried to regulate us ... Now we can go wherever there is a phone line, without you looking over our shoulder. You'll have to shut down every phone, every radio transmitter, to keep us quiet." ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. --

1 0

I'll be in LA from 5-20 to 5-23 (fwd)
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry to hit the whole list with this, but 2 out of the 3 recipients to his message bounced my mail (jpp@jpplap (Jay Prime Positive) does not work, and "la-cypherpunks(a)toad.com" is apparently not the name of the LA Cypherpunks discussion list. Since several of you have asked about an LA meeting, here's my message. Forwarded message: From: tcmay (Timothy C. May) Subject: I'll be in LA from 5-20 to 5-23 To: jpp@jpplap, ghio(a)andrew.cmu.edu Date: Sun, 15 May 1994 14:32:29 -0700 (PDT) Cc: tcmay (Timothy C. May), la-cypherpunks(a)toad.com (I'm just guessing that "la-cypherpunks(a)toad.com" is the right address; if not, could someone forward or respond to the correct list?) I'll be in Hermosa Beach visiting my brother from Friday to Monday, and would (as I have said before) be interested in attending an LA-Cypherpunks meeting, presumably on Saturday the 21st. Others have contacted me about this, but I've told them to watch for the organizers to announce such a meeting. Jay PP has said he'd be willing to host a meeting. The moral on these things, in my experience, is not to wait for some kind of Grand Consensus, there being no voting or debating goint on. As they say, "just do it." Assuming it's on a Saturday, and is not too far away, I'll be there. ("Too far away" might be Riverside, for example.) Even a small gathering (several people) could be useful...perhaps more useful than the mega-meetings of 40 or more people we usually have in the Bay Area. I hope to hear from you folks. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Italians charged with "Appropriation of Secret Passwords" (et al)
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What, exactly, is "appropriation of secret passwords"? extracted from: Computer underground Digest Sun May 15, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 41 ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 15 May 1994 11:37:04 -0700 From: Bernardo Parrella <berny(a)WELL.SF.CA.US> Subject: File 2--Fidonet Crackdown in Italy On May 10-12 1994, the first nationwide crackdown on telecom nets was operated by Italian police. Acting after a warrant issued by a Prosecutor in Pesaro, about 60 Bullentin Board Systems throughout the country have been visited and searched by police officials. Dozens of people were formally accused of "distribution of illegally copied software and appropriation of secret passwords" under the law approved by Italian Parliament in January this year. In several cases police officials didn't know what to search for, thus seizing computers, floppy disks, modems along with electric outlets, answering machines, audiotapes, personal effects. The raids also hit private houses and belongings, and in some places sleeping people were abruptly woken up facing machine guns. After searching probably around one third of the entire network - that includes more than 300 BBSes - police officials closed several Fidonet nodes, but no arrests were made. A still inaccurate figure of people were charged with software piracy, and dozens of computers and related devices were seized - along with thousands of floppy disks, CD-Roms, W.O.R.M.S. Moving after a suspected software piracy ring run by people involved in a Fidonet node, the crackdown started in the night between May 10 and 11 in Milano, targeting in the two following days BBSes in Pesaro, Modena, Bologna, Ancona, Pisa and other cities. Fidonet Italia, member of the worldwide Fidonet network, is a non-profit organization devoted to distribution of shareware and freeware programs as well as to electronic forums on topics ranging from technological to social issues. An essential communication tool for several groups and individuals throughout the country, Fidonet Italia became an active multi-cultural vessel and distributor of several different nodes dedicated to specific issues: Peacelink (solidarity, human rights), Cybernet (cyberpunk), Ludonet (games), Scoutnet, Amynet, and others. For thousands of Italian people, Fidonet BBSes today are invaluable tools of information-exchange, social activism and professional activities. The network policy strictly prohibits any distribution of illegally copied software and fraudulent appropriation of secret passwords. Also, Fidonet is one of the few International organizations which has always stated and pursued a clear position against unauthorized copying software. At the moment, the raids seems to be motivated by accusations against two people involved in a Pesaro-based BBS who were using Fidonet contacts to allegedly distribute illegal copies of computer programs. However, there are no reasons for such a vast law enforcement operation. Most likely the prosecutor acted simply on the basis of the Fidonet telephone numbers list (publicly available) owned by the two suspected of software piracy. The vast majority of the people searched don't have any kind of relationship with the suspected, and many of the search warrants stated a generic "conspiracy with unknown" for the crime of software piracy. Particularly, the random and arbitrary seizures of floppy disks and personal computers are completely unmotivated, because every BBS is a completely independent structure and each sysop is running his/her own hardware and software. The seizures will resolve in a great economic loss for these people and their professional activities will be surely affected from negative publicity. Some of them own small computer-related companies while others are physicians, hobbyists, students who risk personal savings to run their services. Because police officials also seized electronic and paper archives containing data and numbers of the people who logged onto Fidonet nodes, it is evident that investigations are going even further - thus violating the constitutional right to privacy. The first result of this crackdown is that many Fidonet operators decided to shut down immediately their systems all over the country, fearing heavier police intrusions in both their public activities and private lives. While the Italian Parliament recently approved specific laws about copyright and piracy of computer software, there are still no rules to protect personal privacy in the electronic medium. This legislative void inevitably makes the sysop the only responsible person about anything happens onto and around his/her own BBS. Fidonet operators do not want and can not be the target of undiscriminated raids that, forcing them to closing down their activities, cause serious damages to themselves as well as to the entire community. In an article published Friday 13 by the newspaper "La Repubblica", Alessandro Marescotti, Peacelink spokesperson, said: "Just when the worldwide BBS scene is gaining general respect for its important role at the community level, in Italy the law hits those networks that have always been strongly against software piracy. Charging dozens of honest operators with unmotivated accusations, the main goal of this crackdown is directed against the social activities of small community nets - thus clearing the space for commercial networking." While terms and figures of the entire operation should still be clarified, on Sunday 15 Fidonet Italia operators will meet in Bologna to study any possible legal counter-action. ------------------------------ - paul

1 0

How good is MIT-PGP 2.5?
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When 2.5 was first announced a few weeks ago (with the non infamous keyserver announcement), there was some concerns expressed over the political manipulations of the new program and thus, the overall security of the code. To this date I haven't seen any additional commentary on that subject, and I figure that before I recommend locally changing to 2.5, I'd like to find out what exactly was changed from the standpoint of the algoritms and the overall safety of them. No flame please, but I am not a math-oriented person, so please keep it in pseudo-english :-) ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

2 1

Dr Dobbs "CD ROM"
by mgream＠acacia.itd.uts.edu.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Curiously; thumbing through the last issue of Dr Dobbs (April 94 -- it just made it into the newsagents here), I notice their CD ROM for sale (well, I've seen it in previous issues, but just thought about the point I'm going to make now). Considering that previous issues of Dr Dobbs have contained cryptographic algorithms (ie. Nov '93 -- scheiner & IDEA), and this CD ROM makes the code available, then how did they get an export license -- if indeed they did ? The order form for the CD ROM states "add $x.xx if outside US or Canada", so their market is clearly international. Does anyone have this CD ROM, is the code in "ready to compile" form, is it all there ? Matthew. -- Matthew Gream Consent Technologies Sydney, (02) 821-2043 M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au

3 2

Anonymous message failed (wrong password)
by daemon＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sure enough the penet server tracked the message (which I posted to cypherpunks) back to me and sent me the error message thinking that was the right thing to do. Note that had I copied the entire bounced message there is porbably something in it to relate me to my penet anon address. In the case of the other user who was complaining at having been assigned an alias without ever having used the service, this might be the explanation as you likely had no password or account, your mail was not bounced. -uni- (Dark)

1 0

Quantum Computers and stuff
by John K Clark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I found this in the May 6 issue of Science: >At the same press conference where Lenstra and company announced >the defeat of RSA-129,he promised a "surprise" for the next >factoring feat. He hinted at a new, faster algorithm- and >perhaps a test involving a number with quite a few more digits >than 129. Then I found this in the May 7 issue of Science News: >In a startling theoretical result that could call into question >any cryptosystem based on factoring, Peter W Shore of AT&T Bell >Laboratories in Murray Hill, N.J., has just proved that >factoring is "easy" when done on a special type of computer >operating according to quantum mechanical principles . Although >such a quantum computer does not yet exist, this finding has >shaken the cryptographic community. By "easy" I presume they mean solvable in Polynomical time. I'm not saying the writing is on the wall or anything but it might be prudent to start thinking about Diffe-Hellman, perhaps using elliptic curves. John K Clark johnkc(a)well.sf.ca.us -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCzAgUBLdbskn03wfSpid95AQFZuwTvVug954sJilmhlyR3Sye+LpCB9ktG+erw mfDHBbAUpYC34P/lL81dzekGj7hmMhOIgZklZn7h/XfgCydQihm0e+DHGC9h64nT AI6g2xHI5k/hH9QZRUPjFLwreaFeKX4ARy3rfWEgpGC7g1qqyPnKQi7TBuffyYCV 51NJ9lGzGjuSVIcDdHcGBIoTkMg1T8pH+Yr44jo/MehE86KB+/0= =pxVR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Puzzle Palace 2nd edition?
by Ted Cabeen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I few months ago, around when the second edition of The Codebreakers came out, there was mention of a second edition of the Puzzle Palace. Was that just a misguided rumor, or is there a second edition in the works? I was planning on rereading it, but if a second edition is soon coming, I'll wait. Thanks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBM9jOvNBqlyHCkS2NAQEZHgf/Vf3WvnIjzfPCt2wjC7wqwTS6ke26/epr 7J41U+aCrk/fVTtBrTPSmjOTTgfKatRfI407Iq7h2YDHP7FVAKnVzIlXLSddtbr2 1p7A3OU0thZcn9sdq8LfJovqDXgdflSiU+eGC7uhU4MK0Tdx1Xc+/ARO/v6E7zXQ y7sLudLEXyG7P7oM6aLa1eebpfv2rOdq7l5sgIeNRn56k6QuWpFAx1aALjIaWxJD ZnEtLfq/kPXQHu0jXy1mKtb7wvr4+iF/VNI+mDlCh2Q9HvNSi6wGq1vREoJNazxq ReVIeMYwxJt92RLmwDNexFA0qlaB56jNWaH4TER8Qc5JYH+2llNCAQ== =cQhp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Ted Cabeen http://shadowland.rh.uchicago.edu cabeen(a)netcom.com Check Website or finger for PGP Public Key secabeen(a)midway.uchicago.edu "I have taken all knowledge to be my province." -F. Bacon cococabeen(a)aol.com "Human kind cannot bear very much reality."-T.S.Eliot 73126.626(a)compuserve.com

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