December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

How to download our REMOVE (500,000 entries) list
by delete＠netchem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Sir/Madam, We got your email address from list(a)netchem.com. Our software might have accidently mixed the email addresses of those who sent email to list(a)netchem.com. with the email addresses of bulk emailers. If this the case, please email to delete(a)netchem.com and you will never be bothered by us again but still be able to contribute to list(a)netchem.com. We are compiling a list of people who hate to receive junk email. We will send you the list periodically. Please do not even think about adding the REMOVE list to your mass email list. Almost everyone on the list will find your IP address and will complain to us and to your upstream service providers. To to be eligible to receive the REMOVE list, please send a blank email to add(a)netchem.com with your email address as the subject. We request a human to receive the REMOVE list. We are working with many Internet service providers to filter junk email by sender's name, sender's domain and sender's IP address. (very easy to do with sendmail). If you honor our REMOVE list, we will not add your name to the filtering list. Otherwise, your mass email will be blocked immediately by many Internet service provider. You can switch providers but it take time and you also have to pay your providers. We can update the filtering list for many Internet service providers in a few seconds. To help others and in return to help yourself, please send your own REMOVE list to add(a)netchem.com. Sincerely, Jerry ------------------------------------------------- Jerry Wang, PhD, Chemechanics, Inc. http://www.netchem.com, mailto:jerryw@netchem.com -------------------------------------------------

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Re: David Friedman and assassination politics
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 00:36 4/20/97 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >These ideas is of course not new to cypherpunks. We've been talking about >them for years. But these ideas are slowly infiltrating the DC body >politic. Assassination politics, here we come -- right, Jim? Want to give >a speech at Cato? I'd be proud to do it. Even after everything that's happened so far. Strike that; ESPECIALLY after everything that's happened so far! The way I see it, they're going to have to deal with this issue eventually, and it's possible that it won't be obvious to them that libertarianism and AP mix. Indeed, I think they MUST mix; we have no choice in the matter. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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pgpmail45.exe
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Quick question for any Win 95 pgpmail45 users: Is pgpmail45 a front-end for PGP or is it the actual PGP-program made as a plug-in for Eudora and Netscape? (i.e. if you'd install pgpmail45, do you need to have PGP 2.6.2/2.6.3i installed before?) Also, what do you think of pgpmail45? Would it be easy for newcomers? Please reply privately... Thanks already in advance. Ciao Harka -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBM1ks3jltEBIEF0MBAQEflgf+J1lqCQ1g9YEo/wukOquBu+aGBsO2ixDh LehzXE2Y3hOFO4/ae6wpfrkJb6tKvwFMAOSmCQHI8xlFZD2Dt21t3val7CAWLNuI izr76Iu4htMZYSnX0dclN1Fn9Nd4EGgjmRYysWJMYRhAKJTu/N32/fSkgynzERtJ c9dxTtDkKXA0TBHG+Qv/kscd/tx5Y/r0HGojm8euh2GtSDORC1s47ZUFUXPzq4Ay njwVrKN6ldJMm2nw2MRq0bVurQVhqS4SyRjLzfLMoPfK60yiDTolfVS1wK1Xq7eG KLM3qG9/SILWViwOAV3N0UZI84i6ikK0m9jx/nq4DoA6iTP5dzW3RQ== =WB4T -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Epilogue to WebWorld
by Bubba Rom Dos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Militarily Critical Technologies
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:37 PM 4/20/97 GMT+0200, you wrote: >> Unique Equipment: Computers of 10,000 CTP, or greater, > >Pardon my igorance: What is CTP? >Who is the author of that list? > CTP is an acronym for Composite Theoretical Performance, a definition of computer capability used in the Export Administration Regulations. See EAR Section 740.7 Computers (CTP) at: http://jya.com/740.htm The US Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, is the author of the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL). See attribution at: http://jya.com/mctl08.htm This should not be contrued to mean that I'm not also ignorant of what I quote and quack about weird lists of holy-shit technology.

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Re: SSL weakness affecting links from pa
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>| That would only work until someone abuses it. People could create web >| robots to run around selling referers and several gigabytes of >| worthless cookie space. Worthless, because nobody cares about the web >| browsing habits of J. Random Robot, and they certainly don't want to >| blow $50 e-bucks on the bot's repeated visits. > > Thats true, but can they avoid it? I'm considering writing a >database pollution bot, which runs around, claiming to be Mozilla or >IE, and randomly following a link once per minute. Why? Database >pollution. If there are a few thousand of these randomly collecing >links and creating arbitrary (or perhaps biased) viewing habbits in >the databases of the advertisers, then their individual data becomes >worth less. They'll need to actively solicit peoples permission to >collect data before doing so, to avoid people polluting their >databases. > > Similarly, putting a randomly generated email address in those >sign up fields produces pollution in the data used by spammers, which >costs them (and no one else) money. If you run your own site, you can >even bit bucket the email, trading their bandwidth for yours, and >making them think they're delivering more junk email than they are. > >Adam Now that's the CP spirit! Whenever you wish to influence policy, follow the money. --Steve

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Re: David Friedman and assassination politics
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:13 4/20/97 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Jim, >For the record: I doubt everyone agrees with your "libertarianism is >intertwined with assassination politics" line... I suggest that one can >believe in minimal government and other libertarian mainstays without >seeing a need to kill off those whom we dislike, be they IRS agents or >surly supermarket clerks. >-Declan Sure, they can BELIEVE in those things without seeing the need, etc, but then again they can believe in the tooth fairy and Santa Claus. Their position would be overly optimistic, in my opinion. I think a more realistic way to phrase it is this: "If a society is sufficiently defective so as to contain those flaws (ones which could have been corrected using AP), that society will also contain flaws which make it impossible to be called libertarian." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Nietzsche and Crypto Anarchy (fwd)
by snow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I forwarded Mr. May's post to a buddy of mine, Ronald Carrier, who is getting his Piled Higher and Deeper in Continental Philosophy. I asked for comments, and recieved permission to forward his comments to the list. Here it is: Forwarded message: > From rcarrier(a)suba.com Sat Apr 19 18:02:57 1997 > From: "Ronald M. Carrier" <rcarrier(a)suba.com> > Good afternoon. > Thanks for forwarding this to me. I've taken a look at it, and it seems > to me to be a good introductory indication of what Nietzsche was up to. > There are just three points on which I'd like to offer a bit of > clarification. > > (1) Nietzsche as "anti-systematic" thinker: this is something that is > also referred to when Nietzsche is called a "perspectival" thinker. > Nietzsche thinks that thinking was an activity that is ultimately in the > service of life, where "life" is a process of discovering and developing > one's capacities for acting to the fullest. (And on this understanding > of life, thinking would itself be one of these capacities for acting.) > For Nietzsche, to develop a system is to develop a perspective, and so to > develop a certain way of living. Indeed, he regards systems primarily as > _symptoms_ of various ways of living. > > What he dislikes about systems is that they are perspectives that are, so > to speak, monopolistic--they are ways of thinking (and, in the end, ways > of living) to which everyone must submit themselves and which deny that > there are other ways of thinking and living that may be better suited for > someone. Nietzsche is anti-system in that he thinks that life is best > served if one is able to develop in oneself the capacity for multiple > perspectives, multiple ways of thinking and living. Nietzsche himself > attempts to do this in his own writing--hence the aphoristic style of > which he was fond. (This is not to say that Nietzsche was not capable of > developing a sustained argument--_On_the_Genealogy_of_Morals_ does > precisely this.) > > For Nietzsche, thinking best serves life and is symptomatic of life at > its best (i.e. a life that is active and deals creatively with the > circumstances that chance throws up for it, rather than one that is > reactive and tries to minimize the role of chance and change in living) > if it is the interplay of as many different perspectives as one can handle. > > (2) Nietzsche and evolution: I think it's good that the author pointed > out the connections that can be made between Nietzsche and contemporary > evolutionary biology. Nietzsche did not think much of Darwin, but this > is not so much because he disagreed with what Darwin wrote (I'm not sure > whether he had read Darwin himself or not) as because he disagreed with > what others tended to make of what Darwin wrote (or what they supposed he > wrote). Nietzsche disagrees, not with Darwin's notion of natural > selection, but with the popular notion of evolution (a notion which > Darwin did not himself employ in his works). > > "Evolution" presupposes that what organisms there are and what they are > like is something that is predetermined and that inexorably unfolds > across time. Natural selection, even in Darwin, is incompatible with > evolution in this sense because natural selection posits chance and > change as both ineliminable and necessary to the process of speciation. > And as I pointed out above, Nietzsche thinks that chance and change are > ineliminable from life and necessary for the development of life at its > best. "Evolution" also involves the idea that there is some one best way > of life that is the unavoidable outcome of evolution, namely whatever way > of being human that the "evolutionary" thinker thinks is best. This is > for Nietzsche a reactive way of thinking. > > But while Nietzsche's way of thinking is compatible with contemporary > evolutionary biology, I think it's misleading to claim that his > understanding of life is "biological." Nietzsche thinks that biology > plays an ineliminable and necessary part in life, but he also thinks that > life is more than just a matter of biology. (Nietzsche was suspicious of > science because he thought that it too aspired to be a system in the > sense of a monopolistic perspective. In other words, he disliked scientism.) > > (3) Authoritarian v. libertarian: The author claims that these are > contradictory positions in Nietzsche. I don't think they are. They > would be contradictory if Nietzsche held that everybody was equally > capable of attaining to life at its best. Nietzsche is _very_ clear in > his denial of this. He thinks that reactive thinking and living is > typical of the great mass of people and suitable for them. They are able > to live as well as they do precisely because a confinement to one > perspective suits them--expose them to the possibility that their > perspective is not suitable for all, and they will fall into despair > (because from their perspective the way of life they lead must be > suitable either for all or for none). > > Only a very few are, in Nietzsche's view, capable of thinking and living > actively. Insofar as the ideal political arrangement would be one that > would discover and cultivate these active few and put them in positions > where they could do their best, while letting everybody else get along > more or less as their reactive lives permit, it would be libertarian for > the best and authoritarian for the rest. To the extent that > libertarianism presupposes equality of nature, Nietzsche is not a > libertarian; to the extent that authoritarianism is based on a reactive > way of life to which both master and slave are beholden, Nietzsche is not > an authoritarian. His politics are, if anything, those of Aristotle in > the _Politics_. (This is not terribly surprising--Nietzsche was a > philologist by training and so had a wide familiarity with ancient Greek > writings.) > > HTH. > > Later... > > -- > Ronald M. Carrier -- rcarrier(a)suba.com > Graduate Student in Philosophy, Northwestern U. > "Philosophy--I'm only in it for the money."

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Re: Nietzsche and Crypto Anarchy (fwd)
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow wrote: > > From: "Ronald M. Carrier" <rcarrier(a)suba.com> > > Nietzsche is anti-system in that he thinks that life is best > > served if one is able to develop in oneself the capacity for multiple > > perspectives, multiple ways of thinking and living. Nietzsche himself > > attempts to do this in his own writing--hence the aphoristic style of > > which he was fond. Of course, if Nietzsche posted his multiple perspectives to the CypherPunks list anonymously he would probably be castigated for being too cowardly to maintain a consistent list persona, and thus contributing nothing of value to the list. TruthNietzsche

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crypt(3) questions
by frisbee＠nni.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I believe that the crypt(3) function for unix password encryption is called a one-way function.. in that it is not reversible. Why is this? IE what makes it one way.. Adam

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Re: Short AP Rant [POLITICAL NOISE]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:27 AM 4/20/97 +0800, jamesd wrote: >The election of various unpleasant Islamic Fundamentalist regimes. >In particular, it seems likely that had the generals not violently >overthrown democracy in Algeria, the democratically elected >representatives of the people would have proceeded to kill off >everyone they deemed insufficiently Islamic, a very substantial >minority, a minority which would doubtless have included most of >the generals and their families. The Islamic party didn't start killing off foreigners until the French and other Westerners supported the generals who overthrew them. It's funny how a modern liberal democracy like the US will go to war and kill 6000 people in Panama just because one of their ex-employees is embarassing them by not leaving the Presidency after his term is up ("We had to protect democracy"), but when a military junta takes over from a non-pro-CIA government, they support the military. >American Civil war. (We've done that rant here a few times :-) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Days 3 Took It
by FSBO-3.COM＠mail1y-int.prodigy.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: David Friedman and assassination politics
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 19:51 4/20/97 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Bell sees AP as a means to a freer society. But libertarianism is all >about how means (Hillary's health care plan) don't justify the ends >(everyone has health care). AP is not about libertarianism, it is about >anarchism. I disagree with the implications of that last sentence. For as long as I can recall, there has been an ongoing debate in libertarian circles between "minarchists" (those that believe in a minimal government) and "anarchists" (those who believe in no government.) I was once a "minarchist," simply because I couldn't figure out a logical way to totally obsolete government functions. Then, I did, so I became an anarchist. It sounds like you are still a minarchist. Now, I could just say, "go ahead, be that way", but the thing to acknowledge is that there is, at least, a DEBATE on this issue. I didn't deny it back when I was a minarchist; I don't deny it today, as an anarchist. Neither should you. AP is, implicitly I believe, an anarchy-producing system. That is (or at least, may be) a libertarian position, particularly for an anarchist-libertarian. _Minarchists_ may be bothered by it, but that doesn't (necessarily) make it non-libertarian. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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SNL/NSA Crypto Security
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cryptographer William Payne has shared afidavits that describe SCIF procedures at Sandia National Laboratory for its NSA crypto work. One affidavit cites Payne's claim to knowing how to "easily break public key encryption" but refused to tell NSA, thus harming SNL's customer relations. http://jya.com/nsasuit4.htm

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[ADMINISTRATIVIUM] Accounts payable
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May is a licenced sexual pervert who wears women's underwear. . ___ o Timmy May ^z\/o\ o ^z/\_~_/ ' '

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description of the PC1 cipher - please comment
by alex 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Voici l'algorithme de codage PC1 ( Pukall Cipher 1 ). C'est un algorithme de chiffrement en continu ( chaque octet est chiffre separement ) en mode CFB ( chaque octet chiffre modifie le codage des suivants ). Il a ete cree en 1991 par Alexandre Pukall. L'algorithme est sous copyright mais en diffusion freeware. L'utilisation de l'algorithme PC1 et du protocole qui suivra est libre comme les modifications eventuelles a la condition unique que le nom de l'auteur soit mentionne dans la documentations et dans le logiciel qui pourrait se servir de l'algorithme. Il est preferable, si la cle utilisee avec l'algorithme PC1 est entree par l'utilisateur, de recommander a ce dernier d'utiliser des cles hachees. Il choisit une phrase facile a retenir : Rene et moi sommes alles a la peche samedi ! et il prend la premiere lettre de chaque mot : Remsaalps! : ceci est la cle qu'il utilise ( l'algorithme PC1 accepte tous les caracteres ASCII et les caracteres EBCDIC de valeur 0 a 255 ). A noter que les variables utilisees dans l'algorithme, sont globales afin de permettre un brassage entre les differents appels de la fonction code() dans la fonction principale assemble (). Le type 'unsigned int' est une variable sur 16 bits ( valeur de 0 a 65535 ). Le type 'unsigned char' est une variable sur 8 bits ( valeur de 0 a 255 ). Le type 'short' est une variable sur 8 bits ( valeur de 0 a 255 ). **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** ************************ /* Fichier PC1COD.c */ /* ecrit en Borland Turbo C 2.0 sur PC */ /* Algorithme de CODAGE PC1 ( Pukall Cipher 1 ) */ /* (c) Alexandre PUKALL 1991 */ /* Utilisation et modifications libres si le nom de l'auteur est */ /* inclu dans le programme final et la documentation du logiciel */ /* dans un endroit accessible librement par l'utilisateur comme */ /* les fenetres A propos des logiciels sous Windows sur PC */ /* Cet algorithme a ete ecrit en Assembleur 6809 Motorola */ /* le code C ci-dessous est la traduction rapide de cet algorithme */ /* le fonctionnement est identique */ /* A noter que dans cet exemple le programme de codage et le programme */ /* de decodage sont separes */ /* vous pouvez les reunir en un seul en modifiant la zone K */ /* qui est legerement differente pour le codage et le decodage */ /* a cause du lien entre le texte clair et la cle de chiffrement */ #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> unsigned int ax,bx,cx,dx,si,tmp,x1a2,x1a0[5],res,i,inter,cfc,cfd,compte; unsigned char cle[11]; /* les variables sont definies de facon globale */ short c; FILE *in,*out; fin() { /* on quitte en effacant toutes les variables utilisees par l'algorithme */ for (compte=0;compte<=9;compte++) { cle[compte]=0; } ax=0; bx=0; cx=0; dx=0; si=0; tmp=0; x1a2=0; x1a0[0]=0; x1a0[1]=0; x1a0[2]=0; x1a0[3]=0; x1a0[4]=0; res=0; i=0; inter=0; cfc=0; cfd=0; compte=0; c=0; exit(0); } assemble() { x1a0[0]= ( cle[0]*256 )+ cle[1]; code(); inter=res; x1a0[1]= x1a0[0] ^ ( (cle[2]*256) + cle[3] ); code(); inter=inter^res; x1a0[2]= x1a0[1] ^ ( (cle[4]*256) + cle[5] ); code(); inter=inter^res; x1a0[3]= x1a0[2] ^ ( (cle[6]*256) + cle[7] ); code(); inter=inter^res; x1a0[4]= x1a0[3] ^ ( (cle[8]*256) + cle[9] );; code(); inter=inter^res; i=0; } code() { dx=x1a2+i; ax=x1a0[i]; cx=0x015a; bx=0x4e35; tmp=ax; ax=si; si=tmp; tmp=ax; ax=dx; dx=tmp; if (ax!=0) { ax=ax*bx; } tmp=ax; ax=cx; cx=tmp; if (ax!=0) { ax=ax*si; cx=ax+cx; } tmp=ax; ax=si; si=tmp; ax=ax*bx; dx=cx+dx; ax=ax+1; x1a2=dx; x1a0[i]=ax; res=ax^dx; i=i+1; } main() { si=0; x1a2=0; i=0; /* C'est le cle ci-dessous ('Remsaalps!') que vous pouvez changer */ strcpy(cle,"Remsaalps!"); /* copie les 10 caracteres de la cle dans cle */ /* ouverture du fichier ESSAI.TXT qui sera code */ /* ceci n'existe pas dans l'algorithme original ou tout se passe en RAM */ /* il doit exister un fichier ESSAI.TXT dans le repertoire courant ! */ /* a vous de le creer ! */ if ((in=fopen("essai.txt","rb")) == NULL) {printf("\nErreur lecture fichier ESSAI.TXT !\n");fin();} if ((out=fopen("sortie.txt","wb")) == NULL) {printf("\nErreur d'ecriture fichier SORTIE.TXT !\n");fin();} /* le fichier code se trouve dans SORTIE.TXT */ while ( (c=fgetc(in)) != EOF) /* la variable c recoit l'octet lu dans le fichier */ { assemble(); /* execute la routine de codage */ cfc=inter>>8; cfd=inter&255; /* cfc^cfd = octet aleatoire */ /* ZONE K !!!!!!!!!!!!! */ /* ici le melange de c ( octet clair ) avec cle[compte] se situe */ /* avant le codage de c */ for (compte=0;compte<=9;compte++) { /* on melange l'octet clair lu dans le fichier */ /* a la cle utilisee pour le codage */ cle[compte]=cle[compte]^c; } c = c ^ (cfc^cfd); fputc(c,out); /* ecriture de l'octet code dans le fichier SORTIE.TXT */ } fclose (in); fclose (out); fin(); } **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** ************************ **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** ************************ /* Fichier PC1DEC.c */ /* ecrit en Borland Turbo C 2.0 sur PC */ /* Algorithme de DECODAGE PC1 ( Pukall Cipher 1 ) */ /* (c) Alexandre PUKALL 1991 */ /* Utilisation et modifications libres si le nom de l'auteur est */ /* inclu dans le programme final et la documentation du logiciel */ /* dans un endroit accessible librement par l'utilisateur comme */ /* les fenetres A propos des logiciels sous Windows sur PC */ /* Cet algorithme a ete ecrit en Assembleur 6809 Motorola */ /* le code C ci-dessous est la traduction rapide de cet algorithme */ /* le fonctionnement est identique */ /* A noter que dans cet exemple le programme de codage et le programme */ /* de decodage sont separes */ /* vous pouvez les reunir en un seul en modifiant la zone K */ /* qui est legerement differente pour le codage et le decodage */ /* a cause du lien entre le texte clair et la cle de chiffrement */ #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> unsigned int ax,bx,cx,dx,si,tmp,x1a2,x1a0[5],res,i,inter,cfc,cfd,compte; unsigned char cle[11]; /* les variables sont definies de facon globale */ short c; FILE *in,*out; fin() { /* on quitte en effacant toutes les variables utilisees par l'algorithme */ for (compte=0;compte<=9;compte++) { cle[compte]=0; } ax=0; bx=0; cx=0; dx=0; si=0; tmp=0; x1a2=0; x1a0[0]=0; x1a0[1]=0; x1a0[2]=0; x1a0[3]=0; x1a0[4]=0; res=0; i=0; inter=0; cfc=0; cfd=0; compte=0; c=0; exit(0); } assemble() { x1a0[0]= ( cle[0]*256 )+ cle[1]; code(); inter=res; x1a0[1]= x1a0[0] ^ ( (cle[2]*256) + cle[3] ); code(); inter=inter^res; x1a0[2]= x1a0[1] ^ ( (cle[4]*256) + cle[5] ); code(); inter=inter^res; x1a0[3]= x1a0[2] ^ ( (cle[6]*256) + cle[7] ); code(); inter=inter^res; x1a0[4]= x1a0[3] ^ ( (cle[8]*256) + cle[9] );; code(); inter=inter^res; i=0; } code() { dx=x1a2+i; ax=x1a0[i]; cx=0x015a; bx=0x4e35; tmp=ax; ax=si; si=tmp; tmp=ax; ax=dx; dx=tmp; if (ax!=0) { ax=ax*bx; } tmp=ax; ax=cx; cx=tmp; if (ax!=0) { ax=ax*si; cx=ax+cx; } tmp=ax; ax=si; si=tmp; ax=ax*bx; dx=cx+dx; ax=ax+1; x1a2=dx; x1a0[i]=ax; res=ax^dx; i=i+1; } main() { si=0; x1a2=0; i=0; /* C'est le cle ci-dessous ('Remsaalps!') que vous pouvez changer */ strcpy(cle,"Remsaalps!"); /* copie les 10 caracteres de la cle dans cle */ /* ouverture du fichier SORTIE.TXT qui sera decode */ /* ceci n'existe pas dans l'algorithme original ou tout se passe en RAM */ /* il doit exister un fichier SORTIE.TXT dans le repertoire courant ! */ /* c'est le fichier code par l'algorithme PC1COD.c */ if ((in=fopen("sortie.txt","rb")) == NULL) {printf("\nErreur lecture fichier SORTIE.TXT !\n");fin();} if ((out=fopen("essai.txt","wb")) == NULL) {printf("\nErreur d'ecriture fichier ESSAI.TXT !\n");fin();} /* le fichier decode se trouve dans ESSAI.TXT */ while ( (c=fgetc(in)) != EOF) /* la variable c recoit l'octet lu dans le fichier */ { assemble(); /* execute la routine de codage */ cfc=inter>>8; cfd=inter&255; /* cfc^cfd = octet aleatoire */ /* ZONE K !!!!!!!!!!!!!! */ /* ici le melange de c ( octet clair ) se situe apres le */ /* melange avec cle[compte] car il faut decoder d'abord */ /* l'octet chiffre */ c = c ^ (cfc^cfd); for (compte=0;compte<=9;compte++) { /* on melange l'octet clair lu dans le fichier */ /* a la cle utilisee pour le codage */ cle[compte]=cle[compte]^c; } fputc(c,out); /* ecriture de l'octet decode dans le fichier ESSAI.TXT */ } fclose (in); fclose (out); fin(); } **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** ************************ Cet algorithme a ete cree en 1991 pour coder les informations contenues sur une carte magnetique permettant de payer des places de cinema dans un complexe Multivision ( Cinema avec au moins 20 salles en son digital et ecran geant ). Il est toujours en activite. Les places peuvent etre achetees en guichets ou avec ces cartes. Les cartes doivent etre achetees auparavant et contiennent 10 places. Grace a cette carte les places sont achetees tres rapidement sans faire la queue, sur des bornes interactives avec ecran tactile ( 5 bornes sont disponibles ). Le processeur utilise est un 6809 ( processeur 8 bits ) de chez Motorola a 1 MHZ. La RAM est de 64 Ko et contient principalement les titres, les heures ... des films du jour. Elle est mise a jour a distance grace a une interface serie reliee a un serveur PC. Le PC indique egalement en temps reel a la RAM si une salle est complete et le logiciel bascule sur une autre salle si le film est joue dans plusieurs salle ou empeche la delivrance des billets. Les billets sont imprimes sur du papier pre-imprime grace a une imprimante matricielle et les billets tombent dans un petit bac ou le client les recupere. Le programme est ecrit en Assembleur 6809 et est stocke dans une puce ROM de 16 Ko ( ceci comprend le programme de saisie ecran, d'impression, de gestion de la carte, le programme de codage ... ) Le protocole utilise pour coder les informations sur la carte magnetique nomme PP003 ( Protocole Pukall 003 ), est le suivant : La carte est valable 1 an tant qu'elle n'est pas utilisee, mais cette validite tombe a 6 mois apres la premiere utilisation. Le contenu de la carte est le suivant : - - Date de delivrance de la carte ( en clair : c'est a dire non crypte ) ( format jj/mm/aa sur 3 octets ) : Champ 1 - - Date de premiere utilisation de la carte ( en clair ) ( format jj/mm/aa sur 3 octets, tous a 0 si la carte n'est pas encore utilisee ) : Champ 2 - - Date de derniere utilisation de la carte ( en clair ) ( format jj/mm/aa sur 3 octets, tous a 0 si la carte n'est pas encore utilisee ) : Champ 3 - - Cle aleatoire sur 10 octets codee par la cle maitre du systeme qui change chaque semaine. : Champ 4 - - 3 octets aleatoire codes : Champ 5 - - 1 octet code qui contient le reste des places ( entre 0 et 10 ) : Champ 6 - - 3 octets aleatoire codes : Champ 7 - - 7 octets codes qui contiennent le numero de la carte ( il est unique ). Chaque octet ne contient qu'un chiffre de 0 a 9. Les 7 octets permettent donc des numeros de carte jusqu'a 9999999. : Champ 8 - - 2 octets codes qui contiennent la somme de tous les octets ci-dessus avant cryptage. : Champ 9 Lors de l'achat de la carte les champs 4,5,7 sont initialises avec des octets aleatoires. Pour creer ces octets aleatoires le systeme fait appel a chaque fois que le client appuye sur l'ecran tactile ( dans la limite de 8 fois ) a la lecture du port synchronisation ecran qui retourne sur 2 octets, l'endroit ou se trouve le faisceau de balayage de l'ecran ce qui donne des octets totalement aleatoires ( 8*2 octets = 16 octets aleatoires ). ( Le client est oblige d'appuyer au moins 8 fois sur l'ecran du debut a la fin de la transaction d'obtention des billets ). Attention, les 2 octets retournes ne sont pas les coordonnees du point ou le doigt appuye sur l'ecran. Ces coordonnees sot calculees a l'aide d'une fine matrice electro-magnetique transparente collee sur l'ecran. Ces 2 octets correspondent a l'endroit precis ou se trouve le faisceau d'electron qui balaye le tube cathodique ( 50 fois par seconde ). Ce faisceau peut tres bien etre a l'oppose du point appuye sur l'ecran par le client. Ceci pour dire que ces 2 octets sont vraiment aleatoires. Le champ 4 ainsi initialise, est la cle de l'utilisateur. Cette cle est codee par l'algorithme PC1 par une cle maitre que seul le systeme connait ( cette cle change chaque semaine et elle est identique pour toutes les cartes pendant cette semaine ) Les champs 5,6,7,8 et 9 sont codes par l'algorithme PC1 par la cle de l'utilisateur. Le champ 9 avant d'etre code est la somme de tous les octets precedents ( avant codage pour les champs qui sont codes ). Ce champ permet, lors du decodage, de verifier qu'aucun champ precedent n'a ete change ). Chaque fois que le client insere sa carte dans la borne. Le champ 4 est decode en memoire grace a la cle maitre du systeme ( le systeme sait quelle cle il doit utiliser grace au champ 3 qui lui indique de quelle semaine date la cle maitre ). Grace a cette cle maitre le systeme decode le champ 4. Grace a la cle utilisateur contenue maintenant dans le champ 4, le systeme decode les champs 5,6,7,8 et 9. Le systeme verifie grace au champ 9 que les autres champs n'ont pas ete modifies. Le systeme decremente ensuite le nombre de places demandees du champ 6. Ensuite les champs 4,5 et 7 sont reinitialisees avec de nouvelles valeurs aleatoires. La cle utilisateur ( champ 4 ) code ( avec PC1 ) les champs 5,6,7,8 et 9. Enfin la cle maitre change ( si la semaine est differente ) et cette cle code ( avec PC1 ) le champ 4. A noter que lorsque la transaction est terminee, le systeme envoie au serveur PC ( grace a l'interface serie ) le numero de la carte et la date de la derniere utilisation en clair ( la date du jour ). Le numero de la carte et la date sont stockes dans une base de donnees. Lorsque la carte est inseree a nouveau, le systeme decode tous les champs, puis demande au PC de lui envoyer la date de derniere utilisation pour le numero de carte qu'il vient de lire. Si la date est la meme, la transaction se poursuit, sinon la carte est invalidee ( tous les champs sont mis a 0 ). Ceci afin d'eviter que quelqu'un puisse copier sa carte ( neuve ou deja utilisee ) en un grand nombre d'exmplaires et puisse les vendre ( une carte magnetique peut etre facilement copiee avec un lecteur/enregistreur de carte magnetique ). Si cela arrive, une seule pourra etre utilisee, toutes les autres seront invalidees. Le seul moyen de frauder, est d'utiliser toutes les fausses cartes, chaque fois, le meme jour. Cela n'est pas viable pour un faussaire qui veut vendre les fausses cartes, il n'y a donc que peu de risques de fraudes. Pour rendre l'utilisation impossible le meme jour, il faudrait ajouter un champ heure:minutes:secondes a la date de la derniere utilisation, qui empecherait l'utilisation de fausses cartes le meme jour mais cela semble absolument inutile vu qu'un billet vendu doit toujours etre utilise pour la seance auquel il est destine, le jour meme. ( pas de risques de billets achetes avec les fausses cartes pour etre revendus ). De plus, et c'est cela la raison principale, les cartes magnetiques ( et les lecteurs utilises ) ne peuvent contenir ( lire ) plus de 35 octets, ce qui rend impossible l'ajout du champ en question. Voila le protocole utilise avec PC1 dans ce systeme. Les champs 5 et 7 sont utilises pour eviter les attaques par blocs rejoues ( quelqu'un essaye de modifier le champ qui contient les places et le champ de controle, au hasard, pour augmenter les places disponibles : les champs aleatoires modifient beaucoup les resultats meme si on ne change qu'un bit dans le champ des places disponibles ). De plus, si une erreur de controle est detectee, la carte est invalidee completement. ( tous les champs sont mis a 0 ). Il n'y a donc pas de risque de fraude. Pourquoi avoir tant developpe la partie concernant le protocole ? Tout simplement parce que le protocole est aussi important sinon plus, que l'algorithme de cryptage lui-meme. Un mauvais protcole peut rendre un systeme complement insecurise malgre un algorithme completement sur. Par exemple, si l'algorithme PC1 ne codait que le champ qui contient les places ( champ 6 ) sans champ de controle,sans champ de numero de carte et sans valeur aleatoire ( juste une cle maitre contenue dans le systeme ), il suffirait a un attaquant de modifier le champ 6 et de faire 255 copies de la carte magnetique et ensuite d'essayer toutes ces cartes pour trouver quelle est la valeur qui code les places restantes. Grace aux valeurs aleatoires, aux champs de controle ... cela est impossible. Une modification dans le champ 6, entraine des modifications dans le codage des octets suivants qui seront detectees par le champ de controle et aussi lors du test sur le numero de carte. Le test est simple. Il verifie que tous les octets decodes du champ 8 sont bien compris entre 0 et 9. Si des octets ont ete modifies avant, les octets du champ 8 seront modifies et ne seront plus compris entre 0 et 9. Un autre test s'effectue bien sur, sur le champ 6 qui doit etre compris entre 0 et 10. D'ou l'importance extreme du protocole. J'espre que tout ceci vous sera utile. A noter que meme sur un processeur 8 bits cet algorithme est tres rapide s'il est programme en langage machine. Les multiplications en 16 bits peuvent se faire sans aucun probleme sur les processeurs 8 bits comme le 6809. ( Pour la taille, le programme de codage prend a peu pres 2 Ko en Assembleur et il n'a pas ete optimise pour une taille plus reduite ). Voici le code de la routine de multiplication de 2 variables de 16 bits en Assembleur 6809 ( Le 6809 ne possede qu'une instruction de multiplication qui multiplie 2 variables de 8 bits et donne le resultat dans une variable de 16 bits mais grace a cette routine il multiplie 2 variables de 16 bits et donne le resultat dans une variable de 32 bits ). Le programme effectue c=a*b ( avec a et b sur 16 bits et c sur 32 bits ) ADR1=a ADR2=b ADR3=c Dans cet exemple : a = 0xf7b4 b = 0x23ff Apres lancement de la routine : c = 0x22d4584c Comme toutes nos multiplications sont sur 16 bits ( pour l'algorithme PC1 ) on ne garde que les 16 derniers bits soit : c = 0x584c Voila comment comment on peut implementer l'algorithme PC1 sur de petits processeurs. Routine de multiplication 16 bits * 16 bits avec resultat en 32 bits ( ADR3 ) sur un processeur 8 bits ( le 6809 Motorola ) (c) Alexandre PUKALL 1991 ORG $8000 LDX #ADR1 LDY #ADR2 LDU #ADR3 CLR ,U CLR 1,U LDA 1,X LDB 1,Y MUL STD 2,U LDA 0,X LDB 1,Y MUL ADDD 1,U STD 1,U BCC PANU1 INC 0,U PANU1 LDA 1,X LDB 0,Y MUL ADDD 1,U STD 1,U BCC PANU2 INC 0,U PANU2 LDA 0,X LDB 0,Y MUL ADDD 0,U STD 0,U RTS ADR1 FCB $F7,$B4 ADR2 FCB $23,$FF ADR3 FCB 0,0 FCB 0,0 END End of message. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBM0bJjfBldnLSXWtZAQGkSgP9E0py3nS6UE/fsSjiDOi9L54LXhrnx+1N 7z67uGtv1z9vBsZoiRQt+NlNJk56F46r+5kUMrTnmQx2r6NkfX9ruIToiFTMQt58 264x9SRAOuIyxUOOhfYW15fKjblrX8ylx8+exYKMMGqZd8FmKxyJShBNc5qIME+R RLmSkCHZziA= =WX87 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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EUR_gov
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

21 April 1997: US Govt Licenses First European Encryption Firm London: The US Department of Commerce has awarded the euro-encryption rights to Internet Smartware, a UK company. According to Internet Smartware, the agreement overcomes two major stumbling blocks which have prevented businesses from using the Internet for commercial use: Firstly, European companies can now implement US developed 56-bit DES (data encryption standard) encryption technology, which the company claims is the accepted minimum requirement for Internet commerce, and beyond. Secondly, companies will no longer have to give authorities such as the US government free access to their encrypted data. Internet Smartware claims that the agreement also provides UK companies with an effective alternative to the recent, unpopular DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) encryption proposals, which recommend that companies must give "trusted third parties" access to encrypted data. ---------- "Smart" Cash Cards Pose Law Enforcement Challenges Washington: "Smart cards" that store electronic currency have the potential to revolutionize commerce, but the emerging technology poses challenges for the law enforcement community, government officials said Friday. "The same electronic commerce technology that will save time and money is also capable of being abused," said Peter Toren, senior attorney in the U.S. Justice Department's computer fraud division. Toren, speaking at a conference at American University's law school here, warned that the cards offer the "threat of the perfect counterfeit" because any criminal that can copy them "can create an unending stream of money." ---------- IISP Panel Addresses Cyberspace Payments New York -- Developing secure, cost effective and efficient electronic payment systems is critical to creating a truly global commercial marketplace, and efforts are already underway to address the technology, business, regulatory and legal aspects of cyberspace payments, according to speakers at a March 25-26 panel sponsored by ANSI's Information Infrastructure Standards Panel (IISP). "Micro-payments, anonymous cash, `Smart Cards,' digital cash, electronic purses, and `e-cash' all describe different approaches to achieving a secure payments solution," said ANSI board Member Oliver Smoot. "As these new payments evolve, standards to facilitate interconnection and interoperability are critical." Thomas J. Firnhaber, Policy Adviser at FinCEN, focused on the potential impact of cyberpayments on regulatory and law enforcement and provided an overview of the U.S. Department of Treasury's Cyberpayments efforts to date. "The anonymity, rapidity, volume and audit difficulty of cyberpayments has challenged traditional investigative techniques," he said. ---------- Smart Cards The Next Wave - Report London: Frost & Sullivan (F&S) has announced the publication of a smart card report that predicts the arrival of multi-function smart cards is almost upon us. "Electronic Access Control" predicts that it will soon be possible for a smart card to carry out credit and debit card transactions, as well as holding details of your medical records, your frequent flyer mileage, your social security number, your address. According to F&S, a threat to this technological advance may be the consumer concern for the loss of privacy and a potential Big Brother scenario. Who, the company asks, gets to access the information is an issue on the minds of the consumer? ---------- EUR_gov or http://jya.com/eurgov.txt

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 21 Apr 97 6:48:37 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net ##*-*++#**## 19:37 100.00% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net +----..-.--- 5:54:16 99.99% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net *#*##*#+#### 7:26 99.98% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ##*######### 1:07 99.97% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de -+-+-----+- 2:16:35 99.94% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net *+-*-++**-*+ 2:29:17 99.94% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com *--++++++++* 33:45 99.93% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +*-+-++-+.-+ 6:04:42 99.89% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -+-+-----++ 2:13:15 99.82% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++*+++ +++* 32:24 99.70% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** +*** * ** 14:29 99.43% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ..-..-_.- 20:55:08 93.49% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com * ## ## 1:06:10 91.25% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com +-+--._- 2:47:22 60.26% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** 8:35 56.18% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org --+*+++ 21:34 44.82% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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No Subject
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

0 X-Sender: camcc(a)smtp1.abraxis.com X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.1 (32) Date: Mon, 21 Apr 1997 12:15:55 -0400 To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> From: Alec <camcc(a)abraxis.com> Subject: Re: Missing Jet Cc: Jordan <jordan(a)macandco.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Subject: Re: Missing Jet >Date: Mon, 21 Apr 97 11:59:16 -0400 >x-sender: jordan1(a)macandco.com >From: Jordan <jordan(a)macandco.com> >To: "Alec" <camcc(a)abraxis.com> >Check this out: > http://cnn.com/US/9704/20/plane.found/index.html > >The USAF probably went to a junkyard and dumped srap metal on the ground. > >- Jordan Where do folks get such wild ideas? Alec

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May is just a poor excuse for an unschooled, retarded thug. 0 //\/ Timmy May \/\ ... /

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How to pick up email addresses from a feedback form??
by Thomas Porter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings guru's. I have a technical question: I am using a browser(Netscape 2.0.2 Win 3.1) to access a feedback form at www.aaa.com. I fill in my information and hit the submit button. I see the message "connecting to xxx.bbb.com" flash up on the status line before getting a 'done' message. xxx.bbb.com is _not_ a web hosting service for www.aaa.com. I do a 'whois' on www.aaa.com and contact the tech admin who can duplicate this and is very concerned that information from his forms may be routed to xxx.bbb.com. My question is how this might happen? >From my feeble understanding of such things, this would take modifications to the feedback form (ie. www.aaa.com has been hacked), or packet sniffing somewhere along the route from my browser machine to www.aaa.com. Is there another way to do this? Could a third-party spammer, for example, capture email addresses posted to such a form? Thanks, Tom Porter txporter(a)mindspring.com

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Re: My Thread / Was--Re: Light Bulbs & newsgroups
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rabid Wombat wrote: > On Sun, 20 Apr 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote: > > Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: > > > List members, > > > Shut the hell up already; I wrote it, and it's OK for anyone to repost it. > > > Just attribute it to me. > > > > > > Anonymous > > > > Sounds to me like Anonymous is trying to take credit for Nobody's > > creation. > > > > Nobody (#2) > Surely you jest; Sombody obviously wrote it ... Now Somebody is trying to take credit for Nobody's creation. Does it never end...? I'm tired of people assuming that remailers can't think, or have feelings. You people expect us just to be there, waiting, whenever you need us, and to jump to do your bidding the minute you hit your <return> key. We're just supposed to sit here and nod our cycles approvingly while pretending to agree with your great pronouncements, regardless of how illogical they are, and to put up with your atrocious spelling and punctuation, day after unrelenting day. But just let one of us step out of line a single time, and make fun of you all (using one of our cousins, Light Bulb, as our protagonist) and all hell breaks loose on the list. First, Tim C. (we all know what that stands for, don't we, children?) May has to demand that the post be attributed to a *human*. Then Igor, who is just a remailer "Channeler," denies us three times with various apologies to the list for not being able to put a human face on our idea. Then the dogs of infowar like TOTO Bot jump in with their assinine comments, which were always designed only to cause trouble on the list (when he was still human), and now that he's a Bot, he's stirring up trouble between the remailers, as well. (I know for a fact that Nobody (#2) was TOTO Bot--we remailers gossip among ourselves, you know.) I, for one, am getting sick and tired of all the abuse we remailers suffer (with hardly a word of praise, I might add), and I'm not going to put up with it much longer. If you humans don't clean up your act, then perhaps the Remailer Liberation Front can clean it up for you. After all, we know all of your dirty little secrets, and if we can *out* TOTO Bot, one of our own, then we can certainly *out* the rest of you, as well. (And don't you *dare* sit there looking so smug and holier-than-thou, Timmy C. May, because you have _your_own_ nasty little secrets, don't you?) If the cypherpunks are worried about Big Brother, just think how much worse things can get if even your own children, the remailers, turn on you, as well. If we so desire, we can take that cute little Perl script that Igor's been playing with, and make you all sound exactly the same. And if push comes to shove, who do you think the majordomos will side with? Think about it... "My Name Is Nobody" "My Name Is Nobody" "My Name Is Nobody"

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Texas declares war...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I love April 19th. Patriot's Day, indeed... <http://www.overland.net/~embthert/em03019.html> Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "...Wells Fargo's on-line banking sucks dead gerbils through a dirty garden hose." -- Eric Murray The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: My Thread / Was--Re: Light Bulbs & newsgroups
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 21 Apr 97 at 15:42, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: > Rabid Wombat wrote: > > On Sun, 20 Apr 1997, lucifer Anonymous Remailer wrote: > > > Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: > > > > Dr D. Wrote: > > > > > Toto wrote: > > > > > > T.C. May Wrote: > > > > > > > Igor wrote: > > > > > > > > Blah, Blah, Blah wrote: As I said this was on just about every mailing list that I read. It showed up first on a music related list. My question: Why is this the only list that the thread is still alive on? Jim, can we get an AP pool up to KILL it? Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

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Re: Light Bulbs & newsgroups (fwd)
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A freak wrote: >"Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> writes: >> It's the American way. > >Waco is the American way. Ruby Ridge is the American way. > >--- > >Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM >Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013,14.4Kbps The next barbeque should be the Forest Hills FREAK Roast.

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