December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

keywords
by Erich von Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

yes, my remailer does insert keywords, and you can expect that i will continue refinining the keyword insertion system so that it will be harder to automatically filter out. some people have said that keywords should be an option, not a default. i rejected this idea, because keywords are useless unless they are widely used. there is safety in large numbers. from the cypherpunk perspective, ideally, all or most net communications would consist of encrypted text, with the only plaintext being keywords, i think. if the keywords really do bother you, you can use some other remailer. also, if you have good keywords lists, please send them to me. i might have missed something. e

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Key Servers
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone send me a list of the keyservers or which ever one is the largest. Thanks, Reuben Halper -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCPAi16KosAAAEEAMUwRni4a9+GbuAhHDLcBWK60hCJUYxhr2hYokpELAhx0ejp 2fq61Tu9Hjn051CN8Xy5nu6sv2ODfG/t59l4DJSb5pirQaII3zaX0rMX0ydwGDoW YakL4ow1lNY+d/k14KpIuUW404+fNuNhIGSkdVLQIfbOgh0preK7/P44AKvdABEB AAG0JlJldWJlbiBIYWxwZXIgPGZoYWxwZXJAcGlsb3Qubmppbi5uZXQ+iQCVAgUQ LXorceK7/P44AKvdAQEUxwQAoffTibRlwE5tNQVGvrulh1OQgXNhTRec9vUaUwPy U64FIZ+KnmdfYgiJYXtcItA90EB9MDexazKeqJzMOPShVNOfyiwy2yUlnQs425f8 DxBvM//zuvj6s4/mXDTPUZtG9PP0HVaEGTJY15JdfRqtj/w+HHnsHlgCnj0NnIhX TW8= =D9UX -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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ILF: Encryption Plan Gets Gov't Nod
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front Reproduced without permission from Communications Week Encryption Plan Gets Gov't Nod By Sharon Fisher WASHINGTON Encryption users and industry observers have said they are unhappy with the Clinton administration's endorsement of a comprehensive interagency review of cryptographic technology. The review was initiated last April and overseen by the Na- tional Security Council. It was scheduled to have been complet- ed by mid-October of last year. As part of the Feb. 4 release of the report, the administration said it has approved the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) as a voluntary Federal In- formation Processing Standard. The EES, known as both the Clipper proposal and Skipjack, was announced last April. The administration also said that the National Institute of Stan- dards and Technology and the Automated Services Division of the Treasury Department would be charged with storing the escrowed keys. The procedures for gaining access to the keys were also announced. The ESS proposal has been heavily citicized because of the escrow proposal, which gives law enforcement agencies access to the encryption keys via a warrantmuch like a wiretap. Industry observers have said an algoithm with such keys is inherently insecure. They voiced concern at the government's plans to keep the algorithm classified (Comm Week, Jan. 3). Critics said the ESS is a first step toward outlawing other forms of cryptog raphy, but the administration reiterated at the announcement that it had no such intention. Industry groups such as the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, both based here, immediately launched grassroots protests against the announcements. Both groups have citicized the proposal since it was first announced. -

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ILF: What 4th Amendment? Here Comes the Clipper Encryption Plan
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front Reproduced without permission from Communications Week WHAT 4TH AMENDMENT? HERE COMES THE CLIPPER ENCRYPTION PLAN YOU'RE A CRIMINAL. That person sitting next to you is a criminal, too. All of the people you work with are criminals. How do I know this? I get it straight from the federal government. In fact, the federal government is so certain you're a criminal that the executive branch has just announced a new way to pry into your affairs, steal your correspondence, read your electronic mail, and listen in on your most private conversations. Not only that, but the Clinton administration wants you to pay for the privilege of having the government keep tabs on you. The administration claims that it's doing all of this as a way to fight crime, and since you're the one its targeting, apparently the Clinton administration has decided you're a criminal. By now, of course, you probably know what I'm writing about, but in case you've been in a cave for a couple of weeks, here's a summary. Earlier this month, the administration announced that the government was going ahead with its plans to start using the infamous Clipper chip -- that's the one that encrypts information, but includes a government-sponsored backdoor -- for the Justice and Defense departments. You're going to pay about $2,000 for each of the initial 50,000 or so Clipper-encrypted phones and similar terminal devices the government buys. Once the government starts using Clipper equipment, the plan is for these agencies to require anyone dealing with them to use it also. Meanwhile, you must provide a way for the government to listen in to your telephone system. You get to pay for the new or modified equipment. Finally, sources tell us, the adminis- tration plans to outlaw any form of encryption other than that approved by the government. You get to pay for any changes these new systems require, too. No doubt you're thinking that the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is supposed to prevent your papers and effects, among other things, from un- reasonable search and seizure. Is it reasonable to be required to hand over materials in a form the government wishes so that it can search you conveniently? It's not unlike being required to carry on your phone conversations in English for the convenience of government listeners who may not understand, say, pig latin. I suppose we shouldn't be surprised. In his debate on the ratifiation of the Constitution, Patrick Henry predicted that the gov- ernment'may, unless the general government be restrained by a Bill of Rights ". . . go into your cellars and rooms, and search, ran sack and measure everything you eat, drink and wear. They ought to be restrained." Of course, Henry didn't know computers would exist, but he knew of their analogue at the time-a person's papers and effects and that's why he fought successfully for an amendment to restrain the government. Now it appears that the government would slip its restraints. Apparently, in this new world of technology and digital communications, prying into one's affairs has become difficult. It's inconvenient to search an office, after all. It requires work. Instead, the government wants to read your electronic papers and effects, and it wants you to pay for it. The Bill of Rights? I guess that's become inconvenient, too. ------------- Wayne Rash Jr. is a Washington-based networking systems integrator. He can be reached on MCI Mail as WRASH on CompuServe at 72205,221 and on the Internet at rash(a)access.digex.com. The opinions expressed are his own.

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ILF: E-Mail Destination - Black Hole, White House
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front Reproduced without permission from Communications Week Editor's View E-MAIL DESTINATION: BLACK HOLE, WHITE HOUSE Is the Clinton adminisration really an ally of the communications and networking community, or are the politicians only jerking our strings? The answer to this imortant question seems to vary day to day. A few weeks ago I received four elecronic-mail communiques from the White House Office of Media Affairs. This caught my attention for several reasons. First, the administration is not in the habit of communicat- ing with the trade press so I was impressed with this outreach. (Cool move, guys.) Next, the messages were targeted at key journalists using the preferred medium du jour: electronic mail. (Very cool!) Finally, all four messages were dispatched the same day. I was most interested in a message detailing the administration's efforts to communicate over electronic networks. The Clinton administration's Electronc Public Access Project has achieved some important milestones during its first year. According to the project's press release: lt has received over 100,000 E-mail messages to the president and the vice president since it started on June 1, 1993; It established Internet addresses and accepts E-mail from the public; It has electronically processed over 220,000 requests for information since September 1, 1993; 1,600 public documents were published electronically last year; It established forums on America Online, CompuServe, GEnie and MCI Mail. The project plans this year to publish the national budget and other public documents on CD-ROM. It also plans to refine existing electronic com munications techniques via the Internet. I applaud the administration for these innovations. But I also have some reservations. For one, it's looks great on the surface that the administration has set up so many channels for communication. Yet this is the key question: Is anyone really listening? E-mail questions do not get electronic replies from administration officials. Questioners (if they are lucky) get back a letter -- via the U.S. Postal Service. This sounds more like a black hoel than a viable communications process. The president did respond at least once via E-mail -- to a group of fifth-graders in Oxford, Ohio, last spring. At best the opinions of communications and networking experts seem to be ignored; at worst they have been rejected by the president. An example is the president's recent adoption of the socalled "Clipper Chip." This encoding/decoding scheme was devloped by the National Security Agency to assist government agencies to evesdrop on digital communications. Virtually every major computer and communications company, opinion maker, and civil rights group opposes the use of this technology. apparently, however, the president doesn't care what we think. This action has jilted our enthusiasm for the administration's avowed embrace of communications technology. It's beginning to look more like a charade to keep techies playing with their toys instead of a mature partnership in molding our technological future. Send reactions to 542-9851(a)mcimail.com on MCI Mail or the Internet, or by fax, 516-562-5055

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Important Financial Information...
by 68864320＠canma.dyn.ml.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: MIT sysop faces piracy charges
by aburt＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Or more likely the news media had no clue about the relationship of anonymous mail to anonymous ftp/fsp. Sigh. Andrew

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Export Restrictions of Crypto
by Senator Bedfellow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have the cite for the restrictions on the export of crypto, where crypto is classified as munitions for export purposes? I know ITAR says absolutely nothing about crypto, so its a US goverment thingee. Thanks Ben. ____ Renegade academician. They're a dangerous breed when they go feral. -James P. Blaylock in "Lord Kelvin's Machine"

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Re: REMAIL: pseudo-account remailer @andrew gains anonymous feature
by ub075＠freenet.victoria.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >I added an anonymous feature to my remailer. > >If you have an address of the form mg5n+eaxxx(a)andrew.cmu.edu, >anonymous mail can be sent to that address by changing it to the format: >mg5n+anxxx(a)andrew.cmu.edu >An encrypted reply address is created for the sender of the anonymous message. What happens if I already have an encrypted reply address? What happens if I already have SIX encrypted reply addresses? Which one is used? Or is *another* one created? -- Ryan Perkins - 1:340/13 | I feel that suicide jumpers see a glimpse of ub075(a)freenet.victoria.bc.ca | sanity as they throw themselves from the ledge. Ask for PGP 2.3 public key | That's why they scream all the way down. 8C5357 : 9F FF BA 93 54 D5 18 78 4B 1E DA GC E3 4E

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"Crypto-Data" gif
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where can I find a GIF of the "crypto-data" stickers? The diagnol "warning sign"-type sticker with the floppy and 1s and 0s in the back. Thanks.

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Zero Knowledge, Hamiltonian Cycles, and Passwords
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matt Thomlinson asked me in private e-mail about some of my old posts on zero knowledge interactive proof systems (ZKIPS), especially with regard to finding Hamiltonian cycles in graphs. (A graph is a set of nodes with some set of links between the nodes. Like a bunch of cities connected in some way with highways. A Hamiltonian cycle is a path (subgraph) that visits each node once and only once. Try a few examples with n = 5, say, and you'll see that not all graphs have Hamiltonian cycles, and that finding them is done by exhaustively drawing all possible paths until a Hamiltonian cycle is found. Try increasing n to 10 and you'll see the problem get real hard, real fast. By the time n is 100, no computer that will ever be built will ever solve this, assuming "P" is not equal to "NP" (what Steve Smale has called the most important math and computer science problem of the past 50 years, the P =? NP problem). The Hamiltonian cycle problem for a general graph is NP-complete. (For any specific graph, it is of course solvable, by exhaustion. Not necessarily practical to solve, but solvable). Zero knowledge interactive proof systems were invented in the mid-80s (notably by Goldwasser, Rackhoff, Micali, etc.). They allow the paradoxical-seeming ability to *prove one has knowledge of something without showing what one knows*. That is, Alice can establish with arbitrarily high confidence level (to her skeptics or doubter) that she knows some proof, or some fact, without actually giving them any knowledge of the proof or fact! And it was proved in 1988, at the very Crypto Conference I attended, that anything provable in "ordinary" logic (FOL) is provable in a ZKIPS logic system. (I can't find my Crypto-88 Proceedings this minute, so this informal statement will have to do for now.) A potential use for such systems is for passwords--one can prove one has the knowledge without actually producing it (by typing in a password, for example). I don't know that anyone is actually exploring this application, yet, but I expect it'll come. The Hamiltonian cycle problem is a good example of this. Alice claims she knows the Hamiltonian cycle of a graph. But instead of producing it--which would of course "use up" her further use of this--she goes through a process of proving she "almost certainly" knows a Hamiltonian cycle without actually producing it. If this whets your appetite, I can dig up and post my article to this list (first posted to the Extropians list) that I did about a year and half ago. In this article I explain the "cut and choose" probabalistic algorithm central to ZKIPS. Anyway, here is some more stuff I wrote to Matt this morning. I've deleted his questions and comments, as it was private mail, so this answer picks up after he'd asked some questions about the process: As they say, "anything provable in first order logic is provable in a ZKIPS system." I'm not sure what it means to "prove" you know a method of factoring numbers (faster than the "normal" methods, presumably) except by actually factoring them. And factoring a 5,000-digit number is 17 milliseconds would certainly show something significant. And, trivially, it would presumably give zero knowledge about the method used, so in that sense it is trivially zero knowledge. [Matt asks about "construction" of the Hamiltonian cycle] Give a graph, to find a Hamiltonian cycle is generally "hard." With 5 nodes, easy, by exhaustion--can be done on a napkin. With 15 nodes, much harder. With 25 nodes, almost impossible. With 50 nodes, intractable. And yet suppose Alice shows you one. In a textbook, for example. How did she "find" it? She likely didn't. Rather, she took 50 nodes, drew a path visiting each node once, stored this as her 'Hamiltonian cycle' and then proceeded to draw in 50 or 70 or whatever "other links," which are "ringers," as it were (that is, they are never part of the Hamiltonian she "constructed"). The resulting complete graph--50 nodes with maybe 100 or 500 or whatever links--only she knows a valid Hamiltonian cycle for (there may be others, which neither she nor anyone else will ever find). She can use this as her "password," saying: "This is my graph and I know a Hamiltonian cycle for it." Others are skeptical, since nobody knows how to find a H. for such a large graph, but she proves who she is by producing the H. cycle. (The idea is that Alice "registers" or "publishes" the graph....nobody has yet done this, to my knowledge, so the mechanics of "graph servers" are not worked out.) Of course, by producing her Hamiltonian cycle, she's just used up her only chance to use it, since she's shown others, and they can now claim to be her. The trick is for her to show she knows the H.C. without actually producing it. And that's where the "cut and choose" probabalistic algorithm comes in. The one I described in those old postings you are presumably looking at. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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It's the Government
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ziggy's graffiti from the Sunday funny papers: It's the government, *stupid!* DCF

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FW: Shot 'Round the World
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From -uni- (Dark): Freedom of information, and nil transaction cost in anonymous settings is key in empowering the individual and securing individual rights. Obviously the goal will conflict with modern intelligence agencies that seek to attempt domestic monitoring, but I think everyone here needs to address the role of such agencies in the grand scheme of things. Is the cypherpunk position a lawless one, or one promoting the evolution of law? .................................................... 1. What if the cypherpunk position was one or the other; what effect would it have on the subscribers, or upon the law itself? How much do those on the list allow themselves to be affected by other's positioning, and how much could anyone with influence in the law really care? 2. Jeff Davis has mentioned in a past message that the electronic war against the "enemies of freedom" (intelligence agencies) would be mostly a psychological war (or something to that effect). I am concluding that he must have been attempting to accomplish something like this by his act of sending out that NSA manual to all. On the subject of psychological warfare as a method in this privacy effort, I was pondering: . the effectiveness of the tactic employed . the character of the intended recipient of the message . how it will be interpreted by them . predicting whether they will care, in the same way as the sender, about the purpose & content of the message Since the communication is mostly words framing thoughts and philosophical arguments, the effects that one can aim for will be either cognitive or psychological (hopefully achieving both). To aim for a psychological effect only, is to propose that you know so much about psychology, that you know precisely what to aim for - in the minds of all of the recipients, and to expect predictable results. However: . people will often sense when they are being targeted . if they do, they will be resentful at being the object of someone's attack . they may respond in an unpredictable manner different from what was intended, if the total factors involved are more than are known or can be successfully controlled by the attacker . if the intent is only to involve others as elements in the attempt, they can also become angry for being enmeshed in crossfire for a purpose which is not of their own choosing (i.e. being used) and be unconducive to the success of the intent. In the attempt to persuade, convince, convert others from their position which is offensive to one's own, the methods employed are typically negative: pointing out the adverse consequences, pointing out what is wrong with what is being done, pointing out how bad/lousy/wrong/mistaken the offending party is, etc. But it has occurred to me that part of the problem with the effort to defend the dignity of one's "rights" is that there is so much more negativity than positiveness brought into play in the proffered arguments. What impresses me as lacking in the vision of the offending parties is a picture of 'normality'; they're suffering from visions of abnormal motivations. ( I mean normality in the sense of having a "sense of life" which allows for the expectations of normal activity & thought in the average person.) To present only negative insights about the problem to those who propose the disagreeable methods by which they seek to solve it, is to only push the imagination further into the black hole of deficiency. What is lacking in the mind of that type of psychological target is a perspective on what is normal to a regular human being. So how could positive indicators to the rest of life be given; how could a vision of what else is true about real people be created, so that the perspective of those targeted individuals or agencies is offered something better to think about than the problems created by a few out-of-control types; so that their outlook on the subjects of their attention (in this case, the citizens of the US) is not composed only of visions of delinquency and aberrant behavior? It is a challenge to "maintain one's head while all about one, others are losing theirs". Yet not only is that what is needed, but the agencies supposedly charged with our welfare could also use some help in maintaining *their* rationality. They apparently need some support to the end of acquiring confidence in our judgement (the rest of us who are not members of the elite, the chosen few). They are alarmed by the potential threat of destruction of a system which they prize as the means to social stability. What would reduce their felt need to cover the world with wiretraps in order to make sure that they don't miss any loose cannons out in the mists of the wild electronic atmosphere? What could provide that sort of reassurance, that everyone is not going to begin using their liberties in wanton, uninhibited, juvenile ways against the system or against each other. What could provide evidence contrary to the agencies' conclusion that non-government employees do not have what it takes to make rational decisions about the toys & tools and other devices which they create for their own amusement. Considering also: agencies do not by themselves create the man, but vice versa. That is, just because an agency exists, because it has been created for a particular purpose, it does not follow that the people hired to function within it no longer have a recognizable human nature similar to everyone else's [that's part of the problem :>) ]. They also must bring their own personality and character to what they do, however unlikely it seems that they would have the opportunity to do so. If this were not so, then there would be no reason to think that one could argue with them at all. It would be better to give up the effort of communicating with them or attempting to affect them psychologically, since they could not be expected to understand anyway; it would be better instead to think of other methods for achieving the preferred manner of existence. There would be a great benefit to a psychological type of warfare, if it could achieve points for the potential to normality which exists in everyone; if it could present evidence to counter the argument that the individual cannot be trusted, that we need to be saved from each other (by the intelligence agencies). What could bolster their lack of confidence in the judgement of the general population, such that the conclusion made to use the services of these agencies would be proved unnecessary? This would be demonstrated by the kinds of actions taken by individuals in response to the threats against their privacy. To wage a psychological war is to assume a great responsibility for the impressions made upon those who will be judging the behavior of their "charges". The psychological warriors would be taking part in the creation of a picture of the population, the effects of which would be a determining factor in the decisions made for future policies. It is very easy to take exceptional cases and use them as examples upon which to base techniques implemented for the cause of safety. It could hardly be expected that a limited few would have the resources to accomplish the goal for everyone, of saving the image of the individual against the one-dimensional cyclops (within our own lifetime); it is questionable whether any individual should associate themselves with the burden of such a responsibility. Blanc

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Export Restricitons of Crypto
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Message 4/14 From Senator Bedfellow Apr 10, 94 02:39:14 pm -0400 >Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Sun, 10 Apr 1994 14:39:14 -0400 (EDT) >Subject: Export Restrictions of Crypto >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Does anyone have the cite for the restrictions on the export of crypto, >where crypto is classified as munitions for export purposes? >I know ITAR says absolutely nothing about crypto, so its a US goverment >thingee. >Thanks >Ben. Take a look in International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR 120-130), Department of State, Office of Munitions Control, November, 1989. See Part 121 - The United States Munitions List, Category XIII - Auxiliary Military Equipment, paragraph (b), quoted as follows: (b) Speech scramblers, privacy devices, cryptographic devices and software (encoding and decoding), and components specifically designed or modified therefore, ancillary equipment, and protective apparatus specifically designed or modi- fied for such devices, components, and equip- ment. Regards, Dave

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Re: Pseudonyms and Reputations
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Hal: <other discussion on a game deleted> This does suggest an alternative form of "is-a-person" credentialling, though. Rather than trying to verify identity at a distance, . . . . . ................................................... I'm sure I don't understand, said Alice in Wonderland: cryptology is to create anonymity sufficient to prevent the identification of a person; however, it is desireable to have a method/means of verifying identity such that in games or digicash or whatnot, someone cannot take advantage of that ability to obfuscate precise references to themselves. How could these two opposing needs be simultaneously satisfied? It sounds like a self-defeating proposition. Blanc

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Re: Export Restrictions of Crypto
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You can get a copy of the ITAR regulations from cpsr.org /cpsr/privacy/crypto/export_controls dave > Date: Sun, 10 Apr 1994 14:39:14 -0400 (EDT) > From: Senator Bedfellow <samman(a)CS.YALE.EDU> > Subject: Export Restrictions of Crypto > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Message-Id: <Pine.3.07.9404101413.P29469-9100000(a)jaguar.zoo.cs.yale. > edu> Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > Does anyone have the cite for the restrictions on the export of crypto, > where crypto is classified as munitions for export purposes? > > I know ITAR says absolutely nothing about crypto, so its a US goverment > thingee. > > Thanks > > Ben. > > > ____ > Renegade academician. They're a dangerous breed when they go feral. > -James P. Blaylock in "Lord Kelvin's Machine" > > > >

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MacPGP and AOL
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AOL will not allow me to upload MacPGP on the basis that there is a court case pending against the author, and therefore it should not be allowed. My question is since the court case is pending why can't they allow it on until a verdict has been reached? Is this common for commercial online services or ftp sites to ban it? ThAnks, Reuben Halper Montclair High -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCPAi16KosAAAEEAMUwRni4a9+GbuAhHDLcBWK60hCJUYxhr2hYokpELAhx0ejp 2fq61Tu9Hjn051CN8Xy5nu6sv2ODfG/t59l4DJSb5pirQaII3zaX0rMX0ydwGDoW YakL4ow1lNY+d/k14KpIuUW404+fNuNhIGSkdVLQIfbOgh0preK7/P44AKvdABEB AAG0JlJldWJlbiBIYWxwZXIgPGZoYWxwZXJAcGlsb3Qubmppbi5uZXQ+iQCVAgUQ LXorceK7/P44AKvdAQEUxwQAoffTibRlwE5tNQVGvrulh1OQgXNhTRec9vUaUwPy U64FIZ+KnmdfYgiJYXtcItA90EB9MDexazKeqJzMOPShVNOfyiwy2yUlnQs425f8 DxBvM//zuvj6s4/mXDTPUZtG9PP0HVaEGTJY15JdfRqtj/w+HHnsHlgCnj0NnIhX TW8= =D9UX -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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RE: MacPGP and AOL
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> AOL will not allow me to upload MacPGP on the basis that there is > a court case pending against the author, and therefore it should not be > allowed. My question is since the court case is pending why can't they > allow it on until a verdict has been reached? Is this common for > commercial online services or ftp sites to ban it? Jim Bodzos of RSA has a simple plan that goes roughly like this: if you make money off of RSA, he makes money. CompuServ pulled PGP a long time ago, way before PRZ's lawsuit, because they were the only ones making money off PGP in the country -- all those $$ for download fees. EFF had it in their forum, as did several others, all were pulled. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: MacPGP and AOL
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reuben Halper sez: > AOL will not allow me to upload MacPGP on the basis that there is a > court case pending against the author, and therefore it should not be > allowed. My question is since the court case is pending why can't they > allow it on until a verdict has been reached? Is this common for > commercial online services or ftp sites to ban it? Sadly, yes. We've been through similiar situations with other online services. But maybe this opens up some stego possibilities. What if some public-spirited cypherpunks were to write some non-crypto-related software, say a simple PD game, hide PGP in it, and put it up on all the online services. The program could have a hidden bit of code, that when given the proper password, would desteg and decrypt PGP. Something with lots of graphic images, large mazes, or other large files would work well. It'd probably take a while before the net.cops figured out what was going on, and by the time anyone tried to squish it, the program would (hopefully) have been handed down enough times that it'd be impossible to trace it back to the original author. Plus you'd have thousands of people uploading it all over without even realizing what they had. Any takers? :)

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Zero Knowledge, Hamiltonian Cycles, and Passwords
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Page 85 in Schneier's "Applied Cryptography" begins a good introduction to zero knowledge proofs and such.

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No Subject
by Peter Murphy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found Timothy May's post on Hamiltonian cycles in graphs very in- teresting. However, my main reason is due to the relevance between this subject and the P - NP problem. Although I am familiar with the practical aspect of this terminology (through my numerical mathematics subjects), I am a bit hazy on the "pure", theoretical side. Does anyone have any references on this matter. I am especially interested in the "P=NP?" problem. Thanks. Peter Murphy. <pkm(a)maths.uq.oz.au>

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Re: Pseudonyms and Reputations
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Blanc Weber <blancw(a)microsoft.com> > I'm sure I don't understand, said Alice in Wonderland: cryptology is > to create anonymity sufficient to prevent the identification of a > person; however, it is desireable to have a method/means of verifying > identity such that in games or digicash or whatnot, someone cannot take > advantage of that ability to obfuscate precise references to themselves. > > How could these two opposing needs be simultaneously satisfied? It > sounds like a self-defeating proposition. > > Blanc You don't try to satisfy these simultaneously. Rather, one or the other goal is achieved by the participants voluntarily participating in a protocol. In some contexts, absolute anonymity is desired and achieved. In others, the participants agree to some restrictions on their anonymity in order to allow various kinds of agreements. I may not be willing to loan you money if you are totally anonymous; on the other hand, I might be able to loan it to you if your anonymity would be broken only if you didn't pay it back, for example. If you didn't want to take the chance on breaking your anony- mity, you wouldn't have to. You would just choose not to play my game. The point of a lot of this work with pseudonyms and credentials and such is to create a lot of different possible options along the scale between perfect anonymity and perfect identification. That way people will be able to trade off their various requirements and come as close as possible to their ideal position. Hal

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Re: Zero Knowledge, Hamiltonian Cycles, and Passwords
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) > And yet suppose Alice shows you one. In a textbook, for example. How > did she "find" it? She likely didn't. Rather, she took 50 nodes, drew > a path visiting each node once, stored this as her 'Hamiltonian cycle' > and then proceeded to draw in 50 or 70 or whatever "other links," > which are "ringers," as it were (that is, they are never part of the > Hamiltonian she "constructed"). > > The resulting complete graph--50 nodes with maybe 100 or 500 or whatever > links--only she knows a valid Hamiltonian cycle for (there may be > others, which neither she nor anyone else will ever find). I think something like this may be the idea behind "obfuscated computing," which Mike Duvos was writing about here a little while back. The idea is that you do this trick not just with a graph, but with a boolean circuit composed of and, or, not gates, etc. Take your algorithm and express it as such a circuit, then obfuscate it by drawing in extra gates, connections, etc. The resulting circuit has your original circuit embedded in it, but figuring out what the total circuit does can be computationally intractable. Someone could build or emulate this circuit and get a result, but they would not be able to figure out exactly what formula they were computing. I'm not 100% certain that this technique is used, but Tim's posting reminded me that I had read something about this several years ago, and this is how I remember it. Hal

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identity, privacy, & anonymity in cyberspace
by tmp＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hal finney recently wrote an interesting message taking the position that cypherpunk aims are not so much to pursue total anonymity but to promote systems with a variety of degrees in identity and pseudonymity so that the appropriate level can be achieved in various settings. (for example, borrowing money seems to require that one sacrifice some degree of anonymity and privacy). below is a message i have taken to represent the cypherpunk position from hal finney. this came from chaos.bsu.edu, a fun gopher server with a lot of cypherpunk position papers (i assume they are representative). in it, hal argues against identifying anonymous messages, saying that it would mark them with a `scarlet a' and relegate them to the `ghetto'. his recent comments seem more accommodating and less extremist. >The level of anarchy will >inevitably increase as larger numbers of people acquire net access. it seems to me that the cypherpunks already have a name for the kind of anarchy that can happen when somebody uses pseudonyms to harass and cause trouble. that word is `detweiler'. do you really know what `anarchy' is, cypherpunks? as the old parable goes, be careful what you wish for, you might get it. hal argues below that `you already know nothing about the people you interact with on the net' and that `anonymous remailers introduce no more problems than are already present on the net'. these seem to me to be flawed arguments. here's why. first of all, everyone has the experience of going to a party and knowing nobody there. but the fun of the party is learning about the people who are there! do we really want an online environment where identity is as transitory as a nym on IRC? it seems that what everyone is craving behind the banging on the keyboard is what has been called active, human `interconnection' to contrast it to `interaction' with a computer alone (still generally considered an inanimate object). if we want communities, the places we like to live in, it seems that identity is intrinsic to them. next, `anonymous remailers do not introduce any problems beyond those that already exist'-- aren't we trying to *solve* the problems associated with building an online community, our civilizations in cyberspace? it seems to me that if cypherpunks want the rest of the world to adhere to their ideas, they have to show how they are *superior* to those already present, and how they *solve* nagging problems. yes, remailers solve the problem of trying to post messages without identity, but are we sure this is a `problem' we want to `solve'? for example, hal notes that some system operators completely ignore complaints on the net. but do we really want a community of system operators that simply throw any feedback to /dev/null? what about when someone is mailbombing Usenet from a site? isn't what we *really* want a more basic definition of what is allowed and what is not? besides, under the cypherpunk vision, operators would never censor a user for postings-- but is it the case that all cypherpunks can say they have never tried to censor anyone by notes to sysadmins, i.e. of detweiler? regarding the pseudonymity issue, it seems to me a more basic, fundamental design goal might be this: we wish to make sure that people do not use sensitive private information against us. it is not a problem for our friends to know this information-- in fact it is critical that they do (friendship is based on identity!). the cypherpunk vision seems to split the world into two groups: those people i trust (my friends) and everyone else (whom i completely distrust with intense paranoia). this is a very xenophobic and chauvinistic philosophy at heart. hal argues below that there is `no line dividing the clean from the unclean' (real name vs. pseudonymous vs. anonymous etc.). to the contrary it seems to me to be the case that either `i know who you are' or i don't. what does it mean for me to `know who you are'? i admit there is no basic definition, but it does seem to me that should not prevent us from trying to find one. for example, it seems to me you cypherpunks have a very important agenda, but you seem to be extremists. the important goal is `defining what privacy really means' and cypherpunks seem to take the position, `it means that nobody knows anything about me'. our society simply cannot function under this constraint. if i wish to `interconnect', identity is necessary to minimize risk to the people i `interconnect' with. so what the cypherpunks might consider is a less extremist elucidation of what `privacy' means. for example, cypherpunks, what information should a bank be allowed to have on you when you go in to request a loan? what should companies be allowed to do with credit histories, and what rights does the individual have to influence them? if you continue to insist that `nobody should know who i am' i fear you will be bypassed by more sophisticated groups that have a less polarized view of issues of identity and privacy. and it will ultimately be the least controversial proposals that will shape the future we live in. the recent hal finney message as well as recent considerations of `morality' on the list (albeit quizzical) suggest to me you might be open to a more conciliatory, less dogmatic position on these immensely important issues. i am going to sign off for awhile in an attempt to advance some new meaningful projects (such as set up a gopher server), but i thank you for your stimulating conversations and email, and i apologize to anyone i have ever offended (send me mail if you feel i have personally left something unresolved). hal finney's message follows. pseudonymously yours, --tmp -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I sent mail to Cypherpunks on this a couple of days ago, but it never appeared. There is a problem with the notion that all "anonymous" remailers and news-posting services should label their messages as anonymous so that users can decide whether to read them or not. This approach abandons one of the strongest arguments in favor of anonymous remailers, which is that the net is inherently an anonymous environment. Especially as more public access Unix systems, BBS systems, and so on become part of the net, we are going to see less and less of the strict controls on identity which were possible when the net was restricted to a few government labs and large universities. The level of anarchy will inevitably increase as larger numbers of people acquire net access. Unless massive and universal authentication efforts are undertaken, it is going to be more and more the case that you will know little about the true identity of a poster. Because of this, those who object to having to read the words of an "anonymous" poster are taking an untenable position. They are already reading words of people about whom they know no more than they would about an anonymous poster. And the argument that "non-anonymous" posters are subject to a form of discipline not available to anonymous posters - messages to the system operator - is clearly falsified by the existance of many sysops who care nothing about complaints. As more and more people run their own machines with net access, these cases will only increase. In short, we anonymous remailer operators have every right to be part of the net. We introduce no more problems than are already happening and will continue to occur as the net grows and becomes more universal. The resistance we've seen is from old-time sysops who are unable to adjust to a changing network environment. Rather than placating obsolete beliefs about network identity by agreeing to mark our messages with the scarlett letter A for anonymity, by accepting that we deserve to be in a ghetto set aside for inferior posts, I feel that we should challenge the net with messages that blur the distinction between anonymous and authenticated posts. The sooner people realize that there is no line that divides the clean from the unclean, the sooner anonymity will be widely accepted on the net. Hal Finney 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQCVAgUBK7S2oqgTA69YIUw3AQEfagP8DlzINcvUDn7jc351S+hHTBz5NtB3RbRC l+0rgltFcn6QxWaE0GsWFcOa6RcPOe1DOTlwiJejiT6MbnfuDopbUoS98bCiIzLE 0Q2ZVhtsfLs5zFdUj08bRzzU7zyuzSmNoSsCx01O6OiGZB/zs0PEnx/0XqRtXFD2 RM1YTCPIF7Y= =0zw5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Zero Knowledge, Hamiltonian Cycles, and Passwords
by Derek Upham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> A potential use for such systems is for passwords--one can prove one > has the knowledge without actually producing it (by typing in a > password, for example). I don't know that anyone is actually > exploring this application, yet, but I expect it'll come. Look at "Strongbox: A System for Self-Securing Programs" by J. D. Tygar and B. S. Yee in the "CMU Computer Science 25th Anniversary Commemorative" proceedings (from 1991). As the paper describes: ``Strongbox uses an authentication protocol derived from Rabin's observation about the square root operation: if one can extract square roots modulo n where n=p*q , p and q primes, then one can factor n . [That should be `if and only if', i.e., finding the square roots is too hard unless you created n in the first place.] Both our protocol and FFS are *zero-knowledge authentication protocols_* [. . .] And in contrast to Needham and Schroeder's authentication protocol, zero-knowledge authentication protocols require no central authentication server and thus there is no single point of failure that would cripple the entire system.'' In addition to zero-knowledge authentication, the paper provides an algorithm for the secure exchange of sessional symmetric encryption keys, and ways of combining authentication and key-exchange steps. I managed to get the key-exchange working some months back (in C++, using GMP to handle the number-crunching), but it was hampered by my incredibly slow 386 on one side and odd bugs in the Sun4 environment on the other. Contact me if you want to hack around on it. I also know where to find unreleased GMP 1.9 sources for some additional, probably more reliable, functions for calculating the Legendre symbol (which the whole system depends upon). Derek

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