December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

LIST: encrypted
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

About receiving this mailing list encrypted.... I beleive Hal Finney is (was?) offering such a service. Basically you send in your public key, and Hal pipes all list mail through pgp and remails it you, from one of his anonymous remailers. I don't think many people opt for this :) but the option is there (unless Hal isn't offering it anymore). He'll probably answer when he reads the list mail! -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories

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help getting files off csn.org???
by dan＠kypris.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey all! Can someone help me out as to how to get the pgp-related stuff off csn.org? Unfortunately I don't have real ftp, only ftp through the ftp-mail-server. I have grabbed the README.MPJ file and immediately sent an ftp request to get files from the ever-changing I_will_not_export/??? directory, but get back a "no such directory". How often does the directory name change? Am I just not going to be able to get them through ftp-mail requests? Thanks, Dan --- Daniel A. Nichols Voice: (214) 307-0474 Kypris Software Systems Fax: (214) 306-3409 2601 Frankford Rd. #2703 E-Mail: dan_nichols(a)kypris.com Dallas TX 75287-4517 NeXTMail Welcome!

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Standard for Stenography?
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Firstly, congratulations for Sergey Goldgaber's stubborn pushing of this topic, for Bill Stewart's observation: "simple stego-programs, stealthy encryption programs", & for Norman Hardy's notice of the possibility of non-randomness in the low order bits of pixels. Here are my proposed standards & suggestions for stenography. 1. The stenography module is just a simple program for inserting data into a picture. The data is not plaintext! Ideally, stealth pgp is the encryption method. There should be no clever variable positional stenography. No security through obscurity. No "TOWERS of BABBLE". It must be standardized for easy conversation. I agree with Bill Stewart on this: simple stego programs, stealthy encryption programs. 2. The 1st position of the stenography is defined as the 1st pixel transmitted or received. The 1st several pixels should make up the header. The header should be of a fixed size with fixed sized & positioned fields. The header follows: 1____6 7_________17 18>>>>>>> checksum; "STENOGRAPHY"; the encrypted text The numbers refer to pixels. One bit of encrypted data per pixel. The 1st field is a checksum particular to that RSA key. The 2nd field consists of the word "STENOGRAPHY" in caps. The remainder is devoted to the encrypted msg. itself. The checksum is a standardized checksum method that has the same checksum as the RSA key. You need this in case you have given out several public keys. The checksum may also be an integral multiple of the RSA key. The reason for the checksum is in case the recipient has multiple keys, this will help him select the correct one without using huge numbers of cycles. Only 6 bits are used since that would be all that would be necessary & to eliminate the possibility of a huge number that would be large enough to constitute a legal proof. Also, by using a small number, investigators are not given much of a clue. By allowing integral multiples, you allow a fairly large number of keys but also stop small numbers from popping up a lot - no statistical suspensions! The reason for the "STENOGRAPHY" field is to assist your computer in determining if this is a stenography file & that the correct key was chosen without attempting to decrypt the whole file. I know that this presents the possibility of a small "known plaintext attack", but a good encryption system should stand up to such an attack. RSA can ... can't it? 3. No "lossy" picture methods! Two methods immediately suggest them -selves: JPEG & GIF. JPEG is ordinarily a lossy method but I am told that it has a no loss option. GIF is not a lossy method. I hear that JPEG has the ability to carry more bits per pixel than GIF so I would suppose JPEG. Also, while earlier I suggested 1 bit of encrypt per pixel it may be cool to use more. 4. Norman Hardy has suggested something that I have wondered about: are low order bits of pixels really randomly distributed? You graphic/ statistic ace's out there need to check this out & inform us. Possibly, some methods do & some don't? Inquiring cypherpunks need to know! I don't know too much about graphics, so I could use a lot of help. 5. What are the best pictures to use? I would suggest soft focus pin- up girls, mountain ranges, clouds, fields of grain, dense vegetation. Would soft focus help in all these types? note: I think kiddie-porn would be a bad idea. The above suggestions support the stealth method- strong encryption- simple stenography- public key- standardized model. If I have missed anything or you have a better idea, please let us know. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers

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Money Laundering thru Roulette
by rees＠cs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As several people asked for the reference to the guy who perfected a system for playing roulette in which one "neither wins or loses", he was Marcel Duchamp and it happened in 1924. This is on page 126 of the Eudaemonic Pie by Thomas Bass. Of course, as several people pointed out, there are a large number of ways to break even in roulette. So if you have bad money that needs laundered, why not bet evenly on red and black each time. Or even easier, buy 10,000 dollars worth of chips and then cash them in immediately. New and different money on demand. I get the impression though that I am missing something in the discussion since no one has mentioned something like this and that merely replacing the money isn't the objective here. --Dave

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Re: Press Release on Secure NCSA Mosiac
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal wrote: > I suppose it goes without saying that the kinds of privacy-protecting > credentials we have been discussing are not what is being discussed here. No, but hopefully the standard can be extended (officially or unofficially) to include them, even if only a relatively small fraction of organisations will use the privacy-protection extensions initially. Hopefully once some organisations are doing so they'll have a real competitive advantage over those who want to collect marketing data. >This is outrageous! Where on earth did they get the idea that non-U.S. >residents have access only to 40 bit keys and RC2/RC4? Don't worry - as soon as it hits the streets in Europe I'm sure a number of us will be ripping out the RC4 code and implementing real encryption systems instead.... (assuming it comes as source code, otherwise we'll have to upgrade the normal Mosaic source instead once the standard is settled). Overall, I think it's a good thing, and hey, at least it isn't using Clipper !

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LP Press Release about Digital Telephony Act and Clipper (fwd)
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: Date: Tue, 19 Apr 1994 00:58:37 -0400 (EDT) From: Libertarian Party Headquarters <lphq(a)access.digex.net> Subject: LP Press Release about Digital Telephony Act and Clipper To: eff(a)eff.org NEWS FROM THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY 1528 Pennsylvania Avenue SE Washington DC 20003 For immediate release: April 18, 1994 For additional information: Bill Winter, Director of Communications (202) 543-1988 Libertarian Party Announces Opposition to Digital Telephony Act Calling it a "serious infringement of civil liberties and a gross violation of property rights," the Libertarian Party National Committee unanimously voted to oppose the Digital Telephony and Communications Act of 1994. At their quarterly meeting in Kansas City, Missouri, the governing body of America's third-largest political party charged that "the Digital Telephony Act would make furnishing the FBI with easy wiretapping capability the overriding priority for designers of telephone equipment and related software." "It is a lie to call this legislation a 'Privacy Improvement Act,'" said Bill Evers, the National Committee member from California who sponsored the resolution. The Digital Telephony Act, noted the resolution, "requires telephone, cable television, and computer network companies to ensure that the government can conduct surveillance while private communication is going on. It requires the installation of surveillance-facilitating software in telephone switching equipment to expose personal information - such as telephone-calling patterns, credit card purchases, banking records, and medical records - to the view of the government." "Such personal information should be the private property of either the company that assembles it or the individual to whom it pertains," said Evers. Libertarians also oppose the Digital Telephony Act because it "would require a fundamental re-engineering of the communications infrastructure at great expense to American taxpayers, and to the owners of private communications systems," said Evers. The Libertarian National Committee also unanimously voted to oppose the National Security Agency's Escrowed Encryption Standard - the so-called Clipper Chip system - or any "government policies promoting or requiring specific encryption methods for civilian use." The party also urged the "repeal of the U.S. ban on export abroad of Clipper-free encryption devices produced by American companies." "Government-mandated encryption standards will foster indiscriminate surveillance of private communications by the government," charged Evers. The resolution said "the Clinton Administration plans to induce American manufacturers to install government-readable encryption devices in every telephone, fax machine, and computer modem made in the United States." "The Clinton Administration is explicitly denying that the American people have the right to communicate in private," said Evers. By contrast, he said, "The Libertarian Party has long upheld the civil liberties of the American citizen." Approximately 120 Libertarians serve in elected and appointed office around the country, including four State Representatives in New Hampshire and two mayors in California. The Libertarian Party platform calls for vigorous defense of the Bill of Rights, free enterprise, civil liberties, free trade, and private charity. # # # The Libertarian Party America's third largest political party 1528 Pennsylvania Avenue SE (202) 543-1988 Washington DC 20003 Internet: LPHQ(a)digex.net ***Send email or call 1-800-682-1776 for free information package by mail***

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Re: BEST Inc.
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Simple solution to this problem, especially if you have strong magnets >around.... De-magnitize the card. > >If you are a ham operator, you can use the magnetic mount on the basis of >your mobile antenna whip. If you're not, get a big magnet... > Or a bulk tape eraser from Radio Shack. They've a thousand household uses! No home should be without one! :-) Ken +===========================================================================+ | Ken Kirksey kkirksey(a)world.std.com Mac Guru & Developer | +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | When the going gets tough, the tough hide under the table. | | -Edmund Blackadder | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbQwAesZNYlu+zuBAQEeoQQAieN3U5lMrpk24APiEkFQi42oG65ZE8RX My/fEoNolwMnwIh9MkWQeBjfSx8Ixzwcq3vSla2XgWw6UcXxExvxzSUc1IM38zN1 p1qpoDwBatdonZoua7G3mlrxRgxEVMLCakO3aM9HNj4QTNpjJFDWSv5wzLDwBPaX ptmZjAgT+mo= =rqQB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Money Laundering thru Roulette
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I neglected to cc: the list on this reply to David Rees, and he was kind enough to send me back the message so I could post it here. This is me speaking: > > Maybe I'm just misunderstanding the point David Rees is making: > > > Of course, as several people pointed out, there are a large number > > of ways to break even in roulette. So if you have bad money that > > needs laundered, why not bet evenly on red and black each time. Or even > > easier, buy 10,000 dollars worth of chips and then cash them in immediately. > > New and different money on demand. > > I get the impression though that I am missing something in the > > discussion since no one has mentioned something like this and that merely > > replacing the money isn't the objective here. > > No, converting one wad of, say, $100,000 into another wad of $100,000 > is not the goal. > > Let us suppose "Hillary" (much more interesting than our usual > cryptographic stand-in, Alice) want to be able to spend $100,000 given > to her by a friend at Tyson Foods in exchange for regulatory favors. > > He gives her a wad of $100,000. She takes this wad to Las Vegas (or, > now, to the nearby Mississippi River gambling boats) and "exchanges" > it. What has been accomplished? Nothing, except the comparatively > trivial change in serial numbers (which _can_ be an issue if the bills > are marked, as in a sting, but this is rarely an issue). > > This is a _kind_ of money laudering, as is literally running currency > through washer-dryer cycles (yes, this is done), but this is not the > common meaning of "laundering," and the one which we're focussing on here. > > No, one of the main goals of money-laundering is to make the > bribe/whatever money appear to be "legitimately earned," so that taxes > may be paid on it (yes) and the money then used for other investments, > buying houses, etc. "Legitimately earned" can mean won in Las Vegas, > or in cattle futures, etc. Hence the schemes here. > > (In Hillary's case, suddenly having $100K that the IRS and other > agencies can find no "paper trail" for would be evidene of bribery, > for example. I suppose Hillary could claim it came out of her > mattress, where she'd been saving money for years, but I doubt this > would fly.) > > U.S. casinos are closely watched for this kind of thing, of course. I > wonder if the IRS looks suspiciously at money won at the casinos on > Paradise Island, Bahamas? Or elsewhere. > > And, germane to our list, the "Internet Casino" that Nick Szabo and > others have talked about someday building. > > --Tim May > > > -- > .......................................................................... > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. > Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. > "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Remailer Musings
by juola＠bruno.cs.colorado.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I disagree with Brad's interpretation. For example, if I photocopy a book and anonymously snail mail it to people, do you think the postal service is going to take the fall? Nope - they are just a carrier, and are not responsible for content. Like the common carriers - they just receive a message and pass it along. They aren't responsible for message content. If Brad Templeton's view of the world was the prevailing (or correct) one, then every common carrier in the country, including Ma Bell and the US Postal Service, would not exist, because they would've been sued out of existence long ago. On the other hand, part of the rules of being a common carrier are that one is *required* to cooperate with appropriate authorities to prevent this sort of abuse and to catch said abusers if/when it happens. I suspect that Mr. Templeton's lawyer could make a case that by setting up a remailer where one cannot "trace calls," one is violating the requirements of being a common carrier, and thus is responsible for content. - kitten

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re: Sgt Russell
by Graham Toal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: joshua geller <joshua(a)cae.retix.com> : I don't see any reason why sgt. harlow shouldn't be as welcome : as anyone else on the list. there are a large number of people : in the military, and any generalization drawn about them is : likely to be false (of course all generalizations are false, but : that is another matter). for those who enjoy paranoia, I would : point out that sgt. harlow is not the only person on this list : with past or present military associations. Quite right. This is ex Signals-Officer 23434072 Toal, G saying 'Roger out to you hello Charlie Papa come in over.' :-) G

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Re: Money Laundering thru Roulette
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was a more interesting case in, I believe, Australia. Someone who wanted to bribe a politician instead libeled him. The politician sued, and they ``settled'' out of court.

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Re: CRYPTO: Money laundering and traceability
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) > > >Chaum's arguments appear to apply to virtually any electronic cash > >system which can prevent double-spending. They suggest that traceable > >cash will be the rule in any digicash system. > > That's true for transferable and off-line cash systems. The same > argument doesn't hold for on-line systems. There you can have an > exchange protocol to deposit a piece of digicash and immediately > rewithdraw it, blinding it again in the process. There need be no > account with the bank for this to happen. This is a good point, although I think on-line systems are unlikely to be used for payments to private individuals such as in the scenarios I mentioned, because of the cost of accessing a centralized database for every transaction. In any case, this suggests that it might be unwise to carry cash issued by such a bank, because of your vulnerability to robbery. Chaum even considered (in another paper) the threat of being coerced into withdrawing cash from a bank in such a way that you don't see the blinded cash. He had an approach where you would get all of your "blinding certificates" when you opened your account, and these would be the only things you could use to blind cash. So any stolen cash could always be recognized. I suppose one risk is that the robber exchanges the cash so quickly that the robbee has no chance to warn the bank; and once exchanged the cash is certainly anonymous. Perhaps banks would instigate some minimum time for handling an exchange in order to protect their cash holders from this threat. Hal

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Re: Intolerance on the list
by Jim Sewell - KD4CKQ 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<My computer told me that Russell Whitaker said:> >> My job is important to me. Learning about cryptography is going to >> help me protect my systems and my messages. I have no desire to eavesdrop on >> what you or anyone else is doing on this list. I merely want to learn, and > > Your motivations seem clear enough to me. Dig in! Enjoy yourself here, and I > look forward to your participation. I also agree with Russell. Although the organization for which you work may be unnerving to some, they should be willing to give you a shot at being an ok kinda guy as a freethinking individual. Besides that, has anyone considered this: If the good Sargeant here gets his system secured with PGP and Uncle Sam (via the President's efforts) says everything else is bad, you must use clipper... wouldn't it be good ammo to say 'Hey guys! Site x.y.z is secured to military satisfaction by using PGP. Clipper is somewhat weak and you even admit it by not allowing it to secure classified info. I think it would be great ammo in blowing up the Information Super-Highway-Patrol. Keep asking your questions and thinking freely! Jim -- Tantalus Inc. Bringing people together Jim Sewell-KD4CKQ 2407 N. Roosevelt Blvd. to have a little fun. Internet: jims(a)mpgn.com Key West, FL 33041 CIS: 71061,1027 (305) 293-8100 "We keep coding and coding and coding..."

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S Milgram & Authority Response
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >This shows that, in real situations, people will follow herd instincts >and obey orders. >rgds-- TA (tallard(a)frb.gov) Milgram had 66% go to the end of the board with the subjects believing they had killed a person with electric shock. I saw him present the paper. I asked him at the end, placing ethical questions aside, what he felt the most important finding of this research was. He paused thoughtfully, and said: We better be DAMN careful who we put in authority in this country. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbRG11/ScHuGXWgVAQG+yQQAzEXu8jNbhMTXebcgEBuqlA9OCv9we2fK NnyfE8w+TVACgikfzWg2yMWVx99zdrx5g3dlbNvkgz9qhR7tdzLmuh0pRmbN8/gP MUm4B+siLmyeSp5qk9eAxvz9WttcLk5oy0+VCPFcv4EgNRp1Ce67YM4/A5uGqDP9 FyDIvssiWTQ= =+yb+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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re; intolerance on the list
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well, now that the issue of Marines on the list is settled, perhaps the good SGT could share some non classified knowledge of the USMC's extensive use of Banyan Vines. For those who didn't know, during Desert storm every Marine tank was a Banyan server, the self healing nature of this network proved very effective, in fact "Stormin Norman" gave it credit as one of the three key assets we had. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot Ex-Marine Current NRA/ILA and other nasty stuff "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth "When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro" - Dr Hunter S Thompson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbRJztCcBnAsu2t1AQGAEAQAg9z4ddgWqHz6EWQjCGj6dA8o6gFV3YVp q7UhK6EFzqYhhaIxXoI0z/Bvhdw+r4ZRYySXC4y0tcAYFns5mbj1Z3SB5BAytN4l FySoWWjylIRYShwLBO8pmbxF1m/SqZJWkAn9bu17uLAHSlJHxZxbhhqi1q1HtOnW ZFoaWBjs8nU= =Viyp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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TIS/PEM
by forsythe＠fiji.oc.nps.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Our site is preparing to implement the PEM package from Trusted Information systems. The package is available to US/Canadian users from ftp.tis.com Any comments on this package would be appreciated. It appears to use a licensed version of RSAREF. But I just got the docs, so I can't say much else about it. "Sometimes we get lost in the darkness, The dreamers learn how to steer by the stars" ******************************************************************** ** Carl R. Forsythe ** Naval Postgraduate School ** ** forsythe(a)oc.nps.navy.mil ** Monterey, California ** ** crforsyt(a)nps.navy.mil ** Office Phone (408)-656-2836 ** ******************************************************************** Any view presented in this text is purely my own and not that of the United States Government, The Department of Defense, The Department of the Navy or The Naval Postgraduate School. PGP Key available by finger.

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Re: S Milgram & Authority Response
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > >>This shows that, in real situations, people will follow herd instincts >>and obey orders. > >>rgds-- TA (tallard(a)frb.gov) > >Milgram had 66% go to the end of the board with the subjects believing >they had killed a person with electric shock. I saw him present the paper. >I asked him at the end, placing ethical questions aside, what he felt the >most important finding of this research was. He paused thoughtfully, and >said: > > We better be DAMN careful who we put in authority in this country. Really? When was this, precisely? -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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More futures trading analysis...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a paper analysis based on my phone calls to a few brokerage firms and a forage through the stack of old newspapers. If anyone has the time to read through the rest of it, I would appreciate it if you could alert me to any errors in either judgement or execution. Here are the prices for the June S&P 500 Index Futures. These contracts have a value of $500 times the cost of the index when they expire in June. That means the person who bought the contract gets $500 times the index value.The person who sold a contract would have to pay that amount. The clearing house is responsible for making sure the money gets from one place to another. If the contract expired on April 6, for instance, then it would be worth $224,025. Here are some prices gathered from a stack of newspapers waiting to be recycled. They show the S+P 500 date open high low close open-close range March 25 1994 464.70 466.50 459.80 459.95 -4.75 (+1.80 - 4.80) March 29 1994 461.35 461.35 451.00 451.65 -9.70 (+0.00 -10.35) March 31 1994 451.85 453.60.445.60 446.15 -5.70 (+1.75 - 6.25) April 4 1994 435.80 441.75 434.75 439.25 +3.45 (+5.95 - 1.05) April 6 1994 448.45 451.00 440.80 447.25 -1.20 (+2.55 - 8.35) April 7 1994 447.10 452.00 445.90 450.50 +3.40 (+4.90 - 1.20) April 8 1994 450.60 450.95 444.95 447.25 -3.35 (+0.35 -5.65) April 11 1994 447.25 450.90 446.30 450.45 +3.20 (+2.65 -0.95) April 14 1994 446.05 448.00 442.90 445.95 -0.10 (+1.95 -3.15) April 18 1994 446.05 447.80 440.70 442.40 -3.65 (+1.75 -5.35) {There are other days out there, but the newspapers were thrown away or whatever.} In practice, you can usually buy futures contracts by only putting up 5% of the current value of the contract. You can (and usually want to) put up more because the banks and brokerage houses want that amount available to cover losses. You need to maintain 5% of the current value. That means that if the price goes the wrong way and you have less than 5% on hand you have to add more money to your account. This is known as a margin call. Let's assume: Assume that the market will move at least +/- 3 points in a day. Assume that the market isn't moving too fast so you're able to close out a position moving the wrong direction at 3 points off. (There is not as much need to really worry about this because the money isn't disappearing. It's just moving in the wrong way too fast to stop it.) If you want to move $50,000 in _one_ day by opening the transaction in the morning and closing it in the evening, then you would need to move 34 contracts. The 10% margin requirements for these 34 contracts would mean that you must have about $800,000 on hand to cover losses. The cost of borrowing $800,000 for a day at a 10% annual rate is about $220 in interest. Let's assume that the market inefficiencies are about .10 to open the position and .10 to close the position. That means that the difference between the price you buy the futures and the price you sell them is different by .10 in the morning and .10 in the evening. (.10 in the wrong way.) That means you could lose $3400 in trading costs if you can't execute the 34 contract trades successfully at the same price. This gives me the following approximate transaction costs: Day 1 Commissions $200 x 2 on 34 Contr. (guess) Interest Costs $220 x 2 on $800,000 Market Inefficiencies $1700 x 2 --------- 4240 Chance of Succeeding: 50%. So if things go wrong: Day 2 Commissions $400 x 2 on 68 Contr. (guess) Interest Costs $420 x 2 on $1,600,000 Market Inefficiencies $3400 x 2 --------- $8480 Assume you guess that the market will move correctly: 50%. That means you will have moved the $50,000 by now in 75% of the cases. But if things still go wrong: Day 3 Commissions $800 x 2 on 136 Contr. (guess) Interest Costs $840 x 2 on $3,200,000 Market Inefficiencies $6800 x 2 --------- $16920 Assume you guess that the market will move correctly: 50%. That means you will have moved the $50,000 by now in 87.5% of the cases. If these conservative calculations are correct, then it is possible to move $50,000 for $4240n in all but 2^{-n} of the cases. Note, there were about 60,000 S&P 500 contracts traded in the average day. I would guess that even 544 contracts wouldn't make a too much of a difference. Especially since half would be buying and the other half would be selling. There are many places where these numbers may be off, but I believe that I've erred on the side of extreme conservatism by putting up 10% of the contracts' value. Many people who do day trading have low margin requirements. As you can see, the net profits or loss in the day was never more than 3% in the days I included. And the list included a big trading day when the market lost plenty. I've also assumed that the market inefficiences would always move against me. In one sense, this is probably fair because brokers are known to buy a contract and then resell it to a customer for a fraction more. This leads me to the following conclusions: *) It is not cheap to do this well. You could do it for less with some more risk. *) It may take very good timing to execute the straddle effectively. The market inefficiencies are the biggest cost. Being a floor broker may be essential. *) If you can open the position at the same price i.e buy and sell the contracts at the same price, then you've got a good deal. I would appreciate any questions or comments about the details in this very approximate estimate. -Peter Wayner

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Re: BEST Inc.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the info is on the card, follow the refrigerator magnet idea if you don't want them to cash your cheque. Or do as the Sarge did. Then, instead of having a record that you purchased Pentouse Letters on April 14 at 10:33 pm in Mac's Milk on the corner of Broadway and 110th, they have a record of your withdrawal of 50 bucks from the atm and a picture in their video database as you did the withdrawal. Six of one, half a dozen of the other. [Deletions] If the info is in the database, and it is (even though _this_ pos terminal may not have access to it) then - well, if you object to this, keep up with cp and other fora, get yourself some fake or anonymous id's (?), write code, use pgp, become judgement proof, move and don't set up forwarding addresses, have your id killed, etc. Bill Garland, whose .sig just vanished <- What might be really useful is a list of the different measures used on all the states ID's. For example: Maryland uses a magnetic strip, Digitized Photo and a bar code. All that is printed on a credit card like card and not laminated. Military ID's are green and white paper with a polaroid and a signiture, normal lamination. Illinois is a normal lamination with a complete photo within, no bar code or strip, no digitized photo record. Anyone want to further the list? I wouldn't mind compiling the information. What seems key and most attractive to those who are willing to go through the trouble, is identifying the states that use limited measures, espeically avoiding the magnetic strip and digitized photo states, and getting your license(s) in the states that are "behind the times." -uni- (Dark)

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Banyan Vines / USMC
by SGT=DARREN=S.=HARLOW%ISB%MCTSSA＠nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Banyan Vines network was used extensively in Desert Storm/Shield/Sweep. Before the network was in place, people were using a single channel radio relay box called the Hadron. It was capable of being used with the KY-57 (crypto) on the PRC-77 (single channel radio), as well as satcom (PSC-3). Once the network was up and in place. Internet shots were coordinated with Quantico, VA, so that the supply cycles, and requests could be sent in real time. Not every Marine tank was a Banyan server, networks were installed down to the regiment HQ level. Remote shots were done over MUX lines with KG-84 as the crypto, on a four wire leased circuits. This allowed for secure communications within the theater of operations, as well as unclassified communications with the rear (stateside). A number of different ways are available to the Marine Corps to talk to remote spots, and new ways are being found all of the time. If there is further interest, I would be more than happy to post further to the list. Sgt Darren Harlow - Computer Security MCTSSA, Camp Pendleton, USMC Internet: harlowd(a)nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil or another less reliable & slower: harlow(a)mqg1.usmc.mil Voice: Comm: (619) 725-2970 DSN (Autovon): 365-2970 Fax: Comm: (619) 725-9512 DSN (Autovon): 365-9512 PGP Public key available upon request "The views expressed are my own, and always will be..."

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Re: Warrentless Search
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: Ed Carp <ecarp(a)netcom.com> : This was the famous Millikan experiment in the 50's (60's?). The Erm... wasn't that the one where people were suspended between two electric plates and the voltage adjusted so they *wouldn't* get a shock? ;-) G Nee hee Neddie! Shot in the cringe!

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Black Net
by killbarny＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone heard of BlackNet? BlackNet is in the business of buying, selling, trading, and otherwise dealing with information in all its many forms. Through PGP and anonymous remailers, the folks at BlackNet plan to create a huge black market in data: trade secrets, processes, production methods, nanotechnology, privacy databases, and chemical manufacturing. The only way to get in is to find a BlackNet-oriented message (one with the BlackNet PGP key), then respond to it, using anonymous remailers and PGP. It might be found in <alt.extropians> or <alt.fan.davidsternlight>. If anyone knows about this [or their address/key], please send.

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re: Sgt Russell
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just wondering, but if Sgt. Russell is kicked off the list, how will we ever convert the military? Don't we want them on our side in the coup? Smiley to taste, Phil

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Banyan vine use by US Marine Corps...
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a reply to Sgt. Harlow's message about Banyan Vines: Of all the methods the military uses, they are all jammable by one means or another given enough effort, right? There's no totally non-blockable means of communication available to the military or civilian sectors, is there? Trying to get back on topic, Phil

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Re: Remailer Musings
by juola＠bruno.cs.colorado.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ed Carp sez : I understand your objections, but think about it this way: nothing in the world says that you have to put a return address on the envelope. Nothing in the world says that you have to present any form of ID in order to drop a letter into a postal box. Sure, the postal inspectors have to "cooperate", but if you drop a letter with no return address into a box, how could they trace it back to you? Are people going to say to the US postal folks, "hey, it's *your* fault that they didn't put a return address on their envelope!" I think not. Yes, but that's not what anonymous remailers *do*. Anonymous remailers accept mail that comes in an envelope *with a return address* and repackage it in a different envelope without a return address. So, yes, in a way, it *is* the analogical Post Office's fault that the letter arrived without a return address. Similarly, I think that anonymous remailers, like the post office, ma bell, etc., are common carriers. You can't have it both ways - either you are a common carrier and exercise no editorial control over what goes through your remailer, or you are a publisher, and are held to a certain degree of legal responsibility. But if one is a common carrier, one is required to assist. The whole remailer paradigm is designed to prevent such assistance. Therefore, by running a remailer, you are stating that you are *not* willing to assist the appropriate authorities, i.e. that you are not a common carrier. Or so a lawyer could claim. - kitten

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