December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Cypherpunks State of Emergency
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(snip) > I think it's apparent that the events of Friday, with the other shoe to > drop on Monday (the H-P/Intel/Microsoft/etc. Final Capitulation), signal to > us that we are in a State of Emergency. > > The Presidents of this country are in the habit of declaring such States of > Emergency, often essentially secretly (in that the sheeple know little of > such things, and those who speak of NSDDs and PDDs and EOs are demonized by > the media as "conspiracy nuts" and "militia members"). > > Maybe it's time for us to stop flaming about Vulis and his allies, and > concentrate on the Real War. (snip) I have to agree. One of the most impressive things I have seen as a modern "movement" (yes I realize cpunks are not an organized movement, relax) was the massive public relations job done by several core cpunks around the 1993 Clipper proposal. People with largely divergent opinions found public ground in their opposition to Clipper. Lets do that again. One thing that will help is spreading the use of filtering. Those interested in learning how to filter should be able to ask any of us and we should all respond ASAP. The Noise is horrible in here, but I only hear it in my trash folder. [BTW, Tim, thanks for being willing to withstand the crap you go through. You, and others on this list, have consistantly challenged and changed my assumptions about society, law and privacy. I dont always agree with you. But I am glad you are here.] Matt Miszewski > "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM > that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." > [NYT, 1996-10-02] > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
by Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.steptoe.com/oped.htm argues that industry won't accept any system that threatens to cut off backwards compatibility after 2 years, hence DES export liberalization will have to extend beyond the proposed period. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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COMPUTER THEFT, LOW-TECH STYLE
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: oldbear(a)tiac.net Date: Wed, 20 Nov 1996 11:12:35 -0500 To: rah(a)shipwright.com From: Somebody Subject: forwarded without comment Mime-Version: 1.0 COMPUTER THEFT, LOW-TECH STYLE A thief broke into a Visa International data processing center in California a couple of weeks ago and stole a personal computer containing information on about 314,000 credit card accounts, including Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover and Diners Club, says a Visa spokesman. Some issuers, including Citibank, began calling customers last week and have issued new cards. Others are keeping quiet about the event and monitoring accounts for unusual activity. Authorities speculate that the perpetrator was stolen for the resale value of the hardware, rather than the information it contained. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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FYI - Anderson & Kuhn's new "Improved DFA" paper
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My appologies if this has been posted already. ------- Forwarded Message From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> To: ccc-list(a)newton.cam.ac.uk Message-ID: <E0vOSwQ-0000uc-00(a)heaton.cl.cam.ac.uk> Subject: Research Announcement Sender: owner-ccc-list(a)newton.cam.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Improved Differential Fault Analysis Ross J Anderson, Markus G Kuhn In [1], Biham and Shamir announce an attack on DES based on 200 ciphertexts in which one-bit errors have been induced by environmental stress. Here we show an attack that requires less than ten ciphertexts. Furthermore, our attack is practical in that it uses a fault model that has been implemented in attacks on real smartcards. In [2], Biham and Shamir show how their method can be extended to reverse engineer algorithms whose structure is unknown. Our attack can also be extended to such cases and is more efficient there too. In [3], Boneh, De Millo and Lipton discuss how such techniques can be used to attack RSA. Again, their attack is theoretical only, We show how to do it in practice. Introduction A recent research announcement by Biham and Shamir shows that if DES is implemented in a tamper-resistant package, and this package has the property that by applying ionising radiation (or some other environmental stress) we can cause random one-bit errors in the round keys, then we can break DES. If we can get a series of ciphertexts, each generated from the same plaintext but with a different one-bit random round key error, then we will need about 200 faulty ciphertexts to recover the key. In a further announcement [2], they show how on a similar fault model, the structure of unknown Feistel ciphers can be deduced from an adequate number of faulty ciphertexts. In each case, the critical observation is that errors that occur in the last few round of the cipher leak information about the key, or algorithm structure, respectively. This work is inspired by a paper of Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [3] who assume (as Biham and Shamir do) that one-bit errors can be caused by radiation or other environmental stresses. That paper goes on to show that with this fault model, RSA can be attacked. These results have been widely publicised in the press. A frequently voiced criticism is that the attacks are purely theoretical: no-one has demonstrated that single bit errors can actually be induced in a DES key schedule or an RSA computation in any fielded device. In fact, most smartcards hold keys in EEPROM which also contains much or all of the device's application software. Thus errors induced by ionising radiation would be much more likely to corrupt software, thus leading either to a system crash or to uninformative wrong answers. We show here that much faster, and completely practical, attacks are possible. The trick is to induce small changes in the code rather than trying to cause them in keys or other data. The Improved Attack Methodology In a note posted to relevant Internet newsgroups on the 7th November, one of us pointed out that using clock and power glitches gives a practical way of implementing the Lenstra variant of the Boneh attack. In this announcement, we will expand on the threat model, and also show how attacks using clock and power glitches can give attacks on DES that require many fewer ciphertexts - less than ten rather than the 200 or so previously required. In a paper on tamper resistance due to be published next week, we describe a number of techniques for attacking smartcards and other security processors [5]. This paper was written some time ago (the first results were presented at the Isaac Newton Institute, Cambridge, in June) but has been withheld by agreement with the manufacturer of one of the security processors we have attacked, so that banking industry clients had some time to take suitable precautions. Some of the attacks we describe in this paper are new, while others are already known in various small communities (such as hackers and chip testers) and are included for the benefit of the wider crypto and security communities. One of the latter type is that smartcards and other security processors can often be attacked using clock and power glitches. The application of a clock pulse that is much faster than normal, or of a transient in the power supply, can often cause faulty behaviour in a microprocessor, under which the program counter is incremented but the current instruction is executed either incorrectly or not at all. A standard version of this attack is to replace a single 5MHz clock pulse to a smartcard with four 20MHz pulses. We do not claim to have invented this attack; it appears to have originated in the pay-TV hacking community, which has known about it for at least a year. In that context, it has not been used for attacks on cryptographic algorithms, but in order to cause output loops to run for longer than the card's programmer intended, thus dumping key material to the output port. The glitch attack is described more fully in our tampering article, which will appear at next week's Usenix Electronic Commerce Workshop [5]. In this note, we point out that attacks based on faulty instructions are not only proven practical, unlike the as yet undemonstrated fault model of random single bit errors induced by radiation. They also provide a much more powerful attack on many cryptographic algorithms. This holds both when we are seeking to recover a key for a known algorithm such as DES, and when we are trying to reverse engineer an unknown algorithm that has been provided in a smartcard or other tamper resistant processor. Attacking RSA A simplified version of the Boneh-DeMillo-Lipton attack, due to Lenstra, is quoted in [3]: if a smart card computes an RSA signature S on a message M modulo n = pq by computing it modulo p and q separately and then combining them using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, and if an error an be induced in (say) the latter computation, then we can factor n at once as p = gcd(n,S^e-M) where e is the public exponent. This is absolutely ideal for a glitch attack. As the card spends most of its time calculating the signature mod p and mod q, and almost any glitch that affects the output will do, we do not have to be at all selective about where in the instruction sequence the glitch is applied. Since only a single signature is needed, the attack can be performed online: a Mafia eftpos terminal applies the glitch, factors the modulus, calculates what the correct signature should be, and sends this on to the bank. Thus the Mafia can harvest RSA secret keys without the customer or his bank noticing anything untoward about the transaction he did at their shop. Given that implementers of the new EMV electronic purse system propose to have only 10,000 different RSA secret keys per issuing bank, the Mafia will soon be able to forge cards for a substantial proportion of the user population. Attacking DES When we can cause an instruction of our choice to fail, then attacking DES is simple. We remove one of the xor operations that are used to combine the round keys with the inputs to the S-boxes from the last two rounds of the cipher, and repeat this for each of these key bytes in turn. The erroneous ciphertext outputs that we receive as a result of this attack will each differ from the genuine ciphertext in the output of usually two, and sometimes three, S-boxes. Using the techniques of differential cryptanalysis, we obtain about five bits of information about the eight keybits that were not xor'ed as a result of the induced fault. So, for example, eight faulty ciphertexts should give us about 40 bits of the key, leaving a trivial keysearch. Thus DES can be attacked with about one correct and eight faulty ciphertexts. But how realistic is it to assume that we will be able to target particular instructions? In most smartcards, the manufacturer supplies a number of routines in ROM. Though sometimes presented as an `operating system', the ROM code is more of a library or toolkit that enables application developers to manage communications and other facilities. Its routines usually include the DES algorithm (or a proprietary algorithm such as Telepass), and by buying the manufacturer's smartcard development toolkit (for typically a few thousand dollars) an attacker can get full documentation plus real specimens for testing. In this case, individual DES instructions can be targeted. When confronted with an unfamiliar implementation, we may have to experiment somewhat (we have to do this anyway with each card in order to find the correct glitch parameters [5]). However the search space is relatively small, and on looking at a few DES implementations it becomes clear that we can usually recognise the effects of removing a single instruction from either of the last two rounds. (In fact, many of these instructions yield almost as much information when removed from the implementation as the key xor instructions do.) We will discuss this at greater length in a later paper. The ROM Overwrite Attack Where the implementation is familiar, there is yet another way to extract keys from the card - the ROM overwrite attack. Single bits in a ROM can be overwritten using a laser cutter, and where the DES implementation is well known, we can find one bit (or a small number of bits) with the property that changing it will enable the key to be extracted easily. The details will depend on the implementation but we might well be able, for example, to make a jump instruction unconditional and thus reduce the number of rounds in the cipher to one or two. Where the algorithm is kept in EEPROM, we can use two microprobing needles to set or reset the target bit [6]. Where we have incomplete information on the implementation, ROM overwriting attacks can be used in other ways. For example, if the DES S-boxes in ROM, we can identify them using an optical microscope and use our laser cutter to make all their bits equal. This turns DES into a linear transfromation over GF(2), and we can extract the key from a single plaintext/ciphertext pair. Although ROM overwrite (unlike the other attacks suggested in this paper) involves access to the chip surface, it can be carried out using tools that are relatively cheap and widely available. So it may be used by attackers who do not have access to the expensive semiconductor test equipment that professional pirates use to extract keys directly from smartcards [5]. Returning to the non-invasive attack model, we can always apply clock and power glitches until simple statistical tests suddenly show a high dependency between the input and output of the encryption function, indicating that we have succeeded in reducing the number of rounds. This may be practical even where the implementation details are unknown. Reverse Engineering an Unknown Block Cipher In [2], Biham and Shamir discuss how to identify the structure of an unknown block cipher in a tamper resistant package (e.g., Skipjack) using one-bit random errors. As before, they identify faults that affected only the last round or rounds; this can be done by looking for ciphertexts at a low Hamming distance from each other. They then identify which output bits correspond to the left and right halves, and next look at which bits in the left half are affected by one bit changes in the last-but-one right half. In the case of a cipher such as DES with S boxes, the structure will quickly become clear and with enough ciphertexts the values of the S-boxes can be reconstructed. They report that with 500 ciphertexts the gross structure can be recovered, and with about 10,000 the S-box entries themselves can be found. Our technique of causing faults in instructions rather than in data bits is more effective here too. We can attack the last instruction, then the second last instruction, and so on. We will give detailed estimates for DES in the final paper. Let us now consider an actual classified algorithm. `Red Pike' was designed by GCHQ for encrypting UK government traffic classified up to `Restricted', and the Department of Health wishes to use it to encrypt medical records. The British Medical Association, advised by one of us (Anderson) instead recommended that an algorithm be chosen that had been in the open literature for at least two years and had withstood attempts to find shortcuts (triple-DES, Blowfish, SAFER K-128, WAKE,...). In order to try and persuade the BMA that Red Pike was sound, the government commissioned a study of it by four academics [7]. This study states that Red Pike `uses the same basic operations as RC5' (p 4) in that the principal operations are add, exclusive or, and left shift. It `has no look-up tables, virtually no key schedule and requires only five lines of code' (p 4). Other hints include that `the influence of each key bit quickly cascades' (p 10) and `each encryption involves of the order of 100 operations' (p 19). We can thus estimate the effort of reverse engineering Red Pike from a tamper resistant hardware implementation by considering the effort needed to mount a similar attack on RC5. Removing the last operation - the addition of key material - yields an output in which the right hand side is different (it is (B xor A) shl A). This suggests, correctly, that the cipher is a balanced Feistel network without a final permutation. Removing the next operation - the shift - makes clear that it was a 32 bit circular shift but without revealing how it was parametrised. Removing the next operation - the xor - is transparent, and the next - the addition of key material in the previous round - yields an output with the values A and B in the above expression. It thus makes the full structure of the data-dependent rotation clear. The attacker can now guess that the algorithm is defined by A = ((A xor B) shl B) op key B = ((B xor A) shl A) op key Reverse engineering RC5's rather complex key schedule (and deducing that `op' is actually +) would require single-stepping back through it separately; but once we know that `op' is +, we can find the round key bits directly by working back through the rounds of encryption. So, apart from its key schedule, RC5 may be about the worst possible algorithm choice for secret-algorithm hardware applications, where some implementations may be vulnerable to glitch attacks. If Red Pike is similar but with a simpler key schedule, then it could be more vulnerable still. However, since the government plans to make Red Pike available eventually in software, this is not a direct criticism of the design or choice of that algorithm. It does all suggest, though, that secret-hardware algorithms should be more complex; large S-boxes kept in EEPROM (that is separate from the program memory) may be a sensible way of pushing up the cost of an attack. Other protective measures that prudent designers would consider include error detection, multiple encryption with voting, and designing the key schedule so that the key material from a small number of rounds is not enough for a break. Conclusion We have improved on the Differential Fault Analysis of Biham and Shamir. Rather than needing about 200 faulty ciphertexts to recover a DES key, we need less than ten. We can factor RSA moduli with a single faulty ciphertext. We can also reverse engineer completely unknown algorithms; this appears to be faster than Biham and Shamir's approach in the case of DES, and is particularly easy with algorithms that have a compact software implementation such as RC5. Finally, our attacks - unlike those of Biham, Shamir, Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton - - use a realistic fault model, which has actually been implemented and can be used against fielded systems. Acknowledgement Mike Roe pointed out that the glitch attack on RSA can be done in real time by a Mafia owned eftpos terminal. Bibliography [1] ``A New Cryptanalytic Attack on DES'', E Biham, A Shamir, preprint, 18/10/96 [2] ``Differential Fault Analysis: Identifying the Structure of Unknown Ciphers Sealed in Tamper-Proof Devices'', E Biham, A Shamir, preprint, 10/11/96 [3] ``On the Importance of Checking Computations'' D Boneh, RA DeMillo, RJ Lipton, preprint [4] ``A practical variant of the Bellcore attack'', RJ Anderson, posted to sci.crypt as message ID <55picf$dm3(a)lyra.csx.cam.ac.uk>, 7/11/96 [5] ``Tamper Resistance - A Cautionary Note'', RJ Anderson, MG Kuhn, to appear in Usenix Electronic Commerce workshop, 19/11/96 [6] ``Hardwaresicherheit von Mikrochips in Chipkarten'', Osman Kocar, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit v 20 no 7 (July 96) pp 421--424 [7] ``Red Pike --- An Assessment'', C Mitchell, S Murphy, F Piper, P Wild, Codes and Ciphers Ltd 2/10/96 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: How to slow the animals ...
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:00 AM 11/19/96 +0000, The Deviant wrote: >On Mon, 18 Nov 1996, Ernest Hua wrote: > ... >> 3. Re-order out-going mail (from toad.com) according to size. >> Drop messages from queue if it gets "reordered" too many times. >> > >nononononononono Bad Bad Thing. If you start doing that, we'll start >getting replies before messages _even more than we do now_. I thought so too, at first. As the long post won't be there to reply to, replies can't beat the origional post to the e-mail box. Consider, You replied to a post, until you got this post, you could not reply to it. When you got the origional post, most everyone else did as well. by delaying long posts, replies would be forced to come later. However, if a person writes a long argument to a post, and that is delayed, meantime, someone else writes another response which closely mirrors the first, you have now doubled the responses. I may have done so here in fact. What you say would be true if a message could be put on the "back burner" after half of the receipients received thier copy. Then, the remaining half could get the reply before the post. I believe I may be suffering from something similar to this now as my e-mail address is probably near the bottom of the rolls, due to my subscription being less than a month old.

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Anon
by rod＠wired.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who has made the strongest case _against_ anonymity on the Net that you have ever heard? Someone intelligent and theoretical rather than trapped in some child porn or commerce pov. Thanks, Rod R o d e r i c k S i m p s o n rod(a)wired.com A s s o c i a t e P r o d u c e r T h e H o t W i r e d N e t w o r k www.braintennis.com www.wiredsource.com

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Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm off straight science fiction these days because the real world is so science fictional that I find it hard to suspend disbelief. I do continue to like military SF though and now straight military fiction. The problem with straight SF for me is that computers and networks have changed the future so much that (in the words of the motto of the SF Writer's Association) The Future Ain't What It Used to Be. The science fictional futures of my childhood are now dead as doornails. And I can't enjoy contemporary SF that doesn't include a healthy dose of computers and networking. Unfortunately, Since I am involved in "defining" the future in the debates over the effects of the technology, I also can't suspend disbelief and like stories that come to radically different conclusions about that future than I have. This is not old fuddy duddyism (I hope) but arises because the nature of society these days is such that the future has become much more of a consensual act on all our parts and I consider it important to hold fast to my vision of the future and push it so that it comes about. This doesn't encourage suspensions of disbelief. Meanwhile there are plenty of other things to read. Not that I get to read that much fiction these days. The Nets take too much time. DCF

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ACLU sues GA over net ban
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>X-Sender: ewatkins(a)pop.ipst.edu >Date: Wed, 20 Nov 1996 16:01:30 -0500 >Reply-To: Electronic Frontiers Ga Action Mailing List <ACTION(a)efga.org> >Sender: Electronic Frontiers Ga Action Mailing List <ACTION(a)efga.org> >From: Eric James Watkins <eric.watkins(a)IPST.EDU> >Subject: AJC [Atlanta Journal and Constitution] Front page Tuesday final edition >To: ACTION(a)EFGA.ORG > --------------------------------------------------------- >We made the front page!!! I don't have >permission to distribute this. I consider it fair use, and I did suggest >everyone buy a paper earlier. Note: The AJC does not archive these articles. >---------------------------------------- >ACLU sues the state over its ban on some Internet communication > >By Art Kramer >STAFF WRITER > > The ACLU filed suit against the state Tuesday, alleging that a Georgia >law barring the use of pseudonyms and anonymous communication on the >Internet is unconstitutional. > In the first court challenge in an ongoing campaign against >Internet-related laws in 13 states, the American Civil Liberties Union >alleges that when Georgia passed the law affecting the Internet, it >unconstitutionally encroached on the federal power to regulate interstate >commerce. > The suit was filed in U.S. District Court in Atlanta on behalf of >Electronic Frontiers Georgia (EFGA), Rep. Mitchell Kaye (R-Marietta), and 12 >other groups and individuals. > "The right to speak and publish using a virtual 'nom de plume' has its >roots in a long tradition dating back to the very founding of democracy in >this country," said Ann Beeson, staff attorney for the ACLU. > Beeson's use of the Constitution's "commerce clause," the first in an >Internet-related case, could invalidate many state laws affecting the global >computer network, said Trotter Hardy, a professor of law at William and Mary >Law School in Williamsburg, Va. > But Hardy said that approach could backfire by strengthening the case >for federal regulation of the Internet, a result civil libertarians may come >to regret. > State Attorney General Michael Bowers said Tuesday he had not reviewed >the case yet, but that his office typically pursues lawsuits against the >state vigorously. He has 20 days to respond in court. > The ACLU is among a coalition that in February challenged the federal >Communications Decency Act, which bars online content deemed indecent or >"patently offensive." A Philadelphia federal court's decision in June to >block enforcement of the law is on appeal to the Supreme Court. > China, Singapore, Australia, France, Britain and other countries are >debating or enacting curbs on Internet content, and several U.S. states are >considering or already have regulated online material. > The ACLU lawsuit also targets a portion of the Georgia law that the >group contends prohibits online use of trademarked material without >permission. The law went into effect July 1. > That could threaten the use of protected materials such as corporate >logos as links on the World Wide Web, a practice that is now routine, said >EFGA executive director Robert Costner. On EFGA's page, for example, >selecting the BellSouth logo takes the viewer to BellSouth's Web page. > But the law's author, Rep. Don Parsons (R-Marietta), called that >argument preposterous. > "It's just common sense. A link is not an attempt to make a visitor >believe your Web page is someone else's, which is what the law is meant to >prevent," Parsons said. > Kaye, whose use of the Georgia State Seal on his home page angered some >legislators, said he joined the suit to promote open, accessible government. > Kaye said the law has "given Georgia a black eye, sending a message to >the world that we do not understand and are inhospitable to technology." > Parsons said he's been unfairly characterized as an Internet know-nothing. > "I'm an advocate for the Internet's possibilities. To reach its full >potential, users must have real confidence that the sites they visit are >credible, that they are who they say they are. That's all the bill was >supposed to do." > One of the challengers, Avondale Web page designer Bonnie Nadri, said >she already has removed some links from her pages, including the logos of >Coca-Cola, Microsoft and Netscape Communications, because of the law. > The challengers say the wording of the law appears to prohibit >anonymity. Eric Van Pelt, president of the gay support group Atlanta >Veterans Alliance, said his organization joined the suit to shield the >identity of >two gay, active-duty military members of the AVA and to protect their >compliance with the Pentagon's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. > "We made them take an oath of confidentiality to join AVA; we don't want >to expose them to criminal charges just for sending e-mail," said Van Pelt. > RealAudio playback of Tuesday's press conference and the full text of >the lawsuit are available from EFGA.

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Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:33 AM 11/20/96 -0800, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >Most "dual-use" items are export-restricted to Lybia. That means US >businesses will have trouble selling any computers or even things like >trucks to Lybia. For crypto tokens not to be available there does not >seem to be a huge deal, in comparison with everything else. Particularly since Libya bought a bunch of "oil drilling rig transport trucks" from Oshkosh Truck Corp in the '70s and hired a bunch of Brits to convert them into tank transporters. Didn't help them against the deadly Toyota pickups of the Chadian Defense Forces though. DCF

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SSLeay Legality FAQ
by cjh＠osa.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folk, Here's version 1.4 of the SSLeay Legality FAQ. Additions since 1.3 are in the areas of import/export controls in various countries. Enjoy! ---------------------------------- Cut Here ---------------------------------- SSLeay Legality FAQ Version 1.4 Outline: Disclaimer Legality/Patent Rights table Export Considerations Patent Considerations References For more information Credits Disclaimer: This document may contain gross errors, and neither Clifford Heath nor Open Software Associates Limited accept any liability for same. Users should do their own research and receive professional legal advice. With regard to the legalities of using SSLeay, there is a number of geographical considerations, and a number of kinds of legal considerations. Legality/Patent Rights table: I've broken the legal considerations into "legal" (will the govt come after you :-) and "license" (who do you need to pay patent royalties to). Algor: Location: Purpose: Legal: License: Ref: DES world-wide any mostly# public domain RSA US indiv/free only RSAref free RSA RSA US commercial RSAref/BSAFE from RSADSI* RSA DH US ? mostly# Cylink+ DSA/DSS (based on Diffie-Hellman) RC4/2 US any mostly# from RSADSI RSA RC4 elsewhere any mostly# seems safe IDEA US/Europe/Japan indiv/free mostly# free ASCOM IDEA US/Europe/Japan indiv/commercial mostly# $US15, ASCOM ASCOM IDEA US/Europe/Japan company site mostly# from ASCOM ASCOM IDEA elsewhere any mostly# free SAFER world-wide any mostly# free Safer MD2 world-wide PEM only yes free@ rfc1319 MD5 world-wide any yes free@ rfc1321 SHA world-wide any yes free Any(!) France any only with (almost unobtainable) permit Any(!) Russia any only with permit Notes: * RSADSI's patent on RSA (#4,405,829) runs out on 20 Sep 2000. RSAref is free under certain terms, otherwise can be licensed through Concensus. BSAFE is stronger and has RC4 but requires purchase and royalties: $25K up front, royalties the larger of 2% or $2, royalty prepayment of $5000 per annum required in subsequent years covers 50% of royalties over the following year. + DH by itself cannot be used for digital signatures - the El Gamal extension provides this. CYLINK claim their DH patent covers El Gamal. The US patent #4,200,770 runs out on 29 April 1997. The Canadian patent (#1,121,480) registered 6 April, 1982, runs out in 1999. @ Acknowledgement is required - see the RFC. # Many countries have nominal export controls, including the UK and Australia, but I only know of them being enforced in the USA. MD2/5 and SHA are not subject to export controls anywhere that I know of. Export considerations: The USA has regulations under ITAR (International Trade in Arms Regulations) which categorises "cryptographic and ancillary devices" as munitions. Two classes of export licenses are granted: Distribution Licenses or DL's and Individual Validated Licenses or IVL's. To get an IVL you must say who the customer is and why he needs DES (or 3X DES, etc.). One may then use the IVL to export to the approved end user. Thousands are granted every year and very few applications are rejected. Systems which use cryptography for decryption only, authentication only (e.g. Kerberos authentication as available from Cybersafe and others), or can only be used for protecting financial data (e.g Cybercash etc., as long as it cannot be used for arbitrary messaging) are more-or-less readily granted a DL. DLs have also been granted for some implementations of RC4/40 bits (e.g Netscape). Canada has back-to-back agreements with the USA's ITAR controls, so it's easy to get crypto from the USA to Canada but you can't export from Canada. More information is available from Customs Canada (Revenue Canada) and Department of External Affairs and these URLs: http://axion.physics.ubc.ca/ECL.html - Excerpts from the Export Control List of Canada, and http://insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/doc/crypto-export.html Canada's export controls. Many other countries have export controls (UK, Australia and others), but enforcement is less stringent than in the USA. In Australia, export of cryptographic software is controlled by Customs Regulations 13B (military technology) and 13E (Dual Use Technology). The regulations are administered by the Defence Signals Directorate - mail to "Director, Strategic Trade Policy and Operations, Dept of Defence, Anzac Park West Offices APW1-1-OA1, Canberra, ACT" or fax (06)266-6412 and ask for their "Australian Controls on the Export of Technology with Civil and Military Applications". The Australian regulations are also online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp.pl/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/cer43… Software is defined as "one or more programs fixed in any tangible medium of expression", which explicitly leaves electronic shipment uncontrolled. Don't carry or mail media with SSLeay-based software out of Australia - email or FTP it instead! The UK Gov't is funding a project at Royal Holloway College which contains Key Escrow provisions. Watch for the EC DGXIII introducing European legislation under the banner "European Trusted Services", or visit http://www.modeemi.cs.tut.fi/~avs/eu-crypto.html, ftp://ftp.dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk/pub/Chris.Mitchell/istr_a2.ps, ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/euroclipper.ps.Z France disallows *import* and use of crypto technology without a permit, and Russia requires a permit for use also. Patent considerations: According to 35 U.S.C. 271 (a), "whoever makes, uses, offers to sell, sells or imports ... infringes the patent." In other words, you better ensure that you *compile out* and patented algorithms unless you intend to license them, even if the code is not executed. In fact, if you are in the USA, merely ftp'ing SSLeay into the USA is a breach of various patents. (Eric, you might consider splitting it into two ftp archives, one for the USA and an additional one for the rest of the world.) References: RSA: http://www.rsa.com/ CYLINK: http://www.cylink.com/products/security/ ASCOM: http://www.ascom.ch/Web/systec Safer: ftp://ftp.isi.ee.ethz.ch/pub/simpl/ For more information: http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm - Crypto Law Survey Credits: Thanks to to Eric Young, Rich Salz, Donald Lewine, Holger Reif and Bruce Schneier (author of Applied Cryptography), Peter Trei, Remo Tabanelli, Ben Laurie, Ulf Moeller, Michael Taylor for their contributions. ------------------------------------------------------------ Clifford Heath cjh(a)osa.com.au Open Software Associates Limited 29 Ringwood Street / P O Box 401 Phone +613 9871 1694 Ringwood VIC 3134 AUSTRALIA Fax +613 9871 1711 ------------------------------------------------------------ Deploy Applications across the Internet and Intranets! Visit our Web site at http://www.osa.com

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Social Security workers in bribery plot
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Copyright c 1996 Nando.net Copyright c 1996 From staff and wire reports NEW YORK (Nov 20, 1996 4:42 p.m. EST) - Several Social Security Administration employees have been charged with giving confidential consumer information to credit card thieves in exchange for bribes as low as $10, authorities said on Wednesday. [...] The investigation began in February when investigators for Citicorp's Citibank found that a large number of Citibank credit cards had been sent to customers but never received. But the cards had been activated. [...] The Social Security Administration then conducted security reviews to determine if any employees had accessed files of individuals. Gimlett said the investigation was significant because it demonstrated "the reality that employees of government agencies or corporations who have access to personal information may take advantage of their position of trust to steal personal information and sell it for financial gain." [...]

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No Subject
by Giulio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unsuscribe Cypherpunks Giulio <gexing(a)mbox.vol.it>

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Re: US supporting dissidents? (was Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens)
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:52 PM 11/20/96 -0500, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >Trademarks are not copyrights. There is no fair use for trademarks. In >addition, civil suits are not criminal trials. The USG can't throw >your ass in jail for making "big brother inside" stickers, but Intel >can sue your ass off. >In a related note, you may be safe from lible suits... Make you wonder how Mad magazine has gotten away with it all these years... (Maybe we could get Mad to print them! Would make an interesting cover...) ObSpyVSSpy: Mad TV (on Fox) has been running animated Spy V.S. Spy cartoons. (Usually one or two per episode.) Probibly best thing about the show. (I mentioned this because one "prominent Cypherpunk" at Orycon had not known about them.) --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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RE: FUCK YOU punk
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: aga on Wed, Nov 20, 1996 15:24 Subject: FUCK YOU punk/was:Taking out the garbage To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >If you try to make or enforce any rules and YOU DIE cocksucker! You might want to watch yourself. It would be hard to *not* see this as a direct threat... >Your presents shall be totally eliminated form this InterNet! ^^^^^^^ Yeah, Lucky! You better watch out, or there'll be NO CHRISTMAS!! :-) >Your connection will be TERMINATED at once! Suddenly, agatha is everyone's sysadmin... >fuck you punk, and fuck all of your "rules" Whether stated or not, there _are_ certain guidelines (or rules) we all should follow, just so we aren't *ASSHOLES*... >-aga

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Re: Anon
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:06 PM 11/20/96 -0700, Roderick Simpson wrote: >Who has made the strongest case _against_ anonymity on the Net that you >have ever heard? Someone intelligent and theoretical rather than trapped in >some child porn or commerce pov. > >Thanks, >Rod Recruiting for a future Brain Tennis I take it? The Thursday Computer columnist for the WSJ (whose name escapes me) is a possibility. I don't know how strong he is but he is consistently opposed. I wouldn't recommend L. Detweiler though he is opposed to anonymity. How about Esther Dyson? DCF

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Re: Anon
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well. Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed. He has an article in the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas. BTW cypherpunk Doug Barnes is also quoted several times in the long article in that issue by Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash, The Diamond Age) about the undersea cables that carry most transnational information traffic. Hal

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Re: Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > The problem with straight SF for me is that computers and networks have > changed the future so much that (in the words of the motto of the SF > Writer's Association) The Future Ain't What It Used to Be. The science > fictional futures of my childhood are now dead as doornails. And I can't > enjoy contemporary SF that doesn't include a healthy dose of computers and > networking. I find this to be largely true as well. The cyberpunk genre does the best job at grappling with the impact of communications tech but it is traditionally dystopian. It would be nice to see a story about better living through crypto. What fiction can people recommend which presents crypto/privacy issues realistically? How about this new book that Neal Stephenson is working on, does anyone know what it's about? His short story, "Hack the Spew", a few months ago (in Wired, I think?) had a strong crypto flavor. Hal

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Re: Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> > http://www.steptoe.com/oped.htm > > argues that industry won't accept any system that threatens to cut off > backwards compatibility after 2 years, hence DES export liberalization > will have to extend beyond the proposed period. I take a slightly different moral. Baker (former NSA attorney) writes: > If buying key-recovery encryption means customers must give up all > of their legacy encryption systems, key recovery products will carry a > near-fatal burden in many markets where encryption is now used widely. The > transition to key recovery will have to be gradual or it won't happen > at all. What I see this as is a call to come up with architectures that will allow transparent phase-in of government key access (so-called "key recovery") technology. The current HP proposal fits in very well with this model. The appear to be planning on using standard API's so that applications will be able to switch to using key escrow software without changing the applications themselves, just the OS. Maybe there could be a transition period where both the old and new crypto would both be accepted, then after a period of time the old wouldn't work any more. As Baker goes on to say: > Three years ago, no one in the PC world would have bought an operating > system that didn't run MS-DOS. Three years from now, we'll be happy to buy > an operating system that is backward-compatible with Windows 95 but not > with MS-DOS. And then, at last, we'll throw out all our old DOS programs. This suggests to me that we need to be vigilant in watching for systems that will allow for easy "drop in" of key escrow. Hal

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RE: Mass-market crypto phones
by Mullen Patrick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: Clay Olbon II on Thu, Nov 21, 1996 15:20 >A while back, Eric Blossom posted a URL for a mass-market, phone encyrption >device (http://www.comsec.com/) The point of this post is to posit a The above mentioned crypto phone was incredibly expensive, if I remember correctly. What it basically was (Please keep in mind I may be thinking of a different product) a box containing a modem and a crypto-crunching CPU. Phone in one end, processed by said CPU, and send out other end. I have/had a similar idea, but I want to try make it a totally software product (assuming you have the necessary hw requirements on your computer) where you talk in through a microphone (can something be wired so you can use a regular phone plugged into your computer/modem/soundcard???) your CPU crunches code, and spits out the encrypted data. Obviously, the complementing steps would be done on the receiving end. Has anyone ever tried anything like this? >I think we need to keep a couple of goals in mind. The first, is to get >encrypting phones (or phone add-ons) into Wal-mart, K-mart, etc (where >probably most Americans now buy their phones). The prices need to be low >enough that people will want to buy them (<$100?). Is this technically >feasible? The comsec device from the above URL already demonstrates the >needed capability. Is the cost target possible? My guess is soon, given >the lowering costs and increasing capabilities of current processors. Goals sound good. I feel it *definately* has to be below $100. Personally, I use a phone bought at K-Mart that cost $12 _after_ tax... I wouldn't mind paying $50 for a techno gizmo that made my conversations, inane as they may be, private. The price would also have to be low to assure the other end has a similar techno-gizmo, or I would have wasted my money. Anyone else see the *immediate* need for a standard? >The second goal needs to be to push a similar product for cell-phones. If I'm not mistaken (and I've been known to be from time to time :-), cell phones are already encrypted between the phone and cell tower. That way, they are no less private than a regular phone. Of course, you may be referring to further end-to-end encryption built into the phone in addition to this, but as far as they being less secure than a house phone, I'm not sure about that one. >Given that these goals are met, I think widespread use of crypto over phone >lines would become almost inevitable. However, the fun part would be the >introduction of such products. The FUD coming from police, the government, >etc. would be amazing to behold. Agreed! > Clay >******************************************************* >Clay Olbon olbon(a)ix.netcom.com >engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. >**********************************************tanstaafl PM USER ERROR: REPLACE AND STRIKE ANY KEY WHEN READY

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Re: U.S. CIA employee caught spying
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 18 Nov 1996 17:05:47 -0500 (EST), Tim Scanlon wrote: >This is on the local DC news; >Harold Nicholson age 46, a CIA employee was arrested for spying today >at Dulles airport. He allegedly has been working for the Russians >for the past 2 years. Here's a good question to ask: "Why are we getting security policy from the [un]intelligence agencies?" What will get mentioned, however, will be: "If he'd been using PGP we'd never have caught him. This is why we need GAK!" # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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CAVE Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've put the CAVE-based report at: http://jya.com/tr453.htm (46 kb with 7 images) CAVE = Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption algorithm. Nokia, for one, uses a CAVE algorithm to secure its latest toy.

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Re: Database law... silver lining??
by Richard L. Field 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am not suggesting patent-like protection. Rather, I'd argue that there is very little "independent creation" with respect to my personal database. Provided it is considered my database to begin with, information that I give on a warranty card, when I ask for credit, etc. remains mine under the proposed U.S. law. Just because a third party tries to assemble it from those sources doesn't mean it suddenly becomes free data, from a non-database source. By that line of reasoning, any protected database would lose all protection upon its publication by a licensee, so long as you copied it from the licensee and not the originator. This is not how I read the proposed law, and it is not how big database publishers would want it read. - Richard Field (Nothing in this line of argument is meant to imply that I am in favor of the proposal.) At 11:47 PM 11/21/96 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: [my proposal snipped] > >Cute, but any such proposal is almost guaranteed to allow for independent >creation from a non-database source - e.g., warranty cards, info extracted >from you when you ask for credit, public records, etc. For example, one >comment to Article 3 of the proposed WIPO treaty on sui generis protection >of databases provides: > >"3.02 The protection provided does not preclude any person from >independently collecting, assembling or compiling works, data or materials >from any source other than a protected database." > >(see <http://www.loc.gov/copyright/wipo6.html> for more.) > >It's very unlikely that Congress (or the PTO) intends to do anything >that'll screw up what's already working well for big database publishers. >Your theory is similar to a patent flavor for databases, while the >proposals floated out so far are much more like copyright - e.g., >independent creation is OK, but copying is not, even with wide public >distribution, and long protection times. With patent, independent creation >is not OK, copying (the information, not the device) is encouraged/allowed, >and protection time is short.

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Re: 1996 Codebreakers
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> writes: >> I just got a review copy of the new (1996) ed. of Kahn's The >> Codebreakers from my local used bookstore. Its a little disapointing, >... >> & DH. Nothing on Cypherpunks, little on how privacy can be enhanced. The above was stripped from a reply made by Dr Dimitri Vulis. I have just one question, was the copy that you purchased hardcopy or paperback? I found the paperback in a school library and found that it said that the technical portion had been abridged to save space, (and money). I cannot say that I read the whole text, only the first half chapter and then some skipping around trying to find the RSA algorthim. I later found it in a periodical to which I am subscribed.

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Re: Anderson & Kuhn's "Improved DFA" paper
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HP just announced their big new plans for international exportable crypto using tamperproof PCM-CIA smartcards with multiple tamperproof GAK plugins. Anderson&Kuhn just announced the latest in a series of attacks on "tamperproof" hardware crypto modules by Israeli, UK, and US cryptographers. Obviously it must be a conspiracy :-) It's also an opportunity for some well-timed press releases. Clipper 1's reputation was severely damaged by Matt's attack. Anybody know if HP's giving out samples, and if there are real or test GAK plugins for them? HP URL http://www.dmo.hp.com/gsy/security/icf/main.html The paper was posted to coderpunks, and it's on ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/dfa Here's the intro: --------------------------------------------------------------------- Improved Differential Fault Analysis Ross J Anderson, Markus G Kuhn In [1], Biham and Shamir announce an attack on DES based on 200 ciphertexts in which one-bit errors have been induced by environmental stress. Here we show an attack that requires less than ten ciphertexts. Furthermore, our attack is practical in that it uses a fault model that has been implemented in attacks on real smartcards. In [2], Biham and Shamir show how their method can be extended to reverse engineer algorithms whose structure is unknown. Our attack can also be extended to such cases and is more efficient there too. In [3], Boneh, De Millo and Lipton discuss how such techniques can be used to attack RSA. Again, their attack is theoretical only, We show how to do it in practice. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk # (If this is posted to cypherpunks, I'm currently lurking from fcpunx, # so please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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BIS E-money Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to IG, we've put a copy of the BIS report on E-money at: http://jya.com/bis_emoney.html Here's a blurb from the intro: Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Electronic Money October 1996 Since the end of 1995 the central banks of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries have been studying the development of electronic money and the various policy issues which it raises. Much of this work has been carried out by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) or by monetary policy experts from G-10 central banks. Electronic money was discussed by BIS member central banks at meetings in Basle in July and September 1996. In August, the BIS published a report on the Security of Electronic Money prepared by the CPSS and the Group of Computer Experts. This report provides a definition of electronic money and a description of its key features. It discusses the factors influencing the development of e-money products. Finally, it reviews the policy issues raised by e-money developments, as seen from a central bank perspective, and discusses the possible policy responses. --

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