December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

New Infowarfare Panel
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If y'all have heard, Clinton signed an executive order 2 days ago creating a new panel to examine how to "protect" "critical" computer systems. The panel will be made of of the usual suspects with a non-govt person ($5.00 says it will be someone from one of those wonderfully independant companies like SAIC, MITRETEC, EDS, E-Systems). Needless to say, it looks an awful lot like NSDD-145 all over again with the panel recommending changes to the law to allo for greater coordination of LE, intell for govt computers and god knows what for non-govt computers. Anyway, the directive is now up on our site at http://www.epic.org/security/infowar/eo_cip.html -dave _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: New Infowarfare Panel _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org

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TLA abuse (?) [non-crypto, mostly]
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hmmmm. Got a call this morning from a Mike Hughes of the Amarillo PD (APD). Seems they've received "several" complaints about the anti-CDA image on my home page (http://www.shellback.com/p/merriman) Supposedly, it's not the nudity they complainer(s) is(are) all riled up about: it's the age of the models that's being questioned. Hardcopy of said image has been forwarded to the FBI for 'review'. Officer (sorry, don't recall his rank) Hughes says *he* thinks the models could conceivably be 18; a judge they showed it to said _she_ thought (personal opinion) younger. Hence, the forwarding to FBI for quasi-official determination. Officer Hughes going to stop by so I can show him: A - that the page is PICS rated B - the original of the image :-) C - the precautions that PWS takes to warn folks about possibly offensive content. I don't plan to change the image, so if anyone can point me in the general direction of some Legal Assistance (tm), I'd appreciate it. Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMexn/cVrTvyYOzAZAQHlRgP/dKIbtldSNhFe7pe3PVIHfTtDsSFH82OG i4/yBxD2dcFi+Ou+2nbol2MKOew7qKeV7Lq3raU/rcjIVutFDUGIxa+SAJTzuc5F t6Wb8lD3M4rvH/7kklhW0yf1iQaauT+bQt+ZHaUDNGLBCpiy0RPPMnluydcGZeRV Xq6IEnkH9a4= =yg4d -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Fw: Re: US versions of Netscape now available
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Jul 17 17:36:57 1996 - -----Begin Included Message ----- Date: From: To: remailer(a)yap.pactitle.com Cc: cypherpunks(a)toal.com To: remailer(a)yap.pactitle.com, cypherpunks(a)toal.com Date: Wed Jul 17 17:30:28 1996 Successfully downloaded and installed last night. It tool a while for the transfer to commence though. Lou Zirko > > From: Tom Weinstein <tomw(a)netscape.com> > > Date: Tue, 16 Jul 1996 11:56:51 -0700 > > > > Duncan Frissell wrote: > > > > > > I'm glad too. So how many minutes did it take to leak overseas? > > > > I have heard no reports of it leaking overseas. > > Have you heard any reports of anyone successfully downloading it > period? Netscape always times out in the middle of a download. I > think the server is so overloaded that it's actually impossible to > download the software. > > I sure wish there were an ftp site overseas somewhere, then I could > actually get the damned thing. > > Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye - ---- End of forwarded message ---- Lou Zirko (502)383-2175 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMe1rFMtPRTNbb5z9AQHjtwf+Mhz46IY3fImoeymgi5pINyxQ1ifhElJ0 xMlyAVQlaYQYYGTND/xue8Ig3C66eI2WhG4P6L3A1aEcwZNstqFoH90OPmBornPU L8N/7wpVR0EK74Ptlt2cyDsCUYw6UTKjBz9Zue4jR1Y7nW/V8SLhGEPx5PAz/h+r m3yNqgSi4YmKdy4gg35BbuSuSFKQG81iIjcipKYB1s67RORytzXG4kOsrptUHZNm gzLFcR4ldlPw0O1vU3yY38lXi2DygllLZGCl4+HFSW5rnBvEEXeVo4yINqYepVkx vsfoqKGrn2dQ6fWY0yQnPGi0O1mWGeDdTWzabJIvMG2AlM8AfP4hIA== =cXnP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Gorelick testifies before Senate, unveils new executive order
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 17 Jul 1996 15:54:24 -0500 From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu Subject: Gorelick testifies before Senate, unveils new executive order Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick testified yesterday before Sen. Sam Nunn's cyberscare hearing (take #3), where she ranted about the evils of the Net and unveiled an executive order signed by the president on Monday. Gorelick, the administration's newly-annointed chief Net fearmonger, said: "The executive order is on Federal Information Infrastructure protection... It creates a committee to draft policy and recommend legislation. The order cites two types of threats: physical and cyber." The infrastructure she's talking about isn't government computers; she means the private sector. "Because this infrastructure is privately owned, this [executive order] emphasizes and recognizes the importance of cooperation." That is, cooperation with the fear of government regulation hanging over your head. The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which will have an industry advisory panel, has one year to report back with recommendations. Sen. Patrick Leahy testified: "Armed with a modem and a computer, a criminal can wreak havoc on our computers from anywhere in the world. There are no borders in cyberspace... Existing criminal statutes provide a good framework for prosecuting [some] computer offenses... We have to assume we have to update our criminal code." Clinton's executive order also creates a "Infrastructure Protection Task Force," effective immediately, with reps from the FBI, DOD, and NSA. At yesterday's Senate permanent subcommittee on investigations hearing, Gorelick ducked Sen. Nunn's questions about the limits of the task force's authority. But the executive order says the group must: (i) provide, or facilitate and coordinate the provision of, expert guidance to critical infrastructures to detect, revent, halt, or confine an attack and to recover and restore service... (v) coordinate with the pertinent law enforcement authorities during or after an attack to facilitate any resulting criminal investigation. "Critical infrastructures" include telecommunications facilities and the Net. -Declan PS: For background, check out: http://www.netizen.com/netizen/96/29/campaign_dispatch0a.html Critical infrastructures: 1. telecommunications; 2. electrical power systems; 3. gas and oil storage and transportation; 4. banking and finance; 5. transportation; 6. water supply systems; 7. emergency services (including medical, police, fire and rescue); and 8. continuity of government. EXECUTIVE ORDER - - - - - - - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire and rescue), and continuity of government. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to tangible property ("physical threats"), and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or communications components that control critical infrastructures ("cyber threats"). Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their continued operation. NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Establishment. There is hereby established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection ("Commission"). (a) Chair. A qualified individual from outside the Federal Government shall be appointed by the President to serve as Chair of the Commission. The Commission Chair shall be employed on a full-time basis. (b) Members. The head of each of the following executive branch departments and agencies shall nominate not more than two full-time members of the Commission: (i) Department of the Treasury; (ii) Department of Justice; (iii) Department of Defense; (iv) Department of Commerce; (v) Department of Transportation; (vi) Department of Energy; (vii) Central Intelligence Agency; (viii) Federal Emergency Management Agency; (ix) Federal Bureau of Investigation; (x) National Security Agency. One of the nominees of each agency may be an individual from outside the Federal Government who shall be employed by the agency on a full-time basis. Each nominee must be approved by the Steering Committee. Sec. 2. The Principals Committee. The Commission shall report to the President through a Principals Committee ("Principals Committee"), which shall review any reports or recommendations before submission tot he President. The Principals Committee shall comprise the: (i) Secretary of the Treasury; (ii) Secretary of Defense; (iii) Attorney General; (iv) Secretary of Commerce; (v) Secretary of Transportation; (vi) Secretary of Energy; (vii) Director of Central Intelligence; (viii) Director of the Office of Management and Budget; (ix) Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; (x) Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; (xi) Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. Sec. 3. The Steering Committee of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. A Steering Committee ("Steering Committee") shall oversee the work of the Commission on behalf of the Principals Committee. The Steering Committee shall comprise four members appointed by the President. One of the members shall be the Chair of the Commission and one shall be an employee of the Executive Office of the President. The Steering Committee will receive regular reports on the progress of the Commission's work and approve the submission of reports to the Principals Committee. Sec. 4. Mission. The Commission shall: (a) within 30 days of this order, produce a statement of its mission objectives, which will elaborate the general objectives set forth in this order, and a detailed schedule for addressing each mission objective, for approval by the Steering Committee; (b) identify and consult with: (i) elements of the public and private sectors that conduct, support or contribute to infrastructure assurance; (ii) owners and operators of the critical infrastructures; and (iii) other elements of the public and private sectors, including the Congress, that have an interest in critical infrastructure assurance issues and that may have differing perspectives on these issues; (c) assess the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities of, and threats to, critical infrastructures; (d) determine what legal and policy issues are raised by efforts to protect critical infrastrucutres and assess how these issues should be addressed; (e) recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from physical and cyber threats and assuring their continued operation; (f) propose any statutory or regulatory changes necessary to effect its recommendations; and (g) produce reports and recommendations to the Steering Committee as they become available; it shall not limit itself to producing one final report. Sec. 5. Advisory Committee to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. (a) The Commission shall receive advice from an advisory committee ("Advisory Committee") composed of no more than ten individuals appointed by the President from the private sector who are knowledgeable about critical infrastructures. The Advisory Committee shall advise the Commission on the subjects of the Commission's mission in whatever manner the Advisory Committee, the Commission Chair, and the Steering Committee deem appropriate. (b) A Chair shall be designated by the President from among the members of the Advisory Committee. (c) The Advisory Committee shall be established in compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.). The Department of Defense shall perform the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act for the Advisory Committee, except that of reporting to the Congress, in accordance with the guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services. Sec. 6. Administration. (a) All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Commission and provide such assistance, information, and advice to the Commission as it may request, to the extent permitted by law. (b) The Commission and the Advisory Committee may hold open and closed hearings, conduct inquiries, and establish subcommittees, as necessary. (c) Members of the Advisory Committee shall serve without compensation for their work on the Advisory Committee. While engaged in the work of the Advisory Committee, members may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the government service. (d) To the extent permitted by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Department of Defense shall provide the Commission and the Advisory Committee with administrative services, staff, other support services, and such funds as may be necessary for the performance of its functions and shall reimburse the executive branch components that provide representatives to the Commission for the compensation of those representatives. (e) In order to augment the expertise of the Commission, the Department of Defense may, at the Commission's request, contract for the services of nongovernmental consultants who may prepare analyses, reports, background papers, and other materials for consideration by the Commission. In addition, at the Commission's request, executive departments and agencies shall request that existing Federal advisory committees consider and provide advice on issue sof critical infrastructure protection, to the extent permitted by law. (f) The Commission, the Principals Committee, the Steering Committee, and the Advisory Committee shall terminate 1 year from the date of this order, unless extended by the President prior to this date. Sec. 7. Interim Coordinating Mission. (a) While the Commission is conducting its analysis and until the President has an opportunity to consider and act on its recommendations, there is a need to increase coordination of existing infrastructure protection efforts in order to better address, and prevent, crises that would have a debilitating regional or national impact. There is hereby established an Infrastructure Protection Task Force ("IPTF") within the Department of Justice, chaired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to undertake this interim coordinating mission. (b) The IPTF will not supplant any existing programs or organizations. (c) The Steering Committee shall oversee the work of the IPTF. (d) The IPTF shall include at least one full-time member each from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Agency. It shall also receive part-time assistance from other executive branch departments and agencies. Members shall be designated by their departments or agencies on the basis of their expertise in the protection of critical infrastructures. IPTF members' compensation shall be paid by their parent agency or department. (e) The IPTF's function is to identify and coordinate existing expertise, inside and outside of the Federal Government, to: (i) provide, or facilitate and coordinate the provision of, expert guidance to critical infrastructures to detect, revent, halt, or confine an attack and to recover and restore service; (ii) issue threat and warning notices in the event advance information is obtained about a threat; (iii) provide training and education on methods of reducing vulnerabilities and responding to attacks on critical infrastructures; (iv) conduct after-action analysis to determine possible future threats, targets, or methods of attack; and (v) coordinate with the pertinent law enforcement authorities during or after an attack to facilitate any resulting criminal investigation. (f) All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the IPTF and provide such assistance, information, and advice as the IPTF may request, to the extent permitted by law. (g) All executive departments and agencies shall share with the IPTF information about threats and warning of attacks, and about actual attacks on critical infrastructures, to the extent permitted by law. (h) The IPTF shall terminate no later than 180 days after the termination of the Commission, unless extended by the President prior to that date. Sec. 8. General. (a) This order is not intended to change any existing statutes or Executive orders. (b) This order is not intended to create any right, benefit, trust, or responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. (signed) William J. Clinton THE WHITE HOUSE July 15, 1996

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Re: US versions of Netscape now available---NOT
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:03 AM 7/18/96, Tom Weinstein wrote: >Yes. We've had a few thousand people download it. Unfortunately, we >only have one machine serving downloads right now, and it tends to melt >down a couple times a day. I've tried four times, and each time has timed out. (That is, I've filled out the Web form four times and tried n times each iteration...at least I get to experiment with variations on my name and address each time :-}) I guess I'll have to connect to the Italian and/or Swedish sites again. Has the software arrived there yet? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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recent spam: government home-business
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please don't mail mwci.net about the recent spam to cypherpunks. The spam came from interramp: > > >From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Tue Jul 16 12:32:32 1996 > > Message-Id: <199607160811.EAA00698(a)smtp1.interramp.com> > > Comments: Authenticated sender is <cd004561(a)pop3.interramp.com> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > > From: "Creative Financial Alternatives" <homebiz(a)flock.mwci.net> > > To: homebiz(a)flock.mwci.net > > Date: Tue, 16 Jul 1996 04:11:56 +0000 {0} infinity:mail/lists 10:05am [10] > whois interramp-dom PSINet, Inc (INTERRAMP-DOM) 510 Huntmar Park Drive Herndon, VA 22070 USA Domain Name: INTERRAMP.COM Administrative Contact: Administration, PSINet Domain (PDA4) psinet-domain-admin(a)PSI.COM (703) 904-4100 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Network Information and Support Center (PSI-NISC) hostinfo(a)psi.com (518) 283-8860 Billing Contact: Andrews, Ken (KA16) domain-fee-contact(a)PSI.COM 703-904-4100 Record last updated on 22-Feb-96. Record created on 14-Apr-94. Domain servers in listed order: NS.PSI.NET 192.33.4.10 NS2.PSI.NET 38.8.50.2 INTERRAMP.COM 38.8.17.2 The InterNIC Registration Services Host contains ONLY Inte -- Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770 Community ConneXion, Inc. FAX: 510-986-8777 The Internet Privacy Provider http://www.c2.net/ sameer(a)c2.net

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An interesting instance of poltical anonymnity, now revealed
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I find the CBS News response unfortunate. There's also the simple question on lying to maintain the identity: what's so bad about lying? Why he revealed himself is somewhat of lesson also. -Allen _ Wednesday July 17 9:12 PM EDT _ 'Primary Colors' Author Steps Forward NEW YORK (Reuter) - One of the best kept secrets in political, journalistic and publishing circles was revealed Wednesday when Newsweek journalist Joe Klein admitted he was ''Anonymous'', the mysterious author of a novel based on President Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign. [...] Klein, facing fellow journalists who had been speculating along with many politicians and readers about the identity of ''Anonymous'' since the book's publication in January, fended off questions about his credibility and about how he had lied when asked whether he wrote the book. ``It wasn't easy, but I felt that there are times when I too can lie to protect a source and I put this in that category. Other people may see this differently,'' said Klein. [...] CBS News later said it was unhappy with Klein, who works for the network as a political consultant. ``We are obviously disturbed by the fact that Joe Klein was not forthcoming with us nor with nearly anyone else of his authorship of the novel 'Primary Colors,''' CBS News executive Vice President Jonathan Klein (no relation) said in a statement. He said network president Andrew Hayward would meet the author next week to discuss the matter. [...] His announcement followed a report in Wednesday's Washington Post that handwritten changes to the manuscript appeared to match Klein's handwriting. [...] _Reuters Limited_

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Zimmermann's open letter and Congressional crypto-musing
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Wed, 17 Jul 1996 14:02:05 -0500 To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu From: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) Subject: Zimmermann's open letter and Congressional crypto-musing Sender: owner-fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Phil Zimmermann has an open letter to Congress on ProCODE and HR3011 in today's "The Hill" newspaper, on page 17. Excerpts follow. Unfortunately, no matter how wonderful the ProCODE bill may be (and it is), it isn't going anywhere this year. There's no time left. And in the Senate, national security interests have strong allies who would move to block the bill if it suddenly slithered out of committee. But at least netizens have been able to educate Congress, and the debate is shifting in our favor. Take Sen. Nunn's cyberscare hearing yesterday, where Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick cried that "we will have a cyber equivalent of Pearl Harbor in time." During the hearing, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Michigan) mused: "Part of the problem is we have competing goals... Encryption is one way to secure that data. But law enforcement wants access to that data... It's not just a matter of [strong] encryption. We are torn between these conflicting goals." So while the Hill is waking up, American businesses are losing out. By the time Congress moves on this issue in 1997, it may be too late. -Declan --- The Hill, July 17, 1996, page 17 "Democracy in the Information Age" I urge you to support S.1726, the Burns-Leahy ProCODE bill to lift export controls on cryptographic software, or Goodlatt's House version of the bill, H.R. 3011... ...U.S. software makers cannot incorporate good cryptography features into their products if that results in their inability to export such products... It also threatens the competitiveness of the entire U.S. computer industry, as we lose entire systems sales to foreign competitors, because we cnanot supply systems to our foreign customers if those systems contain cryptographic components. Cryptogrpahy has become the most pivotal technology for privacy and civil liberties in the information age. It is for this reason that I wrote Pretty Good Privacy, now called PGPmail, and published it for free on the Internet in 1991... Privacy is a human right that appeals to everyone across the political spectrum. It offers a rare combination of moral high ground and political safety. The onlyway to hold the line on privacy in the information age is strong cryptography, strong enough to keep out major governments. And S.1726 is our best home for giving Americans access to this essential tool of liberty. Let us bequeath to our children a society that lets them whisper in someone ear, even if the ear is a thousand miles away. Sincerely, PHILIP R. ZIMMERMANN Chairman and Chief Technology Officer Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. 555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 570 Redwood City, CA 94065 415-631-1747

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Telecom regulations - Reuters coverage
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, the Demopublicans want to subsidize access for their voters. Those already on the net have a considerably higher likelihood, so far as I can tell, of being Independents or Libertarians. The bad guys naturally want to bring it in line with their domination. -Allen > _ Tuesday July 16 1:52 PM EDT _ >FCC Chairman Hundt Sees Tax On Telecom Industry > FAJARDO, Puerto Rico - A small tax will probably be imposed on > telecommunications companies' revenues to subsidize telephone access > in rural areas and help wire classrooms for the Internet, Federal > Communications Commission Chairman Reed Hundt told the nation's > governors. [...] > But ensuring that residents in sparsely populated areas have access at > affordable rates and meeting the administration's goal of wiring every > classroom in the nation for Internet access will require annual > subsidies of about $10 billion, Hundt said. > "The current subsidy system won't work and has to be totally > overhauled," he said. > Asked how that money would be raised, Hundt said, "Probably the > right way to go is, based on total revenues, throw a chunk of change > into the pot." > He said the levy would be "competitively neutral" and would > represent a small percentage of revenues for the telecommunications > industry, whose annual gross revenues are about $250 billion. [...] > Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved

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Reuters coverage of the Netscape release
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Most people reading this are likely to wonder "how could overseas Net surfers downloading it hurt anyone?", although some wil have their minds go blank (or blanker than normal) at the mention of "terrorist groups." A mixed set of news coverage, overall. As usual (even if I forget to state it), edited to try to stay within fair use. -Allen > _ Wednesday July 17 6:52 AM EDT _ >Government Approves More Secure Netscape > MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. (Reuter) - Netscape Communications Corp. has > received government clearance to distribute a highly secure version of > its popular Navigator Web browser in the United States via the > Internet. [...] > Officials had been concerned that if the more secure version was > available on the Net, overseas Net surfers -- possibly including > terrorist groups -- would download it, she said. > The software contains multiple formulas that make it virtually > impenetrable for computer hackers and others who might attempt to > break into Internet transmissions, steal credit card codes or tamper > with bank accounts. [...] > ``This new ability ... means more people will have access to stronger > and more secure communications than ever before,'' Netscape co-founder > Marc Andreessen said in a statement. > ``This stronger security will help to accelerate the adoption of the > Internet as a medium for online communication and commerce,'' he > added. [...] > _Reuters Limited_

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Re: Opiated file systems
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 16 Jul 96 at 13:30, Jim Gillogly wrote: > "Deranged Mutant" <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> writes: > >A problem with a c'punk-style encrypted fs with source code and wide > >distribution is, of course, that attackers will KNOW that there is a > >duress key. > > Good point. This suggests a design desideratum for any such system should > be that the user may choose not to have a duress key, maintaining > semi-plausible deniability for those who choose to have one. Semi-plausible. (See my other reply to this: an attacker could get ahold of the HD and your system, reverse engineer the driver used, to see what you're doing; backups of the encrypted partition in case of destructive measures are helpful ... they could even return your computer to you and take it apart carefully.) The problem with a duress key is that it relies on "security through obscurity". Rob. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Anyone knows TCFS ?
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone use or know off Transparent Cryptografic File System ? More information available on URL http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs bEST Regards, -- Alex de Joode | Berserk Consultancy -- Diemen, The Netherlands usura(a)berserk.com | mailto:info@berserk.com http://www.berserk.com/

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119_816
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

6-17-96. NYP: "11 Officers Are Accused of Failure to pay Taxes. Claims of Sovereignty and 98 Dependents." At least 11 New York City police officers have been accused of failing to pay any Federal taxes for several years by declaring they each had 98 dependents and by insisting that the Government had no right to tax them. The officers relied on a package of instructions that described how to avoid paying taxes by declaring that they were sovereign citizens who did not have to pay taxes. "16 Indicted On Charges Of Internet Pornography." Exon-Reno-ing into one of the more distant frontiers of sexual crime, a Federal grand jury charged 16 people in the US and abroad with joining in a pornography ring. Its members shared homemade pictures, recounted their sexual experiences with children and even chatted electronically as two of the men molested a 10-year-old girl. The case appeared likely to heighten concerns about the spread of child pornography over the Internet. ----- http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/119816.txt (11 kb for 2) 119_816 (For 2)

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Re: Code used by George Washington made available at last
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:35 PM 7/16/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >There's an AP article by Carl Hartman saying that historians now have >access to a secret handwritten code used by George Washington and >Marquis de Lafayette. (It's a newspaper article that somebody >across the train is reading; looks like today's SF Examiner...) They probably declassified it a week ago, discovering that the "national security" excuse no longer appeared to apply. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: preamble (was Re: Markoff on Clipper III)
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:20 AM 7/15/96 -0700, you wrote: >At 3:50 AM -0700 7/15/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >>At 09:35 PM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >>>Did you miss the part in the Constitution about "provide for the common >>>defence" >>That's a meaningless part of the Preamble. > >Anyone who thinks substantive parts of the Preamble are "meaningless" is >deserving only of contumely. Perhaps you should review your high school >civics course--you did have one of those, yes? I think what he meant (not that I'm trying to speak for him) is that the preamble was intended as an explanation of why the constitution was written, and not to be taken as an actual part of the constitution as such. //cerridwyn//

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Gorelick's Urge
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1996 Panel to Oversee Protecting Systems From Hackers Washington -- President Clinton ordered the creation of a commission to recommend laws and regulations to protect vital government and private systems against attacks by terrorists or computer hackers. Jamie Gorelick, deputy U.S. attorney general, described the effort as having the "same level of urgency" as the Manhattan Project, the crash World War II effort to develop the atomic bomb. She said the commission, which will be headed by an appointee from the private sector, will have a large representation from corporations, because they control the nation's telecommunications system, electrical-power grid, banking, transportation and fuel-supply systems. "We are looking for a structure that cuts across the government and private sector," Ms. Gorelick told the Senate's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee. While some 22 federal agencies have some involvement with such problems, she said there is no central mechanism. While the new Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection deliberates, President Clinton ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to head an interim task force. [End]

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Re: Cookie alternatives
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: >It is interesting to consider how shopping carts might be done without >cookies and similar technologies which allow servers to get more >information about me than necessary. One partial solution would be to turn cookies into nonces - instead of using server-supplied cookies, which may or may not contain hashed/hidden information, client software (and by extension, the human(s) in charge of it) could control the generation and modification of cookies. Some cookie uses are predictable - e.g., "Put the current date and time in the cookie", or "Put the user's E-mail address in the cookie". The user could be presented with dialog boxes asking "Server sneaky.tricky.com would like to set a cookie which will record the date and time of this visit. OK?" or "Server sneaky.tricky.com would like Netscape to generate a random number to keep track of your visits. OK?" A switch from server-generated cookies to client-generated cookies shouldn't involve too many changes on the client software side. (One danger which occurs to me about such a scheme is the potential leakage of client state information, assuming that the algorithm used to generate the pseudorandom cookies is or will be known to attackers.) -- Greg Broiles |"Post-rotational nystagmus was the subject of gbroiles(a)netbox.com |an in-court demonstration by the People http://www.io.com/~gbroiles |wherein Sgt Page was spun around by Sgt |Studdard." People v. Quinn 580 NYS2d 818,825.

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New MiddleMan Remailer! (reno)
by Middleman Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ATTENTION *** ATTENTION *** ATTENTION *** ATTENTION I'm proud to announce the birth of a new middleman remailer! This new remailer uses John Perry's middleman mixmaster code and is located at cyberpass.net thanks to Lance Cottrell. Here are the statistics: NAME: Janet Reno SHORTNAME: reno ADDRESS: middleman(a)cyberpass.net MIXMASTER KEY: reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net b864a69c831f38593d24187122e954f6 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- b864a69c831f38593d24187122e954f6 258 AASx+Qa23TBIu7MTGZQekob8EJrxyhNPYPBRhzZC 17F5scF1MzFIk1PhY0O78QN29aYMHlo99jE37Hlh MvJpQ7HUrqnklRIaRZJBLxUcuBoTckMltIJEdh1r 9Lbh8e5AIoqPr6c9SAxr7Q3v2cthkwuBYEiWDlui 0vGtsX/EC6lTdwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- John Perry, will you please add my remailer to your list when you get a chance? middleman(a)cyberpass.net

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Re: Opiated file systems
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> But, on the other hand, it wouldn't be to hard to have the user set both > keys (yeah, so that didn't actually say anything, so what...), and then do > an every-other-byte type thing (although that would be slow... every other > block would be more efficient), and have 2 EFS's in one file, and make it > so that on the "duress" one the extra space appears to be "free". > One could make it a real file system, and add a fake disk error to prevent > over-writing of the "non-duress" filesystem. This sounds a lot like security through obscurity... What happens when someone reverse-engineers the software and sees that it's carefully skipping over blocks? If you don't want people to know about your encrypted data, use stego. Even if They find the stego software, you can always produce the keys to unlock the duress data from two or three .gif files, and say "that's all there is." Use stego to hide data. Use encrypted filesystems for convenience. If you try to put the two together, you'll probably end up with feature-bloat. The idea of an encrypted filesystems being accessable over the internet sounds interesting, though. Sort of a cross between NFS and CFS. Would be great for backup purposes. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:)

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Re: Surf-filter lists
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fine, call it "blocking," "restricting access to," or "muzzling." My point still stands. -Declan >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >On Tue, 16 Jul 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >> More to the point, as I wrote at the end of the original CWD, it's a >> bait-and-switch maneuver. Go after porn, they say, but the censor political >> information. > >ARGH! I've been keeping quiet about this for a while, but I thing I >gotta say something before I throttle my Zip drive... > ><rant>A Private organization cannot "censor" anything. The fundamental >definition of the word require some agent of the government take action >to censor. To accuse Surf-Watch, net-nanny, AOL, MSU, AT&T, or whatever >of "censorship" accomplishes nothing except to make us look the >fool.</rant> > >I agree that the problem with the "bait-and-switch" filtering of net >materials by these various filtering packages needs to be addressed. If I >want to protect my kids from seeing alt.naughty.pictures, I shoudl still >be able to unfilter political and health speech. The real problem isn't >censorship, it's disclosure by the makers of filtering packages about >what exactly their packages are going to filter for me and my family. >However, in the upcoming war of filtering packages (and it will get ugly) >trade secrets are going to make any company hesitant to reveal what it is >they are filtering and what criteria they are using to determine if >something qualifies. > > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.2 >Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 > >iQCVAwUBMe0jezokqlyVGmCFAQH0SAP+ONXs2f4GxjIrC6cp2sc9CgTrebL4cBWB >UqpH4H3UO0TiKZN4T6MGVC6kCA3OwQnd0DNC0f0D6+iZTPkwN228Am6ZH4+t9hZs >OrmCbZCiWZipLfT1gphIHqFHSqIQ506LkkGgLK0gjsS2ahrI+cNYJA3yYBviMkB1 >zuj1KRJ+pMk= >=ddI5 >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu >\ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key > \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- > \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html > >-----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- >Version: 3.12 >GED/J d-- s:++>: a- C++(++++)$ ULUO++ P+>+++ L++ !E---- W+(---) N+++ o+ >K+++ w+(---) O- M+$>++ V-- PS++(+++)>$ PE++(+)>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ >R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++>$ e++$>++++ h r-- y+** >------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Philippine government moves to block incoming net-porn
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 17 Jul 1996 21:44:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship Subject: Philippine government moves to block incoming net-porn The attached note appears to have been sent to all ISPs in the Philippines. It asks them to report back on how they can "block entry of pornographic materials through the INTERNET." Note how it equates censoring porn with preventing sex tourism. General information about international net-censorship is at: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/international/ http://www.eff.org/pub/Global/Singapore/ Thanks to David Sobel for forwarding this. -Declan =================================================== REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 865 VIBAL BLDG., EDSA CORNER TIMES ST., Q. C. 15 July 1996 M E M O R A N D U M TO: ALL REGISTERED VALUE ADDED SERVICES PROVIDERS RE: REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO BAR OR BLOCK ENTRY OF PORNOGRAPHIC MATERIALS THROUGH THE INTERNET The Special Committee for Children, constituted pursuant to E.O. 275 dated 14 September 1995, is tasked to ensure the special protection of children from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development. Said Committee takes action on specific issues involving the implementation of the provisions of R. A. 7610 which covers several areas of concern, among others, child prostitution and other sexual abuse; child trafficking; obscene publications and indecent shows using children as performers or models; other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions predjudicial to the child's development. The Committee has raised the concern on the INTERNET being used as a very convenient medium for advertising sex tourism in the Philippines, with particular focus on the alleged availability of Filipino children for sexual liaisons and entertainment. Some materials used in the network for the afformentioned puprose were given to this Commission. Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Department of Justice, requested this Commission to bar or block entry of pornographic materials through the INTERNET. In view of this, you are requested to give your comments/position and suggestions on this matter, particularly on the possibility of barring or blocking pornographic materials through the INTERNET, and submit the same to this Commission by 18 July 1996 attention to Director Edgardo V. Cabarios, CCAD at fax no. 921-7128. Your cooperation and prompt action on this matter is greatly appreciated. Signed Simeon J. Kintanar Commissioner

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Re: Washington Post -- "Block but Verify"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:33 PM 7/16/96 -0400, Rabid Wombat wrote: > >A user-selectable menu would be, umm, interesting ... just how could one >describe, in terms offensive to absolutely no one, what one's product is >offering to block? Quite easily. The PICS standard has categories and software like CytberPatrol lets parents select by category. There is a granularity problem of course. 57. The CyberNOT list contains approximately 7000 sites in twelve categories. The software is designed to enable parents to selectively block access to any or all of the twelve CyberNOT categories simply by checking boxes in the Cyber Patrol Headquarters (the Cyber Patrol program manager). These categories are: Violence/Profanity: Extreme cruelty, physical or emotional acts against any animal or person which are primarily intended to hurt or inflict pain. Obscene words, phrases, and profanity defined as text that uses George Carlin's seven censored words more often than once every fifty messages or pages. Partial Nudity: Full or partial exposure of the human anatomy except when exposing genitalia. Nudity: Any exposure of the human genitalia. Sexual Acts (graphic or text): Pictures or text exposing anyone or anything involved in explicit sexual acts and lewd and lascivious behavior, including masturbation, copulation, pedophilia, intimacy and involving nude or partially nude people in heterosexual, bisexual, lesbian or homosexual encounters. Also includes phone sex ads, dating services, adult personals, CD-ROM and videos. Gross Depictions (graphic or text): Pictures or descriptive text of anyone or anything which are crudely vulgar, deficient in civility or behavior, or showing scatological impropriety. Includes such depictions as maiming, bloody figures, indecent depiction of bodily functions. Racism/Ethnic Impropriety: Prejudice or discrimination against any race or ethnic culture. Ethnic or racist jokes and slurs. Any text that elevates one race over another. Satanic/Cult: Worship of the devil; affinity for evil, wickedness. Sects or groups that potentially coerce individuals to grow, and keep, membership. Drugs/Drug Culture: Topics dealing with the use of illegal drugs for entertainment. This would exclude current illegal drugs used for medicinal purposes (e.g., drugs used to treat victims of AIDS). Includes substances used for other than their primary purpose to alter the individual's state of mind such as glue sniffing. Militant/Extremist: Extremely aggressive and combative behaviors, radicalism, advocacy of extreme political measures. Topics include extreme political groups that advocate violence as a means to achieve their goal. Gambling: Of or relating to lotteries, casinos, betting, numbers games, on-line sports or financial betting including non-monetary dares. Questionable/Illegal: Material or activities of a dubious nature which may be illegal in any or all jurisdictions, such as illegal business schemes, chain letters, software piracy, and copyright infringement. Alcohol, Beer & Wine: Material pertaining to the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages. Also includes sites and information relating to tobacco products. Homosexual sites were excluded under "Sexual Acts" because many have links to personal ads or more explicit sites and the gun sites were excluded under "Militant/extremist." There will always be interpretation problems obviously. Actally, the individual is the best at filtering his own stuff. DCF

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Responding to Pre-dawn Unannounced Ninja Raids
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:12 AM 7/18/96, The Deviant wrote: >I have several friends that this has happened to, and pretty much it goes >like this... round 7:00 AM, when your just going to bed (well, some of us >don't have jobs till nighttime.. thank god.), they knock down your doors >and windows (yes, they do come through windows), and they take the >equipment, disks, tv's, CD players (yes, i know somebody who had their CD >player taken. And a pile of CDs. Music ones even.), clock radios, pretty >much everything electronic they can cary. If you ever DO get any of it >back, most likely it is not the same equipment, i.e. they coppied it all >and kept the original. I wonder when and how raids in the U.S. moved from the "Come out with your hands up" verbal announcement (for the cases that needed more than a knock on the door) to this blast-in-the-doors approach, where the raiders are dressed in "tactical black" and are wearing black Nomex hoods and carrying MP-5s and blast any "perp" who looks at them cross-eyed? As people as diverse as Marine Colonel Jeff Cooper and Watergate felon G. Gordon Liddy have noted, any black-clad "ninjas" entering a home at 4 a.m. without clearly announcing themselves are asking for trouble. (Liddy got in a lot of trouble for calling for "head shots" on rampaging BATFags. Frankly, I'm not a good enough shot--especially in high-stress situations--to make head shots with my H & K .45, so I can only hope to make torso shots.) It's a mark of what has gone wrong with this country that ordinary citizens actually fear the midnight raids, the no-knock searches, the "threat suppression" by ninjas. (There are many cases where homeowners awoke to the sounds of crashing doors and windows, reached for a nightstand gun, and were shot dead by the "ninja" raiders. In some of these incidents, the raid was at the wrong house, or the "suspicions" of drug or terror involvement were later shown to be wrong. "Oops.") Personally, I think all folks should be armed at all times in their homes. Those who aren't are taking their chances. My personal choice is a Heckler & Koch USP .45. loaded with Federal Golden Sabres, a hollowpoint round that has a 92% one-shot stop rate, with adequate penetration through Kevlar vests (typically worn by BATF raiders). I may die, but I hope I can take at least two of them with me. (Interestingly, the same class of folks who want to ban "military-grade crypto" are also seeking to ban Kevlar vest-piercing rounds. Fortunately, though KTW ammo is no longer available to "marks" (= civilians), .45 ACP +P does a pretty good job. Certain +P .357 Magnum rounds are even better penetrators, but recoil and muzzle blast is pretty severe with these loads.) This may sound callous, even paranoid. I don't normally talk about such things, but such raids are becoming increasingly common. (Check out the case of the retired doctor in Malibu whose beachfront home was raided without any warnings by the local cops. He reached for a gun and was blasted with 9mm slugs. His wife survived. Turned out the County of L.A. had hopes to seize his property in a drug "forfeiture" and sell it at great profit. They suspected marijuana was being grown. No drugs, no plants, nada was ever found. "Oops.") (I expressed my views about being armed in a Usenet article last summer, and received a "friendly phone call" from a Deputy Sheriff of Santa Cruz County. (Someone who disliked my article faxed a copy of my article to the Sheriff's Department.) When he asked me some questions to find out why I was not trusting the police and "felt the need" to be armed, I got quite forceful in my comments about the role of the Second Amendment. (I should have just told him to fuck off, in retrospect. Anything volunteered to the cops is usually a mistake.) He said he might "send a vehicle" out to my ranch to "talk to me." I asked on what basis, on the basis of what criminal charges? I also said I'd "be ready." He announced unctuously that my "threat" had just been "logged" and would be considered in any future criminal procedures. Needless to say, I got a lot more of my guns ready. So far, a year later, they haven't raided me yet. Knock on wood. This country has gone to the dogs.) The fact is, the "War on Drugs" has tainted this country. Whatever one thinks of drugs, the result of this War has been that cops are now paramilatary in nature, that midnight raids have become much more common, that both cops and citizens are now armed with more firepower than ever before (I have more than 4000 rounds of ammo at my place, for my sniper rifle, my (so-called) assault rifle, and my various handguns. Anyone inside my house without an invitation is assumed to be a threat to me and will face retaliation.) Crypto is just another weapon to use to protect our liberty. Sorry for the rant, but this recounting of pre-dawn raids on computer users reminds me that the American political system will likely treat "rogue computers users" the way it treats suspected drug dealers: break down the doors, enter at dawn, kill anyone who moves, and let God sort out the innocent. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Educational cryptanalysis competition (small prize)
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Educational Cryptanalysis Competition (opened 17 July 1996) ===================================== Cypherpunks teach. Here's your chance. I have a piece of code I wrote ages ago, before reading Schneier. Despite identifying these points as weaknesses I still cannot break it. weak keys rapid collapse in the case of chosen text attack reduced-round versions have a correlation attack Obviously my crytanalysis needs some serious help. The aim of this competition is: to show how to find AND EXPLOIT weaknesses in this cypher. Answers resembling "That's junk - use XXXXX." score zero. Well-prepared comprehensive answers could score highly. - - Entries will be judged on educational grounds as well as on raw results. - - All entries are placed by the entrant in the public domain, and there may be a compilation of good answers come out of this. (With entrants' names except where they state a prefernce for anonymity. ) - - Entries by teams are allowed. - - The number of entries is unlimited. - - The closing date is 30 Sept 1996. - - The judge is Peter Allan. (me) - - There is one prize (a box of chocolate coffee beans). A full pair of programs using this code can be collected from my mail filter. echo rlprm_2.0 | mail -s send_goodies peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk #define RPT 15 #define CRYPT_DEPTH 4 /**********************************/ mkkey(origpass, key) /*** **** The pass (a text string) is used to produce **** a key. Chars used as int. Details in docs. **** 200000 passwords all gave different keys in my test. ***/ char origpass[9]; unsigned char key[8]; { char clearpass[9]; int i, j, k, l, m, ten; /*** make the key from the clearpass ***/ /*** unsigned char[8] from char[9] ***/ ten = FALSE; k = l = m = 0; strcpy(clearpass, origpass); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (clearpass[i] == '\n') ten = TRUE; if (ten) clearpass[i] = '\0'; } clearpass[8] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) key[i] = (unsigned char) i; for (j = 1; j < 256; j++) { for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) key[i] = key[i] + clearpass[i] + j; /* swap bytes */ k = key[j % 8] % 8; l = key[k] % 8; m = key[k]; key[k] = key[l]; key[l] = m; /** this loop is redundant if chars are 8 bits *** and for all I know they are everywhere **/ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) key[i] = key[i] % 256; m = m % 8; key[m] = 256 - key[m]; } /**** for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%d ", key[i]); puts(" "); ****/ } /**********************************/ sym_encrypt(abpos, key, authbuf, cipherbuf) int abpos; unsigned char key[8]; unsigned char authbuf[ABLEN]; unsigned char cipherbuf[MESSLEN]; { int i, j, k, ptr1, ptr2, rpt; int ka1, ka2, kk; unsigned char smoke[CRYPT_DEPTH][8]; unsigned char tmp; /*** **** From the key, make a set of keys to **** be used in order. ***/ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) smoke[0][j] = key[j]; for (i = 1; i < CRYPT_DEPTH; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) smoke[i][j] = smoke[i - 1][j]; for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) { if (j % 2) { smoke[i][j] = (smoke[i][j]) * 3; } else { smoke[i][j] = ((smoke[i][j]) * 3) / 4; } } } #ifndef NOCRYPT /*** **** see the tech waffle file for details ***/ for (rpt = RPT; rpt; rpt--) { if (cl_debug) printf("encryption repeat count is %d \n", rpt); for (i = 0; i < CRYPT_DEPTH; i++) { /**swap driven by values **/ for (k = 0; k < abpos - 1; k += 2) { kk = authbuf[k] ^ authbuf[k + 1]; ka1 = kk / 16; ka2 = kk % 16; kk = ka1 ^ ka2; if ((kk == 1) || (kk == 2) || (kk == 4) || (kk == 8) || (kk == 14) || (kk == 13) || (kk == 11) || (kk == 7)) { kk = authbuf[k]; authbuf[k] = authbuf[k + 1]; authbuf[k + 1] = kk; } } /** xor with key **/ for (k = 0; k < abpos; k++) authbuf[k] ^= (key[k % 8]); /**rotation **/ kk = authbuf[abpos - 1] / 32; ka1 = 0; for (k = 0; k < abpos; k++) { ka2 = authbuf[k] / 32; authbuf[k] = (authbuf[k] * 8) + ka1; ka1 = ka2; } authbuf[0] += kk; /**swap driven by key **/ if (cl_debug) printf(" depth is %d \n", i); for (j = 0; j < 8; j = j + 2) { ptr1 = smoke[i][j] % abpos; ptr2 = smoke[i][j + 1] % abpos; tmp = authbuf[ptr1]; authbuf[ptr1] = authbuf[ptr2]; authbuf[ptr2] = tmp; } } } #endif /*** Now that it has been encrypted it should **** be stored as 'hexabetical' [A-P]. ***/ for (i = 0; i < abpos; i++) { cipherbuf[i * 2] = (authbuf[i] % 16) + 'A'; cipherbuf[i * 2 + 1] = (authbuf[i] / 16) + 'A'; } cipherbuf[abpos * 2] = '\0'; } /********************************/ sym_decrypt(abpos, key, authbuf, cipherbuf) int abpos; unsigned char key[8]; unsigned char authbuf[ABLEN]; unsigned char cipherbuf[MESSLEN]; { int i, j, k, ptr1, ptr2, rpt; int ka1, ka2, kk; unsigned char smoke[CRYPT_DEPTH][8]; unsigned char tmp; for (i = 0; cipherbuf[i]; i = i + 2) { cipherbuf[i] = cipherbuf[i] - 'A'; cipherbuf[i + 1] = cipherbuf[i + 1] - 'A'; authbuf[i / 2] = cipherbuf[i] + cipherbuf[i + 1] * 16; } /*** **** From the key, make a set of keys to **** be used in order. ***/ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) smoke[0][j] = key[j]; for (i = 1; i < CRYPT_DEPTH; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) smoke[i][j] = smoke[i - 1][j]; for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) { if (j % 2) { smoke[i][j] = smoke[i][j] * 3; } else { smoke[i][j] = (smoke[i][j] * 3) / 4; } } } #ifndef NOCRYPT /*** **** repeat suitable number of times: **** first swap bytes in the authbuf **** then cycle bits round to prevent some swaps undoing others ***/ if (abpos == 0) return RUBBISH; /** zerodivide detected-avoided **/ for (rpt = RPT; rpt; rpt--) { /* printf("encryption repeat count is %d \n", rpt); */ for (i = CRYPT_DEPTH - 1; i > -1; i--) { for (j = 6; j > -1; j = j - 2) { /*** key-driven swap ***/ ptr1 = smoke[i][j] % abpos; ptr2 = smoke[i][j + 1] % abpos; tmp = authbuf[ptr1]; authbuf[ptr1] = authbuf[ptr2]; authbuf[ptr2] = tmp; } /**rotation **/ kk = authbuf[0] % 8; ka1 = 0; for (k = abpos - 1; k >= 0; k--) { ka2 = authbuf[k] % 8; authbuf[k] = (authbuf[k] / 8) + ka1; ka1 = ka2 * 32; } authbuf[abpos - 1] += (kk * 32); /** xor with key **/ for (k = 0; k < abpos; k++) authbuf[k] ^= (key[k % 8]); /*** value-driven swap ***/ for (k = 0; k < abpos - 1; k += 2) { kk = authbuf[k] ^ authbuf[k + 1]; ka1 = kk / 16; ka2 = kk % 16; kk = ka1 ^ ka2; if ((kk == 1) || (kk == 2) || (kk == 4) || (kk == 8) || (kk == 14) || (kk == 13) || (kk == 11) || (kk == 7)) { kk = authbuf[k]; authbuf[k] = authbuf[k + 1]; authbuf[k + 1] = kk; } } } } #endif } /**********************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAgUBMezfIB98EdWB2LS9AQFbwgP+Oq8zBlI5d1comIQ5S2+ysnSDLAN5W/L2 UgQyrYZ/Cchn9I8CEFn9UDevmInpABSL8yNQWUHrb4cvWxiTGNnFz54gicaPT7Ki qVETDC5o7nxWOT8qhWmGNTApJC8RBjEkY+90HyYKf2sLEd8hkGLwOGSAF/YWxqkY TKqYWVNKCjA= =3qEU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: An interesting instance of poltical anonymnity, now revealed
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:09 PM 7/17/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > I find the CBS News response unfortunate. There's also the simple >question on lying to maintain the identity: what's so bad about lying? Why >he revealed himself is somewhat of lesson also. > -Allen > > _ Wednesday July 17 9:12 PM EDT _ > >'Primary Colors' Author Steps Forward > > NEW YORK (Reuter) - One of the best kept secrets in political, > journalistic and publishing circles was revealed Wednesday when > Newsweek journalist Joe Klein admitted he was ''Anonymous'', the > mysterious author of a novel based on President Clinton's 1992 > presidential campaign. If they really wanted to know who did it, why didn't they do a word analysis of the book, and compare it to known writers? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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