December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Warning - delayed mail
by NTMail 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------------------------------------------------------- *************************************** ** This is a warning only ** ** No action is required by you ** *************************************** Re: Message to debbi(a)astrobiz.com Your message has not been delivered after 3 hours. Attempts to deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours. If it has still not been delivered, it will be returned to you. The first few lines of your message are repeated below. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Your message follows: >Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ia227352; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:50 -0500 >Subject: deny respectively for >Section >Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:50 -0500 >Message-Id: <18035025000592(a)abraxis.com> > >composed the >shall > >Union. taxed >every Least Jersey >issue States > >be >the. may Meeting >nine shall the >shall the States. shall Congress Section >may > >the to >of any. >.

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Warning - delayed mail
by NTMail 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------------------------------------------------------- *************************************** ** This is a warning only ** ** No action is required by you ** *************************************** Re: Message to debbi(a)astrobiz.com Your message has not been delivered after 3 hours. Attempts to deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours. If it has still not been delivered, it will be returned to you. The first few lines of your message are repeated below. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Your message follows: >Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id da227347; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:44 -0500 >Subject: both States from this Citizens >Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:44 -0500 >Message-Id: <18034454200587(a)abraxis.com> > >the in >Comfort Section. and No may Congress Union >Legislatures > >Ratification Senate be. judicial Establishment first >United and assembled for the without. the >endowed or > >mankind and absolute suspended the >annihilation. raising swarms unacknowledged without instrument and >totaly frontiers tyrant. their representatives that which >Received thank be St How. form column >your List >.

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Warning - delayed mail
by NTMail 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------------------------------------------------------- *************************************** ** This is a warning only ** ** No action is required by you ** *************************************** Re: Message to debbi(a)astrobiz.com Your message has not been delivered after 3 hours. Attempts to deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours. If it has still not been delivered, it will be returned to you. The first few lines of your message are repeated below. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Your message follows: >Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id qa227308; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:02:59 -0500 >Subject: into think Writ >unless >Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:02:59 -0500 >Message-Id: <18025907600545(a)abraxis.com> > >one regular >shall > >coin State >or Troops Section >State. an > >State >directed be Ballot >the the President >a Years the >be shall. execute >States > >of two >whose the give >them Officers > >of >and States between. and have State > >.

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Warning - delayed mail
by NTMail 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------------------------------------------------------- *************************************** ** This is a warning only ** ** No action is required by you ** *************************************** Re: Message to debbi(a)astrobiz.com Your message has not been delivered after 3 hours. Attempts to deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours. If it has still not been delivered, it will be returned to you. The first few lines of your message are repeated below. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Your message follows: >Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ea227348; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:45 -0500 >Subject: also that Judgment and any by >Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:45 -0500 >Message-Id: <18034564300588(a)abraxis.com> > >do. the such House shall during >or time. may he it two >shall in and. him Imposts of >To and define support. To in >over by carrying the ten. Law >State Duties >.

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Warning - delayed mail
by NTMail 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------------------------------------------------------- *************************************** ** This is a warning only ** ** No action is required by you ** *************************************** Re: Message to debbi(a)astrobiz.com Your message has not been delivered after 3 hours. Attempts to deliver your message will continue for a further 12 hours. If it has still not been delivered, it will be returned to you. The first few lines of your message are repeated below. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Your message follows: >Received: from [206.155.199.60] by smtp1.abraxis.com (NTMail 3.01.03) id ha227325; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:18 -0500 >Subject: them Cases the >foregoing >Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 13:03:18 -0500 >Message-Id: <18031860400562(a)abraxis.com> > >to of >unless > >of and. Trust of any >laid Congress > >as >for the one. transmit shall an >chuse a two >which shall his. President > >Services on >and States the >Advice but > >that. to to all >Court a >.

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Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by an7575＠anon.nymserver.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kevin McCurry pretended to ask: I would appreciate any information on the trustworthiness/security of the below named individuals and service. Please, friends, spare me the gratuitous remarks about Sameer, etc., that's not the issue inthis case. Why are you asking for information on these people and then stating that you don't want 'certain types' of information on Sameer and others? Are you connected in some way to these people, perhaps, and just fishing for compliments that will be supplied by the prepared responses of others? Allow me to give my 'unprepared' response in regard to remailers in general, since you seem to be seeking only a one-sided viewpoint about the individuals involved. Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as a method of monitoring supposedly private communications of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth. The communications passing through them remain private and anonymous only to those who aren't running them (or who haven't compromised the system). Secondly, the few remailers that aren't contolled by a small elite within the cypherpunks come and go rather quickly. Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared- when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman. If you want true anonymity, learn how to hack. TruthMonger

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is cypherpunks@toad.com still moderated?
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just curious, is the moderation experiment still continuing or it is over? Thank you. - Igor.

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REA_lly
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-12-97: US claims CIA was not spying on Germany but on rogue states doing business there. Spy has not been expelled. ----- REA_lly

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U.S. State Department crackdown (fwd)
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Conrad wrote > >From jjc(a)infi.net Wed Mar 12 00:21:16 1997 Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 00:20:36 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <2.2.16.19970312001929.4db72c86(a)mailhost.norfolk.infi.net> X-Sender: jjc(a)mailhost.norfolk.infi.net X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 2.2 (16) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" To: die(a)die.com, ttyler(a)mich.com, troach(a)netcom.com, lrkn(a)zeus.anet-dfw.com, crisp(a)netcom.com, victor(a)best.com, "Michael F. Peyton" <Michael.Peyton(a)MCI.com>, dwilson(a)paprika.mwc.edu, stever(a)infi.net, rbritt(a)visi.net, larry51(a)aol.com, jmccolman(a)infi.net, brueger(a)infi.net, lburke(a)infi.net, donjr(a)infi.net, acolejr(a)erols.com From: Jim Conrad <jjc(a)infi.net> Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown Thought you'all might find this interesting ... >Return-Path: jmatk(a)tscm.com >X-Sender: jmatk(a)tiac.net >Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:26:56 -0500 >To: jmatk(a)tscm.com >From: jmatk(a)tscm.com (James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng) >Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown > >The U.S. State Department is starting to crackdown on the illegal >export of TSCM and SIGINT equipment under ITAR. > >Noice how section (b) is worded: > >"...equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance >or monitoring." > >-jma > > >================================================================= > >DEPARTMENT OF STATE - Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs >22 CFR Parts 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, and 130 > >================================================================= > > Category XI-Military [and Space] Electronics > > (a) Electronic equipment not included in Category XII of the U.S. Munitions >List which is specifically designed, modified or configured for military >application. This equipment includes but is not limited to: > > *(b) Electronic systems or equipment specifically designed, modified, or >configured for intelligence, security, or military purposes for use in search, >reconnaissance, collection, monitoring, direction-finding, display, analysis and >production of information from the electromagnetic spectrum and electronic >systems or equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance >or monitoring. A system meeting this definition is controlled under this >subchapter even in instances where any individual pieces of equipment >constituting the system may be subject to the controls of another U.S. >Government agency. Such systems or equipment described above include, but are >not limited to, those: > > (1) Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate the >spreading code for spread spectrum or hopping code for frequency agility. This >does not include fixed code techniques for spread spectrum. > > (2) Designed or modified using burst techniques (e.g., time compression >techniques) for intelligence, security or military purposes. > > (3) Designed or modified for the purpose of information security to suppress >the compromising emanations of information-bearing signals. This covers TEMPEST >suppression technology and equipment meeting or designed to meet government >TEMPEST standards. This definition is not intended to include equipment designed >to meet Federal Communications Commission (FCC) commercial electro-magnetic >interference standards or equipment designed for health and safety. > > > > =============================================================== > "If it doesn't involve a torque wrench, then it's not TEMPEST" > =============================================================== > James M. Atkinson Phone: (508) 546-3803 > Granite Island Group - TSCM.COM > 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ > Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk(a)tscm.com > =============================================================== > The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and the Most > Complete TSCM Counterintelligence Site on the Internet > =============================================================== > > > <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:> <:> Jim Conrad - Ocean View Communications - jjc(a)infi.net <:> <:> 757-490-8127 Office - 757-587-8251 Fax - 757-473-6740 Pager <:> <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>

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TEMPEST protection
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to find out how hard (and expensive) would it be to try to protect my computer by TEMPEST-like measures. I am not an electrical engineer and am looking (hopefully) for a relatively easy to understand do-it-yourself type of manual. I have heard from my acquaintaince who is a tempest professional that it was not very possible. If that is indeed true, are there any measures that can be taken to at least complicate spying on my computer? Not that I think that Martians from the flying saucers are already listening, but it is interesting to find out how to do this stuff. Thank you very much. - Igor.

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Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Keely McCurry wrote: > From: an7575(a)anon.nymserver.com > Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:47:31 -0700 (MST) > > Kevin McCurry pretended to ask: > > I would appreciate any information on the trustworthiness/security of the > below named individuals and service. Please, friends, spare me the gratuitous > remarks about Sameer, etc., that's not the issue inthis case. > > Why are you asking for information on these people and > then stating that you don't want 'certain types' of > information on Sameer and others? > Are you connected in some way to these people, perhaps, > and just fishing for compliments that will be supplied > by the prepared responses of others? > Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as > a method of monitoring supposedly private communications > of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth. > <<<< > Well, that is food for thought. It's an angle I had not considered. The motivation behind the 'generosity' of others should always be considered as a factor. > The communications passing through them remain private > and anonymous only to those who aren't running them (or who > haven't compromised the system). > <<<< > The system does involve trust on the side of the senders and integrity on the > side of the remailers. That was my question: are there members of this list > who can vouch [not swear] for or deny the integrity of the individual running > the anon.nymserver.com nymserver? > >>>> You are asking for opinions from people you don't personally know for opinions as to the integrity of others whom you do not know, in order to make decisions regarding placing your trust in someone else to guarantee your privacy and/or anonymity? > Is the server I asked about controlled, or not? Received: (from root@localhost) by shaman.lycaeum.org (Partyon/dude!) Judging from the (Partyon/dude!) in the headers from the server, perhaps questions regarding 'controlled substances' might be more pertinent. As well, the new-user info they send out tells you how to hack the accounts of others on the system, then tells you that the 'protection' against this is defaulted to 'off'. It goes on to say that you should turn it 'on' only if you are 'paranoid' of someone hacking 'your' account. i.e. - if you don't notice or understand the implications of this, then, by default, you are 'fair game' for hackers on their server. > Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised > cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP > produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared- > when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman. > What do you mean support? Which "newer versions?" Where does 2.6.2. stand in > this hierarchy? Must we use the i versions? I use several versions including > the international, and have noticed no difference in the ways the remailers > process the versions. PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into the country. The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the NSA and the Military. Think about it. TruthMonger >def 2. one who attempts to stir up or spread something that is usually >petty or discreditable Such as blind acceptance of remailers and iconic cryptographical software?

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Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone calling themselves TruthMonger wrote: >> Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as >> a method of monitoring supposedly private communications >> of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth. That message was relatively funny, and trust is a serious issue in this business - even though the suggestion that _we_ in the Cypherpunks Elite Cabal did that, it doesn't mean that there aren't People With Ulterior Motives running remailers, or remailers hosted on machines run by bad guys who are actually monitoring their users. However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job. >> Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised >> cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP >> produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared- >> when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman. ..... > PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into >the country. > The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. >because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the >NSA and the Military. The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm, introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm, Bass-O-Matic. Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords, /* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money. PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem - which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all. If you want to do a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!) or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms patented by PKP... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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[CRYPTO] OTP
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. May carries a turd in his wallet for identification purposes. _ _/| \'o.0' =(___)= Timmy C. May U

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Re: Ecash Brain Tennis
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: > > On the Wired "brain tennis" debate, http://www.braintennis.com/, Kawika > Daguio of the American Bankers Association wrote: > > > The real danger of cyberspace is that it could be the tragedy of > > the commons in waiting. Technology alone won't provide participants > > sufficient security for e-commerce to flourish. Law, tradition, and good > > reputations and technology give rise to trust. Trust cannot be established > > solely though technical protocols. And trust is not irrelevant. > > What do you think he means about a "tragedy of the commons"? > I wonder if he just meant that there would be too many "commoners" trying > to engage in commerce, so you couldn't know who to trust? Be assured that those already in control of commerce in this country and others have already written new laws 'in their head' concerning the future of eca$h. I predict that these laws will be for our 'protection,' but will have the curious effect of limiting the control of eca$h to the already rich and powerful. Some groups such as the Anguila Antagonists may be able to wrest a certain number of digital dollars from the grip of the system currently in place, but above a certain point, they will eaten up, either passively or aggressively (crushed or bought off). If 'outsiders' begin to make too large a dent in the main players' piece of the action, then we can expect to see events similar to the Junk Bonds fiasco, with the 'bad guys' set-up and knocked down like bowling pins. We can expect automatic taxation at the time of all eca$h transactions, as well as strict laws against anonymity in the transfer of eca$h. Freelance cryptographers are going to be outlaws, by decree of law. It is quite simply a matter of money (power and control being merely prerequisites for controlling money). TruthMonger

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Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart wrote: > > However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, > at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job. The straight facts are that you can't trust your best friend not to bop your old-lady, given ample opportunity, and to put even more trust in a stranger is foolish. > > PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into > >the country. > > The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. > >because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the > >NSA and the Military. > > The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm, > introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm, > Bass-O-Matic. Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords, > /* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money. > PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem - > which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the > RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only > way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all. Are you saying that the patent on the RSA algorithm wasn't enforceable? > If you want to do > a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship > between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!) > or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms > patented by PKP... The relationship between MIT and the NSA and the Military isn't very far under the table. The spooks funded MIT's RSA development, and they are not noted for funding projects for the good of the common man. To suggest that they would fund a form of cryptography that didn't have their own back-door for sounds implausible. TruthMonger

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Re: Wassenaar Arrangement and "sensitive dual-use items"
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:21 AM 3/11/97 +0900, Hayashi_Tsuyoshi wrote: >Although I have not seen it, there should be the Japanese >translated version of the W.A. While it is true that MITI has halted all exports of crypto products since late September, citing their obligations under the Wassenaar "arrangement", numerous high level meetings conducted by Japanese industry heavyweights with MITI produced neither a copy of the arrangement nor any written MITI guidelines. MITI reserves the right to decided on a case by case basis. So far, every single export application has been denied. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Everything You Need to Succeed in MLM!
by MLM-Powerhouse＠cash-in-now.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Cato forum on wiretapping and Digital Telephony (3/24/97)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 08:15:15 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Cato forum on wiretapping and Digital Telephony (3/24/97) [I find that Cato's forums are always worth attending. --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 10:15:21 -0500 (EST) From: Solveig Bernstein <sberns(a)cato.org> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: a cato forum Declan, could you post this to fightcensorship or otherwise forward it around? ******************************************************************** This forum will be held at noon on March 24 at the Cato Institute at 1000 Mass. Ave. N.W., Washington, DC. To register, please call Heather Antilla at 202.842.3490 or email to hantila(a)cato.org. ******************************************************************** Wiretapping in the Digital Age: Reassessing CALEA Barry Steinhardt Alan McDonald ACLU FBI Jim Dempsey Albert Gidari Center for Democracy and Technology Perkins Coie CALEA, the "Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act," requires phone companies to retrofit their networks to facilitate wiretapping by law enforcement. Are laws like CALEA appropriate for our constitutional republic, or are the economic costs and dangers to privacy too great? Should Congress have delegated to the FBI so much power to implement CALEA? Have the FBI's demands under the statute been reasonable? Solveig Bernstein, Esq. (202) 789-5274 (202) 842-3490 (fax) Assistant Director of Telecommunications & Technology Studies Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001

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re: True colours
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ray Arachelian <sunder(a)brainlink.com> writes: > On Mon, 10 Mar 1997 paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk wrote: > > > > > What evidence do you have that Dr. Vulis is KGB loving? - As far as I > > > > saw his message only confirmed that he knew that the KGB had employed > > > > a number of good cryptographers, without personal knowledge I cannot I also had the honor of meeting a few of them in person, and exchanging e-mails with others. They're much nicer people than the NSA shills. > > > > confirm or deny this therefore I see no basis in logic for calling > > > > him a master of disinformation... > > > > > > Since when do you know Vulis so well that your personal knowledge can be > > > used to confirm what he is or isn't? Or are you yet another Vulistentacl > > > > Please learn to read, I stated that I did not have enough information > > to confirm or deny this. > > Exactly, and my point is this: if you don't know, why do you feel the > need to point out that you lack the knowledge to determine whether or > not Vulis is KGB loving? If you don't know, why bother stating this, > then claiming you see no basis in calling him a master of disinformation? I will neither confirm nor deny the fact that I'm a KGB colonel. :-) --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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DIMACS Workshop on Cryptographic Protocol Design andVerification, Sept. 3-5, 1997
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 14:11:04 -0500 From: ho(a)earth.hpc.org (Hilarie Orman) To: ipsec(a)tis.com Subject: DIMACS Workshop on Cryptographic Protocol Design and Verification, Sept. 3-5, 1997 Sender: owner-ipsec(a)ex.tis.com Precedence: bulk Here's a more complete announcement for the workshop. Hilarie ============================================================================= DIMACS Workshop on Formal Verification of Security Protocols Sept. 3-5, 1997 Organizers: Hilarie Orman, DARPA and Catherine Meadows, Naval Research Laboratory As we come to rely more and more upon computer networks to perform vital functions, the need for cryptographic protocols that can enforce a variety of security properties has become more and more important. Thus it is no surprise that in recent years a number of new protocols have been proposed for such applications as electronic credit card transactions, Web browsing, and so forth. Since it is notoriously difficult to design cryptographic protocols correctly, this increased reliance on them to provide security has become cause for some concern. This is especially the case since many of the new protocols are extremely complex. In answer to these needs, research has been intensifying in the application of formal methods to cryptographic protocol verification. Recently this work has matured enough so that it is starting to see application to real-life protocols. The goal of this workshop is to facilitate this process by bringing together those were are involved in the design and standardization of cryptographic protocols, and those who are developing and using formal methods techniques for the verification of such protocols. To this end we plan to alternate papers with panels soliciting new paths for research. We are particularly interested in paper and panel proposals addressing new protocols with respect to their formal and informal analysis. Other topics of interest include, but are not limited to - Progress in belief logics - Use of theorem provers and model checkers in verifying crypto protocols - Interaction between protocols and cryptographic modes of operation - Methods for unifying documentation and formal, verifiable specification - Methods for incorporating formal methods into crypto protocol design - Verification of cryptographic API systems - Formal definition of correctness of a cryptographic protocol - Arithmetic capability required for proofs of security for number theoretic systems - Formal definitions of cryptographic protocol requirements - Design methodologies - Emerging needs and new uses for cryptographic protocols - Multiparty protocols, in particular design and verification methods We encourage attendees to bring tools for demonstration. Information about availability of facilities for demonstration will be posted later. To submit a paper to the workshop, submit a one or two page abstract, in Postscript or ASCII to both organizers at the email addresses given below by June 16, 1997. Authors will be notified of acceptance or rejection of abstracts by July 1. Full papers will be due by August 1. Copies of papers will be distributed at the workshop. We also plan to publish a proceedings. Participation in the workshop is *not* limited to those giving presentations. If you would like to attend the workshop, a registration form is available at http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Cryptographic/reg_form.html. Information on accommodations and travel arrangements is available at http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/general/accommodations.html and http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/general/travel.html. Information on the workshop in general is at http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Cryptographic. Organizers Hilarie Orman Catherine Meadows DARPA ITO Naval Research Laboratory 3701 N. Fairfax Drive Code 5543 Arlington VA 22203-1714 Washington, DC 20375 phone: (703)696-2234 phone: (202)-767-3490 email: horman(a)darpa.mil email:meadows@itd.nrl.navy.mil --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/

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Re: Ecash Brain Tennis
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From owner-freedom-knights(a)kachina.jetcafe.org Tue Mar 11 21:48:54 1997 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Wed, 12 Mar 97 08:25:31 EST for dlv Received: from kachina.jetcafe.org by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA20396 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Tue, 11 Mar 97 21:48:54 -0500 Received: (from majordomo@localhost) by kachina.jetcafe.org (8.7.5/8.7.3) id SAA04707 for freedom-knights-outgoing; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 18:48:46 -0800 (PST) X-Authentication-Warning: kachina.jetcafe.org: majordomo set sender to owner-freedom-knights using -f Message-Id: <3.0.1.32.19970311164810.007b6350(a)flex.com> X-Sender: jai(a)flex.com (Unverified) X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.1 (32) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 16:48:10 -1000 To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org From: "Dr. Jai Maharaj" <jai(a)mantra.com> Subject: Re: Ecash Brain Tennis Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org Precedence: bulk Reply-To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) posted: > > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > [...] > Decrypt "tragedy of the commons" as "anarchy" for the cleartext > alarm being transmitted. One is reminded of: "When compared with the suppression of anarchy every other question sinks into insignificance. The anarchist is the enemy of humanity, the enemy of all mankind, and his is a deeper degree of criminality than any other. No immigrant is allowed to come to our shores if he is an anarchist; and no paper published here or abroad should be permitted circulation in this country if it propagates anarchist opinions." - President Theodore Roosevelt Jai Maharaj jai(a)mantra.com Om Shanti

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Re: Mail Volume??
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Cynthia H. Brown" <cynthb(a)sonetis.com> writes: > Perhaps many of the 1400-odd subscribers belonged to unused accounts, or > accounts on dead systems. With fewer names to process, this should speed > up the distribution significantly. FWIW, onthe few occasions when I e-mailed the 1400 addresses directly, I got hundreds of bounces from nonexistent addresses. I guess the 1400 silent supporters of moderation were another one of John Gilmore's lies. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Mail Volume
by Trevor Goodchild 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vulis KOTM wrote: > "Cynthia H. Brown" <cynthb(a)sonetis.com> writes: > > Perhaps many of the 1400-odd subscribers belonged to unused accounts, or > > accounts on dead systems. With fewer names to process, this should speed > > up the distribution significantly. > > FWIW, onthe few occasions when I e-mailed the 1400 addresses directly, I got > hundreds of bounces from nonexistent addresses. I guess the 1400 silent > supporters of moderation were another one of John Gilmore's lies. > > --- > > Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM > Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps > And on that rare occasion, my dear Doctor, why did you email those 1400 addresses directly? Perhaps you would like to share that with the rest of us? --- Trevor Goodchild

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Re: Roosevelt quote
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Dr. Jai Maharaj" <jai(a)mantra.com> writes: > On 97-03-12 18:09:16 EST, > in message <Pine.SUN.3.91.970312154111.18828B-100000(a)panix.com>, > cp(a)panix.com (Charles Platt) wrote to me: > > > > Assuming you are a real person, and assuming it was you who found the > > quote below from Roosevelt, I would love to know the source of the > > quote, because it is such a chilling indictment of a widely loved > > (i.e. misunderstood!) politician. I would like to include the quote > > in one of my future articles for Wired magazine or Internet > Underground. > > > > I'm not entirely sure that your address is genuine because it was > > quoted in a message from Dimitri Vulis, who is not entirely reliable. > > > > --CP > > > >> "When compared with the suppression of anarchy every other > >> question sinks into insignificance. The anarchist is the enemy of > >> humanity, the enemy of all mankind, and his is a deeper degree of > >> criminality than any other. No immigrant is allowed to come to our > >> shores if he is an anarchist; and no paper published here or abroad > >> should be permitted circulation in this country if it propagates > >> anarchist opinions." > >> - President Theodore Roosevelt > >> > >> Jai Maharaj > >> jai(a)mantra.com > >> Om Shanti > > Okay, I will help you in your research this time because even > though you approach me with baseless suspicion about myself and the > defamation of Dr. Dimitri Vulis whom I have found to be a very reliable > source of information, for you do appear to exhibit a genuine > concern about the quote attributed to Theodore Roosevelt. > I believe that I read the quote most recently on a page at > a site called "Anarchy for Anybody". The page has the address: > http://pubweb.acns.nwu.edu:80/~dtn307/species.html > I will be interested in reading what you decide to write on the subject, > and am mildly curious about what sort of articles have already been > published by one who begins a project with not much more than personal > prejudice. You can find a lot of Charles Platt's drivel on alt.torture, where he airs his perverse sexual fantasies. He's also earned a reputation of a crook on sci.cryonics. Be warned that Platt is a pathological liar and a racist. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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ZDNet Announces New Features!
by announce＠lists.zdnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------- ZDNET ANNOUNCEMENT 3/13/97 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Greetings from ZDNet! We're pleased to announce several exciting new features debuting on ZDNet this week! The new features include: -- A dynamic new site design -- Cool and useful Java-based viewers for product reviews -- A new slate of software application classes at ZDU -- 2 new groundbreaking sites: HealthyPC and LaunchPad. Please read on for details and visit us today to check out the latest additions to ZDNet, rated the #1 News, Information and Entertainment Web site by PC Meter for seven months in a row! ______FIND IT FAST ON ZDNET______ We've redesigned the site to speed navigation through our channels of information. You'll find a cleaner look and the ability to find quickly find the information you need using our sophisticated "Find It" feature. ZDNet: http://www5.zdnet.com/ ZDNet Find It: http://www5.zdnet.com/findit/search.html ______EXPERT PRODUCT REVIEWS______ In our enhanced ZDNet Product Channel, you can now view data from our expert product reviews using dynamic, Java-scripted "viewers". Get test results, complete product specs and other review information in a dynamic, interactive graphical interface. ZDNet Products: http://www5.zdnet.com/products/ ______LEARN THE LATEST SOFTWARE______ ZDNet University, the best place on the Web for online learning, has added a slate of new classes. You can get hands-on training from expert instructors in the latest new applications, including Java Script, Adobe Photoshop, Lotus Notes 4.5 and more! ZDNet University: http://www.zdu/com ______KEEP YOUR PC IN TOP SHAPE______ Is your PC in top shape? You can get the best PC healthcare and preventative maintenance at our new HealthyPC site, developed with Symantec, the leading supplier of utilities and anti-virus software. We've got expert advice, free downloads and tips and tricks to keep your PC running in optimum condition. HealthyPC: http://www.healthypc.com ______BE THE FIRST TO SEE NEW SOFTWARE______ Visit LaunchPad, our new site where you can be the first to check out the hottest new software, before it's available anywhere else! LaunchPad is your interactive source for doing your own research -- talk with product managers -- plus by downloading software, you can do your own hands-on testing of the best new software on the market. LaunchPad: http://www.zdlaunchpad.com ________________________________________________ ZDNet Announcements are periodic notices of new features, special events and free offers available to members of ZDNet. --To subscribe to ZDNet Announcements, please send mail to: announce-on(a)lists.zdnet.com You can leave the subject and body blank. --To unsubscribe to ZDNet Announcements, please send mail to: announce-off(a)lists.zdnet.com You can leave the subject and body blank. ________________________________________________ Powered by Mercury Mail: http://www.merc.com

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