December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Counterfieting $$$$
by Jeremiah A Blatz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 18-Mar-94 Re: Locating Color Copiers by stevenJ(a)alpha1.csd.uwm.e > Additionally, it's only possible to photocopy $1, $5 and $10 because anything > larger than that has that funny little strip of plastic in the bill. Actually, they have strips on the tens, too. Re: passing bills Okay, so the 10's and 20's have little mylar strips on them. You can't copy old bills, because they get wrinkles, and, anyway, if someone handed me a crisp, new 1983 $20 I'd get a bit suspicious. There are ways to age bills, but they look a lot less convincing. However.... What night manager at Denny's knows about the strips. How many times have you seen someone at your local convience store check for the strip when you hand them a $20. If you travel a lot, and never use counterfiet bills for transactions where your name is recorded, you can do lots with counterfiet money. True, though, if you wanted to sell suitcases of it for $3 per twenty dollar bill (I just guessed at the price), you may have a problem. Not a crook, Jer darklord(a)cmu.edu | "it's not a matter of rights / it's just a matter of war finger me for my | don't have a reason to fight / they never had one before" Geek Code and | -Ministry, "Hero" PGP public key | http://www.cs.cmu.edu:8001/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr25/jbde/

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PGP/ViaCrypt
by John B. Fleming 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just obtained a copy of PGP 2.3a about 2-3 months ago and have been using it off and on. I just subscribed to this list a couple of days ago and have seen mentions of ViaCrypt PGP. I did a little research, and I now know what ViaCrypt PGP is. My question is, what are the details surrounding the licensed RSA technology in the two. I have gathered that Freeware PGP does NOT have a license, and ViaCrypt PGP does. ... Does this mean in any way that it is technically illegal to use Freeware PGP? Or does it even matter? Thanks John -- FLEMINGJ(a)WABASH.EDU -- (Please request PGP public key via e-mail)

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Re: EFF gun-shy of legally employing PGP
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous is alleged to have said: > : > Yes, but the point of the reply, is that PGP signatures SHOULD > : > be used by sysops. > : Hmmm... why PGP, as opposed to the FIPS Digital Signature Standard? > Yes, you can use the DSS (unless it is given away to PK partners, that is). No, you can't use the DSS. The reason NIST was getting into confusion about whether they have to give it to PKP is that PKP says that it infringes on Schnorr's patent, which they recently bought up; assuming that's true technically (I haven't looked in a while), this means you need a license from PKP to use DSS. Unlike RSA, which the government has some rights to use because it partially funded their work, even the government doesn't have rights over Schnorr's work, since they didn't fund it, so the NIST is in deeper yogurt with DSS than with RSa signatures. You can still use DSS for research and the usual things you can use patents for without a license, but you can do the same with PGP. RIPEM can be used free non-commercially in the US+Canada under the RSAREF license terms, and RIPEM-SIG can even be exported. (Now all we need to do is find a way to get RIPEM-SIG to do key exchange and message encryption as well as signatures and patch it into PGP :-) (presumed not possible...) Bill

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No Subject
by bbrown＠coos.dartmouth.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, I saw a blurb on the new about the the senate debating Clipper. The basics were stated. 1) The FBI wanted phone companies to be forced to comply. 2) Privacy advocates said it would be an invasion. Then they showed clips of terrorists and kidnappers who had been caught thanks to wiretapping. On the subject of home privacy. I am attempting to build a laser bug. The type that one bounces of a window. Does anyone know of the technology involved in such a project? I already have acess to a laser, but it is the photocell that I need more infomation on. Anyone? Artimage.

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Administrivia: Questions about the List
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherdenizens, Sorry to bother the List, but two things have come up that I need some feedback on. Two items: 1. Is the list sending out messages in a defective (slow) way, or is my service (Netcom) bouncing a lot of mail, thus causing these delays as toad attempts resends? 2. I'm getting a lot of error messages from Julf's site, saying my messages cannot be delivered to "an2757938" and the like. This used to be a problem, but was fixed by Eric Hughes a year or so ago. It appears to be back again. Are others seeing this, too? First, I seem to be having delays in Cypherpunks mail of about 1-2 days on about 5-10% of all messages. This shows up as me not seeing messages others are already responding to (because 90-95% of all messages are getting to me in the usual prompt way). I especially notice this, of course, with my own messages. (I can't test whether other mail is being delayed, because I'm no longer on Extropians and so Cypherpunks accounts for 95% of all my mail.) For example, the item on video surveillance cameras, forwarded from alt.conspiracy, did not not reach me until a day after others had already posted public responses. And just today I got a 5-day old message (Steve Bellovin's "Re: Clipper Cracks Appear"). The message I posted today about "Shout it to the world: Clipper is Compromised!" has still not appeared at my site, although some others have already responded to me about it (ironically, Steve Bellovin did). My question is this: Is this just _me_ (and possibly Netcom), or are others seeing these delays? My suspicion has been that Netcom is bouncing mail, because of recent overloading and NFS problems, reports from other about their mail being delayed (usually this implies a bounce and resend), and from the lack of other messages here complaining about delayed messages. Could Hugh Daniel, if he is reading this, or Eric Hughes, or anyone else who has access to the list at toad.com give me some hint as to whether I should beat on Netcom some more? Could other Netcommers here, of which there may be as many as 50, tell me what experiences they've had? The second item is also an administrivia issue: I'm getting dozens of error messages from daemon(a)penet.finland.etc. or somesuch (I can't look right now at the precise address) telling me my mail cannot be delivered, will not be delivered, is being returned, etc. It looks like the old blocks Eric had installed to prevent Julf's system from doing this are no longer working. (There may be more accurate explanations....) Anyone else seeing this? Anything we can do? Does the new automated subscription software (majordomo?) have anything to do with this? If people send me comments, I'll summarize--unless someone really knows the Big Picture and wants to just summarize it all here. Thanks, --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: FWD: RIPEM/SIG - Worldwide Digital Signature Software
by mdbomber＠w6yx.stanford.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- >Proc-Type: 2001,MIC-CLEAR >Content-Domain: RFC822 >Originator-Name: jim(a)chirality.rsa.com >Originator-Certificate: > MIIB0TCCAXoCECnMhIY+nEfjCOoQ6zRCtbAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwbTELMAkG > A1UEBhMCVVMxIDAeBgNVBAoTF1JTQSBEYXRhIFNlY3VyaXR5LCBJbmMuMRwwGgYD > [...] signed PEM message I tried turning RIPEM Mac loose on this message and it complains about a garbled Originator Certificate, then complains that it does not appear to be a PEM/RIPEM message. Did anyone else get this to work? Internet: mdbomber(a)w6yx.stanford.edu Matt Bartley GPS: 33 49' xx'' 117 48' xx'' (xx due to SA :-)

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Note from EDUPAGE
by Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CALL FORWARD FOR CRIME Criminals have discovered that by forwarding their calls, they can evade wiretaps placed on their home lines. "Criminals can go to any phone, call the `intelligent network' and route calls anywhere," says an FBI special agent. The FBI estimates that 25% of all wiretaps "are adversely affected" by this telephone hide-and-seek. (Wall Street Journal 3/18/94 A5A) [Wex notes: this seems relevant to the ongoing fight over the FBI wiretap proposal; I wonder if they're laying the public groundwork for supporing their proposal to get call-setup information. I also wonder if it would do them a damn bit of good. If I call a number which I know has previously been forwarded to a different number, is the eventual target # part of the call-setup info?]

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ANNOUNCE: EXI Idea Forum this Sunday
by jpp＠markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The EXI Idea Forum is a series of informal get togethers where Extropians, and people interested in Extropianism, discuss interesting issues. This Idea Forum will concern Cryptography, Cypherpunks, and the Clipper chip. You are invited to attend. Here are the directions: The EXI Idea Form will be held at my new lodgings in Pacoima this Sunday 1994 March 20. The meeting will officialy start at 1600. Feel free to bring your favorite (non-alcoholic, yet legal) drinks, foods, nutrients, etc. I hope the directions below help you get to our location. If you need extra help for any reason, call (818) 768 9255 first, or (818) 767 5576 if you get no answer. (Sorry, if you are comming from the north, you will have to improvise a little) ------------------------------------------------------------ >From the west side of LA: North 405 == San Diego Fwy over the hill, into the valley, way past the 101, but just before the 118, take the Nordhoff exit, at the bottom of the ramp go East == Right Nordhoff until it T's into Osborne, go N-E == Left Osborne past two lights, Canterbury, and Beachy, S-E == Right Arleta past two traffic lights, Branford, and then Wentworth which has a killer dip, then at the first street on the left, N-E == Left Tonopah past the alley on the left, at the first street to the left, N-W == Left Lev to the end, the house is on the left side at about 10 o'clock were the street entering the court at 6 o'clock S-W == Left 8941 Lev ------------------------------------------------------------ >From the center of the city: North 101 == Hollywood Fwy over the hill, into the valley, North 170 == Hollywood Fwy just befor the end, where 170 merges with 5, right at the end of the ramp, S-W == Right Sheldon under the 170 Fwy, and then immediately N-W == Right Arleta past the first right which is the 170 South onramp, and at the first street on the right, N-E == Right Tonopah past the alley on the left, at the first street to the left, N-W == Left Lev to the end, the house is on the left side at about 10 o'clock were the street entering the court at 6 o'clock S-W == Left 8941 Lev ------------------------------------------------------------ >From the east side of LA: North 5 == Golden State Fwy over the hill, into the valley, just after the 170 merges into the 5, take the Sheldon exit, turn right and you will be on Laurel Canyon Blvd, S-E == Right Laurel Canyon Blvd (Sheldon Exit) follow the sign and turn right onto Sheldon S-W == Right Sheldon for about a mile, under the 170 Fwy, and then immediately, N-W == Right Arleta past the 170 South entrance to the right, at the first street on the right, N-E == Right Tonopah past the alley on the left, at the first street to the left, N-W == Left Lev to the end, the house is on the left side at about 10 o'clock were the street entering the court at 6 o'clock S-W == Left 8941 Lev j' -- O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp(a)markv.com 1250 bit fingerprint B06229 = B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5 89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F 524 bit fingerprint 2A915D = 8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED 66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48 Public keys via `finger jpp(a)markv.com', or via email to pgp-public-keys(a)io.com Your feedback is welcome directly or via my symbol JPP on hex(a)sea.east.sun.com Resist the Clipper Chip, write "I oppose Clipper" to Clipper.petition(a)cpsr.org

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Internet Security Hearing
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded by Gleason Sackman - InterNIC net-happenings moderator ()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()() ---------- Text of forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 17:42:43 -0700 From: richard bryant <rbryant(a)HYDRA.UNM.EDU> To: Multiple recipients of list COMMUNET <COMMUNET(a)uvmvm.bitnet> Subject: SS&T Special Notice Re: Internet Security (fwd) According to SSTPRESS: >From SSTPRESS(a)HR.HOUSE.GOV Thu Mar 17 16:21:07 1994 Date: 17 Mar 1994 18:15:18 EST From: "SSTPRESS" <SSTPRESS(a)HR.HOUSE.GOV> Subject: SS&T Special Notice SS&T|NEWS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2320 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 March 17, 1994 Special Notice Because of considerable advance interest in next Tuesday's hearing on Internet security, we are taking the liberty of including a witness list for the hearing with this week's calendar mailing. The hearing will take place beginning at 9:30 a.m. in 2318 Rayburn on Tuesday, March 22, and will be chaired by Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA). The Subcommittee's interest in the issue arises in part because the Internet is a prime method of communication between researchers in academia and industry. It is also a major means of communication for federal researchers at agencies under the Subcommittee's jurisdiction. Recent break-ins on the Internet prompted the federal Computer Emergency Response Team to issue a special alert to Internet users on February 3, and suggest that the system may be more vulnerable than generally acknowledged to deliberate destruction or alteration of computer files. The hearing will evaluate the status of security on the Internet today and will examine measures currently available to enhance security, assess the effectiveness and degree of implementation of such measures, and identify obstacles to enhancing Internet security. A background memo prepared for Members by the Subcommittee is available from the Committee press office by fax (202/225-8280) or email (sstpress(a)hr.house.gov) Broadcast reporters who plan to attend the hearing should register with the House Radio and Television Gallery, and can call the Committee press secretary (202-225-3359) for logistical information and early access to the hearing room. # # # For further information: Rick Borchelt, 202/225-3359 (fax 202/225-8280) (email "sstpress(a)hr.house.gov") ______________________________ George E. Brown, Jr. Chairman Robert S. Walker Ranking Republican Member SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE Hearing on Internet Security March 22, 1994 9:30 a.m. - 2318 Rayburn House Office Building Tentative Witness List Mr. L. Dain Gary, Manager Computer Emergency Response Team Operations (CERT) Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (CERT is one of the coalition of response teams that form the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, or FIRST) Mr. Thomas T. Kubic Chief, Financial Crimes Section Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, DC Dr. Vinton G. Cerf, President Internet Society Reston, Virginia (Senior VP of Data Architecture, MCI) Mr. Lynn McNulty Associate Director for Computer Security Computer Systems Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, Maryland (NIST is the secretariat for FIRST) Dr. Stephen D. Crocker, Vice President Trusted Information Systems Glenwood, Maryland (Chair, Privacy and Security Research Group, Internet Research Task Force)

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Fw: Public Interest Summit Organizing Kit
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sounds to me that these guys don't want to hear from inside the Beltway folks like me. How about some of the left coast folk? ------------------------------ From: Richard Civille <rciville(a)civicnet.org> Fri, 18 Mar 1994 21:07:24 -0500 (EST) Cc: ace-mg(a)esusda.gov, alt-politics-datahighway(a)eff.org, bluemt(a)cni.org, com-priv(a)psi.com, communet(a)uvmvm.uvm.edu, ednet(a)mr.net, libnet(a)mr.net, net-people(a)nic.state.mn.us, nii-regional(a)rain.org, nii-summit(a)cni.org, nii_agenda(a)civicnet.org, publib(a)nysernet.org, pubpol-l(a)vm1.spcs.umn.edu, roundtable(a)cni.org, ruralnet(a)gibbs.oit.unc.edu, telecomreg(a)relay.adp.wisc.edu, board(a)cap.gwu.edu Subject: Public Interest Summit Organizing Kit Shaping the National Information Infrastructure Public Interest Summit -- ORGANIZING KIT -- NOTE: Use this electronic mail address for contact: <summit(a)tmn.com> Your participation is essential to making the Summit responsive and effective. We are sending you the enclosed "kit" of questions, organizing suggestions, and formats for sending your discussion materials back to us. This is a call for you and your organization or group to discuss the information highway issues -- as YOU see them. Send back your replies for lead ins to the panel discussions, and as questions and concerns for panelists and Administration officials to consider -- as soon as you can. Please use the questions listed below to help organize your discussion group. It is important to hear as many voices across the Nets as possible, as soon as possible. However, it is even more important for us to use the Net to go beyond the Net. We hope the following ideas will be helpful in organizing discussion groups in classrooms, in church, at work, at home; in service organizations, and activist groups; for radio call-in talk shows, local cablecast panel discussions and anywhere where people meet to talk about what is important to them. We must move very quickly to make this work and we need you. Remember, we are talking about beginning a wave of change this week, that will grow in power and momentum beyond the Summit and into the Spring and beyond. -- Registration -- Register with us to become an organizer/moderator of a discussion group (either on-line or off-line). Send e-mail to <summit(a)tmn.com> with "register" as the subject line and a brief description of your project and group. If you cannot email, see the alternative contact points below. We will work for broad discussions among the online communities but we believe that it is ultimately the "real world" that will make the difference here, not simply Cyberspace. We encourage you to organize off-line discussion groups and send us the summaries using the questions and formats given below. -- Video Opportunities -- This is a media event. We are also searching for good, brief, video shots. Do you have good local public media contacts? Do you know of good video opportunities -- important new voices that should be heard, projects in your community using information technologies for good public benefit that should be recognized? Tell us about them as soon as you can. Send your ideas to us at <summit(a)tmn.com>. We are prepared to work very quickly with local public television and cable access groups, who can tape and Fedex the tape to us for inclusion in the program. Video shots must be a maximum one minute in length. We must have all tape submissions received no later than Friday, March 25th and earlier if possible. -- Questions for Discussion Groups -- 1. What is important to your group? 2.What does your group want in terms of connectivity to the NII? 3. What does your group want not to happen with the NII? 4. What special requirements do you have that might be missed in the national planning for the NII which is taking place now in Washington, DC? 5. What would you be able to do with the NII, that you would not otherwise, if you did not have to worry about the cost of access? 6. What one key question would you want the Administration to give you an explicit answer to about the NII? 7. How can you describe the positions your state and federal representatives are presently taking on your concerns about the NII? -- More Ideas -- You might consider several scenarios such as these for your discussion group. Make up your own! * Print this notice and take it to your group (church, class, work place lunch, family) for discussion, summarize the results, and send them to us. * Use the questions for a discussion item in your local community or civic network and report back with summaries of key points. Direct, attributed quotes are very helpful. Pose questions directed to specific panelists or to specific issues. Organize a local press conference. * Help increase the spread of the dialog by taking these questions to people and groups well beyond your own networks of friends and acquaintances, whether online or offline. Fax this Notice all over town. Photocopy fliers and distribute. Get these materials into the hands of those who are not members of online systems. -- Contacts, Format and Deadlines -- Please e-mail results of discussions back to the Public Interest Summit to <summit(a)tmn.com>. Include: - Your name - Name of online community, community/civic network or organization - Describe the process you used for your discussion (was it a working lunch, a bridge club, a call-in talk show, who moderated, how was it organized, etc.) - e-mail address of contact person, or phone if email is not available Please provide a summary, and several vivid highlights, and direct quotes that can be attributed to real people. No more than two pages or 4k. Please e-mail group discussion summaries by Sunday, March 27 at the latest. Videos must be received by the 25th and not be longer than one minute in length. The earlier the better, there is a great deal of pre-production work to be done. Things earlier will be summarized and posted to gopher servers under the menu heading: "Public Interest Telecommunication Summit" including new questions as they arise. If you cannot email you can contact the Summit production team through: The Benton Foundation 202-638-5770 (voice) 202-638-5771 (fax) Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: FOIA text
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU: > Does anyone know an ftp site where I can find the full text of the > Freedom of Information Act? ftp: ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Access_govt_info/FOIA/us_foia_act.txt other articles, acts, cases in the same directory. ftp.eff.org is full of information, articles etc of interest to cypherpunks, particularly in the Policy directory. Most of the material I'm putting into a hypertext WWW guide to cpunks is from there. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)doe.ernet.in, rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: A Certain Monk at a certain village in Hanoi I thought I'd share this with you: -----------CUT HERE------------- program Hanoi(input,output); type Pegnumber = 1..3; var N: integer; Procedure WriteMoves (N: integer; Peg1, Peg2, Peg3: PegNumber); begin {Moves} if N=1 then writeln('Move a ring from ', Peg1:1, ' to ', Peg2:1) else begin {else} WriteMoves(N-1, Peg1, Peg3, Peg2); writeln('Move a ring from ', Peg 1:1, ' to ', Peg2:1); WriteMoves(N-1, Peg3, Peg2, Peg1) end {else} end; {Moves} begin {Program} writeln{'Enter the number of rings and'); writeln('I''ll explain how to play Towers of Hanoi.'); readln(N); writeln (' To move ', M,' rings'); writeln (' from peg 1 to peg 2 proceed as follows:'); WriteMoves(N, 1, 2, 3); writeln (' That does it.') end. {Program} ------------AND HERE----------- I've used it on 64 rings, and it works fine. Of course this runs slowly and does tend to use a lot of storage. The stack really grows too large. I'm hoping that it may be possible to use this type of call with some bandwidth growth to help defeat analysis. "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to." said the Cat. --Lewis Carroll

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Pondering Clipper
by Adam Lake 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Heard enough about Clipper? I have been receiving cypherpunk material for about a week now. I am new to cryptography, and new to security(feel free to laugh). I hope this posting is appropriate.. Well enough excuses for what I am about to say but I might like Clipper. 1.) From what I am hearing (largely propaganda from both sides) Clipper will be OPTIONAL. If I am businessman X and I dont know squat about security (but realize it is a good thing) wouldnt I want something I could feel secure with? For me, wouldnt Clipper be a good thig? 2) If, for some reason, I wanted to keep something even more secure so the government couldnt see what I was doing, couldnt I just encrypt a message before or after it goes through the Clipper Chip? I would think this would prevent the government as well as anyone else from reading my message en route 3) Right now I can pick up cellular phone conversations and intercept data through any network lines with a datascope. For anyone who doesnt wan this to occur wouldnt it be nice if they couldat least be reasonably certain that no one could understand what they are hearing or seeing? 4) Also, would it be unreasonable to have an on/off switch on the Clipper chip? Please dont assume me to be a pro-clipper individual. I am merely trying to form a logical, educated opinion on the issue. I will always feel skeptical when the FBI say we just need this to maintain our current state of survellience capability (or is that survellience state ;-) And I am also aware that if anybody thinks these keys will be kept confidential unless the government has a warrant blah blah blah well I better stop there.......... lake(a)uenics.evansville.edu ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Space for rent ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Pondering Clipper
by sonny＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Lake <lake(a)uenics.evansville.edu> says: -> I have been receiving cypherpunk material for about a week now. I am new -> to cryptography, and new to security(feel free to laugh). I hope this -> posting is appropriate.. Well enough excuses for what I am about to say -> but I might like Clipper. [Don't worry, each individual should be able to make up her/his own mind regarding issues such as this (ie., individual privacy).] -> 1.) From what I am hearing (largely propaganda from both sides) Clipper -> will be OPTIONAL. If I am businessman X and I dont know squat about [If the claim that Clipper will be "OPTIONAL" is propaganda, you might want to take it with a grain of salt. "OPTIONAL" today might not mean "OPTIONAL" tomorrow.] -> security (but realize it is a good thing) wouldnt I want something I -> could feel secure with? For me, wouldnt Clipper be a good thig? [If you are arguing that ignorance about security is a prerequisite for considering Clipper to be a good thing, you may be correct.] -> 2) If, for some reason, I wanted to keep something even more secure so -> the government couldnt see what I was doing, couldnt I just encrypt a -> message before or after it goes through the Clipper Chip? I would think -> this would prevent the government as well as anyone else from reading my -> message en route [If you have the technology at hand to encrypt a message before or after it goes through the Clipper chip using a method that the government can't crack, you don't need to spend money (as a prudent businessman) on Clipper hardware.] -> 3) Right now I can pick up cellular phone conversations and intercept data -> through any network lines with a datascope. For anyone who doesnt wan [Not bad for someone who is "new to security(feel free to laugh)."] -> this to occur wouldnt it be nice if they couldat least be reasonably -> certain that no one could understand what they are hearing or seeing? [Yes. This is why many people don't want Clipper. They want to be "reasonably certain that no one could understand what they are hearing or seeing"] -> 4) Also, would it be unreasonable to have an on/off switch on the Clipper -> chip? [I don't know.] -> Please dont assume me to be a pro-clipper individual. I am -> merely trying to form a logical, educated opinion on the issue. I will -> always feel skeptical when the FBI say we just need this to maintain our -> current state of survellience capability (or is that survellience state -> ;-) And I am also aware that if anybody thinks these keys will be kept -> confidential unless the government has a warrant blah blah blah well -> I -> better stop there.......... -> -> lake(a)uenics.evansville.edu >James<

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(fwd) FBI Wiretaps. Old news....
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For thos who haven't read some of the recent (compelling) newsbytes on Digital Telphony II - Forwarded message: > Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk > From: catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com > Message-ID: <199403190626.WAA25701(a)mail2.netcom.com> > Subject: FBI Wiretaps. Old news.... > Date: Fri, 18 Mar 1994 22:26:45 -0800 > X-Received: by usenet.pa.dec.com; id AA17267; Fri, 18 Mar 94 22:30:46 -0800 > X-Received: from mail2.netcom.com by inet-gw-1.pa.dec.com (5.65/13Jan94) > id AA08698; Fri, 18 Mar 94 22:25:42 -0800 > X-Received: from localhost by mail2.netcom.com (8.6.4/SMI-4.1/Netcom) > id WAA25701; Fri, 18 Mar 1994 22:26:45 -0800 > X-To: comp.org.eff.talk.usenet > X-Remailed-By: Remailer <catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com> > > Today's news. > > WASHINGTON (Reuter) - The FBI warned Friday that wiretaps > might soon become impossible unless Congress updates a law > requiring telephone companies to cooperate with law enforcement > agencies on electronic surveillance. > ``Unless Congress creates a new law, law enforcement's > ability to protect the public against crime will be gravely > eroded and the national security will be placed at risk,'' FBI > Director Louis Freeh told a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. > Freeh said new technology such as cellular telephones, call > forwarding and digital switching was making it more difficult > for the FBI and other agencies to operate wiretaps, which he > called one of law enforcement's best tools against crime and > terrorism. > ``We could be out of the wiretap business in a very short > time,'' Freeh said. He said 91 court-approved wiretaps were > abandoned last year because telephone companies could not solve > technical problems. > ``They (telephone companies) have told us they will not be > able to provide the access we need. We have certain requirements > which they tell us are not going into the software,'' he said. > Freeh said he wanted the 1968 law rewritten to require all > telephone companies to meet technical requirements for wiretaps > of new equipment. He said it would cost less than $1 billion and > would be paid in part by the federal government. > He said wiretaps had helped prevent several terrorist > attacks in the United States in recent years, including a 1986 > plot to shoot down an airliner, and helped convict over 22,000 > felons in the past decade. > Freeh said a new law would not jeopardize privacy, but > Senator Patrick Leahy, a Vermont Democrat, said he was still > concerned: ``My hope is that we can serve legitimate law > enforcement needs without jeopardizing privacy rights or > frustrating innovation and development of new technologies or > undercutting the competitiveness of America's high tech > industries.'' > The U.S. Telephone Association, which represents more than > 1,100 local telephone companies including the regional Bell > companies, said it believed the current law was adequate. It > said its members were cooperating with law enforcement. > Freeh said he had been meeting with representatives of the > telephone industry but had been unable to get a voluntary > agreement that would cover all companies. > - paul

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Re: (fwd) FBI Wiretaps. Old news....
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> ``We could be out of the wiretap business in a very short > time,'' Freeh said. He said 91 court-approved wiretaps were > abandoned last year because telephone companies could not solve > technical problems. I forgot to add, EFF's recent FOIA act asking for equipment interference with court ordered wiretaps showed NO problems. Where the 91 figure comes from is a mystery.

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VIACRYPT/PGP Listservers
by tontine key llc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are there any LISTS that are devoted to developing expertise in the use of the various forms of PGP being peddled by VIACRYPT et al. It would be a boon to us "NEWBIES" and the cause of "Crypto Publicos" if such a forum was available which provided some handholding on the minutia of using the software. Any ideas?

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The CP WWW Home page
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've been setting up a cypherpunks WWW home page on soda. So far I've been linking things into the home page stuff that's already on soda, and there's a good deal more work to be done. If you have some of your work available on the soda ftp site, if you want to make it available, I'd like a little bio info about yourself, (or your psuedonymous identity). So if you would like to send me either HTML pages with information or the proper URL so I can put in a link to your information, that would be great. Other suggestions for links are appreciated as well. (The cypherpunks URL is ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/Home.html) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLYyRZXi7eNFdXppdAQEY5gQApHsTeZ8iyrt5EvS4y9AVP2ayEYCW89sk I2ZT+HFGd6vhZd+AyDoSosjDKyLaslOyiTCIwWWstCRE9P7yM4ZkZEEIaDWPEsyP 9lsSo8AToC9wHnPvOsYyzLJJKGnkS6M3km23gH05HDUUGXKcvEgsyJTKD2spqBMN Ieacy6ely9E= =wpCz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Royal Bank privacy waiver
by marc＠tanda.isis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gentlefolk, The following is in light-grey small print on the back of the current Royal Bank Visa Gold card application. It appears to be an attempt to end-run privacy legislation. The net is that using your Gold Card gives the Royal Bank, and anyone else it chooses to share information with, permission to do what it wants with any information about you that it has, has ever had, or ever will have; even if you are no longer a client. It is worth the read. ... I will comply with the Cardholder Agreement you will send to me when you issue, renew or replace my card. If I sign, use or accept my card, it will mean that I have received and read the agreement. It will also mean that I have understood and agreed with you to everything written there. You may collect credit and other financially-related information about me (Information) from me, from credit bureaux and from other parties. You may use information as follows: - You may give it to credit bureaux and other parties who have or may have financial or other business dealings with me: - You may use it to determine my financial situation; - You may use it for any purpose related to the provision to me of services I request from you. You may also give it to anyone who works with or for you, but only as needed for the provision of those services; - You may use it to promote your services to me. You may also add it to client lists you prepare and use for this purpose; and - You may share it with your affiliates (where the law allows this), in the form of client lists or otherwise, so that they may promote their services to me. If I have ever given you my social insurance number, you may treat it as information and use it as an aid to identify me with credit bureaux and other parties. Even if I am no longer your client, you may keep Information in your records and use it for the purposes noted above. If a co-applicant signs this Application, they also agree and consent to everything written here and in the Cardholder Agreement. .... At the bottom of the page, in bold black letters, for comic relief, are the words "RESPECTING YOUR PRIVACY IS IMPORTANT TO US". Cheers, Marc --- Marc Thibault | Any warming, global Automation Architect | or otherwise, is Oxford Mills, Ontario, Canada | welcome. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQA9AiyT2YcAAAEBgKVboQejsR2t2U70HoWOXTIqlWUCRGkTht8Yn/4kuzWby/e3 Z9tT8RHJbAx9us7QZwAFEbQdVGFuZGEgTWFpbCA8bWFyY0B0YW5kYS5vbi5jYT4= =aFhG -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: NSA and PGP rabblerousing
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Note that doubling the key size from 1024 to 2048 bits is also > probably a ruse, since it dramatically increases computation time (I > think). 1024 bits are a lot of bits as it is. On a 486DX/33 an RSA sign operation takes a little under 2 seconds with a 1024 bit key. With an 1800 bit key (not quite 2048), a little under 9 seconds. (gcc 2.5.8, gmp 1.3.2, Linux) Personally, I think 1024 bit keys are probably enough. I'm currently working on some Montgomery multiplication code for RSAREF (sans gmp), which should make things faster. (It already works, I just need to clean some things up before releasing it). Mark -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca (personal account) RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp -- wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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anti-security measures
by an53400＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I need to convince someone of their need for security. If anyone out there could send me a good trojan program or direct me to somewhere where I can find code or how to code one I would appreciate it. Other security buster measures would also be nice. :) Thanks. Stranger ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: A Certain Monk at a certain village in Hanoi
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BTW, does anybody have a good Tibetan font for X? I've got an application that involves counting up to about 9 billion, and needs some appropriate display technology....

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Recent AA BBS stuff
by H Keith Henson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3/20/94 I got a phone call today from an early player in this affair--the guy who originally turned in Amateur Action BBS to the Postal Inspectors. Turns out he had *not* hacked into AA BBS, but just read the signon screens--and was not familiar with the hype used to describe certain files. AA BBS *does* offer photos of nude "young children." What they are is nudist material, legal (as far as anyone knows) anywhere. The guy started out the call very upset that I would be involved defending someone offering child pornography. I explained to him that AA BBS had no child porn, and that the only child pron involved in these events was that the postal inspector sent to frame the AA BBS sysop. I went on to tell him that the postal folks were mainly going after the sysop *and his wife* for bestiality pictures and the like on his board. The guy was simply horrified at what he had started since he has no problem with any of that kind of stuff, or people who want to look at it. Had he paid the signup fee and been an AA BBS member for even a day, he would have realized there was nothing there to warrant bringing in the postal inspectors. If he had even called the sysop . . . . Well, it is too late now, the legal bill on this case has likely gone over $100k. One thing for sure, this case has totally shaken my belief that the legal system is fair and honest. I find that the court clerks take orders from the US Attorneys. Clerks keep the judges in the dark about letters to them and even motions on their calendars. I have found out that Magistrates provide no protection whatsoever from unreasonable searches and seizures. (Why? Because they *don't even *read* the search warrant affidavits!) I also have found out that the Western District of TN runs a profitable racket against adult BBS and other sources of erotic material. I have also found that there seems to be *NO* possible legal recourse available if a US Attorney breaks the law. The FBI is the only organization which could investigate, and they have to ask for permission---FROM THE US ATTORNEY THEY WOULD BE INVESTIGATING! Thus laws designed to protect your privacy or communications have no teath in them. I am uploading this and several other recent related files to Wildcat BBS in TN. Folks, please check things out before involving the cops. Cops have no sense of humor at all. Keith Henson 3/16/94 More very odd goings on to report in the AABBS case. As you can see from the body of this posting, there is a serious problem with the court clerks controlling what the judges see. It seems to have happened again. I hand delivered the below letter (marked Personal and Confidential) to Judge Patel's clerk [Ms Muriyama] in open court in the presence of three lawyers. Unfortunately, Judge Patel stepped out of the court just at the instance I handed the letter to her clerk. Did Judge Patel get the letter? I suspect not. I know Judge Patel is under no obligation to respond, or even have one of her staff respond, but it would seem like this kind of report would generate a reply *if* Judge Patel received it. Does anyone have an idea of how to reach a judge if her clerks do not want her to see it? Someone has suggested paying the local law paper to *publish* it as an advertizement. Your suggestions would be most welcome since I am absolutely out of ideas. Keith H. Keith Henson 799 Coffey Ct. San Jose, CA 95123 408-972-1132 Judge Marilyn Patel Northern District of California 450 Golden Gate Ave., 19th Floor San Francisco, CA 94102 March 3, 1994 Dear Judge Patel: You may want to look into certain acts last week by some of the Court clerks. It appears they are taking orders from the US Attorney to modify your calendar. Last Thursday, Richard Williams (a lawyer from San Jose) made telephone contact with Ms Muriyama in the clerk's office. He had a motion to file for return of property and suppression of evidence in a case which itself involves a report of fraud on Magistrate-Judge Brazil's court to obtain a search warrant. (A matter about which I informed Magistrate Brazil in a letter dated January 19.) Since you were the Duty Judge in January when these events happened, it was appropriate to bring the motion to you. Ms Muriyama told Mr. Williams that the motion could be heard on the calendar of your Court on Monday, February 28, 1994 at 2:30 pm if he could get the motion filed early Friday morning. Mr. Williams had the motion filed by courier with the clerks office by about 9 am last Friday. He fully expected to be before your Court Monday at 2:30. I learned of the hearing Friday and made plans to be there myself since my affidavit is part of this motion. Two of Mr. William's staffers talked to Ms Muriyama Thursday, and are prepared to testify as to her agreeing to putting the motion on your calendar, though the option was left open that you might shift it to some other department at the same time. Monday at 11:50 am, Vicki from Magistrate Brennan's office called Mr. William's office to tell him that there was nothing on calendar for his motion before either yourself or Judge Brennan because she said the US Attorney had ordered the clerks to take his motion off your calendar! Vicki was told that according to Ms Muriyama (as of last Thursday afternoon), the motion *was* on calendar. Vicki then alleged that Ms Muriyama had not contacted Mr. Willaim's office the previous week. She also said they had no copy of the motion for you to see (two were filed, and one given to the US Attorney after filing). A few minutes later, Ms Muriyama called saying that they had no copies of the motion for you to review, though she did not deny that she had put this matter on your calendar. Since Judge Brazil had excused himself last week, she tried to get Mr. Williams to agree to place the motion before Magistrate-Judge Brennan, and when told that a Magistrate was unacceptable, she placed the motion hearing on Judge Caulfield's calendar late on March 7, one day before the matter is to be moved to Tennessee, a move which will inflict great costs and business damage upon the plaintiffs. Though I do not know that Judge Brazil ever saw the letter I wrote to him, one of his staff called me last week and left a long message (which I preserved) on my answering machine. In it, the staff member stated that it was not a Judge's role to investigate the fraud perpetrated on his Court to which I had directed his attention, and that I should contact the US Attorney if I wished the matter to be investigated. Given that the US Attorney has manipulated your calendar to prevent these very matters from being brought to the attention of your Court, I believe this approach would be akin to getting a fox to guard the henhouse. I would greatly appreciate your looking into these matters which involve the integrity of the Court. I would also appreciate a very short phone call from you to either myself or Mr. Williams indicating only that this letter actually got into your hands. I have never considered myself a naive person. In spite of this, I have always felt that the judiciary in this country was honest. I still feel this way, but how effective can an honest Judge be when their information channels are completely controlled by one party in an action? Sincerely, H. Keith Henson PS I was quite surprised to find the Court clerks are employed by the US Attorney's office. Considering how much control clerks/staff have over what Judges hear and do, this arrangement harbors a high potential for abuse--even if only inadvertent abuse. I simply could not imagine Congressional staff members being employees of the Executive branch! If there is a movement to put clerks under the Judges, I would be happy to lend my support. enc. Copy of referenced letter to Magistrate-Judge Brazil Copy of letter to Chief Judge Thelton E. Henderson ----- [Incidentally, Judge Caulfield was supposed to have ruled on the motion to return property and suppress evidence last Friday. Mr. Williams was called (by a clerk again) and told she would rude on his motion without a hearing, and let him know how it came out by letter. So far, nothing has showed up in the mail, and it will be a week tomorrow. My long standing faith in a fair judicial process in this country has been badly shaken.] RICHARD D. WILLIAMS, APC State Bar #92376 79 Divine St., Suite 101 San Jose, CA 95110 (408) 295-6336 Chief Judge Clifford Wallace U. S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Two Rincon Center P.O. Box 193846 San Francisco, CA 94119-3846 March 11, 1994 In Re: Complaint for Judicial Misconduct Dear Chief Judge Clifford: I am filing a complaint largely as a concerned citizen but also on behalf of my clients, Robert and Carleen Thomas. It is my understanding that section 372 (c) of title 28 is intended to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. I would like to see an investigation of what I consider to be an affront to the Ninth Circuit, its district courts, the American people, and my clients. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas run an adult bulletin board service. Their activities of preparing graphical and written material for public dissemination clearly makes them "publishers" within the meaning of Title 42, Section 2000(aa) (Privacy Protection Act). In addition, their system has 3,500 electronic mail users who were entitled to protection under the Electronics Communications Privacy Act. On January 10, 1994 the Thomas' entire computer system was seized pursuant to a search warrant which was purportedly signed by Hon. Wayne Brazil, U.S. Magistrate in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California. This warrant was applied for by a U.S. postal inspector (David Dirmeyer) from the Western District of Tennessee. They were aware of the requirements of both 42 U.S.C. 2000 (aa) and 18 U.S.C. 2703 that a subpoena be used against both electronic mail services and "publishers" unless a specific showing of need is made by a judicial officer. On the day following the execution of the search warrant I drove to San Francisco (after the Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California could find no such case number) and was told that the U.S. Attorney had the case file for a week, and that I should check back in a couple of days. As the clerk spoke, I could not help but look up and see a sign indicating that removal of any file from the clerk's office was punishable as a felony. I was also told that nothing in the file was sealed (although there was no docket sheet available for me to verify this). I went back three days later and got the same reception at the Clerk's office. Again there was no docket sheet and no file. I was given Magistrate Brazil's office phone number, and I spoke with a woman who claimed to be Magistrate Brazil's secretary. She told me that there was no record she could find that there had ever been an affidavit put before Judge Brazil, nor a search warrant issued. Someone came up and spoke to her at which time she excused herself and put me on hold for five minutes. When she returned she seemed nervous, and told me that there was a file, but that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was "sealed." This affidavit was not unsealed until January 27, 1994, the day after an indictment against my clients was filed in Western District of Tennessee. My clients were deprived of due process in that the rules were manipulated such that the Thomas' were denied their rights to seek return of the seized property under rule 41(e), instead forcing them to litigate this matter (to the limited extent possible) in Tennessee. Since the file had no usable case number in either California or Tennessee I had no way to defend my client, and hence they were denied their Sixth-Amendment rights as well. I apologize for my lengthy presentation, but I could not do this matter justice with a brief statement and no background information. This matter strongly suggests that Magistrate Brazil was conspiring with U.S. attorneys, Postal Inspector David Dirmeyer, and unknown judges in the Western District of Tennessee to deprive the Ninth Circuit of its rightful jurisdiction over matters occurring within its district, and to deprive my clients of their civil rights. If the Court of Appeals were to find such a conspiracy it would have serious implications, and represent racketeering within the meaning of RICO statutes in that their co-conspirator, Agent David Dirmeyer, has also engaged in intimidation of witnesses, extortion, attempted blackmail, and perjury. Further, Agent Dirmeyer referred to his mailing of unsolicited child pornography to unsuspecting persons as "standard investigative procedure." This case has national significance if, in fact, the federal magistrates in this country are routinely violating the civil rights of litigants in this fashion, conspiring with postal inspectors to forum shop for the most conservative jury pools in the country, and allowing the affiants to commit blatant perjury in the course of their affidavits. I believe the clear intent of all of these proceedings was to turn my client's bulletin board into a government asset so that they could use the bulletin board to entice the members with child pornography. In support of the above serious accusation, I cite the fact that David Dirmeyer threatened Robert Thomas that he would suffer serious retaliation should he blow Agent Dirmeyer's ("Lance White's") cover on the bulletin board. This indictment and arrest followed open discussion on the board about Lance White when Thomas did not give in to this extortion. In my opinion, Agent Dirmeyer did not intend a criminal prosecution and, therefore, tried to create only enough of a paper trail to intimidate Mr. Thomas and make his business a "government asset" in their search for alleged pedophiles. This is the only reasonable conclusion for the following reasons: 1. A citizen who stumbled on something they deemed offensive on an adult bulletin board is not likely to call a postal inspector. But Agent Dirmeyer describes someone reporting their involvement in a serious felony (theft of computer services) to the postal inspectors in his affidavit. 2. Agent Dirmeyer already had copies of tapes sought under the search warrant (and had allegedly ordered from Mr. Thomas' board), and could have copied everything necessary for prosecution from his remote location in Tennessee. The only things he could not copy remotely were the electronic mail and member names and passwords. The reasons for the search warrant were to intimidate the Thomases, "frame" them with child pornography for further leverage, and to take the bulletin board off-line for five days so Agent Dirmeyer could extract member names, account passwords, and e-mail. It should be noted that Agent Dirmeyer still has the e-mail. 3. Agent Dirmeyer purports in his affidavit to have informed Magistrate Brazil of my clients' publisher status under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000 (aa) and the email content of the computer under 18 USC 2703 et seq. If so, in effect he told Magistrate Brazil that he would be committing two felonies--by title and section number--and he still got his search warrant. 4. There are several adult bulletin boards in Tennessee with similar (if not identical material) and Agent Dirmeyer chose to act in the Northern District of California. 5. The Thomases were subject to a similar search and seizure in 1992 by San Jose police acting alone, who examined the system and returned it in exchange for a promise not to sue them or Santa Clara County civilly. No items were found to be obscene by the police or Santa Clara County district attorneys. This fact was known by Agent Dirmeyer and even Magistrate Brazil. 6. Agent Dirmeyer made threats to Robert Thomas in his attempt to preserve his "Lance White" cover as a member of the BBS. 7. Magistrate Brazil's office acted as if the affidavit itself was sealed when, in fact, the application for sealing, and his own words in doing so, only sealed the exhibits (deemed obscene by Agent Dirmeyer). I am also concerned about his not releasing the affidavit (Sua Sponte) until January 27th, 1994 (the day after the indictment and 17 days after the search). 8. There is also the fact that not so much as a docket sheet was available in the interim, as well as the sudden change of attitude by the Magistrate's secretary when I called to inquire as to the whereabouts of the file (after she discussed the matter with whoever interrupted our phone conversation). 9. Last, but not least, the initial case number, (allegedly stamped on the search warrant by the Clerk of the Court), was 3005-WDB. Once the file had become unsealed, the case number became 30005-WDB. These factors leave room for and at least suggest that an ex-post- facto paper trail was created after a bluff had gone bad. I believe the court must investigate these irregularities to protect its own integrity. At a bare minimum we have extortion and forum shopping by Agent Dirmeyer with the participation of federal magistrates in Northern California and the Western District of Tennessee. I am appalled as an American at the thought of this. I am equally appalled if an agent's sending child pornography to someone "without his knowledge" (Dirmeyer's own words describing the pornography) has become standard practice for postal inspectors. Sincerely, Richard D. Williams Attorney at Law [a posting I made to the net on 3/14/94] By the time this gets distributed to the net, Robert Thomas (the sysop of Amateur Action BBS), his wife, and their lawyer will be on the way to Memphis for their first hearing on obscenity charges. The charges stem from a postal inspector getting an account on Robert's BBS, downloading files (and ordering tapes) the inspector believes to be obscene in that part of the country. I expect Robert to eventually be bled dry by legal and travel expenses. I have *real* problems with the laws being applied this way. With current technology it not possible for a sysop to control or even identify the location from which BBS members call. It is almost as difficult for *anyone* to determine what is considered obscene in a given location. Such a research project would take years of lawyer time, and would still be only a guess. It would hinge on East Nowhere allowing B&D, South Backwater allowing this plus golden showers, and West Prudence allowing neither, but not being concerned with animal pix. North Nowhere might allow anything, including kiddy porn morphed from pictures of adults, and computer generated pictures of sex with space aliens. If a given local wants to impose restrictions, I don't have as much of a problem with that, since people can always move somewhere more liberal. But imposing local restrictions on a BBS 2000 miles away is not logical--because it imposes an *impossible burden* on a sysop. "You are responsible for knowing what you download (or order) is legal" was argued by the government against the people who downloaded child pornography from Denmark in "operation longarm" a year or two ago. [That BBS was taken over by the U.S. Government and the 140 or so people who called there were traced. Many of them--the ones who did not encrypt or erase what they downloaded--were busted, and now the taxpayers are paying to keep them in jail, while the violent offenders are let out for lack of space.] Given this history of imposing responsibility on the person downloading, it seems inconsistent (to say the least) for the Federal folks to impose the standards of the least liberal places in the country on a *San Francisco area* BBS. (San Francisco is, after all, "Babylon on the Bay.) In the AA BBS case, two years ago the local police had his computer for five weeks. They looked at every .gif and give it back-- which strongly implies that they considered the material on it within community standards. (They found no child pornography, which seems to be the only thing considered illegal here. Cops do not, after all, return contraband!). The postal inspector and the U.S. Attorneys do not seem all that sure of themselves this time either, since (after keeping the BBS for five days) they gave it back with the intent that the BBS continue operating. They have not asked the sysop to refuse memberships from Tennessee, or to remove any of the .gif files they considered obscene. (I think the gifs are just silly.) I am torn between thinking of these events as being part of a Memphis political attention play and an attempt to turn AA BBS into a "government asset" like the one in Denmark from which the postal inspectors could troll for pedophiles. They *did* get the email, member names, and passwords. [Do any of you want to guess how often Memphis gets mentioned in the national press? It turns out to be fewer than a dozen times a year if you discount articles about Elvis/Graceland. One of the biggest events of all time there was the Linda Lovelace/Deep Throat trials--which cost about 10 million dollars and accomplished nothing except some publicity for the U.S. Attorneys involved.] In spite of being extremely busy as the new president of Xanadu Operating Company (Hypertext) and doing a lot of analysis and programming, I have been assisting with the defense on this case. I am *very* annoyed by these proceedings because they are cutting into my productivity. I am more than open to ideas and help from people on the net to generate political pressure on the feds to get them to back off from this stupid test prosecution. One possible approach might be for someone to inform the new U.S. Attorney in Memphis (Veronica Coleman) about the case-- which I bet is being run by subordinate Dan Newsom without her even knowing about it. The investigation was started under her predecessor, Republican Ed Briant, who rose to prominence in the Deep Throat prosecutions. I strongly doubt that Veronica Coleman (Democrat and graduate of Howard University) would put a (very costly) effort to suppress a *California* adult BBS high on a list of priorities for her office. Being associate with the case makes me talking to her of questionable propriety, but there must be someone out in netland who could. The local NAACP office (901) 521-1343 might provide her phone number if someone with a reasonable level of academic or other prestige were to ask. On the other hand, she might be fully behind the prosecution. Thanks in advance for help/ideas any of you can contribute. Keith Henson (408) 972-1132

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Re: Note from EDUPAGE
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-> CALL FORWARD FOR CRIME Criminals have discovered that by forwarding their calls, they can evade wiretaps placed on their home lines. "Criminals can go to any phone, call the `intelligent network' and route calls anywhere," says an FBI special agent. The FBI estimates that 25% of all wiretaps "are adversely affected" by this telephone hide-and-seek. (Wall Street Journal 3/18/94 A5A) <- What the hell is with the FBI and figures? First they cant come up with any effects, then it's 91 instances, which was not released in EFF's FOIA request, now it's 25% of all wiretaps.... which to my math sounds like 75 or so. Oh boy.... -uni- (Dark)

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How to control Internet? Buy it!
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

News reports have it that Bill Gates and McCaw Cellular are going to build a global satellite communications network. I'm having a nightmare about a Microsoft-like domination of global communications, complete with SPA police, etc. Ugh! bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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