December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PGP outside the US
by SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A repeated comment that I see in cypherpunks is that "PGP 2.5 is illegal for use outside the US" and thus communications cannot take place between those in the US and outside using PGP 2.5. However, as I see it PGP 2.5 (or 2.6) is only illegal for use outside the US by US law. Most of us ouside the US really don't care about US law. The only problem is the export of PGP 2.5 from the US, which need only occur once. I can't believe that this hasn't already happened. So: US users can legally use PGP 2.5. Foreign users can also use PGP 2.5 until the US decides to kidnap them. As far as I know there are no laws against sending encrypted traffic across the border. Where lies the problem? -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.5 mQCNAi2LQpQAAAEEAMHIQtQtNi657RDTxpiBAXIonSlwjQJMM/jHbxLlk+bntkEJ g2y4ymguOpdlfEfnSud170Rnc1u04RoCM2CNBlEaNrjBAFTHXzjR6+X7JJ0rj53j 6Ju9U57GiWp+8e0RP/gUADnsplPZeYBlMpTT7Mt93AM2ZTSxFcyi36CIyUXVAAUR tCdEb3VnIFNpbmNsYWlyIDxzaW5jbGFpQGVjZi50b3JvbnRvLmVkdT6JAJUCBRAt i0PDIQX2Z9wex38BAdLMA/4g7HZQq7d3wC0jWoJL5XP7hiegXLT/8WenhBwL2DrR ILDvw2Pe1LGjBtmx4ynFq0Mplo6rIw/uSbMjMX+8AnF8Tei6tRaKj9N97YwziU2B B7AsLWRAnyAzaVoz2vYTPv0IiEbRguvFEem5yakMIfNM7+3dVlQFL4DSCjr8P4Qa qYkAlQIFEC2LQxnoHJmBi3GtGQEBbn4EAI0BynCzIfZFUaH+SeuoHovwsVt4ahZ9 YlqmwzN9Bfd/O4UKIvvYMQc9WnqmbX+I+LNduimIl/XAnUHANXF2ABcx+lbfw5wf j3U/9tkvfqB2Z4Ogtrf5XLN5wAnX8kaWvEqPiMzmxvPQlHIY75GGzhFCVocyBJV0 pRspTpUraoNR =JT40 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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PGP 2.6 and the future
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Seems to me, perhaps, that the introduction of 2.6 might be a precursor to RSA legally cracking down on anyone running pre-2.6 versions (accepting that 2.4, viacrypt, is ok). Scarey if you think about it, especially if the RSA folx are in bed with the fed, which doesn't seem that unrealistic considering the political climate. That, coupled witht he fact that no one has yet verified the seciurity of 2.5/2.6 lead me to seriously question the security of this new version, since we are essentially being forced to use it if RSA starts suing everyone, or gets the fed to crack down because of patent infringement. Sorry, just a rambling... ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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Re: pgp 2.6 stupidity
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Paul Ferguson Personally, I can't see any compelling reason, save legality, for domestic or international users of PGP to upgrade beyond 2.3a. ........................................... Who/how would anyone know which version is being used? Are there going to be net police checking this out? Blanc

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NES
by SGT=DARREN=S.=HARLOW%ISB%MCTSSA＠nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have a write-up on NES? I believe that it is based on DES, but I am not sure. It is for a paper that I am writing up. Thanks! Sgt Darren Harlow - Computer Security MCTSSA, Camp Pendleton, USMC Internet: harlowd(a)nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil or another less reliable & slower: harlow(a)mqg1.usmc.mil Voice: Comm: (619) 725-2970 DSN (Autovon): 365-2970 Fax: Comm: (619) 725-9512 DSN (Autovon): 365-9512 PGP Public key available upon request "The views expressed are my own, and always will be..."

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[ANON] War in rec.guns
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[[Reply-To: john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org]] * Original msg to: Thomteach(a)aol.com -=> Quoting Thomteach(a)aol.com to John Nieder <=- Th> Frankly, if anyone should be discreet, I wish it would be the folks Th> who use my personal E-mail address. Getting exposed to the message Th> involuntarily is something of a drag. At least when such messages are Th> posted to the rec.guns address, I am left with the _choice_ of whether Th> or not to access the post. Alas, Tom, this is untrue. My posts to rec.guns are being stopped by the moderator, as are at least some of the other pro-anon messages going to the group. I put a Bcc: list up including you and others who had commented on the [ANON] thread there or to me by netmail so you would have an unfiltered source for my posts in the continuing discussion. You may get two more posts from a mailing I already sent out tonight, but in that you are apparently requesting that you receive no more netmail on this I will delete your name. Any others receiving these posts netmail who do not wish to, please let me know and I will delete them from the Bcc: list, with my apologies. If indeed the moderator was following his philosophy of - what was it? - "sunlight" or "openness," in the newsgroup instead of selective suppression of dissenting messages, these mailings would have been unnecessary. Thanks for your patience. |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%| | <john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org> * CP2A * PGP Key # E27937 on all servers | |-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=| |"If you love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude | | better than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in | | peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the | | hands which feed you. May your chains set lightly upon you, and may | |posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams, 1776| |=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-| |BOYCOTT: Pepsico <KFC - Taco Bell - Frito-Lay - Pepsi-Cola> & Gillette| |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%|

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Re: Fixing pgp 2.6
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:19 PM 5/16/94 -0700, Hal wrote: >First, note the strong hint in Schiller's message about operators of >key servers who accept pre-2.6 keys being guilty of contributory >infringement of the RSA patent. I think we can expect strong legal >pressure from RSA to shut down the remaining U.S. key servers, even >those which don't use illegal versions of PGP. They succeeded once in >shutting down the key servers which used PGP; they will succeed again >in shutting down the others due to the contributory infringement threat. Presumably this won't affect the non-US keyservers. I don't see the people running said servers bowing into pressure about a patent that doesn't affect them.... >For the same reason, hopes of getting a non-RSA-approved "2.6a" (hacked >to be backwards compatible with 2.3) widely available in the U.S. are >not well founded. FTP sites which hold programs or even patch files to >allow 2.6 to interoperate with 2.3 will be targetted by RSA as >contributory infringers. In short, the legal advantages PGP 2.6 will >have over unapproved versions will be strong enough that it will be >widely used in the U.S. The thing is, though, that PGP 2.5 *doesn't* infringe on the patent, because of the use of RSAREF. Any version that uses RSAREF should be legal from that patent sense. Presuming that there aren't copyright issues involved with the 2.5 release, I don't see any reason that code couldn't be maintained and fixed. I'll have to check the copyright status on 2.5 when I log on. There are many people, including myself, that won't get involved with an infringing version of PGP. PGP won't get "wide" acceptance until the isssues are resolved. At the same time, PGP also won't get "wide" acceptance unless it is interoperable with the outside world. This would involve code using RSAREF coming legally into the US and being used, or code using RSAREF being illegally shipped outside of the US. Apparently, the latter has already happened. But either way, for PGP to be noninfringing in the US, it needs to use RSAREF. I'm guessing that the new version of RSAREF they announced would be coming out will probably alter the terms to make this difficult/impossible. However, I don't believe there is any requirement we use the latest version of RSAREF... Just to use the license that comes with that version of the code. Bob -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu finger for RIPEM public key When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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How to make fixes stick (Was Re: PGP 2.5 Beta Release Over, PGP 2.6 to be released next week)
by Richard Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to Jeffrey I. Schiller, PGP 2.6 will issue broken messages, unreadable by earlier legal versions of PGP (Viacrypt's 2.4 in USA and Canada, and any version outside backward-crypto-land) In summary, how do we make our fixes to this obvious bug stick? (Institutional paranoia on) To me, this change is an obvious step in satisfying the TLA's desire for a segmented crypto market to slow widespread use of strong crypto. On the one side, we have misapplied ITAR regulations preventing export of a worldwide standard. On the other side, we have a wrongly-granted patent preventing use of an imported worldwide standard. PGP is a de-facto worldwide standard, and they're trying to break it. (Institutional paranoia off) From the keyboard of: Adam Shostack <adam(a)bwh.harvard.edu> > And 2.4 is legal, if the 2.6 code doesn't recognize that, > well, then that code is buggy & will need to be fixed. :) Adam has the right idea. The question is, how do we make such a fix stick? In order to beat the "canonical release" advantage of the broken 2.6, we'll need to spread the word widely (at least until a 2.6-compatible PGP is released and ported to the full range of current platforms by our outside compatriots). Some suggestions for after we create such patches: Letters to computer magazines (Infoworld, Wired, PC Week, etc.) Add entry to PGP FAQ about communicating with non-USA/Canada PGP users Add entry to PGP WWW pages in UK Weekly postings of the patches to alt.security.pgp (from outside NA) Monthly postings of the patches to alt.sources.patches (from outside NA) Press releases in other appropriate newsgroups, repeated Come up with others, particularly for the non-net world. :-) Richard

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Hmm
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmm, since I brought up the idea, can I take a flat 10% off the top of any winnings? Sorta a finders fee or someting? Robert "momma needs a new hard drive" Hayden -- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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Barlow Liberty Essay Airs on PBS May 17
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: Date: Mon, 16 May 1994 10:34:42 -0800 From: John Perry Barlow <barlow(a)eff.org> Subject: Barlow Liberty Essay Airs on PBS Tomorrow Night Folks, I commend to your attention a video essay on Liberty which I did for PBS last summer. It will air tomorrow May 17 at 10:00 PM EST (your listings may vary) as part of a program called Declarations. Could I please persuade those of you who re-post to put this in any places where there might be people interested? Thanks much. Enduring, Barlow -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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Combatting 2.6
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One of the ways we might be able to get the general public to not want to use the MIT version of 2.5/2.6 would be to get the various professional organizations, such as the EFF or CPSR to take a stand questioning the security and agenda behind 2.6. Just a thought. ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Political Correctness is \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> P.C. for "Thought Police" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

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Remailer low usage is not surprising
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

After a period of not using them much, I just tried several of the remailers listed in the various summaries by Karl Barrus and Xenon, and the ad hoc "foo is up again" sorts of messages. The results were disappointing. One remailer I used to use quite a bit no longer seems to be working at all, and others still haven't responded to my ping. Couple this with other problems: * one of the hacktic.nl remailers was announced (in a newsgroup) as going offline because the owner of the laptop (!) it ran on was going to Spain for a few months. * other remailers have gone up, down, and sideways...with little warning or "persistence." * the "finger" command that was supposed to at one point provide a fairly current summary, never worked for me. (Sorry, I can't find this finger report, but the idea was that one would "finger foo(a)bar.baz" and a recent ping of the existing remailers would be returned. I tried it several times, but the results were clearly wrong.) * I know about both Matthew Ghio's ping program and Xenon's SuperPing script, but these are both cumbersome to set up and use and will not exactly make remailer use widespread. * What I suspect many of us do is to find a remailer that works, that we get comfortable with, and then use that. This is OK for very low-grade, casual use, but only for that. And, as I just found out, when that system vanishes, changes, or otherwise no longer works.... Caveat: I'm not pointing fingers (literally), and I appreciate the work that has gone into remailers, and the not ignorable personal risk that remailer operators have incurred. And I am not volunteering others for more work. But it is certainly fair to comment on the implications of this state of affairs, right? * The ad hoc, "it'll be up if I remembered to plug in the modem" nature of _some_ remailers is not conducive to wide use, especially in chains. * Experimentation is useful, for new features or for folks just starting out in the remailer business, but not for stable, longterm, widespread use. (Maybe we need to have the remailers refect their experimental, developmental, and production status with some sort of identifying mark. For example "remailer-X(a)foo.bar" could signify an experimental remailer, and "remailer-P(a)foo.bar" could then signify that the remailer is ostensibly "open for business" as a quasi-commercial, stable remailer. Just an idea. Ultimately, I favor external reputation raters/testers, and this idea is just intended to encourage people who _know_ their remailers are "experimental" (read: flaky) to label them clearly as such.) * Some sort of "reputation" rating, with %availability, would be useful. Something like: remailer(a)foo.bar 37 successes in 41 tries over 131 days 11 successes in 11 tries in last 15 days average delay: 3.1 min (including all overhead) supports: PGP 2.3a, 2.4, delays, subject line remailer(a)loser.org 3 successes in 39 tries in 128 days 0 successes in 11 tries in last 15 days average delay: 47 min (including all overhead) I will be willing to pay about $10 a year, real money, for someone who will set this up, reasonably robustly, and then mail me the results on a daily or weekly basis. (Such a pinging service should be done, I think, on at least a daily basis, possibly even more frequently, with statistics compiled about delays, percentage of hits and misses, etc.) This "Daily Remailing Form" would be an obvious thing to sell: it represents value, is of relevance to Cypherpunks, and can be bought with real money (or with Magic Money thingamajigs, at the discretion of the seller). It might be "better" for the "rest of us" if this service were free, as with the finger ping that was to exist at one point, but this free service fails to incentivize the creator to really make his service reliable and robust. * Digital postage is an even more-ideal solution, strongly incentivizing remailers to keep their systems running. I and others have written about this extensively, so I won't here. Just some comments. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Fixing pgp 2.6
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I think we can expect strong legal pressure from RSA to > shut down the remaining U.S. key servers, even those > which don't use illegal versions of PGP. They succeeded > once in shutting down the key servers which used PGP; they > will succeed again in shutting down the others due to the > contributory infringement threat. > ViaCrypt PGP 2.4 is perfectly legal in the U.S. U.S. operators can run key servers that except only version 2.4 and higher keys. I don't think RSA has a legal leg to stand on the U.S. key servers reject all keys with a version number less than 2.4. <wink> <nudge> Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: PGP outside the US
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So: US users can legally use PGP 2.5. Foreign users can also use PGP 2.5 until the US decides to kidnap them. As far as I know there are no laws against sending encrypted traffic across the border. Where lies the problem? With people like me who commute from the UK to the US regularly and don't particularly look forward to a strip-search and a flashlight up the butt every visit. (Unless the customs officer is *very* cute...) This is why I specifically don't want a copy of 2.5/2.6... - and I can't see any need for it anyway. G

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Re: PGP 2.6 and the future
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Allan Bailey says: >> I'm willing to wager that this 2.6 and maybe 2.5 versions are >> hacked by the NSA to put in their spiffy key-escrowed backdoor. > >How much are you willing to wager? I'll take the bet at any size. I'll pick up any piece of this action which Perry is unwilling, or unable, to cover. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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PGP 2.6 incompatibilities
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- First I would like to say that Mr. Bailey is being taken (should have recanted while you had a chance), that being said, it is worth it to get someone to examine the code in a thorough manner. I'll ante up $10 to help alleviate the pain of losing this bet, Mr Bailey. Only good things can come of such a bet in my opinion. Perhaps, the above code analysis will present some new insights into patches and maybe even improvements! Someone wrote the list to say that the RSAREF code in 2.5 is not as good as Phil's, MIT seems to agree since it now has implimented new RSA code "while you wait". I'm not using this new code unless the type of patch Adam Shostack has suggested is implemented, that is, it is fully compatible with previous (i.e. 2.3, 2.3a, 2.4) versions. This attempt at divide and conquer cannot be allowed. I would like to use a PGP which does not violate intellectual property rights (no matter the shaky legal patent grounds, at least here in the U.S.), but I'm not willing to use an "us" (americans, canadians) version of PGP leaving "them" (anyone else) totally incompatible. That just incapacitates all of us. Bring on PGP 2.6a. Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdfjrD2paOMjHHAhAQGSmQQA11SRVxevsL3NNvaBRyYc0yzqLjfxJ3dN 7I2leHc73nRwPwhhUJt2xeooHLlAlOHtLa+FBcbz8E03/vd8aBe7G0t7I4h0pSoB ujT5FRrArqV2x7AlVZquhbRECJ2nhwcIxN862GLvOYYQtIbC7NKvOYCFYMVt0p+x N1/28tvfRD4= =EB2O -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Fixing pgp 2.6
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>In order to fully protect RSADSI's intellectual property rights in >public-key technology, PGP 2.6 will be designed so that the messages it >creates after September 1, 1994 will be unreadable by earlier versions >of PGP that infringe patents licensed exclusively to Public Key Partners >by MIT and Stanford University. PGP 2.6 will continue to be able to read >messages generated by those earlier versions. So it will produce readable messages before Sept 1, 1994? Then there must be an if somewhere in the program to check the date. That should be fix- able with a patch of a few bytes to the object code. The best way to uncripple it would be to distribute a small .exe program which patches your version of PGP in place. Also include the source for the .exe so nobody thinks it does anything evil. We are being divided and conquered. If PGP 2.6 succeeds, our goal of a worldwide strong crypto standard is dead. This needs to be stopped. --- Mike

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Ripem Mac, MacPGP and NEON
by GERSTEIN＠SCSUD.CTSTATEU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey guys- Can anyone tell me what the latest version of Ripem for the Mac is, as well as where I can find it. Also, does anyone know when MacPGP 2.5 or 2.6 will be available? Reply to either question via private mail as I am no longer on the list :( Neon- Mail me if you did/did not get my post to you. Adam Gerstein GERSTEIN(a)SCSU.CTSTATEU.EDU

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Re: PGP 2.5 Beta Release Over, PGP 2.6 to be released next week
by Ezekial Palmer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Date: Mon, 16 May 1994 14:56:06 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> Besides, since 2.5 is legal, and doesn't have this "feature", and can be fixed by people at will, I suspect that no one will see any reason to use 2.6... I still haven't seen a good reason to stop using 2.3a . . . . Zeke -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdgC/hVg/9j67wWxAQE4gQQAgS7erpez7HooIXwHQri0pK3iNPYjAH5d ostRb9+NA9usyJrQ8kC+mQbV67R9dcnqZqivHEx63OXN+Wbo1zy3sZb8W5hs+S8r /cM1FcWJOb9gKVksIFi2DJHP3RljoLHeZQbYJutcTgFhWxokyjOo+rig4gzacfp5 jMlcA3BzXGM= =RyRf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[ANON] Stalemate in ca-firearms
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[[Reply-To: john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org]] -=> Quoting Chan(a)shell.portal.com to John Nieder <=- Ch> I stand behind what I said about not allowing anon postings Ch> & don't have time to argue about it. I hope you'll vent some Ch> of the anger you apparently directe at me at your legislators Ch> instead. It would be a lot more productive.... I don't think so, honestly. My legislators (Feinstein, Burton, Pelosi and Boxer) are just like you: They have their agenda, they won't address the issue, they don't care what I think and they don't want to hear about it. Did I leave anything out? It's discouraging to someone who used to think the truth mattered. I won't bug you any more on this, but think about it, Jeff. Really. |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%| | <john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org> * CP2A * PGP Key # E27937 on all servers | |-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=| |"If you love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude | | better than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in | | peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the | | hands which feed you. May your chains set lightly upon you, and may | |posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams, 1776| |=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-| |BOYCOTT: Pepsico <KFC - Taco Bell - Frito-Lay - Pepsi-Cola> & Gillette| |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%|

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[ANON] War in rec.guns Winds Down, All Parties Lose
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[[Reply-To: john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org]] -=> Quoting Dputzolu(a)cs.uiuc.edu to John Nieder <=- Dp> | I mean, think about it: Would you be polite to Charles Schumer? Dp> I understand completely, and was frustrated about the lack of Dp> thoughtful response. However, by posting in a flame tone you did give Dp> the moderator an excuse to (assuming he was) censor your post. Well, look at it this way. After having several buttheads stamp on your big toe, you're throbbing sore and about ready to kill the next guy who does it. Anti-gun net administrators on another network used obscure and broadly-ignored rules, particularly a dusty "real names only" policy to kill off the best gun forum I've ever seen. Jeff Chan then listened to a couple of really messed up anti-anon people and unilaterally banned remailed posts on ca-firearms(a)shell.portal.com without valid reasons or discussion (note from my previous cross-posts that he STILL won't discuss it to this day). Now this "Magnum" person, for completely illogical and uninformed reasons is doing the same goddam thing on rec.guns, in spite of the fact that I have pointed out the specific fallacies in the anti-anon argument. This is like talking to Sarah Brady about bogus HCI anti-gun claims. I mean, _deja vu_! | Dp> However, you have made quite an accusation. I did see at least | Dp> a few posts arguing the pro-anon side (including mine). Dp> | Obviously, he excluded _mine_, and admitted it. Dp> Right, but he has reasonable reasons for this. If he doesn't for Dp> the other ones, then... There's _always_ a good reason to exclude something you don't want anyone to hear. You show that the Greifer post eventually appeared, but did it do so AFTER the "Closure on [ANON]" post? If so, it was likely retrieved and stuck in AFTER I started raising hell about it. I got that post some time ago. I didn't see the Vetleson post in any case, and certainly none of the short, supporting pro-anon messages that I got that were Cc:ed to the group. If "Magnum" says that his anti-anon position was overwhelmingly supported (despite the fact it was based on erroneous propositions) we only have his word for it, as he filters all messages to the group before we see them. In the first couple of days after my post, I received twelve netmail posts (most, perhaps all, showing headers indicating they were also posted to the group), eight of which supported my pro-anon post, two of which were illiterate anti-anon blasts of one or two lines, and the remaining one was upset at the angry tone of the post. The later mail was about in the same proportion. Only _one_ anti-anon post questioned a single of my assertions, and that was on a technical point about which the respondent was in error (I will post my response to him after I'm done with this message). Is this "overwhelming" anti-anon support? I think not. A very heavy majority who wrote to me supported remailer use, and we are told that people are more likely to write to bitch than to agree on any given issue. Maybe the posts to "Magnum," whoever he is, were completely anti-anon, but it just doesn't seem plausible to me. I'm sure at this point it's too late to know, but it's established that he didn't show us _every_ message that came in, but merely an edited "digest." If he's the moderator, he can obviously do whatever he pleases, no matter if it's the usual capricious and petty nonsense we've all come to expect from the sort of people who tend to become moderators. What bugs me is this charade of consensus...which even if it did exist would be in favor of a demonstrably flawed policy that should be rejected on the basis of objective criteria anyway. Dp> You'll notice that all anti-anon responses were Dp> either butt-kissing | "me-too" posts of moderator adulation, or else Dp> completely ignored the | arguments in my post. Dp> I know, I know. I hoped rec.guns would have a few more free-thinkers, Dp> but it seems most don't see past the end of their muzzle. [Sigh!] This is another subject, but one that ought to be addressed at some point in an appropriate venue. I am _really_ distressed at the intellectual insularity of the RTKBA crowd who are, as a group, probably the squarest bunch of anal-retentive old ladies I've ever had the misfortune to be allied with. Their political unsophistication, narrowness and conceptual introversion drives me nuts. They also have this infuriating timidity about yelling when stepped on. Note the collective reaction (and yours) when I did. Dp> This may be true, but rec.guns has its own rules. Just because someone Dp> makes the superior arguments doesn't mean they win the debate. That's Dp> life. No kidding. Dp> On the other hand, IF consent was engineered, that isn't fair Dp> play, and can and should be acted on. "Fair play" is nothing but a quaint irrelevancy in 1994. Anyone in serious RTKBA lobbying discovers that in a BIG hurry. If fair play mattered, none of these anti-gun bills would have got past committee. Anyway, there's no way that we can "prove" what the input was at this late date. All this mail is ephemeral and gone by now, I'm sure. If "Magnum" fiddled the outcome, as I suspect he did to one degree or another, I don't even really care any more. The wrongheaded policy is passed, just like the recent wrongheaded gun laws, and that's _that_. I see that the moderator (whose comments indicate he _still_ doesn't understand the mechanics of remailers or the point of their use) has essentially told Greifer in this belated entry, "My mind is made up, don't confuse me with facts." The abusive and plainly stupid no-anon policy has made rec.guns lots of new enemies and accomplished nothing else of substance. I've dropped rec.guns as a waste of my time and an insult to common sense. If anything useful at all has come out of this, it's that more and more people are getting fed up with the insularity, intellectual dishonesty and hidebound mindset prevailing in these traditional gun forums. Alternative venues are sorely needed. I think we're going to see them established soon. Stay tuned. |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%| | <john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org> * CP2A * PGP Key # E27937 on all servers | |-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=| |"If you love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude | | better than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in | | peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the | | hands which feed you. May your chains set lightly upon you, and may | |posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams, 1776| |=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-| |BOYCOTT: Pepsico <KFC - Taco Bell - Frito-Lay - Pepsi-Cola> & Gillette| |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%|

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Re: Rabin
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Earlier, anonymous asked: > In the Rabin PK system, your modulus is a Blum integer, a number n > of the form p*q, where p and q are primes equal to 3, mod 4. > According to Schneier, p. 289, encryption is done by C = M^2 mod n. > On the next page, he gives four possible square roots of C: > Anybody know the right way to do square roots mod a Blum integer? Well, I'll look at what Schneier says; maybe there is a typo in the formula... but the way you can solve this is with the Chinese Remainder Theorem. If c = m^2 mod n, then a solution is a common solution of m^2 mod n = c mod p m^2 mod n = c mod q Since p+1 and q+1 are divisible by 4, then (a^((p+1)/4))^2 = a since a is a quadratic residue modulo p, and then a^((p-1)/2) mod p = 1 anyway, you calculate x1 = a^((p+1)/4) mod p x2 = a^((q+1)/4) mod q and then use the CRT four times to get the solution. For this example, p = 7, q = 11, n = p q = 77, m = 50 c = 50^2 mod 77 = 36 x1 = c^((p+1)/4) mod p = 36^2 mod 7 = 1 x2 = c^((q+1)/4) mod q = 36^3 mod 11 = 5 So now you use the Chinese Remainder Theorem for the following four cases CRT(n, p, q, x1, x2) CRT(n, p, q, x1, q - x2) CRT(n, p, q, p - x1, q) CRT(n, p, q, p - x1, q - x1) yeilding: CRT(77, 7, 11, 1, 5) --> 71 CRT(77, 7, 11, 1, 6) --> 50 CRT(77, 7, 11, 6, 5) --> 27 CRT(77, 7, 11, 6, 6) --> 6 Sorry, but I don't have time to write out the steps for the CRT ;) It's pretty straightforward, given the algorithm. so (71, 50, 27, 6) satisfy the equation x^2 mod n = c x^2 mod 77 = 36 as you can see, the original message (m = 50) is one of the choices. This is similar to an oblivious transfer protocol. Actually, I think it is an oblivious transfer as described by Blum. Karl Barrus klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdguSYOA7OpLWtYzAQG35wP+MpdhCUBtSodd53Ppn41UHcKSpkkamx13 YqMmlmP0dKsRV2Vas1IVdcIGcjcowBxDT7IkRJO9UNtj33BB2tTsRDNOi2GqERZl AARVL/y941EIAXwwj2w+WQ/jCAaFhy4ohvZVbI5snWw6D+dsxQ7jMx193ehLjnu1 ieEL4BvHUzA= =MJ0E -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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lies, damn lies, Internet-statistics, and "sinister" EDI (fwd)
by a2＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > ------- Forwarded Message > > Thank you for your interest in Digital Media. > > EVER FEEL LIKE YOU'RE BEING WATCHED? YOU WILL.... > Postal Service and IRS mull national identity cards, > Clinton to sign orders > > Digital Media has learned that the Clinton administration is debating > not if, but how, to create a card that every American will need in order > to interact with any federal government agency. Combined with two > potential executive orders and the Postal Service's designs on putting > its stamp on personal and business electronic transactions, the card > could open a window on every nuance of American personal and > business life. > > The wrangling among the administration, the U.S. Postal Service, the > Internal Revenue Service and Department of Defense, emerged into the > public eye at this April's CardTech/SecureTech Conference. The > gathering of security experts was convened to discuss applications for > smart card and PCMCIA memory card technologies in business and > government. The Postal Service, at the conference presented a proposal > for a "general purpose U.S. services smartcard," which individuals and > companies would use to authenticate their identities when sending > and receiving electronic mail, transferring funds and interacting with > government agencies, such as the I.R.S., Veterans Administration and > the Department of Health and Human Services. > > President Clinton is also considering signing two executive orders that > would greatly expand the government's access to personal records, > including an order that would allow the I.R.S. to monitor individual > bank accounts and automatically collect taxes based on the results, > said sources close to the White House. The collection service will be > presented as a convenient way to avoid filling out a tax return. The > White House did not respond to requests for comments about this > report. > > The Post Office: We deliver for you. The Postal Service's U.S. Card > would be designed to use either smart cards (plastic cards with an > embedded microprocessor carrying a unique number that can be read > by a electromagnetic scanner and linked to computerized records > stored on a network) or PCMCIA cards, which can contain megabytes > of personal information. (You've probably seen this type card in > AT&T's "You Will" ad campaign, which shows a doctor inserting a > woman's card in a reader in order to access a recording of a sonogram). > The Postal Service said it is considering AT&T and other companies' > smart card technologies. > > In a slide presentation at the conference, Postal representative Chuck > Chamberlain outlined how an individual's U.S. Card would be > automatically connected with the Department of Health and Human > Services, the U.S. Treasury, the I.R.S., the banking system, and a central > database of digital signatures for use in authenticating electronic mail > and transactions. The U.S. Card is only a proposal, Chamberlain > insists. Yet the Postal Service is prepared to put more than a hundred > million of the cards in citizens' pockets within months of > administration approval, he said. > > "We've been trying to convince people [in the different agencies] to do > just one card, otherwise, we're going to end up with two or three > cards," said Chamberlain. He said in addition to the healthcare card > proposed by President Clinton last year, various government agencies > are forwarding plans for a personal records card and a transactions (or > "e-purse") card. Chamberlain said the I.R.S in particular is pursuing > plans for an identity card for taxpayers. > > Don't leave home without it. Though he did not name the U.S. Card at > the time, Postmaster General Marvin Runyon suggested that the Postal > Service offer electronic mail certification services during testimony > before the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee in March. The > proposal is clearly intended as a way to sustain the Postal Service's > national role in the information age, since it would give the agency a > role in virtually every legally-binding electronic transaction made by > U.S. citizens. For instance: > > * When sending or receiving electronic mail, U.S. Card users would be > able to check the authenticity of a digital signature to screen out > impostors. > * Banking transactions (notably credit card purchases) that depend on > authentication of the participants identities and an audit trail, would > be registered in Postal Service systems. > * Veterans, or for that matter college students and welfare recipients, > could check their federal benefits using the identification data on their > U.S. Cards. > * Visitors to an emergency room would have instant access to medical > records at other hospitals, as well as their health insurance > information. > > These examples may seem benign separately, but collectively they > paint a picture of a citizen's or business's existence that could be > meddlesome at best and downright totalitarian at worst. Will buying a > book at a gay bookstore with a credit card that authenticates the > transaction through the Postal Service open a Naval officer up to court > marshal? If you have lunch with a business associate on a Saturday at a > family restaurant, will the IRS rule the expense non-deductible before > you can even claim it? > > "There won't be anything you do in business that won't be collected > and analyzed by the government," said William Murray, an > information system security consultant to Deloitte and Touche who > saw Chamberlain's presentation. "This [National Information > Infrastructure] is a better surveillance mechanism than Orwell or the > government could have imagined. This goddamned thing is so > pervasive and the propensity to connect to it is so great that it's > unstoppable." > > Deep Roots; Deep Pockets; Long History. Chamberlain said the Postal > Service has been working for "a couple years" on the information > system to back up the U.S. Card. He said the project was initiated by > the Department of Defense, which wanted a civilian agency to create a > national electronic communications certification authority that could > be connected to its Defense Messaging System. Chamberlain said the > Postal Service has also consulted with the National Security Agency, > proponents of the Clipper encryption chip which hides the contents of > messages from all but government agencies, like law enforcement. The > National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Ames Research > Laboratories in Mountain View, Calif. carried out the research and > development work for Clipper. > > "We're designing a national framework for supporting business-quality > authentication," said John Yin, the engineer heading up the U.S. Card- > related research for NASA Ames' advanced networking applications > group. "This is not specifically with just the Postal Service. We'll be > offering services to other agencies and to third-party commercial > companies that want to build other services on the card." For example, > VISA or American Express could link their credit services to the U.S. > Card. > > Yin, who works on Defense Messaging Systems applications, said his > group has collaborated with "elements of Department of Defense" for > the past year, but would not confirm the participation of the National > Security Agency, a Department of Defense agency. The NSA is > specifically prohibited from creating public encryption systems by the > Computer Security Act of 1987. Yin also would not comment on the > budget for the project, which other sources said was quite large and > has spanned more than two years. > > A false sense of security? According to Yin, the cards would allow > individuals or businesses to choose any encryption technology. "It's not > our approach to say, 'Here's the standard, take it our leave it,'" he said. > "We're not trying to create a monopoly, rather it's an infrastructure for > interoperability on which a whole variety of services can be built." Yet, > NASA, which is a participant in the CommerceNet electric marketplace > consortium will "suggest" to its partners that they adopt the U.S. Card > certification infrastructure, he said. > > The reality is that government agencies' buying power usually drives > the market to adopt a particular technology Q not unlike the way the > Texas Board of Education, the largest single purchaser of textbooks in > the U.S., sets the standard for the content of American classroom > curricula. Since, the administration has already mandated use of > Clipper and its data-oriented sibling, the Tesserae chip, in federal > systems it's fairly certain that the law enforcement-endorsed chips will > find their way into most, if not all, U.S. Cards. Even in the unlikely > event that one government agency should weather the pressure and > pass on the Clipper chip, it's still possible to trace the source, > destination, duration and time of transactions conducted between > Clippered and non-Clippered devices. > > "Most of this shift [in privacy policy] is apparently being done by > executive order at the initiative of bureaucracy, and without any > Congressional oversight or Congressional concurrence, " Murray said. > "They are not likely to fail. You know, Orwell said that bureaucrats, > simply doing what bureaucrats do, without motivation or intent, will > use technology to enslave the people." > > EDITOR'S NOTE: Digital Media has filed a Freedom of Information > Act request for Clinton and Bush Administration, Postal Service, NSA, > Department of Defense, NASA, I.R.S. and other documents related to > the creation of the U.S. Card proposal. > > -- Mitch Ratcliffe, Editor-in-Chief > Digital Media: A Seybold Report > 444 De Haro St., Suite 128 > San Francisco, CA 94107 > (415) 575-3775, 3780 fax > Internet: dmedia(a)netcom.com > Subscriptions: (800) 325-3830 > > Copyright 1994 by Mitch Ratcliffe and Seybold Publications. > > The full text of this story is available in the May 9 issue of Digital > Media: A Seybold Report (published by Ziff-Davis Publishing). > Contact Digital Media on the Internet at dmedia(a)netcom.com. This > article may only be distributed with the above information. > > ------- End of Forwarded Message > >

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Curtis D Frye:
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry for the bandwidth. Mr. Frye, I lost your address. -uni- (Dark) -- 073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est 6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa - wichtig!

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caller ID outrage from the FCC -- time to act (fwd)
by a2＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 15 May 1994 21:15:06 -0700 > >From: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> > To: rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu > Subject: caller ID outrage from the FCC -- time to act > > I've enclosed two messages from the Privacy digest about an outrageous > FCC plan to undermine crucial privacy protections on caller-ID systems > for telephones. Caller-ID exists so that marketing companies can collect > information on unwitting consumers, and those same companies have lobbied > long and hard to eliminate simple, ordinary schemes to give people control > over whether this information is made available from their telephones. > Having lost this battle in many states, they have evidently moved to the > federal level. But time remains for your comments to make a difference. > Please read the enclosed messages, judge for yourself, and act. > > Phil > > Encl: > > Date: Sun, 15 May 94 13:23 PDT > >From: privacy(a)vortex.com (PRIVACY Forum) > To: PRIVACY-Forum-List(a)vortex.com > Subject: PRIVACY Forum Digest V03 #10 > > PRIVACY Forum Digest Sunday, 15 May 1994 Volume 03 : Issue 10 > > Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (lauren(a)vortex.com) > Vortex Technology, Woodland Hills, CA, U.S.A. > > ===== PRIVACY FORUM ===== > > The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the > ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy. > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Date: Fri, 6 May 94 12:10:59 PDT > >From: carl_page(a)rainbow.mentorg.com (Carl Page @ DAD) > Subject: FCC attacks > > Private Unlisted Phone Numbers Banned Nationwide. > Law Enforcement Explicitly Compromised. > Women's Shelters Security Threatened. > Telephone Rules of 30 States Overturned. > Direct Marketing Association Anticipates Profit. > > The FCC released its Report and Order And Notice of Proposed Rulemaking of > March 29th, 1994 (CC Docket No. 91-281) > > With the arrogance that only federal bureaucrats can muster, the Federal > Communications Commission has turned the clock back on Calling Number ID > and privacy protection rules nationwide. > > Have you ever had any trouble giving a direct marketer your phone number? > You won't any more. Your Per Line Caller ID blocking will be banned, > thanks to the FCC Order which preempts the privacy protections provided by > 30 states. > > The order carefully enumerates the concerns of law-enforcement agencies > which need per-line blocking to do their jobs. It mentions the need > Women's shelters have for per-line blocking. (A matter of life and death > on a day-to-day basis) It mentions that the customers who attempt to keep > unlisted numbers confidential will be certainly be thwarted. (Can one > train all kids and house-guests to dial *67 before every call? Can you > remember to do it yourself?) > > But the Order dismisses all of these problems, and determines that the > greatest good for the greater number will be accomplished if RBOC's can > profit a bit more by selling our numbers and if the direct marketers have > less trouble gathering them. > > The FCC doesn't seem to trust consumers to be able to decide whether they > want per-line blocking. It praises the $40 cost of an automatic *67 dialer > as an appropriate disincentive that will benefit the nation by discouraging > people's choice of per-line blocking. > > There was one part of the order I was pretty happy about, until I read it. > The FCC has also banned the sale of numbers gathered by 800-900 number > subscribers using the ANI system, unless they obtain verbal consent. (Note > that no rules prevent sale of numbers from the presumably blockable CNID > system.) The problem is that the only enforcement of the rule seems to be > that the requirement must be included in the fine print of the ANI sale > contract between the common-carrier and the ANI subscriber. So it seems to > be up to the common-carrier to enforce a rule which is contrary to their > financial interest. How can a person who suffers from publication or sale > of their number recover compensation? > > The FCC is soliciting comments, due May 18th > in their Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking on two issues: > > o Whether the Commission should prescribe more precise educational > requirements. > o Whether and how the policies adopted on caller ID should be extended to > other identification services, such as caller party name or CPNI. > > I can think of some suggestions... > > ------------------------------ > > Date: Wed, 11 May 94 02:39:45 EDT > >From: johnl(a)iecc.com (John R Levine) > Subject: FCC order on interstate Caller ID > > [ From TELECOM Digest V14 #208 -- MODERATOR ] > > I picked up a copy of the FCC's Caller ID order, which is available by > FTP as /pub/Orders/Common_Carrier/orcc4001.txt or orcc4001.wp. (Kudos > to the FCC for making this info available so easily and quickly, by > the way.) > > Much of the order is straightforward and not contentious, e.g. > delivering CNID between local and long distance carriers is so cheap > to implement that neither may charge the other for the data. They > also note that per-call blocking is a good idea, and that *67 should > be the universal code to block CNID delivery. > > But the arguments they list against per-line CNID seem, to me, to be > astonishingly specious. > > There are three blocking options 1) per call for anyone, 2) per line > for anyone, and 3) per line for special groups. The FCC thinks, not > unreasonably, that it's a mare's nest to ask the telco to implement 3, > since they have to determine who's in the special groups and who > isn't. Then they say: > > 43. In the NPRM, we tentatively concluded that per line > blocking unduly burdens calling party number based services > overall by failing to limit its applicability to those calls for > which privacy is of concern to the caller. The Commission noted > that even in the case of law enforcement personnel, there may be > a need to maintain calling number privacy on some calls, but that > the same number may be used to telephone other law enforcement > personnel, victims of crimes, cooperative witnesses, and family > or friends. The Commission asserted that in these types of > calls, calling number privacy is not needed and calling number > identification can actually be a valuable piece of information > for both the caller and called parties. The record reflects the > useful nature of CPN based services, and the comments of > Rochester illustrate that callers are likely to be interested in > blocking only a small percentage of their calls. The comments of > USCG illustrate the usefulness of caller ID to emergency > services. In contrast, Missouri Counsel's analogy to unlisted > numbers is inapposite because caller ID only permits parties > called by the calling party to capture the calling party number, > and then only if the calling party has not activated a per call > blocking mechanism. We find that the availability of per call > unblocking does not cure the ill effects of per line blocking. > > Moreover, in an emergency, a caller is not likely to remember to > dial or even to know to dial an unblocking code. For the > foregoing reasons, we find that a federal per line blocking > requirement for interstate CPN based services, including caller > ID, is not the best policy choice of those available to recognize > the privacy interests of callers. Thus, carriers may not offer > per line blocking as a privacy protection mechanism on interstate > calls. We agree that certain uses of captured calling numbers > need to be controlled, and address that issue infra. > > > In other words, per-line blocking is a bad idea because subscribers > are too dumb to unblock calls when they want to unblock them, although > they're not to dumb to block calls when they want to block them. > > In paragraph 47 they note that where per-line blocking is offered, > telcos use *67 as a blocking toggle, so users can't really tell what > *67 does, but it doesn't seem to occur to them that the problem is > easily solved by requiring a different code for unblock than for > block. In paragraph 48 they wave their hands and say that people who > care about privacy can just buy a box for "as little as $40.00 per > unit" that will stuff *67 in front of each call. Thanks, guys. > > The docket number is 91-281, with comments due by May 18th. Comments > must reference the docket number. Send ten copies (yes, 10) to: > > Office of the Secretary > Federal Communications Commission > Washington DC 20554 > > Before you fire off a comment, please get a copy of the order, since > there's a lot of material beyond what I've summarized. For people > without FTP access, I've put them on my mail server. Send: > > send fcc-cnid.txt (for the text version) > > send fcc-cnid.wp.uu (for uuencoded compressed WP version) > > to compilers-server(a)iecc.com. > > > Regards, > > John Levine, johnl(a)iecc.com, jlevine(a)delphi.com, 1037498(a)mcimail.com > > ------------------------------ > > End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 03.10 > ************************ > > > > -- > Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist > "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich > Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of > phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. > When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." > - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994 >

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Re: Rabin
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- About Rabin (and you're welcome, Mr. Anonymous!) Well, I looked at Schneier on p. 290 and I have to confess I'm puzzled. I'm sure these formulas weren't invented out of this air, but I'm not sure why one of them must equal M. (In the example worked none are equal to M). I would bet that this is a typo in the book; check the errata sheet I think the formulas are trying to say the following facts: For the kinds of problems we are considering, If m1 = CRT(n,p,q,x1,x2) m2 = CRT(n,p,q,x1,q-x2) m3 = CRT(n,p,q,p-x1,x2) m4 = CRT(n,p,q,p-x1,q-x2) then m4 = n - m1, m3 = n - m2 So you really don't need to do CRT four times; twice is good enough. (In the example, m1 = 71, so m4 = 77 - 71 = 6 m2 = 50, so m3 = 77 - 50 = 27) Karl Barrus klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdhB04OA7OpLWtYzAQEV3wQAjgcz1AI1ufFfzUpQmh35E0xbeD+PB4FV mc72TL0v7lvjeK4aiGwEK8j/1vtzvw+1QCkSRTY6ATElx4HnskdV0yp4CT8WycPC X/QmeYkqOr+Q4ed0dXgvjYOO++4FOBaqQUqRaTLLgB/BKndfDVbM683MGxtbLOSe gCi3SP86CuU= =REkP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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