December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

MacPGP 2.5
by MWayne＠eworld.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any info on whether or not this new version will be available for Macs? How about for PowerPC Macs? Thanks --Mitch

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Missed stuff
by Tommy the Tourist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sorry to be a pain. I just resubscribed after whatever it was that happened that caused the massive unsubscription. Anyway, I missed the start of the PGP 2.5 thread. If someone archived the messages between the unsubscription and now, I'd appreciate it they'd get in touch with me so I can get a hold of them. Well, except for the Nalbandian message maybe :-) Zeke -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLc7O2hVg/9j67wWxAQHSZgQAhW9bM3QA1GWjIt7+j1eXjh/fDxGHWq3h p8I2x3HnY5kSPU6/0N66Y+gUISHt7z/ojkZ7tadDgUjAMCeqM3eGPJDjoal1VdIJ 7/OEpsjFVcuHwpZp5qrNHjOd4GGcpixmU1/CY6+FPUUyNXmOak9HlqZ4KMWG/dx3 Gr0p5IKA5lI= =aZVk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 7 lines: :: Response-Key: ideaclipper ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```$YS^P;+]AB?X9TW6\8WR:>P&2'9,7.YM5[DU*:IVOLYZ'LR#3R6]%Q. F!LKO;7PXSNM7K3\Q(-"OG(+>&OAJ66?'R7<U=C=-A$)S[(AIZ>L` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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Re: Idiots
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 9 May 1994, Jim Nalbandian wrote: > >I consider this to be a threat and grounds for removal and notification > >of his service provider. As the owner of several mailing lists, this > >kind of childish behaviour can bring certain nodes to their knees, and > >without the max-posting protections of LISTSERV, majordomo will keep > >sending until it dies, killing toad.com in the process. > > Gee Bob, can't you take a joke?? Not when it will spam the net. This is about as funny as Green Card Lawyers, the Clipper Chip, and Janet "Flambe'" Reno. ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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Re: [ Secure Mosaic]
by Jack Bzoza 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 26 Apr 1994, Augustine Lo wrote: > To successfully combine simplicity of operation and key administration > functions with a high level of security that can be accessible to even > non-sophisticated users, significant changes were necessary for > existing WWW security protocols. EIT developed a new protocol called > Secure-HTTP for dealing with a full range of modern cryptographic > algorithms and systems in the Web. > > Secure-HTTP enables incorporation of a variety of cryptographic > standards, including, but not limited to, RSA's PKCS-7, and Internet > Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), and supports maximal interoperation > between clients and servers using different cryptographic > algorithms. Cryptosystem and signature system interoperation is > particularly useful between U.S. residents and non-U.S. residents, > where the non-U.S. residents may have to use weaker 40-bit keys in > conjunction with RSA's RC2 (TM) and RC4 (TM) variable keysize > ciphers. EIT intends to publish Secure-HTTP as an Internet standard, > and work with others in the WWW community to create a standard that > will encourage using the Web for a wide variety of commercial > transactions. > > Availability > > EIT will make Secure NCSA Mosaic software available at no charge to > CommerceNet members in September and NCSA will incorporate these > secure features in future NCSA Mosaic releases. > How likely is it that these specs will be publicly available so that others can build client front ends to this application? Thanks

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GhostMarks
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The trading of ghostmarks has begun. I've personally been party to a half-dozen transactions from my own personal account, and have more than 20 clients. It's time for trade to begin large-scale. I've placed the names of those clients who agreed to be publicly listed on my finger info: phantom(a)stein.u.washington.edu These are people (although not the only ones) that are ready and willing to begin transactions. Each of them has some sort of supply of ghostmarks. Let the grand experiment begin. Matt Executive Director The Phantom Exchange ("I'm not only the director, I'm also a client!") Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. phone: (206) 548-9804 Check my home page -- ftp://ftp.u.washington.edu/public/phantom/home.html PGP 2.2 key available via email, or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Re: This is an abstract from a talk at Cornell University...
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: jamesd(a)netcom.com (James A. Donald) > Peter Wayner writes > > Richard Feynman and others have challenged the traditional Turing > > machine model of computation. A new model of computation based > > on quantum mechanics has recently been proposed. It is too early > > to know whether quantum computers will be practical. However, it > > is shown that quantum computers can factor integers and compute > > discrete logarithms in polynomial time. > > It is news to me that a quantum computer can do this, but > is seems plausible that it could. > > Factoring is a member of a class of problems for which it > is plausible that quantum computers have capabilities > fundamentally superior to classical computers. I would be surprised if quantum computers had the capability to factor in polynomial time. The special capabilities that I have seen claimed for quantum computers have a probabilistic component, so that, in effect, you can do a calculation n times faster but have only a 1/n chance of getting an answer. (This is an oversimplification but gives the idea.) In the context of the Many-Worlds interpretation of QM, you might say that the various instances of the quantum computer spanning the multi- verse can be made to work together, but by a sort of conservation of information production, only a fraction of the individual universes of the multiverse get the answer. The one loophole that I see is that this term "quantum computer" covers a lot of territory. They might sneak in some infinities in addition to adding the strictly quantum capabilities. It is known that ordinary computers which can hold arbitrarily-large numbers (and do arithmetic on them in one time step) can factor in polynomial time. If the definition of your quantum computer is so broad that you can squeeze in some outrageous capability like this, then the claim of polynomial-time factoring is more plausible. Hal

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DigiCash Announcement
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - - -- For Immediate Release -- In an agreement between The Phantom Exchange and UniBank, we are proud to announce the opening of a digital currency server and exchange service at unicorn(a)access.digex.net. UniBank will begin circulating DigiFrancs at 1:38pm EST Tuesday May 10, 1994. (The moment of peak coverage in the annular eclipse of the sun) DigiFrancs are backed by 10 cases of Diet Coke, located at the UniBank "vault" reserves in Washington, DC. DigiFrancs are redeemable for their equivalent value in 16 oz Diet Coke cans (unchilled) on demand FAS Washington, DC. This arrangement implies no agreement between any of the parties and Coca-Cola company. The Phantom Exchange and UniBank have launched a cooperative effort to exchange information and establish realistic floating rates of exchange between our two currencies. As a result PhantomMarks and DigiFrancs will be freely interchangeable at the spot rate. Exchange rates will also be offered for Tacky Tokens from mpd(a)netcom.com's digital bank. Tacky Tokens are exchangeable at UniBank at the current rate subject to some restrictions. No exchange fees will be assigned for the month of May. Current rates of exchange are available via finger at unicorn(a)access.digex.net. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLc8uahibHbaiMfO5AQG7HQP+NChh9+fcegBBdUfiwAt/flUKZBvSEkn/ eNBnuNmRJmm1GLQVn51IWCF8rip17cEvLSSKhV4jBldHOgwFGd5a7jBsHN5bXncC zkDWe6O0q1ftQpGV87smm0NpLUw0Sl7HnXx9SBndcAeUxdEjqag0ROunoCeakcc6 R6HGM2HvlSQ= =Z0Io - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Matt Thomlinson, Executive Director, Phantom Exchange 23:30 PST 5/9/94 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLc8Yi2SGfFo1zsA5AQGtpwQAuahasIOjAqQ9gcJ3vuXNlr6mH2GU70jd MGC1GpmmhJW+L9LtkabCLYyLOXxA7GjQ0XJZm9nWcPZNOFBTpSNgdGG8kUcw5enU tU19EH2b5Q38KI4ICwz38t4/cbsop23TMJGATG977IKwpzOnvzh5nW88/Q4EoUC2 M8MFz01aqH4= =EJmD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- unicorn(a)access.digex.net: Director/Operator, UniBank phantom(a)u.washington.edu: Executive Director, Phantom Exchange

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Re: Patents on RSA will expire soon....
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The algorithm that factored RSA129 takes about exp(sqrt((log n)(log log n))) steps. Indeed 10^17 instructions is just about how much work was required to factor RSA129--. That formula gives about 10^29 for a 1024 bit number. If computers double in speed every 18 months then they will be only 32 times as fast when the patents expire.

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Majordomo
by Cyber City 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm posting this from Toronto, and I have no direct knowledge of what took the Cypherpunks list down, but here's my guess: The CP list is run my "majordomo" [MJD], a group of Perl scripts. According to the MJD docs: "If you'd like a list with the absolute minimum of maintenance (but also a minimum of security), you could create an "auto" list. All subscription or unsubscription requests will be honored without any input from the list owner. For example, anyone could unsubscribe anyone else." - unsubscribe list [address] This unsubscribes the user (or "address") from "list". This means that anyone could write a message to majordomo(a)toad.com, with the following message: unsubscribe cypherpunks user1(a)some.org unsubscribe cypherpunks user2(a)some.org unsubscribe cypherpunks user3(a)some.org ... and so on. Forgery is unnecessary. MJD permits the use of a password by which the list owner can approve unsubscription requests, but Sendmail displays this password. See: telnet toad.com 25 Trying 140.174.2.1... Connected to toad.com. 220 toad.com Sendmail 4.1/Gnu-smail ready at Mon, 9 May 94 22:12:32 PDT VRFY owner-cypherpunks 250 Eric Hughes <"|/u/hughes/.bin/procmail"> VRFY cypherpunks 250 <"|/u/majordom/bin/wrapper resend -p bulk \ -l cypherpunks -f owner-cypherpunks \ -h toad.com -s cypherpunks-outgoing"> *** password would be displayed here *** ==== What it means ======================================================== -l <list-name> list name -h <host-name> host name -f <from-addr> "sender" (default <list-name>-request) -p <precedence> add "Precedence: <precedence>" header -I <file-list> Bounce messages from users not listed in file in colon-separated <file-list> * -a <passwd> approval password ** -s enable "administrivia" checks * Note that majordomo postings can be limited to those on an approved list, but selected posters can not be excluded. This is not appropriate for the Cypherpunk list, due to anonymous remailers, pseudonyms, etc. ** Note that if there WAS an approval password, it would be visible. Fortunately, version 1.90 of MJD, which is now in beta, fixes this problem by putting the passwords in a configuration file. It is available for ftp.GreatCircle.com. What to do about abusive posters? How about reversing the function of the -I switch? === Here's the PERL code for option -I from 1.90 beta: =============== if ( defined($opt_I) && defined($from) && ! defined($approved) ) { local($infile) = 0; @files = split (/[:\t\n]+/, $opt_I); foreach $file (@files) { if ($file !~ /^\//) { $file = "$listdir/$file"; } if ( open (LISTFD, "<${file}") != 0 ) { @output = grep (&addr_match($from, $_), <LISTFD>); close (LISTFD); if ( $#output != -1 ) { $infile = 1; last; } } else { die("resend: Can't open $file: $!"); } } if ( $infile == 0 ) { &bounce ("Non-member submission from [$from]"); } } === Now, with minimal hacking, this can be reversed, so that if the user === name is in the list, the incoming post is bounced to the list owner, === who can approve it or junk it. So here is a technological fix, where we don't have to go bothering system administators if they have a troublesome user. -- Alex Brock

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Re: This is an abstract from a talk at Cornell University...
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I recently saw a video tape of a talk by Feynman on quantum computers. It was taped in '86 or '89 I think. It was his presentation of 'balistic' quantum computers. In that talk he refered very briefly to the David Deutch idea of the many worlds computer but was sceptical, but not entirely dismissive of it. In other comments Feynman seemed to think that the many worlds idea was not very useful. It would certainly be useful if it helped design such a computer. I would bet against it.

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MBone cypherpunks session...
by werner＠mc.ab.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: an49276(a)anon.penet.fi (Joe Blow) >Date: Mon, 9 May 1994 23:35:41 UTC > >Pls excuse my ignorance, but what is MBONE? If anyone would care to enlighten >me on this, use email to avoid noise on the list. ;-) I would also be interested in this info. Pls send it to me too. tw

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Party Announcement
by bsteve＠zontar.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Colleagues; Announcing the 3rd annual.... George Leroy Detweiler Memorial Weenie Roast & Whale Exhibition MONDAY MAY 30, 1 PM - 1 AM * R.S.V.P. * This is our annual pool inauguration. We will be cooking/providing limited quantities of Vienna Beef(tm) hot dogs from Chicago, Home- made cajun hotlinks, South Carolina hotlinks, and some kielbasas; The sausages will be plumped in the *cheapest* available beer and then grilled in the time-honored way. We will provide some limited quantities of snack foods. For the vegetarian diners, we will have some limited quantities of tofu-burgers & garden-burgers. We should have back-up blenders & ice to insure that the we are able to prepare sufficient quantities of Moo-moo drinks, lest we feel the wrath of the Moo-moo gods. We will also provide condiments, picnic gear, some ice for beverages, limited quantities of soft drinks, cheap beer, wine and *good* beer.The pool will be heated as close to body temperature as possible,and the tub will be operational. The tub seats 6-8 regular-sizedpeople and 4-6 extraordinary people. We'll have limited internet access at poolside for those with a requirement for it. We will provide limited crash space if required. WHERE the heck is it? At the home of Steve Blasingame (bsteve(a)zontar.com) and Mihoko Doyama (miho(a)zontar.com) 2608 Totana Court San Ramon, CA 94583 Take I-680 to Bollinger Canyon Road Take Bollinger Canyon Road West about 1/4 mile to Aranda Drive Right on Aranda Drive and 80 feet to Totana Court Left on Totana Court Ours is the light colored ranch with teal trim. If you are lost, the phone number is 510 830 9724. So WHAT do I need to bring? 1) Yourself (if you bring kids, parental discression is advised; this is essentially an adult gathering and when the Moo-moo gods are summoned, young minds may be contaminated) 2) Swimming attire, towel (we have only a limited quantity of towels for guests) 3) Some food item that you deem appropriate for the event; If you bring it, someone else will want to taste it. Chips,Salads,etc. You know the drill. If you wish to join us, drop a note to whale(a)zontar.com. This way we can insure that we provide enough goodies. Steve Blasingame bsteve(a)zontar.com (510) 866-1864 Voice (510) 866-1861 FAX

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RE: C'punks list
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>you need to resubscribe -- somebody (Nalbandian?) wiped the list... Is there the slightest bit of evidence to support this frequently-repeated suspicion? Personally, I don't think he has the spare neurons required. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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NYT op-ed May 8
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just tuned-in last night...Has anyone discussed the NYT op-ed by David Gelernter (associate prof. at Yale)? It was accompanied by a comic "the first wiretap" and Gelernter says common sense dictates that wiretaps be preserved and he wants the digital telephony bill passed. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com

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Re: NYT op-ed May 8
by ABROUARD＠antioc.antioch.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Gelertner's NYT op ed piece seemed to suggest that the government would gain no new information if the digital telephony bill is passed. Quite obviously the ability to automatically scan for what one is interested in would be a tremendous boon to various agencies info gathering projects. Even Gelernter must realize how hollow his reasoning sounds. It makes one wonder what sort of critical thinking they're teaching at Yale these days - or perhaps in whose pocket he's comfortably ensconsed. Andrew Brouard abrouard(a)chaos.antioch.edu

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Re: NYT op-ed May 8
by Eric Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: On Tue, 10 May 1994, Paul E. Baclace wrote: : : > I just tuned-in last night...Has anyone discussed the NYT op-ed by : > David Gelernter (associate prof. at Yale)? It was accompanied by a : > comic "the first wiretap" and Gelernter says common sense dictates : > that wiretaps be preserved and he wants the digital telephony bill : > passed. : > : > Paul E. Baclace : > peb(a)netcom.com : : I sent a message on same into the void on Sunday. If anyone has it, I : would appreciate it if they would repost it (I was unsubscribed to the : list at the time.) : Here it is... : : I've received no cypherpunks mail for 24 hours so this may be old news : but... : : David Gelernter, author of Linda and recent victim of the UnaBomber, : writes in support of the DTI and Clipper. "Wiretaps for a Wireless Age" : is on the Op-Ed page of the Sunday New York Times. : : I will be writing a Letter to the Editor and others should as well. Will : someone who has access pick this up and post it. It's very important. : : It has some factual flaws: : : "What kind of half-wit criminal would...return a rental van that played a : starring role in a big-budget terrorist spectacular?" : : But it represents as strong a statement of their position as Safire's : column was of ours. : : Brilliant bit: : : "Privacy buffs are often big fans of gun control and the Endangered : Species Act; some versions of gun control restrict the objects you may : keep in your own home, and the species act has been interpreted in a way : that drastically restricts the ways citizens may use their land." : : Of course many of us are not fans of gun control or the Endangered Species : Act. : --Eric

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From Todays' RISKS column
by dat＠ebt.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sending this because of the first item, but thought the rest were relevant also, although I would assume that most c'p'ers would read comp.risks anyway... If you haven't seen it, be sure to check out the piece by EFFector Online 07.08 and Digital Media, "Ever Feel Like You're Being Watched? You Will..." -- see below for details... ... from: RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Tuesday 10 May 1994 Volume 16 : Issue 04 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 06 May 94 00:06:10 -0500 From: Dave.Leibold(a)f730.n250.z1.fidonet.org (Dave Leibold) Subject: Secret elevator codes baffle Metro Toronto government An article in _The_Toronto_Star_ on 5 May 1994 described secret codes which are necessary to maintain elevators at Metro Hall, the building which houses Metro Toronto municipal council and services. The elevators, made and maintained by Schindler Elevator Corp., require secret password codes in order to maintain them. This means that only Schindler staff can maintain the Metro Hall lifts, and as such forced Metro Council to award a 10 year contract of $3.5 million to Schindler. Meanwhile, Metro is also suing the building's developer, Marathon Realty, to try to get the codes. Without the passwords, elevator maintenance contracts cannot be given to a competing firm. Metro Councillor Howard Moscoe wanted the Council to issue a $10 000 reward to the first person to successfully crack Schindler's Code. This motion probably didn't get approval. David Leibold Fidonet 1:250/730 dave.leibold(a)f730.n250.z1.fidonet.org ------------------------------ Date: 09 May 94 06:31:56 EDT From: "Mich Kabay [NCSA]" <75300.3232(a)CompuServe.COM> Subject: Dartmouth prof spoofed Here is some old news that was new to me: According to the _Dartmouth Life_ newsletter (Feb 1994--I'm just clearing up my in basket today), an article appeared in _The New York Times_ on 94.01.05 entitled "Confronting changing ethics of the computer age." The unsigned article begins, "Hanover, N.H. -- Somebody in Prof. David Becker's course on Latin American politics did not want to take the midterm exam, so he or she used Dartmouth's innovative electronic mail network to impersonate a department secretary and cancel the test. "At 11 o'clock on the night before the test in the Government 49 class, a message flashed on students' computer screens. Because of a family emergency, the message said, Professor Becker would be unable to administer the midterm." The article explains that half the class understandably failed to show up for the test. No one has been identified yet as the culprit. The rest of the article talks about the extensive electronic mail system on campus. One of the key concerns of the unregulated network is the rapid spread of rumours: "Late in August computer flashed an account of a woman being raped while jogging near campus. The message was intended as a warning, but there had been no rape." The Hanover police department were swamped with calls. The Chief of Police now has his own electronic mail account to try to squelch rumours. M. E. Kabay, Ph.D. (Dartmouth '76) / Dir Educn / Natl Computer Security Assn. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 9 May 1994 18:04:54 +0100 From: pcl(a)foo.oucs.ox.ac.uk (Paul C Leyland) Subject: Re: Bellcore cracks 129-digit RSA encryption code (RISKS-16.03) > predicted would take "40 quadrillion years" to break. ... > This mathematically arduous task was accomplished in eight months by > 600 volunteers in 24 countries who used their organizations' spare > computing capacity. ... There are two risks, one amusing. Ron Rivest now regrets ever making that 40 quadrillion years estimate. It was silly when he made it; his papers in the scientific literature from that era give estimates which are within an order of magnitude of how much computation we actually used. From those estimates, and the observation that way back then it wasn't feasible to hook together hundreds of computers, we can deduce that a late 70's supercomputer using the best algorithms available then would have taken a few decades, maybe a century. Certainly much less than the 40 quadrillion years. The risk is: making predictions about the runtime of computer programs can sometimes make you look silly 8-) The other risk is more serious. RSA is widely used to protect commercially significant information. 512-bit keys are widely used for this. Most, if not all, smart-card implementations are restricted to 512-bit keys. RSA-129 has 425 bits. I estimate (taking a risk 8-) that 512-bit keys are only about 20 times harder to break than 425-bit keys. Readers are left to draw their own conclusions. However, it is not by chance that I have a 1024-bit PGP key. Oh yes, as Arjen Lenstra had pointed out: if you had used RSA-129 as the modulus in a digital signature for a 15-year mortgage, you would have been cutting it pretty fine. It is the use of RSA for long-lived signatures which needs to be examined with a very critical eye. Paul Leyland (one of four RSA-129 project coordinators) ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 6 May 1994 02:45:26 +0200 From: Dik.Winter(a)cwi.nl Subject: Re: Bellcore cracks 129-digit RSA encryption code Perhaps because there is no risk beyond the known ones? Bob Silverman of MITRE (well known in number factoring circles) has publicly predicted already some time ago that it would require about 5000 MIPS years to factor the number. Reasonably close to the actual figure. That the team was led by Bell Communications Research is untrue. It is a team led by four people from Bellcore (Arjen Lenstra), MIT (Derek Atkins), Iowa State University (Michael Graff) and Oxford University (Paul Leyland). dik t. winter, cwi, kruislaan 413, 1098 sj amsterdam, nederland, +31205924098 home: bovenover 215, 1025 jn amsterdam, nederland; e-mail: dik(a)cwi.nl ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 5 May 94 20:02 PDT From: paulb(a)teleport.com (Paul Buder) Subject: Re: Bellcore cracks 129-digit RSA encryption code (RISKS-16.03) I've heard this 40 quadrillion years figure a couple of times now and I find it odd. Is that what the Scientific American said? I have the original document from MIT's Laboratory for Computer Science. It's titled "A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems" by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman, April 1977. I can't do superscripting with vi so 10 10th means 10 to the 10th power. It has the following table in it: Digits Number of Operations Time =================================================== 50 1.4 X 10 10th 3.9 hours 75 9.0 X 10 12th 104 days 100 2.3 X 10 15th 73 years 200 1.2 X 10 23rd 3.8 X 10 9th years 300 1.5 X 10 29th 4.8 X 10 15th years 500 1.3 X 10 39th 4.2 X 10 25th years 200 digits was supposed to take 3.8 trillion years and 100 a mere 73. So where does the 40 quadrillion figure come from? paulb(a)teleport.COM Not affiliated with teleport. ------------------------------ Date: 9 May 1994 15:26:52 GMT From: daugher(a)cs.tamu.edu(Walter C. Daugherity) Subject: White House May Issue National ID Cards >From Prodigy 5/9/94: White House May Issue National ID Cards The Clinton administration is working on a national ID card that every American would need in order to interact with any federal agency, reports Digital Media: A Seybold Report, a computer industry newsletter based in Media, Pa. The so-called U.S. Card would be issued to citizens by the Postal Service. It would be issued as a "smart card," with its own internal CPU, or as a plug-in "PCMCIA" card with megabytes of built-in memory. Administration approval of the plan "could come at any time," states the newsletter. Walter C. Daugherity daugher(a)cs.tamu.edu uunet!cs.tamu.edu!daugher Texas A & M University, College Station, TX 77843-3112 DAUGHER@TAMVENUS [Several folks sent me Mitch's piece from EFFector Online 07.08, and Digital Media, "Ever Feel Like You're Being Watched? You Will..." However, I cannot run it in RISKS because of its copyright notice. Contact Mitch Ratcliffe <godsdog(a)netcom.com> (NOT RISKS) if you want a copy of the whole article. PGN] ------------------------------ -- dat(a)ebt.com (David Taffs)

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Gelernter's piece
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wish I could stop each person advocating Clipper and get them to explain how this will give access to criminals' conversations before they Even DERD backed way down from there on Science Friday last week -- saying that Clipper *wasn't* for giving access to criminal conversations -- just for making sure that the gov't standard didn't shoot the gov't in the foot. Given that more reasonable stance, the next step is to eradicate from the record (before the jury sees it) any mention of criminal behavior or wiretaps of criminals as a justification for Clipper. >From that point, I think we could have a reasonable debate.

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A CC of my letter to Gelernter@cs.yale.edu
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I caught your piece on the Op-Ed page. Of course I agree with you about the fact that there is a need for wiretaps. But I think that there are serious problems with the Clipper chip. It is very expensive compared to software only solutions and it is also very, very brittle. First the cost: * Every extra chip adds to cost, battery usage and pocket bulge. This is a heavy price to pay for something that could be done in software. Many of the next generation digital phones, for instance, use a DSP. There are more than enough spare cycles available to do encryption. * The high cost is effectively a tax on privacy for the average person. It is easy to imagine clipper chips adding $100 to the cost of an already digital phone, fax machine or computer. The poor are just as much targets as the rich. In fact, they are often easier targets because no one wants to bother chasing down a fake credit card transaction or bank account withdrawl if it only amounts to $75. If a chip was necessary, then it would be a different story. Software could help all of America, not just the rich. Now the Fragility: * The first generation of Capstone chips is already obsolete. They're worthless. All of the money that went into fabbing and producing them is gone. Why? Because the NSA discovered a weakness in the Secure Hash ALgorithm. They've fixed it now, but all the old chips are worthless. * Imagine that problems arise well after the chip is standardized. What will millions of Americans do? All of the digital phones, fax machines and modem cards will need to be replaced. * Now imagine that a pair of turncoats sell out America and put both halves of the key escrow on the black market. If we're lucky enough to discover this leak, it could easily take 6 months to a year to replace our now worthless phone system. * Software, on the other hand, is very easy to change. In many cases, the anti-virus programs travel faster than the viruses. These are the main reasons why I think that the Clipper is a boondoggle. Software based solutions would solve all of these problems _except_ the government's desire for a firm grip on the world and technology. -Peter Wayner

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Net Banking in Info Week
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The May 9th Info Week (now being distributed on news stands) has an article on using the Internet for funds transfer. "these banks could save millions by not having to build expensive private networks, and the Internet...could become the backbone of worldwide electronic commerce. Photo of and interview with Daniel Schutzer Citicorp VP. I had breakfast with Shutzer last Fall. He follows this list among others and is up to speed with the institutional changes under way. He thinks it will be a real challenge for conventional banks to survive. DCF "Where do messages go when sent to a Majordomo listserver with an empty subscribers file?" -- unanswered questions of the Net. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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DigiCash announcement correction
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An error was made in the UniBank/Phantom Exchange press release which indicated that DigiFrancs were backed by a store of 16 oz Diet Coke cans. There are of course no 16 oz cans, but rather 12 oz cans. UniBank regrets the error.

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Des....
by lile＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where might I find DES? I have a friend that needs to decript a tape... thanks, -lile

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What happened?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What happened to the list? It hasn't been sending anything out...

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PGP and Yarn (offline reader)
by cort＠ecn.purdue.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- (This may be the 2nd time you hear this.... but the original post may have been flushed.) .............................Cort. PGP can now be nicely integrated with the excellent offline news/mail package, Yarn. You can now, at the touch of a key, encrypt an out-going note, sign an out-going note/post and decrypt/verify incoming notes/posts. Yarn (stable beta version .64) can be retrieved by ftp from oak.oakland.edu:/pub/msdos/offline/yarn-064.zip (as well as mirrors and other sites). Yarn imports news/mail in the SOUP format. (I am quite pleased with this combination.) Thanks to the author, Chin Huang. Cort. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLc/cCus4vmytylqdAQElwgP9G3WSjphJ+C9e0JFQV7GaKNzV3orVy0xV oBKSvO2Hw9jZFp7iPq75PAkyQgYX+vALbJe6LqzWF7Oc0jaEd+LhBjWiYv3rTNzR f+CZCZf2FnNc+00Ylus/MxrXNJj2svYF9nHHH0Pld9CYylq/qNntVuj43MvdNi4W stI98P8c6C0= =GHLe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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away from my mail (fwd)
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sent Phil a copy of my patches to get pgp-2.3a to build under Solaris 2.2 with gcc-2.5.8, and this is what I got in return: From: via the vacation program <prz(a)columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU> Subject: away from my mail I will not be reading my mail for a while. I am on travel until Wednesday, 11 May 94. This canned message was generated automatically by the "vacation" program, but my business trip is not a vacation. Your mail regarding "pgp-2.3A diffs to compile under Solaris 2.2 with gcc-2.5.8" will be read when I return. Also, in case you are still using my old email address, please update your records to use only my current email address, which is prz(a)acm.org. In case you haven't heard, MIT is releasing PGP version 2.5, available from an FTP site at MIT, for US noncommercial users only. It is a nice version of PGP, with all the strength and integrity of PGP 2.3a, with some bug fixes and improvements. -Philip Zimmermann

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