December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Clipper FOIA ! :-)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Very nice. Another interesting FOIA victim would be the NSA - while the designs for the stuff are presumably classified, they may not have thought to classify the rules for accessing the data, or the plans for loading keys onto chips (which they had given Dorothy Denning to announce but have since said the design will be different.) The design of the "black box" for law-enforcement agency use, except for the skipjack and maybe LCM-1 portions, may also be unclassified; if not, then the number of them made, plans/schedule for making them, cost, plans for distributing, etc. may be FOIA-able. Bill

1 0

what is a right?
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

lyled(a)pentagon-emh9.army.mil writes: > > >Good question... what exactly is a "right"? To me, a right is something >that cannot be removed from any citizen. Life can be removed so there must be no rights because I can't imagine anything more irremovable from me than my own life. Actually, crypto is nearly that irremovable. The history of crypto is of spontaneous invention by human beings whenever they feel their privacy threatened. > I would like to see privacy as a >right. However, at what point do you draw the line? When does privacy >interfere with someone else's rights? Not anywhere I can think of -- except: there's always my mother's favorite one liner: "Officer, officer, arrest that man: he's whistling a dirty song." Along those lines, I took a massage class once and my boss at the time was a good, faithful church-going repressed citizen who heard what I was doing and apparently started fantasizing about the orgies we were having in massage class, but of course he was too embarrassed to actually ask me for details. I suppose my privacy interfered with his right to peace of mind. >Freedom of speech has never been a right. A lot of people think it is. But >go out on a street corner and try to incite a riot. See what happens. Or >threaten someone. Or commit treason. Speech is not a right. Ah...but private speech can not incite crowds to riot, by definition. As long as it's private, it can't be "fire" in a crowded theater. It can't be peddling porno. It's private while all those other actions are offensive because they're not private. - Carl Ellison cme(a)sw.stratus.com RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A PGP 2.4 Key fingerprint = E0 41 4C 79 B5 AF 36 75 02 17 BC 1A 57 38 64 78

1 0

Rivest's response to Denning Newsday Editorial
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded with permission... ------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: research!theory.lcs.mit.edu!rivest Received: from big.l1135.att.com by codex.UUCP (4.1/4.7) id AA18940; Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:22:24 EST Received: from research (research.research.att.com) by big.l1135.att.com (4.1/4.7) id AA18303; Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:22:22 EST Posted-Date: Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:24:20 EST Received: by ninet.research.att.com; Fri Feb 25 16:21 EST 1994 Received: from SWAN.LCS.MIT.EDU by theory.lcs.mit.edu (5.65c/TOC-1.2S) id AA24342; Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:23:04 EST From: rivest(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu (Ron Rivest) Received: by swan.lcs.mit.edu (5.65c/TOC-1.2C) id AA01277; Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:24:20 EST Date: Fri, 25 Feb 94 16:24:20 EST Message-Id: <199402252124.AA01277(a)swan.lcs.mit.edu> To: denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu Cc: efbrick(a)cs.sandia.gov, hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu, Rivest(a)mc.lcs.mit.edu, silvio(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu, smb(a)research.att.com, mab(a)research.att.com, jim(a)rsa.com, diffie(a)eng.sun.com Subject: Newsday Editorial Hi Dorothy -- Thanks for sending me a copy of your editorial. But I find the reasoning you present misleading and unpersuasive. First, you argue that the clipper chip will be a useful law enforcement tool. Given the small number of currently authorized wiretaps per year (under 1000) and the ease of using alternative encryption technology or superencryption, it seems plausible to me that law enforcement could expect at most ten "successful" clipper wiretaps per year. This is a pretty marginal basis for claiming that clipper will "block crime". Second, you seem to believe that anything that will "block crime" must therefore be a "good thing" and should therefore be adopted. This is not true, even if it is not subject to government abuse. For example, a system that could turn any telephone (even when on-hook) into an authorized listening microphone might help law enforcement, but would be unacceptable to almost all Americans. As another example, tatooing a person's social security number on his or her buttocks might help law enforcement, but would also be objectionable. Or, you could require all citizens to wear a bracelet that could be remotely queried (electronically, and only when authorized) to return the location of that citizen. There are all kinds of wonderfully stupid things one could do with modern technology that could "help" law enforcement. But merely being of assistance to law enforcement doesn't make a proposal a good thing; many such ideas are objectionable and unacceptable because of the unreasonably large cost/benefit ratio (real or psychological cost). The clipper proposal, in my opinion, is of exactly this nature. Third, you seem unnecessarily polly-annish about our government and the potential for abuse. The clipper proposal places all trust for its management within the executive branch; a corrupt president could direct that it be used for inappropriate purposes. The unspecified nature of many of the associated procedures leaves much room to speculate that there are "holes" that could be exploited by government officials to abuse the rights of American citizens. Even if the proposal were modified to split the trust among the various branches of government, one might still reasonably worry about possible abuse. Merely because you've met the current set of representatives of various agencies, and feel you can trust them, doesn't mean that such trust can be warranted in their successors. One should build in institutional checks and balances that overcome occasional moral lapses in one or more office holders. Fourth, your discussion of "searching your home and seizing your papers" is misleading. You seem to imply that because law enforcement can be issued a warrant to search your home, that we should adopt clipper. Yet this analogy only makes sense if individuals were required to deposit copies of their front door keys with the government. I can build any kind of house I wish (out of steel, for example), and put any kind of locks on it, and wire up any kind of intrusion detectors on it, etc. The government, armed with a search warrant, is not guaranteed an "easy entry" into my home at all. The appropriate analogical conclusion is that individuals should be able to use any kind of encryption they want, and the government should be allowed (when authorized, of course) to try and break their encryption. Finally, you argue (elsewhere, not in this editorial) that the decision rests in part on "classified" information. Such an argument only makes sense if there is a specific law-enforcement situation that makes such classified information timely and relevant. (E.g., if there was a current investigation as to whether the Department of the Treasury had been infiltrated by organized crime.) The use of "classified information" is otherwise generally inappropriate in discussing communications policy that will last over decades. This hardly covers all of the relevant issues, but it covers the points that came immediately to mind in reading your editorial... Cheers, Ron P.S. Feel free to pass along, quote, or otherwise re-distribute this... - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Return-Path: <@axp1.acc.georgetown.edu:denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu> Date: Wed, 23 Feb 1994 16:16:09 -0500 (EST) From: Dorothy Denning <denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu> Subject: Newsday Editorial To: efbrick(a)cs.sandia.gov, hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu, Rivest(a)mc.lcs.mit.edu, silvio(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu, smb(a)research.att.com, mab(a)research.att.com Cc: denning(a)guvax.acc.georgetown.edu Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT ====================================================================== | Newsday, Tuesday, February 22, 1994, Viewpoints | ====================================================================== The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime By Dorothy E. Denning Hidden among the discussions of the information highway is a fierce debate, with huge implications for everyone. It centers on a tiny computer chip called the Clipper, which uses sophisticated coding to scramble electronic communications transmitted through the phone system. The Clinton administration has adopted the chip, which would allow law enforcement agencies with court warrants to read the Clipper codes and eavesdrop on terrorists and criminals. But opponents say that, if this happens, the privacy of law-abiding individuals will be a risk. They want people to be able to use their own scramblers, which the government would not be able to decode. If the opponents get their way, however, all communications on the information highway would be immune from lawful interception. In a world threatened by international organized crime, terrorism, and rogue governments, this would be folly. In testimony before Congress, Donald Delaney, senior investigator with the New York State Police, warned that if we adopted an encoding standard that did not permit lawful intercepts, we would have havoc in the United States. Moreover, the Clipper coding offers safeguards against casual government intrusion. It requires that one of the two components of a key embedded in the chip be kept with the Treasury Department and the other component with the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology. Any law enforcement official wanting to wiretap would need to obtain not only a warrant but the separate components from the two agencies. This, plus the superstrong code and key system would make it virtually impossible for anyone, even corrupt government officials, to spy illegally. But would terrorists use Clipper? The Justice Department has ordered $8 million worth of Clipper scramblers in the hope that they will become so widespread and convenient that everyone will use them. Opponents say that terrorists will not be so foolish as to use encryption to which the government holds the key but will scramble their calls with their own code systems. But then who would have thought that the World Trade Center bombers would have been stupid enough to return a truck that they had rented? Court-authorized interception of communications has been essential for preventing and solving many serious and often violent crimes, including terrorism, organized crime, drugs, kidnaping, and political corruption. The FBI alone has had many spectacular successes that depended on wiretaps. In a Chicago case code-named RUKBOM, they prevented the El Rukn street gang, which was acting on behalf of the Libyan government, from shooting down a commercial airliner using a stolen military weapons system. To protect against abuse of electronic surveillance, federal statutes impose stringent requirements on the approval and execution of wiretaps. Wiretaps are used judiciously (only 846 installed wiretaps in 1992) and are targeted at major criminals. Now, the thought of the FBI wiretapping my communications appeals to me about as much as its searching my home and seizing my papers. But the Constitution does not give us absolute privacy from court-ordered searches and seizures, and for good reason. Lawlessness would prevail. Encoding technologies, which offer privacy, are on a collision course with a major crime-fighting tool: wiretapping. Now the Clipper chip shows that strong encoding can be made available in a way that protects private communications but does not harm society if it gets into the wrong hands. Clipper is a good idea, and it needs support from people who recognize the need for both privacy and effective law enforcement on the information highway. ====================================================================== | Copyright Newsday. All rights reserved. This article can be freely | | distributed on the net provided this note is kept intact, but it may | | not be sold or used for profit without permission of Newsday. | ====================================================================== ------- End of Forwarded Message

1 0

Re: lists of U.S. cypherpunks and Tentacles.
by nobody＠pmantis.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Tentacle(a)medusa.conspiracy.org > > Fellow Tentacles, > Does there exist lists of Tentacles and CypherPunks who > are U.S. citizens with U.S. email addresses? > > Such a list would be useful to code creating cypherpunks > who wish to distribute code widely in the U.S., but who > do not wish to become involved in the Crypto Exportation > hassles. > Yeah, right. And let's get the names and addresses of all the gun owners in the US too...

2 1

CPunk FAQ & TCMay's crimes
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I went to soda the other day, and found the cypherpunk FAQ. I thought there are more FAQs about cypherpunks the FAQ at soda is 44 bytes. It says "When is this going to be done" (or something to that effect.) I went back to soda today, and found a new directory. mailing_list contains two files one of which mentions the cpunks FAQ. The FAQ is still 44 bytes. I saw TC May's message some weeks old, > but his partners in crime^H^H^H^H^H ~~~~~~~~~~ I don't know what mail software he used but it's obvious he was trying to delete the word 'crime' I guess that ^H was not the best way ;-) No, this is not my poem, it's just a creative editor bug (feature?) bursting with expression. Sorry. Rishab

1 0

not a repost
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On sci.crypt on Feb 23, I posted (from world.std.com) a description of a variant on my favorite des|tran|des|tran|des with the inner DES rotating through N different keys, one block each. (This is no sweat, if you have S/W DES.) The result is a *huge* amount of key material to be derived by cryptanalysis. I also posted the keyless tran. I won't pad this list with a re-post. - Carl Ellison cme(a)sw.stratus.com RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A PGP 2.4 Key fingerprint = E0 41 4C 79 B5 AF 36 75 02 17 BC 1A 57 38 64 78

1 0

Use of PGP---statistics from the public key servers
by Peter Kretzman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following table shows the frequency breakdown, by key generation month, just over the past year, of the approx. 3300 public keys that are available on the public key servers (I used the one at <public-key-server(a)martigny.ai.mit.edu>). Note that I've included revoked keys, but there are only 19 of these from the same time period. In other words, of the keys out there, 211 of them were generated in March of 1993, 216 in April, etc. I have no idea if these numbers correlate well to actual PGP use (these are, after all, just the people who are activist enough to post their key on the public key server, which also requires some degree of Internet connectivity). If the numbers DO correlate to some degree, I thought it was interesting that they appear to show a recent decline in usage rather than a steady ramp-up. Is the trend toward universal crypto slacking off? Keys Month Generated ------ --------- 03/93 211 04/93 216 05/93 205 06/93 169 07/93 167 08/93 169 09/93 206 10/93 287 11/93 225 12/93 207 01/94 148 02/94 118 (through 2/24/94) --- Peter Kretzman ---> Note: NeXT Mail welcome ---> Note: Public key available on request

2 1

Michael Clive Price? Please mail me
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- (Sorry about the wasted bandwidth) You mailed me but I inadvertently deleted it and lost your address-- could you mail me again? Thanks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLW6Xyni7eNFdXppdAQHauAP/eQRSsQvvDbbo8LcWc6wh9ogfy+jDnR/f bP8Kq45pz8xP9yf5H3Sc5AWG9FufbGGcntnjbZkZQw5+afhMH0OlB0arHK6X3hTm kyhof3a44vKX/ufqbOmDW+RJ0Nr1wKNORwO04DA+PIglb8n251Uq6eDZuTRStUEf wzB44obCgLI= =E/hJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Fun With Magic Money
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fun With Magic Money -------------------- If anyone wants to play, I have placed DOS executable binaries of the Magic Money client and server programs compiled under Borland C++ 3.1 using the large memory model and 8086 mode in /pub/mpd/mgmnyexe.zip on netcom.com. I have included a BANK.ASC file for my server's key. The name of the bank is "Magic Money Test", the currency is "Tacky Tokens", and is minted in denominations of 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 units. I will batch all my mail with the subject "Bank" together at the end of the day, download it, and run it through my server. I will send 100 complimentary Tacky Tokens to the first 10 people who mail my server. I will run stuff through the server for at least the next few days by which time everyone will probably have set up their own server and I will no longer be required. :) I have played with the binaries a bit on my system and nothing horrible has happened, but as is usual with foreign object code, there is a small but finite possiblity that it could bomb your system badly and eat your hard drive. I would recommend that you back up anything important before playing with this code and of course no warranty is made, other than the usual one about taking up space on the disk. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.3a Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

1 0

lists of U.S. cypherpunks and Tentacles.
by mg5n+eaibiubkxb58z84cy2iaf9r61u26ra5x26mc0h＠andrew.cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tentacle(a)Medusa.Conspiracy.Org sez: > Does there exist lists of Tentacles and CypherPunks who > are U.S. citizens with U.S. email addresses? > > Such a list would be useful to code creating cypherpunks > who wish to distribute code widely in the U.S., but who > do not wish to become involved in the Crypto Exportation > hassles. > > If such a list does not exist, why not create one? Please add me to your list. As you can see, I clearly have a US-based email address. :) -Ibiu

1 0

Information
by w.sloan＠genie.geis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was wondering if I could get on your E-Mailing list. I have an interest in data encryption, especially if this clipper chip stuff really happens. If you could let me know if you all send newsletters on a regular basis, if I could be included if it is not to much of a problem. Thanks. My address is W.SLOAN(a)GENIE.GEIS.COM.

1 0

Intelligent agents
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just wanted to know if Intelligent agents(telescript from General Magic) will pertain at all to crypto. Any feeling on the subject? Reuben Halper

1 0

Re: An Australian Clipper!
by Peter Murphy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks for your quick reply. I will try and interrogate the lecturer involved for any further info on the subject. I will get back to you on Wednesday (Australian time), as the said lecture occurs on Tuesday. Thanks, CCVARGA(a)delphi.com . Peter Murphy.

1 0

Re: Clinton Uses E-Mail to Respond to Swedish Prime Minister Feb 18
by an64907＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> According to reports from the Associated Press, the White House said the > computer messages, commonly called E-mail, started with a "Dear Bill" > electronic letter from Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt. Clinton responded > the next day with a "Dear Carl" E-Mail. If someone else has a message for the Swedish Prime Minister: admcb(a)hhs.se ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

1 0

Re: lists of U.S. cypherpunks and tentacles
by Allen Robinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tentacle(a)medusa.conspiracy.org wrote: >> Does there exist lists of Tentacles and CypherPunks who >> are U.S. citizens with U.S. email addresses? To which julf(a)penet.fi replied: > Uh...I, of course, am a bona fide citizen. Was just about to > announce my new server in Frankfurt, Arkansas. But as I am > having minor problems with my system, my e-mail address > currently *appears* to be in Finland. But rest assured all > stuff automatically gets rerouted to AK, and doesn't go > outside the states. Since there is no Frankfurt, Arkansas, I'm sure you *meant* Stuttgart, Arkansas. Oh, and the two-letter postal code abbreviation for Arkansas is AR, not AK (Alaska). I don't mean to nit-pick....just one good U.S. citizen helping another! AR _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/ Allen Robinson sebago(a)netcom.com Fayetteville, AR, USA

2 1

DH Exchange Code / Magic Money comments
by remailer＠merde.dis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- DH Exchange announcement follows these comments on mpd's message. Pr0duct Cypher mpd(a)netcom.com wrote: >Earlier this morning I grabbed the latest version of Magic Money >from csn.org and compiled it under the Borland C++ 3.1 IDE. Since >the Borland C compiler is one of the more paranoid ones around, I >thought I would briefly list the things I had to do in order to >get zero warnings and zero errors. >The sources I started with were MGMNY10E.ZIP and PGPTL10C.ZIP. >After #defining MSDOS you will find that it is a good idea to >#include <stdlib.h> in almost every module. This prototypes >quite a few of the commonly used functions which would otherwise >cause the compiler to complain. A few modules will require ><mem.h>, <string.h>, and <time.h> since they call functions in >these modules which are not in <stdio.h> or <stdlib.h>. Have they changed the .h files? My compiler isn't missing any functions when I compile it. >The C library function "randomize" is defined in <stdlib.h>. This >conflicts with the Magic Money function of the same name which >initializes the MD5 based RNG used to generate coin ids. I >changed the name of the Magic Money one to "random_init". Blaaah. I didn't have stdlib compiled into that module, so I didn't notice this one. >There is no prototype for pgp_randombyte. Since this function >returns "byte", not "int", this could be painful on any compiler >which treats these types of function returns differently. There is a prototype for it in pgptools.h >Complete prototypes for (*output) and (*lookup) need to be >provided in the function header of pgp_check_sigs and also for a >different function pointer (*output) used in PGPKGEN. Is this bad? I thought a function pointer didn't really care, as long as you called it correctly. >The Borland compiler always warns on "if (a=b)" because it >assumes the user mistyped "if (a==b)". To get rid of the >warning, you have to say "if (0!=(a=b)) which is optomized out by >the compiler. This occurs in a number of places, including the >macro for multiplication mod 65537 in idea.c. I know, mine complains about that too, but it's a common programming technique and there is nothing wrong with it. I've been ignoring that particular warning. >There is a reference to an undefined pgp_pubkey in fifo.c which >goes away if you #include "pgptools.h". You then also have to >toss in "mpilib.h" and "md5.h" to make "pgptools.h" happy. Yes, when fifo.c includes pgpmem.h, it notices that in one of the prototypes in that function. But the only function fifo calls within pgpmem is safemalloc, so it doesn't matter. I didn't want every file to include every other file, although it has been hard to avoid. >It appears that mpilib.c has been persuaded to compile the UPTON >modmult instead of the SMITH modmult. Unfortunately, there are a >few modules which fail to #include the definition of UPTON and >still call stage_smith_modulus and smith_modmult. Sticking in a >#define to UPTON at the top of "mpilib.h" fixes this. MPILIB has not been altered. It is the same as in PGP. PLATFORM appears to set the appropriate modmult, but I usually define UPTON because SMITH has given me some problems in the past. >The conditional code which allows prior definition of external >versions of mp_setp, mp_addc, mp_subb, mp_smul, and mp_rotl >written in assembly language for some strange reason causes the >compiler to generate externals to _P_SETP, _P_ADDC, _P_SUBB, >_P_SMUL, and _P_ROTL instead of _mp_setp, _mp_addc, _mp_subb, >_mp_smul, and _mp_rotl in modules which reference these routines. >It does not seem to have this effect in mpilib.c where these >routines are defined. Deleting the corresponding #ifdefs cures >this. This I hadn't noticed. You have to define NO_ASM or compile in 8086.asm. Also define MSDOS and SMALL_MEM and DYN_ALLOC for an MSDOS machine. Take a look at the PGP 2.3a project file. >The compiler correctly points out that pgp_extract_rsa never uses >the variable "pk" passed to it. At the cost of a few machine >cycles, you can silence the compiler by putting "pk=pk" as the >first executable statement in this function. True. I noticed this after writing the prototype. The public key might be useful in the future if the modexp is changed, so I left it in. >The function pgp_randombyte hashes a variable "time" without >first initializing its value. It might be nice to change "time" >to "timestamp" and do a "time(&timestamp) unless it was the >authors intention to utilize uninitialized memory. I screwed up here. I meant to include the time in the hash and forgot to put in the call to time. I just sent an update to csn.org to fix this one, because it could reduce the entropy of the randomizer. Time was already factored into the initialize, so it wasn't a killer, but it badly needed fixing. Thanks for finding it. >If the server is executed more than one time within a second, it >can generate indentical random values. This could be a problem when >batch-processing mail. Including a fast timer register in the MD5 >hash in addition to the time of day in seconds would likely >eliminate this risk. What are you running, a Cray? My machine takes quite a few seconds to run the server. How do you include this fast timer register? Not all machines have it, so doing so would be very machine dependent. You could put in ifdefs for the PC. I think PGP has this. >The program uses "safemalloc" and "mm_safeopen" to access memory >and files, but does a very large number of "fread" and "fwrite" >calls without checking to see if they completed successfully. A >"safefread" and "safefwrite" might be a good idea so the server >does not continue happily on as the hash file fills up the disk. Yeah, I know, and so does fifo.c in PGP Tools. I hate error checking. If I put in safe read and write calls, what do I do if they fail? You could do this easily with some defines, if you have the error recovery code in mind. Thanks for pointing out that bug, and especially for setting up a Magic Money server. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Diffie-Hellman Exchange addition to PGP Tools Should appear on csn.org as dhex10a.zip There has been quite a bit of interest in online crypto applications, such as secure phones, BBSes, and TELNET connections. For these applications, Diffie-Hellman exchange has a major advantage over RSA: there is no private key to steal. If RSA is used for key exchange, an attacker could record the encrypted sessions, and then acquire your private key after the fact and decrypt them. With Diffie-Hellman, the secret information is gone as soon as the session is over. Using DH is equivalent to using a disposable one-time RSA key for each session, but much faster. This is a DH add-on for PGP Tools. There is a new PGPKGEN which exports the prime-finding functions, the main files DHEX.C and DHEX.H, and a demo. To use DH, we need a modulus n and a generator g. Unlike an RSA modulus, which is a product of two primes, a DH modulus must be prime. (n-1)/2 must also be prime. This makes the moduli slightly painful to find, but they can be reused indefinitely. DHEX tests a modulus by first testing both n and (n-1)/2 with fastsieve. Only if both pass is slowtest used. It still took me a whole day to find the 1024-bit modulus in the demo. There is also a 512-bit modulus there. To find the generator, we need the factors of n-1. They are 2 and (n-1)/2. For each factor f, we compute ((g^((n-1)/f)) mod n). If this is 1 for either factor, the number is NOT a generator. Generators are easy to find, usually in one to three tries. The modulus and generator can be saved and reused. Now Alice and Bob each call precomp. This generates a private piece x and computes X=g^x mod n. Big-X is the public piece. Alice and Bob exchange public pieces, then each compute k=Y^x mod n where Y is the other person's public piece and x is your own private piece. K will be the shared secret. We take the MD5 of this number to get an IDEA key, which will be the same on both sides. No eavesdropper can get this number. The public and private pieces are disposed of - they are only used once. This is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, where an attacker carries out a separate DH exchange with each party and then sits in the middle, decrypting with one session key and encrypting with the other. A digital signature will prevent this, if Alice and Bob have each others' public keys. One approach is for both parties to sign their public pieces before exchanging them. Another is to do the DH, go secure, and then each party signs the session key and sends the signature to the other. If there is a man in the middle, the session keys will be different. I prefer the second method because a passive eavesdropper does not find out who is communicating with whom. You can do this with the pgp signature functions in PGP Tools. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLW7drcGoFIWXVYodAQHKRwQAj4zOGBqNeT6w6VeHRn6QMk5sAmYAep9M MpiVYTEdcSTzW7C2TP9RF/f1cqIpPy4pBK5ATRmGCnaDe12FxM4iIZVMVcprS7Ao XaL52RR/0d0Tctt6YhQBMaODaosPm0Nbd+R3ztRRpugCU37lAFTWLHTuDAVlNqzl yX/8iTSbyGo= =gZ8U -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

re: inept spy
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Chris Knight <uunet!crl.com!cknight> writes: > I have an amusing note to add to this. I was talking to a co-worker this > week about the clipper articles I had been forwarding him. I told him > that I thought we would soon have a media saturated incident concerning > some form of criminal or terrorists. > > The criminal/terrorists would either > a) get caught, and the feds will claim this couldn't have happened if their > communications had been encrypted. > b) a terrorist plot will succeed, and an after the fact investigation will > show that the terrorists had been under surveilance, but the plot > wasn't uncovered because of encryption. I'm not sure this incident helps the pro-Clipper folks; after all, it demonstrates how difficult it can be to keep any information truly secret, particularly where others value it highly. Yesterday's local paper said that perhaps 10 people died because Ames revealed them as agents; will the government protect the key escrow data more carefully than it protected the identities of those agents? How many more "secrets" are known by others .. how sure are we that some of "us" aren't really "them" instead ..? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLW7l333YhjZY3fMNAQFC4gP9EQv19g0qn13VE3sHVqwEt622Sqn9ChPv gB2EjTGZtVM+3R0qCW0b6JlwWSHM5YTHNlqhsqJrcVXUCrWTuE427l/pYhfXt3Py +DEJXviyTfc6j5vSMESEZT5Rr9zvZG4E7Sv+t+lc9TEoOfj5jxPDbHtuwrk2et9I gYTk3pDKBoI= =vs28 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles ".. has bizarre Cyberanarchist theories relating greg(a)goldenbear.com to human punishment." -- L. Detweiler

1 0

Tacky Tokens
by drzaphod＠brewmeister.xstablu.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Welp. I am now the proud new owner of 0 tacky tokens. I guess I wasn't in the first ten to reply. So I know there are more of you out there. Here's the deal: SALE SALE SALE. Everything must go! CLEARANCE CLEARANCE. For anybody with 5 extra Tacky Tokens in their pocket, you can own this wonderful, custom GIF by DrZaphod. It's a 320x200x256 picture that will jump out at you: HIGH QUALITY ART. Remember.. that's only FIVE Tacky Tokens for this CLASSIC GIF! Use it as your X background, your Windows backround.. or even print and wallpaper your room with it! Please PGP me a msg including: Your email address or remailer info. Your 5 Tacky Tokens eSASE if required Your PGP Public Key Mail all requests to: DrZaphod <drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com> once again, that's: drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com Be sure an encrypt your msg with the following key -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2 mQCNAirPdYEAAAEEAMoyYy8lL84DlFK4IRmYBwfSFY8IwWia0J3cKPHKyQVligPK gUnfh+Ky6wN6eXAeZsbEjM6VMXY21mMaRec3IbzXok2UKQHyFNUnL74J4iH1+hGw 0hO89bcDwFeFXvaFqcNTQRF0GJOSSIEiz970fqUOo+esZzKeazP+2tnMgvmhAAUR tCFEclphcGhvZCA8ZHJ6YXBob2RAbmNzZWx4c2kudXVjcD4= =NLcb -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- don't forget: drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com All merchandise sent via armored PGP msg! Write NOW! -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- - DrZaphod #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt! - - [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP] #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity - - [drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com] [MindPolice Censored This Bit] - - 50 19 1C F3 5F 34 53 B7 B9 BB 7A 40 37 67 09 5B - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

1 0

Magic Money Comments
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pr0duct Cypher at remailer(a)merde.dis.org wrote: >> There is no prototype for pgp_randombyte. > There is a prototype for it in pgptools.h Yes, but it needs to say "byte pgp_randombyte(void);" instead of just "byte pgp_randombyte();". >> Complete prototypes for (*output) and (*lookup) need to be >> provided in the function header of pgp_check_sigs and also for a >> different function pointer (*output) used in PGPKGEN. > Is this bad? I thought a function pointer didn't really > care, as long as you called it correctly. No - it is fine. This is simply a list of what it takes to eliminate all warnings from Borland. It is certainly ok not to do this. Even PGP generates quite a few warnings while compiling. > MPILIB has not been altered. It is the same as in PGP. > PLATFORM appears to set the appropriate modmult, but I > usually define UPTON because SMITH has given me some > problems in the past. Yes - I didn't notice all the various knobs and dials in PLATFORM.H until after I wrote that message. I needed to define a few more things. > What are you running, a Cray? My machine takes quite a few > seconds to run the server. I am running on a 33 mhz 486. While MPILIB does indeed take seconds to perform the required arithmetic, it builds its operations from an O(N^2) multiply algorithm. A "fast" algorithm would speed things up considerably. > I hate error checking. If I put in safe read and write > calls, what do I do if they fail? Just exiting with an error message would be fine. > Thanks for pointing out that bug, and especially for > setting up a Magic Money server. You are welcome. I'm not sure I have actually set up a server aside from the purpose of exercising the code for a few days. Hopefully others will grab the executables and do something a bit more permanent. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.3a Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

1 0

Re: I have FOIA'd the Clipper Key Escrow databases
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Also, giving classified information to unauthorized people is a major offense. They threatened me with that offense one time, over texts that I found in a library. If the keys in the database are classified, they can't give them out to cops. FOIA requires that they "segregate" any classified part and give me the rest of what's there, so if they claim that "well, one key isn't classified, but ten or a thousand of them are classified", I bet we can (1) get some keys out, (2) challenge this idea in court. In particular, it should be possible to record the LEAF from a particular chip (whether you own it, or not!) and send it to them in a FOIA request asking for the matching unit key. They clearly can map a LEAF to a key (they do it for cops), and FOIA only requires that you "reasonably describe" the records you want. Given their mapping capability, the LEAF is a reasonable description of the record you want. Good strategy. I still wonder if the decrypted keys are (all) classified, while the encrypted ones aren't. After all, the local cops' magic decoder boxes can strip off that layer of encryption (as, of course, anyone who steals one of those boxes or bribes a local cop). Anyway, I hope the idea works, or at least drives them a bit crazy...

1 0

Cypherpunk FAQ and Gopher
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu writes (in private mail): > Try gophering to chaos.bsu.edu and looking around for an abbreviated > [Cypherpunks] FAQ Matt Ghio wrote. Thanks Karl, but after picking up the FAQ I saw all sorts of interesting things on Digital Cash etc. Now Gopher is about the most painful method of getting info if you know what you want, and I can't even run it in the background. I've picked up most of the *text* files from soda.berkeley.edu//pub/cypherpunks, and it would definetely be more convenient for people like me, who prefer to download everything onto gig drives and browse through them at leisure, if chaos.bsu.edu info was available at an FTP site... At least the DC stuff is NOT at soda. WWW is a decent method of accessing info, and I'm making htmls of all the docs I've picked up. If someone makes chaos' docs available through FTP, I'd be happy to include and release a WWW 'Guide to C*punks'. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)doe.ernet.in, rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA -----------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Re: Infomercial
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Most people couldn't care less. They don't encrypt data, and will >never use a clipperphone. The FBI can *already* listen to all their >phone calls and see all their medical records. Why should people >do anything to protect something they don't have anyway? I don't encrypt my stuff but I gain much peace of mind when I know that I could. This suggests that I should encrypt in order to maintain that right.

1 0

Clipper and the EU
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Clipper and the EU The Independent (UK) February 25, 1994 Page 16 Super-spooks seek to extend domain to data networks; US agency wants ability to spy on new superhighways. by Leonard Doyle In Roman times conquered peoples and slaves were forced to carry tesserae or identity chits and any Gaul or slave who refused to accept one was branded or maimed instead. Soon all users of computer networks may be singled out for the tessera treatment if the National Security Agency, America's super secret military intelligence agency, has its way. The NSA, with a budget of $ 30bn ( pounds 20.5bn) a year, is responsible for intercepting foreign government communications and breaking the codes that protect such transmissions. America's most exclusive spooks are worried that advances in encryption technology are about to rob them of their ability to conduct surveillance on a global scale. After nearly 50 years of electronic eavesdropping, the NSA is finding that some widely available codes are impossible to crack. The worry is that hostile governments, drug barons, terrorists and money launderers will have a field day using networks or information highways built and maintained by the US or, for that matter, the European Union. But here is the rub. Anyone who wants to use government-funded information highways in future may be forced to use the lacklustre encryption technology provided by the intelligence agencies, complete with a backdoor access for official eavesdropping. Simon Davies, of Privacy International, a consultancy, has no doubt this will happen. ''A Wild West frontier - self-regulated by ethics and culture - has evolved in the computer communications business and now that the stakes are getting higher, government is trying to muscle in.'' It is widely predicted that by the end of the century about 50 per cent of world trade will be in services and that much of this will be carried out via computer- linked databases communicating across continents at the speed of light. It is this lucrative trade which the NSA intends to protect and oversee. The Internet system has already been identified by the Clinton Administration as the basis of a new information superhighway. If that should happen, organisations such as Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and the Electronic Freedom Foundation fear that future access to the networks could be restricted to users of an encryption product developed by the NSA - which ironically enough is called Tessera. The fear is that the freewheeling, anonymous access that hundreds of thousands of individual network users enjoy at the electronic frontier may end. To the outrage of users in the US and elsewhere, the Administration recently backed the NSA's plans to ensure that the agency will always be able to intercept and decode messages sent over computer and telephone lines. The privacy concerns are by no means confined to US computer users. Anyone who has every logged onto a bulletin board or computer service like Compuserve or Internet could be affected. The Administration has played up the law and order side of the debate, arguing that advanced encryption will be used by criminals and terrorists. Al Gore, the Vice- president, announcing the new policy at the beginning of February, said: ''Our policy is designed to provide better encryption to individuals and businesses, while ensuring that the needs of law enforcement and national security are met.'' However many leading experts in cryptography, computer security and privacy in the US do not agree and said so in a letter to President Clinton last month asking him to withdraw the NSA's proposal. That appeal failed to avert the decision to back the Tessera and since then a petition organised by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility has been signed by more than 1 million people who have sent their complaints by electronic mail to the President. There is no parallel debate taking place in the European Union, but the intelligence agencies here are just as busy trying to ensure that the information highways of the future can be monitored. Jacques Delors, president of the EU Commission, sees data highways as being key to future competitivity and job creation. Before long individuals will be able to hook up to the highway for all sorts of transactions, from renting a movie to view at home to swiping a smartcard through a reader at the doctor's surgery to bring up an entire medical history. The real business will of course be conducted by service companies, from banks to insurers to market traders. For these companies privacy and security are of growing concern, to which the NSA has responded with its relatively cheap encryption devices. But Tessera, which fits into the back of a computer, will also identify the user and has a special built-in ''trapdoor'' that will allow the NSA to eavesdrop on E-mail and other messages. Another cryptographic device known as the Clipper Chip can be used to scramble telephone and fax communications while giving the security services the same ability to eavesdrop with the help of a special electronic key, held in ''escrow'' by the government agencies. Government agents will be able to obtain the ''keys'' upon presentation of what has been vaguely as ''legal authorisation''. These ''keys'' will be held by two ''escrow agents'' and would enable the government to access the private voice transmissions. A similar device known as Capstone would be used for data sent via computer modem. The Administration hopes its encryption devices will at some stage have to be universally used by US industry. However, the outpouring of vehement objections from the computer industry, telephone companies and privacy groups in the US may have shaken the Administration and some computer professionals say that the NSA's encryption technology has no chance of being accepted in the market place. Sharron Webb of the National Computer Security Organisation is one of those leading the fight against the spy agency's encroachment into the world of computer communications. ''If the US government has a hand in setting up the information superhighways here, they may require users to use Tessera to participate, it is then only a matter of time before foreign users are brought on board as well.'' Already the signs are that big business will knuckle under in the face of fierce pressure from the US Administration. The largest American telephone company, AT&T, has agreed to buy the NSA's technology and to include it in scrambling devices which sell for about $ 1,000 ( pounds 680) each. Other companies are expected to follow suit, especially if they wish to maintain their lucrative contracts with the federal government. What remains unclear is how the EU and individual European governments intend to react to the US moves. So far the US is looking only to American companies and their overseas subsidiaries to use the new encryption technology. But sooner or later decisions will have to be made that affect European users. The smart money is on the EU adopting the Tessara philosophy, but with different electronic keys for each country's eavesdropping agencies.

1 0

DES VS SKIPJACK
by radatti＠cyber.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found part of a paper on DES VS Skipjack using gopher but could not find the remainder. Does anyone know where I can ftp this document from or have any other information about this subject. PS: Skipjack in the form of Clipper is expected to become a FIPS. DES was given a 5 year extention of it's FIPS status then it dies leaving only.... Pete Radatti radatti(a)cyber.com

1 0

Clipper and Amendment 4
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IV The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ------- Is it just me, or is the government ignoring the word 'secure' in the above statement? ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> In the United States, they \/ Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> first came for us in Colorado... -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 1.0.1) GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++ n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)

1 0