December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Lynx...
by Charley Sparks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have had it with all the cutsie moving graphics and Java intrusions on my feeble 28.8 connection. Can someone PLEASE tell me where I can get a copy of Lynx or similar text based browser for '95 and / or NT ? Thanks folks Charley -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCWAwUBMfo2quJ+JZd/Y4yVAQFPkAQIyBl+XmSRoJUlpDbof8FGNi4TGexivaux ZPPiyuCflseiw53077xP4FsF8Q1v5SgDe/87OCCDiG3XrWqOyRhah5IRmDw+3S2L brxbTc/oqwkCddAGglF08OGOIGHa8iK0x2KhRVZPStRopNbHgVIJiDJzcSFOeFLY mpj0jKto1s7+ =qxPe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Charles E. Sparks<sparks(a)bah.com> In God we trust, all others we encrypt ! http:/www.clark.net/pub/charley/index.htm Public Key At http://www.clark.net/pub/charley/cp_1.htm

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Public vs. Private Munitions
by Erle Greer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's how I understand it: The U.S. Government, concerned only with making America a safer place for us taxpayers to live in, wants to regulate domestic encryption in order to have access to the content of all transmissions. Their theory is that any cryptosystem that is stronger than their cryptanalysis systems can be used in illegal transmissions and should be considered munitions. Theoretically, the government should only be have the resources to control commercially-available, public encryption systems. Who is to stop anyone from designing their own cryptosystem for personal use? If the government intercepted a transmission from this private cryptosystem, and could not decrypt it, would they assume that it must be considered munitions? Similarly, anyone could send uniformly-formatted random garble that could also be considered munitions, or at least waste the governments processing time. Why are we so worried about government regulation? Can't we just devise our own cryptosystems and just don't sell them or make them publicly available? vagab0nd(a)sd.cybernex.net http://ww2.sd.cybernex.net/~vagab0nd/index.html Visit web page for public key.

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Publicly Verifiable Anonymous Voting System
by JonWienk＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Begin Rant] As I write this, I am listening to the news coverage of the bombing in Centennial Park. The ABC news reports are already linking the suspected Georgia Militia members accused of plotting to use pipe bombs at the Olympic Games. Just like OKC, the militia-gun owner-right-wing extremist smear is gearing up before the blood has a chance to dry. On the other hand, the govt seems to be awfully reluctant to admit the obvious about TWA 800... [End Rant] Here is the how the voting system works. 1. All voting information (public keys, ballots, ballot signatures, etc.) is publicly available via a Web site or other similar means, and can be downloaded in its entirety by anyone who cares to take the trouble to do so. The software (and source code) used to generate ballots should be publicly available as well. 2. When someone registers to vote, they submit a RSA public key to a registered voter key database. The public key database does not contain voter information; only keys. Access to the key entry terminals is controlled, so that only registered voters can submit keys. A receipt is given to the voter with a hash of the key printed on it (PGP fingerprint style), the key entry clerk's name, a receipt serial number, etc., so the voter can verify the correct key was put in the system, and who to shoot if it wasn't. 3. On election day, each voter submits a ballot signed with their private key. The ballot contains the fingerprint of the voter's public key, the voter's choices, (preferably in a standardized ASCII format) and the digital signature. The ballot goes into the vote database regardless of whether it is valid or not. The voter receives a printed receipt confirming that the ballot was entered in the database, with a hash of the entire ballot (headers, signature, and all), receipt serial number, etc. 4. After the election, each voter can verify whether their public key and ballot are in the database, and see whether their vote is deemed valid or not (if the signature on the ballot can be verified by a key in the key database). If there are any discrepancies, the voter has the public key, the ballot, and the receipts to prove that his vote should be counted. 5. Since the key/vote databases are not connected to individuals, no one can connect votes to voters unless cheating occurs during the registration process. If there is fraud or other errors, the key/ballot/receipt combo is all that is necessary to prove the error--no identification of the bearer is required. 6. Keys in the system should expire every few years. Any comments / constructive criticisms welcome. Jonathan Wienke "1935 will go down in history! For the first time a civilized nation has full gun registration! Our streets will be safer, our police more efficient, and the world will follow our lead in the future!" --Adolf Hitler "46. The U.S. government declares a ban on the possession, sale, transportation, and transfer of all non-sporting firearms. ...Consider the following statement: I would fire upon U.S. citizens who refuse or resist confiscation of firearms banned by the U.S. government." --The 29 Palms Combat Arms Survey http://www.ksfo560.com/Personalities/Palms.htm 1935 Germany = 1996 U.S.? Key fingerprint = 30 F9 85 7F D2 75 4B C6 BC 79 87 3D 99 21 50 CB

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Re: HACKER REPORT
by JonWienk＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 27 Jul 1996, Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> wrote: [snip] >On Sat, 27 Jul 1996, Rich Graves wrote: > >> On Fri, 26 Jul 1996, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >> >> > At the end, Pete Wilson (the TV guy, not the governor) said >> > something like, "Hackers tells us that the problem may be >> > overblown. Most people--and this includes most hackers-- >> >> Really? Hackers are people? > >MOST hackers. [snip] The rest, of course, are chupa-cabras, yeti, descendants of the Roswell crash survivors, and ATF agents... Jonathan Wienke

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Re: Fireworks expected, missed at Senate crypto hearing
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>more about terrorists. And Sen. Slate Gorton (R-Wash) jumped on the >>committee staff for leaning too far *away* from national security interests >>in their summary of the legislation. > >What does that mean? As opposed to what? (Gorton's my Senator, and I'm >going to give a little feedback to his local office...) (If you have Real-Audio capability, you can listen to the hearings at www.hotwired.com/wiredside) Basically he expressed his disappointment at the committee for having a biased view and having minds that were already made up regarding the issue, and he said he was beginning to lean towards the bill, but the attitude of the committee just might make him vote against it. He's my senator too and believe me he got some feedback! =) //cerridwyn//

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Vote early, vote often
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've uploaded my entry in the "Big Java Applet" contest. The best way to locate it (your vote counts) is to point Netscape to http://www.jade.org:8001/jade/show_entries?inCat=Global_Community The best way to view it from a Macintosh is to point the Sun Applet viewer to http://www.vmeng.com/pub/minow/SunClock.html Although you can also use NetScape 3.0b5 to view it, this release seems to have drawing problems on the Macintosh. I haven't tried other browsers. Your comments and improvements are welcome. There is very little Cypherpunks relevance, although "phase of the moon" may be a useful number to mix into a random number generator. (The source is available from the website.) Martin.

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Re: Fireworks expected, missed at Senate crypto hearing
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:44 AM 7/27/96 -0700, Cerridwyn Llewyellyn wrote: > >>>more about terrorists. And Sen. Slate Gorton (R-Wash) jumped on the >>>committee staff for leaning too far *away* from national security interests >>>in their summary of the legislation. >> >>What does that mean? As opposed to what? (Gorton's my Senator, and I'm >>going to give a little feedback to his local office...) > >(If you have Real-Audio capability, you can listen to the hearings at >www.hotwired.com/wiredside) >Basically he expressed his disappointment at the committee for having a >biased view and having minds that were already made up regarding the issue, >and he said he was beginning to lean towards the bill, but the attitude of >the committee just might make him vote against it. >He's my senator too and believe me he got some feedback! =) I would not trust Slade Gordon as far as I can shoot him with a tree shreader. Gordon was the CO-SPONSOR of the CDA. Exon got all the press, but Gordon was just as responsible. (Maybe the netfolk ought to make that fact well known when he comes up for re-election. Hint! Hint!) Where issues of freedom are involved, I doubt if he is on our side. --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Re: Olympic bombing
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:41 PM 7/27/96 +0200, Mike van der Merwe wrote: > >Hi all > >I can just see the FBI screaming "we need weaker encryption to combat >terrosism on US soil" with nasty effects -- it seems all to many people, >lawmakers included, will be only to happy to sacrifice their privacy that >the FBI can better combat these terrorist acts (which could *of course* >could been prevented had only the FBI been able to read their encrypted >mail...) > >Somehow I got the feeling watching CNN that the FBI was given a shitload >of ammo. Call me cynical but the Reichstag fire comes to mind... > >Later >Mike This was on another list. It expresses my sentiments quite well. >Received: from ez0.ezlink.com (lneil(a)ez0.ezlink.com [199.45.150.1]) by bud.indirect.com (8.7.4/8.6.6) with SMTP id UAA15498; Fri, 26 Jul 1996 20:36:06 -0700 (MST) >Received: by ez0.ezlink.com id AA20227 > (5.67b/IDA-1.5); Fri, 26 Jul 1996 21:36:25 -0600 >Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 21:36:25 -0600 >From: "L. Neil Smith" <lneil(a)ez0.ezlink.com> >Message-Id: <199607270336.AA20227(a)ez0.ezlink.com> >To: mongoose(a)indirect.com >Subject: TWA 800 and Atlanta >Cc: tompkins(a)indirect.com > >TWA 800 AND THE POLICE STATE OF GEORGIA > >By L. Neil Smith <lneil(a)ezlink.com> > >Special to _The Libertarian Enterprise_ > > I've been sitting around all week, watching the Olympics whether I >like it or not, because my wife and daughter want to watch them, and I >can deny them nothing. > > In between undeniably dramatic moments -- astonishingly courageous >little girls "playing hurt", as if they were major-league football >players -- I've been treated to story after story of how, due to the >efforts of thousands of uniformed professional paranoids, Georgia, USA >is coming to resemble _Soviet_ Georgia. The sight of _hundreds_ of >trailers moved in to house these security "troops" is demoralizing in >and of itself to anyone with a regard for a free society. > > At the same time, I've been a TV witness to the tragedy of TWA >Flight 800 and an ignoble struggle by network fear-vampires to wring >the story of its last delectable drop -- "It was a bomb!" "It was a >missile!" "It was a bomb!" "It was a missile!" -- the whole thing >beginning to sound like a macabre Certs commercial. > > Over it all hung the spectre of international terrorism, and the >swollen, corrupt, bulbous-nosed, droopy-jowled visage of a politician >(no "New Democrat" as it turns out, but just another damned fascist) >grimly determined -- exactly like Richard Milhous "Guns are an >Abomination" Nixon before him -- to be the last democratically elected >President of the United States: William Jefferson Blythe Clinton. > > Clinton -- aided by his vile minions, the national "news" media -- >went into raptures of ecstasy, listing all the ways that the freedom >of Americans would have to be curtailed (Clinton has spoken of this >before; it's a favorite theme of his) due to the heinous act he >transparently hoped had been committed against TWA 800. > > Afterward, the round-heeled sprayheads obligingly searched out the >usual street-cretins to rubberstamp Our Glorious Leader's latest Five >Minute Plan, and add that they wouldn't mind at all paying extra for >the "service" of having their inalienable rights violated even worse >-- within the increasingly Bulgarian-style compounds American airports >have become -- than they're being violated now. > > But there's a simpler, more effective way to prevent the criminal >acts generally labelled "terrorism" that Clinton and his idiot-box >doxies don't want anyone to know about. Behind virtually every >terrorist attack we've ever seen or suffered, it's relatively easy to >discover vicious and repeated acts of aggression against innocent >individuals by the state. > > Preceeding the highly-publicized excesses of the Irish Republican >Army, for example, we find 850 years of violent occupation by an >exceptionally brutal foreign power that's managed to con the world >into believing that it's civilized. > > Half a hundred years of Middle Eastern terror arise directly from >the fact that, instead of coming to America -- the appropriate refuge >for "huddled masses yearning to breathe free" -- either before or >after World War II, European Jews decided to take somebody else's land >away, and treat their victims the same way they themselves were >treated by the Nazis. (In fairness, at least before the war, would-be >refugees from Hitler's terroristic state weren't given much choice, at >least not by the American Medical Association, the American Bar >Association, and the Roosevelt Administration, all of whom worked >overtime, keeping out imported professional competition.) > > Similarly, there would never have been an Oklahoma City had there >never been a Ruby Ridge or Waco. If Clinton had any real interest in >reducing the threat of "domestic terrorism" (he most assuredly does >not: terrorism, like war before it, has become "the health of the >state") instead of ratcheting government controls tighter around the >necks of 250 million Americans who've done nothing wrong, he'd >immediately arrest, try, convict, and punish all of those responsible >for Ruby Ridge and Waco, abolish the outlaw agencies in whose names >they were perpetrated, and repeal or nullify the unconstitutional laws >which provided them their justification. > > The trouble is, he'd have to arrest, try, convict, and punish >_himself_. > > Oh, yeah, the plan: the best-kept "secret" of our overly- >governmentalized age is that terrorism almost invariably >_reactionary_; simply stop doing things -- things you shouldn't be >doing anyway -- that cause terrorists to attack you and the attacks >will stop. > > Terrorism is the price that governments -- and their hostage >subjects -- pay for exercising illegitimate power. Despite pundits >whose ignorance is exceeded only by their presumption (_Wall Street >Journal_'s Paul Gigot leaps immediately to mind) 20th century history >demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that no further expansion of >that power will do anything but make make the problem worse. > > Benjamin Franklin warned us, more or less, that anyone who trades >liberty for safety is a fool, in part, because there ain't no such >_thing_ as safety. > > We're reminded by Amnesty International that more individuals have >been murdered by governments in this century -- well over 100 million >-- than have died in its wars (war itself being a government >enterprise, as well), proving that government is a worse threat than >anything it claims to protect us from. Tragedies like TWA 800 is >presumed to be, represent a failure of the _state_ -- of the very >_idea_ of the state -- and it is the state, not individuals, that must >be penalized, by reducing its income, and especially the power it >wields over individual lives. > > Americans are famous the world over for doing what was never done >before. It's time we did something historically unprecedented again. >We flew the first airplane; we sent the first men to the Moon. Both of >those were possible _only_ because we were the first people ever to >tell a King to go to hell. > > Now it's time to tell a President to go to hell. It's time to be >the first people ever to _refuse_ to be steam-rollered out of our >liberties by jackbooted thugs claiming to protect us from people and >events that don't threaten any of us nearly as much as the thugs >themselves. > >=================================== > >L. Neil Smith's award-winning first novel, _The Probability Broach_, >which has long been out of print, will be republished by TOR Books >this October. Permission to redistribute this article is herewith >granted by the author, provided that it is reproduced unedited, in its >entirety, and appropriate credit given. > > > Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Pie cutting algorithm
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:40 AM 7/27/96, Rollo Silver wrote: >Tim May said: ><< ObCrypto Sidebar: The "fair" method for dividing a pie between two people >I (RS) believe Claude Shannon proposed the following N-person pie-cutting >algorithm more than 25 years ago: Thanks! I should've suspected that The Master had worked on this problem. >Tim May: as a Licensed Ontologist, do you know who made the wiseassed (but >deep) remark "Ontology recapitulates Philology"? or for that matter, >"Oncology recapitulates Proctology". No, but my friend Chip Morningstar pointed out that "ontology recapitulates philately," (For those befuddled by these jokes, the biological original was "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny," which means that the morphological development of a fetus in the womb retraces, or recapitulates, the morphological development throughout history of the species, roughly. Thus, gills, fins, etc.) --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: The Four Horsemen Go to the Olympics!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:32 PM 7/27/96, Nathan Syfrig wrote: >This is very worrysome, as it truly is a "world stage" event that could >really serve to galvanize various governments into uniting against strong >non-escrowed crypto. Hey, it will look good for the international PR, >never mind the fact that not everybody will be so 'diligent' in registering >their keys and/or use the "approved" crypto. Well, the large crowds milling in public squares with massive numbers of world journalists watching...a classic series of "soft targets." If several million-dollar bomb sniffers are placed in all airports, the terrs will just shift to _trains_, as experts point out. Or _ships_. Or _crowds_. Next time you're out driving around, think of places where a car bomb could take out dozens of people, or where a bag or backpack could take out crowds. (The Mad Bomber in New York or Boston killed quite a few people by using lockers in public places....kind of hard to put bomb sniffers in all such places. And bomb technology, timers, detonators, etc. have advanced apace in the last several decades since the Mad Bomber.) While I don't claim there is nothing to be done about terrorism, the fact is that modern nations highly value free travel and often mingle in "soft target" areas. Even a police state wherein people's movements are carefully controlled cannot fully avoid such acts. By the way, the airline solution is not too difficult to visualize: 1. Eliminate checked baggage, or at least require those with checked baggage to deposit it enough hours in advance to be inspected and to pay any surcharges for this inspection. (I try to only have carry-on baggage, and this seems to be a major trend.) 2. Let the market decide. Airlines could announce their baggage inspection policy, and customers could decide on the tradeoffs between increased inspections and higher costs, and greater confidence in security. I think I'll repost my "Soft Targets" piece of a few weeks ago, in the light of TWA 800 and this morning's bomb in Atlanta. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: "privatizing" phones?
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>While shopping for a new phone recently, I came across >two models (Toshiba and Uniden I believe) that >have buttons to "privatize" you conversations. These >were on no-cord models. Does anyone have any idea >on what these actually do? Can the phones change > the frequency the call is on randomly >so people can't tune into it? I know cellulars offer something >similar. Personally, I would never put much faith into >something of this sort. Even if they did change the frequency the call was on, it would be a simple matter to decode how the frequency change was negotiated, and "follow" the call (also easily accomplished with cellular calls). Failing that, there is a very limited range of frequencies allocated for cordless fones, and simply re-scanning for the conversation is a trivial inconvenience. //cerridwyn//

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RE: Overwelmed with Stupidity...
by Jean-Paul Kroepfli 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Shaun Clark[jacquard(a)teleport.com] wrote 27 juillet 1996 09:18 >For instance what the heck is a TRS-80, DES, or even GAK? TRS-80: A venerable microcomputer, twenty years ago (Tandy Radio Shack, I believe with 80 columns); many experiences begin with this one (and Altair (some years before) or Apple II). DES: Data Encryption Standard, a (also venerable) cryptography algorithm, it has a too short key (56 bits effective) but a good design. Recycled, with TripleDES (or 3DES), in a three pass function. GAK: Government Access to Key, his private key must be deposited (mandatory or pushed voluntary) to a public or private (registered) agency. The Law Enforcement Agencies (and intelligence agencies, but sh!) have access to the key with a court order (nobody is smiling). Jean-Paul ~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~- Jean-Paul et Micheline Kroepfli (our son: Nicolas and daughter: Celine) eMail: JeanPaul.Kroepfli(a)utopia.fnet.fr Also Compuserve and MSNetwork Phone: +33 81 55 52 59 (F) PostMail: F-25640 Breconchaux (France) or: +41 21 843 27 36 (CH) or: CP 138, CH-1337 Vallorbe Fax: +33 81 55 52 62 (Switzerland) Zephyr(r) : InterNet Communication and Commerce, Security and Cryptography consulting PGP Fingerprint : 19 FB 67 EA 20 70 53 89 AF B2 5C 7F 02 1F CA 8F "The InterNet is the most open standard since air for breathing"

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COL_oss
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

7-27-96. FiTi: "Colossus faces rebirth into a world of dispute." The man behind the resurrection of Colossus is Tony Sale, a computer expert and former MI5 operative who once worked for Peter Wright of "Spycatcher" fame. Its reconstruction, now in its final weeks, is not merely an act of homage to the mathematical supermen of Bletchley who hastened the Allied victory over the Nazis. Neither is it just a triumph over the official secrecy in which the machine was cloaked until a few years ago. It is a working demonstration of Sale's contention that Colossus was the world's first computer. So sophisticated was the machine intelligence at Bletchley Park that the very existence of Colossus was not revealed until 1970, according to Tony Sale. After the war the government ordered 10 Colossi to be broken up -- some say as part of an intelligence deal with the Americans. Gripped by a desire to assert the claims of Colossus, the former MI5 man asked GCHQ to reinstate his security clearance so he could work on the project. The parts could be found in any British telephone exchange up to the 1970s. Yet it took until 1992 to get all the electronics declassified. Only last November was Sale allowed to demonstrate the machine's ability to break the Lorenz wheel settings. Even today members of the public are forbidden to operate Colossus: some of its codebreaking algorithms are still, it seems, a secret. ----- http://jya.com/coloss.txt (15 kb) COL_oss

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[REPOST] The Net and Terrorism
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I sent this out on 29 June 1996. In light of recent events, the comments about "soft targets" seem worth mentioning again. I doubt my comment, "A few airliners will shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles. This is unsurprising." will get me any visits from the FBI, as this is the consensus of folks far more expert than I. Likewise, my closing coment, "avoid crowded downtown areas," was just common sense, not a tip-off to the Atlanta bombing.] There have been many recent reports linking the Net and anonymous remailers, pseudonyms, and (of course) strong crypto to various possible and actual terrorist events, with an emphasis on the "possible." (If the Net is linked to _actual_ terrorist incidents, little is being disclosed publically as of yet.) Recent comments by John Deutch, William Perry, and Louis Freeh make reference to the growing danger of the Net. And the "Russian mafia" is playing a major role in this debate; I won't recap the various articles in major magazines about arms sales from the former Soviet Army, the reports that an entire paramilitary unit of the KGB is now working for the Russian mafia, and the obvious corruption of the entire former Soviet system (I'm not saying it wasn't corrupt before, just that now the paymasters have changed). Can anything be done? To stop the likely effects of lots more surface-to-air missiles, lots more nerve gas available on the black market, and so on? In a word, "no." I've been thinking about this a lot, reading the various articles, and pondering the implications. The plain fact is that the modern world is one of great "liquidity," and the vast amount of arms built up by the U.S.S.R. (thanks in large part to responding to a similar build-up in the U.S., without taking any sides...) are now "leaking out" in increasing numbers. (The leakage is quite similar to that seen in the 1975-79 period, when thousands of tons of armaments abandoned by the U.S. in Viet Nam were sold around the world. Except, of course, that the the Soviet weapons include some interesting new things.) Not even a police state can stop armaments from being diverted in situations such as faced in the former U.S.S.R. (For those not familiar with the conditions, read up on it. The combination of former command economy, secret police, selling off of industry to highest bidders, lack of a conventional industrial base...all of this makes it nearly unavoidable that much of the former state industry is now controlled by black marketeers and former Party apparatchniks....after all, who else would have the money to buy these former State industries?) In fact, a former police state does not change its stripes. The names and paymasters change a bit, but the organism lives on. (One need only look at the police states of Central and South America and their platitudes about the "Drug War" to understand the realities of such markets.) Unbreakable crypto will of course be used. This is unsurprising. A few airliners will shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles. This is unsurprising. I expect a city or two to get nuked in the next decade or so. (Haifa or Tel Aviv would be my leading candidates.) To me, this is unsurprising. My personal solution dovetails with other perceived threat responses: avoid living in or near major cities and take reasonable measures to cope with moderate economic or physical crises. (No, I am not a "survivalist," just mentally and physically prepared to deal with a major earthquake, economic dislocation, or terrorist incident in San Jose, which is 30 miles north of me.) FBI Director Louis Freeh and the TLA spooks are already sounding the alarm about the "Four Horsemen." Sen. Sam Nunn is calling for measures to ensure that cyberspace is "secured" and that the Net is not used to further chemical and biological terrorism. The point is that even a police state cannot stop the consequences of the increased "degrees of freedom" the modern world (and the Net) provides. In fact, police states tend to make the scale of the corruption even greater, as the Soviet and Latin American examples show. (I could of course get into the examples of arms dealings in Iran-Contra, the CIA's role in covert arms supply, etc., but this should be self-evident to all.) An Australian radio journalist asked me if the Net could make possible new types of terrorism, and could allow terrorists to plot crimes in new ways. He seemed surprised when I said "Of course" and then proceeded to give some examples of how the Net can be used to undermine governments (what those governments of course refer to as "terrorism," even when it is mostly not). I'm not advocating such "terrorism," by the way, merely telling it like it is. Arguing that the Net cannot and will not be used in such ways is naive and ultimately counterproductive. It is more accurate and useful to point out that the increased role of terrorism is due to many factors, including prominently the vast amount of armaments in the world, the role of police states which have benefitted from these build-ups in the military-industrial complex, the expansion of "virtual communities" around the world, and, crucially, the expanded number of degrees of freedom in transportation, communication, banking, and other such Information Age channels. Keep your head down, avoid crowded downtown areas, prepare for moderate disruptions, and reject arguments that an American Police State will do anything to stop terrorism. (Remember, terrorism is just warfare carried on by other means, with apolgies to Von Clausewitz.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: ALL OF YOU ARE CRIMIN
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At 09:33 PM 7/26/96 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >I AM NOT GOING TO TOLERATE EXISTENCE OF A MEDIUM FOR CRIMINAL HACKERS >AND MUNITIONS SMUGGLERS. I WILL COMPLAIN TO THE FBI IMMEDIATELY SO THAT THEY >CAN TRACK YOU DOWN AND CLOSE THIS LIST. > Damnit Sen. Exxon! We told you not to use the computer!! :) P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... "The future of robotics" Ä by Cy Borg and Anne Droid ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Re: Public vs. Private Munitions
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:24 PM 7/27/96, Erle Greer wrote: > Theoretically, the government should only be have the resources to >control commercially-available, public encryption systems. Who is to stop While I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a "commercially-available, public encryption system," I think your point is incorrect. (My confusion is that a commercially-available system is not necessarily a "public" system, if by public one means public domain. If one means "published specifications," still not the case. Confusing.) Howver, the government cannot step in and "control" a commercially-available product, by even the most liberal interpretations of the commerce clause. "Tim's Pretty Flaky Snakeoil System," for example. I can announce it, sell it, and the government is powerless to "control" it. (Even if it were "public.") If by "public" you mean an NBS or NIST standard, like DES, then I suppose the government can in some sense "control" it. (Even this is iffy, IMO, as I know of no rules saying DES implementations must be approved by NIST or anyone else.) >anyone from designing their own cryptosystem for personal use? If the >government intercepted a transmission from this private cryptosystem, and >could not decrypt it, would they assume that it must be considered >munitions? Similarly, anyone could send uniformly-formatted random garble >that could also be considered munitions, or at least waste the governments >processing time. Most of the cryptosystems are not under the "control" of the government, even by the standards of your first definition. Period. RSA is not a government-controlled system, though it is both "commercially-available" AND "public" (in that the spec and algorithm are clearly published). And the talk about "personal use" is misleading, IMO. It suggests that government can and should regulate use for "business purposes" but not personal uses. I disagree with this distinction. > Why are we so worried about government regulation? Can't we just >devise our own cryptosystems and just don't sell them or make them publicly >available? You mean the way public key systems in general and RSA in particular were invented and devised by non-government folks? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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"privatizing" phones?
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In> have buttons to "privatize" you conversations. These In> were on no-cord models. Does anyone have any idea Hmmm... To Privatize a cordless phone, one would have to turn it off. P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... Save the whales...harpoon a politican! ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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HACKER REPORT
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In> Just saw part I of a two-part series on "hackers" being broadcast In> by a local San Francisco TV station. Nothing horrible, in my In> opinion. The adroitly sidestepped the hacker/cracker distinction In> by saying the "hacker" has come to mean..." and then gave the In> negative, intrusive definition. <<SNIP>> In> Tomorrow's show should be more interesting (and possibly much In> more sensationalistic). Part II is "The Hacker Underground." In> Oooh, scary! Christ. They are almost taking this chapter-for-chapter out of The Hacker Crackdown... P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... Descartes of Borg - "I assimilate, therefore I am." ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Re: The Four Horsemen Go to the Olympics!
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:22 AM 7/28/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >By the way, the airline solution is not too difficult to visualize: > >1. Eliminate checked baggage, or at least require those with checked >baggage to deposit it enough hours in advance to be inspected and to pay >any surcharges for this inspection. (I try to only have carry-on baggage, >and this seems to be a major trend.) > >2. Let the market decide. Airlines could announce their baggage inspection >policy, and customers could decide on the tradeoffs between increased >inspections and higher costs, and greater confidence in security. > >I think I'll repost my "Soft Targets" piece of a few weeks ago, in the >light of TWA 800 and this morning's bomb in Atlanta. Actually, if I wanted to blow up the Portland airport, all I would do is set up a mortar up on the hills overlooking the airport. The entire airport is pretty visible from those hills. There is no way to completely eliminate terrorism. And since the imposition of order tends to promote the escalation of disorder, I expect it to only get worse... And the only people to "win" will be the control freaks. --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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"Soft Targets" as Schelling Points
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The connection should be clear, but in case it is not: many soft targets are Schelling points for terrorist actions. Putting yourself in the mind of a terrorist or militia crazy or whatever, where would you attack? The Olympics, obviously. (And security officials of course see the same Schelling point, hence the unprecedented security measures and presence.) Given that most Olympic events are well-guarded, etc., what's the next target to look at? Crowded public gatherings, where the "message" can still be delivered and where security measures are problematic. There are tens of thousands of such soft targets/Schelling points in an "open society," and it is unreasonable to expect to defend each one of them. (Costly, too.) And if they are so-defended, the attacker moves to other targets. Keep your head down. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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WaPo on Crypto-Genie Terrorism
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post, July 27, 1996, p. A22. Speaking in Code on the Internet ... [Editorial] The decibel level has been rising in the argument over how much control the federal government should have over the export of encryption technology. The Senate Commerce Committee held hearings Thursday on a proposal dubbed Pro-CODE (Promotion of Commerce On-line in the Digital Era) that would lift current restrictions on exporting encryption software above a certain level of complexity. The move is opposed strongly by law enforcement and national security authorities, who fear the consequences to their tracking of terrorism or crime if uncrackable cryptography becomes the global standard. But encryption software -- which scrambles a person's computer messages so no one can read them without a key -- also is thought by many in the computer industry to be the missing piece that's preventing customers from a full-scale move to the Internet for banking and other confidential transactions, rather than, as now, worrying about the security of their data. They also see it as a market in which the United States maintains a comfortable lead, one that is threatened if domestic encryption makers can't sell their products elsewhere. The makers argue that foreign encryption software will rush in to fill the gap, doing nothing about the uncrackability problem -- indeed, making it worse. The administration in turn is pursuing a wider international agreement to maintain controls on cryptology export by all the industrialized nations and has been putting pressure on its colleagues in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which will rule on the matter in a Paris meeting in September. Administration officials, including FBI chief Louis Freeh, have been pushing for an alternative policy of "voluntary key escrow" -- encryption makers would deposit a key to the code with a neutral third body before exporting the products and could then have access to the codes only by court order, as happens now with wiretapping. Mr. Freeh, testifying at Thursday's hearing in favor of an optional key escrow plan, noted that the point is not to prevent all copies of uncrackable code from going abroad -- that's clearly impossible -- but to prevent such high-level code from becoming the international standard, with architecture and transmission channels all unreadable to world authorities. To software companies and Internet users who have been clamoring for the right to encrypt as securely as possible, Mr. Freeh and others argue, "the genie is not yet out of the bottle" on "robust," meaning uncrackable, encryption. It's far from obvious to anyone that an optional escrow plan really can prevent the growth of inaccessible transmissions by international terrorists or criminals. Encryption, if widely used, could conceivably ease some privacy problems concerning who gets to see personal and financial data on individuals -- though such data usually are vulnerable to being dug out of storage rather than intercepted in transmission. But neither is it clear that the encryption enthusiasts' desire for free development should take precedence over the tracking of terrorism. At the very least, Congress should be exceedingly cautious about getting out ahead of administration concerns on controls that, once lifted, are hardly reversible. -----

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Re: Olympic bombing
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 17:41 96.07.27 +0200, Mike van der Merwe wrote: >I can just see the FBI screaming "we need weaker encryption to combat >terrosism on US soil" with nasty effects -- it seems all to many people, >lawmakers included, will be only to happy to sacrifice their privacy that >the FBI can better combat these terrorist acts (which could *of course* >could been prevented had only the FBI been able to read their encrypted >mail...) > >Somehow I got the feeling watching CNN that the FBI was given a shitload >of ammo. Call me cynical but the Reichstag fire comes to mind... The phrase "Get a life" comes to mind. Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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Is Colossus out of date?
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You may recall recent comments by Attorney General Janet Reno where she notes that exportable encryption cannot be broken in reasonable time by modern supercomputers. With that as background, you may find the following paragraph interesting. It is from the Financial Times article on Colossus. http://jya.com/coloss.txt > [Tony] Sale describes [Colossus] as a large electronic valve > programmable logic calculator. "No lay person would argue > that it is not a computer," he says. Furthermore, because > it wasted no time retrieving a stored program it was almost > as fast as a high-speed modern computer whose nominal > work-rate is 1,000 times quicker. A simulation of Colossus > which Sale ran on a top-of-the-range Pentium PC took twice > as long as the real thing. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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Re: Schelling Points, Rights, and Game Theory--Part II
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:31 AM 7/25/96 EST, jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: > Basically, in this view of rights and raising of children it would seem that a > relativistic pragmatism prevails. Personally, I think that the two choices are > either this relative pragmatism or an absolute morality. The fact that someone is doing something that is morally wrong, does not automatically give us the right to go and rectify it at gunpoint. Not all wrongs are crimes, only those wrongs for which is just to engage in violent retribution. > Some implications of Tim's view is that all our rights are basically a > transitory agreement between individuals. Tim may or may not believe this, but that is not a consequence of his views. The schelling point theory of rights is substantially equivalent in practice to "We hold these truths to be self evident." --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: WaPo on Crypto-Genie Terrorism
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:21 PM 7/27/96 GMT, John Young wrote: > The Washington Post, July 27, 1996, p. A22. [Snip] > Mr. Freeh and others argue, "the genie is not yet > out of the bottle" on "robust," meaning uncrackable, > encryption. Why does it sounds like Mr. Freeh and his friends are drinking out of a different bottle than the rest of us? The genie is out of the bottle and has been for a while. The tools are there for those who care to use them. Maybe it is a diffrenet genie that he is trying to portray... Maybe it is the acceptance and relyance on crypto that has not quite escaped into the general populace. If someone tried to portray all automobie drivers as dangerous maniacs and cars as only useful for making getaways, he would be laughed out of the room. If someone tried to claim that phones are a haven for drug dealers, and thus must be licenced, they would get a harsh reaction from the public. Freeh is fighting a war against the public having a positive view of Crypto. By smearing crypto users as "criminals and terrorists", he is using his office to influence the opinions of "law abiding citizens" to be anti-crypto. I beleive that there is alot that can be done to influence the public to be pro-crypto. With the proper memes, you can reveal the flaws in the anti-privacy forces arguments. Here are a few in no particular order... Teaching computer users how to use PGP. Offer to give instruction in use of PGP amongst general PC and Mac users groups. Whenever possible associate the wiretapping requests of the FBI with the opening of mail. Remind people of the abuses in the past. Ask them of if they can remember any good coming from these program. Ask them if they mind *you* looking through their mail and what makes the Government any better or worse. Local stations will usually have a "public forum discussion" program on varioussubjects. get on it. Usually the program is rigged in one direction por another, but you can get in a good meme or two that will stick in the heads of the people watching. (And it can be alot of fun!) Offer to sponsor a crypto archive and discussion area on a local BBS. Keep it current. Get others interested. Spread the tools and teach people how to use them. Build web sites that are pro-crypto. Where possible, get them working under SSL. Are there any SSL crypto sites out there? I know of only one, and it is not advertised. (Or up to date.) Work fast lest the darkness overcome us all... Be creative. The control freaks and authoritarians lack that creativity. Lets use it to our advantage. --- |"Computers are Voodoo -- You just have to know where to stick the pins."| |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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