December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

EzStego in Java!: Now Disappearing At A Site Near You
by romana＠glamazon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EzStego, my tool for "steganography made easy", now has its own web site at http://www.fqa.com/ezstego/ EzStego is currently alpha software. Use it at your own risk. It is a reimplementation in Java, with much improvement, of my notorious shareware product, Stego. EzStego is also shareware. I have made the source code available for peer review and verification. EzStego and EzSteggy are (C) Romana Machado 1996. All rights reserved. Romana Machado romana(a)fqa.com http://www.fqa.com/romana/ http://www.glamazon.com/

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Re: support for "crack DES"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:26 PM 10/3/96 +0000, Omegaman wrote: >Considering the situation -- considering that RSA has even signed on >to this scheme -- I'd have to say that I don't give a rat's ass what >Bill Gates claims. If Micro$oft bucks the system, I'll gladly >applaud their stand. > >The situation is not good at all. > >Cracking DES (whether distributed or through a hardware crack, or >both!) seems critical at this point. Just remember that it would be far better to make the crack look easy, than to make it look hard. quantity 9000+, $1,000 Pentiums for a year (plus maybe $500,000 in electricity) looks "hard." 1000 dedicated chips (whether they be FPGA or custom or...) for 1.5 months or so looks "easy." The latter crack looks far more likely to be repeated. The former is OBVIOUSLY a stunt. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Esther Dyson: Pro-crypto in Poland
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm in Warsaw doing some consulting for a local ISP and got invited to an Internet conference last night targeted toward government ministry officials. Even though I speak no Polish, I decided to go because Esther Dyson was one of the keynotes. The three day conference is being held outside of Warsaw. The location has to be one of the most unique conference settings I've ever seen. How about in a classroom of what appeared to be the government police training barracks. Guarded gates, barking German shepherds in kennels, and armed, marching cops in camo fatigues. Interesting. Got to suggest it to the DefCon folks instead of Vegas. Anyway, not knowing what Esther was going to talk about, I started to smile when she launched into a very pro-crypto (as in anti-key escrow) presentation. Through a translator, she did a good job of covering most of the issues near and dear to Cypherpunks's hearts. She closed with urging the Polish officials to make their own decisions regarding privacy and crypto, and not be swayed by the actions of the US government. Someone in the audience asked what the average American thought of the ongoing crypto controversy. Esther answered correctly, that they're mostly clueless. Of course I had to stand up and mention the grassroots Cypherpunk efforts just to let folks know not everyone besides EFF is idly standing by (I think my host did a pretty good job of translating). Esther's comment was that Cypherpunks weren't average. You decide if that was a compliment or not. I don't know. Despite the bashing she got on the list about anonymity, I was impressed. Presenting the issues in a very logical and rational manner to government officials in "crypto-neutral" territory counts for something in my book. Anyway, based on all of the nonsense going on in the US, it's interesting to be in an environment where there are strong concerns about privacy and government abuses by the average citizen. I think Americans have taken for granted many things, that only living under a repressive regime would make them appreciate. Joel

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Lack of reporting on CALEA and Encryption issues ...
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I must first say that your program is one of the finest in news reporting, and I tune in every day. However, nothing is perfect, and your program is no exception: I am very concerned by the lack of reporting on CALEA (the US $500 Million Digital Telephony bill) and the continuing maneuvering by the Clinton administration on the encryption issue. Two years ago, FBI Director Louis Freeh managed to slip a $500 Million wire tap bill into the Congressional budget using last-minute sneaks. (He and his predecessors had tried unsuccessfully for several years to do it in the full light of open democracy, so this was the only way they could force it down American's throats.) After seeing this pass, many Congress members refused to fund it because the FBI continued to violate terms of CALEA which required full accounting to Congress of how the wire tap capacities were to be designed and used. When the figures were finally published, the public balked. Not surprisingly, Freeh had to resort to the same last-minute maneuvers to sneak in funding for CALEA this year. If the news media had reported either incident (or both), I would probably not be so upset, but the news media completely ignored this horrible abuse of the democratic process. The same goes for the encryption issue. It is clear that all present and past administrations have sided strongly with law enforcement and national security agencies, and have refused to allow for the proliferation of strong encryption despite the fact that it is probably the single biggest technical obstacle to Internet commerce and personal privacy. Again I would not be so upset if they let the issue be decided in the full light of democracy rather than behind closed doors using the "if you only knew what we knew, you would agree with us" argument. This sentiment is precisely echoed by the Congressional study done by the NRC on national cryptographic policy. The Clinton administration was hoping that the two year study would buy time and would eventually agree with its opinion, and when it did not, the Clinton administration dismissed it as uninformed, despite the fact that most of the NRC panel did get the infamous "secret briefing" by the NSA. Basically, they are not open to reason on this issue; they are open to one and only one idea: that law enforcement and national security agencies having guaranteed access to information when they want it, and they don't care about the technical or the privacy implications. Oh .. and by the way, they want access to all information, not just that which crosses national borders. The significance of these two issues are difficult to summarize in a sound bite. The best I can think of is to watch the Tom Clancy movie "Clear and Present Danger". While watching this movie, note how the CIA finds the telephone conversations of the drug dealer's agent. That sort of capability is called "drift net fishing" (for obvious reasons). "drift net fishing" was not possible in the old days of wire taps because the phone company barely kept enough written logs to find the cables and the wires, let alone figure out exactly where they go. The problem is especially difficult in older/larger cities where phone company technicians often tap a wire (for normal services) wherever it works. By the FBI's estimates, each physical wire tap costs on the order of $50K. Basically, the huge cost barrier (in man power) kept the government's powers in check. Enter the digital and wireless age, and suddenly every signal from every phone, beeper, computer and other neato gadgets are sent all over the place. True, it has become more difficult to figure out where a signal is routed, and that is what the FBI complained about. On the other hand, it has become infinitely easier to intercept communications without detection because every transmission is just a perfect verbatim copy of the original. Suddenly, the cost of monitoring a phone is not so high. If the routing capability is there, the FBI agents can sit in their comfortable offices and press the right buttons, and the contents of the call is duplicated at their desks. Of course, they don't have to have real people monitoring such calls; they can have voice analysis computers do it. They can search for anything that sounds like "bomb" or "kill" or "shoot" or "blow up". In the Clancy movie, such "drift net fishing" capability is clearly being used for good purposes, and I certainly applaud that. I hope that all of the leading edge technologies used by our law enforcement and national security agencies are used for good purposes. But that is not what history tells us. History tells us that such technologies are oblivious to the morals and ethics of their masters. Even in the older days of wire tapping techniques, the FBI was able to illegally intercept communications of civil rights leaders and other "dangerous" elements of society. Therefore, to grant the government capabilities that would enable "drift net fishing" on our own citizens is setting a very dangerous precedence. What if the FBI decides to search for "democratic" or "republican" or "pro-choice" or "pro-life"? What if they search for "muslim" or "jewish" or "christian"? These are the real dangers of CALEA and encryption restrictions. The boogie men that will plan bomb attacks and kidnap children have always found a way to do it, and some have gotten away, without any help from encryption or secure telephones. If the law enforcement and national security agencies truly want to save lives and promote public safety, there are many other issues and problems to deal with, and they are wasting valuable time with these two issues; other the other hand, if they just care about keeping and enhancing their abilities to be omniscient, then their current behavior is quite consistent with that goal: 1. Lies and misrepresentations: a. Louis Freeh now claims that CALEA will cost $2 billion. b. The CALEA slush fund Freeh got passed at the last minute of this Congress is actually unlimited. c. Despite their promises of full reporting, they have actually succeeded in defeating all the reporting clauses in CALEA, again, thanks to this last minute sneak. d. Clinton, Gore and company have consistently denied that they intend to restrict domestic encryption. However, if you listen to Gorelick, Freeh, Reno, Crowell and others, you will find out that they absolutely against domestic encryption. 2. Beaurocratic maneuvering: a. Spent 3 years "investigating" Phil Zimmerman and then dropped without comment. b. Used every trick in the book to keep ITAR encryption rules from ever being directly considered for Constitutionality. (NSA internal counsel believes it will not withstand such a legal challenge.) c. Refused to clearly define what is exportable and what is not. (Keep it confusing so that most will stay away just to be safe.) Also refused to clearly define what is "export", given that encryption is just algorithms and information in the purest form. I appeal to you, as a respected news organization, to investigate this in detail and expose the facts and let the public decide. Thank you. Ern

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Re: WINDOWS NT ????
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 03 Oct 1996 19:47:06 +1030, Petr Snajdr wrote: > is Windows NT secured system ? No. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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[ANNOUNCEMENT] Cyclic codes
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now is the time for all good little boys to cum in Timmy May's big mouth.

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Re: gack vs. key escrow vs. key recovery
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:33 PM 10/3/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >cpunks, a note about recent developments in "key recovery" initiative. > >I think cpunks as a group should reconsider very seriously their >own positions on cryptography and come up with something more >sophisticated than "any government bill or plan associated with >crypto is evil" which is the functional equivalent of the ideology >behind many recent posts. We don't think they're all NECESSARILY evil...they just turn out that way. Whose fault is this? >what is the precise difference between gack, key escrow, and >key recovery? Phase of moon? Season? Maybe it has something to do with the 11-year sunspot cycle? Bi-millenialism? >TCM has argued that the administration is muddying >the issue by manipulating the terminology. perhaps so, but I feel >that cpunks are equally guilty, by branding anything that emanates >out of the government as inherently orwellian. do you always have >to have an enemy? is the government always going to be your >enemy, no matter what they do? The government seems to be BEHAVING as if it is always going to be our enemy. Whose fault is that? >I have posted here before that many companies find the concept >of "key recovery" highly acceptable and even desirable. the >basic question is, what does this mean to wiretapping and >search warrants and subpoenas? >it is clear we are coming to a fork in the road at this moment. And it is our goal to not "get forked." >there are going to be two types of cpunk opinions based on recent >developments. > >1. those who feel that wiretapping was illegitimate from the >start and are working to make wiretapping impossible. confronted >with a legal search warrant/subpoena etc. for personal data, >they would not hand over keys. they would "superencrypt" in >systems that do etc. That's me... >2. those who feel that there is such a thing as a legal warrant >or subpoena for information protected by cryptography keys, and >would agree that this logically means that governments will be >getting access to "key recovery" infrastructures. On the contrary: The existence of a "legal warrant" doesn't mean that the government ought to (or even can) get access to data via a "key recovery" system. It's been mentioned numerous times that there are plenty of things that could be done (multiple encryption; encryption of GAK'd key; foreign key escrow with no request cooperation, etc) to prevent this. >personally I am leaning toward 2, because I feel that we already >live in such a society, We also live in a violent, oppressive society. Does this mean that we shouldn't try to fix its problems? > and that it is not orwellian. Pollyanna, meet Eric Blair. > companies are going to lean toward (2). No, they're going to lean towards yet another system, (3), whatever suits them. > I do agree >that the gov't has the potential to twist this process to evil >ends, If it had not had the desire to "twist this process to evil ends" government wouldn't have interfered with the natural development of key-keeping systems which serve only the key owner, not anyone else. > but that has always been true of everything about democratic >government, and the recipe for 200+ years has always been >and remains "eternal vigilance". in other words, I am in favor >of some kind of mechanism by which the government can obtain >keys via subpoenas/warrants. And I am in favor of some kind of mechanism by which the government can be destroyed by ordinary citizens. >cpunks, I think we should try to clarify our terms and come to >some conclusions. > >those who continue to pursue (1) are going to be perceived as >more and more radical and extremist, because arguably it is not >even a system we have today or one that was ever devised. I'd disagree with that. I've devised a system... >remember, the constution guarantees >freedom from *unreasonable* search and seizure, but never >prohibited search and seizure in the first place!! apparently >at least our found fathers believed that "reasonable" search >and seizure was a wholly legitimate function of government, >based on this wording. I guess that means that anything they call "reasonable," you'll agree with? Hint: Between about 1932 and 1968, wiretaps in the US were ILLEGAL. Nevertheless, they were done anyway, by the telephone company on request by the cops. (they were not admissible in court, however.) Question: Should we define the standard of 'reasonable' on the opinion of a group of people (cops, officials, politicians) who have a proven habit of using illegal techniques to get information? Apparently, cops are unwilling to let illegality get in their way. I'd say, on the whole, cops must have a rather enormous motivation to get wiretaps, and only a fool would think that this would fail to motivate them to adjust their standard of "reasonableness." >regarding (2): the government may actually help bring crypto >to the masses via the post office and other routes. are >cpunks going to continue to hold the simplistic, reactionary, >knee-jerk, black-and-white opinion that "anything with the >word 'government' in it is evil"? "if the government is doing >something, then we must sabotage it"? So far, such an opinion would fit the facts far better than anything you've said so far. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Flood Warning
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Oct 03, 1996 10:30:37, 'jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com>' wrote: >> High-Tech Leaders Join Forces to Enable International >> Strong Encryption >> >> See: http://www.ibm.com/news/alliance2.htm > >This is apparently no longer valid. Is there a new one? ----- Sorry. It seems that you need to go through IBM's home page at: www.ibm.com, then follow the links to the full press release where the URL above comes up. This is the release that most of the media parroted. It does include hand-rubbing quotes by industry rats, er, finks. Anybody who can't get through and wants the PR-dirty, send me a blank message with the subject: RAT_ibm

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Re: paging nets
by Mark Neely 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>BBC Blows Radiopager Security Systems Wide Open >LONDON, ENGLAND, 1996 OCT 2 (NB) -- By Steve Gold. Now, why does he sound familiar :) Regards, Mark Mark Neely - accessnt(a)ozemail.com.au Lawyer, Internet Consultant, Professional Cynic & Author

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Re: Censorship?
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What say ye?? > > :From: Zimm2(a)gnn.com (Zimm2) > :Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp > :Subject: Cypherpunks engaged in censorship? > :Date: Wed, 02 Oct 1996 08:39:50 > : > :It has come to my attention that Cypherpunks no longer allows users of > :Microsoft browsers to access their archives. The "cypherpunks archives" is not owned by the cypherpunks or maintained by toad.com (which is the host of the actual list). The owner of infinity.nus.sg/cypherpunks webpage maintains the archive. It is his effort and his choice to restrict the browser. Anyone is free to provide an archive the list. And anyone can read the list. > :Is it contradictory for an organization who proclaims an interest in the free > :exchange of ideas through the mechanism of the Internet to limit the exchange > :of ideas using an individual's software decisions as the criteria? Agreed. But the cypherpunks is not an "organization" in the strictest sense. The only "official" aspect of cypherpunks is the list hosted at toad.com. > :Are issues of annonymity and privacy and the encouragement of private use of > :powerful encryption and remailer tools secondary to and less important than a > :crusade against a software manufacturer? Of course not. But the owner of http://infinity.nus.sg/cypherpunks disagrees and since it's his website and he pays for it and compiles it... me -------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <mailto:omega@bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send a message with the text "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key. --------------------------------------------------------------

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CDT Policy Post 2.35 - Latest Admin Crypto Policy Pushes KeyEscrow
by Bob Palacios 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 35 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 35 October 3, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) Latest Administration Crypto Policy Continues Push Towards Key Escrow (2) Analysis of the Administration's Next Step: Short-Term Export Relief to Compel Long-Term Key Escrow (3) How to Subscribe/Unsubscribe to the Policy Post list (4) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ** This document looks best when viewed in COURIER font ** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) LATEST ADMINISTRATION CRYPTO POLICY CONTINUES PUSH TOWARDS KEY ESCROW This week the Administration announced the latest in a series of encryption policies designed to promote the use of key escrow systems, both domestically and abroad. This latest initiative continues the drive towards a global guarantee of law enforcement access to all encrypted communications and stored data. CDT believes that such governmental access systems -- whether through "key escrow" or "key recovery" -- threaten the fundamental privacy rights of computer users, both domestically and abroad. The latest Administration proposal would promote key escrow by temporarily easing current export restrictions on moderately strong encryption products. The proposal would raise the current export limit from 40 bits to 56 bits for companies that agree to produce key escrow products. Companies would be required to report their progress every six months. After two years, all exportable encryption systems stronger than 40-bits would have to include key escrow. Encryption producers will be compelled to be part of this scheme in order to stay competitive, eventually producing and adopting key escrow systems which so far have been largely rejected by the public. An overview of the latest Administration policy, considered within the context of the government's relentless drive towards key escrow, is attached below. - THE UNSWERVING GOAL: GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO ALL COMMUNICATIONS AND STORED DATA The long-standing goal of every major encryption plan by the Administration has been to guarantee government access to all encrypted communications and stored data. In 1993, the Clipper Chip policy achieved access through keys held by the government. In 1995, the "Clipper II" proposal allowed export relief for commercial key escrow systems. This summer, "Clipper III" sought access to keys through the dual incentives of export controls and a new government "key management infrastructure." In each case, the ultimate goal has been a guarantee of government access to the plaintext of encrypted information. Law enforcement and national security interests have driven this process. The attempt to institutionalize key escrow worldwide is a fundamental threat to the privacy and security of Internet users both domestically and abroad. * GUARANTEED ACCESS TO INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS AND STORED DATA WOULD BE A DRAMATIC EXPANSION OF CURRENT LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES. Guaranteed access to Internet communications and stored files is a far greater intrusion into the privacy of computer users than current wiretapping. As individuals conduct more aspects of their lives online, key escrow is tantamount to guaranteeing law enforcement access to all of our most intimate conversations, sensitive personal records, musings and thoughts in a way never available before. Within the United States, Congress and the courts have established a delicate balance in electronic surveillance between law enforcement and individual privacy rights. Key escrow destroys that balance, providing law enforcement with a comprehensive dossier of individual lives and activities. * GLOBAL KEY ESCROW ENDANGERS THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF COMPUTER USERS COMMUNICATING IN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NO FOURTH AMENDMENT OR OTHER PRIVACY PROTECTIONS. An international key escrow scheme will necessarily entail the escrow of key information in foreign countries, with access by foreign governments through much weaker privacy protections. Such global key escrow jeopardizes the privacy rights of any American who communicates or stores files abroad, where key information might be released with few privacy protections. Moreover, global key escrow endangers the privacy and free expression of computer users everywhere by establishing the global machinery for government surveillance without privacy protections. * THE CHOICE TO ACCEPT THE COSTS AND RISKS OF KEY ESCROW SHOULD BE MADE BY INDIVIDUAL USERS, NOT FORCED UPON THEM. Additional access points to encrypted data will create added vulnerabilities, new security problems, and additional costs. While some users may decide that the benefits of key escrow outweigh the costs, governments should not be imposing these costs and risks on users who do not want them. Individuals should be able to choose the type of encryption they want. The global adoption of government access systems has serious, negative consequences on the privacy of computer users. The recent Administration announcement is another step in that wrong direction. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- WHAT YOU CAN DO -- ADOPT YOUR LEGISLATOR As Members of Congress head home for the fall elections, they need to hear from Internet users about the importance of encryption policy reform for the future of the Net. Adopt your legislator -- tell them that the Administration's Key Escrow plan threatens the basic privacy rights of Internet users, and let us know what they say! Please take a moment to join the "Adopt Your Legislator" campaign. By taking a moment to sign up to contact your member of Congress, you can make a critical difference in the debate over privacy and security on the Internet. Details can be found at: http://www.crypto.com/ and http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ Tell them it's "My Lock, My Key!" (The Adopt Your Legislator Campaign is a joint effort organized by the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)). ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (2) ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEXT STEP: SHORT-TERM EXPORT RELIEF TO COMPEL LONG-TERM KEY ESCROW The latest Administration encryption policy, announced October 1, continues this trend towards governmental access to all encrypted information. Using a carrot-and-stick approach, the plan promises moderate, short-term export relief in return for the development and eventual adoption of key recovery systems. The Administration unveiled its encryption initiative at a White House briefing by CIA Director John Deutch, Domestic Policy Advisor to the Vice President Greg Simon, Undersecretary of Commerce William Reinsch, and high-level representatives of the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget. The basic outlines of the proposal included below were culled from the Administration's statement and Tuesday's White House briefing. Major features of the new policy include: * ALLOWS EXPORT OF 56-BIT ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS, "contingent upon industry commitments to build and market future products that support key recovery." Six-month licenses for 56-bit exports would be granted and renewed for up to two years -- contingent on satisfactory progress towards key escrow. * REQUIRES KEY ESCROW CAPABILITIES AFTER TWO YEARS in all exportable products with more than 40 bits. * "ENCOURAGES" THE ADOPTION OF KEY ESCROW SYSTEMS through international agreements, standards processes, and a new key management infrastructure. * TRANSFERS JURISDICTION OVER ENCRYPTION EXPORT LICENSING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, but grants the Department of Justice a formal vote in the process. The President is expected to sign an Executive Order enacting many of these changes in mid-October. Other pieces will be published as agency rules or regulations; a small part of the proposal (rules governing key holders) may require legislation. WHAT IT ALL MEANS FOR INTERNET USERS: In the short run, computer users may see more widespread availability of moderately stronger encryption products (up to 56-bit key length) if vendors choose to and are able to meet the "commitments" required under the proposal. In the longer term, however, even these moderately stronger products will only be exportable with key escrow. Ultimately, this proposal is designed to force the widespread adoption of key escrow systems, both domestically and abroad. A. EXPORT CONTROL RELIEF AS AN INCENTIVE FOR KEY ESCROW: The Administration proposal would allow for short-term export of 56-bit DES equivalent encryption products in return for commitments from exporters to develop "key recovery" systems. * Starting on Jan. 1, 1997, the Administration would begin granting six month general licenses for export of 56-bit encryption products. * Licenses would be granted "contingent on commitments from exporters to explicit benchmarks and milestones for developing and incorporating key recovery features into their products and services." * Additional six month licenses would be granted "if milestones are met." * In two years, "the export of 56-bit products that do not support key recovery will no longer be permitted." * Export of longer key lengths would continue for certain sensitive financial applications. * Export of longer key lengths may be allowed more generally once key escrow mechanisms are in place. Questions remain as to exactly what form the commitments from exporters will take, who will qualify for these relaxations, and what will happen at the end of two years to 56-bit non-escrow products in the marketplace and how they will be supported. No interoperability restrictions on products have been mentioned, and the Administration seemed to indicate that it would be willing to tolerate a greater degree of interoperability between products. WHAT EXPORT CONTROLS MEANS FOR INTERNET USERS: This Administration export control scheme coerces industry into developing key escrow systems, domestically and abroad, whether they want to or not. Since 1992, export controls have been the favorite vehicle for enforcing the adoption of such key escrow systems. The strong public desire for secure global communications has allowed government to use key escrow as a precondition for export relief. Export controls are a force for key escrow in the domestic market as well as the international market because of the need for secure international communications and the cost of producing product lines for U.S. use only. The Administration realizes this: as CIA Director Deutch stated at the White House press briefing, he was more concerned with encryption that people "buy at Sears" than about less popular strong encryption products that the Administration concedes will always be available. In addition to their impact on the market for key escrow, the proposal's export controls and key length limits themselves hurt user privacy and security. * Export controls don't make sense for a global Internet; they place business at a competitive disadvantage and prevent deployment of a secure global infrastructure. * 56-bits is not enough for many applications. CDT welcomes the Administration's recognition that 40-bit products are not strong enough, but last winter's study by a panel of encryption experts argued that DES keys can be cracked relatively quickly by well- financed groups, and that 70- to 90-bit keys are more appropriate. * Key length limits are a flawed approach because they presuppose that some entities should be able to break keys and some should not -- a solution that is unlikely to appeal to worldwide consumers of encryption. B. "KEY RECOVERY": Government access to the plaintext of encrypted data remains the centerpiece of the Administration proposal. Major features of the key escrow requirements in the latest proposal include: * Key escrow systems would rely on a trusted party to recover a user's confidentiality keys for use by law enforcement acting under "proper authority." * The trusted recovery party might in some cases be internal to the user's organization, but in all cases notice to surveillance targets that their key information had been released would be prohibited. * Access to keys internationally "would be provided in accordance with destination country policies and bilateral understandings." * The Administration will pursue legislation to govern the release of keys, provide criminal and civil penalties for unauthorized releases or theft of keys, and provide liability protection for key holders. * The Administration will continue to "encourage" the adoption of key escrow systems through it's broad efforts to promote international key escrow agreements, government key escrow purchasing standards, and the creation of a key management infrastructure. None of the officials at the White House briefing were able to give specific information about the requirements to be placed on key holders (e.g., response times, security clearances, etc.) The Administration did indicate a broader approach to allowing industry key escrow systems that more limited access to confidential information through, for example, recovery of specific plaintext or separation of key information. NOTE: KEY ESCROW V. KEY RECOVERY -- CDT recognizes that real progress has been made in the development of systems that provide access to the plaintext of encrypted data while minimizing the collection and disclosure of sensitive key information. However, from a privacy policy perspective these approaches have the same basic privacy problem: they are designed to provide law enforcement with guaranteed access to all encrypted information. WHAT "KEY RECOVERY" MEANS FOR INTERNET USERS: CDT recognizes that some companies and users may wish to use key escrow systems. The Administration's apparent recognition that these systems are best designed in the private sector is welcome. However, this policy's acknowledged desire to widely promote key escrow is dangerous and threatens the privacy of users: * Users are being pushed towards key escrow, whether they want it or not. The Administration is using the enormous pressure of export controls, competitive markets, and industry standards to force adoption of key escrow. Each user should be free to decide for themselves whether to accept the costs of key escrow. * International key escrow doesn't protect privacy in a world without a Fourth Amendment -- What legal standards apply to communications when keys are held in foreign countries? Officials have been unable to clearly explain how the privacy of computer users will be preserved. * Key escrow dramatically expands law enforcement capabilities -- Guaranteed access to encrypted information is a far greater intrusion into our lives than the delicate balance struck under U.S. privacy law. * Key escrow is unproven -- The NRC's recent study argued that a policy relying on key escrow is "not appropriate at this time" and "is likely to have a significant negative impact on the natural development of applications." * Key escrow creates new security vulnerabilities, such as the creation of large aggregations of sensitive key information, that are poorly understood. C. TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION TO THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT: According to the White House, "after consultation with Congress, jurisdiction for commercial encryption controls will be transferred from the State Department to the Commerce Department." * Encryption licenses will be reviewed under the Commerce Department's "normal process" by a committee with representatives from the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and for encryption exports, Justice. * The Justice Department will have a single vote in the review committee, which will make its decisions by majority rule. * The State Department will only have jurisdiction over special, single customer, military-specific encryption products. WHAT TRANSFERRING JURISDICTION MEANS FOR INTERNET USERS: While the switch to Commerce has been perceived as helpful by some, CDT believes the benefits are unclear if fundamental policy remains unchanged. The switch to Commerce will have little impact on the underlying policy direction aimed at institutionalizing key escrow. Moreover, the Commerce Department's review committee is heavily weighted towards the law enforcement and national security perspective (State, Defense, Justice, and Energy), with the Commerce Department the lone representative of industry and consumer interests. Finally, the presence of domestic law enforcement in export control decisions raises serious questions about the ultimate goal of this policy. IV. CONCLUSION The Administration's latest encryption proposal remains wedded to a flawed, key escrow and export control oriented approach that does not address the privacy concerns of users. While it contains some welcome ideas, at its heart the Administration proposal uses the short-term easing of export controls to promote key escrow through a Faustian bargain with an industry desperate to produce strong security products. Such manipulation of the market for encryption products is designed to forward law enforcement's dangerous agenda of worldwide governmental access to all encrypted information. The march towards institutionalized key escrow is a real threat to the privacy of computer users, particularly in a world where not everyone has a Fourth Amendment. The United States should be a force for Internet privacy and security worldwide. Rather than forcing key escrow on a wary public, the Administration should look to work with Congress, privacy and Internet advocates, the user community, and industry to craft a truly voluntary policy that meets the privacy and security needs of computer users in the global Information Age. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (3) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by nearly 10,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (4) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: http://www.cdt.org/ FTP ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 2.35 10/3/96 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: ITAR satellite provision
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 3 Oct 1996, jim bell wrote: > The wording was > clearly intended to be an exception to a rule. What the wording doesn't > include is the "exception to the exception," most likely because they > weren't thinking in too great a detail when they wrote the regulations. Yow. The "if we put it in a rocket it's exportable" interpretation made me think twice before posting the text of that definition, because it's seductive and wrong. I posted it because it's amusing to think about and because we all had a good laugh about it at the Mac crypto conference; but I'd feel like a jerk if someone got themselves in a lot of trouble with an enthusiastic misreading of that sentence out of pages and pages of regulations (plus quite a few more pages of opinions interpreting those regulations). > It appears that the government left a loophole so large that you could > drive a truck...er...shoot a rocket through it. If you think you've found an enormous loophole in a regulation which has been around for 15-20 years, you should double-check your research and get a good nights' sleep. Law is like science this way - if you think you have found room-temperature fusion you should stop and check your work. It's much more likely that you're not reading carefully or you've missed something. -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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Pager security
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lest anyone doubt this, pagers in the US have the same exact vulnerability as those in the UK. No current paging systems use any kind of serious encryption and all can be intercepted by using a scanner, a very simple data detector consisting of one IC and an ordinary PC running appropriate software. I wrote a USENET article about decoding POCSAG paging back in 1993, and am aware of at least four different individuals who have implemented programs based in part on my description of the protocol - three of whom have sold the product to the hobbiest market. Dave Emery N1PRE die(a)die.com

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RE: gack vs. key escrow vs. key recovery
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Vladimir Z. Nuri, [who still doesn't get it] what is the precise difference between gack, key escrow, and key recovery? [and] I'll be watching the debate closely, as the true extremists incapable of compromise (and thereby living in a fantasy world) show their colors.... ............................................................................... The precise difference is: who is in control. In order to understand this critical point you must understood the idea of having personal authority as a standard for living. But you would expect that everyone should accept being subject to inspection by default, as if governments owned everyone within the national boundaries and keeping personal things away from them were a sin. The more that governments obliterate the lines of division between what is exclusively one's own to manage and what they have "the right" to share in (including holding your extra keys) or to demand (access to private communication), the less defined the concept of individuality becomes (as compared to being a "borg" of the State) and the more difficult it becomes intellectually to uphold one's separateness from it, since it all seems to be the same, undifferentiated control over things in general ("we are all One - how could you object?"). It is right to resist any attempts by the State to assimilate everyone into its fold by blurring the boundaries of authority (in its favor). It is a better thing to strengthen each individual's ability to maintain their own, than to put them in a situation where they *must* use the assistance of (become dependent upon) the (supposed) benevolence and rational judgement of an overwhelming overseer. It is better to reserve the right of authority over who & when anyone may keep one's software keys in escrow. It is better than to forfeit the right to make that decision on one's own good time and according to one's own plan, which would otherwise weaken that authority. .. Blanc [If 51% of the true extremist voters would elect Harry Browne, GAK would not be a problem.]

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Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 20:50:17 -0700, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >> "What?" I asked. "Unless you're talking about import restrictions." >> >> "Exactly," he said. >> >> -Declan > >I don't doubt that they can do this if they really want to, but I >wonder what legal basis they will use for import restrictions. > >Are there any current import restrictions for products on can legally >manufacture, sell, and use in the United States? > >Thanks. They could easily levy a $1*10^99 tariff per byte. That might have the same effect... <g> # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: [NOISE] ITAR Satellite
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:46 PM 10/3/96 -0400, David Lesher wrote: >Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law sez: >> >> Alas, a common fallacy. >> >> You have committed a prohibited export when the stuff lands outside the >> USA....It's not illegal when it goes up ("by reason of the launching" and, >> e.g. *stays up* in orbit) but it is illegal when it comes down abroad. >> > >"I just shoots them, who CARES where they come down? >It's not my department, said Werner Von Braun...." No... not exactly. "Vhen the rockets go up... who cares vhere they come down... That's not my department... says Werner Von Braun." Tom Lehrer. 1965. "That was the year that Was." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Clipper III on the table
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 19:34:23 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >As for IBM's involvement, they've played around with the NSA for decades. >Nothing new there. Fortunately, today they're just a marginal player. This is a very dangerous statement to make. IBM is nowhere near as powerful as they were, but they're still very solidly entrenched in the business world*. Money is what will ultimately decide this issue - if Bill Clinton's VISA was abused after a hacker sniffed a network transaction ITAR would be dead within seconds! * - people have said that OS/2 is dead. Well it turns out that IBM is making several *BILLION* in sales every year on it from their business deals. According to figures I've seen, they have a high percentage of the F500 market. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 2 Oct 1996 10:27:46 -0700 (PDT), Joe Shea wrote: > You just managed to justify your own censorship of the list, >Declan. Talk about clueless! How'd that old line go about cooking implements and carbon deposits? As has often been enumerated on the list: If someone wishes to say something - anything - to a group of like-minded people, that is his choice. If they choose not to listen, that is their choice. If declan chooses not to forward mail to a list he moderates, it's his choice. He doesn't force anyone to read that list. He certainly doesn't force them to avoid any other lists. If they don't like his list or disagree with his views they can show their disapproval by going elsewhere (seealso: Free Market) Consider your argument in a different light: Do you complain that Rush Limbaugh never lets the head of N.O.W. or Bill Clinton do a show? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Uruguayan 'pirate' radio seized
by aaron＠burn.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought that I had sent this out already to my various private lists, but it appears that I haven't. From my perspective of involvement in Free Radio and support for armed struggle, I consider it important. Feel free to redistribute this. If you can improve the translation, or find additional information, please send me a copy. --Aaron The Spanish original follows my translation. La Jornada (Mexico), 23 September 1996 Uruguayan pirate radio equipment seized; transmitted EZLN messages. Ap y Dpa, Montevideo, 22 de septiembre. Uruguayan military intelligence services confiscated the transmission equipment of a clandestine radio station that broadcast messages of Mexico's EZLN, according to the Defense Minister, Raúl Iturria. He speculated that it could have involved the promotion of collective armed uprisings, and possible terrorist acts. According to a report in the Uruguayan periodical El País, the raid on the broadcaster 'La Intrusa', located in the Montevideo suburban barrio of La Teja, allowed the discovery of "subversive plans" and radio messages sent from the Lacandon jungle and from Nicaragua, although not 'codified' by the military intelligence services. [Can any Spanish speakers clarify the last clause? See original below.--Aaron] The Nicaraguan instructional materials contained formulas, systems of putting together explosives, and some suggestions for illegally obtaining the various materials necessery for the armaments to reach their maximum potency. The instructions were put to music, with Central American rhythm, explaining directly and even joyfully the means of equipping any group. In the international communications broadcast by the pirate radio, reporters, presumably Uruguayan, reported from the Mexican jungle "whole chapters of tactics useful for confronting the enemy", and these made reference to impending contact with unidentified inserrectional forces of Chile, according to the newspaper. According to a Uruguayan broadcast official, the police operation also allowed the seizure of propaganda material and materials for making molotov cocktails that were used by members of the pirate radio station against patrol vehicles in their area of operation. ******************************************* La Jornada 23 de septiembre de 1996 Confiscaron en Uruguay equipo de radio que difundía mensajes del EZLN. Ap y Dpa, Montevideo, 22 de septiembre. Los servicios de inteligencia militar de Uruguay confiscaron los equipos de transmisión de una estación de radio clandestina que difundía mensajes del movimiento rebelde Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, de México, informó hoy el ministro de Defensa, Raúl Iturria, quien especuló que podría tratarse de la promoción de alzamientos armados colectivos, y eventuales acciones terroristas. De acuerdo con información del periódico matutino uruguayo El País, el allanamiento a la radiodifusora La Intrusa, ubicada en el barrio suburbano La Teja, de Montevideo, permitió descubrir ``planes subversivos'' y mensajes radiales enviados desde la Selva Lacandona y de Nicaragua, aún no codificados por los servicios de inteligencia militar. El material instructivo nigaragüense contenía fórmulas, sistemas de ensamblado para explosivos y algunas sugerencias para la obtención ilegal de los distintos materiales necesarios para que el armamento alcanzara su máxima potencia. Las indicaciones eran musicalizadas, con ritmo centroamericano, dijo, al explicar directa y hasta alegremente el modo de pertrechar a cualuqier grupo. En las comunicaciones internacionales difundidas por la radioemisora pirata, reporteros, presumiblemente uruguayos, informaban desde la selva mexicana ``capítulos enteros de tácticas ejecutables para enfrentar al enemigo'', y en ellos se hacía referencia a un próximo contacto con fuerzas insurrectas de Chile aún no identificadas, precisó el diario. Así, el operativo policial permitió incautar, además, material de propaganda y elementos para la fabricación de cocteles molotov que, según dijo el director nacional de Comunicaciones de Uruguay, Ernesto Dhel, eran utilizados por los miembros de la radioemisora ilegal, contra los vehículos de patrullaje instalados en su área de acción.

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[FUN/GAMES] re: airhead
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Deana Holmes" <mirele(a)xmission.com> writes: .Sheesh. .You know you're doing good when both Dmitri Vulis and Attila both badmouth .you. (For the record, Attila's badmouthing consisted of stating via private .email that I was "the same air head pseudo-intellectual who has poisoned .her own life with hatred and ignorance in so many other venues.") . .Some people are just terribly threatened, I guess. . threatened by an airhead?!? ROTFL ...reminds me of the man driving in the country with his blond bimbo, when they crest a hill and see YABB in the middle of a grazing field rowing a boat, ...absolutely oblivious to all else. our fearless BB demands her date stop as they pull abreast of the scene; our BB nimbly jumps from the car, runs to the fence line, and commences screaming at the YABB who is still rowing away with all her heart. BB, returning to the car, is asked by her date what she was screaming at YABB. "Oh," BB said, "I was sooo mad! I told her she was a disgrace to all blonde [bimbos]; ...and that if I could only swim, I would come out there and thrash her..." Go on home, Deana; you have been in one more than too many intellectual arguments with only one oar and half the deck. --attila 04 10 96 : 06 20 15 UT -- "Why should I go the circus? Congress is in session." --Will Rogers

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Re: Export laws don't just affect crypto
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 00:05:16 -0700 (PDT), Lucky Green wrote: >The recent posts about GPS made me research the state of the art of GPS >receivers. Seems they are getting pretty good. Two pounds, sub-meter >accuracy, attitude determination, all at altitudes up to 60,000 feet and >speeds up to 1,000 nmph. But what really caught my eye was the fine print >at the bottom of the spec sheet: > >"Higher altitude and velocities up to 25,000 nautical miles-per-hour >options are available in the U.S." > >I gather from this that as long as you are in the US, you are welcome to >use this technology for applications that require larger than 1,000 nmph >speeds. > >Seems the software industry is not the only industry that's suffering >from silly export control laws. Possibly - certainly there are plenty of legislators who'd do it. I'd heard, however, that the precision of your signal could be increased by getting a fix on more than 3 satellites at a time - and that the GPS network had been designed to 'blanket' the Northern Hemisphere. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 20:55:40 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >And just what would you call PGP? >Long before the MIT deal, people in the U.S. were using their "OK in >America" (not counting RSADSI's issues) software to communicate with >"illegally exported" copies in foreign lands. Just informally, how many of the people on this list do you think have bypassed any cooperation with the USG on general principles and are using International PGP? ("Well this one uses non-banned math") Unfortunately, we've already demonstrated that hackers (real ones) and/or cpunks will use Underground Crypto. What's missing is evidence that business (and thus Joe Sixpack - either directly or indirectly) will. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Majordomo results: mailto:pr-news@pa.dec.com
by majordomo＠dws008.ako.dec.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- >>>> What is DEC's official position regarding the new Clipper III proposal? **** @_ **** No valid commands found. **** Commands must be in message BODY, not in HEADER. **** Help for majordomo(a)dws008.ako.dec.com: This is Brent Chapman's "Majordomo" mailing list manager, version 1.93. In the description below items contained in []'s are optional. When providing the item, do not include the []'s around it. It understands the following commands: subscribe <list> [<address>] Subscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) to the named <list>. unsubscribe <list> [<address>] Unsubscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) from the named <list>. get <list> <filename> Get a file related to <list>. index <list> Return an index of files you can "get" for <list>. which [<address>] Find out which lists you (or <address> if specified) are on. who <list> Find out who is on the named <list>. info <list> Retrieve the general introductory information for the named <list>. lists Show the lists served by this Majordomo server. help Retrieve this message. end Stop processing commands (useful if your mailer adds a signature). Commands should be sent in the body of an email message to "majordomo(a)dws008.ako.dec.com". Commands in the "Subject:" line NOT processed. If you have any questions or problems, please contact "majordomo-Owner(a)dws008.ako.dec.com".

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Re: The Right to Keep and Bear Crypto
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>No. And No. This argument will never fly in any court. > >If you want to see why, go to my homepage > >http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin > Thanks, the material was indeed informative. Some great work! However, I found much disturbing. The inference that the Exec branch could on the one hand classify crypto as a munition ('arms' by any other name), while for constitutional purposes the Courts may not exposes a deep-seated legal duplicity. Constitutional interpretations over the past century not withstanding, it is clear (to me) that a substantial number of the Framers would abhor what has become of the Second Amendment's ... right to keep and bear arms. One of the primary reasons put forth by the Framers for such a right was in order to resist the an oppressive state. The strongest reason for the people to retain the right to keep and bear arms is, as a last resort, to protect themselves against tyranny in government. --Thomas Jefferson When firearms go, all goes. We need them every hour. --George Washington It is ludacrous to expect citizens armed with no more than side arms, bolt-actions and shot guns to resist the actions of a modern military or law enforcement which citizens may find in violation of their inaliable natural rights (whether mistaken or not). In my opinion, all citizens should be be able to keep and bear any arms (without registration) which the state might use against them. To do so now is a criminal action. So be it. Unfortunately, it is common for groups especially governmental to be come statist, mean spirited and eventually malevolent. I hope jim bell or his ilk are soon successful at putting up functional, anonymous and active AP sites. I can't wait to wager! -- Steve

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Re: ITAR satellite provision
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 02 Oct 1996 09:28:22 -0800, jim bell wrote: >> "Export means, for purposes of this subchapter: >[snip] >>* A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason of the launching >>* of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this >>* subchapter. Most of the requirements of this subchapter relate >> only to exports, as defined above. However, for certain limited >> purposes, the controls of this subchapter apply to sales and other >> transfers of defense articles and defense services (see, e.g., Sec. >> 126.1) of this subchapter." > > >Okay, everybody, call Estes! We've got some crypto to export...er...launch! For some reason I'm getting a very comical picture here of a Crypto-CD inside one of those cylindrical oatmeal boxes with about 50 F model-rocket engines strapped to it.... Now, if you could just hit Airforce 1 on the way over - call it sending a message. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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