December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:47 AM -0800 5/20/97, Peter Trei wrote: >What I posted was an idea for a POLL, nothing more. There was no >suggestion that of any kind of action or incentive - no advocacy >of murder, no anonymous cash, no payoffs, nothing. This is NOT >'implementing a variant of assassination politics', and I take >strong exception to your implication that I would support such >a thing. All Bell ever proposed was a kind of POLL. A series of bets. There is very little distinction. In fact, were a POLL to be used as the scoreboarding mechanism, any number of clever derivatives of the same poll could be used to implement AP. (To flesh this out, imagine Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas posting the poll the way they post racing results...others could then take bets on who would appear on the poll. If "Janet Vegas" led the poll of "Living Persons Desired to be Dead," and I knew approximately when Janet Vegas were to die--similarities with AP intentional--then I could make a fair amount by betting that Janet Vegas would soon disappear from that list of "Living Persons Desired to be Dead" poll. My point was not that you were supporting the kiling of anyone, Peter, but that your playing around with a variant--and I maintain that this is what your POLL is--of Bell's variant is essentially just what Bell was doing. (I happen to think it's a lot cleaner and more efficient to have primary market, using untraceable contact and payment systems to contract for murders, and that Bell's AP was clumsy and inefficient and would probably have outcomes far from what he speculated might be the outcome.) > >I really hate it when you misread, misconstrue, and misquote >other people. You really seem to have a very tenuous love of truth >and accuracy when falsehood will serve your purpose better (if >you think that sounds like the tactics of a certain large >organization you dislike, you're right.) As I said, I wasn't claiming you supported AP or killings in general. I was noting that your playing with related ideas, which surely you must admit bear several similarities to AP, is just what Bell was doing. >Let's take just one paragraph from your latest screed. Can you back >up all or even most of the points in it? I don't think so. You wrote: > >>The United States of America is the world's leading terrorist state. > >Matter of opinion. I suspect that Libya, Iraq, and Iran are better >candidates. If you include internal terrorism, add China, North >Korea, and many others ahead of the US. As you say, a matter of opinon. Next point. > >>From mining harbors in countries with democratically elected >>governments... > >I've got only a quibble with this one. We did mine Managua, ie one >harbor in one country. While this was clearly unacceptable behaviour, >it does demonstrate your tendency to play fast and loose with >numbers. It seems you agree with me on this. Next point. >>...to financing the blowing up of airliners by dissident >>groups > >Really? Which ones? Be specific. Which airlines, which flights? >What were the circumstances in each case? You're using plurals >again, so you'd better have multiple instances. Cuban Airlines, for example, by CIA-funded Cuban guerillas. Cf. the URL http://www.cubaweb.cu/noticias/violence.html, one of many describing the details. "The U.S. government has taken almost no action against Cuban emigree terrorists who operate freely from U.S. territory, despite the fact that that country pretends to condemn terrorism around the world. Further, when Cuban defectors have hijacked planes and boats and/or killed people in the process, U.S. has refused to return them to Cuba for prosecution and, in fact, have released them with at most a gentle verbal slap. "The most awful terrorist action occurred on October 6, 1976, when a bomb planted aboard a "Cubana Airlines" plane exploted after the passenger jet took off from Barbados, killing all 73 people aboard -57 Cubans (including the entire fencing team), 11 Guyanese and 5 North Koreans." The CIA also engineered the bomb timers Terpil and Wilson, either CIA agents or CIA renegades, or both (you decide), used in several airliner destructions. (Why was the CIA building altitude-sensing bomb fuzes which could be disguised in radios? Only one guess allowed.) (It's also been reported that Abu Abbas has worked for the Agency, and that much of the Bekaa Valley/Syrian/Lebanese drug trade is connected with these areas. No time to write about it here, but do searches on BCCI, Abbas, Castle Bank, Terpil, Wilson, Bekaa, etc.) >>...to assassinating dozens of leaders of countries the USA wished >>to shape in different directions, the USA is Terror State Numero Uno. > >Dozens? As in 12+? Again, which ones? When? Any since the (Carter?) >exec order forbidding attacks against heads of state? It would take too long to find all the URLs and supporting evidence for a precise count, but here are some of the _countries_ and leaders in which the U.S. has been fairly convincingly linked to the killings: * Iran/Mossadegh * Algeria/Ben Bella * Congo/Lamumba (and the guy who came before or after) * Viet Nam, Diem, and other regional leaders * Cuba, several attempts on Castro, well-documented (they got Che Guevara) * Chile, Allende * several other smaller African nations, whose leaders were assassinated in what are believed to be CIA and DIA actions (or where CIA, etc. provided support) As to Carter's order, so? Do we know, or even have reason to believe, that Reagan, Bush, and even Clinton have not had government officials of even heads of state in other countries whacked? (Noriega claims, fairly convincingly, that he holed up in the Catholic hospital (or church, whatever) because he understood the desire of the U.S. was to kill him and not have to have a very public trial in the U.S. This is not a proved claim, but the "smoking gun" on these sorts of things is rarely found. Many analysts have stated that avoiding taking Noriega alive was a goal of "Operation Just Cause.") >Tim, can you back up your words with facts, or are your recent >posts "... full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."? Well, it seems we agreed the first "claim" was a matter of opinion, the second one was as I stated it, the third one was evidenced by the Cuban airliner blown up by CIA-funded terrorists (excuse me, "freedom fighters"), and possibly other examples in the Mideast. Which leaves the last point, about assassinations of foreign leaders. Counting all the killings of leaders, I believe the body count for U.S.-sponsored or -encouraged killings will exceed a dozen. Maybe a couple of dozen over the past several decades. In any case, if you want me to taken the "s" out of "dozens," as I cannot document 24 such kilings, I will be happy to. (Here's one analysis, of many, of the Lamumba situation: "CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT: Le Mumba, the first democratically elected leader in all of Africa, was aligned with the Soviet Union, and in the post-independent chaos was murdered, if not with CIA help, many believed with CIA blessing. Urquhart argues that the politics of the Cold War severely retarded Zaire's political development. "SIR BRIAN URQUHART: These were proxy Cold War battles, and, of course, the Congo, now Zaire, originally got into trouble on an East-West split because the West of the United States backed President Kazabubu and the East and Soviet Union backed the prime minister, who was Patrice LaMumba." Add to this list the others I mentioned. I'd say it's fine tribute to a democartic people's republic like the USA. >There are sufficient *real* problems with US policy that >your exaggerations are counter-productive. > I stand by what I wrote. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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LSE UK crypto politics conference
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I went to the conference in London on Monday organised by PI (Privacy Intl.) and GILC (Global Internet Liberty Campaign.) Speakers were DTI representatives, Whit Diffie, Phil Zimmermann, Ross Anderson, Carl Ellison, IBM UK representative, a few people from LSE (London School of Economics, who hosted the conference). I don't take notes, but here's a list of points I considered interesting. If you want details on any issues I can give more detail as required. If anyone else reading went and did take notes they might be able to attribute quotes a little more accurately. I understand there's supposed to be an audio transcript on the web http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/dti might be a good place to look. Government Presentation of proposal 1) David Hendon and Nigel Hickson from DTI presented the DTIs arguments. They argued that this is a green paper only, the government has changed, the document was partly the views of the previous government and partly the views of the DTI. This I viewed as an attempt to deflect criticisms, as they could not specify what has changed, and were not planning to change the document. (The new government have not looked at the issue at all). The labour party had a much more reasonable policy they published before they got in power; but it remains to be seen whether they will stick to this or whether the CESG/GCHQ will lobby them to adopt GAK/TTPs etc., which are in the CESGs interests. They claimed to not want to escrow signature keys, but only to escrow encryption keys. (The wording in the document clearly states that they wish to escrow all keys as a condition of being a TTP). They said they had many comments on this issue. (Clearly the only use for escrowing signature keys is to allow forgeries. Why would the government want to forge messages from citizens? To provide law enforcement access they only need access to private encryption keys.) The DTI said much of licensing requirements for TTPs were modelled after banking regulations. Architectural and Technical 2) Ross Anderson gave the example of the health service's experience with CESG/GCHQ foisting flawed cryptography solution CASM on it (complete with key escrow and secret algorithm Red Pike). The BMA (British Medical Assoc), and even DoH (Dept of Health) rejected this `offer'. Ross is a computer security advisor to the BMA. He also debunked many of the lies spread by GAK proponents, and gave a potted history of the behind the scenes GAK activities in the UK and Europe. He also said that CASM was now the laughing stock of Europe in the crypto community, and that in response the CESG had allocated a new project manager and given CASM a cosmetic name change to CLOUD COVER. 3) Whit Diffie argued about the importance of privacy in the information society. Explained how PK crypto removed the previous problems with centralised key distribution services. 4) Phil Zimmermann gave his usual talk about the ethical case for free use of crypto. Civil rights workers, resistance fighters against governments with poor civil rights records, etc. Also made the point that the backdoor into crypto the DTI appeared to be pushing would allow the current government to abuse it's power to stay in government. Legal and Commercial 5) Peter Sommer, LSE made some points on legal topics digital signature legislation, etc. 6) Carl Ellison, Cybercash argued against the centralised trust model, and against X509. Arguing instead for distributed trust models particulary Rivest's SDSI and his own work on distributed trust. Carl argued that trust should represent permissions, and be administered by the interested parties. (eg your bank gives you a key with permission to draw money from your bank account, not some government licensed TTP). 7) IBM (in the form of Peter Dare, IBM UK) sold out to GAK. Peter Dare's presentation started with a list of things he liked about the DTI proposal, then a few minor criticisms (very respectfully put), and as a punchline to his talk presenting IBM GAKware (forget the product name) and his talk finished with a sales pitch for this product. At the end of which Whit Diffie shouted out from the audience can Carl Ellison have equal time for a cybercash sales pitch! International 8) John Dryden representing the OECD gave a presentation of the OECD guidelines. (T-shirt and jeans odd the rest of the government and business types wore suits.) He explained the guidelines as a significant relaxation. The guideline referring to key escrow was changed to a `may' escrow keys rather than a `should' escrow keys. Said most of the time spent during the OECD SOGIS discussions was spent arguing about key escrow. He considered the guidelines a significant step forward. The guidelines are non-binding recommendations. He said 28 countries signed up, which should indicate that their countries representatives found the guidelines consistent with national laws. 9) Alistair Kelman, visiting position at LSE Made the point (as several others had) that a general principle should be that trust should mirror existing user trust relationships. People do not trust government, nor the sort of large organisations the DTI is clearly envisaging as suitable TTPs. He argued that GPs (General Practitioners, family doctors) would be suitable candidates as trusted members of the local community. Kelman also seemed to be arguing that keys should handed to the user, and not generated by the user. I queried him about this afterwards, as it is clearly a bad security model, and he said he considered it a usability issue, generating keys being too difficult for the user. I don't agree, the usability is a matter to be solved by good software, not by centralising key generation. Civil Rights and Privacy 10) Simon Davies, PI argued that case for commonality of interests between business and privacy issues. 11) David Banisar, EPIC talked about the history of the US clipper series, and raised the topic of digital telephony bill (where the government requested access to first 1% and then reduced simultaneous wiretaps). Following up from this someone from the floor claimed that the telephone networks are tappable without the phone company (BT, British Telecom's) cooperation. Indeed the person making this claim (who claimed comprehensive experience and knowledge of phone routing hardware) said that BT would not even be aware that the tap had taken place. Several others in the audience confirmed this was the case. Whit Diffie said that he had not heard this claim, and that it was not the case to his knowledge in the US. The person making the claim said that he knew the switches used in the US were the same (and quoted the switch model), and so he didn't see why not. The question was raised as to why digital telephony was necessary at all with this type of phone switch being used in the US. Law Enforcement 12) The guy from NCIS (National Criminal Intelligence Service) didn't turn up because he had to go to hospital due to an eye problem. The chair, Prof Ian Angell, LSE suggested this might have been due to looking through too many keyholes :-) Panel and Open Discussion Panel: Carl Ellison, legal advisor to GLIC (forget name), Nigel Hickson DTI, someone from TIS (?) who spoke too quitely. Chair was Caspar Bowden, Scientists for Labour. Most of the panel session consisted of arguments directed at the DTI and questions for Nigel Hickson representing the DTI. Hickson had made jokes about the hostility he was expecting. He appeared quite competent at avoiding answering questions directly where this suited him. Each panelist was given the opportunity to summarise their position. Nigel Hickson claimed the main motivation for the proposal was to encourage user and business confidence in digital signatures for business purposes, and thereby to promote electronic commerce. He used this as justification for the banning of un-licensed TTPs. Several comments from the floor that it would be better to let the market decide, and to allow unlicensed certification authorities, key servers etc to continue unmolested, and in competition with GAKked government licensed services. Hickson also claimed key escrow was a small part of their consideration. (I'm sure it's true that this is the part they wish to downplay as this is the part which causes the majority of resistance.) The question was raised as to whether the DTI understood that the TTP system could be trivially bypassed by the criminals it was supposedly designed to catch. An example given was that anyone wishing to bypass could use the sigature key helpfully certified by the TTP to authenticate non escrowed keys they generated outside the TTP system. The point that there were many other subliminal channels was raised also. Nigel Hickson acknowledged this, but said in defence that some criminals are stupid, that criminals must talk to non-criminals. Someone put it to Hickson "What is the worst thing that could possibly happen if the government did nothing?" ie what if the government didn't legislate anything, ie why doesn't the government get the fuck out of the way so that business can get on with commerce unimpeded. Several business people put it to the DTI that they didn't need any `help', and that the regulations had held up electronic commerce for too long already. Several people argued that business is most interested in authentication, and not in confidentiality. So for business purposes (which what after all the DTI claim is the main reason for the paper, and the DTI being after all the `Department of Trade and Industry' and having a mandate to further the interests of UK businesses), they could achieve what they wanted without bringing escrow into the argument at all, as they have acknowledged that they will now not be requiring copies of secret part of signature keys. People argued against the high cost of becoming a TTP. The point was raised that it should be SME (Small to Medium-sized Enterprises) which are encouraged in electronic commerce. Also that many internet innovations start as small or even one man consultancies. Several asked whether the paper should be re-written as a result of comments before being presented to the new government, as the comments if listened to would remove most of the current content. Also the question was asked as to whether the deadline for comments could be extended beyond end of May. No substantive answer was given to either of these two questions. My conclusions The DTI didn't really clarify their position much, most of the contentious stuff (mandatory licensing, key escrow, financial barriers to becoming a TTP) there were no substantive replies to from the DTI, other than that they were collating the comments. They said they would present the Labour science minister/labour government with the green paper unmodified together with the comments. (And one presumes a few spooks from GCHQ/CESG will get the opportunity to present the four horsemen/spook special interest perspective). The only clear statement I noticed the DTI spokespersons make was that they wouldn't hold the private halves of signature keys. On the positive side, the labour statement on encryption prior to coming to office was no where near as draconian as the DTI paper. Anyway, we'll see. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Poison Pill Defense
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hear from anonymous correspondents that the following technique has been successfully deployed among some militia members and cypherpunks who fear raids on their private property. Apparently the technique was originally invented by a biotech lab that the FDA was planning to shut down in an uncivil manner when Kessler first came to power. The lab was never raided. Preliminary: choose a suitable viral agent. This may range from a short, severe flu to Eubola, depending on the level of deterrence desired and safety precautions you have available. Long-latency debilitating diseases have also been suggested as an especially effective deterrent that puts the property owner at less risk of detection. The property owner must obtain both the agent and an effective vaccine. Step one: immunize household members against this agent. Step two: create "tamper avenging" packages around the house. Make them very suspicious looking (gun lockers, boxes labeled "Danger: Toxic Materials", file folders labeled "Assassination Schedule for December", and so on). Don't put them where guests, pets, and so on can get to them, but in places where the thugs will look. Step two (detail): the tamper avenging package contains an invisible film of the viral agent in fluid adsorbed to a suitable carrier. The carrier is a clear, thin film of sponge-like material that produces a fine aerosol of virus containing fluid drops when disturbed. When the package is opened and disturbed, the aerosol quickly shoots and and spreads throughout several surrounding cubic meters. Persons unprotected by immunization or breathing masks are contaminated with high probability. I've heard unconfirmed rumors of a special sponge material that lasts for days, infecting a variety of government personnel and contractors who come in contact with the evidence, and in some cases, depending on the particular vector, people they in turn come in intimate contact with. Obviously I have not provided enough useful information in this post to propery implement this technique. Don't try this at home without the help of paid professionals (who I hear are making a killing now with the recent spate of raids against militias, patriot groups, cypherpunks, and so on). Give me Liberty or Give me Death; Johnny Appleseed

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Re: Digital signatures
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Embedded in Tim C[retin] May's babblings are preposterous lies, wild distortions, child pornography (both as graphic descriptions and in JPEG format), ethnic slurs, and racial epithets. o/ Tim C[retin] May <| / >

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BOUNCE cypherpunks@Algebra.COM: Admin request of type /^\s*which\s+\S+\s*$/i at line 6 (fwd)
by cpunks＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com ----- >From owner-cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM Sun May 18 16:04:30 1997 Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 16:04:27 -0500 From: owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com Message-Id: <199705182104.QAA32347(a)manifold.algebra.com> To: owner-cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM Subject: BOUNCE cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM: Admin request of type /^\s*w-h-i--ch\s+\S+\s*$/i at line 6 >From cpunks(a)manifold.algebra.com Sun May 18 16:04:17 1997 Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> Received: (from root@localhost) by manifold.algebra.com (8.8.5/8.8.2) with UUCP id QAA32329 for cypherpunks+incoming-toad(a)algebra.com; Sun, 18 May 1997 16:04:13 -0500 Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by www.video-collage.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id RAA24795 for <cypherpunks+incoming-toad(a)algebra.com>; Sun, 18 May 1997 17:04:05 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id NAA26718 for cypherpunks-unedited-outgoing; Sun, 18 May 1997 13:57:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kizmiaz.dis.org (se7en(a)kizmiaz.dis.org [206.14.78.160]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id NAA26713 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Sun, 18 May 1997 13:57:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from se7en@localhost) by kizmiaz.dis.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id NAA26241; Sun, 18 May 1997 13:58:05 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 18 May 1997 13:58:04 -0700 (PDT) From: se7en <se7en(a)dis.org> To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> Subject: Hacked, Trashed and Out of Beer Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.91.970518135516.26216A-100000(a)kizmiaz.dis.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Well, I finally managed to catch up on all the email from this list, and managed to also get all of the hacked web sites thus far up on my web page at http://www.dis.org/se7en w-h-i-c-h includes: Amnesty International Central Intelligence Agency East Timor, Indonesia Kriegsman Fur NASA U.K. Labour Party U.S. Air Force U.S. Department of Justice se7en ----- End of forwarded message from owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com -----

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Jim Bell's legal defense fund
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi there, I do not know Jim Bell personally and am not sure how rich he is, but suspect that he might be in need of some funds in order to be properly represented by good attorneys. How about setting up his legal defense fund? igor

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Lethality, guns, knives, & reality
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 13:05:12 -0800 > From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Re: SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS > Also, the "boiling a frog slowly" metaphor comes to mind...most people have > little idea how the vise has tightened. And in the case of "gun rights," > most Americans are apparently of the opinion that their lives will be safer > if all guns are banned. > > (Which may be true, if _all_ guns were banned. The last time I looked at the FBI stats on homicide deaths by beatings with clubs, hands, and feet were much larger than homicides by gun or knife. trivial dribble: Nifty thing I found out today is that the cleaner that I use on my whiteboard at work burns quite rapidly. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: The USA is the world's biggest terrorist state (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 16:49:34 -0400 (edt) > From: Ryan Anderson <randerso(a)ece.eng.wayne.edu> > On Tue, 20 May 1997, Peter Trei wrote: > > >...to assassinating dozens of leaders of countries the USA wished > > >to shape in different directions, the USA is Terror State Numero Uno. > > > > Dozens? As in 12+? Again, which ones? When? Any since the (Carter?) > > exec order forbidding attacks against heads of state? > > Ford, I believe. I would be interested in someones itemized list regarding this matter. In particular I would be interested in the paper-trail of proof used in making the assertions. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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update.322 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From physnews(a)aip.org Tue May 20 14:20:29 1997 Date: Tue, 20 May 97 09:14:36 EDT From: physnews(a)aip.org (AIP listserver) Message-Id: <9705201314.AA25712(a)aip.org> To: physnews-mailing(a)aip.org Subject: update.322 PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News Number 322 May 20, 1997 by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben Stein IN QUANTUM CASCADE LASERS electrons are put in a barrel, as it were, and sent over a series of waterfalls. Instead of recombining with holes to create photons, as in conventional semiconductor lasers (one injected electron resulting in one photon), electrons in a QC laser pass through a succession of closely coordinated quantum wells---each well consisting of a sandwich of semiconductor layers---unloading energy as they go, in the form of photons (one electron creating 25 photons, one for each stage in the stack). QC lasers are unique in that the output light wavelength is determined not by semiconductor chemistry (the type of materials used) but by the thickness and spacing of the layers (sometimes only a few atoms thick). Cascade lasers, first developed in 1994 by Federico Capasso and Jerome Faist at Bell Labs, can operate in the mid infrared wavelength region (4- 12 microns). This technologically important range is currently being served primarily by low-power lasers which can only work at low temperatures. By contrast, Bell Labs' new QC laser can not only operate at room temperature with high output power (60 mW, with even higher power evident in recent experiments) but can also be tuned to a single wavelength through the use of gratings within the laser. These features will allow scientists in the field to carry out remote chemical sensing (of, say, pollutants present at parts-per-billion levels) by selectively exciting, and detecting, specific chemical species. (Jerome Faist et al., Applied Physics Letters, 19 May 1997; and a talk at this week's Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics in Baltimore.) ZERO-DIMENSIONAL METALS are studied by physicists at Harvard. In general, reducing the dimensionality of an object makes its quantum nature more manifest. In a semiconductor, for example, confining mobile electrons to a plane (2D) or a wire (1D) or a dot (0D) enforces an ever sharper limit on the allowed energies, and this can be exploited in producing compact and highly controllable electronic devices. The Harvard scientists (contact Dan Ralph, now at Cornell, ralph(a)msc.cornell.edu) have succeeded in attaching leads to 10-nm-sized metal particles; this allows them to apply a gate voltage which turns the tiny particle into a transistor. Unlike semiconductor dots, the metal nanoparticle can be made magnetic or superconducting, allowing forces inside the sample to be analyzed. Indeed, with this speck of aluminum, the discrete quantum-mechanical spectrum of electrons in a metal have been measured more accurately than ever before. One can watch the electron spectrum even as magnetic fields break up the superconducting state. (D.C. Ralph et al., upcoming in Physical Review Letters, 26 May 1997.) GAMMA RAY BURSTERS HAVE REVEALED THEMSELVES at optical and radio wavelengths. Astronomers have sought to establish whether these once-only gamma sources were near at hand (in the halo of our galaxy) or resident in distant galaxies. On May 8 the BeppoSAX satellite spotted a new GRB at gamma wavelengths. Alert Caltech scientists soon viewed the same object with the Palomar and Keck optical telescopes, establishing from the redshift that the object was some billions of light years away. Meanwhile, the Very Large Array radio telescope has also glimpsed the object. As of last week the visible signal was decreasing and the radio signal increasing in intensity. (Press releases from Caltech (May 14) and VLA (May 15).)

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CABLE DESCRAMBLER...Build Cheap & Easy!
by 53807121＠earthlink.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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encryption laws
by Allan Thompson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key, and order you to tell them the key ? If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ? -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAyw57X8AAAEEANs79QzyCIwCXMUnbiFTK5l8lJBXKdZqGAHxwgbDOuOGBSJB HBxlfycbSqevTPmKRTL4yHD1yCmAbkTrZtZuP1DDWeStaujf3M8lh6RlU4lOLU4Z IAu12Y9i4IgyBQkM03d/TZfAaXwUKQu2APBNz8D6ZT53xVzJVy80opqUWHzJAAUR tB9BbGxhbiBUaG9tcHNvbiA8YXRjMTJAd2VsbC5jb20+iQCVAwUQLDsrvS80opqU WHzJAQEvWgQAvx/DdLFB5Jk4BOiSD5QX8qDbAb40L1rgNAi3R/1kSYnBjli/ncDR msyJKoviG0Ppl0JSxfX4SpgoKOsS1jpz5yFFmBAPCPJ5VC0cjwhgItdnyHnAcj99 FdrcVhF9G2oJkeoqgXkt3Hy6YWhGhxI4Wvcrv6eAC1yKZ8FA3xltuWA= =o+Ud -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I think that the Government is trying to make an example of Mr. Bell. I think that much of the charges reported in the news are flase. Here is why... 1) They claim that Jim was actively trying to disrupt 911 service and poison the Bull Run water supply. These are non-political targets. Jim only thinks in political targets. (I remember trying to get him to come to grips with the idea that such a system as AP would not be used just for government types. That is would be used against anyone who had enemies. Could not even make a dent...) 2) The warrent is sealed, yet the media is reporting all sorts of things about the case. Where is the information coming from? Sounds like planted information to keep people from complaining too much when they send him up the river for a few years... (Whether he survives long in custody is another story. I would be willing to bet that if he does not "cooperate" that he will have some sort of "accident" while in government hands.) 3) The suspected crimes list keeps changing. How many times has the "official" story changed? Each time it gets more and more lurid. (And many of the crimes are ones that get used against damn near every case the government tries against someone who threatens the security of the state. Belief starts to wear a bit thin after a while...) Of course, i do not expect anything like the truth from standing in the way of a conviction... "Paranoia strikes deep... Into your soul it will creep... It starts when you're always afraid... Step out of line, the man come, and take you away..." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBM4J5L+QCP3v30CeZAQGzywf9HoiiBqO3vbuYDtHreTk7IPKP6ZUIZX4c 5Wn54ip08cJ3pRKi+xWFhuniVve5GaenMoMbWMvVH2AQ8jVl+xGpnjGyACr0dnFK icJkwXX59/v+whYyu9R7lWba9qjqCq6XAUkyZog28F23mVGqKYz+QRPqYQF2C9AE KN7WCXd1C38m6q1YtpqgaZZ7i3+9wDjkYTm+2J4wogKzxnhSWZchhslI0V0QoySe 0zf83U8nHWQtE0d4c8nzmdRV+wTBB3Aj5Q9WVOYFSukRfn9n1pBC00aZ3Pec8BLC AeRkbbG6pKprTOfxWzd+s5T5KlWZZXo9667n7xfi/wH9LNtKNGHfEg== =vP8r -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- | "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time." | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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encryption laws (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1993 23:04:39 -0400 > From: Allan Thompson <sparky12(a)earthlink.net> > Subject: encryption laws > Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key, > > and order you to tell them the key ? > If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ? If they had reasonable cause to believe you had knowledge of the key and were refusing to divulge it under direct order of the court you would be held in contempt until you were very old and gray. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

4 3

The Bell Plan
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- John Young wrote: > The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1: > An affidavit says a Vancouver man arrested Friday talked of > sabotaging Portland's 9-1-1 computer and Bull Run water > > Vancouver, Wash. -- A Vancouver man arrested Friday by Internal > Revenue agents discussed sabotaging the computers in Portland's > 9-1-1 center and talked about using a botulism toxin to contaminate > the Bull Run water supply, a federal agent said Monday. After reading this news article and a variety of posts on the cypherpunks list (especially by Tim May and Paul Bradley), I have decided that I cannot in good conscence allow Jim Bell's persecution for exercising his basic human right to free speech to pass by without taking personal action to support him. "Then they came for the CypherPunks, and nobody spoke up..." - Jonathan Accordingly, I am hereby starting a thread on the cypherpunks list to discuss "the possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents of a federal building" to kill its computers, and the feasability of using other methods to accomplish the same end. If Jim Bell is guilty of the charges against him, then I am already guilty of the same types of charges, as are many other cypherpunks. I undoubtedly have some of the same files/posts on my computer as the ones that the government will use as proof of Jim Bell's guilt. My action in this regard is for the purpose of protesting the governments persecution of its citizens, Jim Bell specifically, and to act to counter the benefits that they expect to gain by doing so. (CypherPunk Translation~~"I'm pissing in the government's face.") In keeping with what I see as a cypherpunk frame of mind, I am posting this via an anonymous remailer, but I am also digitally signing it. I am not hiding my identity, but merely taking action to prevent my public statement from being used to unjustly persecute me. In effect, I am telling the U.S. government that in exercising one of my basic human rights I feel it is necessary to protect myself legally from the government persecution of its citizens. I am also telling them that I will not "go quietly into the night" in the face of censorship, loss of privacy, and oppression. I will "route around" the "damage" that the government's policies and legislation cause, doing so in a non-violent manner. (Hopefully, but not realistically, they will recognize that if they manage to block all means for me to non-violently route around the abrogation of my rights as a free human being, that my only alternatives will be conflict or enslavement.) Anyway, in thinking about the possibilities surrounding the introduction of carbon fibers into a federal building, my first thought was in regard to whether or not carbon fibers are actually known to cause damage to hard drives. Does anyone know where this idea comes from and whether it has any known basis in fact? If there is some basis for believing it to be a possibility, then it would not take much effort to test it out. One could get an old computer for a petty sum and use it to test the results of introducing the fibers through the power supply. TruthMonger #1 "They will get my cryptography when they pry it from my cold, dead algorithms." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM4KR+6ozBjzmqceZAQHeRQQAiI6CSKzPgioO5UdacoNbtKPyTvhHOuNB /kkCx1UuYiVOaIw48oVX7Gj1bIcMMkAiM+q6q+SOZkEq+hNUdriISpY5/aKA39Yp ejNKl2McRK7WrP+TQPNx9hwxFrW93JrqjhSPhZsgkVNtIHG/wE1RpdWJzPiIOeP2 /Q9TTHmRoRU= =x+P/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 5.0 beta mQCNAzMs140AAAEEAL1CAoB5pd97hIOoT6L0v05Ov8nw0unf0db6NXZ91EJAyq9p DoPGJl7Z6m5McIsNI2DrCEEt7KYdt0ZIGcqqK2gmCePYI0oQOFj+jznI3jKXg1k2 R+ngk+cUn21EfrNXFGPk1Tuc1/3Qib6cX6BZRJvvz1FNYNt/zqozBjzmqceZAAUR tBtUb3RvIDx0b3RvQHNrLnN5bXBhdGljby5jYT6JAJUCBRAzPR6jIokaQ0EgfuUB ARyWA/9P1UVMvBAGXY488f/Nvs1CZnp/a0SNxELXfpMyJz/Vdd2RuahRYoc50Cbp F1/QOd4PZeEW2aNT/shxfm3Q9zpxGzyFgy//tEXdw2aedzdT4oMOgDBqMrzc2LfN 8zWqF5cWJLASIqwbrIkmyZR6LUCxmE79WmgRlQGAHfMwwC3WLYkAlQMFEDOCfw+w X4yQZvuMZQEBhuYEAJW2pN2aj1m7972GkQvUVBeenWrMqKXNyHF/73+YGZsLLo79 ApWR1ROm2RgxXJQeHSrUolXhxpkjHe9DJ5GwrsV7m97HfwvM32Vw/32U4T1jyeez VvBqJQ417UxxYS2QSQZIyLcVojFEJvh/kQ2NFXwTPJ1BscPn4/KnT6DD0u5ciQCV AwUQM4J+6pfboLn8NWjNAQGTigQAnrFZ8OiAguWqi1LsClKo0t9y+Ly98EPnpBt2 FgQN9/Z8PSZjPqEn9AJk7Z5TBhGJNXBmkULiuNA9zvGTsRM0S7Oi6/WFUcL9rio6 gMsxTnDythGaFa5YDQXgXtFxqcjsojGhe922KFnVi4xxatO9vm9Zo3JaNAK8zvg2 rIrd7VQ= =MuiR -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Why I think Jim Bell is getting railroaded
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:25 PM 5/20/97 -0700, you wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >I think that the Government is trying to make an example of Mr. Bell. I >think >that much of the charges reported in the news are flase. ^^^^^ I meant "false". Dyslexia. Name for it by ask! --- | "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time." | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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Re: Anonymous remailers: A call to arms wanted
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: misc.survivalism, alt.cypherpunks) In article <3382463a.1158385(a)news.nr.infi.net>, wjs(a)nr.infi.net wrote: > Please, wackos, set up an alt.* group for your drivel. It is the > idiots like you you have the media and the general populace believing > that all of us are just like you. > > Thanks to you, I have to be very careful about who I talk to about > "certain subjects", and my wife thinks I am paranoid for taking what I > view as reasonable precautions. > > I know I don't speak for everyone on the group, but I also know I'm > hardly alone. GO AWAY! Anonymous remailers protect speakers from retaliation. The Founders used anonymity, as the pseudonymous writings in the Federalist Papers show. Granted, some anonymous posts are drivel, some are even illegal. So? The government is attempting to get anonymous remailers shut down, is proposing restrictions on strong cryptography, and is trying to make it look as though anyone supporting these things is a kind of right-wing militia member crazy. If you don't _like_ something, some opinion, either ignore it or write a rebuttal. But don't play their game by saying there's something basically _wrong_ with anonymous remailers. --Tim May -- There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 14 May 1997, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: I think Vulis needs each of us to send ten copies of this back to him. > Tim May's mother attempted to pro-choice the unwanted > Graham-John Bullers by fishing with a coat hanger in her giant > cunt, but failed miserably to pull the rabbit and > succeeded only in scraping out the contents of little > Timmy's fetal cranium (not much to begin with). > > (_) _____ (_) > /O O\ Graham-John Bullers > ! I ! > ! \___/ ! > \_____/ > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Graham-John Bullers Modulator of alt.2600.modulated ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ email : real(a)freenet.edmonton.ab.ca : ab756(a)freenet.toronto.on.ca ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~real/index.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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The Bell Plan
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- John Young wrote: > The Oregonian, May 20, 1997, Metro Section P-1: > An affidavit says a Vancouver man arrested Friday talked of > sabotaging Portland's 9-1-1 computer and Bull Run water > > Vancouver, Wash. -- A Vancouver man arrested Friday by Internal > Revenue agents discussed sabotaging the computers in Portland's > 9-1-1 center and talked about using a botulism toxin to contaminate > the Bull Run water supply, a federal agent said Monday. After reading this news article and a variety of posts on the cypherpunks list (especially by Tim May and Paul Bradley), I have decided that I cannot in good conscious allow Jim Bell's persecution for exercising his basic human right to free speech to pass by without taking personal action to support him. "Then they came for the CypherPunks, and nobody spoke up..." - Jonathan Accordingly, I am hereby starting a thread on the cypherpunks list to discuss "the possibility of putting the fibers down the air vents of a federal building" to kill its computers, and the feasability of using other methods to accomplish the same end. If Jim Bell is guilty of the charges against him, then I am already guilty of the same types of charges, as are many other cypherpunks. I undoubtedly have some of the same files/posts on my computer as the ones that the government will use as proof of Jim Bell's guilt. My action in this regard is for the purpose of protesting the governments persecution of its citizens, Jim Bell specifically, and to act to counter the benefits that they expect to gain by doing so. (CypherPunk Translation~~"I'm pissing in the government's face.") In keeping with what I see as a cypherpunk frame of mind, I am posting this via an anonymous remailer, but I am also digitally signing it. I am not hiding my identity, but merely taking action to prevent my public statement from being used to unjustly persecute me. In effect, I am telling the U.S. government that in exercising one of my basic human rights I feel it is necessary to protect myself legally from the government persecution of its citizens. I am also telling them that I will not "go quietly into the night" in the face of censorship, loss of privacy, and oppression. I will "route around" the "damage" that the government's policies and legislation cause, doing so in a non-violent manner. (Hopefully, but not realistically, they will recognize that if they manage to block all means for me to non-violently route around the abrogation of my rights as a free human being, that my only alternatives will be conflict or enslavement.) Anyway, in thinking about the possibilities surrounding the introduction of carbon fibers into a federal building, my first thought was in regard to whether or not carbon fibers are actually known to cause damage to hard drives. Does anyone know where this idea comes from and whether it has any known basis in fact? If there is some basis for believing it to be a possibility, then it would not take much effort to test it out. One could get an old computer for a petty sum and use it to test the results of introducing the fibers through the power supply. TruthMonger #1 "They will get my cryptography when they pry it from my cold, dead algorithms." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM4KR+6ozBjzmqceZAQHeRQQAiI6CSKzPgioO5UdacoNbtKPyTvhHOuNB /kkCx1UuYiVOaIw48oVX7Gj1bIcMMkAiM+q6q+SOZkEq+hNUdriISpY5/aKA39Yp ejNKl2McRK7WrP+TQPNx9hwxFrW93JrqjhSPhZsgkVNtIHG/wE1RpdWJzPiIOeP2 /Q9TTHmRoRU= =x+P/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 5.0 beta mQCNAzMs140AAAEEAL1CAoB5pd97hIOoT6L0v05Ov8nw0unf0db6NXZ91EJAyq9p DoPGJl7Z6m5McIsNI2DrCEEt7KYdt0ZIGcqqK2gmCePYI0oQOFj+jznI3jKXg1k2 R+ngk+cUn21EfrNXFGPk1Tuc1/3Qib6cX6BZRJvvz1FNYNt/zqozBjzmqceZAAUR tBtUb3RvIDx0b3RvQHNrLnN5bXBhdGljby5jYT6JAJUCBRAzPR6jIokaQ0EgfuUB ARyWA/9P1UVMvBAGXY488f/Nvs1CZnp/a0SNxELXfpMyJz/Vdd2RuahRYoc50Cbp F1/QOd4PZeEW2aNT/shxfm3Q9zpxGzyFgy//tEXdw2aedzdT4oMOgDBqMrzc2LfN 8zWqF5cWJLASIqwbrIkmyZR6LUCxmE79WmgRlQGAHfMwwC3WLYkAlQMFEDOCfw+w X4yQZvuMZQEBhuYEAJW2pN2aj1m7972GkQvUVBeenWrMqKXNyHF/73+YGZsLLo79 ApWR1ROm2RgxXJQeHSrUolXhxpkjHe9DJ5GwrsV7m97HfwvM32Vw/32U4T1jyeez VvBqJQ417UxxYS2QSQZIyLcVojFEJvh/kQ2NFXwTPJ1BscPn4/KnT6DD0u5ciQCV AwUQM4J+6pfboLn8NWjNAQGTigQAnrFZ8OiAguWqi1LsClKo0t9y+Ly98EPnpBt2 FgQN9/Z8PSZjPqEn9AJk7Z5TBhGJNXBmkULiuNA9zvGTsRM0S7Oi6/WFUcL9rio6 gMsxTnDythGaFa5YDQXgXtFxqcjsojGhe922KFnVi4xxatO9vm9Zo3JaNAK8zvg2 rIrd7VQ= =MuiR -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem forNext Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: Jack Oswald <joswald(a)rpkusa.com> To: "'joswald(a)rpkusa.com'" <joswald(a)rpkusa.com>, "'maujacca(a)iprolink.ch'" <maujacca(a)iprolink.ch> Subject: Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 18:41:20 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Also see recent press coverage in Infoworld: RPK announces deal for fast crypto with Swiss consortium http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?97059.wrpk.htm SET 2.0 on the way http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayArchive.pl?/97/16/t04-16.1.htm PRESS RELEASE For Release May 19, 1997 RPK, Inc.: Jack Oswald, +1 408.479.7874, joswald(a)rpkusa.com, http://www.rpk.co.nz ADESA, Inc.: Maurice Jaccard,+41 22.910.29.14, maujacca(a)iprolink.ch Swiss Consortium Chooses RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem for Next Generation Wireless Electronic Transactions Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc. introduce HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor San Francisco, CA - RPK, Inc. announced today that a consortium of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) and ADESA, Inc., a Swiss application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) design firm have chosen the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem to provide strong cryptographic security in a next generation wireless electronic transactions application. At the same time, EPFL and ADESA unveiled HAWK a new generation cryptography-enhanced microprocessor specifically designed for use in high speed/low power embedded applications. "The RPK encryption technology won the design review after an extensive evaluation of all existing cryptosystems based on well known and understood cryptographic techniques," said Maurice Jaccard, Managing Director of ADESA, Inc. "With RPK there are no compromises. We get uncompromised security, high speed and low cost of implementation." "RPK is a strong encryption technology based on well know and trusted cryptographic techniques," said Jack Oswald, President and CEO of RPK Inc. "Having RPK chosen by the Swiss for this breakthrough electronic-commerce application is the strongest endorsement we could possibly achieve for the RPK technology." Wireless Electronic Transactions Application The collaboration of RPK, EPFL and ADESA has resulted in a prototype application that promises to become the "wallet of the future". This new wireless electronic transaction application may take the form of a credit card, a watch or a key chain and will sport features analogous to the leather wallets used today by billions of people worldwide. Early designs of the system allow the user to withdraw and hold cash in multiple currencies, as well as, purchase and hold vouchers for hotels, planes and car rentals all through the use of wireless communications technology. Officials in charge of the project envision that such devices could also become a personal key chain for gaining access to motor vehicles, offices and dwellings, in addition to traditional credit card uses. ADESA concluded that performance of the RPK implementation in the prototype far exceeded existing smart card implementations based on the RSA and other algorithms. The RPK technology performs the necessary encryption functions in less than 10 milliseconds using an 823-bit key compared to the best performing RSA-based equivalents that require greater than 100 milliseconds to perform the same type of function using a much weaker 512-bit key. The application is not limited to 823-bit keys. The design of the system, based on the new HAWK processor is flexible and can accommodate and process various sized keys, smaller or larger than 823 bits based on downloadable parameters. ADESA officials explained that the simplicity of the RPK algorithm makes it much simpler to implement than the popular RSA approach. It was RPK's simplicity, offering a much faster and cheaper solution while providing even higher security, that drove the choice over RSA for this application. About the RPK Fast Public Key Cryptosystem RPK is a relatively new public key cryptosystem that is based on mathematics widely used in cryptography today. It was designed to be immediately commercially viable without the years of study that a new area of mathematics normally requires, such as the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC). The source of the security for RPK is the same as that of Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a widely used and well studied cryptographic technique. RPK offers real advantages for high speed networking, SmartCard, wireless communication applications as well as high volume software processes such as credit card transactions. RPK has at its core an invention called a Mixture Generator. In the preferred implementation, three fairly long linear feedback shift registers are used. This state machine has two modes of operation. One that uses the shift registers for exponentiation and the other as a generator of a random stream of bits used in a combining phase for the actual encryption. Effectively, RPK allows for the amortization of two "costly" exponentiations over the entire length of a message because the core engine is used to initially establish a secure state of the machine and then switches modes to perform very high speed encryption. This has been referred to as a paradigm shift where the operation of encryption does not require the costly calculations that an RSA or even an ECC implementation would require for each block of data that is about the size of the key. This mechanism can also be implemented in silicon quite efficiently such that at high strength it is much cheaper to produce than alternative technologies. Finally, it is also possible to create a Mixture Generator that is made up of Elliptic Curve groups which would provide a similarly speedy and efficient initialization mode that could still produce high speed encryption as noted above. About the HAWK VLSI Crypto Processor The HAWK VLSI cryptography-enhanced processor is the result of more than three years of research and development conducted at the EPFL in Lausanne, Switzerland in the area of high speed compression and encryption. The HAWK processor will benefit most cryptography implementations but is particularly well suited for use with RPK. "The HAWK processor is the most innovative approach that we have seen yet for implementing cryptographic processes in silicon," said Bill Raike, Chief Technology Officer for RPK Inc. and inventor of the RPK fast public key cryptosystem. "HAWK breaks the barrier for high speed, low cost, low power and high strength encryption for embedded systems." Background RPK, Inc. is a supplier of next generation fast public key encryption technology. RPK was invented and originally patented in New Zealand. The company is therefore unaffected by restrictive U.S. export rules. RPK has been successfully exported to virtually all countries of the world at high strength. The company's headquarters are based in San Francisco, California, USA, with an offshore research and development center located outside of Auckland, New Zealand. http://www.rpk.co.nz ADESA, Inc. is a leading ASIC design firm based in Geneva, Switzerland with expertise in embedded and cryptographic applications. EPFL is a leading teaching and research technical institute in Lausanne, Switzerland. The school is known for its work in advanced processor design. *** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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New FinCEN Rules
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FinCEN has published today in the Federal Register three inter-related proposals for new rules for the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations: 1. Changes in the scope and type of transactions to be regulated, including, say, micro payments and and electronic transactions such as stored value cards. 2. Changes in the reporting requirements for suspicious transactions and the types of institutions to be regulated, including "money services establishments." 3. Changes in requirements for reporting currency transactions, and setting a new floor at $750 (as reported recently in the news). http://jya.com/fc052197.htm (79K) http://jya.com/fc052197-2.htm (69K) http://jya.com/fc052197-3.htm (63K)

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Mil-LE Forensic Tools
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the NTI Web site, http://www.secure-data.com Free downloads: Forensic Tools The FILTER Forensic Tool: This program is used to remove binary (non alpha-numeric) characters from computer data. This program has been used internationally by military and law enforcement agencies for years and was donated to the law enforcement community by one of our founders back in 1991. Once a file has been processed with this program the content can be printed and viewed with more traditional types of programs, e.g. word processors. This program should not be confused with NTI's intelligent filter program. ... The NTIDOC Forensic Tool: This program is used to essentially take an electronic snap shot of files and subdirectories that have previously been identified to have some evidentiary value. It is a documentation tool. The program automatically creates documentation that can easily be printed, viewed or merged into forensic reports. The original program entitled DOC has been used for years by military and law enforcement computer specialists and has previously been donated for that use by the founders of NTI. ... The SPACES Security Review Tool: This program is very simple. It creates one or more files that contain nothing but spaces. To be exact, every file created by this program will contain 10,000 spaces. Such output is ideal in the evaluation of encryption patterns to determine security weakness. Our forensic training courses and cryptography courses cover this concept in detail. MICRO-ID Computer Theft Prevention Software: This software is used to mark computer hard disk drives with computer ownership information. Once a computer has been marked it can be identified by police should it be recovered as stolen property. The program that reads the ownership information is called COP-ONLY and as the name implies the program is only distributed to local, county and state law enforcement agencies. ... ----------

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Rogue Key Warning
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TruthMonger wrote: > In keeping with what I see as a cypherpunk frame of mind, I am > posting this via an anonymous remailer, but I am also digitally > signing it. I am not hiding my identity, but merely taking > action to prevent my public statement from being used to unjustly > persecute me. The PGP public key included with the file for identification purposes has a verifying signature that can corrupt your PGP 5.0 keyring file if you use the "Get Selected Key" option to get that particular verifying key and add it to your keyring. It crashes the program. The offending key shows up as "Unavailable, 0xFC3568CD" in the PGP 5.0 list of verifying signatures for the key. The key included in the file causes no problems with the program when added to the keyring as long as you don't use the program to retreive the offending verification key and add it to your keyring. > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 5.0 beta > Charset: noconv > > iQCVAwUBM4KR+6ozBjzmqceZAQHeRQQAiI6CSKzPgioO5UdacoNbtKPyTvhHOuNB > /kkCx1UuYiVOaIw48oVX7Gj1bIcMMkAiM+q6q+SOZkEq+hNUdriISpY5/aKA39Yp > ejNKl2McRK7WrP+TQPNx9hwxFrW93JrqjhSPhZsgkVNtIHG/wE1RpdWJzPiIOeP2 > /Q9TTHmRoRU= > =x+P/ > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- > Version: 5.0 beta > > mQCNAzMs140AAAEEAL1CAoB5pd97hIOoT6L0v05Ov8nw0unf0db6NXZ91EJAyq9p > DoPGJl7Z6m5McIsNI2DrCEEt7KYdt0ZIGcqqK2gmCePYI0oQOFj+jznI3jKXg1k2 > R+ngk+cUn21EfrNXFGPk1Tuc1/3Qib6cX6BZRJvvz1FNYNt/zqozBjzmqceZAAUR > tBtUb3RvIDx0b3RvQHNrLnN5bXBhdGljby5jYT6JAJUCBRAzPR6jIokaQ0EgfuUB > ARyWA/9P1UVMvBAGXY488f/Nvs1CZnp/a0SNxELXfpMyJz/Vdd2RuahRYoc50Cbp > F1/QOd4PZeEW2aNT/shxfm3Q9zpxGzyFgy//tEXdw2aedzdT4oMOgDBqMrzc2LfN > 8zWqF5cWJLASIqwbrIkmyZR6LUCxmE79WmgRlQGAHfMwwC3WLYkAlQMFEDOCfw+w > X4yQZvuMZQEBhuYEAJW2pN2aj1m7972GkQvUVBeenWrMqKXNyHF/73+YGZsLLo79 > ApWR1ROm2RgxXJQeHSrUolXhxpkjHe9DJ5GwrsV7m97HfwvM32Vw/32U4T1jyeez > VvBqJQ417UxxYS2QSQZIyLcVojFEJvh/kQ2NFXwTPJ1BscPn4/KnT6DD0u5ciQCV > AwUQM4J+6pfboLn8NWjNAQGTigQAnrFZ8OiAguWqi1LsClKo0t9y+Ly98EPnpBt2 > FgQN9/Z8PSZjPqEn9AJk7Z5TBhGJNXBmkULiuNA9zvGTsRM0S7Oi6/WFUcL9rio6 > gMsxTnDythGaFa5YDQXgXtFxqcjsojGhe922KFnVi4xxatO9vm9Zo3JaNAK8zvg2 > rIrd7VQ= > =MuiR > -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Mailing List
by Bose 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Put me on your mailing list, please.

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Re: encryption laws
by Steffen Zahn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 15 Jul 1993, Allan Thompson wrote: > Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key, > and order you to tell them the key ? > If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ? How about claiming that you used a OTP and then revealing the key? Or should I say a key? Regards Steffen -- home email: domain: berlin.snafu.de, user: zahn To send email to me combine user@domain above to construct my address. Use of my address for unsolicited commercial advertising is forbidden.

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Key Recovery War
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of news reports on the Key Recovery critique by Blaze et al from NYT and C|Net: http://jya.com/krnews.htm Both cite Reinsch of BXA's counter-critique. And another report on Sybase getting BXA approval for export of 56-bit crypto without key recovery. However, it's only for data storage not communication. The story also reports that Sybase will be allowed to export 128-bit crypto with a key recovery plan. http://jya.com/krnews2.txt And, baiting another barb, Senator Kerrey has entered the outline of his crypto bill in the Congressional Record, along with a statement on natsec and commerce and privacy need: http://jya.com/kerrey3.txt So the Administration seems to be tickling the market, sending up balloons, wet fingering the air, pulling head out, and so forth, to see who might be induced to succumb to the strategem of bait-and-bribe, trot-line eager minnows of ga-ga commerce in the national interest, ahem, like those survivalist national labs, Bell Labs, Lincoln Labs, Mitres, SAICs, and, their patrons at National Security councils, departments of commerce, defense, state, energy, justice, et al. Tim and Blanc are right, it's no holds barred Dual-Use Civil-National Security War for the nation's goodies, no matter what fur's feigned to outfox the hounds and poachers and encroachers. It would be swell if the NLs truly competed with industry, but not likely with all those federal advisory groups eyeing and spying and lying each other.

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