December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Export laws don't just affect crypto
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 00:05:16 -0700 (PDT), Lucky Green wrote: >The recent posts about GPS made me research the state of the art of GPS >receivers. Seems they are getting pretty good. Two pounds, sub-meter >accuracy, attitude determination, all at altitudes up to 60,000 feet and >speeds up to 1,000 nmph. But what really caught my eye was the fine print >at the bottom of the spec sheet: > >"Higher altitude and velocities up to 25,000 nautical miles-per-hour >options are available in the U.S." > >I gather from this that as long as you are in the US, you are welcome to >use this technology for applications that require larger than 1,000 nmph >speeds. > >Seems the software industry is not the only industry that's suffering >from silly export control laws. Possibly - certainly there are plenty of legislators who'd do it. I'd heard, however, that the precision of your signal could be increased by getting a fix on more than 3 satellites at a time - and that the GPS network had been designed to 'blanket' the Northern Hemisphere. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 20:55:40 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >And just what would you call PGP? >Long before the MIT deal, people in the U.S. were using their "OK in >America" (not counting RSADSI's issues) software to communicate with >"illegally exported" copies in foreign lands. Just informally, how many of the people on this list do you think have bypassed any cooperation with the USG on general principles and are using International PGP? ("Well this one uses non-banned math") Unfortunately, we've already demonstrated that hackers (real ones) and/or cpunks will use Underground Crypto. What's missing is evidence that business (and thus Joe Sixpack - either directly or indirectly) will. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Majordomo results: mailto:pr-news@pa.dec.com
by majordomo＠dws008.ako.dec.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- >>>> What is DEC's official position regarding the new Clipper III proposal? **** @_ **** No valid commands found. **** Commands must be in message BODY, not in HEADER. **** Help for majordomo(a)dws008.ako.dec.com: This is Brent Chapman's "Majordomo" mailing list manager, version 1.93. In the description below items contained in []'s are optional. When providing the item, do not include the []'s around it. It understands the following commands: subscribe <list> [<address>] Subscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) to the named <list>. unsubscribe <list> [<address>] Unsubscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) from the named <list>. get <list> <filename> Get a file related to <list>. index <list> Return an index of files you can "get" for <list>. which [<address>] Find out which lists you (or <address> if specified) are on. who <list> Find out who is on the named <list>. info <list> Retrieve the general introductory information for the named <list>. lists Show the lists served by this Majordomo server. help Retrieve this message. end Stop processing commands (useful if your mailer adds a signature). Commands should be sent in the body of an email message to "majordomo(a)dws008.ako.dec.com". Commands in the "Subject:" line NOT processed. If you have any questions or problems, please contact "majordomo-Owner(a)dws008.ako.dec.com".

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Re: The Right to Keep and Bear Crypto
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>No. And No. This argument will never fly in any court. > >If you want to see why, go to my homepage > >http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin > Thanks, the material was indeed informative. Some great work! However, I found much disturbing. The inference that the Exec branch could on the one hand classify crypto as a munition ('arms' by any other name), while for constitutional purposes the Courts may not exposes a deep-seated legal duplicity. Constitutional interpretations over the past century not withstanding, it is clear (to me) that a substantial number of the Framers would abhor what has become of the Second Amendment's ... right to keep and bear arms. One of the primary reasons put forth by the Framers for such a right was in order to resist the an oppressive state. The strongest reason for the people to retain the right to keep and bear arms is, as a last resort, to protect themselves against tyranny in government. --Thomas Jefferson When firearms go, all goes. We need them every hour. --George Washington It is ludacrous to expect citizens armed with no more than side arms, bolt-actions and shot guns to resist the actions of a modern military or law enforcement which citizens may find in violation of their inaliable natural rights (whether mistaken or not). In my opinion, all citizens should be be able to keep and bear any arms (without registration) which the state might use against them. To do so now is a criminal action. So be it. Unfortunately, it is common for groups especially governmental to be come statist, mean spirited and eventually malevolent. I hope jim bell or his ilk are soon successful at putting up functional, anonymous and active AP sites. I can't wait to wager! -- Steve

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Re: ITAR satellite provision
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 02 Oct 1996 09:28:22 -0800, jim bell wrote: >> "Export means, for purposes of this subchapter: >[snip] >>* A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason of the launching >>* of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this >>* subchapter. Most of the requirements of this subchapter relate >> only to exports, as defined above. However, for certain limited >> purposes, the controls of this subchapter apply to sales and other >> transfers of defense articles and defense services (see, e.g., Sec. >> 126.1) of this subchapter." > > >Okay, everybody, call Estes! We've got some crypto to export...er...launch! For some reason I'm getting a very comical picture here of a Crypto-CD inside one of those cylindrical oatmeal boxes with about 50 F model-rocket engines strapped to it.... Now, if you could just hit Airforce 1 on the way over - call it sending a message. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: "Macintosh -- the Surveillance System for the Rest of Us
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:48 PM 10/3/96 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >At 7:13 pm -0400 10/3/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >> "Macintosh, the Surveillance System for the Rest of Us." >> >> (Why Apple would go along with this, while Microsoft and Netscape are >> apparently not playing ball, is incomprehensible to me. Apple risks >> alienating its remaining core user base, who often characterize Microsoft >> as "the Borg." So, Apple capitulates, while MS does not. I guess the >> "Macintosh Crypto Forum" didn't do a lot of good, did it?) > >Ouch. > >My first reaction to the above was to say, "Oh, Yeah??? Well, you're ugly, >buddy, and your mother dresses you funny, too!" But, I won't upset the >decorum of so august a forum with such eggregious classlessness. Not here >on cypherpunks. :-). > > >If one were to be completely uncharitable in the interpretation of Tim's >most recent outbreak of vitriol here, it would seem that he's offended that >he wasn't asked first to be the keynote at MacCrypto, the conference a >bunch of us had at Apple a month ago, which, I might add, was a >considerable success. I know what probably happened. A new high-level manager at Apple picked up some old dusty videotape off the shelf, labelled "Super Bowl 1984", played it and said, "Yah know, that guy on the screen was making a hell of a lot of sense until that trouble-makin' bitch smashed it!" Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Can we kill single DES?
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 16:27:18 -6, Peter Trei wrote: >1. Is this a good idea? What will happen if DES becomes perceived > as insecure? That's Declan's department (and other non-clueless journalists - declan is just the most visible). If it get's widespread and the target is something like Digicash, it'd get picked up by the Crime/Snoozeweek crowd. >2. What is the probability of success required to make it worth doing? Judging by the people on the list, about 50%.... <g> >3. What would be the consequences of failure? Depends on the type of failure - ranging from dreadful to minor. >4. What other platforms than NT/Win95/Pentium should be considered? > I could write a Unix demon version, but unless it's tailored for the > cpu, a lot of efficency is lost > (The aggregate number of idle cycles available for testing is the > crucial number). A Linux port (Pentium) would be *very* good - lots of Linux people tend to by pro-cpunk. Ditto for OS/2. And who knows, if you hyped the business aspects enough you might even find IBM or some other large corp willing to donate some time on large system. >5. What's a good target? Ideally, we need a plaintext/ciphertext pair, ecash, ecash, ecash! Given all the attention anything that 'will give your VISA number to evil hackers' gets, this is an important target. It's serious and newsworthy. >6. What other incentives can be used to recruit machines? Maybe give away a Pentium to the person who finds it? (Assuming donations from list members, of course) # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: Can we kill single DES?
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 01 Oct 1996 19:01:08 -0800, jim bell wrote: >Maybe Microsoft would be willing to help? After all, it is THEY who are >going to be limited to DES-strength exports if things continue as they've >been going. How about Intel? Netscape would be a great choice as well - the Internet security market is *very* important. Microsoft has publically said that their cash flow model will work if they make NOTHING off of internet software of any sort. Compare this with the fortunes being spent on "Netscape Enterprise Server" or the like. They could issue press releases talking about how they have the software to keep your VISA secure but the USG isn't allowing them to use it! Microsoft would probably do anything the USG asked if, say, immunity from the DOJ was granted under the table. NTT is also a great choice, as you mentioned above. IBM, Sun, DG, Cray (a Silicon Graphics subsidiary?), etc. might go for some free publicity - I've seen a LOT of press releases out of IBM that talk about "blue-sky" research being done. Given that IBM lives because of big business, they also have a demonstratable interest. I'm sure they'd love to be able to advertise that the data you trust to DB2 (for instance) is entirely secure. The same argument works for DG. Also, IBM has a lot invested in chip fabrication facilities - there's got to be some extra capacity there! Sun has always seemed to be big on tech-demo type things. Cray - well that's obvious. The supercomputer market is heading toward massive parallelism. Leaching time looks interesting! # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: Timmy May the buffoon
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm glad that you agreed with my assessment of Timmy May. >From remailer(a)flame.alias.net Fri Oct 4 08:00:56 1996 >Date: Fri, 4 Oct 1996 14:00:48 +0200 (MET DST) >Message-Id: <199610041200.OAA11852(a)basement.replay.com> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com >From: nobody(a)flame.alias.net (Anonymous) >Organization: Flame International Inc. >Comments: Please report misuse of this automated remailing service to <remailer-admin(a)flame.alias.net> >Subject: your idea > > >>Tim is an ignorant asshole who knows nothing about cryptography and floods >>this mailing list with inane rants and personal attacks. I recommend that >>he be massively killfiled. > >Gosh, we have never heard this from you before! A new idea. > >

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Jon Katz retracts...thanx Jon
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"And a final note, on another topic entirely. In Threads and in my recent columns, I've tried repeatedly to make the distinction between the original Cypherpunk mailing list - designed to ensure anonymous access to information on the Web and, in other contexts, a techno-anarchist movement - and the adolescent pinheads using the name Cypherpunk to successfully block open and free speech on The Netizen's public forums. They are not the same thing. The movement to protect anonymity is an important part of the Web and the Net. The use of the name to anonymously attack people is not an embodiment of that movement, but a perversion of it. I didn't make this distinction clear in my columns this week. Many thanks to the people who pointed it out." -------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <mailto:omega@bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send a message with the text "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key. --------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: The New GAK-Clipper Thing will Fail
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:07 PM 10/3/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: >The point, of course, is NOT to encourage these companies to support Clipper >IV. Rather, goal is to suggest to them a "poison pill" which would make >their cooperation meaningless in the end, while at the same time giving them >a 2-year free 56-bit export. Think of it as a monkey-wrench they can throw >into the works. A really _fine_ post! I'm also impressed by the way they announced it just _after_ Congress ended its session, while they're busy losing the export level in court. On the other hand, boycotts aren't particularly useful, when RSA (who is or is not joining the Bad Guys) owns half the public key patents and Cylink (who definitely is) owns the other half. If you're selling public key, you've got to pay the Bad Guys, until the DH patents expire in 97 (later for RSA.) Or you've got to buy from somebody who's paying the Bad Guys. And the Bad Guys Unindicted Co-Conspirators' announcements haven't even _mentioned_ permitting export of public key technology (since 56-bit RSA doesn't quite make it.) But they _could_ export Kerberos, with only minor hacks needed to implement Key Ripoff. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com America's Open Presidential Debate - Beyond Dole and Clinton! <A href="http://gate.net/~bdcollar/bbe/debate.htm">Tuesday, Oct. 8th 8:00 PM EDT</a>

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Re: WINDOWS NT ????
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:47 PM 10/3/96 +1030, you wrote: >hi, > is Windows NT secured system ? Windows NT 3.51 is a real operating system. It is not as secure as I would like, but it is much better than Windows 3.1, which was totally insecure. It has some good security techniques, but I don't know how secure the networking is, and networking is the big technical insecurity on most machines today. (Well, bad administration is the biggest insecurity on almost all machines for almost all time. And physical security is also big.) Windows 4.x moves the graphics/windowing system into Ring 0, where the "secure" parts of the kernel are. Bad. This means graphics bugs can make the kernel insecure or crash. I don't trust it, especially because Windows 3.1 crashes all the time for me, and stupid bugs make Windows 3.1 behave badly for me. So if they put the window system in the kernel, I don't trust it. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com America's Open Presidential Debate - Beyond Dole and Clinton! <A href="http://gate.net/~bdcollar/bbe/debate.htm">Tuesday, Oct. 8th 8:00 PM EDT</a>

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Re: Fighting Clipper III
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:37 PM 10/3/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >IBM truly does deserve to be criticized, soundly. When I get a chance I'll >write up the report of what happened at yesterday's IBM "let's recruit >industry to join our alliance" confab session that took place in the >afternoon at their DC lobby-office. It was supposedly closed to the >press. :) > >-Declan If those "Big Brother Inside" stickers are re-printed, in fine print should be included a web-page at which more information could be obtained. See, I anticipate actually visiting local hardware/software sellers and placing those labels. Including an address would allow people to get far more information, and get involved. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RSA's Official Permission
by The Deviant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- RSA Optimistic on User Benefits of Administration's Recent Key Recovery Initiative Announcement Further policy change required for US vendors to be competitive worldwide REDWOOD CITY, Calif.---Oct. 2nd, 1996--RSA Data Security, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Security Dynamics Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: SDTI), issued the following comments on the administration's recent announcement of a Key Recovery Initiative: The administration's proposed Key Recovery Initiative is a positive step towards meeting the needs of individuals and organizations that buy and use products which utilize encryption. However, the proposal leaves significant competitive issues unresolved for suppliers who compete overseas. Modern encryption and authentication technologies are crucial to the growth of electronic commerce and the health of the future global electronic economy. The continued leadership of American computer and software firms in the world market depends on their ability to provide competitive solutions for consumers and business around the world. These consumers and businesses depend increasingly on encryption and authentication technologies -- such as those developed at RSA -- to provide solutions that protect the privacy of consumer purchases, personal medical information, sensitive corporate data, and electronic commerce and funds transfers as they travel over the global Internet. US government agencies, however, have long insisted that they must have potential access to all encrypted information for law enforcement purposes, and have advanced several proposals towards those ends. To date, these proposals have met with little support from the user and vendor communities due to concerns about privacy and competitiveness. This new proposal from the administration, however, is a move in the right direction for users. One positive step is that the administration has indicated, for the first time in over six years of discussion, that it will lift all key size restrictions on the export of products which utilize cryptography, provided that manufacturers provide a viable means of key recovery for legitimate government access. In addition, under the administrations proposal, industry, not government, will develop and propose the actual key recovery mechanisms. This will to result in more effective solutions to managing and recovering keys. Finally, the proposal addresses the concerns of users that any third party designated to hold user keys might improperly disclose those keys, thereby compromising a user's right to privacy. The administration has agreed that under certain circumstances, organizations would be allowed to "self-escrow" their own encryption keys. RSA is confident that industry can develop and gain approval for several excellent key recovery mechanisms that would be acceptable to government concerns. In fact, RSA has been a pioneer in this field with our RSA Emergency Access technology in its award-winning RSA SecurPC product. In the case of SecurPC, companies using the product can use Emergency Access keys with RSA's unique secret-splitting technology to gain access to critical information in the event of an emergency. The recently announced Key Recovery Alliance, of which RSA is a part, is chartered to provide a flexible, workable solution for users working within the government's proposed key recovery framework. Members of the group are working on technology which will allow users to maintain the privacy of their keys while allowing legitimate business or law enforcement authorities to recover keys when appropriate. It will also address challenges that arise when a user must comply with the differing encryption policies in countries around the world. The technology could allow products to provide the flexibility a user needs to take full advantage of the maximum privacy allowed in their locality, while maintaining interoperability and information exchange with other users regardless of location. It is not clear, however, to what extent the administration's proposal provides relief to US software and hardware companies who must compete with foreign suppliers. These foreign suppliers, not subject to US law, can provide strong, non-key-recovery encryption in their products. Today, most major computer and software solutions firms derive significant revenues from outside the United States. The government's proposal, while satisfying the US government's needs, does little to enhance the competitiveness of American products overseas. Robust encryption products are already available from many overseas suppliers, and U.S. market share in encryption-enabled products is under siege. Under this proposal, it appears that U.S. companies will still be prohibited from selling non-key-recovery encryption solutions in overseas markets, creating a significant barrier to their competitiveness. RSA looks forward to additional announcements by the administration that specifically address this issue and provide competitive relief for the US computer software and hardware industries. RSA Data Security, Inc. RSA Data Security, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Security Dynamics Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: SDTI), is the world's brand name for cryptography, with more than 75 million copies of RSA encryption and authentication technologies installed and in use worldwide. RSA technologies are part of existing and proposed standards for the Internet and World Wide Web, ITU, ISO, ANSI, IEEE, and business, financial and electronic commerce networks around the globe. The company develops and markets platform-independent developer's kits and end-user products and provides comprehensive cryptographic consulting services. Founded in 1982 by the inventors of the RSA Public Key Cryptosystem, the company is headquartered in Redwood City, Calif. -0- Note to Editors: BSAFE and TIPEM are trademarks of RSA Data Security, Inc. All other product and brand names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective companies. | [1]Al Gore's Statement | [2]Jim's Testimony | [3]IBM's Alliance | CONTACT: Corman/Croel Marketing & Communications (for RSA) Patrick Corman, 415/326-9648 [4]corman(a)cerfnet.com ---------- End Forwarded message ---------- This is definatly bad... If you want to look it up yourselves, its at http://www.rsa.com/PRESSBOX/releases/keyrecov.htm --Deviant They seem to have learned the habit of cowering before authority even when not actually threatened. How very nice for authority. I decided not to learn this particular lesson. -- Richard Stallman

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NYT Nix GAK
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, October 4, 1996, p. A32. A Flawed Encryption Policy [Editorial] The new White House proposal to keep high-powered encryption software out of the hands of foreign terrorists and criminals is needlessly restrictive and probably unworkable. Though the new plan is better than previous Administration proposals, it risks doing more harm than good. The Administration is rightly worried that foreign terrorists or criminals will get hold of encryption software that will make it impossible for the Government to eavesdrop on their telephone and computer messages. The technology is legal in this country, but the Administration wants to keep the powerful new software out of foreign hands. However, the Administration downplays the fact that encryption is also a good way for honest citizens to prevent crime. At a time when banks and other private companies send vast amounts of confidential information over the electronic highway, it would seem sensible to make high-quality encryption widely available so that the private sector can protect itself from criminal or malicious eavesdropping. For that reason, the Government ought to promote wide-scale dissemination of encryption, both here and abroad. Trying to block dissemination is probably useless and almost certainly harmful to American exports. Powerful encryption systems made by foreign companies are already available in Europe and Asia, and American exporters will need to sell state-of-the-art software to keep competitive. The Clinton Administration previously proposed that the computer industry adopt a single type of encryption, known as key-escrow, which would scramble messages with mathematical passwords. Under the plan, private companies and individuals would turn over these passwords to the Government, which, with court authorization, could use them to unscramble the phone and computer traffic. The purpose of key-escrow, then, would be to preserve the Government's existing ability to tap phone calls. But that Clinton plan was firmly rejected by industry and privacy-rights advocates who feared that a government that held passwords would abuse First Amendment prohibitions against listening in on private communications. The latest White House plan addresses many of these concerns. It would impose restrictions only on the software that exporters sell abroad. Privacy advocates have less to fear from the latest plan because it would allow individuals to deposit their passwords with private organizations, rather than the Government. Yet the Administration has not explained why foreigners would buy American software that would allow the F.B.I. to eavesdrop when they could buy equally powerful software from non-American manufacturers that omits any such trap door. Critics assume that foreign governments -- few of which pay attention to American constitutional protections against invasion of privacy -- would demand access to passwords, making such software unattractive for anyone to use. There is room to improve the plan. A panel of the National Research Council recently concluded that there is no good reason to restrict exports of currently available encryption because foreigners already have access to equally powerful software. There is time to work out restrictions, in cooperation with the industry and privacy advocates, for the next generation of encryption software. In the meantime the Administration might push forward on the panel's other sensible recommendations -- such as developing better encryption expertise within the F.B.I. and helping the private sector develop the encryption software it needs to stop illegal eavesdropping. [End] The National Research Council report is available at: http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/nrcindex.htm

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Re: Key recovery/RSA/Bidzos/WTF?!?
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:38 PM 10/3/96 -0700, Declan wrote: >PC World (at www.pcworld.com) has a radio interview with Bidzos, I'm >told, probably in the same story for which they interviewed me. RSA's "position statement" is at: http://www.rsa.com/PRESSBOX/releases/keyrecov.htm ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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RE: DESCrack keyspace partitioning
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"geeman(a)best.com" <geeman(a)best.com> wrote: >(P)RNG's just aren't that likely to produce a key of 010101010..... nor 001100110011... etc etc and I have been thinking about how one might formalize and exploit this randomness property to increase the probability of finding the key sooner. ... >Any thoughts here? Suppose we have a function f() that randomly chooses an integer between 1 and 100 such that each integer in the range is equally likely to be selected on each call. If we call f() 6 times, each time noting whether the result is even or odd, which of the following sequences is more likely? Even Even Even Even Even Even Even Odd Odd Even Even Odd If you picked the second sequence as more likely, you are like most people who responded to similar questions in a classic study of cognitive biases [1]. The two sequences actually have an identical probability of occuring, and, in fact, all sequences of six outcome are EQUALLY probable. This example illustrates the representativeness bias, in which we mistakenly suspect the global characteristics of a process to be represented locally in a specific sequence[2]. Ciao, James 1. Kahnman, D., and Tversky, A. Subjective probability: A judgement or representativeness. Cognit. Psych. 3 (1972) 430-454 2. Stacy, Webb and MacMillian, Jean, Cognitive Bias in Software Development. Communications of the ACM June 1995, 57-63

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RE: DESCrack keyspace partitioning
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry, but you are ASSUMING that which I dispute. The point I am making is that keys in the real world are not uniformly distributed. Some results forthcoming. Suppose we have a function f() that randomly chooses an integer between 1 and 100 such that each integer in the range is equally likely to be selected on each call. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ If we call f() 6 times, each time noting whether the result is even or odd, which of the following sequences is more likely?

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RE: DESCrack keyspace partitioning
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re: DESCrack keyspace partitioning geeman(a)best.com wrote: > > What about the heuristics of partitioning the keyspace? > > Seems to me that a _subset_ of all possible keys is much more likely > to appear than a random selection from an equidistributed population 0..2^56. > > (P)RNG's just aren't that likely to produce a key of 010101010..... > nor 001100110011... Why? They seem just as likely as any other sequence. I left out a piece: again heuristically speaking, most DES keys are derived from pasword hash, or similar technique. In such a case the statistics of the generated keys are (it looks like) _highly_ skewed. etc etc and I have been thinking about how one might formalize > and exploit this randomness property to increase the probability of finding the key sooner. Again, which randomness property? The property that essentially _no_ predictability is found in a hash-derived key. Gary -- "Of course the US Constitution isn't perfect; but it's a lot better than what we have now." -- Unknown. pub 1024/C001D00D 1996/01/22 Gary Howland <gary(a)systemics.com> Key fingerprint = 0C FB 60 61 4D 3B 24 7D 1C 89 1D BE 1F EE 09 06

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[IMPORTANT] GAK
by dustman＠athensnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May is a convicted child molester.

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Re: boycott GAKkers (was Re: NYT on IBM GAK)
by Scott J. Schryvers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 08:39 PM 10/3/96 -0400, you wrote: GAKked DES! Talk about redundant. >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >On Thu, 3 Oct 1996, Adam Back wrote: > >> (I've seen HP, Sun, RSADSI, TIS, Apple, Atalla, DEC, Groupe Bull, IBM, >> NCR Corp., and UPS mentioned). Any confirmations? Denials? > >IBM and TIS are definitely pro-GAK. TIS is selling a firewall that uses >GAKked DES. IBM has been working on developing the "key recovery" technology. >The article posted here a while ago that told of IBM's plans to support GAK >also said that they were planning to license the technology to Sun and >Netscape. I don't know about the accuracy of that last statement. > >Mark >- -- >PGP encrypted mail prefered. >Key fingerprint = d61734f2800486ae6f79bfeb70f95348 >http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.3 >Charset: noconv > >iQEVAwUBMlRcsCzIPc7jvyFpAQEiIwf/btvAiIVHF3alGh+Vivr3MoHnSSciFjGX >qhqdS+SEsM4cTxE+y8vvfpHFs/faQPmWLgT70lyf1pJ+Avei7brieb/qWoC5q9MJ >gBlSa1f2yVMY7ax+KPTwU+Yk63A7oi964d+ebCp51BLOtzKammRlIw/nBFuDMq/5 >ss2a4w4PuOEOP35WQIy0i8NBoJxEi5gHx5J/+gGzWK9iw/yZa0xyoT25ci6uh7mJ >sPgNmedr/Pq+D5gk5GduGgGni/jrDeADH0K7R0M8Jqlh0Xc82NPkau8xwZAXDMJV >947PF56souwrx3BHmj7fXPXIVBJEjWy/Ymv2N8LBm+BHS09CN0ns5Q== >=URZJ >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMlUoaf+hzPlzwZAdAQGopQgAvlREZb8S6SPQs/WQvZzkoR9ETJy1byEK xGO/ymOpkivpGCZBXGcdOLnnDJbH26x8eh7iHi+Mzv6iVrbt11YkbZ9h7z7UTkdq jtUMVN9MvOaKPxcLqTvcYgTOyKgLPYpIa27xKlP5Y7NqovacTHHA6TgSz5HjC8fQ Jg+xCPDYsJTLEDmmdJVykJx/SU4ovIFP2o/8eF+LMIW7M3L7w5bHUO14HYkuMrUy hpNp4NCycGbwia1GYkwfOYnx5YuQFSjBeubIm8sqC2Zs3A7B9OoTyOmec12JyvGz G4kJe5vKhF+q8MktOSzazqMvdJ8PgQX0ecrhrurLVdVnwu1H1QB1ZQ== =HViK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Secret Swedish GAK and ITAR
by Asgaard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gunnar Klein, a Swedish MD, is chairing a EU committee dealing with standardization of security measures in medical information systems. Recently, in a full-page anti-GAK debating article in a national Swedish evening newspaper (Aftonbladet 9/25/96), he chose to reveal some secret information he's gotten hold of: Sweden's representatives in the OECD GAK proceedings have declared that Sweden is willing to sign bilateral or multilateral GAK treaties, if other countries so demand. This declaration, along with the OECD records per se, has been classified. He also discloses that Sweden in late 1994, effectively in total secrecy, issued a completely new law against export of 'stretegic products', principally including all cryptography, without permission from the 'Inspection for Strategic Products'. In theory this law would cover export of a crypto program on a notebook. Gunnar Klein suspects US strong-arming behind all this. Obviously, Denmark has taken a different, anti-GAK, position in the OECD proceedings. Denmark is less susceptible to US blackmail than Sweden - they don't build fighter-planes with lots of US high tech parts inside (like the JAS/Gripen). Asgaard

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RE: DESCrack keyspace partitioning
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Another thinking step: most real-world DES keys are derived from hashes. Not (P)RNGs. The distributions are **not** uniform. I am talking about FAMILIES of predictable bit patterns in keys, not any specific pattern. I'm doing the stats. The goal is to search the most likely keys first, and not all keys are created equally. Your reasoning is thin. ---------- From: Mike McNally[SMTP:m5@tivoli.com] Sent: Friday, October 04, 1996 6:10 AM To: geeman(a)best.com Cc: 'cypherpunks(a)toad.com' Subject: Re: DESCrack keyspace partitioning geeman(a)best.com wrote: > > (P)RNG's just aren't that likely to produce a key of 010101010..... > nor 001100110011... etc etc Right. A good CSPRNG is ulikely to produce the pattern 010101010101. It's also unlikely to produce the pattern 0011001100110011. Oh, and it's also unlikely to produce 01100100101001011. In fact, a good 32-bit CSPRNG has only a 1/2^32 chance of producing any particular bit pattern. Of course, another way of saying that is that it's just as likely to get an "obvious" bit pattern as it is to get any other one. You can't just throw away part of the keyspace based on such bogus reasoning. (There may be other reasons to throw away part of the keyspace, of course.) ______c_________________________________________________________________ Mike M Nally * IBM % Tivoli * Austin TX * How quickly we forget that mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com * "deer processing" and "data http://www.io.com/~m101/ * processing" are different!

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The attitude of US peoples toward govt WAS: [AP stuff] (fwd)
by snow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jean-Francois Avon asked me to forward this to the list. It is part of a conversation that He and I had last week. The Crypto Relevance if any is in the attitudes we are discussing, and in the the last couple paragraphs of Mr. Avon's writing. Forwarded message: > From jf_avon(a)citenet.net Fri Sep 27 23:59:05 1996 > Message-Id: <9609280545.AB01676(a)cti02.citenet.net> > Comments: Authenticated sender is <jf_avon(a)pop.citenet.net> > From: "Jean-Francois Avon" <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> > Organization: JFA Technologies, Montreal, QC, Canada > To: snow <snow(a)smoke.suba.com> > Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 01:45:30 -0500 > Subject: The attitude of US peoples toward govt WAS: [AP stuff] > Priority: normal > X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.32) > > On 27 Sep 96 at 20:01, snow wrote: > > When I talked about driving for 48 hours straight, I was trying to > > impart an idea that many midwestern people are rasied with, the > > total VASTNESS of the world. We (midwesterners, and some of the > > westerners, and a lot of older people (in their 60's & 70's) > > honestly believe deep down inside that this country is too vast to > > effectively control that the government simply CAN'T do it. They > > can't enforce any control they wish to have with the army, because > > WE have guns, and a lot of us are ex-army (a little older, a > > little slower, a HELL of a lot more devious and a lot less > > impetuious<sp>). We simply don't accept the fact that any one CAN > > control us. > > This might be why I liked NM, and AZ and TX. I can understand the > feeling you describe as you can barely escape it while visiting the > place. I suppose our canadian politicians also understood that: c.f. > Bill C-68 :( > > > Anyway, [the person's] point was that [some type of software] took > > control and decesions out of peoples hands, and that is why it was > > a market sucess. This I see as a European disease, the looking to > > government & the church for the solutions to every day problems. > > That is the feudalist attitude and philosophy. Absolutely > disgusting. Although we have, here in Quebec, french roots and > civil laws based on the Napoleon Code (Common Law everywhere in > Canada except in QC), the population have a very american way of > seeing life. Every time I have political discussion with French from > France, the feudal mentality always surfaces up and I always have > problems with them. They have a hierarchy-worshiping attitude, > coupled with an abdication of the power of their own reason (at the > individual level). In short, they are brought-up to become yes-men. > It litterally gives me an uncomfortable feeling in my guts. > Disgusting. > > > The original Colonists didn't have that attitude (well, they did to > > some degree, but not the people on the edges) In fact the attitude > > really didn't develop fully in this country until the 1920's, and > > still hasn't caught on everywhere. > > Roosevelt and his New Deal... I got the chance to find a magazine > who explained how the Federal Reserve was created. Politicians > sneaking into trains as "duck hunters", grand political socialistic > schemes sprung on peoples in secret, etc. The magazine did not say > that but I am leaning on the Objectivist side and I tend to read > what *is* written... > > > politicians started paying for votes with government largess > > As a 70 years old englishmen, ex-company managing president & very > friend of mine once said: Everyday, they buy us with our own money... > > > These two attitudes are pretty diametrically opposed, but coupled > > it with a school system that doesn't encourage extra-curriculer > > thought, and you have some pretty incosistent people. > > Unfortunately, you are absolutely right. > > > [slight topic drift...] I was wondering lately... Words have a lot > of power. They are the building blocks we use to materialize > concepts. Think about the word "Government". You would think of it > as a body that governs. But the american peoples think the > government ought to be a body that acts under a mandate to > administrate and oversee certain things. > > The very word "govt" seems to (conceptually) almost "justify" the > actions of present govts, while any other word (like, for example, > "overseers", "Mandated", etc) would stress out that they are under > *our* orders (and nowadays, exceeding their mandate). > > Maybe we should start using a new word to describe *exactly" what it > is that they ought to be doing. Doing so would also stress out > *exactly* what they are pulling on us... > > Comments? > > jfa > > Please e-mail me directly since I am not on cypherpunks anymore. > Thanks. > Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds (Montreal) QC Canada > DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee > Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal > JFA Technologies, R&D consultants > physicists and engineers, LabView programing > PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon > ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 > ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C Petro, Christopher C. petro(a)suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff> snow(a)smoke.suba.com

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Re: DESCrack keyspace partitioning
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

geeman(a)best.com wrote: > > Another thinking step: most real-world DES keys are derived from > hashes. Not (P)RNGs. Hashes? Hashes of what? > The distributions are **not** uniform. Then that's a wonderful weakness in the cryptosystem. Let's fix it. > The goal is to search the most likely keys first, and > not all keys are created equally. Any cryptosystem for which one can compute likely vs. unlikely keys has already been partially compromised. ______c_________________________________________________________________ Mike M Nally * IBM % Tivoli * Austin TX * How quickly we forget that mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com * "deer processing" and "data http://www.io.com/~m101/ * processing" are different!

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