December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Race Bit: C
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:11 PM 9/5/96 +0000, jonathon wrote: >On Thu, 5 Sep 1996, Anonymous wrote: >> defunded 100%, IMO). Violence begats violence which begats even larger >> government, don't start us on that road -- leave me in peace. >If I understand you correctly, it is OK for a government to >institute violence against the residents of the land it claims >dominion over, but it is not acceptable for the inhabitants of >that piece of land to respond in self defence. I think Mr. Anonymous displays a mental crutch that you'll occasionally see: A person who, while he'll not quite admit defending the status quo, criticizes alternatives to it yet doesn't have a solution of his own. He says he wants to be left "in peace," forgetting that most people in the world today are NOT left in peace. The way I see it, the status quo doesn't come "pre-justified": It needs just as much a defense as any other proposal. Its main advantage is that it tends to be more understood that most hypotheticals, because it's been tested. Sadly, people tend to ignore its disadvantages, to to excess familiarity. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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No Subject
by Zaphoid _d00l 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

desubscribe

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Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology (fwd)
by Donald E. Eastlake 3rd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Suggest you look at draft-eastlake-internet-payment-*.txt in the IETF shadow directories. I don't think any one step will solve all our spam problems but I wouldn't mind spending, say, 5 cents for each real piece of mail I sent outside my company and if end machines charged 5 cents per piece of ouside mail received, I think spamming would be crippled. (Note that with bad guy lists, you could collect the money and then just throw away the mail.) Donald (not on cypherpunks) ===================================================================== Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1 508-287-4877(tel) dee(a)cybercash.com 318 Acton Street +1 508-371-7148(fax) dee(a)world.std.com Carlisle, MA 01741 USA +1 703-620-4200(main office, Reston, VA) http://www.cybercash.com http://www.eff.org/blueribbon.html ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 1 Sep 1996 19:47:15 -0400 From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Subject: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology Date: Sun, 1 Sep 1996 11:35:28 -0700 Mime-Version: 1.0 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology Keywords: agoric systems, computational ecologies, resource auctioning, Mark Miller, K. Eric Drexler, Bernardo Huberman, contracts, distributed trust, metered usage, software objects, software ICs, superdistribution, Brad Cox, emergent order. In physics there are various conservation laws: conservation of energy, mass, charge, and whatnot. You all know about this... Conservation of mass says that mass is neither created nor destroyed. (For smart aleck quibblers, conservation of mass-energy.) How does this relate to our issues? "Abuse of Resources": Mail loops, infinite loops, spamming, overloads of networks, and congestion in general are cases where "unrealistic" models of costs are implemented in software. In the real physical world, infinite loops don't occur (at least not in the sense seen with mail loops, as a relevant example.) Conservation laws are related to the "cost model" of the universe. Real physical objects have costs, or ontological status, or presence.... (Please don't read too much into this point...I mean to be suggestive, not literal.) There are no "memory leaks" in the universe which suddenly fill it up with stuff, no perpetual motion machines, no creation and destruction of objects. Cyberspace Ontologies: There are several things which need to be done to make the cyberspatial world more like the spatial world: * payment for CPU cycles consumed (via contractual, permission-based access: "If you want access to this machine, here are the terms and conditions.") * metering mechanisms, such as e-stamps for e-mail (essentially a special case of the first point, where a machine says "I'll pass on your message if you pay me to.") * digital contracts, agreements on usage and payment (resource auctioning, or the "smart contracts" that Nick Szabo has written about) (you can all think of additional examples....) Cryptographic protocols have their uses here, but there are also some other measures which bear looking into. In the LISP community, for example, work has been done on "engines," which are building blocks that are "fueled up" with "CPU fuel" and allowed to run for some amount of CPU cycles. Thus, one could put an engine into a process and it would run for some number of ticks, then stop. (I'm sure there are Unix-level tools which do similar things, in terms of giving a spawned process so many ticks of the clock. The "engines" concept is somewhat more semantically clean, in that it's pushed down into the "ontology" of the thing being simulated or run, and is not at the "God level" (to use a non-technical term!).) Now, certainly I support the right of any person or machine to run programs freely and without charge, to pass on e-mail free of charge, to run remailers for no charge, to accept spam mail without complaint, and so on. What I'm suggesting is that many of the problems being seen with overuse of resources, spam, congestion, and denial of service are really due to a poor model of resource allocation. Unix and other modern operating systems offer various tools for helping to constrain such problems, but, I submit, better methods are needed. (Especially when multiple machines, networks, and even anonymous sites are part of the overall system....clearly the constraints must be managed locally, and via "contract," as part of a computational ecology, and not as a hierarchical, top down Unix-type operating system.) Economics is about the "allocation of scarce resources." Many of the existing models being used treat various scarce resources as _free_. Then, when the inevitable problems occur, calls for top-down regulation are heard (e.g., the frequent calls for illegalization of "unwanted mail"). In my view, building a consistent, distributed, "conservative" system is what Cypherpunks need to be thinking about. (I used the term "conservative" in the physics sense. A system in which various conservation laws are obeyed.) As I said before, this should not be compelled, but voluntary. However, those who give their resources away for free (choosing not to adopt a conservative ontology, in other words) should be in no position to complain or run to the government for top-down regulation because there freely-given resources are being overused or "abused" (in their thinking). And closely related to this whole issue--and something I've written about extensively--is the issue of "building walls in cyberspace." In the real world, persistent structures are build out of real materials, resulting in castles, forts, skyscrapers, bridges, houses, highways, etc. These objects have persistence, have controllable access (gates, doors, locks,...), and have "structural integrity." Cryptographic and distributed trust protocols are about the only means I can think of for constructing the equivalents in cyberspace. (And to a large extent, this is already happening: the Net and the Web have structure which cannot be demolished casually, or by top-down orders from any single national leader. Millions of machines, linked in various ways and implementing various protocols and "terms of service" with users and other machines....an early version of the "conservative" system I think we'll someday see.) Well, this gives the flavor of my points. I haven't rigorously argued all of the points, but the Cypherpunks forum is for presenting informal arguments. Thoughts? --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe from this list, send a letter to: Majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu In the body of the message, write: unsubscribe dcsb Or, to subscribe, write: subscribe dcsb If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB(a)ai.mit.edu

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BAY AREA PARTY REMINDER
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, We are at one week and counting until my Second Occasional Anarcho-Dilettante costume party. If you would like to attend please RSVP as soon as possible. If you did not get or keep the original invitation, let me know and I'll send you another copy. In addition to Cypherpunks and Extropians, there will be gun nuts, a contingent of Burning Man survivors and some total strangers. It will be one hell of a party. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exactly?)
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is another spin possible on the reasons for replacement of pay phones with credit card phones. In Canada all new credit card phones are also able to take phone cards (which are anonymous). Using a prepaid phone card permits full anonymity. But what it also permits is metered local calls. This infrastructure would be more familiar to someone from Europe where metered local calls are the norm. Paris make the change to phones that *only* take prepaid phone cards (thus fully anonymous) obstensibly because people were breaking into phones for the money. Prepaid phone cards avoid this. James Why should my long distance calling subsidize your local internet access? ;-) ---------- From: "<pstira(a)escape.com>" <pstira(a)escape.com> Sent: Friday, September 06, 1996 9:54 AM To: unicorn(a)schloss.li Cc: vznuri(a)netcom.com; cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: What is the EFF doing exactly? Not just DC and Chicago, I'm afraid. If anyone around NYC noticed, there are less and less payphones, and all new ones installed, just about, are those yellow credit card phones. Not all of them, but it's now one for one, at least.

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Re: Reputations
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I don't see how there can be such a thing as negative reputation > capital. Wouldn't that mean B believes the opposite of what A says? If > you anti-believed someone in a consistent manner, couldn't they exploit > that? Of course they could exploit that. But you're not "anti-believing" the information an untrusted party is passing. Rather, you are not acting on their information in *any* fashion. You're ignoring them. In the case of the common killfile, you may not even know that they're talking at you. > Also, you are speaking only of 1-to-1 reputation-relationships. But that > is inefficient. The mere fact of having to evaluate each person's > reputation yourself is significant work. It is significant work. How much work depends on how valuable the transactions you are considering are to you. It's not as if the notion of reputation capital doesn't have precedent. When I make a purchase for my business, I do quite a bit of checking on the background of individuals and businesses I am purchasing from. The amount of reference work I do depends on how much I intend to spend. Furthermore, I am much more apt to do business with individuals who have been referred by other trusted parties (a transfer of raputation capital). Also my initial investment with a relative unknown is usually small. The repuatation capital of both parties increases relative to one another as a relationship is continued. > On the other hand, you could talk about the transmission of reputations. [..snip..] > For instance, when a certain infamously-low-reputation (deservedly so) > individual recently joined the cypherpunk lists, others who had endured > him in the past tried to relay their impressions of him. It proved very > difficult to convey, and they were somewhat attacked for their efforts > and not entirely believed. You seem to view the notion repuatation capital as absolute. It is relative to each user of it. The unnamed you are referring to did indeed come in with quite a bit of negative repuatation capital attached to his name. While I might regard the opinions of others on the list as being valuable, I chose to see for myself if the unnamed person warranted his bad repuation. > In other words, he *could not* spend down to 0, despite years of > unflagging effort. In other words, I decide if an when he has "spent down to zero" with me -- even if we never directly communicate. > Now, suppose J. Anonymous Gourmand spams all of Usenet, and millions of > people who have never heard of J. Anonymous Gourmand before read a > plausible but false account of the disgustingness of McDonald's food. > Perhaps the same detailed study, just fake. (Not to intertangle this > with other issues, let's further suppose that Ms. Gourmand sneaks in > underneath spam-watcher's radar, and cleverly appears to be on topic in > every group.) > > Nothing about her reputation has changed, but surely when her claim is > read by millions it will hurt McDonalds a non-trivial amount. Why? That depends on the sophistication of millions of Usenet readers (heh). I think your extension of this example is not useful. It's impossible not to "intermingle it with other issues" such as the substance of the message itself, the ability to verify any factual information, etc. etc. ad nauseam. Reputation is but one factor in many and has a mostly negative effect if J. Anonymous Goumand is indeed anonymous. Change J. Anonymous Gourmand to say, C. Everett Koop, and you can envision a more tangible example of reputation capital in action. me -------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <mailto:omega@bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send a message with the text "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key. --------------------------------------------------------------

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U.K. cyberporn fearstorm, Singapore attacks Julf, from HotWired
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sgt. Toby Tyler is actually a bit of a cypherpunk. He told me he "absolutely" supports anonymous remailers -- repressive governments in Asia and all that. He just doesn't think that many people will use 'em. -Declan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 1996 05:55:26 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: U.K. cyberporn fearstorm, Singapore attacks Julf, from HotWired [Also in today's Netizen on HotWired is a report from India on their Net-regulations and Brock in Muckraker on the White House's new "Key Recovery Initiative" anti-crypto legislation. Check out http://www.hotwired.com/ --Declan] ********** http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/96/36/index4a.html HotWired, The Netizen 6-8 Sept 96 Finnish Line by Declan McCullagh Washington, DC, 5 September Call it a cyberporn fear-storm: Splashed across the front page of the 25 August issue of the London Observer was a hysterical report naming Finnish pseudonymous remailer operator Julf Helsingius as the "man US police-experts charge with being at the hub of 90 percent of the child pornography on the Internet." The report continued: "'Somewhere between 75 and 90 percent of all the child pornography I see is supplied through this remailer,' said Toby Tyler of the FBI." That was enough to make Helsingius - already reeling under threats from the Singapore government and repeated legal attacks from the always-litigious Church of Scientology - pull the plug on his anon.penet.fi site last Friday. But in trying to milk the story, the Observer went too far. The "FBI investigator" the paper cited as their only support for the accusations doesn't exist. In truth, Tyler is a sergeant in California's San Bernardino sheriff's office, and he says the Observer intentionally misrepresented his identity and his statements. Tyler says "there's very little of the story I agree with," and the Observer took a conversation he had with a reporter "and selectively chose words that would mean what they wanted." [...] Helsingius blames the Observer for scaremongering. "It was quite clear that they were trying to create a story where there was none ... I quite clearly outlined why my server wasn't transmitting child porn," Helsingius said. "I stated that the Finnish police had investigated and found that it wasn't. These comments were ignored. They wanted to make a story so they made things up." [...] Still, a malicious front-page splash in the Observer isn't the full extent of Helsingius's troubles. Now he's also up against the Singapore government, which has demanded the identity of one of the users in his half-million-person database... The unknown user, who has the email address an511172(a)anon.penet.fi, posted hundreds of messages to the soc.culture.singapore newsgroup under the name of "Lee Kwan Yew," the retired prime minister of Singapore. The messages are short and unimaginative, yet apparently are just enough to piss off the thin-skinned Singaporean officials. One post reads: "We are small and vulnerable. Without regulations, we will be like Hong Kong, oops, fuck, bad example, they are actually doing quite all right. - SM Lee Kwan Yew, Republic of Singapore." Now that a Finnish court recently ruled that the remailer's database could be breached in a Scientology case, Helsingius says he's not sure what might happen. In the meantime, he's stuck somewhere between a sensationalist British newspaper and a Singaporean government bent on silencing opposition. [...] Links from the article: Linkname: hysterical report in London Observer Filename: http://www.scallywag.com/obtext.htm Linkname: Singapore banning Web pages Filename: http://www.eff.org/~declan/global/sg/ Linkname: hundreds of messages pseudonymously posted Filename: http://www.eff.org/~declan/global/sg/anon.posts.090596.txt ###

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CFP 97: Burlingame, CA
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwadred from RISKS: ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 3 Sep 1996 12:37:14 -0700 (PDT) From: Bruce R Koball <bkoball> Subject: 7th Computers, Freedom, and Privacy THE SEVENTH CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, AND PRIVACY Call for Participation San Francisco Airport Hyatt Regency Hotel Burlingame, California 11-14 March 1997 CFP97: Commerce & Community will be sponsored by the Association for Computing Machinery SIGCOM and SIGSAC. The host institutions will be Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley. Co-sponsors and cooperating organizations include the ACM SIGCAS, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the WELL. CFP97: Commerce & Community is the latest in a series of annual conferences assembling a diverse group of experts and advocates from the domains of technology, business, government, and academia to explore the evolution of information and communication technologies and public policy, and its effects on freedom and privacy in the United States and throughout the world. Past CFP sessions have discussed, debated -- and often anticipated -- issues of great social import. In this tradition, CFP97: Commerce & Community will examine the social and policy questions posed by: * the growth of electronic communities; * electronic commerce and the commercialization of cyberspace; * the problems of legal and regulatory control of the Net; * the interests of privacy and property in the electronic domain; * high-tech law enforcement and security concerns. The CFP97 Program Committee invites your suggestions for presentations on these or other important issues at the nexus of technology, business, public policy, freedom, and privacy. Proposals may be for individual talks, panel discussions, debates, moot courts, moderated, interactive sessions or other formats. Each proposal should be accompanied by a one-page statement describing the topic and format. Descriptions of multi-person presentations should include a list of proposed participants and session chair. Proposals should be sent by e-mail to cfp97(a)cfp.org. If necessary, typewritten proposals may be sent to: CFP'97, 2210 Sixth Street, Berkeley, CA 94710. Please submit your proposal as soon as possible. The deadline for submissions is 1 October 1996. (Please note that we have extended our deadline for submissions) For more information on the Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conferences, as well as up-to-date announcements on CFP'97, please visit our Web page at: http://www.cfp.org ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | Technology (n): | | A substitute for adulthood. stevenw(a)best.com | Popular with middle-aged men.

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Neo-Nazis etc.
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Try to keep in mind that "Nazis" aren't skinheads and other troublemakers exactly, which is to say, those are the first people Hitler got rid of when he came to power. Real Nazis are/were bureaucrats; cold, calculating, bureaucratic. Do we know anyone like that?

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Sep 20th SF C'punks meeting: ITAR on trial
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We're having another "Cypherpunks Dress-Up Day" on Friday, September 20th. Meet at the Federal Building in San Francisco, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, at 11:45AM, in high-quality business drag. [There will also be a regular Saturday meeting this month, on Sep 14.] It's been eleven months to the day since our first hearings in Dan Bernstein's lawsuit against the NSA and State Department. At this hearing, starting at High Noon, we hope to convince Judge Marilyn Hall Patel to declare that the ITAR (export regulations) and AECA (export law) are unconstitutional. We are asking her to order the State Department to immediately stop enforcing them with respect to cryptographic software. Simultaneously, the government is asking her to declare that their actions have been completely legal and Constitutional, and to throw out our lawsuit. Judge Patel has asked both sides to fully explore all the legal issues in the case for this hearing, leaving aside any unresolved factual questions (like exactly how many people have had their exports denied). She plans to decide the questions: * Should the government's actions be examined under the "strict scrutiny" appropriate when they attempt to restrict speech, or under a looser "O'Brien" test that applies when the government seeks to restrict conduct and only incidentally restricts speech? * Is the ITAR Scheme a prior restraint on speech? * Does the ITAR Scheme impermissibly punish speech after the fact? * Is the ITAR Scheme too vague to constitutionally regulate speech? * Is the ITAR Scheme so broadly worded that it unconstitutionally limits speech protected by the First Amendment? * Were the government's actions as applied to Dan Bernstein unconstitutional restrictions on his First Amendment rights? It's possible, but unlikely, that the judge will decide some of this then-and-there. Instead, we will get some insights into how she is leaning, based on her questions and comments. Her written decision will come out some weeks or months later. She then plans to certify the case for immediate appeal to a higher court (the Ninth Circuit, also here in San Francisco), to confirm or deny her legal analysis. >From there it will probably go to the Supreme Court. Watch the wheels of justice grind! Meet the intrepid lawyers who are working hard to protect our rights! Shake hands with one or more NSA representatives specially flown in for the occasion! Meet some journalists and be quoted talking about crypto freedom! We will follow the hearing with a group lunch at Max's Opera Plaza, a block away at Van Ness Avenue and Golden Gate Avenue. As background, Dan Bernstein, ex-grad-student from UC Berkeley, is suing the State Department, NSA, and other agencies, with help from the EFF. These agencies restrained Dan's ability to publish a paper, as well as source code, for the crypto algorithm that he invented. We claim that their procedures, regulations, and laws are not only unconstitutional as applied to Dan, but in general. Full background and details on the case, including all of our legal papers (and most of the government's as well), are in the EFF Web archives at: http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case. Like Phil Karn's and Peter Junger's cases, this lawsuit really has the potential to outlaw the whole NSA crypto export scam. We intend to make your right to publish and export crypto software as well- protected by the courts as your right to publish and export books. It will probably take more years, and an eventual Supreme Court decision, to make it stick. But this is the hearing at which we plan to convince our judge that these laws really are unconstitutional. Her order restoring our legal right to publish crypto source code could come out by Christmas! Please make a positive impression on the judge. Show her -- by showing up -- that this case matters to more people than just the plaintiff and defendant. Demonstrate that her decision will make a difference to society. That the public and the press are watching, and really do care that she handles the issue well. We'll have to be quiet and orderly while we're in the courthouse. There will be no questions from the audience (that's us), and no photography, but the session will be tape-recorded and transcribed, and you can take notes if you like. The lobby guards will want to hold onto guns, "munitions", and even small pocketknives, before they'll let you go upstairs to the courtrooms. So, here's your excuse to put on a nice costume, take an early lunch, and pay a call on the inner sanctum of our civil rights. See you there! John Gilmore PS: If you can't come, you can still contribute. Join EFF's Legal Defense Fund; see http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/cyberlegal_fund_eff.announce.

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FW: Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exa...
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: FW: Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exactly?) There is another spin possible on the reasons for replacement of pay phones with credit card phones. In Canada all new credit card phones are also able to take phone cards (which are anonymous). Using a prepaid phone card permits full anonymity. But what it also permits is metered local calls. This infrastructure would be more familiar to someone from Europe where metered local calls are the norm. Paris made the change to phones that *only* take prepaid phone cards (thus fully anonymous) obstensibly because people were breaking into phones for the money. Prepaid phone cards avoid this as well as collection costs. James Why should my long distance calling subsidize your local internet access? ;-) ---------- From: "<pstira(a)escape.com>" <pstira(a)escape.com> Sent: Friday, September 06, 1996 9:54 AM To: unicorn(a)schloss.li Cc: vznuri(a)netcom.com; cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: What is the EFF doing exactly? Not just DC and Chicago, I'm afraid. If anyone around NYC noticed, there are less and less payphones, and all new ones installed, just about, are those yellow credit card phones. Not all of them, but it's now one for one, at least.

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Co$ Buys EFF
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, September 6, 1996, p. D2. Behind an Internet Message Service's Close Pressure From Church of Scientology Is Blamed for the Shutdown. A Finnish judge says different rules apply to E-mail. By Peter H. Lewis Pressure from the Church of Scientology International was at least partly responsible for the recent shutdown of a well-known Internet messaging service based in Helsinki, according to the Finnish operator of the service. The service, known by its Internet address, anon.penet.fi, was used by hundreds of thousands of people worldwide to send and receive electronic messages without divulging their true identities. It was the best known of a small, global network of special computers known as remailers, whose legitimate users include political dissidents, people with medical or drug ailments and others who want to communicate anonymously. Although previous news accounts had reported that the service was shut down because of accusations that it was a primary conduit for child pornography transmitted on the Internet, police investigators in Helsinki dismissed those accusations as groundless. The real reason for terminating the service, according to its founder and operator, Johan Helsingius, was a recent Helsinki court ruling that ordered him to reveal the true name of one of his system's users to the Church of Scientology. The judge held that under Finland's current telecommunications laws, Internet electronic mail does not carry the same privacy protections enjoyed by postal mail or telephone calls. The church, which in recent years has been trying to protect its copyrighted scriptures by trying to block their dissemination over computer networks, said an unknown person or persons had used the anon.penet.fi computer to illegally publish copyrighted church documents on Usenet, the global electronic bulletin board. Mr. Helsingius, a 35-year-old computer networking expert, has not yet revealed the name sought by the Scientologists, and said he planned to appeal the court ruling. But he said the court ruling opened the door for future subpoenas seeking the real names of anon.penet.fi users, and that he would rather close the system than spend all his time in court. Mr. Helsingius has operated anon.penet.fi for more than 3 years, handling over 7,000 messages a day. "In a sense I've done my pioneer work and it is now up to others to carry on," Mr. Helsingius said. Helena Kobrin, a Church of Scientology official, said the complaint against anon.penet.fi was just one of several actions the church had taken against the operators of remailer computers in Europe and the United States. She said the church has five lawsuits pending in the United States against remailer operators and users of remailers. "We have actively been in communication with various remailers about postings that have gone through their systems," said Ms. Kobrin, general counsel for the Religious Technology Center in Los Angeles, which is responsible for protecting the copyrights and trade secrets of unpublished Scientology scriptures. Earlier this year, another remailer, known as hacktic.nl, in the Netherlands, was shut down under pressure from the Scientologists. Unlike many other churches, the Church of Scientology, founded nearly 40 years ago by the science fiction author L. Ron Hubbard, regards its gospel as copyrighted material and a trade secret. Several courts have upheld the validity of the copyrights. Foes and critics of the church have used the Internet to publish the church documents, as well as other documents the church contends were stolen from its computers. The Religious Technology Center has also unsuccessfully attempted to put a stop to the forum on Usenet, alt.religion.scientology, where many of the copyrighted documents are published. A series of recent news articles in The Observer of London among others had linked the anon.penet.fi computer to accusations it was a conduit for child pornography. Mr. Helsingius, who has denied that his system is a conduit for child pornography, declined to speculate on the motives of the accusers. The accusations of child pornography first appeared several days after Mr. Helsingius declined to turn over to the court the name sought by the Scientologists. The Observer quoted Toby Tyler, identified as an adviser to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as saying anon.penet.fi was the source for up to 90 percent of the child pornography on the Internet. But Richard P. (Toby) Tyler, a sergeant in the San Bernardino, Calif., County Sheriff's Department who said his involvement with the F.B.I. was minimal, said he was misquoted by the newspaper. Mr. Tyler, who has investigated pornography trafficking in cyberspace, said that most child pornography on the Internet did not pass through remailers. He did say, however, that of the small portion that does, 70 percent to 90 percent passes through anon.penet.fi. "I think that's a shame," Sergeant Tyler said upon learning that anon.penet.fi was closed. "I personally view its closing as a loss of freedom. I did not like the abuse of the remailer for child pornography, but I felt it served a necessary political purpose in this world." Ms. Kobrin of the Religious Technology Center said that despite its legal actions, the Church of Scientology does not oppose the operation of remailers, which are also known as anonymous servers. "We were not opposing the existence of his server," Ms. Kobrin said. "We have no opposition to there being anonymity for private, consensual communications. What we oppose is using anonymous servers for the purpose of permitting criminal or other unlawful acts. There has to be responsibility and accountability." [End]

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Test...sorry about this
by Z.B. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm just posting this to see if there's something wrong with my mail filter - it dumped a ton of messages from this list over the night, and I'm trying to figure out why the !@%$# it did that. Sorry for the interruption. --- Zach Babayco zachb(a)netcom.com <----- finger for PGP public key http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Park/4127

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Re: Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exactly?)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:08 AM 9/6/96 EST, jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: >There is another spin possible on the reasons for replacement of pay phones with >credit card phones. In Canada all new credit card phones are also able to take >phone cards (which are anonymous). Don't be too sure about the "anonymity" of these cards. You don't have to give your name when you buy or use them, but assuming a large number of phone calls (to, from different locations) can be associated together after the fact, your name can probably be fairly easily obtained. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology (fwd)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:46 AM 9/6/96 -0400, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote: >Suggest you look at draft-eastlake-internet-payment-*.txt in the >IETF shadow directories. I don't think any one step will solve all >our spam problems but I wouldn't mind spending, say, 5 cents for each >real piece of mail I sent outside my company and if end machines charged >5 cents per piece of ouside mail received, I think spamming would be >crippled. (Note that with bad guy lists, you could collect the money and >then just throw away the mail.) Assuming we all agree that we're moving from a paper-based mail system to email, it is logical that "junk mail" will move as well. As I recall, statistics show that the average cost of a piece of junk mail is about $1 or so, including postage, printing, etc. It occurred to me a while back (and this proposal appears to be at least approximated by other proposals around here) that since companies are already saving a dollar, they should use some of those savings to "bribe" Internet-users into reading those (commercial) messages. Don't bother with all the details on how to verify this, just include digital cash along with the message, to be credited automatically to the recipient. Assuming the average Internet user already pays about $15 per month for access, he would only have to receive 2 emails a day which pay him 25 cents per, to pay for this service. At that point, his Internet access would be free, at least somewhat analogous to free TV which is paid for by commercials. Everybody's ahead, except for the postman, the printer, etc. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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electronic offshore banking
by Jüri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are there any good offshore banks that would allow you to use your account over the Internet? I know European Union Bank www.eub.com is on of those available, but their US$ 25.000 minimum deposit is too stupid. Jüri Kaljundi AS Stallion jk(a)stallion.ee

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Re: Reputations
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:11 AM 9/6/96, Greg Burk wrote: >> I strongly disagree. It's quite possible for Person A to quickly convert >> his reputation to Person B to a _negative_ value. Real quick, in fact. > >I don't see how there can be such a thing as negative reputation >capital. Wouldn't that mean B believes the opposite of what A says? If >you anti-believed someone in a consistent manner, couldn't they exploit >that? Well, I suppose that if you don't believe in negative repuation capital, I'm not going to be able to spend enough time to convince you. It's like someone saying they're not sure such a thing as "entropy" exists. >For instance, when a certain infamously-low-reputation (deservedly so) >individual recently joined the cypherpunk lists, others who had endured >him in the past tried to relay their impressions of him. It proved very >difficult to convey, and they were somewhat attacked for their efforts >and not entirely believed. > >In other words, he *could not* spend down to 0, despite years of >unflagging effort. No, with many of the list members, his reputation was in fact negative. They disbelieved nearly anything he had to say, and his approval of some idea was largely cause for others to take the opposite tack. About as clear an example of a negative reputation as one can find. (Note that I am not saying his reputation is negative with _me_.) >I've already made the points I wanted to make, so I may not have further >comments. Nor me. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: What the NSA is patenting
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:26 AM 9/3/96 -0500, Bruce Schneier wrote: >I just spent a pleasant hour or so searching a patent database for all >patents assigned to the NSA. There's some interesting stuff: > > "Self-locking, tamper-evident package" > Method of retrieving documents that concern the same topic" > >Fifty-Four patents total. (Used to be they just kept stuff secret; now >they patent some of it.) Attached is the most interesting thing I found: a >patent on techniques for reading data off overwritten magnetic media. > >Bruce [ Interesting patent deleted ] This method implies that they have the ability to scan the entire platter surface at resolution level that is basically atomic. >From lots of experience gained from working with metalworking machinery, it sounds like some of the old magnetic data might be leaving traces behind by a process called "backlash". It happens because machines don't realign themselves precisely, unless the lead-in steps are repeated every time. A fairly simple demonstration of this can be found on most dot-matrix printers. They usually have a mode called "uni-directional" printing, where the printhead puts dots on the paper only when travelling from left-to-right. This is used to improve the quality of a graphic image. Print a simple pattern of repeating vertical bars (||||||) across the page and down several lines with this mode turned off, and you'll probably notice the lines tend to not line up perfectly. Turn uni-directional printing on, and watch the behavior of the printhead. It will "home" itself to the far left side before printing the next line of bars. The bars will then be lined up "better" than in the bi-directional print. We should be able to use this feature to our advantage to write a "backlash- enhanced" wipedisk driver. The wipedisk utilities I've seen today primarily consist of repeatedly writing a pattern such as 0x55555555, then 0xAAAAAAAA, then 0xFFFFFFFF, then 0x00000000. While this will probably eradicate most of the traces of the original data, it's all happening "unidirectionally" -- starting at the first sector of the file, write this data till all the sectors have been overwritten. Given that the original data may have been written in reverse sector order, or reverse cylinder motion order, or after a large cylinder change, the wipedisk might still leave traces remaining on the disk. Using the above example of printing vertical bars, imagine having each line print three times using the unidirectional mode, and randomly picking one line out of the entire array to print bi-directionally. It'll stand out like a sore thumb. That's what I think they're looking for with their data recovery method. What would probably make for a more secure wipe utility would be to alter the "head approach path" prior to making each of the passes described above. So, before overwriting the sectors in order from 0 to EOF full of 0x55555555s, have the head move to the 0th cylinder first. Before overwriting the sectors in order from 0 to EOF with 0xAAAAAAAAs, have the head move to the last cylinder beforehand. Repeat for the 0xFFFFFFFF and 0x00000000 sectors, except overwrite the sectors in order from EOF to 0. All this pre-writing motion could theoretically reduce the repeatability of the drive head positioning arm as well as possibly hitting different rotational sync points, using the backlash effect to its fullest extent. Of course, the biggest problem will be that of overcoming intelligent disk controllers. No self-respecting SCSI drive is going to voluntarily swing the disk head around inefficiently, and I don't know enough about how IDE works to say anything different about it. I hope some hardware hacker who knows their low-level stuff will be able to write a secure disk wiper. John -- J. Deters "Captain's log, stardate 25970-point-5. I am nailed to the hull." +-------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'36"N by 93^16'27"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +-------------------------------------------------------+

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Muckraker column
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Not sure it came through in my cut-and-paste, but the Muckraker column is of course by Brock Meeks and went up on the site today. -Declan

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Re: Race Bit: C
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:05 AM 9/6/96 +0000, jonathon wrote: >On Thu, 5 Sep 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> The way I see it, the status quo doesn't come "pre-justified": It needs >> just as much a defense as any other proposal. Its main advantage is that it >> tends to be more understood that most hypotheticals, because it's been > >More understood, and just more accepted, because alternatives >are hard to conceive, and even harder to popularize, without >lots of red liquid running in the streets? Since red liquid running in the streets is generally so reviled, one of the things which mystifies me is why there aren't more simulation-type programs used to test out hypotheticals, for example a "SimEconomy." For example, you'll occasionally hear about a media news organization gathering a dozen or so volunteers in a room, and asking them to solve a problem like "The Budget Deficit" or some such. The result of their interplay is generally used to explain why these problems are hard to solve. I, for one, would love to be able to program in an immediate 25%+ reduction in military spending (added to that a 5%/year cumulative cut after that for 10+ years), a 5% cut then a cap on Socialist Insecurity, 5% per year (cumulative,for 10 years) of reduction in welfare, along with similarly substantial cuts/caps in Medicare and a few other features. Obviously, a computer-based simulation wouldn't just blindly do the cuts, but would also estimate the secondary and tertiary effects of such cuts, for example spending in areas whose economies are traditionally dependant on defense programs, etc. I'm not saying that I think these changes would be _easy_, politically, but if the average citizen were made aware of how simple the changes were, he'd be less tolerant of special-interest politics. > On second thoughts, let's just terminate > with extreme prejudice, each and every individual > who has worked in any capacity for any part of any > government agency in the us -- regardless of whether it > was federal, state or local, and regardless of whether > they were president, janitor, or clerk. > All people in the employ of government agencies are death-dealers. I hope you don't expect me to argue with this B^) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: PRESS RELEASE: GERMANY CENSORS DUTCH WEBSITE WWW.XS4ALL.NL
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:18 AM 9/6/96, tank wrote: >Please forward: > * * * P R E S S R E L E A S E * * * > > >GERMANY CENSORS DUTCH WEBSITE WWW.XS4ALL.NL, WITH 3100 WEBPAGES > > >German internetproviders, joined in the Internet Content Taskforce >(ICTF), started censoring the Dutch website www.xs4all.nl, containing >3100 personal and commercial homepages. This act of censorship is >caused by the webpage of a magazine that is banned in Germany, Radikal >(http://www.xs4all.nl/ ~tank/radikal/). ... Though my German friends will perhaps feel I am picking on them, this is not so (this week Germany is in the hot seat, last week it was Singapore....). A Modest Proposal: * as Germany is bent on blocking sites which carry this subversive pamphlet, "Radikal," let us mirror it on thousands of sites around the world. * when the Germans went into Danmark and insisted Jews wear badges, ordinary citizens (and the Danish Royal Family, as I recall) also took to wearing these Star of David badges. * wouldn't it be deliciously ironic if the "Free Speech Blue Ribbon" now attached to so many pages were to be joined by a "Star of David"? This Star of David symbol could mean "We support freedom to read, and our site contains the "Radikal" publication which Germans are forbidden to access." (I know nothing of how such symbolic campaigns are actually launched and managed, so I'm suggesting the hint of an idea. I do think mirroring the banned publication (_any_ banned publication, by _any_ government) on as many sites as possible is a Good Idea.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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"The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...."
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:30 PM 9/5/96, Omegaman wrote: >What strikes me as odd is that the arguments against anonymous >communication are nearly identical to those against strong crypto. >ie. the same four horsemen flare up in these discussions. Yet we >have parties who are ostensibly pro-crypto but anti-anonymity. > >To put it in a nutshell, in a free society I can have a private >conversation, but I must essentially announce that I am having one >and who I am having that conversation with? As with Adam Back's mini-rant yesterday, this is exactly correct. In a free society, speech need not be approved, registered, escrowed, labelled, or identified with the Registered True Name of the speaker. One can paraphrase Esther Dyson's concerns about anonymity in several fairly equivalent forms. Here's the original: "Anonymity can be dangerous -- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." Here's a slightly paraphrased version for freedom to read anonymously, with some "reasons" included in brackets: "Books and magazines can be dangerous [bomb recipes, racial hatred, instilling bad values, etc.]-- as can restrictions on reading, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing unfettered reading -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." (i.e., "book escrow," where one's reading materials are escrowed with Trusted Authorities, and only accessed by law enforcement under Proper Conditions. Failure to escrow reading materials would be a Class B felony. Cf. the FBI's Library Awareness Program of circa 1987-8.) A version for freedom of movement: "People moving around can be dangerous [avoiding parental responsibilities, avoiding taxes, spying, plotting to bomb buildings]-- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing freedom of movement -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." (a la the "position escrow system" I predicted a couple of years ago would someday be seriously considered) A version for freedom of association: "Freedom of association can be dangerous [plotting of crimes, gathering of mobs, spread of dangerous ideas, disease]-- as can restrictions on such gatherings, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing freedom of association -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." ("Club escrow"? All mailing lists, clubs, associations, and such would have to escrow an up-to-date list of members, associates, and contacts. Then, with proper authorization by proper authorities, law enforcement could inspect these lists to see who had been meeting with whom. Hotels would have to monitor use of rooms by more than two persons (the two person case is already covered by the "Sex can be dangerous..." variant of the Dyson Principle).) A version for anonymous purchases and sales: "Anonymity in sales and purchases can be dangerous [bomb materials, stolen goods, unhealthful foods, etc.] -- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing anonymous purchases and sales of goods -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." (There go the flea markets and garage sales (for buyers), which are largely anonymous. There goes walking into a store and paying cash for a piece of pipe (could be made into a bomb). There goes cash, period. See next item.) A version for cash: "Cash can be dangerous [illegal purchases, drugs, prostitution, tax evasion, illegal workers, extortion, etc.] -- as can traceable money, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing cash -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." (One has to presume that Dyson would probably not support Chaumian untraceable e-cash, though I doubt she would go for the other examples.) And so on. One can take Dyson's basic argument for why anonymity may be dangerous at times and why it may need to be restricted, limited, or banned, and use these arguments for a variety of other basic freedoms. Essentially, freedom can be dangerous. The world can be dangerous. In fact, it is. (No, Dyson has not called for such restrictons on freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom to read anonymously. But her argument that she would support anonymity if some form of traceability is built in essentially applies, by the same logic (that it can be dangerous) to a wide variety of other cases.) To summarize: "The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...." --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exactl
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Audit trails may now be in place, in which case the cost of anonymity is increased to the cost of the lowest denomination card. Think OTP. However, in both Britian and France I have seen defective phones that allowed LD calls but did not deduct the call amount from the card. Obviously, the effect was free LD and these phones were perpetually busy. If audit trails were in place, this problem should have been noticed quickly. As I said, things may have changed for newer systems. James ---------- From: Flying insect killer <kadafi(a)netcom.com> Sent: Friday, September 06, 1996 1:20 PM To: jimbell(a)pacifier.com Cc: James Bugden; pstira(a)escape.com; cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exactl On Fri, 6 Sep 1996, jim bell wrote: > At 10:08 AM 9/6/96 EST, jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: > >There is another spin possible on the reasons for replacement of pay phones with > >credit card phones. In Canada all new credit card phones are also able to take > >phone cards (which are anonymous). > > Don't be too sure about the "anonymity" of these cards. You don't have to > give your name when you buy or use them, but assuming a large number of > phone calls (to, from different locations) can be associated together after > the fact, your name can probably be fairly easily obtained. > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com And phone companys that offers phone cards keep track of every call that goes thru each card number.

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Anonymous Payphones Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:31 AM 9/6/96 -0400, "<pstira(a)escape.com>" <pstira(a)escape.com> wrote: >Not just DC and Chicago, I'm afraid. If anyone around NYC noticed, there >are less and less payphones, and all new ones installed, just about, are >those yellow credit card phones. That's not a big problem - you can buy telephone credit cards, anonymously, in your local convenience store. Around here you've got a choice of cards where the announcements are in Spanish and the rates to call Mexico are cheap, cards that come in exact $20 from machines that don't give change, cards with pretty pictures on the front, cards with advertising, etc., as well as cards that are reusable and want some personal information about you to activate. I don't blame phone companies in New York for using non-coin-phones, especially non-monopoly phone companies. Collecting and handling coins is expensive, phones get vandalized to steal the coins, it's harder to change your rates when you need to go to each phone to do it, and people get annoyed at coin phones that charge higher than Bell prices. What I do get annoyed about is that most pay phones won't accept calls, they'll only initiate them. This means that if you call somebody from a pay phone who only has a beeper, or if you don't have a beeper, you can't leave them a useful message to call you back. Part of this is done because of the Great Drug Hysteria, but I suspect part of it is that pay phone companies don't make money receiving calls, so they don't want to tie up their phones doing that; perhaps if they charged money to receive calls as well as initiate them, they'd be willing to receive calls? Not all of them, but it's now one for >one, at least. > >=Millie= >PS: i wrote a fiction book about this a few years ago -- i should have >published. People could've said i was the next nostradamus. :( # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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Cypherpunk meeting?
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi all, I`m just dashing off a quick note to see how many south eastern UK cypherpunks there are here, preferably in the sussex area, I might organise a meet if we can get enough people to make it worthwhile mail me if you are an experienced cryptographer in the area and would be interested in attending an informal meeting for key signing, discussion and copious beer.... ;-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMi7qLb5OPIRbv66xAQGGqQP/cJI2sWgCc0cR8jlTDbCv0W2hklW5++7K oO23Qs7sxNQziK1lcEzIKX1kbQIng/apR4FEEhWggS+Bvadx3NNpW46BdHTI7IfZ rjE8M4K0EtYcDUZmsAG0pV70b8XKu+v/dogu/BlIFwAUCwR2ocDeIbW88tBXq4ok dcffJFY2Q4Q= =PCNL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az4= =riHc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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