December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

HP crypto-announcement and key recovery, from The Netly News
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 18 Nov 1996 09:03:25 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: HP crypto-announcement and key recovery, from The Netly News The Netly News http://netlynews.com/ November 18, 1996 Under Lock And Key Recovery By Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) As a non-event, it was a rather well-attended one. This morning Hewlett-Packard Co. threw a press conference in Washington, DC to announce that it had vaulted the Federal government's export restriction hurdles by including "key recovery" technology in its encryption products. At least that's what the press release said. The reality is somewhat less exciting: HP's announcement is crypto-vaporware. "We're not making any specific announcements of products today," admitted Doug McGowan, HP development director. HP's move comes after competitors such as IBM and DEC stole the limelight last month by being the first to buy into the Clinton administration's latest key escrow scheme which would allow U.S. law enforcement agencies to locate copies of the private keys used to encode files and communications. The company's announcement follows a presidential executive order signed last Friday codifying the administration's "key recovery" proposal unveiled in October, which the White House hopes will splinter an industry previously united in opposition to Federal regulations governing encryption exports. HP responded by flying CEO Lew Platt into town today to announce a product using plug-in hardware or software "activation tokens" that can vary by country -- but Platt admitted that the tokens don't exist yet. Rather, he admitted, it's only a product with "a security framework built into it" that currently uses woefully-insecure 40-bit DES encryption. Eventually, HP hopes to export crypto that's stronger, but the company declined to discuss details. Dave Banisar, a policy analyst at EPIC, says such a system would be "worse" than current policy. "It's got this new detection system in it that requires monitoring of your crypto use and program use to determine what the national government says is correct," he says. The "key recovery" technology HP licensing is likely to come from Trusted Information Systems Inc., a company founded by former NSAers that still enjoys close ties to the spook community. TIS's Commercial Key Escrow uses the 56-bit Data Encryption Standard and so was cleared for export on January 18, 1996. "This is the first step toward implementing key recovery. That's a policy that's just not going to solve the privacy problem for Internet users," says Alan Davidson, staff counsel for the Center for Democracy and Technology. "This is the first step on that road toward building key recovery for the world. It's a very dangerous thing." Clinton's executive order is carefully crafted to counter the three strategies that crypto privacy proponents have devised to kill the export rules: the public relations, the judicial and the legislative approaches. Netizens, privacy advocates and high-tech firms rightfully blasted the old export policy, which classified crypto as a "munition," as a relic of the cold war -- a sentiment with which even The New York Times agreed. So Clinton has reclassified it as a non-munition, yet the change is in name only: Netscape browsers remain subject to export controls. Several lawsuits are challenging the constitutionality of the old export regulations. So Clinton's executive order contains language that EFF's John Gilmore says is designed "to evade the current lawsuits" by taking aim at some of the legal arguments. Administration officials spent an unhappy summer on Capitol Hill being grilled by senators who were considering legislation to lift the crypto export embargo. So Clinton carefully crafted his announcement to defuse some of the reasons to pass this legislation when Congress returns in January. In other words, the White House has been able to answer or deflect many issues that netizens have raised in favor of strong encryption. But another argument may not be as easy to counter. Patrick Ball is a senior program associate at the American Association for the Advancement of Science who has traveled the globe teaching human rights workers how to protect themselves from oppressive governments. The stamps on his passport read like a who's who of censor-happy regimes: El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Guatemala, South Africa and Turkey. "I have done PGP training in every country I've worked in," says Ball. To Ball, the debate over crypto isn't about civil rights or businesses losing export dollars, but over something much more fundamental: human rights. He says: "Why do security police grab people and torture them? To get their information. If you build an information management system that concentrates information from dozens of people, you've made that dozens of times more attractive. You've focused the repressive regime's attention on the hard disk. And hard disks put up no resistance to torture. You need to give the hard disk a way to resist. That's cryptography." And that's a winning argument. ###

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Re: Crypto Bounties: Another Thought that crossed my mind.
by Ian Grigg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow(a)smoke.suba.com said: > Well, I was thinking, what if a "Crypto Software Bounty Server" > were set up, so that someone could propose a tool that they would like > to see, along with an initial bounty. Others could contribute toward that > bounty (anonymously if they wish) until either the tool was delivered. > > The original issuer sets standards for the software (i.e. "easy to > use interface to mixmaster remailers for Macintosh", then must define > easy to use; Software considered delivered when in [alpha beta late-beta > &etc.]). The first to present software meeting these qualifications gets > the bounty, with the caviate that the software must be either gnu-copylefted, > or some similar "free use" copyright, after all, "The Net" paid for it... Hmmm. This is a one shot game (is that the term?) whereas software generally has implications that escape a single sale scenario. For example, the more difficult the software, the more risk there is that someone else will beat you, thus lowering the real risk-adjusted payoff dramatically. For this reason, more complex stuff would need some sort of contract+reputation scenario that allows a repeating game to work. A contractual alternative could work like this. I (the initial desirer) write a contract specifying my requirements. I publish this as a market tender, where other desirers can contribute funds, and this becomes a cumulative sum that grows. Programmers can offer to supply by naming a price. The market clears when the pot of desire equals or exceeds the lowest offer to supply. In a simplistic scenario, the contract is now sealed and the work is done and paid for. In order to overcome project failure, I could write my contract as a multi-supplier seed project (often done by governments). That is, the pot gets shared around, say, the three best alternatives. Once supplied, all are free to pick from the alternatives. In order to overcome the low silly bid, somehow reputation would have to be built into the market. That is, your efforts in the past as programmer will cause your solution to be better valued than mine. So perhaps we should turn this around. Programmers would write contracts to supply the given requirements at clearance+T, also specifying the clearance price. Your price is 2000 for the widget, mine is 1000. (That makes three contracts, a widget spec, my work plan and your work plan.) The market (the desirers) would then push funds back and forth between the two until it became clear that one or the other cleared. As more pressure increases, more funds pour in. Then, deliverables could be phased, with monies similarly phased, so that the market has a chance to monitor. Now, if it is not delivered, reputation suffers, and you have to lower your price for the next job (or hide in shame). There's a lot of aspects of newbies and switching funds that I havn't really thought through here. However, I like this viewpoint because it eliminates the need for judges. History shows that a good market microstructure will beat an authority approach in the long run. Also note that if you drop the free software assumption, and make it, say, moneyware, then the market becomes much more workable - the asset being traded is a share of future revenues. This has more ramifications than might be obvious: Propose a market to write a GAK killer for e$10,000. If it clears and is built, is the Dept. of Justice forced to buy the rights out? > Has anything like this been proposed before? I don't know if this has been proposed before, but it is a logical conclusion of the CP world. If the Internet transaction costs make single-person economic entities the most efficient unit in the machine, and e$ in all its forms provides the oil, then we need some way to connect up the parts for grand projects where there are hard cash incentives. There has to be some mechanism to distribute that cash in the most efficient manner to produce the result. BTW, this is a here and now issue, not a hypothetical future. We have already found that there is too much work on our plate, and limited efficiency in farming it out. Others may have found the same. -- iang iang(a)systemics.com

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I don't quite follow how this would work. If Trent issues a blind > signature, then that means (doesn't it?) that he doesn't see what he > is signing. So how can he confirm that the message is actually from > a member of the group when he doesn't see it? I should have elaborated a little on this. My idea was that trent should be able to decrypt the message and verify it was meaninful (at least probably so) by some form of frequency analysis, as he would be a computer program this would not be a significant time loss in a system with few users (such as parliament as suggested with the initial problem) if the resulting message didn`t have approximate frequency distributions of letters you would expect in natural langauge or source code or whatever the message would not be published as it is probably an invalid key being used thus decrypting to garbage. A better way to do all this would probably just be to have Bob sign the message then Trent strip the signature before signing it himself but I just dashed this off as a quick response without really thinking it through. A nicer protocol would be one where the key distribution is easier initially (isn`t this always the case ;-)) or even a protocol which isn`t arbitrated, like your reply said Chaum mentions protocols for this. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Cypherpunks State of Emergency
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:51 PM 11/16/96 -0800, Tim May wrote: >And sabotaging the GAK scheme in more devious ways remains an option. I see several "leverage" points here: The cards can use either a "dongle" model, similar to that used in ordinary copy protection, which has to date been a big failure - or they can use an "on-card processor" model, where the card does the actual crypto processing. This will be tough to break using the traditional cracking techniques, but will also be expensive. And card distribution can be either weak or strict; if it's a weak model (e.g., cards are sold at Fry's or 7-11 :) or are otherwise easy to come by) it'll be tough to control their distribution and export. It's a little easier to control the export of chips than to control the export of software, but neither is easy. And strict distribution will cost an enormous amount of time and money as some agency or another is deputized or created to check credentials, keep records, issue keycards, charge fees, and so forth. If cards are easy to come by, requiring them won't be much of a deterrent to the use of strong crypto; the people the government is supposedly trying to keep from using crypto (terrorists, spies, etc) are already accustomed to keeping and purchasing things which are forbidden. If cards are difficult to come by, that's a big hole waiting for someone to fill with software crypto, or software tricks to get around the hardware requirements. One bug/feature I suspect we'll see will be the inclusion of the keycard's ID in every message that it signs, facilitating detection of unauthorized use and traffic analysis. Without this, the scheme seems entirely futile. (Which is not to say that the US Government hasn't done some futile things :), but ..) Another likely feature is an expiration date, such that the cards stop working after X months and the owner must go to the Bureau of Crypto Control and show his/her credentials and exchange the old card for a new one. Of course, if you've got outstanding warrants or haven't filed your taxes or are in arrears for child support or are a "foreign person" or have been saying illegal/controversial things with your crypto card, well, perhaps you won't feel like going down to the BCC after all. So they're going to have to find a way to make the cards easy/cheap enough to get that many people will adopt them; but they have to be expensive/difficult enough to get that people won't want to "lose" them, lest they fall into the hands of the wrong people. And that seems like a difficult task, especially if opponents of the scheme continue to provide cheap/free software-only solutions. And, as always, folks not subject to the US export regulations won't need to fuss with all of this regulatory bullshit, and can produce strong software-only crypto, or drop-in replacements for the "policy chips" which are distributed without government control. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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Re: TIS + HP
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:18 AM 11/18/96 -0500, John Young wrote: >A blurb in the Wash Post today says that the HP roll-out >this morning will include TIS's "trusted third party" product. >"One essential ingredient in the equation: technology >developed by TIS. TIS is so far the only company that has >received permission to export encryption technology >overseas that exceeds the government's existing >threshold." > >Guess we'll know shortly who else in the System is to be >Trusted with Information -- other than Thirds, Fourths and >other Dots and Steves. With TIS bending over for the big GAK Monster in so many ways, it brings up a question... (A probibly off-topic one...) Does anyone know of intentional GAK-like holes put in their Firewall Toolkit? They distribute it for free and distribute source, but with their record i have little trust in the matter... (Better yet, does anyone have suggestions for Firewall code that will run under Linux or FreeBSD?) --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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BIS_sez
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-18-96. FiTi: "Electronic money threat to central banks" A report issued today by the BIS says that innovations such as "electronic purses" or "digital cash" used over the Internet could erode central banks' income. "However, if issuance of e-money is limited to banks, the regulatory framework already in place can be extended to cover the new products, but competition and innovation might be more limited." ----- http://jya.com/bissez.txt BIS_sez

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HP proposal available
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HP has put up info on its crypto proposal at http://www.hp.com/go/icf. You can also try http://www.dmo.hp.com/gsy/security/icf/main.html if that URL is slow. The basic idea is what we had been speculating, their old "International Cryptography Framework" based on hardware crypto cards. It has now been given government approval, which is no big surprise since the system looks like it's been designed by fed bootlickers. The claim of other companies signing on is less impressive than it sounds. They're using Microsoft's Crypto API, and of course Microsoft would like plenty of companies to use it. Intel offers to build some hardware, which is more business for them. "Netscape and VeriFone are exploring a wide range of uses for ICF technology." That's all they say about those companies. This is hardly a commitment; Netscape and other companies generally keep abreast of everything happening in the field to keep their options open. So this is not a resounding endorsement. The one good thing about the plan is that since it is very complicated and requires specialized hardware, we probably won't see any impact from it for years. Hopefully it will be obsolete before it can be deployed. The plan itself is an NSA wet dream. Not only do you need a token from Big Brother to activate the crypto in your computer (the token can be hardware or software, but the crypto card itself apparently must be hardware), it's also necessary for any application which wants to use crypto to supply an application specific certificate to the card. This lets the law enforcement bureaucrats not only determine who gets to use crypto, but which applications get access to it. If you want to build an app which will use crypto you'll have to get permission from the authorities in order for them to give you a certificate which you can compile in to let your app run. The one thing which was not clear was how much of these rules would apply within the U.S. In fact notably missing from the press release, white paper, overviews, slides, etc. on the web site was any discussion of civil liberties impact. It certainly was not listed as one of the considerations in the design of the system. Overall, I'd say this is just HP trumpeting the unsurprising government approval of their ICF system and turning it into a press event by providing some lukewarm "endorsements" from well known companies. This system looks to me like it's got a long way to go before it becomes a widely used standard. Hal

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HP announcement
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HP has info on its new crypto stuff on the web now: <http://www.hp.com/go/security> and <http://www.hp.com/go/icf>. It's apparently a crypto coprocessor embedded in a board or chip which looks for a "policy token" (which is software/data, delivered via network or smartcard) which is doled out by local "policy servers", "developed and managed in conformance with national policy". Sounds to me like they want to be able to turn off strong crypto the way they can turn off high-detail GPS during politically/militarily sensitive events. As the press release notes, "ICF is designed to run any current or future cryptographic algorithms. Algorithms for key recovery also can be used. "Keys" are strings of computer code that lock and unlock data. Key recovery is a method that allows users to unscramble encrypted data if they lose their keys. Users can decide whether to use key recovery, based on personal needs or domestic -- or foreign -- government regulations. ICF cryptographic units, which can support keys of any length, are exportable because they are disabled until a Policy Activation Token activates them again. Policy Activation Tokens can be either a downloadable software module or a smart card. Policy Activation Tokens trigger particular algorithms for specific applications, based on needs. Additionally, ICF adapts easily to current government encryption policies, new encryption algorithms and changing key-recovery schemes. Customers who use ICF-based products are offered long-term investment protection, with rapid flexibility to meet changing needs." ICF is "International Cryptography Framework". The press release includes quotes from US and French government officials indicating that the new system will meet their needs. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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Re: ?????
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Sun, 17 Nov 1996 05:36:00 -0800 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com (John Anonymous MacDonald) apparently wrote: |Dale Thorn wrote: |>people on a list are given tools to filter with and reminded on |>occasion |>how to use them? |You are the reason, you can't shut up and you have little or nothing |to say. plonk. I wish I'd said that; my fear is that Dale will take 17 messages to compose his vapid thoughts. Love you all.

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Playing card cryptosystems
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Also I did hear tell that Bruce Schneier was working on a crypto > algorithm which was designed to work with playing cards, for a book > which Neal Stephenson is writing. Presumably painful to use, but > maybe good plausible deniability, all that you need is a pack of > cards. Not even that in fact, there are methods, and I can confirm they work because I can do it myself, that allow one to memorize the order of a pack of playing cards, some people can even do it with up to 8 packs, although this requires a more complicated method. So while encryption requires one to have the cards ready (about 8 good riffle shuffles will restore a high degree of randomness to a deck) you can keep the pad for short messages in your head. But one can do the same with one time pads that use other plaintexts as the pad. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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[QUADRUPLE]-- Rewards for errors in _Digital Cash_
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just saw the movie "Ransom" where Mel Gibson gets to be cool by doubling the reward for the capture of his son's kidnappers. In that spirit, I'm doubling my reward again. What was once a reward of $10 for information about a technical error in the book is now a reward of $40. Also, I've opened an account with Mark Twain bank so I can pay the rewards in Digicash. Or, if you prefer First Virtual, I can handle that as well. Or, if you're old fashioned and want my signature, you get the proverbial check in the mail. The details are simple. The first person to report a technical error in the book gets $40. You're also welcome to make suggestions for ways to improve the book. I may pay a reward for these, but I can't make a blanket promise. I'm reaching my deadline so this offer will only be good until the end of November, 1996. So far no one has reported any technical errors. A few have made suggestions that I've taken. I hope more will continue to offer suggestions for improving the book because they're a great help and I will reward them. Here is the ``fine print'': 1) My decisions on what constitutes an error are final. I could declare something a ``feature'', not an error. Or I could lump many errors together and label it ``one''. So if I left out a page, this could be one error, not 200+ errors in the page number on all subsequent pages. But I hope to use this power benevolently. 2) Technical errors are eligible. Errors in spelling and grammar aren't. It's just too hard to come up with a logical definition of correct grammar. Technical errors also involve some amount of judgement, but I think they are tighter. 3) My decision on who is the ``first'' person to discover an error is final. I may choose to reward two people who obviously work independently. I just want to defend against people saying, "Okay, let's mail him this simulatenously." 4) This offer may be withdrawn at any time. Check my webpage for details. 5) Copies of the book may be obtained by purchasing them from 1-800-3131277 or from your local bookstore. Peter Wayner pcw(a)access.digex.net http://www.access.digex.net/~pcw/pcwpage.html 410-433-8275

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U.S. CIA employee caught spying
by Tim Scanlon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is on the local DC news; Harold Nicholson age 46, a CIA employee was arrested for spying today at Dulles airport. He allegedly has been working for the Russians for the past 2 years. He was caught after he failed a series of polys, and bank account irregularities had been noticed, as well as suspcious travel. They got him on hidden video apperently photocopying documents that he intended to pass along. Tim

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Re: The Utility of Privacy
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:55 AM 11/18/1996, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > SANDY SANDFORT > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . > >C'punks, > >On Sun, 17 Nov 1996, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: > >> >> Informally, I don't know anybody who has suffered due to a loss of >> >> privacy. >> > >> >Your circle of associations must be limited. >> >> Examples [of people who have suffered due to loss of privacy]? > >Phil Zimmermann often tells the story of a woman whose marriage >was destroyed by the revelation of a long-past indiscretion. >After her husband divorced her, she committed suicide. Deceiving your spouse is not a good reason to protect your privacy. >Any number of celebrities have been stalked, attacked and even >killed by obsessed fans who found them through public records. Unfortunately most readers of this list do not have this problem. >Every year, children and business executives are kidnapped for >ransom. The proximate cause of these kidnappings is a breach in >privacy about the whereabouts and schedules of the victim. Or this problem. >Hitler's gun registration in Germany allowed the Jews to be >disarmed. I'm sure you are aware of the ultimate consequences >of that little invasion of privacy. Not a bad example, but genocide happens rarely. Those alert enough to protect their privacy in advance might be alert enough to get out in time, anyway. Subjective utility: low. >The US Post Office co-operated in the identification and >imprisonment of people of Japanese ancestry during the second >world war. 97,000 victims over a ~100 year period. Doesn't really show up on the scope, sorry. (Plus downside bad, but few were murdered.) >The problem with having a whole lot of private information about >you floating around in public is not what damage it can do to you >now, but rather the problems it potentially could cause in the >future. Just about everyone on this list has been to university. >Not long ago, a college education was essentially a death warrant >in Cambodia. Prior to that, a degree was considered a good thing >there. People saw no reason to hid the fact that they had been >in school. Trouble is, things changed. > >And the trouble today is that things can change now, too. Think >about the things that you have publicly done or advocated. Even >if they are as legal as church on Sunday NOW, how comfortable >will you be about them if there is extreme right or left takeover >in the future? Start to get the picture? These things CAN happen. Will they happen? Odds are low. BTW, are you operating under your True Name?

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Re: The Utility of Privacy
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:38 PM 11/17/1996, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: >Before we complete your school assignment for you how about letting us >all know the due date and the credit value first. > >On Sat, 16 Nov 1996, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: > >> Privacy is a hassle. Is it worth it? >> >> Which unfortunate situations does privacy prevent? What are the odds >> that they will occur? How much effort will it take to prevent these >> outcomes? As a model, use the present and future situation of a >> typical reader of this list. Insult is not enlightening. URL? Book?

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Re: Fuck You Dumb Cunt
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brian Davis writes: > I'm especially sorry that some of you don't believe in property > rights. I believe in them, alright. It's just that they seem to be at odds with freedom of speech. They are at odds with a lot of other things as well, but that's a different fla...er...discussion. ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet History is not usually what has happened. History is what some people have thought to be significant.

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Re: Does John Gilmore...
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn writes: > Dave Hayes writesL: > > [For those who's assumptions rule their perception: I am *not* arguing > > that all speech should be subsidized. I am merely pointing out that > > the organization that is spending the money to broadcast is > > controlling the speech, hence it is *not* free speech in terms of > > freedom or cost.] > Again, you confuse free speech with free broadcast. Isn't broadcast a subset of speech, especially in this culture? ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet The penalty for laughing in a courtroom is six months in jail; if it were not for this penalty, the jury would never hear the evidence.

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Re: Warfield's audience is terminated
by Sven 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I have been advised by my associates that you are a waste of my time. >My audience for your comments is therefore terminated. Right on -- that guy came across as a masturbator with the "I'm my own p0stmastur!1!!1" response and it's probably more effective for both of you to work separately. Fuck flames, Feed trolls. Sven |__ |--> SVEN: a.k.a. Chris Blanc Internet consulting/Web design [ http://www.loop.com/~sven/ ] Some only sample the dark wine of life's blood...

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Re: Security hole in premail
by Mixmaster 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 20 Dec 1996, Mixmaster wrote: > *** premail.orig Fri Dec 20 18:46:01 1996 > --- premail Fri Dec 20 18:55:54 1996 > *************** > *** 3574,3579 **** > --- 3574,3582 ---- > } > for ($triesleft = 2; !$done && $triesleft; $triesleft--) { > $pass = &getpass ($x); > + if(!-O $ps) { > + &error ("Secrets file exists and is owned by another user\n"); > + } > $status = &decrypt_secrets ($ps_pgp, $ps, $pass); > if (!-s $ps) { unlink $ps; } > $done = (!$status && -e $ps); That patch doesn't work. It will always return an error. I have tested the following patch and it does work as intended: *** premail.orig Wed Oct 30 22:25:10 1996 --- premail Sat Dec 21 15:45:41 1996 *************** *** 3631,3636 **** --- 3631,3639 ---- $invoc .= ' > '.$ps; $invoc .= ' 2> '.$errfile; &pdv ("Invoking PGP as $invoc\n"); + if(-e $ps) { + &error ("Premail secrets file already exists\n"); + } $status = &open_pgp ($invoc, $pass, ''); $err = &read_and_delete ($errfile); &pdv ($err); Sorry about the previous mistake.

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Re: Ebonics
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 21 Dec 1996, Mark Rosen wrote: > No. Speaking in Ebonics is the same as speaking with an accent. You can't > control their expression; you learned to speak with a Southern accent as a > child, while other people learned to speak with an Ebonic accent (?). By > condoning speaking in a Southern accent, you condone speaking in Ebonics. Whatever rational basis your arguments may have had were eradicated by the ludicrous logical conclusion drawn above. > I can't understand thick Southern accents. No matter how smart you are, > I'm not going to hire you because I can't understand you. How do you feel? Oh so sad. Let me make this clear, an accent is far different from grammatically incorrect speech. I can speak with grammatic perfection and a drawl so heavy it'll make your eyeballs hurt. (Of course, being from New Orleans, my normal accent is more like brooklyn than Nashville -- four years in Mississippi changed all that) > Replace the word Ebonics with "Southern accent" and "black English" with > "Southern twang" and you'll see how hypocritical you are. Also, why do you > make an exception for foriegn accents? They're just as difficult to > understand. And can still be spoken with proper grammar. I make an exception for foreign accents because we are dealing a completely separate language. Speakers of ebonics are certainly not bilingual in this sense (and neither am I). I don't see hypocrisy at all. I do see an apologist, pampering, paternal point of view, however. And we southern folk jes' don't abide that sorta thang. > Language is completely different from intellect. You can't control whether > you were taught, Ebonics, a Southern accent, or "normal" English. I wasn't "taught" a Southern accent. I absorbed it in daily conversation. I certainly wasn't taught a Southern dialect. I was taught the English language. I'll say it again...the notion that Ebonics exists as a separate language -- not derived as slang from standard English -- is absurd. me _______________________________________________________________ Omegaman <mailto:omega@bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send e-mail with "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key _______________________________________________________________

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[Fwd: To unsbscribe, unscrivive, or ubsribibe]
by Carl Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Reply to:toto@sk.sympatico.ca "There's only one two." To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> Subject: To unsbscribe, unscrivive, or ubsribibe From: Carl Johnson <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> Date: Sun, 22 Dec 1996 06:18:30 -0800 Organization: TOTO Enterprises References: <2BJaZD31w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> ABB Electrical Engineering <abbee(a)ritsec1.com.eg> writes: > Can anyone tell me please how to unsbscribe and not to receive such mail. To unsbscibe, unscrivive, or ubsribibe, just send eMail to fuck(a)yourself.up. He will be happy to send you an executable program that will ensure that you will no longer get any mail from this conference. Glad I could be of assistance. -- Reply to:toto@sk.sympatico.ca "There's only one two."

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Re: Dale defends free society from the NSApunks
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Carl Johnson <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> writes: > Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > > For those who don't know what kind of slimeball Rich Graves is: > > Rich Graves is a paranoid Jewhater who likes to harrass Jews by > > spamming inappropriate public forums with Holocaust flame bait. > > Dr. DM K, > Yes, but I'm sure that he has some bad qualities, too. Is "Gravesian" gay? --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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EMR Threat of RS-232 Cables
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Steve Schear we've put a 1990 article on eavesdropping on RS-232 cable emanations which parallels van Eck's work on VDUs. "The Threat of Information Theft by Reception of Electromagnetic Radiation from RS-232 Cables" By Peter Smulders, Dept of EE, Eindhoven University of Technology Smulders notes that this type of emanation can disclose information, such as passwords, that does not appear on VDUs. And that cable shielding does not always prevent snooping. http://jya.com/rs232.pdf (367 kb)

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No Subject
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 22 Dec 1996, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: you honkies do not understand this, but this is what I grew up with. will you muthafuckin cyberpunks PLEASE learn to spell; the word is "NIGGAZ" > Apparently-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > Punks, > > Nawh nigga, yous don't want dem udder foo's to be able to read jo > mail! What da hail?! Don'chew see it now? Dis's anutha foam of > kryptografee! > > Da reason we be doin' dis shit is dat so dem basta'ds out dere > who be wantin' in on ours konversayshun can't be gettin' in. > > See?! Now what foo' ass cracka muthafucka can be readin' dis > shit at a decent clip? Shit! Can't none of 'em! De only problem is dat > it be takin' too long to put in dees apo-straphees. If we gots rids ofs > dems, dens we'ds haves a much easia' time of doin' dis shit. > > Why don't one you cleva' boyz come up wit some kinda editor dat > crossreferences (oops, too many syllables) wit dat phat ass ebonics > dikshunary at EBONIC.ORG? Den jus' give da dikshunary only to dose > people who you be wantin' to read jo shit. > > Yeomsayn'? Hilary Clinton can't be readin' dis shit! Can't > nobody else ova dere in D.C. Us niggas here in Compton been down wit dis > phat ass kryptografee fo' a long ass time. How do you tink dat us > gangstas is all still around? We be talkin' shit ev'y night on da co'na, > but can't none da fuzz be translatin' so we's frees tos dos whateva' we's > wantin's tos dos. > > Yo, jus' lemme quote my phat ass nigga dogg Method Man befo' I go: > > "I'm slammin' niggas like Shaqueel, dis shit is real, > When it's time to eat a meal, I rob and steal, > Cuz mom ain't givin' me shit, > So for da bread an' butta I leave niggas in da gutta, > Wherde 'the mutha, I'm dangerous, > Crazia' den a bag o' fuckin' angel dust, > When I bus' my gat, muthafuckas take dirt naps, > I'm all dat, wit a dime sack and a payback!" > > Dag! Dat shit's phat, dogg. > > > > > > ************************************************************************** > # Gangsta J # "Dead bodies pile up, an' it's plain to see, # > # j(a)hardcore.gangsta.com # it's because o' me. I'm the girl killa, the # > # Brownsville ghetto # throat slitta, the cunt rippa" - J # > ************************************************************************** > this muthafucker has a sick sig. keep all fuckin replies to the mailing list ONLY.

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the word is "NIGGAZ"
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 22 Dec 1996, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: you honkies do not understand this, but this is what I grew up with. will you muthafuckin cyberpunks PLEASE learn to spell; the word is "NIGGAZ" > Apparently-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > Punks, > > Nawh nigga, yous don't want dem udder foo's to be able to read jo > mail! What da hail?! Don'chew see it now? Dis's anutha foam of > kryptografee! > > Da reason we be doin' dis shit is dat so dem basta'ds out dere > who be wantin' in on ours konversayshun can't be gettin' in. > > See?! Now what foo' ass cracka muthafucka can be readin' dis > shit at a decent clip? Shit! Can't none of 'em! De only problem is dat > it be takin' too long to put in dees apo-straphees. If we gots rids ofs > dems, dens we'ds haves a much easia' time of doin' dis shit. > > Why don't one you cleva' boyz come up wit some kinda editor dat > crossreferences (oops, too many syllables) wit dat phat ass ebonics > dikshunary at EBONIC.ORG? Den jus' give da dikshunary only to dose > people who you be wantin' to read jo shit. > > Yeomsayn'? Hilary Clinton can't be readin' dis shit! Can't > nobody else ova dere in D.C. Us niggas here in Compton been down wit dis > phat ass kryptografee fo' a long ass time. How do you tink dat us > gangstas is all still around? We be talkin' shit ev'y night on da co'na, > but can't none da fuzz be translatin' so we's frees tos dos whateva' we's > wantin's tos dos. > > Yo, jus' lemme quote my phat ass nigga dogg Method Man befo' I go: > > "I'm slammin' niggas like Shaqueel, dis shit is real, > When it's time to eat a meal, I rob and steal, > Cuz mom ain't givin' me shit, > So for da bread an' butta I leave niggas in da gutta, > Wherde 'the mutha, I'm dangerous, > Crazia' den a bag o' fuckin' angel dust, > When I bus' my gat, muthafuckas take dirt naps, > I'm all dat, wit a dime sack and a payback!" > > Dag! Dat shit's phat, dogg. > > > > > > ************************************************************************** > # Gangsta J # "Dead bodies pile up, an' it's plain to see, # > # j(a)hardcore.gangsta.com # it's because o' me. I'm the girl killa, the # > # Brownsville ghetto # throat slitta, the cunt rippa" - J # > ************************************************************************** > this muthafucker has a sick sig. keep all fuckin replies to the mailing list ONLY.

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Re: Language (Was:Re: Ebonics)
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:03 PM 12/21/96 -0800, you wrote: :[snip] :If you read my complete post, you would note that I made a distinction :between "twang" (i.e., slurring words) Twang is _not_ slurring words; twang is speaking with a nasal accent. A good example is the principal's secretary in "Ferris Buhler's Day Off." Thanks, y'all. Cordially, Alec PGP Fingerprint: Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/41207EE5 1996/04/08 Alec McCrackin <camcc(a)abraxis.com> Key fingerprint = 09 13 E1 CB B3 0C 88 D9 D7 D4 10 F0 06 7D DF 31

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