December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Review of a Review
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A new novel, "Black Money" by Michael M. Thomas was reviewed in the Sunday and Monday New York Times (both). It concerns the money laundering of the proceeds from the retail pharmaceutical trade. >From the Monday review: Black money, says a character ... is "money fleeing regulation, taxation or disclosure....Offshore is where it seeks and acquires anonymity. Of course, you must not think of 'offshore' as having a defined physical geography, as an exotic setting for a Paul Erdman novel. Offshore is no longer of our geography: it exists in what is called cyberspace, its cartography is digital. You can be in the bar of this very hotel, and if you have a palmtop computer and a phone jack you can make yourself every bit as 'offshore' as if you were sitting on a Swiss mountaintop or a beach on Vanuatu." Make that a palmtop and a wireless net link... DCF "If 5 billion people each have the ability to travel anywhere, buy anywhere, sell anywhere, invest anywhere, and communicate with anyone, the design of a control regime to rule them quickly becomes an NP complete problem." - DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Sternlight and Stokes
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Has anyone else noticed that David Sternlight has been quiet for the past > two weeks or so? > I hope he's not like you-know-who in that mentioning his name summons the > fiend. Coincidentally, or maybe not, a fellow named Ralph Stokes (Ralph.Stokes(a)f1611.n375.z1.fidonet.org) has been mentioning "you-know-who" by name all over the net in his now infamous "Beware of Roman Catholic Corruption" spam, and accusing all matter of people of being in league with him. You don't suppose that, with Sternlight's disappearance and Stokes' appearance that ... nah, forget it...

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"military" one-time-pad generation
by fasttech!zeke＠uu4.psi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While we're on the topic of random numbers, etc., this is what I was told a long time ago about military OTPs. I don't know if this OTP generation was by NSA or by one of the military forces itself. And, as this information is at least 10 years old, who knows if this is how it's still done. And maybe it was disinformation, and never done this way. Anyway, there was supposedly a heavily shielded room which had equipment that used radioactive decay to generate random numbers. Apparently it was pretty automated and the thing basically spit out pairs of paper OTP pads that were already prewrapped in tamperproof packaging. To me, this makes more sense than Clancy's "atmospheric noise" hypothesis. But then, Clancy was generating entire CD's worth of bits, which would certainly need orders of magnitude more bits than actual paper pads.

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Lotto odds
by edgar＠spectrx.sbay.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May said, ...As for lotto, simple calculations tell anyone that the best way to win is not to play. The return _at best_ is 30 or 40 cents on the dollar, with the rest going to all the various programs the lotto is supposed to support. The more you play, the more you lose. Actually, if memory serves, the CA Lotto claims to return 50% of income in prizes with the remainder divided between schools and "administration." Better than 30-40, but still worse than odds on any casino game or even the "numbers racket" run by organized crime. However, one can improve the percentage by only playing lotto after 1 or more games where there was no perfect match, as often happens, where some of the prize money is carried over to the next game, and so on, until eventually somebody wins the grand prize. After some number "x" of passed games, the odds turn in favor of the player; but not by too much since this is just when large numbers of people play and if more than one perfect ticket is played, the prize is split. Calculation of "x" is not "simple", since you also have to figure in the 20-year (with no interest) payout of large prizes. One other tip for lotto players: Never mark your ticket with any recognizable pattern. The random "quick pick" is probably best. Reason: A pattern is equally likely to be picked at random as a "quick pick" but much -more- likely to also be picked by some other schmuck. So if your pattern pick wins, you're more likely to have to split the prize. -- edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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Use of large Keys
by edgar＠spectrx.sbay.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Roger Bryner said, ...You should always take some reasonable ammount of time(say 5 min) to encrypt your most sensitive messages, even if you have a 12 crays and a connection machene. The algorithim can be viewed as giving you an economic advantage, and worying over spending $.01 vs $.0001 is not just stingy, it is dangerous. I disagree. The problem is not time to ENcrypt, which is not much greater for large keys than small ones. This is because the ENcryption exponent is usually a small number, like 17. The problem is the time for your recipient to DEcrypt. On my 386/SX 16mz, DEcrypting a msg with a 4096-bit key takes 5-10 minutes. I have a report that a Pentium takes about 1.5 minutes. During that 5-10 minutes, many recipients will not sit there watching grass grow, but will leave the PC unattended to do something else. If during that time Janet Reno's storm troopers break through the front door, your recipient may not have time to power-off the PC and PGP will deliver your plaintext message right into JR's hands! Thus in some cases use of a large key can -reduce- security of your msg. I haven't worked out the math, but I suspect that an 8000-bit key is completely impractical for use on any desktop machine. At this time, open use of a large key marks you as not using an MIT version of PGP, thus making you a target of RSA. This is easily avoided by exchanging large keys and messages encrypted with large keys "inside an envelope" of 1024-bit key encryption. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLg6Mjd4nNf3ah8DHAQErZwP/RiKYC+iTX61iuNV/a8Ga1H3Cz1M/r1iL 0gYiHId1QckiKcWMt1f9XwbT4TpY9OWrVKb7wK1N94nKQq7T56eg/fuoEC4e2TlL j5WXHX8S5SEUPWpTeU0V2XsnYeojsyBCHh8keVcDROr6nBZmxACmSxWEFMTjYfUf 3x8YdS2ThoE= =0CI+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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NSA Agents Threaten to Kill Bidzos of RSA? (fwd)
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Another interesting part of this article (Monday San Jose Mercury News) quotes Lynn McNulty of NIST saying that they explicitly chose DSS as the FIPS digital signature standard in order to discourage use of RSA. It looks like Bidzos has a clear case for a restraint of trade lawsuit. Bidzos would also be well advised to tape record any future conversations he has with NSA officials.

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Re: Sternlight
by tim werner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 17:03:59 -0500 >From: "Bill O'Hanlon" <wmo(a)digibd.com> >Content-Length: 308 >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk > >Has anyone else noticed that David Sternlight has been quiet for the past >two weeks or so? Sternlight does not belong to this list. Why are you looking for him here? tw

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NSA Agents Threaten to Kill Bidzos of RSA?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a lead article in the New York Times Business Section today on Bidzos and RSA. It reviews current crypto, RSA, NSA and others. If there is interest I will transcribe the article for this forum. John

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Re: Lotto odds
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: >I've never played, and never plan to. Money down the drain. I have a completely different attitude towards mega-buck lotteries. I seem them as a form of entertainment. For less than the price of a two hour movie, I can purchase a ticket that is good for a few days of daydreaming. Yes, I admit it, although the rational portion of my brain understands the odds against winning are mostly zero, there still exists a portion of my brain that says "sure, but mostly zero means partly non-zero". I derive pleasure from the daydreams of instant wealth that mega-buck lotteries make possible. Therefore, for me, it's not money down the drain. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com ObC'punk: [regarding export of crypto] "That the arguments they are hearing about American companies are unproven, and that no single case of a problem has been documented (in his view)." What's the official government form I need to fill out to prove loss of revenue from an inability to export a version of our product that was never produced since we knew in advance we would not be able to export it?

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Markoff/NSA/RSA
by KillBarny＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's something to put in your FYI files... 6/28:PROFIT AND EGO IN DATA SECRECY By JOHN MARKOFF c.1994 N.Y. Times News Service REDWOOD CITY, Calif. - If the web of thousands of computer networks around the world can be thought of as an information superhighway, then Jim Bidzos is one of its best-placed toll takers. Bidzos expects to become very rich - unless the government has its way. As president of a Silicon Valley company called RSA Data Security Inc., Bidzos, 39, controls the patents for software crucial to scrambling and unscrambling computer messages so they can be sent confidentially. Just about anyone using a computer network - whether for sending personal messages, filing taxes electronically, or shopping from home with a credit card - would want such confidentiality. On the strength of its coding technology, RSA has sold more than four million copies of its software, and it has won wide support from industry giants like Apple Computer, AT&T, IBM, Lotus Development, Microsoft, Motorola, Northern Telecom, Novell and Sun Microsystems. Until recently cryptography, the science of sending secret messages, was a province generally populated by the armed forces, governments and their spies. But with the rise of commercial computer networks, cryptography has become an essential ingredient in information-age services. RSA's software is based on an innovation in cryptography that permits people to exchange private messages without actually getting together beforehand and arranging a secret password. In the past, cryptography required that the two parties to a communication first meet to exchange a large number that enabled them to encode and decode messages. RSA's system employs two keys, one for encoding a message, known as a public key, and another for decoding it, called a private key. People who wish to receive secret messages can freely distribute their public key, which enables senders to encode a message. Only with the private key can the message be decoded. A company selling products on-line, for instance, might make its public key widely available, which would enable customers to send in a coded message containing their credit card numbers that could not be intercepted and read by others. The company could decode those messages with its private key, which has a mathematical relationship to the public one. The government fears that should the RSA system become available abroad, it would lose its ability to eavesdrop and wiretap in cases involving risks to national security. It would much prefer that the global standard be based on its own Clipper encryption standard, which has a "backdoor" that law enforcement officials can peek through. Precisely because the RSA method has no backdoor, it is the choice of industry. But to some government officials, Bidzos is nothing short of a scheming businessman. "The government would like him not to exist," said Jeffrey Schiller, a computer manager at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has negotiated a licensing deal with Bidzos. And Stuart Baker, who until several weeks ago was chief counsel of the National Security Agency, observed, "My sense is that his motivation is no more than trying to convince people to buy his products." Officials at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, another federal agency, say they want to create a standard that is not beholden to the patents of one small company. And the National Security Agency and the Justice Department want a standard that will allow law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop on suspected criminals or violators of national security. >From Bidzos' perspective, Washington remains bound up in a cold war mentality, and should simply get out of the way and let RSA Data go about its business. What is more, he complains, any number of foreign companies are developing encryption techniques just as hard to crack as his, so the government's efforts to keep him from exporting his software are useless, and perhaps counterproductive. Notwithstanding the official concerns, RSA has developed a loyal following among a wide range of computer, communications and software companies. "They have the strongest technology and the best reputation in the cryptography business," said William Ferguson, vice president of Semaphore Inc., a maker of data-scrambling systems that licenses RSA's software. Adding spice to this dispute is Bidzos' ability to outmaneuver the government, most recently by snatching a crucial patent from under the noses of officials who were planning to use it in an official standard they are trying to establish. Several years ago, two top computer scientists from the National Institute of Standards and Technology traveled to Europe to meet with a German mathematician, Claus Schnorr, who holds a key patent that the government's coding system may violate. When they returned to the United States, the scientists told their superiors that the United States should license Schnorr's patent. But Washington was slow to act. So in March 1993, while Bidzos was on a trip to France, he met with Schnorr for a four-hour lunch. By the end of the meal, Bidzos had a deal to use Schnorr's patent. Despite Bidzos' high profile in the world of encryption, RSA's revenue is small - somewhere between $5 million and $10 million annually. But analysts say that the company has the ability to grow substantially. "They have a huge opportunity in the Internet," said Lisa Thorell, a researcher at Dataquest in San Jose, Calif., referring to the global web of computer networks that is regarded as a working but primitive model of a global data highway. RSA is also playing an increasing role in the $500 million secure-communications business for equipment that permits safe financial transactions and voice and data communications. The issue clouding the future of the company is how severely it will suffer from export controls and competing standards backed by the National Security Agency. Last month the government made its own competing standard for signing electronic documents mandatory for all federal agencies, and declared that the digital signature standard, as it is known, did not violate RSA's technology. Bidzos thinks that Washington is infringing his patents, and, eventually, the strength of his patent claims will be tested in court. Rather then sue the government, Bidzos is likely to start with one of the small companies, like Group Technologies Corporation in Tampa, that is making components under a government contract, industry executives say. Bidzos, who is a Greek citizen and a permanent resident of the United States, was working at a small international marketing firm in 1985 when he decided to move from Florida to the Silicon Valley to help a friend save a failing business. "I wanted to do deals and stay in luxury hotels," he said recently at his office here. "I had no idea I'd be in the center of a political whirlwind." When Bidzos joined the company in 1986, RSA was a shoestring operation about to go into bankruptcy. With his help, RSA struck a deal with Lotus Development in 1987, in which the software giant agreed to advance money for the right to include RSA software in Lotus Notes, a program designed for work groups of office employees. A year later RSA was presented with an offer to be acquired by Rupert Murdoch in a multimillion-dollar deal. A Murdoch subsidiary, the News Data Communications Corp., was developing technology for Murdoch's Sky TV. So in 1988 Bidzos flew twice to Britain to attempt to negotiate a deal, but the sides were far apart on price. He says the offers to buy RSA still roll in. "I've received no less than five firm, written offers in the last two years," he said. He also says he doesn't think that the government can regain the upper hand in the cryptography wars. "They've fired every weapon they have at us now, and we're stronger than ever," Bidzos said. "All they can do is try and get RSA legislated out of business, and that will never happen, in my opinion."

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NY Times on Bidzos and RSA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From The New York Times, June 28, 1994, pages D1, D5: "Profit and Ego in Data Secrecy" [headline]. By John Markoff. Special to The New York Times. REDWOOD CITY, Calif., June 27 -- If the web of thousands of computer networks around the world can be thought of as an information superhighway, then Jim Bidzos is one of its best-placed toll takers. Mr. Bidzos expects to become very rich -- unless the Government has its way. As president of a Silicon Valley company called RSA Data Security Inc., Mr. Bidzos, 39, controls the patents for software crucial to scrambling and unscrambling computer messages so they can be sent confidentially. Just about anyone using a computer network -- whether for sending personal messages, filing taxes electronically, or shopping from home with a credit card -- would want such confidentiality. On the strength of its coding technology, RSA has sold more than four million copies of its software, and it has won wide support from industry giants like Apple Computer, I.B.M., Lotus Development, Microsoft, Motorola, Northern Telecom, Novell and Sun Microsystems. Not Just for Spies Anymore [subhead] Until recently cryptography, the science of sending secret messages, was a province generally populated by the armed forces, governments and their spies. But with the rise of commercial computer networks, cryptography has become an essential ingredient in information-age services. RSA's software is based on an innovation in cryptography that permits people to exchange private messages without actually getting together beforehand and arranging a secret password. In the past, cryptography required that two parties to a communication first meet to exchange a large number that enabled them to encode and decode messages. RSA's system employs two keys, one for encoding a message, known as a public key, and another for decoding it, called a private key. People who wish to receive secret messages can freely distribute their public key, which enables senders to encode a message. Only with the private key can the message be decoded. A company selling products on-line, for instance, might make its public key widely available, which would enable customers to send in a coded message containing their credit card numbers that could not be intercepted and read by others. The company could decode those messages with its private key, which has a mathematical relationship to the public one. The Government fears that should the RSA system become available abroad, it would lose its ability to eavesdrop and wiretap in cases involving risks to national security. It would much prefer that the global standard be based on its own Clipper encryption standard, which has a "backdooor" that law enforcement officials can peek through. Precisely because the RSA method has no backdoor, it is the choice of industry. But to some government officials, Mr. Bidzos is nothing short of a scheming businessman. "The Government would like him to not exist," said Jeffrey I. Schiller, computer manager at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has negotiated a licensing deal with Mr. Bidzos. And Stuart Baker, who until several weeks ago was chief counsel of the National Security Agency, observed, "My sense is that his motivation is no more than trying to convince people to buy his products." Officials at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, another Federal agency, say they want to create a standard that is not beholden to the patents of one small company. And the National Security Agency and the Justice Department want a standard that will allow law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop on suspected criminals or violators of national security. Conventional Wisdom [subhead] >From Mr. Bidzos's perspective, Washington remains bound up in a cold war mentality, and should simply get out of the way and let RSA Data go about its business. What is more, he complains, any number of foreign companies are developing encryption techniques just as hard to crack as his, so the Government's efforts to keep him from exporting his software is useless, and perhaps counterproductive. Notwithstanding the official concerns, RSA has developed a loyal following among a wide range of computer, communications and software companies. "They have the strongest technology and the best reputation in the cryptography business," said William Ferguson, vice president of Semaphore, Inc., a maker of data-scrambling systems that licenses RSA's software. Adding spice to this dispute is Mr. Bidzos's ability to outmaneuver the Government, most recently by snatching a crucial patent from under the noses of officials who were planning to use it in an official standard they are trying to establish. Several years ago, two top computer scientists from the National Institute of Standards and Technology traveled to Europe to meet with a German mathematician, Claus Schnorr, who holds a key patent that the Government's coding system may violate. When they returned to the United States, the scientists told their superiors that the United States should license Mr. Schnorr's patent. But Washington was slow to act. So in March 1993, while Mr. Bidzos was on a trip to France, he met with Mr. Schnorr for a four-hour lunch. By the end of the meal, Mr. Bidzos had a deal to use Mr. Schnorr's patent. Despite Mr. Bidzos's high profile in the world of encryption, RSA's revenue is small -- somewhere between $5 million and $10 million annually. But analysts say that the company has the ability to grow substantially. "They have huge opportunity in the Internet," said Lisa Thorell, a researcher at Dataquest in San Jose, Calif., referring to the global web of computer networks that is regarded as a working but primitive model of a global data highway. RSA is also playing an increasing role in the $500 million secure-communications business for equipment that permits safe financial trasnactions and voice and data communications. A Question of Patents [subhead] The issue clouding the future of the company is how severely it will suffer from export controls and competing standards backed by the National Security Agency. Last month the Government made its own competing standard for signing electronic documents mandatory for all Federal agencies, and declared that the digital signature standard, as it is known, did not violate RSA's technology. Mr. Bidzos thinks that Washington is infringing his patents, and, eventually, the strength of his patent claims will be tested in court. Rather then (sic) sue the Government, Mr. Bidzos is likely to start with one of the small companies, like Group Technologies Corporation, in Tampa, that is making components under a Government contract, industry executives say. Mr. Bidzos, who is a Greek citizen and a permanent resident of the United States, was working at a small international marketing firm in 1985 when he decided to move from Florida to the Silicon Valley to help a friend save a failing business. "I wanted to do deals and stay in luxury hotels," he said recently at his office here. "I had no idea I'd be in the center of a political whirlwind." When Mr. Bidzos joined the company in 1986, RSA was shoestring operation about to go into bankruptcy. With his help, RSA struck a deal with Lotus Development in 1987, in which the software giant agreed to advance money for the right to include RSA software in Lotus Notes, a program designed for work groups of office employees. A year later RSA was presented with an offer to be acquired by Rupert Murdoch in a multimillion-dollar deal. A Murdoch subsidiary, the News Data Communications Corporation, was developing technology for Mr. Murdoch's Sky TV. So in 1988 Mr. Bidzos flew twice to Britain to attempt to negotiate a deal, but the sides were far apart on price. He says the offers to buy RSA still roll in. "I've received no less than five firm, written offers in the last two years," he said. He also says he doesn't think that the Government can regain the upper hand in the cryptography wars. "They've fired every weapon they have at us now, and we're stronger than ever," Mr. Bidzos said. "All they can do is try to get RSA legislated out of business, and that will never happen, in my opinion."

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Bidzos and the NSA
by Dave Otto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

posted to talk.politics.crypto in response to Tim's article... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I think the issue, at this point, is not so much whether the NSA goons actually threatened his life, but that they have consistently attempted to suppress crypto anyway they can. That the NSA has tried to intimidate Bidzos is no secret. That the NSA considers PGP a threat to their domain is also well known. Given that the purpose of the ITAR restrictions appear to be to prevent an international standard from forming, I think we need to refocus on the issue of presenting strong crypto as "a right", inevitable, and ubiquitous. CPSR and EFF are doing an admirable job of taking the fight to the beltway; but outside the net, the grass roots support just isn't there. As has been pointed out by PRZ et al., the primary reason to avoided hacks to PGP is that doing so fragments what standards we have now. The release of the MIT PGP was the first step in legitimizing cryptography. The next step is to install interoperable crypto on EVERY box out there. While I don't advocate bypassing your local sysadmin, try to get PGP installed on each machine you touch. Use 2.6 (MIT in U.S., _ui_ elsewhere). Publish your key. Tell your friends. Annoy your family. Irrate your boss ;-). My wife suggested that my activities would have gotten me "black-listed" 40 years ago. I suggest that the NSA would like to do exactly that to individuals like Bidzos and PRZ, but it is too late (and the net would make it virtually impossible anyway). Besides, some things are worth fighting for. Dave Otto -- dave(a)marvin.jta.edd.ca.gov -- daveotto(a)acm.org "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!" [the Great Oz] finger DaveOtto(a)ACM.org for PGP 2.6 key <0x3300e841> fingerprint = 78 71 3A 5B FD 8A 9A F1 8F BC E8 6A C7 BD A4 DD -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLhA9qCuceIAzAOhBAQHxjwP/eNcmflW3Pwve/ag8D7G0b5l39QKlNUSF nEcm3DJp0Mhnwd5SIvlOgwPb9K4nH9ASMyjl7NtKCbAEQK9T0XN5nTazg+EsyT2q qfm99I6ozFBQBe1XWMnCyNd6fr3fHoyqY8zIMMR7k29SByUaM9/lxK2ZawMoPgj1 6AS7r4xXFkw= =OISd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cryptography export legislation in need of help!
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[URGENT ACTION REQUIRED BEFORE 10:30AM JUNE 30TH, 1994] [PLEASE CHECK THE "WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW" SECTION!] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Introduction & Alert Status of the bill What you can do right now List of legislators supporting HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) List of legislators wavering on HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) List of legislators opposing HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) What is the Cantwell bill? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION & ALERT Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please send them to vtw(a)panix.com so they can be added to this list. General questions: vtw(a)panix.com Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request(a)panix.com Press Contact: stc(a)panix.com Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/1/1/vtw WWW URL: Be patient; we're working on it. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILL (updated 6/28/94) The Cantwell bill, that allows for fewer restrictions exports of cryptography, has an interesting history. It was rolled into the General Export Administration Act HR 3937. The House Foreign Affairs Committee passed the full strength version out of committee after open, public hearings. The House Intelligence Committee took the bill and gutted it after a day of closed, secret hearings. The gutted version is making its way to the House floor. There is a crucial stop-off point, however. The House Rules Committee will hold a hearing on Thursday June 30th, 10:30am in D.C. (Room H-13) to determine if the bill can be amended on the House floor (an "open" bill) or not (a "closed" bill). If they mark the bill as "open", then the Cantwell bill could be restored to its previous version, removing the language put in by the House Select Intelligence Committee which gutted it without a public hearing. It is crucial that you call of the members of the House Rules Committee before 10:30am Thursday June 30th and urge them to mark the bill as "open". This may be the last thing you can do for the cryptographic export legislation. Take the time to make a call! Chronology of the bill Jun 30, 94 House Rules Comm. decides whether to allow amendments on the bill when it reaches the House floor Jun 14, 94 Gutted by the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 20, 94 Referred to the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 18, 94 Passed out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18 attached to HR 3937, the General Export Administration Act Dec 6, 93 Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Nov 22, 93 Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW Estimated time to do this good deed: Two minutes Show your support for HR 3937 (formerly HR 3627) by contacting a member of the House Rules Committee and ask them to mark the bill as "open" (allowing amendments) when it reaches the House floor. The phone numbers of the members of the House Rules Committee are listed below. Please pick one from your state and call them. If your state isn't listed please call the Chairman, Rep. Joe Moakley. Feel free to use the following sample communique: The Honorable ____________ address Washington DC, 20515 Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, Please mark the General Export Administration Act (HR 3937) as "open" (allowing amendments on the House floor). Recently the House Intelligence Committee removed several provisions of the General Export Administration Act, HR 3937, dealing with the export of cryptographic technology. The House Intelligence Committee did this in a closed, secret hearing which provided for no public input. The House Foreign Affairs Committee previously held an open hearing on the same issue and received a flood of people testifying in favor of the bill, which the committee then reported out in full. I urge you to allow the democratic process to take its course on the House floor and mark the bill as "open". Sincerely, _________________________________ Phone/Fax/Addresses of members of the House Rules Committee 103rd United States Congress, 1993-1994 All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 9 MA Moakley, John Joseph (D) 1-202-225-8273 1-202-225-7304 235 Cannon 3 SC Derrick, Butler (D) 1-202-225-5301 1-202-225-5383 221 Cannon 24 CA Beilenson, Anthony (D) 1-202-225-5911 1-818-999-2258 2465 RHOB (might not answer) 24 TX Frost, Martin (D) 1-202-225-3605 1-202-225-4951 2459 RHOB 10 MI Bonior, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2106 1-202-226-1169 2207 RHOB 3 OH Hall, Tony P. (D) 1-202-225-6465 1-202-225-6766 2264 RHOB 5 MO Wheat, Alan (D) 1-202-225-4535 1-202-225-5990 2334 RHOB 6 TN Gordon, Bart (R) 1-202-225-4231 1-202-225-6887 103 Cannon 28 NY Slaughter, Louise M. (D) 1-202-225-3615 1-202-225-7822 2421 RHOB 22 NY Solomon, Gerald B. (R) 1-202-225-5614 1-202-225-1168 2265 RHOB 1 TN Quillen, James H. (R) 1-202-225-6356 1-202-225-7812 102 Cannon 28 CA Dreier, David (R) 1-202-225-2305 1-202-225-4745 411 Cannon 14 FL Goss, Porter J. (R) 1-202-225-2536 1-202-225-6820 330 Cannon ------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS SUPPORTING CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION The following legislators have formally registered support for cryptography export legislation. Call them with your cheers. All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 1 WA Cantwell, Maria (D) 1-202-225-6311 1-202-225-2286 1520 LHOB HR 3627's sponsor; thank her for her work! 16 IL Manzullo, Donald (R) 1-202-225-5676 1-202-225-5284 506 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 11/22/93 3 UT Orton, William H. (D) 1-202-225-7751 1-202-226-1223 1122 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 3 OR Wyden, Ronald (D) 1-202-225-4811 1-202-225-8941 1111 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 16 CA Edwards, Donald (D) 1-202-225-3072 1-202-225-9460 2307 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 19 OH Fingerhut, Eric D. (D) 1-202-225-5731 1-202-225-9114 431 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 4 MA Frank, Barney (D) 1-202-225-5931 1-202-225-0182 2404 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 2 UT Shepherd, Karen (D) 1-202-225-3011 1-202-226-0354 414 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 3 WA Unsoeld, Jolene (D) 1-202-225-3536 1-202-225-9095 1527 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 19 FL Johnston II, Harry (D) 1-202-225-3001 1-202-225-8791 204 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 9 WA Kreidler, Mike (D) 1-202-225-8901 1-202-226-2361 1535 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 4 WA Inslee, Jay (D) 1-202-225-5816 1-202-226-1137 1431 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 7 WA McDermott, James A. (D) 1-202-225-3106 1-202-225-9212 1707 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 8 IN McCloskey, Frank (D) 1-202-225-4636 1-202-225-4688 306 Cannon Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 14 CA Eshoo, Anna G. (D) 1-202-225-8104 1-202-225-8890 1505 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 03/22/94 10 NC Ballenger, Thomas C. (R) 1-202-225-2576 1-202-225-0316 2238 RHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 05/04/94 2 WA Swift, Al (D) 1-202-225-2605 1-202-225-2608 1502 LHOB Cosponsored HR 3627 on 05/04/94 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS WAVERING ON CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION [Feel free to use the sample communique at the end of the FAQ when calling or writing a legislator.] 26 NY Hinchey, Maurice D. (D) 1-202-225-6335 1-202-226-0774 1313 LHOB Recently told a constituent that he is taking the Cantwell bill under consideration, but has "national security concerns" about allowing encryption to be exported outside the United States. 1 IA Leach, James (R) 1-202-225-6576 1-202-226-1278 2186 RHOB Has yet to answer a constituent letter with a stated position. 13 NY Molinari, Susan (D) 1-202-225-3371 1-202-226-1272 123 Cannon Has yet to answer a constituent letter with a stated position. (has taken inordinately long) 8 NY Nadler, Jerrold (D) 1-202-225-5635 1-202-225-6923 424 Cannon Met with lobbying constituent in April '94; no position taken yet 25 CA McKeon, Howard P. (R) 1-202-225-1956 1-202-226-0683 307 Cannon Responded to a constituent with a "non-position", May '94 Had a favorable meeting with a constituent and a VTW volunteer in May '94. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS OPPOSING CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LEGISLATION [Feel free to use the sample communique at the end of the FAQ when calling or writing a legislator.] Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 5 AL Cramer Jr, Robert E. (D) 1-202-225-4801 1-202-225-4392 1318 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 8 CA Pelosi, Nancy (D) 1-202-225-4965 1-202-225-8259 240 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 32 CA Dixon, Julian C. (D) 1-202-225-7084 1-202-225-4091 2400 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 40 CA Lewis, Jerry (R) 1-202-225-5861 1-202-225-6498 2312 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 46 CA Dornan, Robert K. (R) 1-202-225-2965 1-202-225-3694 2402 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 2 CO Skaggs, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2161 1-202-225-9127 1124 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 10 FL Young, C. W. (R) 1-202-225-5961 1-202-225-9764 2407 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 4 KS Glickman, Daniel (D) 1-202-225-6216 1-202-225-5398 2371 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 NE Bereuter, Douglas (R) 1-202-225-4806 1-202-226-1148 2348 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 9 NJ Torricelli, Robert (D) 1-202-224-5061 1-202-225-0843 2159 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 3 NM Richardson, William (D) 1-202-225-6190 1-202-225-1950 2349 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 NV Bilbray, James H. (D) 1-202-225-5965 1-202-225-8808 2431 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 17 PA Gekas, George W. (R) 1-202-225-4315 1-202-225-8440 2410 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 2 RI Reed, John F. (D) 1-202-225-2735 1-202-225-9580 1510 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 14 TX Laughlin, Gregory H. (D) 1-202-225-2831 1-202-225-1108 236 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 16 TX Coleman, Ronald D. (D) 1-202-225-4831 None 440 Cannon FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 19 TX Combest, Larry (R) 1-202-225-4005 1-202-225-9615 1511 LHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 1 UT Hansen, James V. (R) 1-202-225-0453 1-202-225-5857 2466 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. 6 WA Dicks, Norman D. (D) 1-202-225-5916 1-202-226-1176 2467 RHOB FAILED Cryptography exports: Voted to kill Rep. Cantwell's export provisions in the House Intelligence Committee on 6/15/94. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- What is the Cantwell bill? The Cantwell bill would permit companies to export products with encryption technology in them. US companies are currently not permitted to export products (hardware or software) with this technology in them. What is encryption technology? Encryption technology, or cryptography, is the art of scrambling a conversation so that only the people communicating can decode it. Other people (such as eavesdroppers) cannot learn about the conversation. Where is cryptography being used? Cryptography is used to encrypt electronic mail to protect its confidentiality in transit. It's used by bank automatic teller machines to protect sensitive data (such as your account number, your Personal Identification Number, and your bank balance). It can be implemented into software (such as electronic mail programs and word processors) as well as hardware (such as telephones and "walkie-talkies") to ensure your privacy. Why is there a restriction on exporting products with technology in them? For many years the United States was a leading researcher in cryptography. High quality cryptographic technology was available only within the United States. The US government thought that if they did not let this technology be exported, foreign individuals would not be able to obtain it and use it against us (by keeping US intelligence agencies from eavesdropping on their communications) Since then, cryptography research has been published in international journals. Companies have been created throughout the world who export cryptographic technology from countries that do not have these restrictions. You can now buy the same, high-quality cryptographic technology from many international firms. Although the marketplace has changed, the regulations have not. Why should the regulations be changed? US companies compete in a global marketplace. Because of the export regulations, they often compete alongside products with superior cryptographic capabilities built into them. The result is that US companies build their products with an inferior encryption technology. The result of this is that you, as an American consumer, have great difficulty obtaining products with strong encryption in them. Because US products cannot compete against products with better privacy features, and because the laws are outdated, the regulations should be changed. The Cantwell bill fixes these regulations to more accurately resemble the current situation of the world marketplace. How can I help encourage more privacy-enhanced products and pass the Cantwell bill? Call or write your representative and ask them to support or cosponsor Rep. Cantwell's export provisions (formerly HR 3627) in the General Export Administration Act, HR 3937. You can base your letter on the sample communication below. SAMPLE LETTER OR PHONE CALL The Honorable ____________ address Washington DC, 20515 Dear Congressman or Congresswoman, As a citizen concerned for my privacy, as well as a supporter of American business, I urge you to cosponsor the Rep. Cantwell's cryptographic export provisions (formerly HR 3627) in the General Export Administration Act, HR 3937. The bill would allow US companies to produce and export products with cryptographic privacy-enhancing technology in them. These products are already available from firms throughout the world. US companies lose nearly $100 million per year in exports to them. By encouraging this industry, ordinary citizens like you and me would be able to purchase products with better privacy features. Please support or co-sponsor HR 3937. Sincerely, ___________________________________ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

BLACK UNICORN
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks, Black Unicorn called me from Florence, Italy just now. He said he was not connected to the Net, so to say hight to the list. Hi. S a n d y

1 0

EFFector Online 07.11 - House vote on NII bills, OR ISDN, Clipper news (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

News re Telecom NII Bills, Clipper -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 | finger for full PGP key > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 22:51:41 -0400 (EDT) From: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> To: effector-send(a)eff.org Subject: EFFector Online 07.11 - House vote on NII bills, OR ISDN, Clipper news ========================================================================= ________________ _______________ _______________ /_______________/\ /_______________\ /\______________\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \ ||||||||||||||||| / //////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\/ ||||||||||||||||| / //////////////// \\\\\\_______/\ ||||||_______\ / //////_____\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\ \ |||||||||||||| / ///////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\/____ |||||||||||||| / ///////////// \\\\\___________/\ ||||| / //// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \ ||||| / //// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\/ ||||| \//// ========================================================================= EFFector Online Volume 07 No. 11 June 27, 1994 editors(a)eff.org A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation ISSN 1062-9424 In This Issue: ALERT: Open Platform Update - House Vote on HR3636, HR3626 06/28/94 Oregon PUC Request for Comments on ISDN Deployment House Intelligence Committee Just Says No to Crypto Export Republican Party Texas Denouces Clipper, DigTel, and ITAR Regs PSI and Canter & Siegel Negotiate Net Access: No Spamming SunFlash E-Journal Call for Papers: "UNIX and the Law" Symposium "How Do I Get the Most Current EFFector?" What YOU Can Do ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject: ALERT: Open Platform Update - House Vote on HR3636, HR3626 06/28/94 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- EFF OPEN PLATFORM UPDATE JUNE 27, 1994 House Prepares to Vote on Landmark Communications Bills EFF's Open Platform Language Remains a Central Aspect On June 28, 1994, the full House of Representatives will vote on landmark telecommunications legislation. Two bills will be considered: H.R. 3636, the "National Communications and Information Infrastructure Act of 1994" (which contains EFF's Open Platform Proposal), and H.R. 3626, the "Antitrust and Communications Reform Act of 1994" (which will permit RBOCs - local-loop telephone companies - to re-enter the long distance, manufacturing, and information services markets). Together, these bills represent the most dramatic restructuring of communications law in more than 60 years. Both bills are expected to pass easily, but your supporting faxes and calls to your Representatives are still important. See ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Issues/Activism/govt_contact.list for a full list of Congressional fax numbers. H.R. 3636, THE NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION AND INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE ACT OF 1994 H.R. 3636 seeks to promote the development of the National Information Infrastructure (NII) through a combination of increased competition and a new regulatory framework. The bill would require local telephone monopolies to provide equal access and interconnection to their network, remove restrictions preventing telephone companies from providing video services, and preserve and enhance the universal provision of telecommunications services at affordable rates. There have been no major changes to the legislation since it was marked up by the Energy and Commerce Committee on March 16, 1994. Key points of the bill are analyzed below: * OPEN PLATFORM SERVICE EFF believes that open platform service, available to all Americans in the near-term at low cost, is key to promoting the democratic potential of the NII. Open platform service is designed to give residential and commercial subscribers access to voice, data, and video services over digital lines on a switched, end-to-end basis. With open platform service widely available, individuals and organizations would have access to a variety of important applications, including telemedicine, telecommuting, and distance learning. Open Platform services enable any user on the network to reach any other user or information source on the network, without having to pass through any bottlenecks that might be erected by vertically integrated network operators. Today, many carriers are only building capacity for primarily one-way services such as video-on-demand, home shopping, and 500 channels of entertainment. Open platform architecture is a strong safeguard against anti-competitive behavior and will promote the First Amendment goal of access to a diversity of information sources. EFF has been working closely with Rep. Markey and other members of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee to ensure that the open platform philosophy was incorporated in NII legislation. Open platform service, as defined in section 101 (3)(ii) of H.R. 3636, refers to -- ...a switched, end-to-end digital telecommunications service that is subject to Title II of [the Communications Act of 1934: Common Carriers]; and that (1) provides subscribers with sufficient network capability to access multimedia information services, (2) is widely available throughout a State, (3) is provided based on industry standards, and (4) is available to all subscribers on a single line basis upon reasonable request. Section 102 (d)(3) of H.R. 3636 directs the FCC to conduct an inquiry in order to determine what regulations and policies are necessary to make open platform service available to subscribers at reasonable rates. Based on the inquiry, the FCC is then directed to prescribe regulations to ensure the deployment of open platform services. The FCC may also require carriers to file tariffs for open platform service as soon as such service is economically feasible and technologically reasonable. The FCC is also directed to establish procedures for granting carriers a temporary waiver from complying with the open platform requirements. Carriers would be granted a waiver if they could demonstrate that compliance with the open platform requirements would (1) be economically or technically infeasible, or (2) would materially delay the deployment of new facilities with improved capabilities or efficiencies that will be used to meet the requirements of open platform services. Access to open platform service at affordable rates is also a key part of the definition of universal service in H.R. 3636. * UNIVERSAL SERVICE Universal access to telephone service has long been a cornerstone of Federal and State telecommunications regulatory policies. Because residential local telephone service is provided by a monopoly carrier, maintaining universal service has not been difficult. As the ability to participate in society becomes increasingly more dependent on access to information, the need to preserve and maintain universal service becomes more and more important. However, as competition in the local exchange increases the diversity of communications services providers, the old systems for maintaining universal service will become more and more ineffective. H.R. 3636 seeks to establish a mechanism that ensures universal service is preserved as competition increases in the telecommunications market. H.R. 3636 does not attempt to establish a statutory definition of universal service. Instead, the bill establishes a process which allows the definition of universal service to evolve as new technologies and services emerge. Federal-State Joint Board to Determine the Definition of Universal Service The bill establishes a Federal-State Joint board (composed of representatives from the FCC and State public utility commissions) to determine what policies and regulations are necessary to preserve and enhance universal service. In determining the nature and extent of universal service, the Federal-State board is directed to consider several factors. These include the extent to which: (1) a telecommunications service has, through the operation of market choices by customers, been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers; (2) the possibility that denial of access to such service to any individual would unfairly deny that individual educational and economic opportunities; (3) such service has been deployed in the public switched telecommunications network; and (4) inclusion of such service within a carriers' universal service obligations is otherwise consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. The bill states that all providers of telecommunications services should contribute to the preservation of universal service. * LOCAL COMPETITION: EQUAL ACCESS AND INTERCONNECTION In order to promote competition in the local telecommunications market, H.R. 3636 requires local exchange carriers to provide equal access and interconnection to their networks. The equal access and interconnection requirements will allow competitors, such as cable companies, long distance providers, and others, to compete with local telephone monopolies without requiring competitors to build their local network from scratch. Regulations Required The bill directs the FCC to establish regulations that require reasonable and nondiscriminatory equal access and interconnection with the facilities of a local exchange carrier's network. Such regulations must allow a competitor to place any equipment necessary for interconnection to the network on the premises of a local exchange carrier. The FCC is also directed to prescribe regulations requiring reasonable compensation to the exchange carrier providing equal access and interconnection. State Preemptions H.R. 3636 preempts existing State and local regulations prohibiting competition in the local exchange, while maintaining a State's ability to enforce consumer protection laws, protect public safety and welfare, and regulate interstate rates and quality of service. Exemptions Finally, small and rural telephone companies (those with fewer than 500,000 access lines) are not required to comply with the equal access and interconnection requirements unless the FCC determines that complying would not be unduly economically burdensome, unfairly competitive, technologically infeasible, or otherwise not in the public interest. * PROVISION OF VIDEO SERVICES BY TELEPHONE COMPANIES H.R. 3636 removes restrictions preventing telephone companies from providing video services within their service area. In order to provide video services within its service area, a telephone company would be required to: (1) establish a separate video programming affiliate; and (2) establish a video platform. Separate Video Programming Affiliate: H.R. 3636 requires separate video programming affiliates to maintain separate books and records from their affiliated telephone company, and conduct its own separate promotion (with certain exceptions). The bill also contains prohibitions against cross subsidies. The separate affiliate requirements are intended to prevent a telephone from using its power as a monopoly from impeding competition in the market. Video Platform H.R. 3636 requires any common carrier that provides video programming to its subscribers in its telephone service area to establish a video platform. Any carrier establishing a video platform is required to grant, on a nondiscriminatory basis, access to all bona fide requests for carriage. The FCC is also directed to prescribe regulations to prohibit video platform providers from imposing discriminatory rates, terms, and conditions on access to the video platform. In order to promote competition in the delivery of video services, H.R. 3636 also prohibits (with exceptions for small and rural areas) any common carrier that provides telephone exchange service (or its affiliates) from purchasing an existing cable system located within its telephone service area. Extension of Regulations to Other High Capacity Systems This section extends the video platform requirements of H.R. 3636 to cable systems that operate switched broadband delivery systems. Such systems are required to establish a video platform, and are prohibited from discriminating among program providers with respect to carriage, and requires that the rates and conditions for carriage of video programming are just and reasonable The FCC is also directed to study whether it is in the public interest to extend the video platform requirements to other cable operators though they may not have switched broadband video delivery systems. * INTERACTIVE SERVICES AND CRITICAL INTERFACES (SET-TOP BOXES) The bill states that set-top boxes and other interactive communications devices may be "a critical gateway" to American homes and businesses. The bill states that, "In order to promote diversity, competition, and technological innovation among suppliers of equipment and services, it may be necessary to make certain critical interfaces open and accessible to a broad range of information providers", the FCC is directed to identify "critical interfaces" that allow end users to connect information devices to networks and information service providers to transmit information to end users. The bill directs the FCC to conduct an inquiry, to examine the convergence of interactive technologies. The FCC would examine the costs and benefits of establishing open interfaces between, on the one hand, the network provider and the set-top box, and on the other, between network providers and information service providers. The FCC would also determine how to ensure the interoperability of converter boxes with interactive networks. The bill instructs this FCC to report to Congress within one year of the date of enactment of this section on the results of its inquiry. Finally, the FCC is instructed to make such changes in its regulations as deemed necessary in order to implement the findings of its inquiry. * BROADCAST SPECTRUM FLEXIBILITY If the FCC decides to issue additional licenses for advanced television services (such as HDTV) H.R. 3636 allows the FCC to prescribe regulations that would permit broadcasters to use spectrum for "ancillary and or supplementary services". Such ancillary or supplementary services will be treated as broadcast services and are subject to all regulations applicable to broadcast services * PUBLIC ACCESS H.R. 3636 requires the FCC to prescribe regulations to provide access for the public on video platforms and cable systems at preferential rates. The FCC is directed to determine the appropriate capacity consistent with the video platform requirements of the bill. * CIVIC PARTICIPATION ON THE INTERNET The bill directs the FCC in consultation with the NTIA, to conduct a study of policies that will enhance civic participation on the Internet. In conducting this study, the FCC and NTIA are directed to request public comment on whether common carriers should be required to provide citizens with a flat rate service for gaining access to the Internet. For More information on EFF's Open Platform Proposal, contact Jerry Berman, Executive Director, <jberman(a)eff.org> Danny Weitzner, Deputy Policy Director <djw(a)eff.org> Jonah Seiger, Project Coordinator, <jseiger(a)eff.org> For the most up-to date version of the bills and the reports, call the Telecommunications Subcommittee at +1 202 226 2424 ------------------------------ Subject: House Intelligence Committee Just Says No to Crypto Export ------------------------------------------------------------------- June 15, the House Intelligence Committee deleted the provisions of the Export Administration bill (HR3937, formerly HR3627) which would have allowed the export of all mass-market encryption products and thus eliminated the ITAR restrictions on most cryptographic material. The Intelligence Committee substituted the cryptography study previously adopted by the Senate. So, instead of getting strong encryption in the international information infrastructure, we'll get a nice big study to read and debate. The next phrase of this fight will be in the House Rules committee, which will have the job of resolving the dispute between the Foreign Affairs Committee, which approved the Cantwell bill, and the Intelligence Committee version, which removed it. The Rules Committee will decide which version, if any, goes to the floor of the House for vote. Stay tuned for further news and action alerts... The members of the House Rules Committee are listed below. You may wish to send them letters and faxes supporting retention of the language supporting the export of cryptographic products, in the version of the bill passed by the House Foreign Affairs Cmte. p st name phone fax position ______________________________________________________________________________ D MA Moakley, John Joseph 1-202-225-8273 1-202-225-7304 Cmte Chair D SC Derrick, Butler 1-202-225-5301 na R NY Solomon, Gerald B.H. 1-202-225-5614 1-202-225-1168 D CA Beilenson, Anthony 1-202-225-5911 na D TX Frost, Martin 1-202-225-3605 1-202-225-4951 R TN Quillen, James H. 1-202-225-6356 1-202-225-7812 D OH Hall, Tony P. 1-202-225-6465 na R CA Dreier, David 1-202-225-2305 1-202-225-4745 R FL Goss, Porter J. 1-202-225-2536 1-202-225-6820 D MO Wheat, Alan 1-202-225-4535 1-202-225-5990 R TN Gordon, Bart 1-202-225-4231 1-202-225-6887 D NY Slaughter, Louise M. 1-202-225-3615 1-202-225-7822 ------------------------------ Subject: Oregon PUC Request for Comments on ISDN Deployment ----------------------------------------------------------- EFF will be filing comments in this inquiry and we encourage all interested parties, especially those in Oregon, to do so as well. Oregon Public Utility Commission May 26, 1994 TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES The Public Utility Commission of Oregon has been sponsoring a series of workshops concerning the deployment of an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) in Oregon. Through the workshop process, the Oregon ISDN working group has established the feasibility of ISDN deployment by local exchange carriers (LECs) within the state. The Commission now seeks comments on ISDN deployment from the work group and any other interested parties on the following issues and questions. If parties have comments on any issues or concerns not covered in the questions, they are encouraged to add them to the issues list. Issues and Ouestions: 1. Does the Commission have jurisdiction to compel the provision of ISDN? Explain the basis of your position. 2. What policies should the Commission adopt regarding the deployment of ISDN? Should the Commission mandate deployment or encourage deployment to be driven by customer demand? 3. Should ISDN-based services be considered a replacement for, or an evolution of, current services? 4. Should all Oregon subscribers have access to ISDN? What policies should be adopted concerning the general availability of ISDN to customers? 5. Assuming that all central office switches in Oregon are either digital or analog electronic, what network upgrades are necessary to deploy ISDN? 6. What is the cost of these upgrades? Are these upgrades necessary exclusively for ISDN, or will they be shared by other services? Explain. 7. What digital switches are currently incapable of providing ISDN? Are there plans for making them ISDN-capable? In what time frame? 8. Are there methods of providing ISDN from ISDN-incapable switches? Explain in detail. 9. If overlay methods are used to provide ISDN in certain exchanges, how will this affect the current structure of local, EAS, and toll services within Oregon? 10. What policies regarding ISDN standards should be adopted by the Commission? Please explain. 11. Should the Commission require that certain services or capabilities be provided by ISDN? What are they? Why? 12. What is the appropriate time frame for ISDN deployment in Oregon? Why? 13. How should ISDN services be priced? Should there be a residential/business price differential? Why? 14. Should there be a voice/circuit data price differential? Why? 15. Should there be flat rate/measured rate pricing options? Why? 16. How should features be priced? Should they be provided in packages, unbundled, or both? Why? 17. How should the policies regarding ISDN be implemented by the Commission? If tariff filings are required, what should they contain? Why? 18. To which local exchange carriers should rules and policies on ISDN apply? Why? 19. Should the LECs be required to provide ISDN services in a manner that is conducive to the competitive provision of ISDN? Why? If so, how? 20. Should there be a mandated interconnection and interoperability of competitively provided ISDN services? Why? If so, how and by whom? 21. Are there any other aspects or characteristics of providing ISDN that should be considered by the Commission? If yes, describe each and explain why. Please mail one copy of your comments by July 22, 1994, to: Woody Birko Oregon PUC 550 Capitol St. NE Salem, OR 97310-1380 and one copy of your comments to everyone on the attached ISDN work group mailing list. If you are not on the ISDN work group mailing list and would like to receive a copy of everyone's comments, please call Woody Birko at (503) 378-6122. Reply comments should be mailed in a similar manner by August 30, 1994. The next meeting of the Oregon ISDN work group is tentatively scheduled for September 14, 1994, to discuss the comments and reply comments and to see if a unified position paper can be written to the Commission on ISDN deployment in Oregon. If you have any questions concerning this, please call me at (503) 378-6122. Wolodymyr Birko Sr. Utility Engineering Analyst Telecommunications Division (503) 378-6122 ------------------------------ Subject: Republican Party Texas Denouces Clipper, DigTel, and ITAR Regs ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Partly in response to a widespread petition effort, conducted primarily over the Internet, the Texas Republican Party has adopted a platform supportive of electronic privacy, denoucing in one breath the ITAR crypto export restrictions, the FBI's draft wiretapping bill, the Adminstration's Escrowed Encryption Standard, and overly-broad cryptographic algorithm patents. This is comes as something of a surprise given the unanimous House Intelligence Committee Vote to retain export restrictions on cryptographic products - a vote which included the ballot of Rep. Larry Combest (R/TX). [see previous article in this issue] The relevant section of the RPT 1994 Platform is reproduced here: "Electronic Privacy-The Party believes that no governmental trapdoor encryption standards should be advanced for use in any civilian communication system (eg Clipper Chip, Digital Telephony Act) and that the US patent office should limit the RSA patent to allow individuals to secure their own communications systems. We believe that encryption systems publicly available outside the US should not be classified as munitions." More info will follow when available. ------------------------------ Subject: PSI and Canter & Siegel Negotiate Net Access: No Spamming ------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Thu, 23 Jun 1994 18:19:47 -0400 From: "Martin Lee Schoffstall" <schoff(a)us.psi.com [This is just an informational forward, and is not an EFF document, nor does it reflect official EFF positions or statements - mech(a)eff.org] I'm sure this will provide for stimulating discussion... Marty ------- FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE PSI AND CANTER & SIEGEL NEGOTIATE AGREEMENT ON FUTURE INTERNET ACCESS June 23, 1994 - Herndon, VA - Performance Systems International, Inc. (PSI), of Herndon Virginia, which provides Internet connection services to more people and organizations than all other providers, today disclosed that an interim agreement had been reached with Canter & Siegel (C&S), of Phoenix, Arizona regarding the controversial C&S advertising over the Internet and USENET. Both firms concur that the continuing orderly evolution of the commercial Internet must be preserved, and to that end, Canter & Siegel and PSI have agreed to the following: a) C&S will refrain from mass electronic postings of any unsolicited, non-contextual, non-topic advertisements to the USENET discussion group bulletin board system; b) C&S will refrain from mass postings of any unsolicited, non-contextual, non-topic advertisements using electronic mail or other TCP/IP Internet applications. The worldwide Internet and USENET response to Canter & Siegel's activities have been very strong. Many of the actions have been particularly virulent, including the sending of "mail bombs". PSI has had first hand experience where the actions in response to C&S were damaging to third parties. PSI took a number of steps to remove these damaging situations as they occurred. While the actions of C&S have been considered by many to be completely inappropriate, the same is now being said about the actions in response to C&S. Clearly, the ENTIRE situation needs to be amended and will take many months, if not years, to settle out. Better education will be key to Internet evolution with books like "NET Etiquette" and the Internet Business Association (IBA) of Washington, DC facilitating those changes. In addition, mediation and discussion instead of unilateral confrontation, threats, and disconnection will be required to develop the general framework for operating on the Internet as it continues to evolve. Several other application-oriented Internet service providers have taken this approach successfully with C&S and others in parallel with PSI. ### PSI's headquarters are located at 510 Huntmar Park Drive, Herndon, VA 22070. Canter & Siegel is located at 3333 East Camelback Road, Suite 250, Phoenix, AZ 85260. ------------------------------ Subject: SunFlash E-Journal Call for Papers: "UNIX and the Law" Symposium ------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: troll(a)sug.org (Alex Newman) [Excerpted from _The_Flordia_SunFlash:_The_Electronic_Journal_for_Sun_Users_ _Since_1988_, Vol. 66, No. 54, June 1994.] Theme: UNIX and the Law Security Computers and Privacy UNIX and the Government Copyrights and Licensing The Sun User Group is pleased to announce its First Annual Technical Symposium, which will address the important issues of legality and morality that face computer users every day. Technical papers and presentations concerning this topical issue, as well as other topics of interest to the Sun/SPARC community, are invited. Manufacturers of computer equipment and software based on SPARC/Solaris technology are encouraged to participate in this conference with presentations, and technical talks. CALL FOR PAPERS SUN USER GROUP First Annual "UNIX and the Law" Symposium November 14-18, 1994 Austin, TX SUG conferences are attended by members from all over the world. Past conferences have drawn upwards of 4000 attendees from 43 countries and 43 states. We expect this timely topic to generate even more interest than usual. Submission Guidelines: Submissions should be in the form of extended abstracts (750 to 1000 words) and be sufficiently complete to allow the committee to understand and evaluate the submission. Abstracts should include: 1. Author name(s), postal and e-mail address(es), and telephone number(s). 2. Presenter name(s), postal and e-mail address(es), and telephone number(s). 3. Title of the paper 4. Time needed for presentation/questions. (30,45,60,90 Min. time slots) 5. Audio-visual requirements. 6. Student paper entry (Full time students only) Authors whose submissions are accepted will receive instructions for the preparation of final papers which will be published in the conference proceedings. The Presenter will receive one free registration for the conference. Any tutorial attendance must be purchased. IMPORTANT! All presentations will require a paper submission for inclusion in the conference proceedings. Deadlines: Abstracts Due: July 8, 1993 Notifications to Authors: August 22, 1993 Final Papers Due: September 12, 1993 Student Papers: There will be an award for the best student paper. Be sure to indicate with your submission if you are a full time student. A cash prize and free registration will be awarded by the Conference Program Committee. Submit one hardcopy and one electronic copy to the Sun User Group office: Sun User Group Conference Committee 1330 Beacon Street Suite 315 Brookline, MA 02146 Email: office(a)sug.org Phone: (617) 232-0514 Fax: (617) 232-1347 The Program Committee will select presentations from among those submitted. It includes experts from many areas of the Sun/Sparc world. It will be aided by: S. Lee Henry SUG board liaison Johns Hopkins University Peter Galvin SUG board liason Brown University Alex Newman SUG liason Sun User Group Possible themes and topics are listed below. These are only for reference, however, and all submitted papers will be considered for presentation at the conference. Thematic Track Topics directly related to the theme of the program: System Security; Software law for businessmen; Copyrights vs Copylefts; Encryption Sytems; Public and private keys; Clipper chips; Digital signatures; Designing software for export; Carjacking on the Information Superhighway; Mini-Tutorials and Q&A These sessions should be designed to directly address Sun user's needs. They could include step-by-step guides to administration, networking, programming in various tools, and understanding aspects of system operation such as performance and utilities. Q&A sessions are important and interesting to attendees because of their interactive, problem solving and question-resolving nature. Previous talks in this vein have included "securing your environment" and "system administration tips and tricks". System Administration, System Security Talks in this area should address the interests of those who have been Sun users for a year or more. Some of the more in-depth topics: mixed environments/mixed operating systems, backups, PPP/Slip, automounter, perl, tools for problem troubleshooting, and remote off-site administration. Technical Product Information This topic provides a chance for vendors to toot their own (technical) horns and describe the compelling technical advantages of their products. Panels of competitive products will be assembled when it seems appropriate to do so. No sales-oriented or non-technical talks will be accepted. Alex Newman Sun User Group Heus, Cerebre, quid vis troll(a)sug.org 1330 Beacon St., facere hac nocte? (617) 232-0514 voice Suite #315 Quod semper noctu facimus, (617) 232-1347 fax Brookline, MA 02146 o Rufo. Conari ut mundum superemus! ------------------------------ Subject: "How Do I Get the Most Current EFFector?" -------------------------------------------------- For those that may have not received an issue due to net.troubles, found it expired in their newsfeed before they could get to it, or don't wish to subscribe to the mailing list, EFF Systems Administrator Dan Brown has set up an infobot (an automated mail reflector, that will send you a file in response to email) to deliver the current issue of EFFector to you. Simply send any message to effector-reflector(a)eff.org (or er(a)eff.org for short), and you'll get the latest issue mailed to you. For ftp users, ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Newsletters/EFFector/current will always contain the most recent issue of this newsletter. Reminder: the info(a)eff.org infobot will send you basic EFF info and membership form in response to any email, while the netguide(a)eff.org infobot will likewise send you the current version of EFF's Guide to the Internet, and pgpkey(a)eff.org will send you our PGP 2.6 public key for encrypting sensitive messages (e.g. membership forms that bear a credit card number) to us. Queries that need answers from a real live person should be sent to ask(a)eff.org. ------------------------------ Subject: What YOU Can Do ------------------------ "If you say to people that they, as a matter of fact, can't protect their conversations, in particular their political conversations, I think you take a long step toward making a transition from a free society to a totalitarian society." - Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, world reknowned cryptographer, MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, Thursday, 4/7/94 Who will decide how much privacy is "enough"? The Electronic Frontier Foundation believes that individuals should be able to ensure the privacy of their personal communications through any technological means they choose. However, the government's current restrictions on the export of encrytion software have stifled the development and commercial availability of strong encryption in the U.S. Now, more than ever, EFF is working to make sure that you are the one that makes these decisions for yourself. Our members are making themselves heard on the whole range of issues. To date, EFF has collected over 5000 letters of support for Rep. Cantwell's bill (HR3627 - Sen. Murray's companion bill is S1846) to liberalize restrictions on cryptography. The bill's provisions, now part of the more general HR3937, will need your immediate and vocal support to succeed. We also gathered over 1400 letters supporting Sen. Leahy's open hearings on the proposed Clipper encryption scheme, which were held in May 1994. If you'd like to add your voice in support of the Cantwell bill's language, which is in danger of being stripped from HR3937, fax the members of the House Rules Committee [see above for fax number] immediately! You KNOW privacy is important. You have probably participated in our online campaigns. Have you become a member of EFF yet? The best way to protect your online rights is to be fully informed and to make your opinions heard. EFF members are informed and are making a difference. Join EFF today! For EFF membership info, send queries to membership(a)eff.org, or send any message to info(a)eff.org for basic EFF info, and a membership form. ------------------------------ Administrivia ============= EFFector Online is published by: The Electronic Frontier Foundation 1001 G Street NW, Suite 950 E Washington DC 20001 USA +1 202 347 5400 (voice) +1 202 393 5509 (fax) +1 202 638 6119 (BBS - 16.8k ZyXEL) +1 202 638 6120 (BBS - 14.4k V.32bis) Internet: ask(a)eff.org Internet fax gate: remote-printer.EFF(a)9.0.5.5.3.9.3.2.0.2.1.tpc.int Coordination, production and shipping by: Stanton McCandlish, Online Activist/SysOp/Archivist <mech(a)eff.org> Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged. Signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of EFF. To reproduce signed articles individually, please contact the authors for their express permission. To subscribe to EFFector via email, send message body of "subscribe effector-online" (no quotes) to listserve(a)eff.org, which will add you a subscription to the EFFector mailing list. To get the latest issue, send any message to er(a)eff.org, and it will be mailed to you automagically. You can also get ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Newsletters/EFFector/current. ------------------------------ Internet Contact Addresses -------------------------- Membership & donations: membership(a)eff.org Legal services: ssteele(a)eff.org Hardcopy publications: pubs(a)eff.org Technical questions/problems, access to mailing lists: eff(a)eff.org General EFF, legal, policy or online resources queries: ask(a)eff.org End of EFFector Online v07 #11 ****************************** $$

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No Subject
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dave Otto wrote: I think the issue, at this point, is not so much whether the NSA goons actually threatened his life, but that they have consistently attempted to suppress crypto anyway they can. That the NSA has tried to intimidate Bidzos is no secret. That the NSA considers PGP a threat to their domain is also well known. CPSR and EFF are doing an admirable job of taking the fight to the beltway; but outside the net, the grass roots support just isn't there. As has been pointed out by PRZ et al., the primary reason to avoided hacks to PGP is that doing so fragments what standards we have now. The release of the MIT PGP was the first step in legitimizing cryptography. The next step is to install interoperable crypto on EVERY box out there. While I don't advocate bypassing your local sysadmin, try to get PGP installed on each machine you touch. Use 2.6 (MIT in U.S., _ui_ elsewhere). Publish your key. Tell your friends. Annoy your family. Irrate your boss ;-). My wife suggested that my activities would have gotten me "black-listed" 40 years ago. I suggest that the NSA would like to do exactly that to individuals like Bidzos and PRZ, but it is too late (and the net would make it virtually impossible anyway). Besides, some things are worth fighting for. Dave rightly suggests that "black-listing" and other stigmatizing and threatening inhibit the rights of citizens. Such attacks also intimidate others who learn of the assault on organizations and persons and who fear they may become targets. To oppose this it seems also right that any attack we learn about should be posted in this forum, at the least. Please post who else NSA -- and its like -- has threatened besides Bidzos and PRZ. John -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLhBhiyC2hhsUMyZpAQH/JAP/fjhJrxoe76Dbo2+wHD9EcFl2PObKgqEa vjNaRomGIYgb/BKe/M4DejgtNgEGi+DyGoFspf14u18q2ZzFV8iQFJjaP7y5GFFI /5ztKpAH/ERCpNmF6L9jOYqIy6p3FZTsMVsxQwSW9IsM+XD7jxW7g0QU/NkvcTIn Vz7Bt0hjY9s= =AlBx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: BLACK UNICORN
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, I just sent mail to you, Sandy at crl.com, but it came back to you saying that you were "554 Unbalanced '>' ". I guess it's in reference to the software :>) I was just inquiring, since you yourself are lately leaving the US & going off to Hong Kong, whether you would be there long enough to be part of the events in the changing of the guard to the Commie Chinese? Blanc

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Re: NSA and competence
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Perry E. Metzger" ...They have plenty of money, and EXTREMELY smart people. ........ That, and the concrete evidence that they are probably twenty years ahead of us, leads me to believe that it is stupid to underestimate them. .............................................. They sure make some BIG mistakes, though, don't they? And they didn't cover up the Clipper mistakes very well at all. And they're not seeing the economical relationships regarding exports very well. Do you suppose that maybe this is intentional? Blanc

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Re: NSA and competence
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> They sure make some BIG mistakes, though, don't they? > And they didn't cover up the Clipper mistakes very well at all. > And they're not seeing the economical relationships regarding exports > very well. > Do you suppose that maybe this is intentional? What big mistakes? The Clipper error is a relatively small mistake. Sure, there's a loophole that allows someone with the neccesary will and knowledge to clipper-encrypt things in such a way that the government can't decrypt them. But I believe the NSA when they say they knew about this, but didn't care. Because it makes sense. The NSA knows that anyone with the neccesary knowledge to exercise this loophole _surely_ knows about other non-clipper encryption methods too. Any terrorist who knows enough about encryption to know how to exercise the loophole (which will be any terrorist at all pretty soon) will surely know enough to encrypt with PGP underneath clipper anyway. So what difference does it make to the NSA? Sure, clipper might be a bit harder for the NSA to crack then RSA/IDEA, but appearantly not enough to justify NSA-concern. This just re-emphasizes that the NSA isn't _really_ worried about terrorists and drug dealers and such. I mean, they're worried, but that's not the worry that motivates clipper. Because clipper wont' be any good against terrorists and drug dealers as long as alternate encryption is legal. They are worried about non-escrowed encryption becoming a _standard_, for the Average Joe. The Average Joe, while he might use PGP in a clipper-free world, proably isnt' going to use it if his mail is protected by clipper already. And he sure isn't going to exercise the clipper loophole. IMHO, the NSA obviously spends enough effort spying on the Average Joe to justify clipper for these reasons. Because they can't be blind enough to think that Clipper is going to be any use at all against those who care. The fact that they are unconcerned about this loophole seems to justify that. As for "not seeing the economic relationships", they just don't care. The export restrictions have one purpose only: to hinder cryptology R&D in America. Yeah, anyone who thinks about it realizes that this means hurting american software companies ability to compete, but the NSA doesn't care about ability to compete. They care about National Security. And they think that National Security will be compromised if American firms engage in lots of crypto-R&D. So they are doing anything in their power to prevent that. Export-restrictions are really the only thing they have the power to do in this regard, but they should work perfectly sufficiently for their purposes. They dont' seem to be making too many mistakes to me.

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Pipe>>OTTO5.ASC<<Pipe
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

begin 644 /tmp/baaa006Cn end

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Bidzos and RSA
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dave Otto posted today: < I think the issue, at this point, is not so much whether the NSA goons <actually threatened his life, but that they have consistently attempted to <suppress crypto anyway they can. That the NSA has tried to intimidate <Bidzos is no secret. That the NSA considers PGP a threat to their domain <is also well known. < Given that the purpose of the ITAR restrictions appear to be to prevent <an international standard from forming, I think we need to refocus on the <issue of presenting strong crypto as "a right", inevitable, and ubiquitous. < CPSR and EFF are doing an admirable job of taking the fight to the beltway; <but outside the net, the grass roots support just isn't there. As has been <pointed out by PRZ et al., the primary reason to avoided hacks to PGP is <that doing so fragments what standards we have now. The release of the <MIT PGP was the first step in legitimizing cryptography. The next step is <to install interoperable crypto on EVERY box out there. While I don't <advocate bypassing your local sysadmin, try to get PGP installed on each <machine you touch. Use 2.6 (MIT in U.S., _ui_ elsewhere). Publish your <key. Tell your friends. Annoy your family. Irrate your boss ;-). < My wife suggested that my activities would have gotten me "black-listed" <40 years ago. I suggest that the NSA would like to do exactly that to <individuals like Bidzos and PRZ, but it is too late (and the net would make <it virtually impossible anyway). Besides, some things are worth fighting for. Dave rightly suggests that black-listing and other such stigmatizing and threatening offenses inhibit the rights of citizens. These attacks also intimidate others who learn of the aggression on organizations and persons and who fear they may become targets themselves. To oppose these offenses it seems also right that any attack we learn about should be posted in this forum, at the least. Please post who else NSA -- and its like -- has threatened besides Bidzos and PRZ. John -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLhCBFyC2hhsUMyZpAQGUnwQAqFgV+nYmG+yaDMfEp7jc3KIsU3dFddvO 8pRKo9049PZMMhScksExpgmQmTQAeXRuShKiRNFzaiO8RGCPOSX/iU8QaGPI/d8o DMvoNYSDrK7IUEjTinaAGtCdHXvRE0JwtEXA/dgvj5X/s4eEzRFu4ZK3nvxsi2ey YtcH8dQ2SnI= =PdKJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Bidzos in the NYT
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Markoff has a profile of Jim Bidzos on the front page of today's NYT business section. "Profit and Ego in Data Security." No death threats mentioned other than: "The government would like him not to exist," said Jeffrey I. Schiller, a computer manager at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has negotiated a licensing deal with Mr. Bidzos. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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(fwd) Re: Real random numbers
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: bga.com!news.sprintlink.net!hookup!yeshua.marcam.com!zip.eecs.umich.edu!newsxfer.itd.umich.edu!gumby!wupost!spool.mu.edu!torn!nott!cunews!freenet.carleton.ca!freenet3.scri.fsu.edu!mailer.acns.fsu.edu!not-for-mail From: jac(a)ds8.scri.fsu.edu (Jim Carr) Newsgroups: sci.physics Subject: Re: Real random numbers Date: 24 Jun 1994 15:56:03 -0400 Organization: Supercomputer Computations Research Institute Lines: 39 Message-ID: <2ufdoj$h69(a)ds8.scri.fsu.edu> References: <2u69cp$46q(a)asterix.uni-muenster.de> NNTP-Posting-Host: ds8.scri.fsu.edu Keywords: real random numbers , Monte Carlo simulation In article <2u69cp$46q(a)asterix.uni-muenster.de> hoppep(a)asterix.uni-muenster.de (Peter Hoppe) writes: > >4-bit random numbers (0,1,...,15) have been produced from >thermal noise by a complicated method. >Since the production is not due to a determining algorithm >(of a pseudo random generator) these numbers are 'real random numbers'. >So a priori there could not be any periodicity in the number series. >The equipartition has been checked by the "chi-square-test" and the >correlations by the "serial-test" [1]. Both equipartition and >correlations fulfill the theoretical expectations very good. >[1] D. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. II, > Addison-Wesley, 1969 There are much tougher tests for random numbers than these, particularly if they are to be used for Monte Carlo where the numbers are used as m-tuples. The tests you really need to make are the ones George Marsaglia calls the 'monkey test' and the 'birthday test', as well as the m-tuples test. The first two are generalizations of the well known statistics problem of the monkey typing Shakespeare and of coincident birthdays in a group of people. They are tough to pass. The problem as I see it is that 4-bit numbers do not generate much variability, so you will really need m-tuples of 4-tuples of these. This increases the chance that long range correlations will catch up to you when you least want them. I am sure George would be interested in this, however, since they have been looking at ways to incorporate physical noise that is truly random into the very sophisticated generators like the combination of lagged fibonacci with congruential. The problem is that noise is seldom random enough, according to talks he has given. -- James A. Carr <jac(a)scri.fsu.edu> | "It's never confusing though, http://www.scri.fsu.edu | because ultimately it all fits Supercomputer Computations Res. Inst. | -- it's just cockeyed and fits Florida State, Tallahassee FL 32306 | and is fire." - Norman Maclean

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A question about encryption methods.
by nobody＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to encrypt data for a CD-Rom. Anyone's data can get on the CD-Rom by way of the encryption box. Likewise anyone could read the cypher data back from the CD-Rom. Given that every 2k block of data will be encrypted with the same key. Given that there are weak keys with the IDEA cypher. And given that someone could mount an adaptive chosen plaintext attack. Which of the following would be a good bet for a secure data CD-Rom? 1 - IDEA cypher using Cypher Feed Back for the 2k data block. Insuring that the Weak Keys are not used. 2 - A combination cypher consisting of... IDEA -> T -> IDEA -> T -> IDEA where each IDEA cypher is in Cypher Feed Back mode with it's own key. where each T mixes the bytes around in the 2K block based on a modulo sum of the 2k bytes. Would method two be too time consuming? Would I need to exclude the weak keys from the IDEA cyphers in the second method?

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NOT JUST CYPHERPUNKS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, There's a pretty good article about the privacy debate in the July/August issue of BEYOND COMPUTING. The article, "Technology and Government: The Battle Heats Up," is by Dr. H. Jefferson Smith. It appears in the "ethics" section. Mostly it was a once-over-lightly, but at least it never mentioned kiddie porn, narcotraffickers, pedophiles nor terrorists. It was fairly even handed in its presentation. The article ended with these paragraphs: . . . On one level, discussions of an individual's rights--such as the right to conduct private conversa- tions without a threat of government intrusion--are pitted against the worthy goal of an efficient and safe society. On a deeper level, a potentially more perplexing dilemma is at play: Should our government interject itself into technological advances to achieve some socially desir- able outcome? And, if so, who should determine which outcome should be sought? Of course, we know the Cypherpunk answers, but at least other folks are looking at the issues. Onward and upward. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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