December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Cylex is already reality
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The very first entry of the Cyberspace Lexicon, *autolott* is well on its way to becoming a reality. An Associated Press story, "Is lottery by phone the ticket?" was on the front page of my local paper today. The article describes a proposed plan to establish a lottery where one would select numbers and pay for tickets via a touch-tone phone. The system would involve depositing money in a special account which the lottery commission could also access. The system could be set to purchase tickets when the jackpot reaches certain levels automatically. "Players could bet until their accounts are depleted, withdraw mopney anytime and replenish their accounts by check, electronic transfer, or credit card." It does state that "each wager would carry a $2 service charge." It souldn't be long before they realize they save more money by not printing the tickets. I don't have time to type in the whole article, but I think you get the picture. Six states are already interested. I'm surprised they didn't suggest just setting it up as a 900 number, or are there laws against that? So how long will it be before Las Vegas goes on-line? Call 1-800-LOAN-YES for easy credit extensions today! -john. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ John Blair <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> phone: (513) 529-4879 Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send you my PGP public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm actually me.

1 0

No Subject
by ltech1!ltech1!mercury＠heifetz.msen.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why WHY THINGS ARE MEASURED BY NUMBERS NEAR ONE by Michael E. Marotta We naturally choose scales that are naturally in tune with Nature. To do otherwise would be unharmonious and would be rejected by practice over time. Here are the numbers from an article about the Great Lakes in the World Book Encyclopedia. 5 lakes 1 in US 4 border 1909 year of treaty 94,650 combined area 600 alt of Superior 245 alt of Ontario 325 drop from Erie to Ont 1900 Chicago canal opened 1,000 miles inland 20 drop in St. Mary's 3 canal groups 1959 St. Law Seaway 182 miles of Seaway 2 times more than Panama Depths Areas 1333 31,800 Superior 923 22,400 Michigan 750 23,000 Huron 210 9,930 Erie 778 7,520 Ontario The numbers 4,5, and 6 are uncommon. You can round 7,8,9 to the next order of magnitude and make them all 1. This doesn't need explanation. Finding that measures clustered near 5 would...

1 0

T-SHIRT UPDATE #2
by cvoid＠albemuth.tatertot.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings. Sorry for the delay, I hope you all had a wonderful holiday. We are finishing up the t-shirt design, and it will soon be made available for approval in it's entirity. The plan is to have people order before the end of January (February 1st being the cutoff), and have the shirts shipped out in the first week of February. We are doing only as many shirts as we get orders for, hence the mass mailing. I will be posting an update in the next few days with information on the preview files and ordering information. The t-shirts will cost approximately $10 each, and will include shipping, etc. All additional information will be posted in the next update... We are only doing one mass run of this design, so it will not be made available again in the future. If anyone has any questions or comments please mail me. Thanks. Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | V/M/Research, Inc. cvoid(a)netcom.COM | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213 Tel. 1+415-807-5491 | -Erwin Schrodinger (1887-1961) | SF, CA 94117-0213 * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *

1 0

Domestic ftp sites
by mpjohnso＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> If you mean a site -in- the USA/Canada, no problem. If you mean a >> site which will not send files outside the USA/Canada, I don't think >> there is any such animal. The only site even -attempting- to restrict >ripem.msu.edu evidently has such a policy. I'm considering using it to >... I've just started an ftp site with a USA/Canada distribution policy for crypto software. Nothing can totally prevent the theft of data from this site, or ripem.msu.edu or rsa.com, but I decided that I would exercise my right to publish within the USA anyway. About the best I can do without demanding to see proof of citizenship in person (and even that could be forged) is to make it very difficult to get the data without reading a warning notice first, and hope that a combination of conscience along with the possibility of the actions being traced by the U. S. Government and/or the government of the perpetrator's country will limit the number of violations. anonymous ftp to csn.org and read mpj/README.MPJ for details. There is also the Colorado Catacombs BBS (303-938-9654) crypto areas that I hope to expand. Mike Johnson mpjohnso(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu

1 0

VOICE-Why not?
by charliemerritt＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why isn't there a cypherpunk-ish voice crypto system? I would have to guess that it has to do with compression. Compression, lack of CPU and baud rate and money for gadgets. Well I have been fooling around and I think we can get a punk-phone up real quick. My system: 286-12 2400 baud modem sound blaster With just this I can get poor quality recognition of speech, In realtime. With a 9600 baud modem and nothing more than CVD for compression algorithm, fairly decent speech is a snap for the dumbest CPU. Surely the crypto is a lead pipe certainty in realtime. I would like to see this minimal secure phone system SOON: hardware: 286 9600 BPS (7680 bits of data/sec) sound blaster software: CVD "push to talk" (one at a time, please) xor against prng If we got this up, then people could improve on it, add "real" crypto auto detection of faster cpu for "real compression" etc. My point is we have to have something to improve on. My 2400 baud 286 compression is poor quality, very poor. But interesting, it shows what can be done with nothing. If the general feeling is that it would not be too disruptive i could post a reconstructed speech snippet UU Encoded on this list. (.VOC)

1 0

RE: GPS and security
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is still off list, so consider pressing D now... Phil, Thanks for the corrections In message Tue, 28 Dec 1993 15:03:49 -0800, karn(a)qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes: > >>[general erroneous drivel elided] >> Such as the surveying marks at the US Naval Acadamy, or >>"ground zero" in the Pentagon. > > False. > [general good stuff by Phil elided] Last time I looked, the Pentagon was more than 100 meters in diameter. One of Phil's later posts talks about SA being in a 100 meter range. Obviously the Coast Guard and FAA want pretty good accuracy. Whatever the actual numbers on the error terms are, either a moderate high explosive, or tiny nuke, guided to within 100 meters of the Ground Zero Cafe will probably take out all of the above ground portions of the Pentagon. Look at what a single smart bomb (a fairly small one at that) did in the Pentagon's favorite Gulf War video. Similarly, just off the Naval Acadamy's grounds is a huge array of naval communincations gear. It wouldn't take much to put atserious hurt in the Navy's C-cubed net. And you could easily use GPS to get close, and then image recognition for final targeting. Seems to me that the important concept here is that this is yet another technology that the government can't control once its out of the bottle. The scare tactics, and worrisome quotes about "terrorists and drug dealers" will cause confusion among the masses, but I can't see them having any long term effect. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)netcom.com Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

1 0

Cypherpunk Credit Union
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello cy{ph,b}er{wo,pu}nks. I wanted to follow up on a posting by B.Stewart who said that the cypherpunks are putting together a cash credit union over the Internet. I have a few questions about this. 1. Do you have to join the CA cypherpunks to learn about this? Obviously you guys have been working on this a long time, and as long as I was on the list I barely saw any peep about it. 2. Is this a private development group? Is it open to anyone who wishes to join? If so, are cy{b,ph}erwonks allowed to join in the development? We are interested in these kinds of projects. 3. Do you have a mailing list dedicated to this project alone or other internet development projects? We know about the cypherpunks list but there are rumors that there are some other development lists `behind the scenes' -- are these open to the public? 4. If any of your projects are indeed secret, why are many cypherpunks actively engaged in a campaign on the imp-interest list (Internet Mercantile Protocols)? Why don't you just stick to your own project and let the Internet sort out which protocol is more acceptable to the world-at-large? 5. What about the rumors that seem to be confirmed by what B.Stewart said about evading tax laws and black marketeering, that the cypherpunk credit union is actually a surreptitious front for plans to provide money laundering over the Internet? 6. Again, if this is a public project, why is there so little documentation available? There doesn't seem to be any on soda.berkeley.edu, and many of my requests elsewhere have been ignored. 7. What is the David Chaum connection to all this? I know that he met with E.Hughes to discuss plans but are the Cypherpunks to be understood as the U.S.-based Chaum group? Thanks in advance for any information, I hope we can get more cooperation where our goals overlap; it seems to me like we have many common goals.

1 0

Cypherpunks & Clipper
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello darlings. I heard a rumor that Mr.May has requested that everyone stop talking about Clipper on this list, saying it was `time to move on'. Or maybe it was one of his tentacles, say Wonderer. (It's hard to keep track, as you all know!) Anyway, I have written a lot about Clipper when it first came out on the list, and I have seen a lot of interest here, so I'm kind of mixed up. I have to admit my feelings are kind of hurt to hear Mr. May just kind of dismiss all the hard work of everyone who has lobbied against it here. Maybe everyone who has an opinion on this could post to the list -- is Clipper dead? Should we stop talking about it? Do cypherpunks have better things to do with their time? p.s. many cypherpunks have objected to my long postings, so I will try to post some shorter ones. I'm here to serve you, a fellow cypherpunk and human being, in whatever way I can.

1 0

On Troublemakers and Torture Techniques
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, a long time ago I suggested on the cypherpunks list that people be limited in the tentacles and anonymous IDs they be permitted to use in Internet mailing lists and groups dedicated to serious subjects and goals such as project development. This fell on deaf ears at the time but perhaps the atmosphere and climate is more suitable at this time for both groups to consider ideas that will prevent their being tormented by troublemakers. One of the best ideas I have I like for its utter simplicity. The idea is this: the mailing list software tracks how long someone has had their email address subscribed. When they post, a field added by the list software broadcasts to the world how `old' they are. This is an interesting measure of their `wisdom' on the group. In the real world, we defer to people based on their age all the time; it is a basic aspect of our human interaction. Now, I know that there are objections to this kind of tracking, but it seems to me they come mostly from people who like to invade others attention with tentacles and anonymous posts. (Note that under the scheme, all anonymous posts or for that matter anything from `outsiders' gets a rating of 0 days old.) Nevertheless I think that this is a very reasonable measure of `credibility' and would be appreciated by everyone who is interested in building their own filtering tools. We need to get more information to individuals to make logical choices about filtering; today it is `every man for himself.' The second idea is this: let the list software track how much that certain people's postings are *replied* to. In a sense, this is a measure of their `relevance'. If I am continually posting messages that get no response at all, I am probably doing something wrong, like asking annoying newbie questions or posting on topics that are outside the charter. On the other hand, if I consistently get huge chains of interesting feedback on the list started, it suggests that what I am writing about is inherently interesting to everyone on the list. Now, when I post and an extra header tells everyone how `interesting' I am by this criteria, they can judge for themselves if I have a personality that is `irrelevant' or `fascinating' and reply to the list or privately based on that. The `reply tracking' has some extra considerations. One of the problems is that people tend to respond to posts that they think are irrelevant with further flames. But this just tends to start a chain reaction of meta-postings in which all the regular topics are buried in. I think that this suggests a fundamental frailty and deficiency in human nature: the inability to `turn the other cheek' when offended. Imagine! In cyberspace, all you have to do to neutralize a troublemaker is to delete his messages! But people cannot even do that. They believe that in cyberspace, as in all other realms of their life, justice is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth and a flame for a flame. If someone makes you miserable, the only justifiable response (so it goes) is to make them miserable themselves. So, I think this new list software that tracked *responses* to messages would be very valuable in encouraging people to take the `Christian' approach of not counterattacking a tormenter but absorbing their hatred. Because, if you *did* respond to them with flames, it would actually aid their `reply count' rating, and you don't want to aid them in any way whatsoever, of course! So perhaps these new rating systems will actually encourage *real* `moderation' and forbearance. Once again, I urge everyone `out there' to experiment with new systems to encourage responsible and courteous Cyberspatial interactions.

1 0

...Into your life it will creep
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello {CA,CO,Internet} cy{ph,b}er{wo,pu}nks. Many cypherpunks have told me that trust is not an inherent element of daily life and that new features of cyberspace such as digital signatures make things like human trust obsolete. This reminds me of a poem that I saw by S.Boxx. ===cut=here=== How do I Trust Thee? S.Boxx <na12070(a)anon.penet.fi> How do I trust thee? Let me count the ways. Some sofware I get free, and have used for many days; I trust the program author is not waging Virus War. I trust that when I need a key The one I seek is there for me. And where a map depicts one door I don't stumble into four! I trust you not to peek When it's anonymity I seek; The cypherpunk remailers must be free from failures! You trust that when you send me mail, privacy isn't broken by a cyberspatial wail! All our mailboxes Are open to the world, To mailbombs and S.Boxxes and vicious insults hurled. I trust that when you hear my name, You will not smear me with the blame of another arsonist's black flame, My reputation you will not defame, My friends escape your poison aim! My messages go to many lists, I trust they go to all-- Though I've seen Dictators' fists And when they hit a wall-- If you notice that they do, I dearly hope to hear from you. (Afer all, if you should fall, or if you burn, you'll quickly learn, Cyberspatial liquidation Is like anarchy in a nation.) We all trust that our leaders are not evil breeders, and not Draculean feeders! We trust that when we hear `true' stories, They're not cruel lies for somebody's false glories. We trust that we aren't living lies, We trust our friends are friends, not spies: In dark hours their light lives, not dies. Otherwise their rotten smell Will not make you feel well-- Even be your living hell. Eventually your mind will drench, Permeated by their putrid stench, Finally your sanity will wrench. Above all else we trust our foes Not to lash us for their woes, That whatever it is they think we owe, Whatever secret sin of theirs we know, They avoid the `brick-through-window' throw. We pray that even while we doze, Their fuse or dynamite never goes... Not to assail me with deadly blows, Not to kill me for merely stepping on some toes.

2 1

Paranoia Strikes Deep...
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I have been hearing some rumors about the cypherpunks being `penetrated' by some spies and areas of the Internet (mailing lists, newsgroups, private mail, journal articles, etc.) being targeted with `tentacle' infiltrations. I thought this was kind of fascinating to contemplate how they would behave. It seems to me that loyalty is very hard to judge by mere email messages alone, and that these hypothetical spies might take that to their advantage. Here are some of the things that either cypherpunk loyalists (cyberanarchists) or cy{b,ph}erwonk spies might say to gain credibility and further `intelligence' from insiders: - L.Detweiler is insane, has sent death threats, is behind S.Boxx, is involved in cyberspatial guerrila warfare, is the mastermind of a spy plot, etc. He is the only person in the world who cares about pseudospoofing. (All the complete ad hominem fantasy stuff). - `T.C. May and E.Hughes and J.Gilmore are all outstanding and upstanding net citizens, have never pseudospoofed or done anything wrong, and are the target of an anonymous smear campaign by terrorists.' - `I have been to cypherpunk meetings and parties, and I have met all the people who have been accused of being tentacles, and they are all real. In fact, I saw their drivers licenses.' `Someone accused of being a tentacle actually lives with me.' - There are no conspiracies whatsoever going on inside the cypherpunks, including drug use by `leaders' or pseudospoofing or other illegitimate activities. - Lies are liberating. `We have a right to lie to the media and other people through tentacles.' One can make a game out of infecting respectable media outlets like Wired and NYT with elaborate deceptions. - Pseudospoofing is liberating. `You are only as good as the number of identities you can project on the internet; this is a feature, not a bug.' The Enders Game book (Orson Scott Card?) is an example of the liberating effect of pseudospoofing on freeing people from their arbitrary prejudices about human identity and accountability. - There's no big deal about black marketeering or tax evasion. Everyone does it. It's a survival tactic in a brutal world of corrupt governments and massive corporations out to oppress the little guy. We are entering a New World Order where anarchy will rule and all governments will crumble. - Blacknet is a harmless and visionary cyberspatial experiment done by T.C.May. - `Please take these annoying discussions about secret conspiracies elsewhere.' Of course, if any of these statements are by the spies, they are just trying to build up your trust so that they can betray you later when they have the proper opportunity. Or, sometimes, there is the dictum that `intelligence is more valuable than liquidation' and they may continue to deceive you just for the valuable intelligence indefinately. * * * Then there may be some `tentacles' out there that are being driven by the counterrevolutionaries bent on destroying the Cyberanarchist movement and interested in getting some of their own propaganda out there. These would be indistinguishable from cy{b,ph}erwonk loyalists. - L.Detweiler is brilliant, has made stellar net contributions, has never sent death threats, no evidence exists that he is behind S.Boxx, he has spoken out against cyberspatial guerrila warfare, is the mastermind of a new mailing list but talk of a spy plot is preposterous, etc. He is one of many in the world who cares very seriously about pseudospoofing as all his writing in e.g. RISKS and CUD attests. - `Very little is know about T.C. May and E.Hughes and J.Gilmore as far as their personalities, and in fact J.Gilmore has admitted publicly to drug use, and all vehemently resist making unequivocal public or private statements on pseudospoofing, although they do seem to be the target of an anonymous smear campaign by the anonymous person S.Boxx, but with some disturbing elements of truth.' - `I have never been to cypherpunk meetings and parties, and I am suspicious of the behavior of many of the `people' L.Detweiler has accused of being tentacles, because of the lack of verifiable information and a sort of `cardboard cutout' flavor to their personalities. There seems to be some desperate damage control going on.' - There seem to be some actual conspiracies going on inside the cypherpunks, including drug use by `leaders' or pseudospoofing or other illegitimate activities. - Lies are lies. `No one has a right to lie to the media or other people through tentacles.' Anyone who makes a game out of infecting respectable media outlets like Wired and NYT with elaborate deceptions is malicious, depraved, and perverted. - Pseudospoofing is perverted. Statements like `You are only as good as the number of identities you can project on the internet; this is a feature, not a bug.' are depraved and deluded. The Enders Game book (Orson Scott Card?) is an example of the very dangerous effect of pseudospoofing on manipulating people in their assumptions and presumptions about human identity and accountability, and for mind control and brainwashing. - Black marketeering and tax evasion are evil. Though many promote it, it is toxic to social harmony. Those that promote it are all hypocrites who claim that they have found new societies that are free of it, but have found only societies of poisonous distrust and paranoia. The whole purpose of governments and corporations is to serve people, and if they fail to do so they need to be adjusted but not destroyed. - `Please don't censor these fascinating discussions about secret conspiracies and cyberanarchists.' * * * It's quite a pity that in Cyberspace, to borrow a phrase that is rapidly becoming a cliche, no one knows if you are a spy. Perhaps we can work together to build systems that minimize this kind of rampant paranoia. It's really a shame that someone with a grudge against any mailing list or its leaders could so disrupt its smooth flowing operation with no repercussions. I have some ideas for preventing this, and in fact I encourage anyone else who does to join the Cy{ph,b}erwonks list and discuss these issues associated with Electronic Democracy. ``The first casualty in war is the truth.'' There is a saying in war, `shoot them all and let God sort them out.' Perhaps in these turbulent times, this message represents a `list all the rumors and let the People sort them out.' I hope the truth prevails in Cyberspace as it does in the real world. Our own controversies, such as those above, will serve as an interesting experiment.

1 0

Revised Clipper FOIA results from Asst Secretary of Defense
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We sent in an administrative appeal on June 17th, 1993, of various things that were withheld in the response to our FOIA request. The Office of the Secretary of Defense responded on December 21, 1993 -- six months later. (By law, agencies have twenty business days to respond to an administrative appeal. However, agencies regularly violate all FOIA time limits because the courts have largely refused to censure agencies for breaking the law, and have refused to force agencies to follow the law. I will point this out each time it happens, largely to educate you -- the general public -- about how pervasive a problem this is.) We did an administrative appeal of the parts they withheld and other documents they did not provide. The result is that one more doc came out (a cover sheet for a review copy of the President's actual directive, which is still classified and has been referred back to the National Security Council for processing), and the previously withheld paragraph of the last two memos below is now only blacked out for a sentence or two. The newly released text is highlighted with XXXX's and explanation. John Gilmore [This page originally XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TOP SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040 COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM FOR MS. JOANN H. GRUBE, NSA REPRESENTATIVE/NSC PRD-27 EXPORT CONTROL WORKING GROUP SUBJECT: Comments on PRD-27/NSA Draft (U) (U) Following are comments concerning your proposed memorandum to Jim Lewis, Department of State: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX blacked out via FOIA (b)(1) exemption. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (U) The assertions in this draft are merely unsupported statements. Recommend that the memorandum provide more empirical evidence to back up its assertions, and that the above comments be reflected in its contents. (signed) Daniel J. Ryan Director, Information Systems Security CLASSIFIED BY: OASD(C3I)/DIR, ISS DECLASSIFY ON: OADR [This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 30 APR 1993 (stamped) MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I) Subject: PRD/NSC-27 Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U) (U) Advances in telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal communications. These same advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and SIGINT targets. Diverse interests are in diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right to use such capabilities. A highly-emotional, spirited public debate is likely. (U) In its simplest construct, this complex set of issues places the public's right to privacy in opposition to the public's desire for safety. The law enforcement and national security communities argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and other intercepts and consequently prosper. They propose that cryptography be made available and required which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications. Such cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically possible to achieve. (U) Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right to and an expectation of privacy, that a trapdoor system would be prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not work in any practical sense. They assert that people who are deliberately breaking much more serious laws would not hesitate to use cryptography that does not have a trapdoor, and that secure cryptography will inevitably be supplied by offshore companies. Thus, freedom will be lost and many tax dollars spent to no effect. (U) This situation is complicated by the existence of other interests. For example, there currently exist strict controls on the export of cryptography. The computer industry points out that it has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export licenses. The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when offshore products which do not have them are available. In support of their argument, they note that powerful public-key cryptography developed and patented by RSA using U.S. tax dollars is free to developers in Europe, subject to royalties in the United States, and cannot be exported without expensive and time-late export licenses. These charges are true. (U) The national security community is especially interested in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will inevitably result in such a proliferation. Actually, it is too late. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM and a telephone. In one recent experiment it took three minutes and fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the INTERNET. Widespread availability of DES and RSA will enable offshore developers to provide high-quality encipherment for voice and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's products. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX The entire paragraph that follows was originally withheld as XX XXXX classified information. We appealed the withholding, and XXXXX XXXX most of the paragraph was released, with only one or two XXXXXX XXXX sentences withheld at the bottom. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [(S) crossed out, replaced by] (U) Trapdoor encryption technology is not essential to the debate (a system that required the escrow of keys by users of cryptographic technologies could be established even if the trapdoor chips did not exist), proposed use of trapdoor technology does raise a further complication: neither the academic community nor private industry is comfortable with encryption algorithms that are kept secret, as will be the case with the trapdoor chip. It has been suggested that an independent panel of cryptography experts will be invited to evaluate the algorithm. This will undoubtedly fail to reassure the community at large that there are no unrecognized vulneratilities, since the panel will be perceived as captive and tainted. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX One or two sentences blacked out via FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXX (U) Despite these concerns, the President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip, and at least AT&T has been reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by promises of Government purchases). The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip. (U) The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned. (U) The new administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and a National Information Infrastructure in support of the economy. This worthy goal is independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing along the information superhighway. A full-scale public debate is needed to ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy, and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with development of the processes needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law enforcement and national security. (signed) Ray Pollari Acting DASD (CI & SCM) [This page originally SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040 May 3, 1993 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM: CHARLES A. HAWKINS, JR., ACTING ASD(C3I) (initialed C. Hxxx) SUBJECT: Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U) PURPOSE: INFORMATION DISCUSSION: (U) In response to DEPSECDEF's tasking of 21 Apr 93 (TAB A) this information is provided. Advances in telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal communications. These same advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and a broad range of SIGINT targets. Diverse interests are in diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right to use such capabilities. A highly-emotional, spirited public debate is likely. (U) The law enforcement and national security communities argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and other intercepts. They propose that cryptography be made available to the public which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications. Such cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically possible to implement. (U) Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right to and expectation of privacy, that such a system would be prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not work in any practical sense. They assert that criminals and spies will not hesitate to use secure cryptography supplied by offshore companies. Thus, the loss of privacy would outweigh any advantages to law enforcement or national security. (U) The computer industry points out that it has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export licenses because of strict controls of export of cryptography. The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when offshore products which do not have them are available. CLASSIFIED BY: DASD(CI&SCM) DECLASSIFY ON: OADR [This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] (U) The national security community is especially interested in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will inevitably result in such a proliferation. This would increase the cost of performing the SIGINT mission or decrease the amount of intelligence, or both. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM, and a telephone. Thus far, widespread availability has not led to widespread use. However, widespread availability of DES and RSA will make it possible for offshore developers to provide high- quality encipherment for voice and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's products. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX The entire paragraph that follows was originally withheld as XX XXXX classified information. We appealed the withholding, and XXXXX XXXX most of the paragraph was released, with only one or two XXXXXX XXXX sentences withheld at the bottom. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [(S) crossed out, replaced by] (U) Trapdoor encryption technology is not essential to the debate since a system that required the escrow of keys by users of cryptographic technologies could be established even if the trapdoor chips did not exist. Proposed use of trapdoor technology does raise a further complication: neither the academic community nor private industry is comfortable with encryption algorithms that are kept secret, as will be the case with the trapdoor chip. It has been suggested that an independent panel of cryptography experts will be invited to evaluate the algorithm. This will not reassure the community at large that there are no unrecognized vulneratilities, since the panel will be perceived as captive and tainted. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX One or two sentences blacked out via FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXX (U) The President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip. The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip. The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned. (U) The new administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and a National Information Infrastructure in support of the economy. This worthy goal is independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing along the information superhighway. A full-scale public debate is beginning which will ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with development of the processes needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law enforcement and national security. Prepared by: Dan Ryan/ODASD(CI & SCM)/x 41779/28 Apr 93/OSD -- John Gilmore gnu(a)toad.com -- gnu(a)cygnus.com -- gnu(a)eff.org ``This committee has not tried to determine whether the National Security Agency tendency to advance exaggerated claims of authority ... stems from conscious policy or the actions of individual NSA employees.'' The Government's Classification of Private Ideas, House Report 96-1540, p. 67

2 1

Trapdoor vs. Escrow
by baldwin＠LAT.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was shock when I read the material in John Gilmore's message of 12/30/93 (Revised Clipper FOIA results from Asst Secretary of Defense). It strongly suggests that the government has two options: 1. Key Escrow, and 2. Trapdoor chips. The comment about ATT being willing to make the chips suggests that the clipper/Capstone project includes BOTH Key Escrow and Trap Door. The chips would use a subliminal channel (like the bits that can be hidden in a DSS signature) to reveal the chips key. Presumably the revealed key is encrypted to make sure that only the "good guys" can recover the key. Notice that the NSA has plenty of motivation to have already developed trapdoor chips long before the need to use them in public cryptography. The US exports its crypto hardware to "friendly nations" and has a strong interest in being able to read our friend's traffic. The old fashion way of doing this was to sell old crypto hardware to these nations even though the NSA new how to break the systems. I recall that an NSA employee went to jail for telling Sweden that the NSA knew how to break the Hagelin cipher machine at the end of WWII when the US gave Sweden and other nations a large number of these machines. Given the length of the jail sentence (30 years), I suspect that he did other crimes, but the government did not want to expose them. Perhaps the modern way of reading our friends traffic is to sell them chips that reveal key bits via a subliminal channel. --Bob Baldwin

1 0

Re: GPS and security
by jerry＠terminus.dell.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <2fq4rk$t78(a)uudell.us.dell.com> you write: >From: m5(a)vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) >Subject: GPS and security > > >CBS's "60 Minutes" had a "Oooh Scarey" segment about the Global >Positioning System last Sunday. The scarey part is, according to 60 >Minutes, that any old terrorist government can now put together >accurate guided missles and wreak death and destruction upon our >homeland. The crux of the problem is that the system broadcasts out >positioning information to one and all indiscriminately, and according >to the show there's no way we can stop it. A couple of points here. Any terrorist group can get pin-point accuracy with a suitcase bomb. Someone could have launched an ICBM at the world trade center, but it was much cheaper to just rent a truck. Terriorist don't need high-tech. GPS has two modes, civilian and military modes. When the GPS is operating in "secure" mode civilian access gives 10meter accuracy. The military codes give accuarcy down to ~1meter. The GPS broadcasts using a spread spectrum mode and the encoding is based on the frequency hopping. Now if a military unit wanted to blow up your tank, they would need the 1meter accuarcy. During desert storm, the u.s. military turned off the secure mode, because all of the equipment they had use the civilian mode. >Because my mind is regularly exposed to wild conspiracy theories and ... >they could be told to do several things in case of national emergency: > >* Shut down (probably possible; they may have actually mentioned >this on the show). Problem is that lots of friendlies may grow to >rely on the data for life-critical things, like guiding commercial >airliners. All of the systems I know of, including airplanes and ocean going ships has LORAN C, GPS and inertial nagivation systems. Currently there are still holes in GPS coverage, to get a "good" fix, you need three satilites overhead. Currently there are still gaps where only two satilites are available. >* Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted >transmission. No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were >originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data >difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated >(by the FAA or someone contracted thereto). Actually the system was designed to offer the two modes, but advances in technology have allowed the GPS reciever people to take into account things like relativity(high speed satilites, freq shifts etc.), using more than 3 satilites to get a better fix, averaging techniques etc. With some more complex equipment and a "known" reference you can use GPS to measure down to centimeter accuarcy. Not at very high speeds though... >I don't know much about how this system works, so I don't know whether >any of my thoughts are relevant. It's probably most likely that the >government indeed blasted these things up into space without >considering using encryption technology to enhance security. Actually the government put a lot of thought into the security, but seeing as the actual data is just timecode pulses, its not real easy to secure, but with a good encryption and a frequency hopping setup like GPS, you can do a lot. I think that there are provisions for disabling the civilian channel altogether during wartime. It would be interesting to see what happens to MCI, Sprint, etc that use GPS to syncronize they're high speed syncronis optical networks... The should work fine for several hours but after a couple of days, the phase a frequency errors in the timecode equipment would lead to a high error rate. MCI and sprint may also use LORAN C for backup, I don't remember. -- | Jeremy Porter ----------------- Dell Computer Corp. ---- | Systems Engineering --- jerry(a)terminus.us.dell.com -------- |------------------------------------------------------------- | Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology.

1 0

Here we go again ...
by Bradley W. Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am one of those evil troglodyte NRA members mama Janet warned about. Along with my ignorant red-necked bretheren, I have protested increasing encroachment on my right to keep and bear arms. The standard pattern of the encroachment has been for our philosopher-kings to publicize incidents wherein something bad occurred involving a firearm, followed up by rules infringing upon our rights in the name of public safety. Lately the philosopher-kings have discovered the internet. Today, the FBI has announced that an evil bomber may be using it. I fully expect to hear soon that bad people may be using crypto on the net for nefarious purposes, and that crypto should be outlawed. It's deja vu all over again. bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us ask for PGP data

1 0

Re: Trapdoor vs. Escrow
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the term "trapdoor" in this context merely refers to known characteristics of the Clipper chip and does not imply any additional abilities to decrypt messages other than what has been revealed. A "trapdoor" is generally some secret which allows you to decrypt messages which could not be decrypted without the secret. It is normally applied in the context of one-way functions but I suppose an encryption system could be thought of as one-way. In this case I think the trapdoor may just refer to the Law Enforcement field which, upon decryption, allows information to be recovered so that the message can be read without the user's cooperation. The comment about the trapdoor issue being independent of the escrow issue harked back to Denning's original suggestion, which was that all users of encryption would have to escrow their keys with the government. This could be done in the context of any cryptosystem, such as DES or RSA. The trapdoor makes the system more convenient for users, hence perhaps more acceptable. But the escrow provision is the aspect that the government really cares about. BTW, there were some comments on sci.crypt about how this review document showed that the government was not as opposed to our views as had been thought. On the contrary, my take was that this document reflected something of a maverick view, one which was not politically acceptable with those in authority. Note the critical comments about the document containing unsupported assertions, a common buzzword for "views I don't agree with." I don't think the author of this review has helped his career. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

1 0

"Almost 2001" -- NBC transcripts available via Gopher
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

forwarded message - From: kadie(a)eff.org (Carl M. Kadie) Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk Subject: NBC transcripts Date: 30 Dec 1993 19:29:20 -0500 Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation To see transcripts of "Almost 2001: an NBC [News] series on the communications revolution", try: gopher -p1/Communications/2001 gopher.well.sf.ca.us 70 - Carl -- Carl Kadie -- I do not represent EFF; this is just me. =kadie(a)eff.org, kadie(a)cs.uiuc.edu =

1 0

End of Year E-Zine Listing
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Once again, we find ourselves facing a new jahre and pondering the untold wonders of the anarchy of cyberspace! In celebration of this joyous occasion, I've decided to post a compilation of electronic 'zines for your perusal. I especially like the reference for Practical Anarchy and will probably send a copy of this message to our old chum, Larry "the squid" Detweiler. Enjoy, - Spooge /---------------- good stuff follows ------------------/ Last updated: 27-Aug-93 by John Labovitz <johnl(a)netcom.com> This is a summary of electronically-accessible zines. The format should be fairly self-explanatory. In most cases, descriptions are excerpted from the masthead of the zine listed. [For those of you not acquainted with the zine world, "zine" is short for either "fanzine" or "magazine," depending on your point of view. Zines are generally produced by one person or a small group of people, done mostly for fun, and often irreverent, bizarre, and/or esoteric. Zines are not "mainstream" publications -- they generally do not contain advertisements (except, sometimes, advertisements for other zines), do not have a large subscriber base, and are not produced to make money.] If you have any additions, deletions, or changes to this list, please email them to johnl(a)netcom.com. I will post this list (and/or changes to the list) to various mailing lists and Usenet news groups. It can also be obtained via anonymous FTP from netcom.com as "/pub/johnl/zines/e-zine-list", and via email (either single issues or subscriptions) from e-zines-request(a)netcom.com. If you publish an e-zine, or know someone who does, please send a copy to e-zines(a)netcom.com and I'll add the relevant info to this database. All comments, suggestions, changes, deletions, etc., are welcomed and encouraged. John Labovitz johnl(a)netcom.com ----- Arm The Spirit "Arm The Spirit is a anti-imperialist/autonomist collective that disseminates information about liberation struggles in advanced capitalist countries and in the so-called 'Third World.' Our focus is on armed struggle and other forms of militant resistance but we do not limit ourselves to this. In Arm The Spirit you can find news on political prisoners in North America and Europe, information on the struggles of Indigenous peoples in the Americas, communiques from guerrilla groups, debate and discussion on armed struggle and much more. We also attempt to cover anti-colonial national liberation struggles in Kurdistan, Puerto Rico, Euskadi and elsewhere." Editor(s): Autonome Forum <aforum(a)moose.uvm.edu> Format: ASCII text FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Politics/Arm.the.Spirit E-Mail: aforum(a)moose.uvm.edu, subject: "ATS: e-mail request" Postal: Arm The Spirit, c/o Wild Seed Press, POB 57584, Jackson Stn., Hamilton, Ontario, L8P 4X3, Canada Arm The Spirit, c/o Autonome Forum, POB 1242, Burlington, VT 05402-1242, USA Phone: +1 416 527 2419 (FAX for Canadian group) Armadillo Culture "Being the excremeditation of a hyperactive armadillo's activities, opinions, and other stuff..." Editor(s): Steve Okay <sokay(a)mitre.org> Format: ASCII text FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Zines/Armadillo.Culture Postal: Armadillo Culture, 2857 Foxmill Rd. Herndon, VA 22071, USA ART COM "An online magazine forum dedicated to the interface of contemporary art and new communication technologies." Editor(s): Carl Eugene Loeffler <artcomtv(a)well.sf.ca.us> Format: ASCII text Usenet: alt.artcom Postal: ART COM, POB 193123 Rincon, San Francisco, CA 94119-3123, USA Phone: +1 415 431 7524 (voice), +1 415 431 7841 (fax) Other: Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link (WELL): ART COM Electronic Network (ACEN) BLINK "BLINK would like to be a forum for the issues surrounding the intersection of consciousness and technology. This is our best defense against postmodern angst: To critically look at and anticipate the cultural and social changes spurred by the rapid development of technology." Editor(s): Justin Kerr <ratsbats(a)casbah.acns.nwu.edu> Joe Germuska (managing editor) Danny Dunlavy (chiphead) Jake Eldridge (assistant editor) Format: ASCII text FTP: blink.acns.nwu.edu:/pub/blink Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us Computer Underground Digest "An open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views." Editor(s): Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer <TK0JUT2(a)NIU.BITNET> Format: ASCII text FTP: ftp.eff.org:/pub/cud etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/CuD/cud halcyon.com:/pub/mirror/cud aql.gatech.edu;/pub/eff/cud ftp.ee.mu.oz.au:/pub/text/CuD (Australia) nic.funet.fi:pub/doc/cud (Finland) ftp.warwick.ac.uk:pub/cud (United Kingdom) Gopher: etext.archive.umich.edu Postal: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA Phone: +1 815 753 0303 (voice), +1 815 753 6302 (fax) Usenet: comp.society.cu-digest CompuServe: DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG; DL1 of LAWSIG; DL1 of TELECOM Other: GEnie: PF*NPC RT libraries; VIRUS/SECURITY library America Online: PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters" Delphi: General Discussion database of the Internet SIG PC-EXEC BBS (+1 414 789 4210) Rune Stone BBS (IIRG WHQ) (+1 203 832 8441) NUP:Conspiracy RIPCO BBS (+1 312 528 5020) via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70 ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (+352 466893) Bits against the Empire BBS (+39 461 980493) (Italy) Crash "A guide to traveling through the underground. Alternative travel stories, hints, and tips." Editor(s): John Labovitz <johnl(a)netcom.com> Miles Poindexter Nigel French Format: ASCII text FTP: netcom.com:/pub/johnl/zines/crash Postal: Crash, 519 Castro #7, San Francisco, CA 94114, USA CTHEORY -- Virtual Review of Books for Post-Modem Theory "CTHEORY is a new international, electronic review of books on theory, technology and culture. Reviews are posted monthly of key books in contemporary discourse as well as theorisations of major 'event-scenes' in the mediascape. Editors and contributors include: Kathy Acker, Jean Baudrillard, Bruce Sterling, Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, Deena and Michael Weinstein. CTHEORY will also offer the possibility of interactive discussions among its subscribers in the electronic theory 'sim-posium/salon.'" Editor(s): <ed22(a)musica.mcgill> Format: ASCII text E-Mail: LISTSERV(a)VM1.MCGILL.CA with text body: "SUBSCRIBE CTHEORY <full-name>" Cyberspace Vanguard "News and Views of the Science Fiction and Fantasy Universe" Editor(s): TJ Goldstein <tlg4(a)po.cwru.edu> Sarah Alexander, Administrator <aa746(a)po.cwru.edu> Format: ASCII text E-Mail: cn577(a)cleveland.freenet.edu Cyberspace Vanguard@1:157/564 (FidoNet) CVANGUARD (Delphi) Postal: Cyberspace Vanguard, POB 25704, Garfield Heights, OH 44125, USA Drum "Drum is not an isolated event but an ongoing process." Editor(s): R. Patrick Jones <dh644(a)cleveland.Freenet.Edu> Format: ASCII text FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Zines/Drum Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us Ego Project "This 'zine is a product of me and as such will contain anything I feel like putting in it. Whatever I feel like putting in it shall include, but is not limited too, anything I feel applies to Gothdom in general. Album/single/tape reviews, book and movies reviews, etc. The Sisters of Mercy and the Mission are my main focuses, but since neither of them put out music on anything resembling a frequent basis I imagine other groups will be featured quite frequently." Editor(s): Corey Nelson <ieya(a)byron.u.washington.edu> Format: ASCII text Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us Postal: Ego Project, 1717 Monroe #b, Bellingham, WA 98225, USA Factsheet Five / Factsheet Five - Electric "FactSheet Five is the central clearinghouse of information about zines, those opinionated publications with press runs of 50 to 5000 (often done through surrepticious use of on-the-job supplies and xerox). Mike Gunderloy of Rennsalaer, NY published 44 editions of F5. Hudson Luce published the final issue, #45. I opened my big mouth (or, rather, let my fingers blab away) about doing an online, net-accessible version of FactSheet Five." Editor(s): Jerod Pore <jerod23(a)well.sf.ca.us> (electronic version) Seth Friedman <sethf5(a)well.sf.ca.us> (paper version) Format: ASCII text FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Factsheet.Five nigel.msen.com:/pub/newsletters/F5-E src.doc.ic.ac.uk:/literary/newsletters/factsheet-five Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us WAIS: nigel.msen.com Postal: Factsheet Five, 1800 Market St., San Francisco, CA 94102, USA (This is for *BOTH* the electronic and paper versions; or for items that can't be delivered to a PO box) Seth Friedman, POB 170099, San Francisco, CA 94117-0099, USA (This is for the paper version *only*, especially subscriptions) Other: The WELL BBSes around the world FUNHOUSE! -- The cyberzine of degenerate pop culture "Dedicated to whatever happens to be on my mind at the time I'm writing. The focus will tend to be on those aspects of our fun-filled world which aren't given the attention of the bland traditional media, or which have been woefully misinterpreted or misdiagnosed by the same. FUNHOUSE! is basically a happy place, and thus the only real criteria I will try to meet is to refrain from rants, personal attacks, and flames -- and thus FUNHOUSE! is an apolitical place. Offbeat films, music, literature, and experiences are largely covered, with the one stipulation that articles are attempted to be detailed and well documemnted, although this is no guarantee of completeness or correctness, so that the interested reader may further pursue something which may spark her interest." Editor(s): Jeff Dove <jeffdove(a)well.sf.ca.us> Format: ASCII text FTP: netcom.com in /pub/johnl/zines/funhouse High Weirdness by Email random Internet information Editor(s): <mporter(a)nyx.cs.du.edu> Format: ASCII text Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us International TeleTimes "International Teletimes is a general interest magazine. There are several recurring monthly columns but the rest of the content changes from month to month as new themes are chosen. The goal of Teletimes is to attract a large variety of writers from all over the world so that the readers will be exposed to a great variety of ideas and opinions." Editor(s): Ian Wojtowicz <ian(a)breez.wimsey.com> Format: Macintosh Doc-Maker application FTP: sumex-aim.stanford.edu:/info-mac/per/teletimes-*.hqx Postal: TeleTimes International, 3938 West 30th Ave., Vancouver, BC V6S 1X3, Canada Other: OneNet (network of FirstClass BBSes) InterText "InterText is a bi-monthly fiction magazine with over 1000 subscribers worldwide." Editor(s): Jason Snell <intertxt(a)network.ucsd.edu> Geoff Duncan <gaduncan(a)halcyon.com> Format: ASCII text PostScript FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/EFF.journals/InterText CompuServe: Electronic Frontier Foundation's "Zines from the Net" section, accessible by typing "GO EFFSIG" Obscure Electronic "OBSCURE is the zine that profiles the people in this publishing subculture." Editor(s): James P Romenesko <intertxt(a)network.ucsd.edu> Format: ASCII text FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Zines/Obscure.Electric Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us Postal: POB 1334, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA People Power Update The newsletter of the bicycle advocacy group "People Power" Editor(s): Ron Goodman <goodman(a)cats.ucsc.edu> Format: ASCII text FTP: netcom.com:/pub/johnl/zines/ppu Postal: People Power, 226 Jeter Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95060, USA Phone: +1 408 425 8851 (voice/fax) Play by EMail "Electronic 'zine about free play-by-electronic-mail wargames. Reviews, game openings, information." Editor(s): Greg Lindahl <gl8f(a)fermi.clas.Virginia.EDU> Format: ASCII text FTP: ftp.erg.sri.com:/pub/pbm/PBEM-Fanzine Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us Usenet: rec.games.pbm Practical Anarchy Online "An electronic zine concerning anarchy from a practical point of view, to help you put some anarchy in your everyday life. The anarchy scene is covered through reviews and reports from people in the living anarchy." Editor(s): Chuck Munson <cmunson(a)macc.wisc.edu> Bitnet: cmunson(a)wiscmacc.bitnet Mikael Cardell <cardell(a)lysator.liu.se, Fidonet: Mikael Cardell@2:205/223 Format: ASCII text Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us Postal: Practical Anarchy, POB 173, Madison, WI 53701-0173, USA Practical Anarchy, c/o Mikael Cardell, Gustav Adolfsgatan 3, S-582 20 Linkoping, Sweden Quanta "Quanta is the electronically produced and distributed magazine of science fiction and fantasy. As such, each issues is packed with fiction from amateur and professional authors from around the world and across the net." Editor(s): Daniel K. Appelquist <quanta(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Format: PostScript ASCII text FTP: export.acs.cmu.edu:/pub/quanta ftp.eff.org:/journals/Quanta lth.se:/documents/Quanta catless.newcastle.ac.uk:/pub/Quanta Gopher: gopher-srv.acs.cmu.edu (in the Archives directory) Postal: Quanta, 3003 Van Ness St. NW #S919, Washington, DC 20008, USA CompuServe: "Zines from the Net" area of the EFF forum (accessed by typing GO EFFSIG) Scream Baby "What do I want? Besides world peace, a sexy Mexican maid, and someone to use their fucking brains around here, I want a really good all-encompassing-sub-culture zine. Music, literature, art, television, film, weird space-time kinks, events, information, news, humor, interviews, and re:views of 'Stuff I Think Is Cool.' Not all at once, of course. Each issue of Scream Baby will come out whenever I can scrape together 25-30 kilobytes of really good stuff." Editor(s): Blade X <bladex@bladex@wixer.cactus.org> Format: ASCII text FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Zines/ScreamBaby ftp.eff.org:/pub/journals/ScreamBaby Postal: Cyberlicious <tm>, POB 4510, Austin, TX 78765 USA Other: WWIV: 46@5285 Unplastic News "the odd e-mail magazine w/a fever" Editor(s): <tibbetts(a)hsi.hsi.com> Format: ASCII text FTP: ftp.eff.org:/pub/cud/misc/journals etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/EFF.journals/Unplastic_News quartz.rutgers.edu:pub/journals Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us Voices from the Net "There are a lot of folks with at least one foot in this complex region we call (much too simply) "the net." There are a lot of voices on these wires. From IRC to listservs, MUDspace to e-mail, Usenet group to commercial bbs -- all kinds of voices -- loud and quiet, anonymous and well-known. And yet, it's far from clear what it might mean to be a "voice" from, or on, the net. Enter "Voices from the Net": one attempt to sample, explore, the possibilities (or perils) of net.voices. Worrying away at the question. Running down the meme. Looking/listening, and reporting back to you." Editor(s): Bookish <tibbetts(a)hsi.hsi.com> CountZer0 <mgardbe(a)andy.bgsu.edu> NEURO <fbohann(a)andy.bgsu.edu> Format: Macintosh HyperCard stack ASCII text FTP: sumex-aim.stanford.edu:/info-mac/per/voices-*.hqx etext.archive.umich.edu:pub/zines/Voices E-Mail: Voices-request(a)andy.bgsu.edu to subscribe: subject: Voices from the Net body: subscribe Whole Earth Review "We are dedicated to demystification, to self-teaching, and to encouraging people to think for themselves. Thus our motto: 'ACCESS TO TOOLS AND IDEAS.' Tools in the Whole Earth sense include hammers, books, and computer conferencing systems. Our readers are a community of tool-users who share information with one another. The ideas we make accessible have not often been found in university courses, but are becoming recognized as part of what you need to know to be truly educated. Our readers contribute to the editorial content as well, with both reviews and articles." Editor(s): <> Format: ASCII text Macintosh PageMaker 4.2 files Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us E-Mail: wer(a)well.sf.ca.us Postal: Whole Earth Review, 27 Gate Five Road, Sausalito, CA 94965, USA Phone: +1 415 332 1716 (voice), +1 415 332 3110 (fax) ----- Sites archiving e-zines with FTP: ftp.eff.org etext.archive.umich.edu ftp.cic.net quartz.rutgers.edu ftp.msen.com ftp.halcyon.com world.std.com netcom.com in /pub/johnl/zines) nigel.msen.com in /pub/newsletters grind.isca.uiowa.edu (128.255.19.233) in /info/journals Sites archive e-zines with Gopher: gopher.eff.org etext.archive.umich.edu gopher.cic.net gopher.msen.com gopher.well.sf.ca.us world.std.com gopher.unt.edu -----

1 0

Benford revisited:
by jpinson＠fcdarwin.org.ec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In regards to my posting about the New Scientist article on "Benford's" law (unexpected number ratios in observed data), I received many comments along the line of: > I suggest you look at any slide-rule or log graph paper for the > simple explanation of this trivial phenomenon. Actually, the New Scientist article gave a very clear explanation of Benford's law, and how it can be a simple artifact of the way numbers are counted. The article caught my attention, when it went on to explain how other phenomena, such as alpha particle half-lifes can follow Benford's law for completely different reasons. I won't attempt to retype the entire article, but Buck, Merchant, and Perez, reported in the European Journal of Physics (Vol 14, p59) that both expected and observed half-lives followed Benford's law. Quoting New Scientist: "..Why should nature operate in this curious manner? Buck and his colleagues point out that in the case of alpha decay, there may be a good physical reason. In 1928 George Gamow used the newfangled theory of quantum mechanics to describe alpha decay. The alpha particle lives inside a "potential well" in which the energy is lower than in an any other state that it can normally reach. It escapes by "tunneling" through the potential well. The probability of tunneling occurring within a given time is found by forming a so- called "tunneling integral" and raising it to a power that is proportional to time. So tunneling times, and hence half-lives naturally correspond to a geometric series, not a arithmetic one. If nature chooses the tunneling integral "randomly" with uniform probability, then the power-law dependence of alpha-particle half-lives on this integral leads to scale-invariant behavior, and so to Benford's law. " I am not a physicist or a mathematician, so I can't speculate on the validity of these statements. However, all this did make me wonder if advances in fractal geometry, or chaos theory, might one day reveal patterns in seemingly random numbers derived from real word phenomena. Since most random numbers used in cryptography are derived from real word phenomena, we should be aware of such potential influences. Actually, we don't have to bring in fractals, chaos, or Benford's law to have reason for concern about using real world based random numbers. A method commonly recommended on this list for generating random numbers is to take the audio input from a workstation (with no mike attached) and then compress the output: cat /dev/audio | compress - >random-bits-file First of all, without extensive study of the audio output (from the *specific* source) who can say the output is random in the first place? Harmonics from the various electrical circuits in the computer could easily produce non-random effects (like a 60 cycle hum). The second aspect that concerns me is the use of compression. Unless you are very familiar with the type of data compression being used, how can you be sure there aren't various signatures, tables, data structures, or headers being inserted into the output. Indeed, I had to go no further that the beginning of a data file produced by the "Compress" program, to find nonrandom numbers. All such files begin with the same three bytes! If something so obvious is being overlooked, what about more subtle patterns? Anyway, it seems to me there can be many factors "contaminating" random numbers based on physical phenomena, factors ranging from a simple 60 cycle hum to unrecognized fractal patterns. It is perhaps a good idea to routinely "massage" random numbers to remove both recognized and unrecognized contamination. Xor'ing random numbers derived from two or more different sources might be sufficient. If done properly, such a procedure may produce non-Benford, evenly-distributed random numbers, which might be considered superior to the original. Actually, I tend to be rather cautious about such things and am always on the lookout for possible "contamination". I also try to keep an open mind to new ideas. Jim Pinson

1 0

Hoax or ???
by mikeingl＠news.delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Path: news.delphi.com!noc.near.net!MathWorks.Com!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!library.ucla.edu!agate!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!news.ysu.edu!psuvm!auvm!DSC.BLM.GOV!cjames >Comments: Gated by NETNEWS(a)AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU >Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada >Return-Path: <@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU, > @VM42.CSO.UIUC.EDU:owner-info-ada@VM1.NODAK.EDU> >Return-Path: <@VM1.NODAK.EDU:cjames@DSC.BLM.GOV> >X-Mailer: SCO System V Mail (version 3.2) >Source-Info: From (or Sender) name not authenticated. >Message-ID: <9312212330.aa07880(a)dsc.blm.gov> >Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 23:30:25 MST >Sender: Ada programming language <INFO-ADA(a)NDSUVM1.BITNET> >From: Colin James 0621 <cjames(a)DSC.BLM.GOV> >Subject: Public key encryption broken >Comments: To: info-ada(a)vm1.nodak.edu >Comments: cc: barlow(a)eff.org, gdean(a)yarrow.wt.uwa.edu.au >Lines: 30 William H Payne originally discovered how to break RSA without factoring by using powers of two on 10/15/90. Mr Payne wrote a draft paper "Public Key Cryptography is Easy to Break" on 10/16/90. The abstract (draft only) appears below: Public key, also known as Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman, cryptography is broken without factoring the modulus m. The product of the encryption and the decryption exponent is computed directly with order log(base 2) m shifts, adds, and compares. A continued product between the modulus and its multiplier which matches a criterion solves the Fermat-Euler theorems simply for even very large moduli. Mr Payne is writing a tutorial paper on the same subject with Jon Grant which should propose a new public encryption algorithm as a standard which can not be easily broken. This indirectly relates to Ada in that projects in the process of implementing public key encryption in Ada may find these advances of value. This information also calls into the question the validity of patent claims for RSA. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Colin James III : Disclaimer: BLM, SC-342D, DFC : ----------- Denver, CO 80225 : The opinions expressed here are solely (303) 236 - 5897 : responsible for their content. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2 1

anonymous "video on demand"
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of a good, practical way of doing "video on demand" in such a way that the video supplier can't track the videos you select? I suppose the trivial solution would be to send your video selection request (and service fee) through a "anonymous video remailer". The video supplier would send the encrypted video back to you via the remailer. Since I don't see "anonymous video remailers" as being a practical solution in the near future, I'm more interested in finding out if there are other ways of solving this problem. This sounds like an All-Or-Nothing Disclosure Of Secrets problem. However, all I know about ANDOS is what I read in "Applied Cryptography", and the algorithm it describes doesn't seem a good fit. Are there other ANDOS algorithms that may work better? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

1 0

Anonymous Video on Demand
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Does anyone know of a good, practical way of doing "video on demand" in >such a way that the video supplier can't track the videos you select? Are you thinking of physical videotape or electronic distribution? For electronic distribution, suppose you have a fiber-optic cable with n channels, where n is a large number. You send in your request and pay with digicash or a prepaid system like a prepaid phone card. You send them an encryption key, and they broadcast the movie over one of the channels. Or they generate the encryption key and send it to you using a key you gave them. Problem: you can share the encryption key with a few thousand of your closest friends, thus cheating the video dealer. They could require you to make a digicash deposit, and offer a reward for anyone who reports a pirated encryption key. If you give out the key, someone reports it and gets half your deposit, and they keep the rest. But a group of people who all trust each other could still rip off the video dealer. You could have a decoder with a key unknown to you, but that system would be only as strong as the physical security of the decoder. Is there any way to use offline-digicash-like techniques to set up a system so that if you reveal the encryption key, you also reveal your identity? This would be a real deterrent. For a videotape system, there is no strong way I can think of to prevent revealing your identity. You have to pick up the tape, and they have to know what to record on it or which tape to put out. A camera at the site could always catch you in the act of retrieving the tape. It is possible to protect the dealer in an anonymous transaction, but not the customer. The dealer, if he was selling pirate tapes, could go out and hide them in various places. In exchange for your digicash, he tells you where one is. --- Mike

1 0

add
by Nikolaos Daniel Willmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

add Hope this doesn't end up in a real person's mbox taking up space.

1 0

Re: Revised Clipper FOIA results...
by an55689＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> A full-scale public debate is beginning which will ascertain the wishes > of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy and the impact on public > safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and > communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national > security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. Why wan't the public brought in at the _beginning_ of this process? How will U.S. citizens at large be brought into the debate? and When? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

1 0

Off the deep end (PUNCH!)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, although Perry Metzger has expressed a disdain for re-postings of Detweiler's rants to this list, I think that a little, subtle reminder should occasionally be posted just to remind us all how deranged this fucker really is. Enjoy. -------- cut here ------------ Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk From: ld231782(a)keller.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) Subject: ancient torture techniques Sender: news(a)yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account) Message-ID: <Dec31.090735.79631(a)yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> Date: Fri, 31 Dec 1993 09:07:35 GMT Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523 Geoff Dale (plaz(a)netcom.com) wrote: : > Congratulations! If you repeat anything frequently enough, : > people begin to believe it. : : That seems to be your strategy. It doesn't work when you so consistantly : undermine your credability with rants, tho. : So stop posting and this little bit of net.history will soon be forgotten. Hello world, I am not proud of everything I have posted `out there' lately, but I am even less proud of the ugly depths and grotesque deformities I have seen in certain black corners of the Internet lately, and the apalling complacency with which you all view it. The skeletons have not only fallen out the the closet, they have danced around us and punched us all in the face. My own letters on the subject are an attempt to shock you from your silent complacency and `accessorizing'. What happens when trust breaks down? What happens when people respond to their own posts? When they misattribute writing? When they don't care who is behind email addresses, or deceive others about them? When they post multiple messages from different addresses? Imagine that every one of my posts came from a different address. What is to prevent me? My honesty? My integrity? What if I am a cyberanarchist? Would I be horrified or delighted at these embezzlements of trust? By the squirming and writhing of my victims underneath my crushing onslaught? * * * I was reading a book about ancient torture techniques. (Actually, it was about something else, but some paragraphs on the subject crept in from obvious relevance.) The Roman soldiers had invented some of the most grisly torture and execution techniques the world has ever seen, perhaps the most humiliating and heinous punishments known to man. One that I was reading about was called `Circle of Eight'. A blindfolded prisoner stands as Roman soldiers (enthusiastic volunteers?) circle him and take turns punching him in the face. They take the blindfold off, and ask him, who hit you? And if the prisoner fails to name the person, the game continues, they dance in their delight, circling at a faster, more dizzying rate, and pummel harder. What is the point of all this? I don't have a major point, except to suggest that this is one of the most evil abominations of humanity I can imagine. And that it is shockingly identical to the mentality that a cyberanarchist has in hammering others with his fake email identity arsenals. Medusa is delighted to punch the blindfolded victim in the face with her dizzying circle of tentacles. Guess who it is! Ooops, you're wrong, sorry. PUNCH. What? No, N.Szabo is a real person. PUNCH. Pseudospoofing is immoral? nah. PUNCH. N.Szabo is my roommate. PUNCH. Lies are liberating. PUNCH. cypherpunks have never pseudospoofed. PUNCH. especially the leaders. PUNCH. and everything in the media is true. PUNCH. especially what we say. PUNCH. and our leaders are the greatest of all. PUNCH. See the blood dripping on the ground, see the hideous disfigurement of the victim's face. * * * I am posting this many messages to drive home the point that the Cyberanarchists are not really noble at all. They are like Roman Soldiers who will hit you when they see that you are blindfolded. Otherwise, they hide in the shadows like all the rest of the cowardly slime at the putrid, dank recesses of humanity. And unless someone takes out the trash, we're going to have to get used to the smell. But where will we go to eat, then? go ahead, tentacles, water down my words with more trash. dilute and warp my message beyond all recognition. that's probably all we read is, anyway. all of history is just a big lie set out by people who aren't interested in the truth, but in fooling us to assuage their egos. the Bible, of course, is the worst of all. * * * I read one author who suggested that as part of Christ's torture before literally bearing his cross, he had been subjected to the Circle of Eight. Cyberanarchists, who are you punching? What was that saying of Christ's, as you do unto the lowest of men, you do unto me? I think the question you have to ask yourselves is, if a victim is blindfolded, does God hear his screams? What if the soldiers are athiests? When does the Circle of Eight stop, anyway? When the victim is unconscious? When he is dead? ``NEXT!'' -- ld231782(a)longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU

1 0