December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Backing
by Matthew J Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The problem with using a concrete anfd finite source to back ypour currency is that it is just that...finite. This causes many economic problems for the social/economic system founded on it. I was barely a pup when the world first discovered this... er...that is when everyone in the mainstream allowed economists to be heard. Remember the Gold Standard? --Matt ______________________________________________________________________________ "This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy and political upheaval. The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art." -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne - the first Copyright Statute) (c)1993 ______________________/___________________________________mjmiski(a)macc.wisc.edu

2 1

Re: Clipper Chip report on 700 Club today (Wednesday)
by mlshew＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was asked in private mail how the show went. I'll write up a proper summary later, but for now, rest assured that it was a most excellent report. There were a few technical inaccuracies here and there, (~"Clipper is the most secure encryption device they've come up with yet"), but for the most part, if you were out to give a ten minute explanation of the facts of life in regards to encryption to people who would never read _Wired_, and actually spread useful and non-hostile memes, you'd have a hard time outdoing that segment of the 700 club. They interviewed a number of people, including a spokesman from NIST, EFF, and Dorothy Denning herself. The guy summarizing the situation at the end mentioned how the government claims these regulations are just for child molestors, terrorists, and criminals, but that after any regulatory sytem is in place, there's nothing to keep them from redefining who the criminals are, and so monitor anyone they like. I'll write up a better summary in a few days. (Remember: 10pm and 2am on the Family Channel. I'd recommend watching it if you still can.) -Mark Shewmaker

3 2

Re: JUDGMENT PROOFING
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Something in the way of a test post, to see if I can get through to toad.com yet...] From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor(a)foretune.co.jp> > Thus, the difference is that today, it's much harder to be > discreet -- the encryption is a red flag. "What's he hiding?" > And as any intelligence analyst can tell you, even traffic analysis > can tell you a _lot_. This is exactly what anonymous remailers are for - to defeat traffic analysis. The goal is a situation where you, and everyone else, receives and sends out a bunch of encrypted traffic every day. There will be no way a snooper can find out exactly what you are reading, what you are writing, or whom you are communicating with. That's what I call private. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

1 0

ANNONYMOUS BANK ACCOUNTS
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Punksters, Robert J. Woodhead suggested: . . . Rather than aspire to join the alleged clique of rich and powerful tax evaders, might it not be better to aspire to develop techniques that both maintain privacy but guarantee that they have to pay their share of the load. . . . Oh Robert, the clique is hardly alleged. Their there whether you like the idea or not. Strong crypto can do far more than merely maintain privacy while we try--in vain--to fairly share the load. It can help us *reduce and ultimately eliminate* the load for rich and poor alike. If you want to submit to taxes to buy piece, go right ahead. I'll put my faith in crypto anarchy. Mr. Woodhead went on in another post: . . . the difference is that today, it's much harder to be discreet -- the encryption is a red flag. "What's he hiding?" And as any intelligence analyst can tell you, even traffic analysis can tell you a _lot_. . . . Nope, where message volume is high, encryption is lost in the noise. When encryption is wide-spread, it's not a read flag. If steganography is used, there is no flag at all. Remailers make traffic analysis extremely difficult or impossible. Finally, the traditional methods are still just as effective as always. I'll say it again: We have already won. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1 0

pseudospoofed out
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, I use the internet for a lot of serious activities, and it deeply troubles me to think that I have been vicitimized by pseudospoofers in areas outside of merely the cypherpunks list such as in the numerous FAQs I edit (a very time consuming endeavor) or in my other favorite mailing lists. I feel like my blood has been drained by parasites that suck my prose and passions. Since there is absolutely no support for any `True Names' here whatsoever, I volunteer to drop the subject. And of course I am just another blip on this list, so my ideas for its improvement mean nothing, and I will not *ever* make a proposition again here regarding the subject. however, A PERSONAL REQUEST I humbly request that ANYONE SENDING ME PERSONAL MAIL have the decency to do so under their `True Name' or `obviously anonymously' under the same identity. Do not deceive me for perverted sport. Do not try to build up trust merely so that you can betray it. Do not manipulate me simply because you have the capability or because I am a basically trusting person. This sentiment is equivalent to something like `if a woman doesn't carry a gun then it's OK to rape her' and it is one of the most alarming aspects of what I have seen promoted here and in the general `hacker' community. `nothing is wrong if you can get away with it.' I believe that there is no such thing as a `consequentless action'. Please, do not drag *me* into the gutter because you like to wallow there. If anyone has deceived me in manipulating me with multiple pseudonyms in my personal email, please inform me *now*. I believe this is the absolute least that *anyone* could ask on the internet. Another point to make is that Usenet & current mailing lists are far from the future models. I fundamentally believe that `true name' systems are entirely socially desirable and can be erected without invading privacy. Anyone who claims that `true names' and `privacy' are fundamentally incompatible is simply mistaken. Does `absolute privacy' mean that no one *ever* knows who *anyone* is? It seems to me the ability to differentiate identities or reject their input based on `true names' is a basic right of the listener. You do not have a right to bludgeon me with identical opinions from an unrepresentative arsenal of imaginary identities. I suspect some of the people advocating `absolute privacy' are themselves currently using powerful tools to detect pseudospoofing others do not possess. Is that the cypherpunk Utopian ideal? A place where you can manipulate people without them knowing it? let others drown in mud while you trample atop their backs? Also, please do not deceive the press. T.C. May has recently satirically suggested that some of the Wired pictures are of hired actors. I don't find this funny. If the `cypherpunks' are really something other than that which they claim, it will eventually and inevitably come back to haunt the `movement,' whatever it is (algorithms or ideology? I no longer care). History and society is far more shrewd than that. If pseudospoofing is really the #1 cypherpunk agenda, please make that clear. `We want to fool everyone with brainwashing techniques so they are at the mercy of our whim.' One of my attractions to cyberspace was the promise of making online friends, and I have made many over many months. But the idea that some psychopaths are sending me email just to leech my strong emotions and play with my passions, like a cat does a captured mouse, perhaps even with the support of a large and complex software `arsenal' designed specifically to promote camouflage and manipulation, perhaps on a very widespread scale involving multiple lists, I find reprehensible and inherently evil. Please, choose another lab rat victim. My whole `cyberspatial reality' has been cast into doubt. Who's real? Who's fake? I used to really look forward to reading and responding to my mail, but now I approach it with dread, horror, and nausea. I don't even know if who I am talking to on the phone is who they say they are anymore, or if I really have any true cyberspatial friendships, because of all the pseudospoofing in my mailbox. There are some among you who say `welcome to the real world'. Are you people saying that man's natural state is confusion, desperation, and paranoia? I am not opposed to `pseudonymity' and multiple reputations of couse. But the strong sentiments on this list that I should be kept *guessing* I find abhorrent. What is most disturbing is the possibility of a single entity attempting to stick someone's psyche in a vice by systematic and concerted assaults from multiple supposedly `unique' identities in private email. This is like dealing with a tentacled octopus-monster. What could be more depraved? This is nothing but vicious interrogation and brainwashing. I'm simply in favor of truth in advertising, and I think this list has been misrepresented as a `forum' when it's nothing but a hotbed of pseudospoofing, possibly even aided by automatic software tools. Someone tell me, how long have I been arguing with AI programs anyway? Trully, I never would have subscribed if I had realized the `practice' of pseudospoofing was epidemic. I mean, I suspected there were isolated cases, but now it appears a large part of traffic is manufactured flames and froth. Does anyone have any idea how much time has been wasted wading or even arguing with opinions that were nothing but mirages? I'm deeply disillusioned. But of course, who cares? Certainly not the leadership or the followers. I'm not sure that some of the `identities' I've been dealing with over the past few months really have any basic morality. I suspect there are some demagogues that tout `privacy' while really subtly and insideously promoting dishonesty, sociopathism, treachery, and barbarianism. An example: I am on another mailing list where I posted a long article as a `gift' to the subscribers. I got some favorable comments, except from the moderator who said that `people are shocked at what you did.' I asked him. What people? What did they say? He backed down. But imagine that someone slandered me with a worthless pseudonym? and, in fact, even if they mailed *me* would I be able to tell that they didn't care about the reputation of that pseudonym? It seems to me that there is a basic idea of reputation and postings. To a degree, if you haven't earned a reputation in some subject, you should be disqualified from pontificating on it, irrelevant of your arsenal of pseudonyms. Filters based on reputations may help make this a reality. (I would personally like to ban my mailbox of all opinionated pseudonyms who have not read more than 2 of my posts.) I remember E.H. once announcing to the list that J. Markoff had unsubscribed. Who's really in favor of privacy? Is everybody here really interested in `privacy' as an `offensive weapon'? `Privacy' as a way of evading taxes? `privacy' as a way of manipulating or betraying the gullible and trusting for perverted pleasure? `privacy' as destroying social order and promoting anarchy? Really, nevermind. please, don't send me any more blistering flames. These are rhetorical questions. In fact, this is a rhetorical essay.

2 2

Re: pseudospoofed out
by jrk＠sys.uea.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

L. Detweiler writes: >I'm simply in favor of truth in advertising, and I think this list has >been misrepresented as a `forum' when it's nothing but a hotbed of >pseudospoofing, possibly even aided by automatic software tools. ... >I'm not sure that some of the `identities' I've been dealing with over >the past few months really have any basic morality. I suspect there are >some demagogues that tout `privacy' while really subtly and insideously >promoting dishonesty, sociopathism, treachery, and barbarianism. I note that "S.Boxx" is saying much the same. Who is pseudospoofing whom? >I would personally >like to ban my mailbox of all opinionated pseudonyms who have not read >more than 2 of my posts. Well, go ahead. Mail readers that support kill files exist already. -- ____ Richard Kennaway __\_ / School of Information Systems Internet: jrk(a)sys.uea.ac.uk \ X/ University of East Anglia uucp: ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk \/ Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.

1 0

defeating traffic analysis
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 22:43:46 PDT >From: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com (Hal Finney) >Message-Id: <9310200543.AA22959(a)jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com> >Subject: Re: JUDGMENT PROOFING >This is exactly what anonymous remailers are for - to defeat traffic >analysis. The goal is a situation where you, and everyone else, receives >and sends out a bunch of encrypted traffic every day. There will be >no way a snooper can find out exactly what you are reading, what you >are writing, or whom you are communicating with. That's what I call >private. To really defeat traffic analysis you also have to remove any information from volume of traffic. If I don't know any message routing but I do know that cme sent 10 MB of traffic and you received 10 MB of traffic and the other 30 people on the anon subnet dealt with only 100B each, .... So: have everyone send and receive exactly the same size message to/from the same sites at the same time every day. - Carl

2 1

Re: crypto anarchy
by an42035＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Count on it. Things are moving much too slowly on "our" side. Entities >like AT&T, Warner, etc. stand a good chance of controlling much of what >becomes "the net" in the future, if much of this technology is not: >1) in place and functional >2) easy to use by the clueless and lazy as well as techies >3) accepted for use within the network, indeed considered *part of* the > network both as "flavour" and technical specifications >4) impossible to remove - no govt/corporate turning back of the tide >VERY soon. In addition the populace has to become aware of: >4) HOW to do all of this - easy "newbie" software is needed - plug-n-play >5) that privacy is possible. Most have forgotten this. If we need this stuff out VERY soon, then there is a serious problem: Time-Warner, AT&T, etc. can afford to spend major $$$ on implementing technology, including having employees work on these projects full time, while the cypherpunks work that goes on is largely on a part time basis by otherwise employed professionals, or students. Not to insult anybody; each contribution in anonymous mail, digital cash, dc-nets, crypto software, etc. is GREATLY appreciated. However, the progress that has been made still has a fun oriented research and development slant. But all the same, if what you are saying is that these volunteer/hacker types have to battle for the future of the net, there's no way. I mean, look at all the stuff Phil Zimmerman went through to put out one crypto program. Can you expect anybody else to do the same? Many volunteers have spent countless man-hours working on PGP, and by no stretch of anybody's imagination is it "plug-n-play" ready. I can't tell you how many announcements of upcoming Windows PGP front-ends I've seen. I'm sure many hobbyists are working on it as much as they can, and I'm glad, but these people can't be expected to compete with real software development efforts. A software company that wants to make "plug-and-play" easy to use crypto software which meets #1 and #2 - including integration into popular mail software - will bury PGP or RIPEM by sheer numbers. Most people fall into the "clueless and/or lazy" category. >There's a lot of work to do. The Wired article may have called cypherpunks "millionaire hackers", but I don't think the majority of this list can afford to work on cypherpunks stuff full time like it probably needs to be worked on. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQBVAgUBLMRcPcOOfkF1iwTdAQE7ygH+OixoYSJBqiH5HbLj4TSjnEaUJINZlndk /zBYfigU0hFYB12rEpI1MBsqep9DNSzR4aOqyQMz4WQ45ayBCp4ekw== =kQBw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

5 4

Re: pseudospoofed out
by Doug Luce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

to the individual with difficulties of a spoofing sort: the answer is procmail. my inbox script strips all recipiant header information. it also chops off signatures. it puts in a bogus From: line with a sequence number. it even parses the text for items like "My name is Joe Hoop," replacing them with "My name is XXXX." if i can't figure out who it is by the context, the sender loses. my outbox script matches the sequence number up with the proper recipient and ships my response out. rarely is the reply "I don't know who you are." dug

1 0

Re:backing
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

F_GRIFFITH(a)CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU said: >Greshams law: "bad money drives out good" >i.e. where people have a choice (e.g. gold vs greenbacks post Civil >War), in making payments, they will use the lesser value money and >keep the higher value. Thus, the lesser value money will circulate, >the higher value money will not. So in essence you're saying that poorly-backed digital currency will win out over e.g. U.S. dollars? That's an interesting concept. (I mean the above literally, not sarcastically; I don't care to take either one side or the other of this question right this instant, although I will say that there must be some extra caveats to add.) Doug

6 5

PRIVACY: Shredded trash doesn't cut it
by System Operator 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fellow Cypherpunks, As if there was any doubt, the following will show that even shredded trash is not safe: >From _Search and Seizure Bulletin_, Vol 30, No. 9, September 1993 Shredded Documents - No Privacy Interest in Public Trash Massachusetts United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1992) The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) suspected Scott of filing false income tax returns. IRS agent's searched Scott's garbage bags which were left in front of his house for collection and found shredded documents. The agents pieced the papers together and were able to establish probable cause to request search warrants based on the evidence revealed in the whole documents. The IRS presented a 47-count indictment against Scott. Scott moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the search of his garbage violated his privacy interests. His motion was granted and the United States appealed. DECISION: Reversed and sent back to the lower court. The Constitution does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of shredded documents found in public trash. Scott relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage once he abandoned it outside his house to be collected or destroyed by a third party. That he may have desired secrecy by shredding the documents does not change the fact he left the garbage in the public domain, and the police were free to use their resources to collect the evidence. A legitimate expectation of privacy is measured not by the individual's desire to maintain secrecy, but by whether the government's action violates constitutionally recognized privacy rights. Because Scott had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in this trash, the appeals court decided his motion to suppress should have been denied. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988) United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (1972) Dan uunet!anagld!decode!dan -- system(a)decode.UUCP (System Operator) Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS +1 410 730 6734 Data/FAX

1 0

Re: pseudospoofed out
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dug writes that he intentionally strips out all identifying information from his incoming mail that would show who it is from. Truly this is a radical solution to the problem of spoofing. A basic principle of discourse is that the validity of an idea is independent of its source (which is why ad hominem attacks are considered invalid). Yet this principle is not widely followed (which is why ad hominem attacks are considered effective). Dug's solution enforces the discipline of judging each piece of mail on its own merits. Maybe more people should consider this approach. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

1 0

(fwd) Re: Error in RFC1 321 (MD5)?
by ferguson＠icm1.icp.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought (perhaps) this may be of interest - Forwarded message: > Newsgroups: sci.crypt > Subject: Re: Error in RFC1 321 (MD5) ? > Date: 18 Oct 93 09:10:29 > Organization: RSA Data Security, Inc. > Lines: 27 > Distribution: world > Message-ID: <BURT.93Oct18091029(a)chirality.rsa.com> > References: <29u8jqINNn0s(a)umbc7.umbc.edu> > NNTP-Posting-Host: chirality.rsa.com > In-reply-to: olson(a)umbc.edu's message of 18 Oct 1993 10:18:34 -0400 > > In article <29u8jqINNn0s(a)umbc7.umbc.edu> olson(a)umbc.edu (Bryan G. Olson) writes: > > I just ftp'd RFC 1321 ( MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm ) from > rsa.com, and I believe there is a minor error in the > specification of the algorithm. > > On page 5, the four operations used in the four rounds are > defined, and the operations for round 3 and 4 seem to have > mis-matched parameter names. Specifically from page 5: > > [...] > >> /* Round 3. */ > >> /* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation > >> a = b + ((a + H(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ > >> /* Do the following 16 operations. */ > [...] > >> /* Round 4. */ > >> /* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation > >> a = b + ((a + I(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */ > >> /* Do the following 16 operations. */ > [...] > > Yes, the 't' should be an 'i'. Not a major source of confusion, but > something that should be noted and corrected. > > -- Burt Kaliski > RSA Laboratories > _____________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson Mindbank Consulting Group fergp(a)sytex.com Fairfax, Virginia USA ferguson(a)icp.net

1 0

Re: PRIVACY: Shredded trash doesn't cut it
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ah, the infamous Shred Scott decision.

1 0

Re: pseudospoofed out
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

on Wed, 20 Oct 93 09:23:03 PDT, hfinney(a)shell.portal.com (Hal Finney) writes: < A basic principle of < discourse is that the validity of an idea is independent of its source < (which is why ad hominem attacks are considered invalid). Yet this < principle is not widely followed (which is why ad hominem attacks are < considered effective). i believe the reason this principle is not often followed is because so much context is gained from knowing who a person is. not just the message history, but knowing what a person's experience and profession are can be extremely helpful in understanding the intent of the communication. removing the sender's identity also removes a substantial amount of semantic information. computers might be able to send billions of bits per second over a network, but it's up to us humans to remove the degrees of freedom and figure out what is really meant. < Dug's solution enforces the discipline of judging < each piece of mail on its own merits. Maybe more people should consider < this approach. i don't think that's what he meant. Doug Luce <doug(a)lm.net> says: < if i can't figure out who it is by the context, the sender loses. which means to me, doug is still using contextual information gained by his knowledge of the sender. as an example, i often find mr. detweiler's posts to this list difficult to interpret, since i don't know him personally. is he playing devil's advocate? is he just trying to be entertaining? is he deliberately behaving in a schizophrenic manner, or is he just a victim of MPD? i can't tell from his posts alone. which is why i believe that honest humans for the most part will have no good reason to spoof. trusted communication just won't work without reputation. both the sender and receiver rely on context provided by reputation to send comprehensible messages. ---- i liked the point made recently that e-mailing lists are often like discussions at a coffee house, and are not formal environments for objective culling of opinion.

1 0

taggnets
by kone＠COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Taggnets are also found in the main components of "home-made" bombs. At least as early as '85. (call it a childhood indiscretion.) Components like high nitrogen fertilizer and heating oil #5. This alows the investigator to narrow down about when and where the components were bought. (I had bought a large quanty with my fathers card.) Most cases are solved because the "mad-bomber" is follish. i.e. keeps on buying more components or explosives, after the first bombing. Or, like me, bought in large quantys with no real reason too. Just something to think about. Kone. (yes it is a real name.)

1 0

Re: crypto technique
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >So, if I could prevent you from finding c, then you couldn't solve it. >How can I do this? By adding another constant. [...] >136.375x^4 + 139.25x^3 + 33.625x^2 + 110.75x + 179 >So what values for A,B,C,D,E,& F did I use? Have fun factoring! :) Sure, I'll give it a whirl as soon as my exams are over. Offhand, it looks like you get five equations in six unknowns, which is under-specified. So possibly one parameter can take on any value (or maybe any odd value), and the rest are then solved in terms of the fixed variable. The variable paramter can only take on values less than P (maybe only odd values under P), the number of unknows is then 2*(nestings) - 1; everything still looks linear. However, I haven't actually tried yet, so we'll see! This isn't meant as a flame (in fact, this method is very interesting), but you've posted two or three methods and declared them all impossible to break. Are you yourself trying to break these schemes? The very first method posted would have fallen under scrutiny. Also, mail any additional info to me directly; I'm behind on list mail. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMV1CIOA7OpLWtYzAQGQRAP8CT79JpMKxVb/R//GVUfmCJ2ybtf8ASGY BZa8bsL1VG49sxpoe7LsnQH2mJVAv3GloJhnuVN0d/MbTmohN6mgtGXbrQxvTdyn r0eaTYcrXI0hiR5ahPp5SdfAHGuQ9LeQDermiiU+DK8I6lc+K6tzG0ZOUvs4r80n cF4K9aXSaLQ= =wMas -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re:backing
by F_GRIFFITH＠CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: CCSVAX::F_GRIFFITH 19-OCT-1993 16:06:40.42 To: SMTP%"owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com" CC: F_GRIFFITH Subj: Re: backing? peb:if a currency loses reputation (value) people will switch to a better reputation (value) currency (paraphrase) Greshams law: "bad money drives out good" i.e. where people have a choice (e.g. gold vs greenbacks post Civil War), in making payments, they will use the lesser value money and keep the higher value. Thus, the lesser value money will circulate, the higher value money will not.

1 0

Paper Shredders
by nobody＠rosebud.ee.uh.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of an AFFORDABLE shredder that really destroys documents by cutting them into confetti, rather than the easy-to-reassemble strips that the typical shredder does?

4 3

Re: why anon bank acct?
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor(a)foretune.co.jp> > Not at all. I recognise that, however inefficient, taxes pay to maintain > the legal and physical environment that makes my life more comfortable. > There are many oppressive things about governments, but _by_and_large_ > the US government is one of the least oppressive, and the vast majority > of the people who work in it are honest and well-intentioned. I don't know if I'd go so far as to say that myself. But the reality is that no matter how much some of us would like to replace the current government with a more libertarian one, or how much we would like to see the current government back off from its current course, its not gonna happen. > What I hope comes out of groups like cypherpunks are ways to make the > government better and more responsive to the needs of the citizenry > (in other words, some good checks and balances), rather than petty > ways to avoid a few bucks in taxes. Rather than aspire to join the > alleged clique of rich and powerful tax evaders, might it not be better > to aspire to develop techniques that both maintain privacy but guaran- > tee that they have to pay their share of the load. Hint: develop > something that makes it worth their while. exactly, this is exactly what I have been getting at. LUX ./. owen

1 0

Please add me to mailing list
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to be added to the cypherpunks mailing list. Thanks, Jim_Miller(a)suie.com [Sorry for broadcasting this to the entire mailing list, but I don't know of any other address to use.]

1 0

US Privacy Council Seminar
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

US Privacy Council Seminar 10/22 *********************************************************** [please post] US Privacy Council Brown Bag Lunch Seminar Series "Privacy and the National Informational Infrastructure" Patricia Faley US Office of Consumer Affairs CPSR Washington Office Friday, October 22, 1993 12:00 - 2:00 pm Pat Faley is Acting Director of the United States Office of Consumer Affairs and Chair of the Working Group on Privacy, Information Policy Committee, Information Infrastructure Task Force. She will discuss the Clinton Administration's privacy proposals for the NII for the NII and for the health care reform program. Following Ms. Faley's talk, there will be a general meeting of the US Privacy Council to discuss the agenda for the Clinton administration on privacy issues such as health care, the SSN, the Clipper Chip, and amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act. CPSR Washington Office 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 303 Washington, DC 202/544-9240 (one block from the Eastern Market metro) In cooperation with Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. For more information on the US Privacy Council, please contact Evan Hendricks at 202-829-3660. [if you would like to be notified of future USPC Seminars, please send a note with e-mail address to banisar(a)washofc.cpsr.org] ***********************************************************

1 0

Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: m5(a)vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) >>I also suspect that such attempts will flush out a whole raft problems and >>deficiencies along with those who exploit such things. >>Hopefully new protocols and services can be developed which will minimise >>vulnerability and maximise protection for bussiness assets while allowing >>us as much freedom as possible. > Why does this preclude continuation of net services as they exist > today? You seem to feel that there can only be one mode of use for > network resources. No, I have quite a bit of experience in network management. It certainly does not preclude continuation of current services. I am trying to get people to expand their scope of thinking beyond the mere technical capabilitys and into the practical realities and political/social consequences of said technology. I am not championing any particular set of these, i am championing efforts to get us as much freedom and as much privacy as possible. I find that the limited scope of individuals who are *living in science fiction* scenarios to be kinda short sighted however. > If businesses want to use the net only under the > aegis of some authentication/credentialing scheme, fine! That means I > may or may not choose too participate, or that I may choose to > participate as "myself" while still maintaining other digital > alter-egos for other purposes. of course, I am not saying otherwise! >>Nobody really knows what those things will be,and it is sorta problematic to > > make public laundrey lists of vulnerabilitys without some sort of idea > > how to deal with cleaning up the mess. We are going to have to learn by > > example. > Why are you so stuck on the idea of "cleaning up a mess"? The network > is a resource. It can be used concurrently in lots of different ways. > You're free to start up your own set of authenticated services this > afternoon if you like. I and some others are indeed working on just that. I hope you are too. Surely you are aware that many of the currently used network services are woefully insecure and prone to abuse? > > My main point though is that eventually business will find decentralised > > anarchic networks to be hostile territory, and will move on to less > > vulnerable, more reliable networks where user authentication, and > > accountable security are provided. > Really? So the presence of paying customers on the anarchic networks > won't be attractive? We've had experience with lots of nasty problems > on the Internet already, and yet companies are all the time paying for > things like T1 channels for better service. yup, all you say here is true. but thats for now. I am predicting that there will be trouble in paradise, and that when it gets to the point where business is loosing more than they are gaining there will be hell to pay. You are under no obloigation to agree or to even pay any attention to me. But I warn you now, I'm a terrible *I-told-you-so*. > > It means an unfolding from two dimensional thinking ( text) to three > > dimensional thinking ( virtual reality ). > I think you're selling text short, but that's another discussion. I am trying to put it in perspective, that doesn't mean I discount its value. >>perhaps you are unaware of some of the more starling things that are being >>done with biofeedback interfaces. > I'm aware of plenty of hype and pipe-dreams, but little reality. > Sure, it'd be neat though. What does it have to do with > authentication and accountability? Since you seem to believe these things to be mere hype, I'll leave it to your imagination. > I'm losing track of what this has to do with "need" for > accountability. you manged to mix up a great deal of what I was saying. I don't have time or energy to untangle it for you. but put simply.. accountability will be driven by the desire for it. Those who *need* it .. will have it.. LUX ./. owen

1 0

Re:backing
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Greshams law: "bad money drives out good" Yes, but the money changers in Moscow are fairly busy converting bad money to good. Certainly, people will spend the bad money as soon as they get it, so it circulates more, but for long term storage (which in Russia could mean a few weeks at the rate of inflation they have (was in the quadrillions annually a few months ago)), the higher quality money is used. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

1 0

Re: crypto technique
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- One question before I work on this more at a later date. Can you still decode properly if you take the modulus of each coefficient? I ask since if you can't, the modulus makes is harder to find the constants, but as a side effect it also destroys the message. Say I use f = 29/2 x + 40 g = 135/2 f^2 + 135/2 f + 75 I get g = 110775 + 317155/4 x + 113535/8 x^2 This is easy to solve, so Matt takes the modulus of each coefficient (some power of 2, I pick 32 here to keep it simple). results in g' = 23 + 99/4 x + 127/8 x^2 Say I encode my message x = 5 g(5) = 6895725/8 mod 32 = 109/8 g'(5) = 4349/8 mod 32 = 253/8 Notice that these two results aren't equal at all! Am I misunderstanding the encoding (and decoding) process? Aren't these two results supposed to be equal? I'm not getting the expected result when each coefficient is reduced mod 32. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMWsI4OA7OpLWtYzAQHdMQP+Jy7gdjgyhg9vrwi8K+KkrVSDbciOy6Sb BJQ1/zMg8inqmILbahO9SG3yTTh7+/k+OdUhiyxHYaaC5Jhv5n+QIvFTizHDA3VY /M5uXpt883bBLBaCp3ICDsPJEtgzMePxySP3n+qKG+nZ9MUDQ7msLq7SDCqM6eUU BXHHmjNjr+A= =kjVG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories

1 0