December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: signing pictures
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One reason that signing pictures could be useful is so that you could tell that a given picture came from, say, FoobarFoto Mark IV Camera Serial #32767, which lets you know that the photo was digitally retouched after it was taken. Yes, it's easy for someone to transform that into an unsigned picture, simply by twiddling a few bits (doing so at the end of the bitstream lets you minimize any corruption, btw), but you can at least be sure that a signed video or still picture was faked in real-space before digitizing it... and it's easier to detect those fakes, though reputable publications like the National Enquirer and the TV news programs showing exploding cars still have trouble on occasion :-) Bill # Bill Stewart NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 # Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com

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RESEND: Re: MTGS: Conflict Alert
by dkrieger＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:02 PM 12/14/93 -0800, Geoff Dale wrote: >>If the Cypherpunks schedule their January '94 meeting on the 2nd >>Saturday, Jan 8, that will conflict with a party announced >>by visiting Exi fireman Harry (Hawk) Shapiro. Harry said: >> >> As I announced a month or so ago, I am holding a party on Jan 8, >> at the Shearaton Palace Hotel in San Fran. >> >> Jan 8th is the last day of MacWorld. Hopefully a group of us will >> meet for dinner arround 6pm. The party will start about 8 or >> 8:30. >> >>As I doubt either Harry or MacWorld will change their schedules for >>our benefit, I suggest the Cypherpunks consider (and announce with >>plenty of lead time) changing theirs to the Saturday after (Jan 15) >>(The Saturday before is New Year's day). > >Actually, there were plans to move the CyPunks meeting to Sat, Jan 15 >anyway, since Jan 8th already conflicts with something else (Usenix? >something Unix-y). > >Of course, the 15th is when the ExI-BATF (Extropy Institute - Bay Area >Transhumanist/Task Force, for the extropianly-impaired) meeting would >normally be held. I think we can ask Dave Krieger to put this off one week >to the 22nd. If so, then I'll be happy. What d'ya say Dave? Dammit, I specifically picked 3rd Saturdays so they wouldn't conflict with cpunks. Okay, just this once. Remind me at New Year's so I get it right in announcements. dV/dt

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Re: anonymous video rental store
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not convinced a simple anonymous customer/buy-back(or deposit) mechanism is the ideal solution. First, the clerk sees what videos you rent and might be able to identify you from a picture. Second, if the store issues ID cards, then the store can track which videos are rented by each ID. Although the store doesn't know for your real identity, it wouldn't be to hard to find it out in many cases. The clerk coud look out the store window and get the license number of your car. You could avoid some of these problems if the store didn't issue permanent ID cards, but instead issued one-time ID cards. You would get a new ID card everytime you rented some videos. This would make it impractical for the store to automatically track your rentals. This doesn't eliminate the posibility of a clerk remebering your face and pairing it up with a specific rental, or a rental pattern. "Oh yeah, I remember that guy. he usually comes in late Friday night, just before closing. He always rents children's videos. Is he some kind of pervert?" Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: Improved DH system.
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Howdy, >I have been told that there is a new improved version of >DH key exchange, which is authenticated. Could >someone give me the reference, and/or tell me what it is >all about?........ Diffie?? I'm back at the office and can (finally) provide the information, sorry for the delay. The paper is "Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges" by Whitfield Diffie, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Michael J. Wiener, published in _Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 2, 107-125 (1992), by Kluwer Academic Publishers. Here is some notation, and a brief description of the basic protocol. Almost everything from this point forward is quoted directly from the paper. {.} Braces indicate a hash function. {x, y} is the result when a hash function is applied to x concatenated with y. S_A Alice's secret key for a signature scheme. S_A(x) is Alice's signature on x. S_A{x} is Alice's signature on the hashed version of x. P_A Alice's public key for a signature scheme. If the signature scheme is a public-key cryptosystem, then we define P_A{x} and P_A(x) to be Alice's public key encryption function with and without hashing. E_K(x) Encryption using a symmetric cryptosystem with key K. [...] 5.1. Basic [Station-to-Station] Protocol The STS protocol consists of DH key establishment, followed by an exhcange of authentication signatures. In the basic version of the protocol, we assume that the parameters used for the key establishement, (i.e., the specification of a particular cyclic group and the corresponding primitive element a) are fixed and known to all users. While we refer to the DH operation as exponentiation, implying that the underlying group is multiplicative, the description applies equally well to additive groups (e.g., the group of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field). We also assume in this section that Alice knows Bob's authentic public key, and vice versa; this assumption is dropped in the following section [which I did not type in]. [...] Alice Bob ----- --- a is known, x is random ------------- a^x --------------->> a is known, y is random K = (a^x)^y = a^(xy) <<---- a^y, E_K(S_B{a^y, a^x}) ---- K = (a^y)^x = a^(xy) ------- E_K(S_A{a^x, a^y}) ------>> The paper is a very good read. It describes the motivations behind the protocol; how to assure (or dis-abuse) yourself of the security of other protocols; modifications; other uses; etc. I highly recommend it. Hope this helps, Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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Re: Error-Qualifying Signatures
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter, Since this description is of a more general interest, I am cc'ing this thread back to the list. >Yes, but inverting a hash function isn't necessarily a problem. >Inverting an encryption function is. With hash functions, we >really want to know it is hard to take message A and append something >B so that f(AB)=f(C). Now, ideally people have always thought >that it was bad if given C, one could come up with a D such that >f(C)=f(D). But I haven't figured out how that can affect practical >problems. Did I miss something? Let {x} be a hash on x. Let S_A{x} be encryption of the hash of x with Alice's secret key, i.e., Alice's signature over x. Thus, a signed 'thing' is (x, S_A{x}). If {x} yields the function f(y) which tells how different y is from x (ostensibly to measure what damage x sustained in transit, to become y), then f(y) can be exploited to find y such that {y} = {x} (this is, after all, the design criteria behind f(y)). If {x} = {y} then S_A{y} = S_A{x}, and therefore I can publish a document signed by Alice (y, S_A{y}), without her knowledge (both meanings) or cooperation. Someone on the list showed a few months back that provably few errors (or abitrary attacker introduced changes) are needed to get to a matching hash, but finding the changes to introduce is expensive. Building a hash function such that a distance measure is easy to calculate and exploit, makes finding the right errors easier, and thus allows falsified signatures. I take x, introduce my required changes yielding y, and then exploit f(y) with say a genetic search, or simulated annealing, to find y' such that {y'} = {x}, then I republish (y', S_A{x}): my altered document/image/whatever, + some errors to make the hashes match, + Alice's original signature. The signature is verifiable. Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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Keyservers and anonymous Mailings
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for alleged copyright violations. Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess. Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a keyserver? A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a good deal of heat. Would this simply cause more problems than it solves? Perhaps the ethics are simply too black? (LD are you listening?) If PKP is going to employ this tactic, it seems that even the 'new' keyservers that run as simple databases and thus are not a copyright question are subject to harassment in the least, even if unfounded. If this is true, would anonymous remailing provide a buffer of some type? It always confused me that anonymous remailers were not used more actively for 'questionable' (read fringe) internet services. Perhaps there is a reason for this? Criminal liability I suspect. :) Perhaps I am mistaken in thinking that the lack of attribution just makes centralization less of an option on the 'data highway'? Considering the attitude of the current U.S. administration I am surprised this is not more of a common practice. After all, with the methods available, why make it easy to put the genie in the bottle? Again, would this just cause more problems than it solves by calling attention to already on the rocks anonymous remailers? Would make a nice test case. Or a poor one? - -uni- (Dark) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLQ/DJxibHbaiMfO5AQH8+QQA1FkotVUUabYOV+aYSqOgzhOjntl5jIE5 l9xHQ1XbzLrhHwamHPIjanGEfWow6xlGfaA6dUP/RvqVpZjNcAGMQ6v33bxJNpmb 5jL/w2/xq/GNssqeaJMeb0gCkQPJXrlZohY9EZeDOiZJzobLCbCIRdzXSjXoRir0 C83FYcN1Xns= =Wn1F -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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DCASH: ACM Digital Cash Paper Available via FTP
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The following is excerpted from the Internet Business Journal Electronic Currency NetCash: A Design for Practical Electronic Currency on the Internet, proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Computer Communications Security (November 1993), Medvinsky, Gennady and B. Clifford Neuman. This document is available via FTP: prospero.isi.edu /pub/papers/security/netcash-cccs93.ps.Z. Note: PostScript documents can be printed/viewed without a postscript printer with "Ghostscript", which is available from the SIMTEL archive. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLQ+n9N4nNf3ah8DHAQHEpwP6Arilf9L7wyRhaDPVFlXsbK9JQDwYhcMM WQmVTkU1BtDX7RKV1zfU3QcmKUqo5/VY/EopMAqNI0GqEbnaSU9kNkAzlS0eK1CP 9CdRDXrl0Gv4HTOKJWrWkoYwQdCxpuQLr28foBebGsKXPVwVDWSfJvAU4QZWoubY yyveAX87McM= =H5Fs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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traffic report: expect delays on the 93
by Eric Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Commuters should expect random delays of between 0 and 20 minutes on the 93 (the 128.32.182.93, or cicada.berkeley.edu) remailer. I'm starting my project of modifying my remailers to thwart traffic analysis, so as the first step I put in a random delay. The next step is to add an "ignore me" header command and also a "bounce me to neverneverland" header command. Other header commands (all in an encrypted header, which will have to wait until I finish configuring encrypted remail on cicada) will say things like "chop off the last X bytes and continue" or "add X random bytes to the message and pass it on", all with random delays. I also want to set it up so that it just spontaneously mails stuff to random places. e

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more traffic delays!
by Eric Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've "upgraded" all of my remailers (hh@soda, hh@cicada, hh@pmantis, 00x@uclink) to insert a random delay in the remailings. e

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No Subject
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Keyservers and anonymous Mailings Newsgroups: mail.cypherpunks In-Reply-To: <199312160710.AA28701(a)access3.digex.net> Organization: An Teallach Limited In article <199312160710.AA28701(a)access3.digex.net> you write: :If PKP is going to employ this tactic, it seems that even the :'new' keyservers that run as simple databases and thus are not a :copyright question are subject to harassment in the least, even if :unfounded. If this is true, would anonymous remailing provide a :buffer of some type? First of all, I wrote the new replacement keyserver and I happen to know it isn't even released yet (except to a handful of people for the purposes of testing portability and ease of installation etc), so it is not *possible* that the new sites have been harassed, and I think you should wait until it happens before you start worrying about it. As I've said before, all these keyservers will be doing is *publishing* information, and that's a protected right in the US. Now, if pkp choose to start chasing down people who publish their keys and asking them if they have a license (assuming they're in the US and need one), that's a different thing altogether, but that could happen at the moment given that the actual keys are up for ftp all over already. A keyserver that doesn't patent (or copyright? Who told you that?) infringe *cannot* be closed down even if the people whose keys are published *are* harassed. Anyway, the keyservers have to exist for the benefit of both ViaCrypt customers and European FreePGP users. G

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Digital Telephony Threat Returns
by jim＠Tadpole.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Digital Telephony Threat Returns According to FBI Dir. Louis Freeh, the development of sophisticated digital telecom and networking technology threatens the ability of the Feds to wiretap. In a Dec. 8 speech at Washington's National Press Club, Freeh annouced a renewal of the FBI's 'Digital Telephony' legislation scheme: the return of the controverial 'Wiretap Bill'. The bill is strongly opposed by organizations and individuals concerned about privacy, as well as the telecommunications and computing industries at large. The FBI's 'need' for this legislative action is under review by the Administration as part of its examination of security and encryption issues. The reappearance of this Bureau effort contradicts statements by Special Agent Barry Smith of the FBI's Congressional Affairs Office, who stated less than a month ago that the 'Wiretap Bill' had been tabled. According to classified documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the FBI and the Electronic Communications Service Provider Committee or ECSPC (an ad hoc industry working group, which formed in March), are attempting to decide if technical solutions can be found to satisify law enforcement. According to a Nynex representative co-chairing the group, Kenneth Raymond, no solution has yet been found, but that FBI has yet to prove any solution is needed at all. Raymond likened Freeh's tactics to "yelling out the window" - an attention-getting move that needs some sort of clarifying followup. Though the ECSPC claims to be attempting to evaluate the problem and to solve it "in some reasonable way that is consistent with cost and demand", Raymond indicated that the group considers one 'solution' to be building wiretap access into future telecom hardware - like the Clipper chip backdoor, but a 'feature' of all switch specifications for phone and data lines. This news was just received, and a more detailed analysis and statement from EFF will follow soon.

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Keyservers and anonymous Mailings
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn <uunet!access.digex.net!unicorn> writes: > It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for > alleged copyright violations. Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess. > Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a > keyserver? A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a > good deal of heat. As far as I can tell, the copyright issue exists only in David Sternlight's addled mind; and even he has conceded that he's got no factual basis for asserting that PGP might infringe someone's copyright. I can't tell if his messages about this reflect actual confusion about the difference between patent and copyright, or if he's simply stumbled across another FUD tactic to use against PGP. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLQ7bV33YhjZY3fMNAQGG1QP/XbLehbgzvvdsSeN1YSKeKQGoZM0XigBt 0JClAQXHaoMeu2PDh4et7Txhq+IOvhAwrW3xCB+0aEXWiyZ3XGU0Z5rYL4e57/q6 Z5IgeYyPO/5DSIc+45XlwdC24X2MPENvex2IN2dYypGU4fUIff2GxaTW4hc4458u Agno8lsCjs4= =cjSg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles Lemon Detweiler Pledge? greg(a)goldenbear.com You're soaking in it.

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addme
by Ophir Ronen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Eric, Please add me to the list. *Thx, -Ophir

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Anonymous Video Rental
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P>So, when I go to Huntsville Utilities and ask them to turn on the P>power at my house, rather than writing a check or giving them personal P>information, I just tell give them a blinded token which they could P>use to withdraw $X from my account at the Austin-Internet Credit P>Union. As always the UK is ahead of the curve on this one. It is still possible in certain UK apartments to pay gas *and* electricity bills anonymously. The electricity and gas meters have coin boxes on them. You want electricity or gas and you just put the coins it. True. This used to be the standard method of paying for utilities. This is less common for electricity now but any office of British Gas will still sell you plastic "keys" that are shaped like keys. They turn on your gas for a set period of time and presumably break off in the process so they can't be reused. Cutting-edge high tech! DCF "Buy Extra Gas Tokens For the Holidays" Poster inside BG offices this time of year. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Use foreign key servers
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)access.digex.net> thus posted: > > It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for > alleged copyright violations. Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess. > Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a > keyserver? A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a > good deal of heat. > (I thought it was a patent problem rather... but that's not the point) Let me know if I'm missing some essential point here, but why are people insisting on running key servers in the US, the only country where there may be a patent claim? I doubt mailers would care one way or the other if you used foreign keyservers. I do understand how some of us would make it their Duty to actively protect their Konstitooshunol Right to run PGP key servers in their Own Country, free from interference from evil commercial and governmental entities :-) (no, really, I understand) but what other reason could there be for that? In this case, to the user, it should not matter where the keyserver if physically located. I'm not really up to speed as to which key servers are running where, but the current versions of PGP being developped outside of the US, there must be a few keyservers here and there. Keys crossing the border cannot be the problem, they are all over Netnews and all over mailing lists too. So, I do not understand why this could be a "nice tactic if you are PKP". Surely they cannot be spending much ressources on this when the easy counter move is to use foreign key servers. I do not understand what reason there is to start (or even develop) keyservers in the US, apart from annoying PKP. Pierre Uszynski pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Anonymous remailers and keyservers.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A keyserver that doesn't patent (or copyright? Who told you that?) ()() oops, did I say copyright...? First of all, I wrote the new replacement keyserver and I happen to know it isn't even released yet (except to a handful of people for the purposes of testing portability and ease of installation etc), ()() I hadn't realized that my message implied this. so it is not *possible* that the new sites have been harassed, and I think you should wait until it happens before you start worrying about it. As I've said before, all these keyservers will be doing is *publishing* information, and that's a protected right in the US. ()() Again, I did not mean for my message to so imply, my point was that it was a possbility and considering past behavior, not way beyond PKP. I really wanted to point out that it might be an interesting statement on other internet services (none come to mind which might be the most revealing statement on the applicability of the idea) and the use of anonymous remailers. Now, if pkp choose to start chasing down people who publish their keys and asking them if they have a license (assuming they're in the US and need one), that's a different thing altogether, but that could happen at the moment given that the actual keys are up for ftp all over already. ()() I had not considered this, it was a little beyond the scope of my message. I was more concerned with the operators of the servers not the end users. It's a good point none the less. A keyserver that doesn't patent (or copyright? Who told you that?) infringe *cannot* be closed down even if the people whose keys are published *are* harassed. ()() You use the word *cannot* pretty strictly. I think you mean legally cannot. Consider that the keyservers that have been closed down (if they have...?) may fall into the legally *cannot* be shut down group. They just haven't been tested yet. What I think you mean is legally cannot, as opposed to practically cannot. Political pressure is plenty enough to make university administrators jumpy. Private machines are immune of course (to some extent anyhow). Anyway, the keyservers have to exist for the benefit of both ViaCrypt customers and European FreePGP users. ()() And argueably those who don't hold ViaCrypt licenses. -uni- (Dark)

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Is VIACrypt PGP authorized for use byPKP?
by Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would appreciate some commentary as to whether the VIACRYPT PGP MSDOS package is licensed for use by PKP (Public Key Partners). It is my belief that it is.

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Inman vs. crypto
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bobby Inman has just been nominated as the new secretary of defense. When he was director of NSA, he was not, as I recall, particularly sympathetic to private-sector cryptography. In fact, he tried to institute a review process for civilian cryptographic papers. His nomination is subject to confirmation by the Senate, after review by the Armed Services committee. While in my opinion it's unlikely that his nomination will be blocked, the hearings would be an excellent time to question him on this subject. Contact your senator (this is for U.S. residents only, of course...), especially if he or she is a member of that committee.

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Digital Cash Session as Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference (fwd)
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: From: BAUM(a)HULAW1.HARVARD.EDU Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1993 08:44:21 -0500 (EST) Subject: Digital Cash Session as Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference FYI, a Digital Cash session has been added to the Jan 17-18 Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference: Law, Policy and Controls Conference in NYC at the Waldorf Astoria. Because a number of people on this list might have obtained a copy of the program on some other list, I will only reprint the press release below. PRESS RELEASE Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls Conference announced for January 1994 in NYC Dallas - June 11, 1993: MultiCorp, Inc. today announced Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls Conference, a conference addressing the Legal, Audit and Security aspects of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Electronic Commerce and Electronic Messaging. The event is offered in affiliation with the American Bar Association's Section of Science and Technology, Harvard Law School, The Computer Law Association, the EDI Association of the United Kingdom, Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, the U.S. Council for International Business, National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the University of London's Centre for Commercial Law Studies. This unique event Brings together leading academic and business experts from around the globe on the control issues facing EDI and messaging. Additionally, various industry associations will participate including HEDIC, the Healthcare EDI Corporation. A comprehensive program is planned revolving around over 40 sessions designed to address the issues, opportunities, strategies, status, and future of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Electronic Commerce and Electronic Messaging from Legal, Audit and Security perspectives. This program is designed to address the real-world issues and emerging questions encountered by legal professionals, auditors, information managers, EDI professionals, security managers, purchasing managers, sales and marketing executives and others engaged in the developing global information infrastructure. Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls Conference will be held January 17 - 18, 1994 in New York City at the Waldorf=Astoria Hotel. The price of registration is $550.00 per attendee. Parties interested in attending, acquiring sponsorships, or speaking should contact the conference coordinator at (214) 516-4900 or by fax at (214) 475-5917. The conference group can also be reached at: 76520.3713(a)compuserve.com. ***

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Bobby Inman
by karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case you haven't been following the news for the past two days or so, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has resigned, and Clinton has already nominated Bobby Inman, a retired 4-star Navy admiral, as his replacement. Inman was NSA director during the Carter administration. He is probably best known for his outspoken calls for draconian laws regulating private cryptography. He wanted all cryptographic research, public or private, to be "born classified", just like nuclear weapons, with NSA given authority over all publications. He lost, of course, but his becoming Secretary of Defense just as the issue of private crypto regulation is coming to a head again does not bode well at all. Phil

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Re: Bobby Inman
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was some mentions that he spend some time in the private sector since "then". Anybody knows what he was doing? Pierre Uszynski pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: Spreading Technology (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Spreading Technology (fwd) > Date: Thu, 24 Jul 1997 18:05:17 -0700 (PDT) > From: Mike Duvos <enoch(a)zipcon.net> > > The SU(5) theory was arrived at by political contrivance in > > 1927 when the Solvay Conference was called to resolve the > > various theories that happened to be flying fast and furious > > at the time, instigated by DeBroglie. > Excuse me? SU(5) is a supersymmetric theory. I seriously doubt > it made its appearance in 1927. I didn't say it did, I said the conference which decided what would end up being the 'standard model' was decided in 1927. I further thought it was interesting that the deciding factor was how the participants FELT about the various theories and on NO theoretical or experimental evidence whatsoever. The fact that I used the SU() symbology is a reflection of my thinking and not history. When I took Engineering Physics from Sudarshin at UT in '82 that was what he used because he worked in particle physics. You are of course free to use whatever symbology you feel comfortable with. SU() is the symbology used by physicist as an extension of group theory's U() symbology. The number in the () represents the number of indipendant variables in the model and tells the researcher how many rows and columns they need in their representative matrix. SU(5) is the symbology used for the standard model of quantum mechanics. SU(22), for example, is the commen "Super-string" theory that was of such popularity a few years ago. Glashow & Georgi developed the standard model representation in terms of SU() in 1973. It has become the standard representation via group theories for the standard model since then. Bottem line, all cosmological theories that I am aware of can be mapped onto SU() models. This is the power of this symbology in manipulating the models. For those interested you should check out: Particle Physics in the Cosmos: Readings from Scientific American ISBN 0-7167-1919-3 $9.95 Pay particular attention to the explanation in Chpt. 4 (written by Georgi) around pp. 69. Particles and Forces: At the Heart of the Matter: Readings from Scientific American ISBN 0-7167-2070-1 $11.95 ____________________________________________________________________ | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Bobby Inman
by karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Inman's first job after retiring from his spook's life in the Navy was to start MCC in Austin, TX. I saw him speak in 1984 at Bell Labs Murray Hill shortly after the AT&T divestiture, before Bellcore got its own facilities. He was there to sign up Bellcore for MCC membership, although we didn't know it yet. He gave an almost content-free talk about "regaining America's technological leadership" or something like that. When he finished, I got up and asked him how he could reconcile his stated need to lead the world in high technology with a DoD-dominated export control system specifically geared to keeping us from selling those very technologies in which we lead the world. He waffled like a classic politician. I was still trying to decipher his answer long after he finished. After MCC, I think he went to Westmark, a defense contractor. He also showed up on at least one Baby Bell board of directors (SW Bell?). As a shareholder, I made it a point to specifically withhold my vote for him when the proxies got mailed out. (To be sure, big corporation proxies are about as meaningful as ballots in a Communist election, but what the hell -- unlike the Publishers' Clearinghouse sweepstakes, at least they pay postage. Eventually I started voting against ALL of the directors on all of the Bell proxies, just for the hell of it.) After what Inman tried to do to civilian crypto in the late 1970s, the word "slime" keeps coming to mind. But then again, there are plenty of Inmans in the military-industrial complex. Phil

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Re: Inman vs. crypto
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am almost positive Inman will be confirmed. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBVAgUBLREvDx1kTJuroDD9AQHe1QH/TWfLMQUFOlMf4Uz2GaKC/jXYLql4upkk qmg2xhRlob55uwTuhHJe1FekHXoPCs7LBPtUAMC4eM+XZppBSCcNsA== =xt6N -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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by banisar＠washofc.cpsr.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cpsr.digex.net> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 1993 08:48:10 +0000 From: Dave Banisar <banisar(a)washofc.cpsr.org> To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Inman vs. crypto > Message-Id: <9312170947.AA18162(a)anon.penet.fi> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: an41418(a)anon.penet.fi (wonderer) > X-Anonymously-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Organization: Anonymous contact service > Reply-To: an41418(a)anon.penet.fi > Date: Fri, 17 Dec 1993 09:47:37 UTC > Subject: Re: Inman vs. crypto > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > I am almost positive Inman will be confirmed. > Boy, its a good thing that was posted anonymously. A real budding deep throat (grin) More recently, Inman was quoted by John Barlow in "Decrypting the Puzzle Palace" as saying ' "My Answer", he said "would be legislation which would make it a criminal offense to use encrypted communications to conceal criminal activity...you could have a registry of institutios which can legally use cryphers. If you get somebody using one who isn't registered, then you go after him." '

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