December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Liberating PGP 5.0 Source Code the Old-Fashioned Way
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:46 AM -0700 6/24/97, Lucky Green wrote: >At 02:08 AM 6/24/97 -0700, Mark Grant wrote: >>It's kind of hard to modify the code when I'm still waiting for the PGP >>5.0 code to be made available. I can't do a lot until people finish >>OCR-ing it. > >Note that the scanning teams are looking for non-US volunteers to proofread >the scanns. Each volunteer gets 100 pages. They must have access to a box >with perl and a C compiler to process the per-page error correcting code. >You *don't* need a scanner. A lot of work that could better be spent in other areas. Why doesn't one of the many persons with access to the PGP 5.0 code already in machine readable form just mail it to the group doing the scanning and whatnot? (Using remailers, obviously. And even making it look like a porno image file. Whatever. Even easier: just put the source code CD-ROM in an envelope and mail it to Norway. "Duh.") This would shorten the process, and the Norwegian group could announce "We're done!!!" So, PGP employees, do it today. (Or send me the source on CD-ROM.....) --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: spam on this list
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 23 Jun 97 at 11:26, Jason William RENNIE wrote: > NO i dont wish to post any, i just want to know if this list has > spam sent to it ?? I started reciveing various pieces in the last > couple of days and i'm trying to identify the source. Spam *is* free speech, you know. <g> Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: (408) 259-2795

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http:--cnnfn.com-digitaljam-9706-23-netbiz-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DIGITAL AlphaServer Systems [INLINE] Digital Jam [INLINE] Big Brother brouhaha Privacy concerns lead on-line marketers to try softer approaches June 23, 1997: 11:08 a.m. ET [LINK] [INLINE] Archenemies join hands - June 11, 1997 FTC tackles privacy - June 10, 1997 [IMAGE] Federal Trade Commission TRUSTe NEW YORK (CNNfn) - There's an Internet argument going on. [INLINE] On one side are people who want to surf the Net in peace, free from the "spam" and insidious snooping of those anxious to make a quick buck. [INLINE] On the other side are businesses looking to take advantage of the Internet's promise as a vehicle for reaching specific customers cheaply and efficiently. [INLINE] Can the two sides coexist? Or will privacy advocates succeed in driving cyber-hawkers off line? [INLINE] Unlikely, experts say. That's because online companies are starting to use other marketing tools that make people worry less about Big Brother. [INLINE] The issue has heated up lately. Privacy rights groups are alarmed about the potential for abuse with junk e-mail and other invasive technology. In response, the Federal Trade Commission is probing whether marketers are snooping too much. [INLINE] The industry, meanwhile, is coming up with its own solutions to prevent lawmakers from stepping in. [INLINE] Experts say most of the practices raising eyebrows aren't much different from what's been happening off-line for years. Yet other analysts concede there is danger in an age where extensive personal information is available with the press of a key. [INLINE] "Consumers don't like to be shoulder-surfed when they're online," said Kate Delhagen, a senior analyst with Forrester Research Inc. in Cambridge. "(But) this is not a deal-breaker for the Web. The Web is alive and well and will continue to thrive. These little bombs will continue to go off, and they'll continue to be fixed." [INLINE] Besides e-mail, or "spamming," some marketers use browser technology to find out where a user has been on the Net or track him when he leaves a site by following his electronic footprints. Companies are also selling information on databases. [INLINE] "It's as if they can shadow you on the Web," said Susan Scott, executive director of TRUSTe, a non-profit organization of 50 companies whose mission is to promote trust in online commerce. [INLINE] Dan Miller, senior editor with The Web Magazine in San Francisco, thinks junk e-mail and the other practices aren't central to doing business online. [INLINE] "You can do business online without violating someone's privacy," Miller said. [INLINE] Instead of flooding people with junk e-mail, or "spam," some companies such as Amazon.com ask users if they want to be notified about new products, Miller said. That puts the control in the hands of the users, he said. [INLINE] In other cases, companies are creating new partnerships, like the one between Border books and Salon, an online Arts magazine, Miller said. At the end of Salon's book reviews is a link to Border so people can order the book. [INLINE] Experts said the disputed methods do work - but at the risk of alienating customers. [INLINE] "People universally hate spam," said Evan Schwartz, author of "Webonomics" and a contributing editor to "Wired" magazine. Smart Web sites treat customers respectfully by avoiding mass e-mailing or selling information from lists, he said. [INLINE] Scott said spamming is more widespread among smaller companies because it's so cheap - pennies for each e-mail address compared to a few dollars for each name in direct mail. [INLINE] "It's a numbers game - the more you send out, the more response you get," Scott said. The method has about a 1 percent return. [INLINE] Sanford Wallace, founder and president of Cyber Promotions, the largest bulk e-mail company in the country, insists the practice doesn't violate privacy. But he helped organize the Internet E-Mail Marketing Council to promote ethical standards. The council has a central address where people can get their names removed from all mass e-mailers. [INLINE] While the new standard might mean the loss of huge numbers of customers, "there are still millions and millions left," Wallace said. [INLINE] Tracking has been effective to help marketers find out about a person's interests so they can target ads, Scott said. If a person visits gardening sites, for example, a vendor can flash banner ads on the topic. [INLINE] "People don't understand the technology and there's a lot of anxiety about it," Scott said. "There's so much bad press that it's past the point of educating the consumer." [INLINE] Controversy about tracking was so heated two archrivals, Microsoft Corp. and Netscape Communications Corp., recently proposed a common standard so users can control how much information is available about themselves. [INLINE] Experts say selling information from databases isn't much different from what's been happening in the catalogue business. [INLINE] "That type of thing happens all the time," said Don Heath, president and chief executive of the Internet Society, a non-profit organization of 8,000 individuals and organizations. [INLINE] Eight information companies, including LEXIS-NEXIS, recently adopted guidelines to protect personal information like Social Security numbers on databases. [INLINE] Scott argued that most online companies still rely on traditional advertising. [INLINE] "These (disputed) methods haven't been widespread," Scott said. "Even Yahoo goes on TV to tell people to get on the Web. To reach the mass market, you have to go through traditional means." [INLINE] Scott thinks the uproar about electronic privacy will force people to think about the issue off-line, too. People have resigned themselves to getting piles of junk mail and catalogues, for example. [INLINE] "People had given up trying to protect their privacy, but this will make them think about it again," Scott said. Link to top [INLINE] -- Martine Costello [INLINE] quote box [INLINE] - Kate Delhagen [INLINE] Wallace photo [INLINE] Sanford Wallace doesn't think bulk e-mail violates privacy home | digitaljam | contents | search | stock quotes | help Copyright © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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Re: The Global Fix is In
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm reading a book, "Who Will Tell the Truth" with some very clear insights into How it All Works. The bottom line is the Bottom Line and the reason the crypto debate is going this way is due to exactly one thing: Money. I know there are those amongst this readership who feel that there is no place for the usual political process in dealing with the crypto issues, but that's not a universal or a given, nor is it necessarily practical in the long run. But within the existing structure the missing component in the debate is the active participation of a lot of dollars. The weight of Micro$osft + Netscape + (name your favorite list) is miniscule, and their players woefully inexperienced, compared to McDonnell D., G.E. Fed., TRW., Lock/Martin, IBM, and others who stand to gain hugely from a Federally-mandated and controlled PKI. Those heavyweights are all drinking buddies with the other Washington sorts who are in search of ever-expanding missions in life, and the result is a coterie who's primary interest isn't even remotely concerned with Child Pornography, Money Laundering, etc. but their own aggrandizement measured in personal and corporate dollars. There are no doubt massive investments being made by Industry in the conservative thinktanks who produce the intellectual fodder-de-jour that supports the position of this elite, and overwhelm the likes of McCain and Kerrey with impossible-for-the-legislature-to-understand managed "information" which boils it all down to the 4 Horsemen arguments. What's necessary here is a knowledgeable application of the same techniques, a coalition organization comprised of large business interests with an awareness of how Bad this all is, competing on the same turf. Noble anarchist or Constitutional arguments, whining about our Rights and such, are insignificant and irrelevant to the players. Who will belly up to the bar and provide leadership on terms that will truly be effective? ======================================================= At 10:16 AM 6/21/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > > >The "Meeting of the Eight," formerly the G7, is happening in Denver. >Listening to what's coming out of it, it's apparent that the Four Horsemen >are front and center. Clinton is speaking of a network of banking and >communications policy coordinators, to detect and halt drug dealing, money >laundering, and nuclear terrorism. > >This fits with the details of reports about global wiretapping efforts, >about joint intelligence activities, and, of course, with the OECD/GAK laws >being proposed, passed, and about to be signed into law about "Key >Recovery" and "Trusted Third Parties." > >The fix is in. > >It probably won't be long before Stronghold is barred for export from >either Britain or RSA (the other one); both Tony Blair and Nelson Mandela >are Friends of Bill, so a few phone calls should take care of that little >problem. (And Norway and the other Scandinavian countries are part of the >global wiretap agreement, so I rather doubt free export of PGP 5.x code out >of Norway will be feasible, despite the OCR effort now underway there.) > >(Not that Clinton will mention Stronghold to Blair...that's far too much >microdetail. Jimmy Carter might have gotten involved at that level, but not >Bill. Details will be left to underlings.) > >The call to Japan, probably the visit by David Aaron, stopped NTT's plans >for exporting the RSA chip. > >Anguilla and other "offshore" havens, will be subject to the same kinds of >pressure. Mark my words. > >It's not hopeless. Physical havens are vulnerable, to all sorts of >pressures (I doubt many cryptographers want to set up shop in Libya or >Iraq, not that these places would be hospitable to Cypherpunks sorts of >goals and methods). > >Going underground, using the untraceable features of cyberspace, may be the >last, best hope. > >--Tim May > >There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. >Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" >---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- >Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, >tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero >W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, >Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. >"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > > > > >

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Re: The Global Fix is In
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <Pine.LNX.3.91.970622115344.593A-100000(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk>, on 06/22/97 at 11:58 AM, Paul Bradley <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> said: >I think that finally the poloticians in D.C, London, Berlin and all the >other major capitals have caught on, and realised that open availability >of anonymity, security and strong crypto can only lead to crypto anarchy, > they are *scared*, this time they are no longer do-gooding idiots, they >are out to cover their own backs... There have only been 2 intrests of the politition: CYA -- Cover Your Ass LYP -- Line Your Pockets There is also the desire to get re-elected but that directly relates to the two above. - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBM61ko49Co1n+aLhhAQGylQQAvLLnNgbu5SamAMMimF0BYina9gNdXkf6 r52wIpTncCHVeFS8khA73IcIwCOyMi7ktFuVOJKUWT/cNdFoMYEp2bDbai/KzVcx O/2ueFTiqEQNk2WR4caTABJtPxASRxPa7X8M8u9gdaBUwHOCTj+yRcDxAhxaAc3+ Ma29OH+tgxk= =kCas -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Ownership of McCain
by geeman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It was suggested that I look a little at McCain, so here is a dribble; I think it's instructive to see the following PAC's on McCains feedlist. Anyone who thinks that these Co.'s won't profit tremendously in the deployment of a Federally-designed and mandated PKI is taking the wrong drugs ..... (note: obviously these figures are meaningless in terms of actual $$$ amounts. They only serve to indicate that real soft money is flowing from the same source.) 4,000 05/03/95 AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 2,500 02/14/95 ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (AKA) APA PAC 2,500 11/17/95 ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (AKA) APA PAC 1,000 02/27/95 AMERICAN AIRLINES POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 100 03/29/95 AMERICAN SUPPLY ASSOCIATION PAC 500 02/02/95 BDM INTERNATIONAL, INC. POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (BDM-PAC) 500 03/01/95 BP AMERICA PAC >>>> 1,000 02/06/95 CIVIC ACTION FUND - LORAL SYSTEMS GROUP (FKA GOODYEAR AEROSPACE CORP PAC) 2,000 05/11/95 FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE "FEPAC" 1,000 09/18/95 FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE "FEPAC" 3,000 09/18/95 FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE "FEPAC" >>>> 1,000 01/16/95 MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE >>>> 1,000 03/13/95 MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE >>>> 1,000 02/17/95 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS EMPLOYEES' POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 1,000 08/17/95 PMAA/SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE 1,000 02/10/95 PODIATRY POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE >>>> 1,000 03/11/95 RAYTHEON COMPANY POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 1,000 02/22/95 SVGGS FUND 1,000 03/14/95 TALLEY INDUSTRIES, INC, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (TALLEY-PAC) 1,000 02/23/95 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (UPSPAC) 100 03/14/95 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (UPSPAC) 3,550 03/14/95 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (UPSPAC) 350 03/14/95 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (UPSPAC) 31,100

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Assault on Pornography
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since the U.S. legislature is so concerned about child pornography and the government is interested in promoting world-wide enforcement of laws meant to fight evil, I was wondering about the following scenario: Manuel Noriega sends pictures on the internet to Iraq of women with their ankles showing and their heads uncovered. Iraq sends an armed force to the U.S. to capture Noriega and take him to Iraq for trial. Sure, a few thousand U.S. troops and citizens might die, but it is for the greater good, right? Scenario Two: Bill Clinton sends a picture on the internet to Iraq of Hillary, with her ankles showing and her head uncovered... TruthMonger

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McCain's War for Security
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times Magazine had a feature story on Senator McCain a week or two ago which covered in detail his personal, military and political history and his heroic struggle to meet the high standards set by his admiral father, the Navy and individual ethics. His long imprisonment by the North Vietnamese due to a refusal to be released as the well-known son of a prominent admiral was cited as an example of his duty to to put national interests above his own. This iconic treatment of a national hero is worth pondering for the way it reveals what Tim calls "the fix is in." The imposition of protective measures often occurs through those with impeccable credentials, especially by appealing to the ones who believe that their special role is to rise above ordinary struggles and dispense exceptional wisdom, fairness and justice. The question on McCain is: has he been sold on the threat to national security of cryptography by appealing to his deep patriotism, his belief in a special duty to protect the nation, to fight its "war" with the day's enemies. Such feeding of grandiloquence is historical practice of the Richlieus running the government, raiding the till, commanding the academies, distributing authorizations to placate antsy kings-in-queue. The cariacature of this are "banana republics" where military and political saviors justify coups in the name of the "public interest," or "the people," fairly well in accord with threats to authority. Military, naval and governmental academies worldwide teach this belief in the special duty of public servants, notwithstanding the evidence that some graduates reap the not-so-public rewards. As amply displayed in S.936, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998, the perennial US banana republic raid on the till. Read it to see who McCain thinks are the nation's enemies and protectors and who are the supreme judges of both. What's not as well publicized about leadership academies of all kinds is that they also teach (and practice) the Machiavellian wisdom of most stringent laws and harshest enforcement for challenges to the authority to govern, to tax, to command, to rule. To assure "national security" for those who thrive on it.

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Dirty hands kill more people (80K/yr) than guns (FWD)
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This needed to be shared... Expect government hand escrow any day now. From: aib(a)col.hp.com (Allan Best) Newsgroups: alt.politics.clinton,alt.politics.democrats.d,alt.politics.usa.republican,al t.rush-limbaugh,alt.fan.rush-limbaugh,alt.politics.libertarian,talk.politics .libertarian,talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.guns,alt.law-enforcement Subject: Re: Dirty hands kill more people (80K/yr) than guns Date: 17 Jun 1997 20:18:00 GMT Organization: HP Colorado Springs Division ec Roberts (armed_and_safe(a)technologist.com) wrote: : On Mon, 16 Jun 1997 14:00:03 +0900, Jason Gottlieb : <zj5j-gttl(a)asahi-net.or.jp> wrote: : {snip} : >The #1 murder weapon is a hand with a handgun in it. : > : The #1 murder weapon is a hand. This is so, : regardless of the tool in that hand. : Bob The obvious solution is to register all hands. Hands must be kept away from children. To protect children, a hand shall not be transported to within 1000 yards of any school, playground or daycare facility. All concealed carry hands must be registered. Concealed carry is banned in all government facilities, especially US Post Offices, and all public buildings including, but not limited to airports, bus stations, train depots and taxi stands. Furthermore, there shall be a 15-day waiting period and a background check before the purchase of any legal hand can be completed. Anyone caught with an unregistered hand shall have that hand immediately confiscated and be liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. The ownership of fully-automatic hands, assault hands, ugly hands, or cop-killer gloves is expressly forbidden. : > : >-- : >Jason Gottlieb : >Homepage goodies: Japanese SDF info, USA : > gun control info, travellogues, and more! : >http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~zj5j-gttl : **** Armed and Safe(tm) **** : **** www.ivic.net/~ecr **** --- | "That'll make it hot for them!" - Guy Grand | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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Re: The spam thread
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 24 Jun 97 at 9:45, Jason William RENNIE wrote: > Anyway shall we let this thread die at this point ?? I've tried. But I am eternally pulled back in. Sometimes at the first post, sometimes later. As long as people have promiscuous mail boxes they will get spam, use a filter, use your delete key. Denial of service attacks are destructive and unproductive. Die, Spam thread, Die! Out, spot, out! Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: (408) 259-2795

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Bomb-making instructions....
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The latest crime for which Senator Diane Swinestein has earned the [CENSORED] is her "bomb-making instructions on the Internet are illegal" bill. But I have a question. Does this mean CNN will face prosecution if it publishes the transcripts of the McVeigh case? Keith Henson, an explosives enthusiast since the early 1960s, was describing to us last night at a Silicon Valley party just how accurate the instructions were in the transcripts of the McVeigh trial, as the experts pointed out the steps needed to make the liquid explosive "Astrolight" (or "Astrolite"). Keith pointed out that most of the "lay" reports had repeated some of the usual lay errors about ammonium nitrate and fuel oil bombs, but that the full court transcript "got it right" on the conversion of the precursors to the more effective liquid form. It was Keith who raised the issue of the Swinestein bill making publication of court transcripts a crime...sort of collides with the notion of open trials.... (This party was a regular plotting opportunity...we figured out just how big a Ryder truck has to be to hold the "ergs" needed to take down some targets that sorely need taking down...all in theory, you understand.) We need to hold a trial for this bitch. Then a quick trip to the firewall. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Comparing Cryptographic Key Sizes
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes. > Below is a explanation of the meaning of cryptographic key sizes which > started as an explanation I wrote for a journalist friend of mine, on > being asked about how relatively secure a system using DES and RSA > (SET) was as compared to netscapes export version of SSL. > It could use some criticism. If you are not that crypto aware, does > it make sense to you? If you are crypto aware, what do you think of > my off the cuff estimates of hardness? > > > 56 bit DES is probably roughly similar to 512 bit RSA in hardness to > break. This is way off. We used ~457,000 MIPS years to search half of the DES keyspace. Factoring a 512 bit modulus using the General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) would take about 28,000 MIPS years (see Schneier for the exact number - I don't have AC2 at hand) Lenstra has estimated that with 500,000 MIPS years, you should be able to factor a 600 bit modulus using GNFS, if your workstations had enough memory. [...] > About 10 years ago now Michael Wiener made a design for such a DES > breaking machine. He estimated it would cost $10,000,000 to build a > machine which would break a 56 bit DES encrypted message a few hours. > His machine was scalable, pay more money, break the key faster, pay > less take longer. The estimate was that could build one with enough > DES key searching units to break it in a day for $1,000,000. That was > 10 years ago. 10 years is a long time in the computer industry. > Nowadays you build the machine more cheaply as chip technology has > progressed, and computers are much faster per $. Estimates are around > $100,000 to build the machine (neglecting hardware engineers > consultancy fees). Go back and check the numbers - if you don't the journalists will. (I don't have this paper to hand either :-( ) The Wiener paper is much more recent (93?) , and the cost much lower (I think it was about $1M for HW and $500K for development costs, for a 3.5 hour machine). Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Re: Hettinga's e$yllogism
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Digital Commerce *is* Financial Cryptography, > Financial Cryptography *is* Strong Cryptography, > therefore, > Digital Commerce *is* Strong Cryptography. > and, therefore, > No Strong Cryptography, no Digital Commerce. Why can't escrowed ecash support digital commerce? Strong crypto with a government backdoor. That's what you're offered. Prove it can't work. Anon

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Child Porn 2 [JPG]
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is the same Time-Life child pornography encrypyted with the public keys of even more co-conspirators in the cypherpunks list child porno ring. Of course, you will all do an extra five years in prison for the use of encryption in the distribution of Time-Life child pornography. -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 MessageID: dPprVrWTzaklAcPs8B3n61dBuYrBHpvx hQCMAwQmfXmOCknRAQQApIAwz57cQ7Zrk08AtLeFwUezMdwPbODjge/mQcWVXmWo To8sHziT0Sk3qfpqBCncUHUgkVdSmS0hehLeaCgFW9yyXchKiI6AMWi+6LKPJta3 MBKRSlQLMJc9y00xmPbm03dhkIZ+SbyjvWvwQauwIgz3kO/jD3tzepN6Uop4p5qF AMwDunrblleXqAsBBf9c6A9RWOfUR/1k+4bhjaRrog9XsWG9oYMKOs0lDNOXne3I lqvZ+qAzJTRec0mCH4oDKqSZ/pBbfPmqyby1mNqWk1U+P1U1vhBq2f5IiQXo18Ru FNKG5R+r/y93OBkJLJspFs5bt8ncu8UM11c2NyOiu3NiP1FRVrvosZ9hF+MZFiZX 2mEgHlzH4v3HKZcm7I6FIM1gJ49Ejp7VmWvQdjVmOWPferA9jwYY+SjO/Hx6qrXe I+ORb1WJKXBT+eBVSvWFAIwDTlQtNdy3UjMBBACIGvfgleN4QfImOOyz03x2d2G6 LT5XVMLs+2wd2CLYeKdtBTSkg1oKO2Is9chYoxRvXfAOAY3aJwlvb80m4T9c84EZ riNEZ1CmZOMI7EXJmtwalsAWYcSipTtPdeRI8+eVag0kOWSGDJ4wNkUvts0hfUCa hXuAbtPg1OnJ5eFJnYUBBgNBRgRa9JX9kQEHzRCs7RBPhmO8NtQsWuOxPl3D6N8k 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2 1

CP uses for the PGP 5.0 source
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With the on-line availability of PGP 5.0 source code expected any day, perhaps the group should consider what CP goals can now be made practical. Hopefully, PGP will not object to CP uses. I submit the following as CP projects which could be substantially eased by the source code: EMAIL PLUG-INS PGP 5.0 contains some very good code examples for creating email plug-ins for Microsoft Exchange for Windows 95 and Windows NT 4.0, Microsoft Outlook for Windows 95 and Windows NT 4.0, Eudora Pro/Light for Windows 95, Windows NT 4.0, Macintosh, Claris Emailer for Mac only. For cross-platform ease, I suggest we tackle the Eudora emailers, which have a well defined API, first. 1. Remailer: One reason remailers haven't been as popular as we've hoped is the need to operate separate, sometime difficult to use, remailer client software. By integrating these and other functions into plug-ins, creation of persistant identities and integration with key generation and management can be simplified. 2. Digital postage: CPs can gain the high-ground in the battle for handling the SPAM problem by offering plug-ins which enforce restrictions on incoming mail using digital postage. Two postage approaches have been discussed on the CP lists: ecash and hashcash. I suggest that the plug-ins offer both d-postage forms. Hashcash is eligent in its simplicity and its lack of a required central clearing facility. Hascash-based d-postage could also seed the development of commercial distributed computing Net industry, as SPAMers elect to purchase hashcash rather than generating it themselves-the idea isn't to eliminate SPAM, just place it on similar economic footing with junk snailmail. Adam Back has already done a considerable amount of investigation of ways to implement hascash (See http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/hashcash/) ECash could really supply an economic shot in the arm for remailers, making possible commercial (read profitable) remailers. It will also offer a ready-made market for accountless ecash, which will be available soon. Jeremey Barrett's higher level ecash API should greatly simplify ecash integration. --Steve PGP mail preferred Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- I know not what instruments others may use, but as for me, give me Ecache or give me debt. SHOW ME THE DIGITS!

3 2

Re: New PGP signatures
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <Pine.SOL.3.96.970623055041.2746A-100000(a)sirius.infonex.com>, on 06/23/97 at 05:53 AM, Mark Grant <mark(a)unicorn.com> said: >Could I humbly request that people don't post the new (SHA?) PGP >signatures to the list for the time being as it's a pain in the ass for >those of us outside the US who don't yet have the ability to read them. >PGP 2.6.x error handling doesn't know what to do with them and it breaks >our mail-processing code. Hi Mark, You really need to modify your mail-processing code as you are going to see more and more of these. You should also start work on implementing the PGP/MIME RFC as you will be seeing more of these messages. Nothing personal but your code should not "break" on any data that is sent to it. PGP 2.6.x doen't have a problem with these signatures it just returns a error code and goes on it's way. - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBM660l49Co1n+aLhhAQHZEQP+MGX87jPWCO3VZMZG4Pt0R0sgFSSc6N+I 7/3w1QSxJomyd6jt9SUuyKsLMMC5UY7HCC71CHVyp2Aqm4N7Q8ratNC+WMxVPO3z 1DTNM4GYOnZmwdTMgowIPhb0Cfstd4Z+KXlr0jR5pE1Kni6+r3LBG7+jVv+Im6BY SlizRYaent0= =YBoc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

spam on this list
by Jason William RENNIE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NO i dont wish to post any, i just want to know if this list has spam sent to it ?? I started reciveing various pieces in the last couple of days and i'm trying to identify the source. thanx in advance, jason =8-]

2 1

Washington Post says McCain-Kerrey bill "raises red flags"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 22 Jun 1997 20:52:08 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Washington Post says McCain-Kerrey bill "raises red flags" The Washington Post has a long history of endorsing the Clinton administration's position on export controls of encryption products. On June 10, 1996 the paper editorialized that "national security and law enforcement questions remain too important to be sacrificed lightly." On July 27, 1996: "Congress should be exceedingly cautious about getting out ahead of administration concerns on controls." "Unbreakable codes on the loose strike us as a real danger, a legitimate reason for tight export controls," the Post said on October 4, 1996 -- worrying the White House wasn't strict enough -- and again last month. But even the Post couldn't quite stomach the McCain-Kerrey bill that the Senate Commerce committee approved last week. In an editorial today, the Post said: ...the McCain-Kerrey legislation goes the other way, seeking to expand such restrictions to cover most of the uses of encryption software in the United States. That proposal raises red flags even if you believe, as we do, that there are legitimate national security and law enforcement reasons for controlling the diffusion of such `robust' coding software overseas. Below I've attached five Washington Post editorials on encryption. Thanks to Alan Olsen, Peter Trei, and especially John Young for holding on to these editorials and sending them to me. -Declan --- Senate Commerce committee and McCain-Kerrey bill: http://www.jya.com/declan3.txt http://www.jya.com/declan2.txt Problems with SAFE and ProCODE: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1022,00.html Kerrey crypto-bill: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,931,00.html ------ Net Tangle on Privacy Sunday, June 22, 1997; Page C06 The Washington Post PITY THE senator or representative who still hasn't quite mastered the details of how the Internet works, or the difference between the World Wide Web and e-mail. On the Net-related issues that, by all indications, draw the most urgent public interest -- those relating to privacy protection -- there are now multiple clumps of competing bills, whose differences are both highly important and highly technical. Three of these involve different strategies to curb junk e-mail; two, diametrically opposed, concern encryption. All these bills are tangential, strictly speaking, to the basic concern expressed at hearings before the Federal Trade Commission: how to safeguard personal and sensitive data about yourself once it gets into the hands of institutions and third parties. (The commission itself is weighing whether to recommend such legislation based on what it heard.) But any of them could powerfully affect future privacy protection. A striking example is the newest bill on encryption, sponsored by Sens. Robert Kerrey and John McCain, which the Senate Commerce Committee on Thursday voted to adopt as a replacement for a long-standing proposal by Sen. Conrad Burns, dubbed Pro-CODE. Where the Burns bill would have lifted restrictions on the export of "uncrackable" encryption software abroad -- restrictions that the administration has fought to maintain for national security reasons -- the McCain-Kerrey legislation goes the other way, seeking to expand such restrictions to cover most of the uses of encryption software in the United States. That proposal raises red flags even if you believe, as we do, that there are legitimate national security and law enforcement reasons for controlling the diffusion of such `robust' coding software overseas. The bill, offered as a compromise between the administration's priorities and those of Congress, shows how difficult it is to square this particular circle. It would require users of domestic networks with any government funding (such as universities, many hospitals and government contractors) to deposit an extra "key" to their codes with a licensed "key management" authority -- with the licensing to be done by the government. Like the administration's international policy, this bill envisions the development of whole new government-regulated industries for key management, retrieval and authentication. This meets the needs of domestic law enforcement agencies, which could get the keys with an ordinary subpoena, but at a considerable cost to the consumer confidence that would be expected to drive a market in encryption software to begin with. What you think of these bills has a good deal to do with how you think the worlds of electronic commerce and networked communal life will develop -- and, of course, no one knows. Even the most enthusiastic boosters of the right to encryption concede that very few people actually use it yet. Electronic commerce itself has yet to take real shape. The main force shaping the Internet for now continues to be the perception -- not to mention fear -- of the all-too-likely prospect that anyone who wants to can snoop around in the stacks of your most private data, which are constantly accumulating in unknown files. ---------- The Washington Post, June 10, 1996, p. A18. Global Village Cops? What will be the long-term effect of Internet technologies on global law enforcement? The amazing story of Bill and Anna Young, a k a Leslie Rogge and Judy Kay Wilson, offers one possible scenario. The pseudonymous Youngs, residents of Guatemala who the FBI says have been on a decade-long run from U.S. justice since Mr. Rogge was convicted of a string of bank robberies and other offenses, turned themselves in to authorities after a neighbor recognized Mr. Rogge's face on the FBI home page's Most Wanted list. According to a story first told in the Guatemala Weekly, the person who recognized him was a newly Internet-wired 14-year-old. The vision of the future evoked by this story, of a world in which the familiar "global village" becomes a place not just of instant communication but of neighborly nosiness and where no one can just melt into the crowd, is reassuring and unnerving in about equal proportions. (What if it were a network of hit men or an authoritarian government seeking a dissident, rather than the FBI, making use of this powerful technology?) But it's also worth keeping in mind that, other than the romance of the technology, it doesn't represent that great an advance on current global media that have made celebrities or fugitives' faces familiar to a vast public -- just ask Salman Rushdie. The Rogge nabbing is the first that the FBI credits to its home page specifically, but TV's "America's Most Wanted" has scored similar coups. The impossibility of predicting the exact shape of these extensions of policing is relevant as well to a report that the National Research Council recently issued on another computer technology issue -- the vexed matter of whether to ease export controls on encryption software, which encodes information sent electronically so that only a user with a key can decipher it. The government until now has resisted lifting controls on "uncrackable" encryption software -- that is, codes that are too complex to be broken by brute force -- unless the industry agrees to deposit keys in an escrow arrangement with a third party so the government can seek and obtain a warrant to read encoded communications if necessary. Software makers, meanwhile, are pushing hard to have these restrictions eased. The research council, an arm of the generally neutral National Academy of Sciences, sought to bridge the gap between industry interests and such government agencies as the FBI and national security agencies, whose case, they say, is based largely on classified matter that can't be publicly discussed. Part of the report's conclusion, which favors the easing though not the abolition of current restrictions, is that wider use of encryption technology will actually *help* national security and law enforcement because more data, economic and otherwise, will be secure to begin with. But if the news of the changing terrain tells anything, it is that it is far too soon to base arguments on such a premise. Our own sense on encryption is that the national security and law enforcement questions remain too important to be sacrificed lightly, despite the considerable economic interests of the parties on the other side. But the world of Internet law enforcement is still taking shape. Whatever the public conclusion on encryption, the debate should not rest on any assumptions about what that shape will be. ----------- > The Washington Post, July 27, 1996, p. A22. > > > Speaking in Code on the Internet ... [Editorial] > > > The decibel level has been rising in the argument over how > much control the federal government should have over the > export of encryption technology. The Senate Commerce > Committee held hearings Thursday on a proposal dubbed > Pro-CODE (Promotion of Commerce On-line in the Digital Era) > that would lift current restrictions on exporting > encryption software above a certain level of complexity. > The move is opposed strongly by law enforcement and > national security authorities, who fear the consequences to > their tracking of terrorism or crime if uncrackable > cryptography becomes the global standard. > > > But encryption software -- which scrambles a person's > computer messages so no one can read them without a key -- > also is thought by many in the computer industry to be the > missing piece that's preventing customers from a full-scale > move to the Internet for banking and other confidential > transactions, rather than, as now, worrying about the > security of their data. They also see it as a market in > which the United States maintains a comfortable lead, one > that is threatened if domestic encryption makers can't sell > their products elsewhere. The makers argue that foreign > encryption software will rush in to fill the gap, doing > nothing about the uncrackability problem -- indeed, making > it worse. The administration in turn is pursuing a wider > international agreement to maintain controls on cryptology > export by all the industrialized nations and has been > putting pressure on its colleagues in the Organization for > Economic Cooperation and Development, which will rule on > the matter in a Paris meeting in September. > > > Administration officials, including FBI chief Louis Freeh, > have been pushing for an alternative policy of "voluntary > key escrow" -- encryption makers would deposit a key to the > code with a neutral third body before exporting the > products and could then have access to the codes only by > court order, as happens now with wiretapping. Mr. Freeh, > testifying at Thursday's hearing in favor of an optional > key escrow plan, noted that the point is not to prevent all > copies of uncrackable code from going abroad -- that's > clearly impossible -- but to prevent such high-level code > from becoming the international standard, with architecture > and transmission channels all unreadable to world > authorities. To software companies and Internet users who > have been clamoring for the right to encrypt as securely as > possible, Mr. Freeh and others argue, "the genie is not yet > out of the bottle" on "robust," meaning uncrackable, > encryption. > > > It's far from obvious to anyone that an optional escrow > plan really can prevent the growth of inaccessible > transmissions by international terrorists or criminals. > Encryption, if widely used, could conceivably ease some > privacy problems concerning who gets to see personal and > financial data on individuals -- though such data usually > are vulnerable to being dug out of storage rather than > intercepted in transmission. But neither is it clear that > the encryption enthusiasts' desire for free development > should take precedence over the tracking of terrorism. At > the very least, Congress should be exceedingly cautious > about getting out ahead of administration concerns on > controls that, once lifted, are hardly reversible. ---- The Washington Post, October 4, 1996, p. A22. Crypto Politics [Editorial] The Clinton administration once had a coherent, if unpopular, position on encryption software, the stuff that allows you to encode your email messages or other data so that no one can read it en route without a key. Now, in the wake of word that the president will sign an executive order, the position is no longer coherent, nor discernibly more popular with the high-tech audience it attempts to mollify. People and companies doing international financial business are highly interested in this kind of software, the more powerfully "uncrackable" the better. The U.S. software industry thinks there's a lot of money in it, especially if encryption becomes routine. The administration position till recently was that, much as U.S. software companies might profit from being able to market "uncrackable" encryption software freely, national security and law enforcement considerations dictated that such exports be controlled by license. Powerful encryption, like arms, could be dangerous in the hands of terrorists, rogue governments or international criminals. The software was classed as a munition; software above a certain uncrackability level could not be exported unless law enforcement authorities could get access somehow to the "key" after obtaining the proper warrants. Unbreakable codes on the loose strike us as a real danger, a legitimate reason for tight export controls. But if the administration really believes this, you'd think it would stick with steps that can plausibly meet the goal of control. Instead, trying to please, it has been splitting and splitting the difference between itself and the largely unmoved industry, which argues that no one will buy an encryption product that a government can decrypt at will. As with arms sales, the companies also argue that if they don't sell it, somebody else will, and that anyway it's far too late to fence off rogues. The national security people respond that there is still a "window," perhaps two years, in which they can prevent, if not all leaks of unauthorized crypto technology, at least its off-the-shelf use and wide adoption as the international standard. The administration initially proposed, then repeatedly refined, the concept of key "escrow" -- depositing a copy of the code with trusted third parties -- but never came up with a version the industry would accept. It commissioned a National Research Council report, which recommended a significant easing of restrictions. Now the president appears to have embraced a yet looser form of licensure upon declaration by a company that it will develop a plan within two years for key recovery. Also, the technology no longer will be considered munitions. What kind of plan? Nobody can quite say. What if the plans aren't acceptable? Licensing will revert to the old rule in two years. Will the security issue be moot by then? Probably. Barring some burst of clarity, one is left wondering whether the administration has compromised or caved, and what it now believes about the dangers of exporting uncrackable software. ---------- Showdown on Encryption Sunday, May 25 1997; Page C06 The Washington Post AFTER A YEAR'S rumbling, Congress seems ready to mount a direct challenge to the administration's position on encryption, the sticky issue of how to handle software that creates, for commercial use, codes too strong to break. The House Judiciary Committee the other day passed a bill dubbed Security and Freedom Through Encryption, or SAFE, which would undo existing curbs on the export of "uncrackable" encryption technology abroad without a license. The administration has fought to maintain those curbs against increasing pressure from the manufacturers of such software and from a loose but growing coalition of privacy and civil liberties groups. A similar bill is pending in the Senate. The administration maintains that the sellers of software capable of encrypting electronic messages to a complexity beyond ready cracking shouldn't sell it abroad -- or, if they do, should be prepared to deposit keys to the codes with trusted commercial third parties at home. Police or national security authorities could get these keys with a search warrant or court order, as in normal investigations, and a market would develop to provide the third-party service of holding them. This vision of a worldwide "key management" structure is a clever way to reconcile two otherwise contradictory desires: the desire of Internet users for absolute security and privacy in electronic transactions and the government's desire to prevent criminals and terrorists from making themselves impregnable to a degree never before seen. "Key management" does not, however, exist. And the administration has gone so far toward undercutting its own position -- saying key escrow should be voluntary, trying to accommodate industry with numerous exemptions, licensing uncrackable software separately for banks -- that it's not clear it ever will exist. Meanwhile, the once-obscure drive to make unlimited-strength cryptography available to all has picked up momentum -- and some odd allies. Phyllis Schlafly was among those who testified in favor of the SAFE bill, saying it would protect Americans from unprecedented government intrusion and the FBI reading their mail. Libertarian groups such as Americans for Tax Freedom are enthusiastic about the vision of a world where powerful, widely available encryption renders communications totally safe. The odd part is that there currently are no restrictions on use of uncrackable encryption software within this country. The software industry has argued that the export control makes for a de facto domestic curb, because it's too complicated to market a full-strength version for the domestic market and a weaker one for the foreign market. But this isn't a very persuasive argument, since most popular software programs exist in dozens of versions for different markets and in different languages. The real question is whether you believe this stuff poses a significant national security threat in the wrong hands. If you do -- and we think it irresponsible to assume otherwise -- then it's not enough to declare uncrackable privacy a civil right. You have to at least address the question of how to minimize intrusion into that right while preserving some ability to grapple with the potential danger. Neither the SAFE advocates in Congress nor the administration's voluntary escrow enthusiasts up to now have laid out that vision in a convincing way. ###

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Excerpts from New York and Georgia court decisions
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 22 Jun 1997 21:46:12 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Excerpts from New York and Georgia court decisions ---------- http://www.aclu.org/court/nycdadec.html ALA v. Pataki Decision Thus, as will be discussed in more detail below, the New York Act is concerned with interstate commerce and contravenes the Commerce Clause for three reasons. First, the Act represents an unconstitutional projection of New York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside New York. Second, the Act is invalid because although protecting children from indecent material is a legitimate and indisputably worthy subject of state legislation, the burdens on interstate commerce resulting from the Act clearly exceed any local benefit derived from it. Finally, the Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent 'legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether. Thus, the Commerce Clause ordains that only Congress can legislate in this area, subject, of course, to whatever limitations other provisions of the Constitution (such as the First Amendment) may require. [...] The inescapable conclusion is that the Internet represents an instrument of interstate commerce, albeit an innovative one; the novelty of the technology should not obscure the fact that regulation of the Internet impels traditional Commerce Clause considerations. The New York Act is therefore closely concerned with interstate commerce, and scrutiny of the Act under the Commerce Clause is entirely appropriate. As discussed in the following sections, the Act cannot survive such scrutiny, because it places an undue burden on interstate traffic, whether that traffic be in goods, services, or ideas. [...] The State vigorously argues that its low was designed to avoid the constitutional pitfalls presented by the CDA; however, the New York Act was clearly modelled on the CDA, and numerous provisions of the New York Act mirror their federal counterparts. [...] I believe any determination of plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge should therefore await the guidance to be provided by the Supreme Court's forthcoming opinion. ----------- http://www.efga.org/hb1630/preliminary_injunction.html AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF GEORGIA v. ZELL MILLER, et al., Defendants allege that the statute's purpose is fraud prevention, which the Court agrees is a compelling state interest. However, the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve that end and instead sweeps innocent, protected speech within its scope. Specifically, by its plain language the criminal prohibition applies regardless of whether a speaker has any intent to deceive or whether deception actually occurs. Therefore, it could apply to a wide range of transmissions which "falsely identify" the sender, but are not "fraudulent" within the specific meaning of the criminal code. [...] The Court concludes that the statute was not drafted with the precision necessary for laws regulating speech. On its face, the act prohibits such protected speech as the use of false identification to avoid social ostracism, to prevent discrimination and harassment, and to protect privacy, as well as the use of trade names or logos in non-commercial educational speech, news, and commentary--a prohibition with well-recognized first amendment problems. [...]

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Re: Bomb-making instructions....
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 22 Jun 97 at 20:32, Tim May wrote: >The latest crime for which Senator Diane Swinestein has earned the >[CENSORED] is her "bomb-making instructions on the Internet are illegal" >bill. > We need to hold a trial for this bitch. Then a quick trip to the > firewall. Tim: That's "Murderous, Boss Killing Bitch", please. Spam is free speech. Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: (408) 259-2795

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Re: Canarypunk: Jim Bell in a coalmine
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:38 PM 6/22/97 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Admittedly, this is a distraction from the most important thing, which is >writing code, but I bet that there are in fact cypherpunks-who-don't-code >in Bell's neighborhood, and not necessarily even Friends of Jim, who would >be happy to personally go see how Bell is doing and come back and tell us >what happened. Think of it as part of the feedback loop for net.freedom. A >trip into the coal mine with a canary cage. > >Yeah, I know. It's me making work for someone else. Nonetheless: Anyone out >there want to do this? ............................................................................ ..... I live about an hour's drive from Tacoma. I'm not too enthused about taking such a lengthy trip just to go see how Mr. Private Assassinations is doing, but - taking after your own methods, Robert - I'd be glad to do it in exchange for a trip to Anguilla next Feb. :>) (You know, it is true that having friends in times of stress, like when you're sitting in jail, is good for the soul, but on the other hand one must give credit to Jim for his having created his own situation. He did provoke the government types into suspicions about him and he must have known that distributing his AP ideas, containing such apparent potential for being translated into reality, would make him a grand target. When you do things like that, you ought to consider what you're going to do when "they" come after you. He afterall is quite aware of the atmosphere in which we live and how fragile is the relationship (if it can be called that) which civilians have with the local military saviors which daily protect us from ourselves.) Having said that, I'll consider the possibility, if visitors are allowed on weekends. Perhaps several cpunks could go (if anyone else around here interested? (Wei, Joel, I know you're just dying to go <g>)), if more than one visitor at a time is allowed . .. Blanc

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Re: Canarypunk: Jim Bell in a coalmine
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:38 PM 6/22/97 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Admittedly, this is a distraction from the most important thing, which is >writing code, but I bet that there are in fact cypherpunks-who-don't-code >in Bell's neighborhood, and not necessarily even Friends of Jim, who would >be happy to personally go see how Bell is doing and come back and tell us >what happened. Think of it as part of the feedback loop for net.freedom. A >trip into the coal mine with a canary cage. > >Yeah, I know. It's me making work for someone else. Nonetheless: Anyone out >there want to do this? ............................................................................ ..... I live about an hour's drive from Tacoma. I'm not too enthused about taking such a lengthy trip just to go see how Mr. Private Assassinations is doing, but - taking after your own methods, Robert - I'd be glad to do it in exchange for a trip to Anguilla next Feb. :>) (You know, it is true that having friends in times of stress, like when you're sitting in jail, is good for the soul, but on the other hand one must give credit to Jim for his having created his own situation. He did provoke the government types into suspicions about him and he must have known that distributing his AP ideas, containing such apparent potential for being translated into reality, would make him a grand target. When you do things like that, you ought to consider what you're going to do when "they" come after you. He afterall is quite aware of the atmosphere in which we live and how fragile is the relationship (if it can be called that) which civilians have with the local military saviors which daily protect us from ourselves.) Having said that, I'll consider the possibility, if visitors are allowed on weekends. Perhaps several cpunks could go (if anyone else around here interested? (Wei, Joel, I know you're just dying to go <g>)), if more than one visitor at a time is allowed . .. Blanc

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recoverability
by Lee Tien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Although there is still talks much about key escrow/mgmt/recovery, the policy on KMI recoverable products appears to be framed in terms of plaintext recovery. E.g., at a BXA crypto reg seminar, the handout used the following def'n: "Products which allow government officials to obtain, under proper legal authority and without the cooperation or knowledge of the user, the plaintext of the encrypted data and communications." Lee -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBM645jbk2KqHYSFEtEQKFIQCbBiazwaIWeWM28iLHOKIInzCj+nAAn3oj 9OddweX2M+fIa47cigevhiR1 =YuHD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: A better DES challenge
by Mike Duvos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matt Blaze <mab(a)research.att.com> writes: > I'm not a big fan of cipher ``challenges'' in which a prize > is awarded to the first person who discovers the key that > produces some plaintext/ciphertext pair. The effort > required to produce a solution tends to grossly overstate > the actual difficulty of searching the keyspace, since > invariably the winner uses the idle time on general-purpose > computers, which are poorly-optimized for use as keysearch > engines. Really. It appears that the DESCHALL frivolities actually enhanced the reputation of DES, fluffy press releases by C2 and Security Dynamics notwithstanding. > A more basic problem with challenges is that even when they > are solved they don't really provide convincing proof that > the keyspace was actually searched. For example, in the > recent 56-bit RSA DES challenge, RSA has no way to prove > that it didn't ``leak'' some hint about the solution to the > winner. (I hasten to point out that I'm not suggesting that > anything like this actually happened, only that a skeptic > might raise the possibility, against which RSA has no real > way to defend itself). This is a problem which I have been pondering in recent days. How would someone in the future demonstrate that they have broken DES, now that the RSA DES Challenge is behind us, and trusted parties offering to generate and keep secret ciphertext/plaintext pairs are no where to be found. It would seem to me that the best way to demonstrate that one has broken a block cipher without releasing ones algorithm would be to generate and publish some key collisions, in which a ciphertext/plaintext pair is mapped by more than one key. If one encrypts plaintext with a known key to generate ciphertext, cryptanalysis of the resulting ciphertext/plaintext pair for a key other than the one used to generate it should be comparable in difficulty to cryptanalysis of a ciphertext/plaintext pair provided by a trusted third party. The ability to generate such collisions at will clearly demonstrates that one can calculate keys from ciphertext/plaintext pairs. > A better challenge, then, would be one in which even the > challenger doesn't know the solution in advance (or would > have had to itself search the keyspace or otherwise > cryptanalyze the cipher in order to find it). For example, > a challenge for a one-way collision-intractable hash > function could simply ask for an example of a collision, or > could ask for the inversion of some well-structured output > (such as all zeros). A step in the right direction. We should develop ways of demonstrating cryptanalysis which do not require one person to solve a problem provided by another person without the possibility of collusion. [snip] > Recall that there are 2^56 DES keys that each select a > different permutation of the 2^64 codebook entries. We > expect that there's about a 1/2^8 chance that there exists a > DES key that converts any given plaintext block to any given > ciphertext block. > My challenge is to find a key such that a ciphertext block > of the form <XXXXXXXX> decrypts to a plaintext block of the > form <YYYYYYYY>, where X and Y represent any fixed eight-bit > byte value repeated across each of the eight bytes of the > block. > Observe that I'm actually posing 2^16 different challenge > plaintext/ciphertext pairs, each with about 1/2^8 > probability of having a solution, where groups of 2^8 > challenges can be searched for simultaneously. Each > challenge may have no solution key, exactly one solution > key, or more than one solution key, but it is very likely > that there is at least one solution key to at least one of > them (in fact, one could expect to find about 2^8 solutions > overall, assuming DES produces good pseudorandom > permutations). I like this. It is somewhat cleaner than the key collision trick suggested above. > I will award a grand prize of 56 bits (seven (7) US > dollars) to the first person to provide a solution key. (The > challenge ends when first key is found). While the prize > money is admittedly trivial (this is out of my own pocket, > after all), I hope it will serve as ``seed money'' that > encourages others to add their own prizes to a growing pot. Let me know when the money reaches $10k. > Of course, I cannot be completely sure whether there exist > any solutions at all. If there were to be no solutions at all, given the alleged pseudorandomness of DES, this would probably be an even more interesting result than solving the problem posed. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ enoch(a)zipcon.com $ via Finger $

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Your surfing days are over
by Shift Control 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This week, in the Seaside Issue of Shift Control... "We bade farewell to the snail collectors and moved down to the beach. The tide was out, revealing a broad stretch of seaweed-covered stones. At the tide's edge a man and a woman were harvesting winkles, "for tonight's tea". We continued to the next bay, half expecting to find someone digging for maggots or collecting slugs, but instead we bumped into a naked bloke. He seemed more surprised than us and dashed off into the sea." - Paul Robinson on a weekend away at the seaside. "The good news from the English Tourist Board (ETB) is that the seaside amusement industry is booming: last year we took 18.7 million seaside holidays and spent £4.2bn. The coast is still the most popular domestic holiday destination, possibly because, as Anna Crombie of the ETB points out, 'you can still have fun whatever the weather, which is not always true of our continental competitors'. Who needs the sun when you can visit Mr Blobby's Bubble Kingdom?" - Rebecca Fox provides the ultimate guide to British beaches. "As soon as we got to the sand my father sprinted down to the sea, gritted his teeth and dived in. We stood there unimpressed, looking for the nearest café. Dad waved, beckoning us to join him. With the sun having just gone in and the wind picking up, none of us were going to comply." - Leo Hickman on growing up at the seaside. Plus new fiction, the story of a bionic bee and the chance to see your own music and movie reviews published on the net. ShiftControl: waiting for you NOW at http://www.shiftcontrol.com __________________________________________ Shift Control is produced by the Guardian's New Media Lab with help from Boddingtons and Stella Artois Dry To unsubscribe from this mailing list send e-mail to shiftcontrol-request(a)nml.guardian.co.uk with the following text in the body of the mail message: unsubscribe

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