December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Minsky skeptical of privacy
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Monty Cantsin wrote: >>Incidentally, does anybody know what percentage of the research >>funding Marvin Minsky has used in his career was directly or >>indirectly related to the defense establishment? >> >>The interesting thing about the privacy "debate" is that there is an >>exceptionally high correlation between opposition to privacy and the >>consumption of public money. > >Monty's customary reasonableness goes bizarro with these statements. > >In that direct or indirect defense funding implicates just about >every US citizen, even world denizen, not holed up in a treetop for >the last half century of national security octopussing. Sore nerve in a glass house, eh? Charming Minsky still does a Denning. Trillion dollar pork barrel: some gives, some takes. Not both. Every rat pulls the lever, gets the pellet. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Minsky skeptical of privacy To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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

2 1

Cantsin Protocol No. 2
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> wrote: >Monty Cantsin writes: >> You can't see it up here, but this is a signed message using a >> protocol which is modestly titled "Cantsin Protocol No. 1". >> Suggestions for improvement are most welcome. > >A very interesting idea! Please consider the following suggestions >if you like, or feel free to ignore them. Your suggestions were very helpful. Thank you for making them! I'm calling the latest version "Cantsin Protocol No.2" and its identifying number is "25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3". It is similar to Cantsin Protocol No. 1, but the bug with the hash of the public key is fixed. Instead of concatenating the values p, g, and y, you concatenate "p:<p> g:<g> y:<y>" and compute the hash. p, g, and y should be represented as ASCII hexadecimal digits without leading 0s. The hashes should now be correct SHA1 hashes. >One problem with signatures which have no indication at the top is >that two passes over the data are necessary: the first to scan and >find the start-of-signature indicator, and another to go back and >calculate the hash. Signatures such as S/MIME and PGP have enough >information at the top of the signed message to allow one pass >processing. My thinking on this is that passes are cheap these days. I want the signature to be unobtrusive which probably can't be done if only one pass is required. Incidentally, a nice feature of these signatures is that they can be moved around in the file just by changing the offset. You don't need to control the secret key to do it. >> The first line is "16A5942B6EED349ECF4594C784DFD177 [Cantsin >> Protocol No. 1]". The hexadecimal number was chosen randomly and >> is the indicator that this is a Cantsin Protocol No. 1 signature. >> The number was chosen randomly and it is somewhat unlikely that >> anybody else will accidently choose it. > >You might want to think about what happens if the document itself >contains (maliciously, or perhaps because it is talking about your >signatures) the string in question (as yours does and this one does >as well). This could throw off an automated signature checker. The signature checker should ignore bad or incomplete signatures. I would consider this to be a bug in the software and not a bug in the protocol. A bad signature simply lacks meaning and an error message need not be reported. That might seem a little callous, but actually it's how we should regard signatures. The current model seems to be "computer, check the signature on this file and tell me if it's good", whereas the correct (in my view) model is, "computer, extract all of the material from this file which is properly signed and throw out the rest." (Of course, you could imagine a smart editor which highlighted the areas of a document which were signed by various parties. It seems a little early to implement this.) If it's not authenticated, you shouldn't even look at it. I've taken to putting the To: and Subject: header lines at the bottom of my messages for this purpose. There's really no need to keep any of the header fields. The header fields can be put at the end just as unambiguously as at the beginning, but at the end they can be signed. >> The second line in the signature is an SHA1 hash of the public key. >> The hash is computed on the concatenation of the hexadecimal ASCII >> forms of p, g, and y respectively. There should be no leading zeros. >> (Remember to leave off the newline!) > >Presumably you could use the key hash to look up the key to use for >verifying the message. Strictly speaking it's there to save space. If we put the public key components in every signature it wouldn't be much harder for the key management software to compute a hash on them somehow. This does not have to be standardized. >This has a mild denial of service attack. Someone else could create >a key with different boundaries between p, g, and y but which would >create the same string as this concatenation, and therefore the same >hash. If you left the "p: ", "g: ", and "y: " in place it would >prevent this. PGP's key fingerprints have had the same problem. ACK! I knew about this problem, but I couldn't remember exactly how it worked. So I said, "Monty, let's not be dumb like those PGP guys. Let's concatenate the keys together and compute the hash. Nobody will ever..." Thank you very much for pointing this out. >> The fourth line contains an offset and a length to specify the area >> of the text which is signed. The offset is relative to the >> signature itself. That is, the first character of the Cantsin >> Protocol No. 1 code is at position 0. As signatures are usually >> appended, the offset will usually be the additive inverse of the >> length. > >It is intriguing that this can be used to sign a subset of the text. >Presumably there could be multiple signature blocks each of which >signed different subsets, possibly with different keys. One problem >is that it is not obvious to the human reader what part of the text >is signed. A nice effect with PGP and S/MIME signatures is that even >readers who don't have the tools can have some slight confidence in >signatures, because other readers will often report it when >signatures don't verify. With a signature that only covers a portion >of the text, people might assume that if there are no reports of >failure, more of the text is signed than is the case. This is not a >technical problem but is a social phenomenon which may not interact >well with this signature format. People who want this feature should type something like "BEGIN CANTSIN PROTOCOL NO. 2" and "END CANTSIN PROTOCOL NO. 2" into the text at the right points. >You need to specify a canonical line ending format. Based on the >count values in your document, it appears that you are counting line >terminators as being one character long. Your count value of 1CB9 >corresponds to decimal 7353, there are exactly 7353 characters from >the first character of your message body to the beginning of your >signature magic number, if line ends are one character. > >The specific characters for line endings need to be specified as well >for the hash to be calculated consistently. Your hash appears to be >calculated with LF as the line ending (although the hash program is >broken, see below). Probably CR/LF would be preferable for the line >endings as that is a widely used internet standard as well as being >common on windows. My feeling on this is that this is outside the scope of a signature protocol. The protocol should not make any assumptions about what is being signed nor should it modify what is being signed. I use LF to terminate lines and would recommend this to others, but it is not part of the Cantsin Protocol No. 2 specification. In any event, if we must put in patches to handle the poor fidelity of electronic mail, the patches should go in afterwards. When a signature checking program finds ">From" it should replace it with "From" and see if it can get the right checksum. Likewise, it should try the various line endings until it gets a match. There can't be more than about 12 variants, so this shouldn't create an onerous burden on the machine. (And, I suppose, it would be possible to add a field after the length or after the hash which made a suggestion about the line ending.) >> You also need to be able to compute SHA1 hashes. I've been using >> something called "sha1file" which, I believe, originated at Adam >> Back's web site. > >That program has a bug. The routine SHA1_update in the file sha1.c >is missing a line: > > CENSORED BY THE UNITED ST > A > TES GOVERNMENT CENSORED BY THE UNITED STATES > GOVERNMENT CENSORED B > Y THE UNITED STATES GOVERN > MENT CENSORED BY THE UNITED > STATES GOVERNMEN > T CENSORED BY TH >*** E UNITED STA *** MISSING *** > T > >Correcting this will make your hashes be correct. Another great suggestion. The hashes should be correct now. Incidentally, in another thread I've been talking about partial signatures. The code above is an example of where this would be useful. In some countries we are not allowed to express ourselves freely without persecution. If I wanted to provably quote somebody who included forbidden ideas in their message, it wouldn't be possible without partial signatures. >> El Gamal is simple enough that the signature on this message can be >> checked using standard Unix tools such as dc version 1.1. Let's >> say M is the SHA1 hash of the message. It is checked by verifying >> the truth of this equation: (y^a * a^b) mod p = g^M mod p. > >El Gamal is a rather lengthy signature, although the verification >equation is relatively simple. DSS has a shorter signature. This might be a good thing to add to a later Cantsin Protocol. >There are some subtleties to choosing El Gamal keys, but with the >2048 bit values you have chosen you are pretty safe. Schneier doesn't mention this, although presumably this information will show up in one of his references. Do you know offhand of a published source which covers this? >Also, you can't really justify using 2048 bit keys when your hash is >only 160 bits. The hash becomes the weak link for keys beyond about >1024 bits, and unless you use a stronger hash your key strength is >misleading. This is why DSS is only specified up to 1024 bits. This is just intuition, isn't it? Since we really don't know how hard it is to factor it seems hard to claim we know the ratio of difficulty between breaking SHA1 and El Gamal. Factoring could be broken before SHA1. Not that any great science was applied to the choice of a 2048 bit prime, it just seemed like a good size. ;-) Also, I think it is a mistake for people to communicate the strength of a system by choosing various key lengths based on general popular views. It's probably better to say "I estimate this system requires at least 2^x operations to break." We've seen this with people choosing short keys so nobody will get the idea that it is secure. This just seems all wrong to me. The key length is only one way in which a key could be insecure. Monty Cantsin's authentication key, for example, is not kept very securely. But, the way to communicate that is to say "this key is not kept all that securely." However, in Cantsin Protocol No. 2 the size of the prime chosen is completely unspecified. There doesn't seem to be a reason to restrict the choice other people will make regarding the length of the prime. I could imagine choosing a short key for control over a semi-persistent identity. The advantage is that you can claim somebody else brute forced the key for statements you wish to repudiate. Similarly, I could imagine choosing an obnoxiously long key to make it hard for people who don't have super fast machines to associate with you. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Cantsin Protocol No. 2 To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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

2 1

Re: Freemen and Serfs
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous <nobody(a)REPLAY.COM> wrote: >This model of "sheeple" doomed to slavery while cypherpunks >comfortably live independent of the state is even less plausible than >the original idea of crypto anarchy. It appeals to our elitist >instincts and makes us feel comfortably superior, but it has little >connection to reality. If elitism had been intended, the subject would have been "Lords and Serfs". Freemen are more like people with some rights, some property, and some skills, but who are not serfs. >This idea overlooks the "fax effect", where the value of a technology >rises in proportion to the number of people who use it. Cypherpunks >will have to set up a virtual Galt's Gulch, trading only with >themselves, and unlike in Rand's fantasy the limitations of such an >economy will soon be apparent. Early cypherpunk experiments like >"Magic Money" showed how pointless a virtual cypherpunk bank would >be. Cypherpunks should be able to provide services which slavers and others want. This could be code. It could be expertise. It could be connections. Whatever. The slavers have things to offer cypherpunks, whether it's food, construction work, hardware, etc. Whatever the medium used to trade these services, there is no reason why the slavers would forego the services they may want. Assuming that the Freemen aren't agitating on behalf of the slaves, that is. We don't need all the slavers to deal, nor do all cypherpunks have to deal with all slavers. Just some members of both groups need to get together and trade. >In an increasingly interdependent world economy, the only hope for >cypherpunk technologies to succeed is to extend them as far as >possible throughout society. Standard doctrine, but I no longer believe it is sound. We've been at it for years now. Are the masses using crypto? I didn't think so. It's a waste of time to sell to people who think they "have nothing to hide". Even if they were using crypto, they would accept snoopware if it were accompanied with the right media programming. Which means that instead of proselytizing, it's probably better to develop systems which we can use which are expensive-to-impossible to thwart even in hostile environments. There's no need to turn people away, of course, but begging people to help themselves is a poor investment. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Freemen and Serfs To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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

1 0

Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A ghost speaking through the medium replay.com communicated: >Everyone likes to overlook this, pretending that May didn't mean it. >Well, he never withdrew it, did he? He never apologized for it. >He's on the record as explicitly calling for the murder of high >officials. > >And of course May further revealed his true colors with this horror, >from the same message: > >> Every day that passes, I'm more convinced that McVeigh did the >> right thing. Some innocents died, but, hey, war is hell. Broken >> eggs and all that. > >May's apologists have tried to pretend that he didn't say this, that >he said that he was beginning to understand McVeigh, or something. >That's not what he says here. He says he is becoming convinced that >McVeigh did the right thing in murdering all those people. Whether we like it or not, many people are sympathetic with McVeigh. Some are considering whether actions like bombing Federal buildings are justified. It's far far better that these issues are raised and discussed. >He callously compares the shattered bodies of the children and other >innocent victims to broken eggshells. Monty Cantsin has provided us >a moving description of the painful deaths of the children in Waco. >Will dying of asphyxiation under pressure too great even to draw a >breath be any easier? You've hit upon something interesting here, Anonymous. Let's consider three groups of children. 1. ~100,000 children harmed in Iraq. 2. ~40 children harmed in Oklahoma City. 3. ~20 children harmed outside Waco. Of these three groups, the third upsets me the most. Why? There are several factors. One is the extent to which the people committing the actions claim to represent me. It is often claimed and widely believed that the Federal government is acting as a representative for and is answerable to the American people. (Allow Monty Cantsin a hollow laugh here.) That being the case, Waco is far more upsetting than Oklahoma City in this regard because McVeigh (or whomever) is not thought to represent a sizeable proportion of the American public. In the case of Iraq, this factor raises my concern well above other places in the world where children are mistreated. Of the three groups of victims, I identify most strongly with the people in Waco. While not strongly religious myself, I respect people who have unusual beliefs and stick to them. And I have sympathy for those who might live in unusual ways. While I share a culture with the victims in Oklahoma City, in general we would have little to say to each other. I don't know anything about people in Iraq. This factor probably governs my feelings on the matter most strongly. The motivations of the people committing the acts are important. I do not believe that McVeigh (accepting the standard paradigm) meant to kill children. He certainly meant to kill people who had no involvement with Waco. I do not approve of his choice. I would maybe even kill somebody to prevent it from happening. But, one feels differently when children die more or less by accident than when it is cold bloodedly premeditated. In the case of Iraq, it is extremely hard to justify killing kids for their oil. The provocation that leads to an act must also be considered. I am extremely sympathetic with McVeigh's desire to do something about Waco, even though I do things less violent and (hopefully) more effective. There was no reason whatsoever for the Waco crime to be committed, likewise people living in the Middle East have not really committed any provocative act more serious than having oil on their land. The mob mentality that seems to have gripped the United States during the Waco atrocity has a particular horror which is absent in the case of Oklahoma City and, right now anyway, mostly absent with Iraq. The blatant misrepresentation of what was occurring and the degree to which people were compliant with it is shocking. There was no serious attempt to investigate the motivation behind the raid, or even what was actually occurring from day to day. The aftermath was even more horrifying. The government attacks and murders ~80 innocent people in the most brutal way for no identifiable reason. And all anybody can seem to do is to try to protect the establishment, instead of finding out exactly what happened, instead of charging the criminals who perpetrated the horror, instead of taking the necessary actions to make sure nothing like this will ever be done again by the Federal government, and instead of telling the truth. The implications of the three situations create varying degrees of alarm. I do not expect to see many more bombings. Bombs are nothing new. They've been around for over 100 years and they are a manageable problem. Every few decades there's been a big explosion. It is unlikely McVeigh will do something like this again. In the case of Iraq, I'm used to governments behaving this way and I do not see it directly affecting me very soon. (Perhaps this is a bit insensitive.) Waco, however, is quite another matter. When you watch the footage it gives you the creeps because what is being reported belongs in the 1940s and the people should be speaking German. Instead, everybody speaks English with an American accent and it's happening right now. When you see an FBI agent justify what happened on the grounds that he goes to a "normal" church and has a "normal" family, and when you see other officials state that they wanted to harm the children to encourage the parents to turn themselves in, the implications are that we have a very serious problem that will not go away by itself. Finally, in the case of Waco, the people in charge had all the time in the world to think very carefully about what they were doing. They apparently decided to kill everybody they could, including particular children whose names they knew, whose pictures they had seen, and some of whom they may have even spoken to on the telephone. This really is hard for me to understand. I can't imagine what kind of person can do something like this. This horror is particular to Waco. In the case of McVeigh and the people making policy regarding Iraq, the victims are at least anonymous. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution? To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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

1 0

Re: Question for the [obscene Star Wars reference deleted]
by Randall Farmer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > What is the best windows shell I can acquire to run PGP > > if I have windows 3.1? If I have windows 95? Thanks! > > In both cases the best shell to have is a shotgun shell. Naah, that'll wreak havoc with the win95 registry...Private Idaho is supposed to be fairly good. <http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/pi.html> > Rick > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Randall Farmer rfarmer(a)hiwaay.net http://hiwaay.net/~rfarmer

1 0

Re: Pasting in From:
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nerthus wrote: >Since anonymous remailing is now considered a free service in the >minds of most of its users, charging for it does not make sense. I'd >be curious to know how much money has been collected by the >ecash-accepting remailer that Ian Goldberg set up a couple months >back. My guess is it has brought in very little money. There is really no reason to use it. It seems to be the same as the jam remailer which is free. I had hoped to use it as an exit remailer, but even that is a loss as it apparently uses cracker (?) for that purpose. What we did learn is that it isn't that hard to set up a remailer to accept ecash. I doubt we've learned much about the market potential. The recent reports of the anonymizer pulling in $180,000 annually are worth thinking about. >[nym] remailer like I mentioned above may become lucrative if it >generates enough repeat customers (i.e., persistent nyms). So could >charging a fee for each address put in the Bcc: header. This is a good idea. Ecash accepting remailers should offer perks which are not generally available, or just offer a faster more reliable service to paying customers. For example, free messages are delayed 90 minutes while paid messages are sent immediately, modulo some details like mixing. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Pasting in From: To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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

1 0

Re: CDT and the Threat of Gov't Intervention
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Besides demonstrating that cyberporn is a topic that will never disappear, the Kids and the Net summit has highlighted the tensions between the different types of Net-advocacy groups here in Washington. The civil liberties groups (ACLU, EPIC, EFF, CPSR), and journalism, publishers, and media groups have lined up on one side [http://www.ifea.org/] saying the government shouldn't pressure the Internet to self-censor (or be censored by the Feds). They held a counter-summit press conference yesterday. Even the libertarian Cato Institute is in this corner. On the other side, the Center for Democracy and Technology [http://www.cdt.org/] is participating in the summit along with antiporn groups, high tech firms, and "censorware" vendors. CDT says that the Net needs to self-regulate or face the wrath of the U.S. Congress. (Folks at CDT generally take pro-industry positions and have been involved in many compromises in the past: wiretapping, "harmful to minors," and jail time for use of encryption in a crime.) CDT, however, has called for the development of multiple rating systems. You could easily tell the difference between the two outlooks today. ACLU associate director Barry Steinhardt and CDT director Jerry Berman debated this afternoon. "If we sit back and we offer nothing... that's not a solution for the American public," Berman said. He said that CDT is "looking to balance free speech rights" with other values. -Declan At 11:04 -0400 12/2/97, Michael Sims wrote: >What "they" are saying: > >SF Chronicle: > >"Internet Self-Regulation Draws Wide Praise But advocates for free >speech call for extreme caution > >Jon Swartz, Chronicle Staff Writer > > Civil libertarians and porn peddlers yesterday praised the Internet >industry's attempt at sweeping self-regulation to keep smut out of >the hands of children and the government at arms' length. ..." > > >Civil libertarians praised sweeping self-regulation, eh? I hope >everyone realizes this is CDT that is doing this. They continue to >claim they are a civil liberties group, and continue to push for >restrictions on civil liberties. Has the ACLU considered setting up >a group which describes itself as "conservative and pro-family" in >its press releases and pushes continually for the elimination of >censorware and ratings? Such a trojan horse group could hardly do as >much damage to the censor crowd as CDT continues to do to the >free-speech crowd, but perhaps it would achieve some measure of >compensation. > >"Pros: [of "filtering"] Filtering does block out almost all >inappropriate material." > >I sure am glad our message is getting out. > >"Education. A series of TV spots and school-sponsored programs >touting filtering software will debut next fall." > >What a treat. Bennett? Know anything about this one? > > >Plenty more to come on this subject, I'm sure. > > >-- Michael Sims

3 2

The Eye Bank
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vin McLellan wrote: >With respect, I disagree. I think it is quite likely that an >iris-scan technology can effectively differentiate between a living >eye and a reproduction (or, as one of my many correspondents on this >topic suggested, an eye forcibly removed from the socket of a >potential fraud victim.) In any case, the issue of false >positives/negatives will be settled with evidence. I think the >technology will probably be useful, in those terms. I can see the advertising campaign now: "Bank at Big Brother Bank, NA - have your eyes ripped out!" The device probably has trouble distinguishing between a mannikin with some real eyes and a real person. Conveniently for the robbers, the victim will be unable to identify anybody later. The plausibility of this threat model has a lot to do with whose eyes we're talking about. If they're your eyes, be my guest. It's probably safe. ;-) This is just one of the many risks of deployment of these technologies, but it's the one that makes even the most docile sheep pay attention. Consider the child implant issue. "You have nothing to worry about because your child's Protect-A-Life implant can only be removed with surgery!" The problem is, that's exactly how it will be removed. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: The Eye Bank To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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

1 0

Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A ghost speaking through the medium of replay.com communicated: >There's a fallacy which is quite common on this list, especially >among members whose positions are otherwise indefensible. It's >surprising in a way because this fallacy is more common among >statists. > >There, the fallacy goes like this: if it is immoral, then it must be >illegal. We see this all the time. People think of the government >as their way of expressing moral values. Drugs are wrong, so they >must be made illegal. Discrimination in employment is wrong, so it >also must be illegal. We have countless bad laws based on this false >premise. > >On this list we see the same fallacy, turned around: if it is legal, >it must be moral. Someone is attacked for posting some vicious, >hateful, immoral rant, and they respond that what they said was >legal, because of freedom of speech and the First Amendment. Their >critic must be opposed to free speech if he objects to their words. > >Confusing what is legal and what is moral is a dangerous game. It >leads to the false reasoning of the statists. We must remember that >there is a clear distinction between morality and legality. This is a good thing to remember. However, what you seem to be calling immoral is holding a belief with which you disagree. Is it possible to hold an immoral belief? I don't think so. Once you've drawn a conclusion about the nature of the world you can hardly decide that it would be immoral to understand the truth. Actions, on the other hand, can be immoral. Let's not confuse beliefs with actions. What you seem to be proposing is that Tim May (or whoever) should refrain from expressing certain of their beliefs about the world because they are immoral. You have seldom addressed Tim's statements directly. Orwell had a word for this: "crimestop". Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution? To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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

1 0

Bernstein argument is in Courtroom 1
by Cindy Cohn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi everyone, This is just to confirm that the Bernstein oral argument is scheduled in Courtroom 1 of the 9th Circuit building. The address is 95 Seventh Street, San Francisco. See ya there, Cindy ************************ Cindy A. Cohn McGlashan & Sarrail, P. C. 177 Bovet Road, 6th Floor San Mateo, CA 94402 (415) 341-2585 (tel) (415)341-1395 (fax) Cindy(a)McGlashan.com http://www.McGlashan.com

1 0

Re: RICE v PALADIN ENTERPRISES
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duncan Frissell wrote that the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: >Certainly, such a conclusion would be reasonable based upon this >promotional description coupled with the singular character of Hit >Man, which is so narrowly focused in its subject matter and presenta- >tion as to be effectively targeted exclusively to criminals. This claim is demonstrably absurd. There are roughly 26,000 murders a year in the United States each year. The number of contract killings is probably a good deal less than 10% of this which leaves 2600. Let's be generous to the Court and say 10% of these murders are committed by people who read the book. (This can probably be shown to be entirely false by comparing suspected contract murder rates before and after publication of the work.) If we treat the Court with extreme charity we will say that each contract killer reading the book has only killed one person. Total: 260 killers read the book. Presumably many more copies of the book were sold and will be sold. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that most of the people purchasing the book did so for reasons of morbid curiosity. This should not be very surprising. It appears that the judges in this case allowed their eagerness to punish Paladin get in the way of their duties, the law, and common sense. This decision should be overturned. The judges should be impeached. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm Subject: Re: RICE v PALADIN ENTERPRISES To: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com 25BA1A9F5B9010DD8C752EDE887E9AF3 [Cantsin Protocol No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

1 0

Qualified Traffic Key to Toys..
by shop＠ns.alpina1.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

and Hobbies Internet Sales. Special Announcement..First Time Offered to selected web sites - Exclusive Banner Program - **only four spaces available in Toys/Hobbies** As the Web gets more and more congested, you know that attracting qualified buyers to your site gets even more challenging! This New Exclusive Offer for your Toys/Hobbies Site will bring you specific, targeted, exposure. Established in 1994, our award-winning, World Wide Shopping Complex with avg 1.5 million hits a month now offers you EXCLUSIVE banner ads in our FOUR highly-visited Toys/Hobbies category directories. This is an exceptional opportunity at a very affordable rate and has not been previously offered. You will get tremendous exposure in four shopping locations. You could not get a more targeted audience for your products. These visitors are specifically looking in theToys/Hobbies section. Introductory Rates: ONE ONLY banner per location at top of Toys/Hobbies category directory. Per Location.....$495.00 for one year All Four Locations...$1495 for one year. What some of our storeowners have accomplished: One storeowner, after just over a year, grew to 5-figure Internet sales,another doubled their sales in just one month, another's business grew to over 70% international, an industrial client reports great response and sales, wholesalers and mfg. are getting distribution for their product lines, another storeowner has built a tremendous catalog mail order business, one store introduced a new product which started selling the first weekend online... To get full details of this exclusive banner offer, please hit reply and type BANNER OFFER in the subject line. However, there are only Four Banner Spots available in your category, so if you are interested, please email back at once. (We will also include other options for your information). +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ If you wish to be permanently removed from our announcement mailings, please hit reply and type remove in subject line. Thank You. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

1 0

Re: [RePol] Bill Stewart kills babies after he molests them. Honest! / Re: Pasting in From:
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> wrote: > > So what's the problem? Has everyone forgotten how to use their > >delete key? Does nobody have anything better to do with their time > > >and resources than to waste them being offended by people who are > > >trying to offend them? > > > > Well TruthMonger (if that is your real name,) I think you are missing the > > point. For purposes of the discussion, no one cares about the content of > > the messages, who or why they are being sent, nor is anyone bothered by > > anything concerning the message itself. What's being discussed is scarce > > resources of remailer operators. > > I was responding to Bill and Lance's comments in regard to forgery > victims being set up as targets of retribution. I think references to > "deplorable content" indicate some measure of judgement in regard to > defining what is considered 'abuse' of a remailer. You start to tread on dangerous ground when you concern yourself with the content (body) of a post. If, for example, you start to filter on content, then you're implicitly approving anything that you do allow to pass through. That sets a precedent that's hard to contain and exercising editorial control over the contents increases the remailer operator's legal liability for material posted. > However, you are right about the thread basically dealing with the > reprecussions to the remailer operators and their resources as an end > result of the particular modes of remailer use. At the risk of actually > being on-topic in a thread, I should point out that I have always been > of the opinion that it is up to the individual remailer operators to > judge what level and types of use they are able to provide as a service > with their given time and resources. Agreed. My main concern is that those policies should be explicitly disclosed in advance. If certain keywords are forbidden in the Subject: line or body of a message, or if it is forbidden to post to certain NGs or to cross-post to certain combinations of NGs, those restrictions should be explained in the remailer's help file. I don't know whether remailers are currently engaging in content-based filtering or not (none are currently flying the "filter" flag in Raph's remailer list), but there seems to be a strong suspicion among certain posters to the alt.privacy.anon-server NG (probably from newbies) that this is indeed occuring. The usual scenario is that the person tries to make a bunch of posts, none of them show up, and it is assumed that they were blocked by the remailer operator based on their content. My guess is that in most cases the person screwed something up, like sending a message to a mail2news gateway with a malformed or missing Newsgroups: line, but it's rather rare that the poster is reassured by someone in a position to know what might have happened. It would be great if these people were told "we have no restrictions on content other than the length of the message" or at least, "it has become necessary to block certain types of posts, but those cases are spelled out in our help file". > > Most remailers are operated with donated time and resources. Problems with > > the remailer, especially artificially generated ones, are just simply not > > desired. > > True, but I doubt that the artificially generated attacks on a > remailer are possible to fully deter, no matter what convolutions > one puts themselves through in order to stop it. It's important that such attacks not succeed, lest they encourage even more such attacks. They succeed, or course, when they convince the remailer operator to do what the attacker wishes done. Often what is required is a bit of creative damage control. For example, when an attacker starts making posts with pasted From: headers in an attempt to get remailer operators to disable this feature, offering him source blocking instead. - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNIVb4gbp0h8ZvosNAQH2Ywf9H6HrrV/QA1TxdLo5OzA/RKKxmfnonuLI Kjd38SnXXw9WtVsTwbvGGdt7HiQ4BP93JWMSDseM0Rg61Rvsa5sBp017V3xeHqzF mr8wE70VkXGa/P0Dmk8ToP0R0wIQoFasyrK8QeBXNZpII0VZo0qlsz1SctwIhmpZ NQ44yBDRramc3zOy2OFzKoxM4iBz3TBLuZodqeiFFWbJtwmvK9PxxmZ3wYgxjDGA JnqHriOMwG74qUBYmmyrrR877HIL6WJreQR+m0PAiuzSvKSyJngT44ejcS1e33zf XMipKUZAAyVqmtfkRLsgBd3aVDS/zwBQWWgDMnLNo/Fzo70vhs33BQ== =OCx/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: Bill Stewart kills babies after he molests them. Honest! /
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> wrote: > > It never fails to amaze me that complainers point out that an > >'abusive' letter started out, "I hate niggersfaggotsjewsyou!" > >and then proceed to list the other fifty 'abusive' things that > >the writer had to say. > > The real problem, besides the emotional distress some people feel > at the abuse they get in response to forged postings, > and the potential loss of reputation capital, is that people > keep trying to call their ISP to get them shut down, > and some ISPs do this sort of thing, squashing abusive-sounding customers > first and asking questions later. Ok, soon-to-be-ex customers... Any ISP that would react that way should probably be avoided, anyway. Knee-jerk censorship like that is one of the best arguments around for posting via remailers. Not to mention the fact that posting anonymously prevents one's e-mail address from being misused in that fashion. But personally, the most persuasive argument is to keep people from compiling a de facto dossier on you based on your public postings, selling it to potential employers, and perhaps keeping you from getting a certain job because of your controversial, unpopular, and/or un-politically-correct opinions. IMO, people who rely on placebos like those "X-No-Archive" header flags are fooling themselves if they think they will be universally honored. Most so-called "forged postings" are rather crudely done, and the ones done using a remailer to paste headers are the most obvious ones of all. I'm not sure what the legal standard for "forgery" is, but if it's anything like that for fraud, it requires that a REASONABLE PERSON would be fooled. Given all the disclaimers present in the headers of remailer output, I doubt that any posts with pasted From: would meet that standard. Yes, I've heard the argument that "people don't read headers", but so what? Most of them probably don't read the fine print on contracts, either, but they're still responsible for what it says. - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNIVRpAbp0h8ZvosNAQHcBAf+MCa1DBhmtI4h93zsegO6/fR0RJPko68+ f5ImWOnzxdg1eN4WkbdD4ELn00jLTZC+7+Xw94BkeT9wj1KLmP/BE6NUANdYFzdW YRyAHIK/WsYN6k9dal54TdDviC7SpBUH3IHnQa2USYJjfd9raviYp5NoCpBz5D7s E0+mnfxo8ufTE9Z09qRGmjtxrEfO+gug6lYYCG0h5j7SD+6mVcGuWFmoxbDzhqma IkzngE1dn3xXmwdMTQ5WNvWj+qths52hnszeQ7ZPE/pwrROVobhMevlabM2NYPA0 BLv5L0Te+p12Hj2599znmzJyY5NdqsqBzBbg9yFfaqoavdM/bg4wVw== =4Ppz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Cypherpunks, PGP Buyout, & Writing Code...
by Nerthus＠server1.efga.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[NOTE: This message was remailed by an anonymous remailing system. The original sender is unknown, and has inserted the From: header. This information has not been verified. As with all mail or news messages, you should examine the headers carefully before responding. Direct questions about this system to <admin(a)anon.efga.org>.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Jim Choate wrote: >Perhaps the buy-out of PGP is a good thing. Consider that now there is a >clear and present motive for Cypherpunks to start writing the next wave of >world-class crypto...it really is the *only* shure way that the process >doesn't get subverted...we're no longer able to rely on a single commen >source of crypto tools. Perhaps we should hold a Requiem for PGP, or maybe an Irish wake instead. Let's take a look back at some of the good things PGP did toward furthering the use of crypto. Phil Zimmerman took public key cryptography and brought it to a fairly wide base of users: 4 million people, plus or minus a million or two. :-) That's rather substantial given that less than 100 million people are estimated to be on the Net right now. Think of how many more yet-to-be Net users will demand strong cryptography in their communications, be it personal, financial, legal, recreational...who knows what else? PGP also showed how both a freeware and paid-for version of encryption software can be marketed together. The paid-for version of PGP 5.0 allows users to generate the new El Gamal/DSS keys as well as the familiar RSA keys, while the freeware only allows for the former. The important lesson here, I think, is that the writers of "the next wave of world-class crypto" can make money from the paid-for versions with the extra bells and whistles that some of us like, but they are not stifling the expansion of their software's user base because they are offering a freeware version that implements the basic protocols for communicating with users of the paid-for version, and of course other freeware users. Nerthus -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNIUHwxa1d3zm4nqOEQIG4wCgsDqyMsl64IsDwz814eL9SwdJmu0AoJ9M OaSWiBx2cZZqq97f0GZ1GuJR =Mqbu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: ATTN: Gary L. Burnore
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :The remailer help documents I'm familiar with say they will act to prevent > :"harrassment" through the remailer. I presume the above would be viewed by > :the remailer owners as harrassment. > > Interesting presumtion. Hopefully true. The ONLY difference between remailers > and ISP's in this case, is that with an ISP, if you forge another's real ^^^^^ > address there's at least a possibility that you can be held accountable for > it. It's nothing at all to do with the CONTENT of the post. If same can be > said of a remailer, ie if you get UCE based on a post made with your address > as a from line the _real_ poster can be held accountable, then there is no > issue. That argument might have some validity if Netcom (your own ISP) didn't allow its own mail servers to be utilized by spammers and tell people who complain about this practice to G.F.Y. Just read some of the complaints about Netcom on the news.admin.net-abuse.email NG. If you had been "UCE baited" by someone using Netcom's mail servers, rather than those of a remailer, would you attempt to harass Netcom like you did Jeff Burchell who ran Mailmasher and the Huge Cajones Remailer? Would one of your associates at DataBasix demand that Netcom be shut down since they are unable or unwilling to stop the abuse of their servers? Would you threaten legal action to get Netcom to turn over all of their sendmail logs to you? What do you mean by "held accountable"? Having a throwaway Netcruiser account (perhaps one of many), acquired under a phony name, cancelled? You've already been informed, and admitted that it has been effective, that if you don't wish your e-mail address to appear in a From: line from a remailer you can request source blocking. It's sort of like the blocking of a/c 900 telephone numbers. If you are worried about abuse of your phone, you can request that calls to 900 numbers from your phone be blocked. You don't have to insist that they be blocked from EVERYONE'S phone just because they're a problem FOR YOU. Can you point to any equivalent safeguard against someone's e-mail address being forged through Netcom's SMTP servers, either by a Netcom user or by someone else? If not, isn't it time to make sure your own house is in order before meddling in the neighbors' houses? IMO, the remailers are already doing more to prevent what you perceive to be a problem than your own ISP is willing to do -- and this by VOLUNTEERS who are not being paid by you, or anyone, for their efforts. I also note that you're using the word "forge" again. Yet in another post from you within a day or two of this one, you claimed that you weren't concerned about forgery. Which is true? --

1 0

More microsoft monopoly::Re: NT 4.0 Option Pack released (fwd)
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Microsoft has now broken up the Service Packs into Bug Fix and Option Pack (new feechures) packages. However the catch is this: they require you to have Internet Exploiter 4.01 installed *BEFORE* you can install the Option Pack (whose features have little to do with Internet Exploiter, though they are part of the IIS web server. For example RAIDUS Remote Access Authentication has nothing to do with Exploiter.) IMHO: This is a cheap shot at making their browser more "incorporated" with the OS, that way they can get around the Justice Dept. :( Lame. Another message claims VC++ requires IE as well -- can anyone confirm this? =====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos============== .+.^.+.| Ray Arachelian |Prying open my 3rd eye. So good to see |./|\. ..\|/..|sunder(a)sundernet.com|you once again. I thought you were |/\|/\ <--*-->| ------------------ |hiding, and you thought that I had run |\/|\/ ../|\..| "A toast to Odin, |away chasing the tail of dogma. I opened|.\|/. .+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|my eye and there we were.... |..... ======================= http://www.sundernet.com ========================== ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 3 Dec 1997 08:08:57 -0500 From: Russ <Russ.Cooper(a)RC.ON.CA> To: NTBUGTRAQ(a)LISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM Subject: NT 4.0 Option Pack released FYI, the final release of the NT 4.0 Option Pack has been posted, you can get full details at; http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/default.asp For those that aren't already aware, Microsoft has split the old Service Pack into two components. One is the Option Pack, which includes new features and functionality, while the Service Pack will be kept to bug fixes or patches only (or so they say, we still haven't seen what this new SP will look like). Amongst other things, this first release of NTOP includes; IIS 4.0 Microsoft Transaction Server 2.0 Microsoft Message Queues 1.0 Microsoft Certificate Server 1.0 Internet Connection Services for Microsoft RAS (Radius) Microsoft Site Server Express (Web Usage and Content analysis/reporting) Internet Explorer 4.01 These components will now ship on a separate CD included with NT. Its important to note that IE4.01 *must* be installed prior to installing any of the NTOP components. Cheers, Russ ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 3 Dec 1997 17:05:35 +0200 From: "Juha [ISO-8859-1] Jäykkä" <juolja(a)utu.fi> To: NTBUGTRAQ(a)LISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM Subject: Re: NT 4.0 Option Pack released > Its important to note that IE4.01 *must* be installed prior to > installing any of the NTOP components. And MSIE must be installed before installing Visual C++.. Soon we hav= e it that MSIE must be installed before TCP/IP is installed... and then befo= re NT in installed! Is there no limit to this??? Is there any way to prevent = MS from *FORCING* us to install MSIE - other than boycott all MS products entirely (with NT5 it would seem that we have to boycott even the OS to= save ourselves from MSIE)??? Sorry the bitter tone - I just don't like programs that require me to install yet another program which I don't want to install. --=20 ----------------------------------------------- | Juha J=E4ykk=E4, juolja(a)utu.fi | | home: http://www.utu.fi/~juolja/ | | pgp-key: http://www.utu.fi/~juolja/pgp.txt | -----------------------------------------------

2 1

Re: Censorial leftists (Was: Interesting article)
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:42 AM 12/3/97 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: >This is nothing new. Honest (self-identified) leftists like my friend Bob >Chatelle complain about the censors on the left almost as much as censors >on the right. Other fave leftist censorship causes: > Not to forget the CPUSA's long time platform plank that promised to make racisim a crime punished by imprisonment. DCF -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBNIWH6oVO4r4sgSPhAQH7YwQAo/vMb7hqDMQ/6GP+gBXtruClj31qstbx mBSrb8VG8+9ZQO8/Tl8zY3h2FzRKea/sOQIlhpVeD2kryQUyqc2D6z79dklru5vu D7b5iJEY1na8xkQW/c3nD3ejsJRQ/5kjcNcZBQ4zxG/jM95B0tt3Wmn4B0/uMmid bJZDE0fMMEQ= =9qf9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed (was: Re: not so fast Re: Kudos to NETCOM!)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Sam" <sam-001(a)dpinc.ml.org> wrote: > In article <3485813d.117631170(a)nntp.best.ix.netcom.com>, > gburnore+NOspam(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) writes: > > > On 2 Dec 1997 14:59:30 GMT, "Sam" <sam-001(a)dpinc.ml.org> wrote: > > > >:Found it: > >: > >:Subject: Re: Burnore forgeries easily solvable > >:From: Sam <sam-000(a)usa.net> > >:Date: 1997/07/10 > >:Message-ID: <5q3ms3$phq(a)chronicle.concentric.net> > >:Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.anonymous,alt.anonymous.messages,alt.censorship,news.ad > >: > >: > > > > > > Nice try Sam but no go. > > Not so fast. In the message that this was a follow-up to, > <gburnoreED2z89.GHs(a)netcom.com>, your own exact words were: > > > This one dated 9 July 1997 > > is a good example. See the forged from line? Ths did not come from > > mmdf(a)databasix.com > > Well, no matter how you look at it, it was. It did came from > mmdf(a)databasix.com. There was no forgery. And that was precisely the > point of my initial post. I cannot believe that someone who is supposed to > administer a mail server cannot recognize an auto-ack generated by his own > machine, instead insisting that the message came from a third party, forged > with his return address. > > This puts all other claimed forgeries from a mail2news gateway, that you ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > have taken an issue with, and used as a basis to form your claims against > UCE-baiting, and such, as suspect. ^^^^^^^^^^ You've noticed that too, huh? Gary Burnore's "big lie" technique depends upon his claims being retold over and over, by himself and his associates such as Belinda Bryan <eridani(a)ix.netcom.com>, WITHOUT SERIOUS ANALYSIS like yours, in order to be believed. Gary's continuous whining about "forgeries" is becoming pathetic. In his haste to falsely claim that something was "forged" he missed the fact that the claimed "forgery" was traceable back to HIS OWN SERVER. He shot himself in the foot trying to frame the remailers this time. What would be the point in trying to forge a Usenet post to make it look like it came from "mmdf(a)databasix.com", anyway? Gary Burnore's forgery allegations against Mailmasher are similarly suspect. First of all, before planning the attack, somebody apparently didn't do his homework, or he'd have realized that Mailmasher was a web-based 'nymserver, not a remailer. Despite being challenged to do so, Gary has never been able to produce a single piece of documentation showing that Mailmasher ever had the ability to paste From: headers. The "evidence" that was posted had truncated Path headers that stopped at the mail2news gateway and contained "X-No-Archive" headers, just as Gary's own posts do, presumably to explain why none of these posts is independently available from third-party archives for verification. If the posts even existed in the first place, they are more likely to have been generated from a Netcruiser account, complete with headers designed to frame Mailmasher, than from Mailmasher itself. --

1 0

Re: CDT and the Threat of Gov't Intervention
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:46 AM 12/3/97 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Besides demonstrating that cyberporn is a topic that will >never disappear, the Kids and the Net summit has >highlighted the tensions between the different types of >Net-advocacy groups here in Washington. I'm sure the Feds are happy that their Good Cop (Clinton) / Bad Cop (Freeh) routine is having the divisive effect they planned, and making sacrifices seem acceptable. ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu Information is a dense, colorless, odorless material readily transmitted across empty space and arbitrary boundaries by shaking charged particles.

3 3

Re: Censorial leftists (Was: Interesting article)
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:42 AM -0700 12/3/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >This is nothing new. Honest (self-identified) leftists like my friend Bob >Chatelle complain about the censors on the left almost as much as censors >on the right. Other fave leftist censorship causes: > >-- MacKinnonite antiporn laws (she's a self-identified Marxist, I recall) And her partner, Andrea Dworkin, belies the oft-quoted notion that someone so far to the left comes out a libertarian rightist. No, this chick Dworkin is so far left she's just plain _left_. She argues that porn for womyn (or is it wimmin?) is fine and dandy, because this represents lesbian sisterhood exploring their own blah blah blah, but porn aimed and directed at men, even if containing precisely the same images of naked chicks, is inherently exploitative and should be banned. (How?) Dworkin has clamined, several times, that all heterosexual sex is rape. >-- "Hate speech" bans And "hate speech" laws are already spreading on the Net. Just a day or two ago there was a report that a student is being prosecuted for "hate speech" messages mentioning Asians (or maybe just Japanese?) in a derogatory way. What part of "shall make no law" is not being understood here? What part of "sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me" did they not understand? (This being one of the lessons, along with several other crucial memes, that some of us learned early on...apparently this lesson, and the fable of the grasshopper and the ant, has been replaced by the Dworkin-approved "Heather Has Two Mommies" lesbian propaganda.) >-- Sexual harassment "hostile environment" regulations (Give me a break. >This is the justification for at least one library censorware >installation.) This is a fairly old one, at least 15 years old. Girlie calendars, even of bikini girls, are banned in most work environments. GIFs or JPEGs with sexy themes are banned (unless, one presumes, they are "lesbigay or transgender" (!), in which case they must be encouraged by Management so as to provide a nurturing environment for lesbigays...sort of a kind of affirmative action for dykes and fags). The City of Berkeley has floated proposals to ban public reading, in diners, restaurants, etc., of magazines like "Playboy." Not because children might catch a glimpse of a naked breast, but because womyn and other sensitive souls might be offended. (I don't know if this was ever passed into law, let alone challenged in court.) >-- Various FCC regulations aside from indecent stuff Like mandatory voluntary ratings. Like mandatory voluntary "public service announcements." Like denials of licenses for politically incorrect stations. >-- Labeling/compelled speech requirements (Jamie, are you out there?) > Labelled speech will be the touchstone for the next couple of decades of debate about censorship, hurtful speech, and mandatory voluntary self-ratings. "But you can say anything you wish, provided you voluntarily and accurately self-label your words, and provided none of the protected class members are offended or insulted." >>bottom line is that most any political orientation is likely to thrash free >>speech when it appears to be a threat. > >Well, at least the libertarians in the audience are consistently opposed to >government censorship. Such has it always been, such will it always be. --Tim May The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 3

Khristian Kult Killings
by Canadian Nutly News 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[CANADIAN NUTLY NEWS-Bienfait, Saskatchewan]AN ASSORTMENT OF POLITCAL criminals from Washington, DC, held a press conference at the Coaldust Saloon last night, with the main topic of discussion being the gangland battles between rival Christian cults. Bill Clinton expressed dismay over secret intelligence reports that not only were the Christian gangs widely dispersed throughout the school system, but that there was evidence of involvement by many teachers and school administrators, as well. "Many of these cults have beliefs very similar to the Heaven's Gate cult, with their members involved in preparing to participate in an exiting of the physical plane in a similar manner, and the eventual overthrow of democratic government in all countries, led by their currently exiled guerilla leader." Lying Jackoff Fuck Louis J. Freeh stated that more crimes are committed in America by followers of the Christian cults than even the large number committed by people with Italian names. "The problem is enormous." Freeh stated. "Many of the children are committed to these gangs by their parents, almost from birth. It is not surprising that the kids seldom manage to escape the grip of these cults, even as adults." Murdering Nazi Cunt Janet Reno stated that BATF agents had informed her that Christian cult members throughout the U.S. were in possession of more weapons than members of the paramilitary. "The real threat of having weapons in these people's hands is that, like most paramilitary members, they don't regard the Federal government as being the supreme authority." Anonymous sources at the scene of the recent cult slaughter at a high school in Kentucky confirmed that several copies of a popular cult manifesto were found in the homes of both the shooter and the dead participants in the bizarre ritual. The manifesto, which is vastly more subversive and violent than books such as "The Turner Diaries," is often referred to by cult members in oblique coded-language as simply, "The Book." Bar maids and local drunks at the Coaldust Saloon denied the rumors that the book, known as the Word of God to most cult followers, was actually one of the early manuscripts of the author of 'The True Story of the InterNet,' and that 'God' was nothing more than a thinly veiled anagram for 'Dog', representing one of the author's many nefarious aliases. However, A Sorry Drunk To Be Named Later informed gathered reportwhores that if Christian cult members around the world sent their tithes, in cash, to PO Box 281, Bienfait, Saskatchewan, that they would be assured a space on the spaceship approaching earth in the shadow of comet Khrist-Bop-Shoo-Bop. (When pressed for details as to the time of arrival of the mythical space aliens worshipped by the cult, A Sorry Drunk To Be Named Later merely winked and said, "Let's just say that cult members will be swept up into another dimension on the same day as their computers.") Canadian Nutly News sources confirmed earlier today that the shooter in the ritual slaughter at the high school in Kentucky was wearing a T-shirt with a radical cult slogan often used to whip cult members into a violent frenzy, "He was clothed with a robe dipped in blood, and His name is called The Word of Dog." ~sog~

1 0

Bad Cop, Worse Cop / Bum and Bummer / Re: CDT and the Threat of Gov't Intervention
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Honig wrote: > At 12:46 AM 12/3/97 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >Besides demonstrating that cyberporn is a topic that will never > >disappear, the Kids and the Net summit has highlighted the tensions > >between the different types of Net-advocacy groups here in Washington. > I'm sure the Feds are happy that their Good Cop (Clinton) / Bad Cop (Freeh) > routine is having the divisive effect they planned, and making sacrifices > seem acceptable. Yes, but Freeh is now positioning himself to be best pals with the incoming Republican President. Would _you_ vote for a politician whom the FBI Director has implied is part of a criminal tag-team that deserves investigation by a special prosecutor? A politician whose previous running mate was embroiled in WhiteWATER and FosterGATE at a time when hard evidence that a former president was GUILTY in WATER-GATE is coming to the fore? "Vote for the manipulated public image of your choice, but vote." Our 'democracy' is run by Information Management Engineers. Or so I would have you believe... TruthMonger

1 0

Transcript of Gore's remarks at "Censorware Summit"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a transcript of Al Gore's remarks (not his prepared remarks, but his actual remarks) at the "Censorware Summit" yesterday. --Declan *********** REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE AT THE INTERNET/ONLINE SUMMIT INTERNET/ONLINE SUMMIT: FOCUS ON CHILDREN RENAISSANCE HOTEL 999 NINTH STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1997 VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Thank you, Christine. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you. Thank you very much for your warm welcome. And Christine Varney, I want to thank you for your kind introduction. And I want to tell you how much I appreciate your friendship over the years, and how much President Clinton and I appreciate the outstanding work that you did in the White House and the Federal Trade Commission and as a leader in so many ways. And that leadership is demonstrated again as you chair this Internet/Online Summit. Let me also thank and congratulate co-chair Bill Burrington and the summit host, Steve Case of American Online, and host Dan Schulman of AT&T and Laura Jennings of Microsoft and Jake Weinbaum (sp) of Walt Disney and Dan Oakrent (sp) of Time Warner. And I want to acknowledge with special praise my colleague in President Clinton's Cabinet, the secretary of education, Richard Riley, who will speak after I do. I want to thank the students of Hind (sp) Junior High School here in the District of Columbia and Rocky Run Middle School in Fairfax, Virginia; Rock Creek Valley Middle School in Maryland; and Du Fief (sp) Elementary School in Maryland. These kids who are behind me took part in an Internet demonstration in an adjacent room just before this morning's session, and I was very, very impressed with all of the things they showed me and their skills and their teachers and their librarians. And I want to thank all of you for inviting me here today and congratulate you for this summit. The president and I hosted a meeting back on July 16th, with many of those who are leaders of this summit. We challenged the industry to move forward. This independent initiative which has been undertaken is, I think, most impressive and a very, very important step forward. Your interest in expanding the vast opportunities and living up to the growing responsibilities of the Internet is admirable. I'm pleased to be here today to outline some objectives and announce some important initiatives to help make this exciting new tool safe for our children. Both the president and I have long been convinced that the Internet is not a luxury or a diversion; it is an essential tool for children. And its use is fast becoming an essential skill for adults. That is why we're committed to connecting every classroom and school library to the Internet by the year 2000. We have already connected 65 percent of our schools in a very short period of time. We're ahead of schedule in meeting our broader goals. Earlier this morning, as I mentioned a moment ago, I heard some more reasons why we should encourage our young people to get on-line. The parents and children that are behind me, and their teachers and librarians, told me about how their families use the Internet. The high value these parents place on their children's Internet explorations is more proof that the Internet offers unsurpassed opportunity for our children and also for the businesses that can serve this fast-growing market. You know, throughout the history of our civilization, we have learned how to store knowledge outside of our own brains, first in spoken language and then in written language, in culture and its various manifestations, including song and dance. And then with the invention of the printing process, the ability to store knowledge outside the brain grew by leaps and bounds. The Electronic Revolution further advanced this process. But now the Internet allows our civilization to take a quantum leap forward, dramatically changing the way we relate to this rapidly growing amount of knowledge that's stored outside the brain and is accessible to people all over the world. And as our children go through the learning and acculturation process, it is absolutely essential that they learn how to use the Internet, just as it became essential for children, in the learning process, to learn how to read books when the print process was first invented. Ten million children are already on the Internet, and that's four times as many as just a few years ago. In a short time, more young people will be connected to the Internet than any other segment of the population. And yet the parents I talk to express deep concerns about Internet content they consider inappropriate for children. They made it clear that if the Internet industry hopes to serve the interests of America's children, it must first gain the trust of America's parents. That is why this administration has charged the Internet industry with taking the responsibility and taking the lead for making the Internet safe for children. You have taken some important and impressive first steps. I want to congratulate you for your efforts in this area - the search engines, the filtering and blocking software, the access to high- quality children's sites and a choice of rating systems so that parents can find the one that meets their families' needs. In tandem with that, I want to congratulate the sponsors of the tens of thousands of web sites who have voluntarily self-rated those sites. And I want to congratulate you again for organizing this conference and stepping into the middle of a very difficult debate. And we need to understand clearly why it is so difficult and not be daunted by that task or scared away from wading into the middle of this and finding a solution. It's a debate about a 21st century question: How do we keep our children safe while protecting the First Amendment and preserving the limitless opportunities of this exciting new technological medium that changes form and content on a daily basis? Some say we should refrain from any action, that all action to block children's access to objectionable content amounts to censorship. To them I say, blocking your own child's access to objectionable Internet content is not censoring; that's called parenting. And it is essential. And a parent's right to block offensive speech is as fully protected by the First Amendment as the right to issue that speech. There is a view, which I consider an absurd view, that defines "children" as "nothing more than miniature adults," not really in need of special protection from material that their parents believe they're not ready to process and handle. Well, children are not "miniature adults." Their minds are developing and growing and evolving. And they are especially vulnerable to some kinds of images and information that, of course, ought to be freely available to adults who have matured and developed and have the full rights of citizenship to choose whatever they want to see and listen to and read and look at. Children are in a different category, and that ought not be a controversial conclusion. But still others say that government must immediately come in with a heavy hand and outlaw certain activities on the Internet. Well to them, I say we need to listen to the justices of the Supreme Court and to the United States Constitution that binds them. Since the days of George Washington and John Marshall, when Chief Justice Marshall, the greatest chief justice of all, told us that the Supreme Court does indeed interpret the Constitution; as a nation of laws, we have been bound to follow our Constitution and the interpretations of that Constitution given by our Supreme Court. And the court has ruled that we must find methods to keep our children safe that do not infringe on the free speech of others. Therefore, we must give ourselves the time we need to develop these methods. In short, we must meet this 21st-century challenge in a 21st-century way, not by using the heavy hand of government in ways that would harm and squelch this exciting new resource, and certainly not by ignoring the dangers and allowing our children to roam free and unsupervised on the Internet. Instead, we should pursue a third way, an American way: allow the industry to take the lead, with the help and guidance of government, advocacy groups, and families, to provide parents with the education and the tools they need to preserve both safety and freedom on the Internet. You have begun this effort. And I know that there's only a small percentage of sites on the Internet that parents feel are not healthy for their children. You have begun designing the tools to guide children away from content that their parents consider harmful and steer them toward content that their parents consider helpful. So the work you've begun is extremely important, and doing it well, so that it is an effective solution, is an absolutely essential task. You know as well as I do that the Internet will never be a fixture in every home until parents have the tools they need to make it safe for their children's explorations. There is a danger for this effort to degenerate into a discussion about how to avoid regulation. To be successful, it must be elevated to a discussion about how to meet the needs of America's families. Industry will never be able to meet those needs unless it devotes the same resources and commitment to designing parental controls that it would devote to the design and launch of any new product. I'm convinced that this is an area where you will do well by doing good. So again I say, industry must do more. I congratulate you on what you have done and on the great promise signified by this meeting here. But it means that industry must keep working to make the new technologies easier to use, more effective, and more widely available. And this is not to slight the current developments, because they are indeed impressive, but it is to put them in the context of our overall goal of making sure that every parent has the technology and the technological know-how to guide their children to sites on the information superhighway just as easily as they guide their families to places on the interstate highway. These tools must become as commonplace and as easy to use as the remote control on the family TV. And yet, allowing parents to block access to sites they deem objectionable is not the only issue the industry faces. To gain the trust of parents and families, you must give users, and especially children and parents, control over how their private information is used over the Internet. In addition, we must also look at direct marketing to children. If Internet sites for kids continue to feature advertising blurred into entertainment and targeted directly at children, parents may soon shut off the Internet. You might as well prepare yourselves if there's not an effective industry-led solution. You might as well prepare yourselves for a massive nationwide backlash that will stunt the growth of this exciting resource. That shouldn't happen. It doesn't have to happen. But it will happen unless the industry-led solution to these problems also are effective, not just - let me emphasize again - not just theoretically effective, not just designed in a way that they ought to be effective, but really and actually effective in the real-life experiences of American families. You've got a lot at stake, and so the resources and the level of effort you devote to this task ought to be commensurate with the importance of finding a real solution. The Department of Commerce will be hosting conferences early next year to focus on issues of quality, content, access, privacy, marketing and advertising for children. The first of these conferences will focus on access and will take place from February 25th through February 27th. I challenge the industry to bring to these conferences, just a few months from now, several clear ideas for addressing these issues and, by addressing them, go a great distance toward gaining the trust of concerned parents. Of course, we have said that industry's role is to take the lead, not to carry the entire load. And so today, I am pleased to announce several initiatives that will work in tandem with industry efforts by helping educate parents about the availability of parental controls and how they can use them to help protect their children. First of all, I am delighted to announce the release of a new "Parents Guide to the Internet" prepared, at the president's request, by the Department of Education. And Secretary Riley will be talking more about this in a few moments, but this "Parents Guide to the Internet," we hope, will become a valuable resource for parents who want to understand how they can play a responsible role as parents in helping to protect their children against inappropriate sites and inappropriate material, and finding the exciting opportunities that really are available for educational and cultural purposes on the Internet. Parents today face a "technogeneration" gap that's different from anything that they ever experienced with their own parents. One journalist wrote that it's almost as if Ward and June Cleaver were suddenly charged with supervising the Jetson children, Judy and Elroy - (laughter) - a pretty good analogy. This new guide introduces parents to the Internet and suggests how they can help their children experience its wonders and dodge its hazards. I'm also pleased to announce a new national public awareness campaign calling - called "Think, Then Link." This will feature a national town hall meeting, scheduled for next fall, to be held in schools all across the country and designed to educate adults and children about how to create a safe online environment. This will be followed by local town hall meetings at libraries, schools, and community centers across the country. This is part of our effort to give parents the tools they need to ensure a safe, constructive Internet experience for their children. But those tools themselves are not enough. They must be accompanied by aggressive enforcement of the anti-stalking, child pornography, and obscenity laws as they apply to cyberspace. And that's why I'm pleased that the leading Internet service provider associations are announcing a new agreement to cooperate with law enforcement authorities on a zero-tolerance policy against child pornography. Internet service providers will be working closely with law enforcement to report and pursue any suspicious activity. I really want to congratulate these providers for stepping forward in this fashion. We've had experiences in the Reinventing Government effort that has resulted in airlines reporting on information that drug smugglers might be involved in air freight shipments. And the partnership between the airline carriers and the Customs people has resulted in a really dramatic improvement in that whole law enforcement effort. And this new partnership, I believe, is likely to have similar dramatic effects. I'm also pleased to announce a cybertips line - in effect, a 911 number for the Internet. This number will work like an emergency hot line or a crimestoppers tip line, and will take reports on illegal Internet activity related to child pornography and predation. This project is sponsored by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, with a sizeable grant from the Department of Justice. It is a warning to criminals and a promise to parents: There are Internet police for those activities that are illegal, and they will capture and punish those who would use the Internet to harm and hurt our children. Together, these new initiatives will make a significant difference in the ability of parents and law enforcement to work together to keep our children safe on the Internet. Most parents quickly learn the value of letting children explore. Small children can learn much more from emptying a cupboard of pots and pans onto the floor than they could ever learn by direct instruction. Weight, balance, sound, texture, touch, temperature - there is no human being competent to teach a child all those lessons. They're just too vast and varied. Therefore, sometimes the best teaching is to encourage exploring. So, just as a parent covers electrical outlets when a baby is crawling around and locks medicine cabinets to protect children against poisoning, and cushions the hard corners of coffee tables to make a home safe for a child to explore, we must also help parents anticipate and block dangerous places on the Internet to make it safe for a child to explore. And again, children are special, and different from adults. I think it's hard for us to debate that point about the Internet, partly because throughout the history of civilization, societies that have core values always have difficulty debating issues that bring those core values into place. Our core value in the United States of America is freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of expression. Those who founded the United States came here in order to establish that core value. And any time a new proposal or a new idea or a new challenge rubs up against that core value in any way, it's very difficult for our country to come to terms with it. And there's always going to be a group that takes an absolutist view that is different from what the Supreme Court has said the Constitution endorses, and we'll always have very, very heated debates whenever this subject is dealt with. And we understand you can't eliminate all risk, but you can get to the point where the risk of letting children explore is less than the risk of not letting them explore. And we can deal with this issue in a way that does not compromise our core value of freedom of expression. This will take a lot of effort, and the combined conversation of all the boardrooms, classrooms, living rooms and chat rooms in America, to sort out the issues and give parents the tools they need to childproof the Internet. We will never achieve a complete consensus here in Washington, DC, I guarantee you. But that's okay. The debate will not be won in Washington; it will be won in the hearts and minds of America's families. And that's where the only victory that matters is going to take place. For the sake of our children, let's keep up the fight to uphold both freedom and safety on the Internet. I'm convinced, after seeing and hearing all of you here today, it's a fight that we're going to win as Americans. Thank you very much for what you're doing and for having me here today. (Applause.) Thank you.

1 0

Re: CDT and the Threat of Gov't Intervention
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Danny, I may respond in more detail to your post shortly (I'm supposed to be working on an article right now), but I wanted to ask you: Does CDT consider itself to be a "civil liberties" group? If so, how do you reconcile that stance with CDT director Jerry Berman's statements this week and elsewhere that we need to "balance free speech" and "balance civil liberties" with other concerns? If so, how do you reconcile this with your anti-civil liberties "compromises" on issues like wiretapping, the "harmful to minors" version of the CDA you supported, and the "crypto in a crime" jail penalties you continue to support? CDT seems to take positions that are often much closer to business lobbyists than civil liberties groups. Now, I don't mind business lobbyists -- I'm friends with many of them and I talk with them every day -- but I want to be clear on your position. -Declan On Wed, 3 Dec 1997, Daniel J. Weitzner wrote: > At 12:45 AM -0500 12/3/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >Besides demonstrating that cyberporn is a topic that will > >never disappear, the Kids and the Net summit has > >highlighted the tensions between the different types of > >Net-advocacy groups here in Washington. > > > >The civil liberties groups (ACLU, EPIC, EFF, CPSR), and > >journalism, publishers, and media groups have lined up on > >one side [http://www.ifea.org/] saying the government > >shouldn't pressure the Internet to self-censor (or be > >censored by the Feds). They held a counter-summit press > >conference yesterday. Even the libertarian Cato Institute > >is in this corner. > > > >On the other side, the Center for Democracy and Technology > >[http://www.cdt.org/] is participating in the summit along > >with antiporn groups, high tech firms, and "censorware" > >vendors. > > Declan, > > Life would indeed be dull without tensions, but it's important to have a > clear picture of what's going on in the tension over filtering. > > Somehow you have filtered out a few groups on what you call the "other > side." Even though your was present for much of the Summit, you neglected > to mention important participants in the Summit including: > > People for the American Way, one of the nation's leading civil liberties groups > American Library Association > Media Access Project > > These groups are some of the leading defends of free expression in the > country, so I'm not sure why you left them out. > > In a statement issued at the Summit, People For the American Way's > President said: "We do not want an Internet where lawmakers and > corporations have decided for us what the best filtering method is, but > neither do we advocate a 'Wild West' where any safeguard is called > intrusive. We stand for traditional democratic principles like freedom of > expression and freedom of choice, and as such we believe that families > shold have an array of choices about how best to guide their children." > > CDT shares this view with People For and is committed to assuring that: > > 1) the Net does not become dominated by a single rating system; > 2) that the choice to filter or not is always up to parents, not > governments; and, > 3) anyone using filters has full knowledge of the filtering criteria used. > > Painting this as CDT vs. all other civil libertarians may be convenient, > but it's wrong. I do thank you for acknowledging, at least, the CDT is > committed to a diversity of options. > > We'll have more to say about what happened at the Summit in a day or so. > We welcome the debate over the desirability of filtering, and various > approaches to the issue can go on, but it isn't served by misleading > characterizations. > > Thanks. > > ============================================================================ > * Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * > Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crypto.com/adopt > > ------------- > > Daniel J. Weitzner, Deputy Director <djw(a)cdt.org> > Center for Democracy and Technology 202.637.9800 (v) > 1634 Eye St., NW Suite 1100 202-637.0968 (f) > Washington, DC 20006 http://www.cdt.org/ > > > > >

1 0