December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Wiesenthal Center (Canada) and the Ostrich Syndrome (fwd)
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For Skippy. - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: 23 Jul 1996 08:26:15 -0700 From: Ken McVay OBC <kmcvay(a)nizkor.almanac.bc.ca> Newsgroups: alt.revisionism, can.general, alt.censorship, comp.org.eff.talk, misc.legal, ont.general, bc.general, talk.politics.misc Subject: Wiesenthal Center (Canada) and the Ostrich Syndrome The July 19 article in the Vancouver Sun, "B.C. Internet provider is the largest Canadian site for racist material" is alarming. (See URL http://ftp.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi?orgs/american/wiesenthal.center/press for a copy of the article.) It is not the material found on the websites mentioned, nor the fact that the host server is Canadian - nor indeed that the server is physically located in BC - which give cause for alarm. It is alarming because - either by deliberate design or by abject ignorance - - Sol Littman (and the Simon Wiesenthal Center [SWC] whom he represents in Canada) is fostering and promoting the spread of the "Ostrich Syndrome." Their actions represent a counter-productive denial of reality - akin to the Ostrich burying its head in the sand. Littman is quoted as saying: "We found the longer you leave these groups unexposed, the longer they fester and the more they infect others and the only way to deal with them honestly and forcefully is to expose them to the light of truth." Yet the article concludes, "Littman said he wants to see if Klatt will remove the groups from Fairview voluntarily before the centre takes any other action." The only truth that seems to emerge from such a veiled threat is that Littman has no understanding of the Internet. One is at a loss to determine how removal of the "groups" from one Internet Provider's server would in any way "expose them to the light of truth." If Littman had any knowledge of the Internet, he would know that the Nizkor Project [http://www.nizkor.org/] is an award winning website that is accessed daily by hundreds. In addition to being a source for those who seek information about the facts of the Holocaust, it is used as an electronic resource for those who wish to "deal with [these groups] honestly and forcefully" thereby exposing Lemire and many others - of whom Littman may not even be aware. Nizkor is arguably the "host" to more hate literature than any other website. Since we also include a link to the Zundelsite amongst others, will Littman next be targetting Nizkor and demanding that we remove such links? Or that we hide from public view the mountains of archived material which meticulously documents and uses the "arguments" put forward by these groups as instruments of their refutation and exposure? If Littman and the SWC prefer to bury their heads in the sand while engaging in this futile exercise in darkness, let them do so. But the martyrdom they hand on a platter to Lemire and others whom they find offensive stands in marked contrast to their failure to use the Internet on their own website. Conspicuously absent on the SWC website are links to the increasingly growing number of useful resources for those who truly do wish to participate in the battle to expose racist and anti-semitic groups on the Internet. The Ostrich syndrome is far more dangerous to society than any white supremacist group on the Internet. Such groups will fester in darkness, but wither in light. Kenneth McVay, OBC The Nizkor Project - -- Nizkor Canada | http://www.nizkor.org - -----------------------| Prince Myshkin's Troll Bait Sold Here |-------------------------------------- http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/g/giwer-matt/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMfVcLJNcNyVVy0jxAQENJQIAwGhMdP82l3S0Ac3uSaYaUcj1TowW6J9F K+l+wRmWwpQBuxq+INEPghNcY54thnc6iQIqGfR5KVoUsFNLAk9lcg== =12JK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Netscape
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:23 7/23/96, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > If you know that the recipient can read a message encrypted with >3DES, IDEA, or RC2-128, then you can send the message using one of >these strong algorithms. Given that you need someones public key >to send them a message, there are several obvious ways to transmit >information about what algorithms they accept along with it. Granted. What about the signature bug? Will Netscape encrypt the outside signature? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: Bare fibers
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:20 AM 7/23/96 -0400, Rabid Wombat wrote: > >> >> Doesn't that make it vulnerable (detectable) to Tempest attacks? >No. >Transmitting light via fiber doesn't emit EM. >Anyway, the original post, as I recall, was about keeping sensitive data >on a second hard drive, connected via (very thin, therefore harder to >notice) fiber. Tempest monitoring was not a factor. It occurs to me that a bare fiber could actually be (randomly) hung across treetops, roofs, power lines, and various other structures, over a many-block distance in suburban areas. Such a fiber wouldn't be protected very well, but it would probably last a few months. It would also be exceedingly hard to find its terminations, and tracing it would be a real pain. (It probably wouldn't be visible against a bright sky more than a meter or two away.) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: Brute Force DES
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

well, first of all, I wasn't computing 2^40, I was computing something like 2^(56*0.667) * 8bytes/each or somesuch, I don't recall exactly as I don't have the paper in front of me. In any case, it was the tradeoff between time and space -- 2^40 in time was something like 2^38th in space. But don't trust my numbers, get the paper and rattle them off yourself. It just seems like if we're going to browse all of the way through the DES keyspace, we _ought_ to take notes along the way -- that means building a table. I don't care how big the table is; if it is only 2^30 entries (about 1G entries, each 8 bytes = 8Gig) we reduce our next DES crack by a factor of 8. If we keep 2^31 entries (16Gig) we can cut it down to 2^50, or a factor of 16. If we have 4 - 9 Gig drives (or perhaps three drives and some wiggling, described below) we can save about 2^32 entries and the search becomes a measly 2^48. :) To whittle this down to a 40-bit workload, we'd have to save 2^36 entries* 2^8 bytes/entry = 2^39 Bytes = 512 Gig. Yes, admittedly large. What's the cheapest form of storage, magtape? How much can you store on magtape? The entries can be sorted so that lookup doesn't take long even when you have to mount tapes. Wiggling: We may be able to save less than 2^8 bytes/entry because we know the quality that made the point interesting enough to save (say we only keep points where the top 32 bits were zeros -- no need to save these zero prefixes) but I suppose we'd only be able to cut this storage factor down by a factor of two at most. If you don't have Hellman's paper handy, the apropos formulas are: Total time=T, memory=M, search space=N Time/space tradeoff: M=mt , T=t^2, m*t^2=N In our case, N=2^56; M, T variable. mattt >---------- >From: Ray Arachelian[SMTP:sunder@dorsai.dorsai.org] >Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 1996 3:16 PM >To: Matt Thomlinson >Cc: 'trei(a)process.com'; 'cypherpunks(a)toad.com' >Subject: RE: Brute Force DES > >On Tue, 23 Jul 1996, Matt Thomlinson wrote: > >> why not put together (a LOT of) disk space and we can build a table >> (read: "a cryptanalytic time-memory tradeoff") for cracking DES? Using >> the table, we could brute-search the DES keyspace in less time than it >> would take to do an exhaustive search of a 38 bit keyspace, according to >> the paper. 4 gigs is what, a couple of hundred nowadays? >> >> Making DES equivalent to a 40-bit crack would take approx. 500Gig, but >> publishing the table would push DES out usefulness. Certainly we could >> scale back (make DES equivalent to a 45-bit crack?) if we don't have >> enough disk... > >IMHO it's more expensive to go this route than to build a machine with >dedicate DES cracking chips. 2^40 = 1,099,511,627,776 or about 1 terabyte >worth of space, not 500G. 2^39 would be 500Gb. A 4Gb drive these days is >$800, hardly a couple of hundred dollars. :) > >Even so, that's a ton of hard drives. Further you need machines to hook >these drives up to. Infact, you need a farm of machines. Why? You can >only put 7 on a chain, and maybe if you're lucky four chains in a machine >using four controllers. > >A better idea might be to make small cheap computers, say based on 8086's >or 68000's that replace the drive's controller card, or if that drive >controller card is intelligent enough to be a CPU or contain one, burn >EEPROMs. Have the EEPROMs be able to generate DES (or any other >cypher's) keyspace given a range, and then have them able to search the >whole drive for a match. > >Even so, if you build these drive boxes, all you've accomplished is to >create a nice huge big searchable array. You still will need some sort >of logic to figgure out when it finds the right key, and you still can't >do 3DES or recusively encrypted files, nor know when you've found the key >for data you can't recognize - or rather have these drives recognize. > >However: Reading a 4Gb drive end to end takes less than 2 hours. I know >this because I have a RAID array of them, and it takes 2 hours to >rebuild, so since rebuilding an array requires reading from two drives >and writing to one drive, reading a whole 4Gb drive at full speed would >be something like maybe 1 to 1.5 hours(???) > >You might be better off with 9.0Gb drives if you can afford them because >you then have less controller logic cards to build. > >The drives alone will cost $204,800. $800*(2^40/(4*1024*1024*1024)). >You could get a nice big discount if you buy that many, but this will >also mean however much it will cost you to build the cpu cards for >multiplied by 256 drives, plust the R&D cost, plus the network connection >between all the CPU boards. > >At that point you also run into the MTBF of the drives which means that >your drives will fail quite often. > >If you want to go dirt cheap on the CPU's while using this huge space >method, you could just buy something like 37 Mac IIsi's, hook each up to 7 >of the drives (you'll have to partition the drives as they won't support >volumes that huge.) and network the machines using localtalk. You won't >need a faster connection because all you need for networking is keyspace >distribution and success reporting. But then IIsi's are sloooow machines >and your searches will suffer a hit from the lack of the machine's speed, >plus all the overhead of having an operating system and using the SCSI >chain to talk to the drives. > >IIsi's go for $350-$500 nicely loaded... $14800 for 37 at $400 a pop, >add the drives to that, plus the cost of writing the program and hooking >all of this crap together and that'll be $219,600. Ya got that kinda >dough to spare? > >========================================================================== > + ^ + | Ray Arachelian |FL| KAOS KERAUNOS KYBERNETOS |==/|\== > \|/ |sunder(a)dorsai.org|UL|__Nothing_is_true,_all_is_permitted!_|=/\|/\= ><--+-->| --------------- |CG|What part of 'Congress shall make no |=\/|\/= > /|\ | Just Say "No" to|KA|law abridging the freedom of speech' |==\|/== > + v + | Janet Reno & GAK|AK| do you not understand? |======= >===================http://www.dorsai.org/~sunder/========================= > Key Escrow Laws are the mating calls of those who'd abuse your privacy! >

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Re: DES-Busting Screen Savers?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim and others have discussed the effectiveness of random search vs. centralized servers, problems of cheating, scaling, etc. My take is that, if you can ignore scaling, the best approach is probably to have a central server that doles out keyspace and wraps around when it reaches 100%, and doesn't worry too much about collecting results - even if there are cheaters, machine failures, etc., and people don't finish their keyspace, it'll be more likely to cover the whole space than randoms. (Make it a web page, and use cut&paste to transfer to the search programs so they don't need to be network-equipped.) To support scaling, make it easy for people to run subset servers; grab a chunk of keyspace from the main server and dole it out to people who ask you for it. If you want to get fancy, hack a DNS server to allow people to register their machines as NNN.descrack.org, 0<=NNN<1000, so that people can find subsets without having to ask the main server. >>> a brute force "screen saver" for >-- By the time the total amount of computons expended has equalled the >amount that would have been expended in a "no duplications" allocated >search, the Poisson probability distribution says that 1/e = 36.8% of the >keyspace will not have been searched; the rest of the probabilty lies in >keyspace searched once, twice, three times, etc. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Confuse Authority!

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re:SHI_fty
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:13 PM 7/22/96 -0800, Vinnie Moscaritolo wrote: >Uh I think apple had that for a while, it's called cyberdog >http://cyberdog.apple.com screw this ole fud. Unfortunatly, this is only available for Macs at this time. Hopefully we will see Windows and/or Unix versions sometime soon. (Of course if you expect Microsoft PR to resemble *ANYTHING* vaguely like reality...) --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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RE: Distributed DES crack
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I've a few machines around that could be dedicated almost full time to the > task. What are the bandwidth requirements? Specifically, could the > keycracker be run over a 28.8 (with a 486 running linux)? If so, how many > 486's could I get over a single 28.8 (i.e. 28.8 -> multiple 486's daisy > chained with ppp over direct serial connection)? > It's not a factor of the bandwidth, you search offline and send in > your results to a central server. > But first, a little reality check is in order. According to libdes, > the 200Mhz Pentium Pro on my desk will do 1,827,997 ECB bytes/sec, or > 228,499 ECB blocks. A DES crack would have to try, on average, 2^55 > blocks. That would take my machine 43,798,875 hours, or 1,824,953 > days. > OK, so let's be reasonable and say that a week would be a good time to > come up with a DES key. We would need 260,707 200Mhz Pentium Pro's to > achieve this. > Looking at that, 30 days seems not such an unreasonable target. We > would need 60,831 200Mhz Pentium Pro's to achieve this. > It seems obvious to me that DES is still *way* out of reach of > anything other than special purpose hardware. In> - Andy (hoping he got his sums right) (I think you did :) One small thing... You are assuming that we will not get the right equasion/code/whatever untill the very end. There is a good chance that it will only take half that time...and a slim chance that we will get it with the first try... P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com (BTW, I have a 486 DX/4 100MhZ That I will put to the effort...) ... As easy as 3.14159265358979323846264338327950288419716 ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Re: Responding to Pre-dawn Unannounced Ninja Raids
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:38 PM 7/23/96 -0400, hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu wrote: >>I don't understand this conclusion. One book people aside, it is generally >>believed that humans evolved in an evolutionary context and they certainly >>frequently use cooperative strategies. Cooperation usually also involves >>the ability to sanction misbehavior. Unilateral disarmament is throwing >>away your sanction. > >That depends on the circumstances. If you are arguing the case for >unilateral disarmament or unilateral reduction. In many cases there was a >deliberated attempt to confuse one with the other. Unilateral >reduction can be the right move to make. No argument. I said disarmament. >In the case of a minor nuclear power such as the UK unilateral >disarmament may be the right move... But still, the UK has available other sanctions. That's why they are still called the Falklands. >... Burglars are not rational actors, and >are more likely to have their behavior determined by drugs or >alcohol than analytical game theory. Burglars are among the most rational of thieves. They try to maximize gain and minimize risk by acting when no one can oppose them. Even muggers, a much less rational activity, try to pick on people smaller than them. >The facts are very clear, if you have a handgun in the house it is >far more likely to kill a member of the familly than stop an >intruder. The NRA know this which is why they have lobbied for the >CDC to stop research in this area - they do not like the facts. Christmas trees make your house far more likely to catch fire. However many people have them because they provide other, hard to quantify, values. (BTW, my mother's retirement home does not allow them in individual units.) Guns have value besides home defense. Just one off-the-wall example: I learned to hold a camera steady by competitive target shooting. Home defense is not the only reason to have a gun. (Besides, I would rather have a shotgun with a short barrel for close-up defense than a handgun. As the California police forces discovered when they (briefly) changed from pump shotguns to "automatics", the sound of chambering a round with a pump shotgun makes people focus very clearly on their situation. Frequently it avoids violence.) IMHO handguns are much more useful when you need a portable defense. Examples: 1. The USGS will allow field geologists to carry handguns in bear country after a rigorous training program. 2. I have a friend who defended himself from a pack of feral dogs after they attacked him and forced him to retreat to the roof of his car. (He killed three of the four. The local rancher treated him to dinner for ridding the neighborhood of a dangerous nuisance.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Cave ab homine unius lebri | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | [Beware the man of one | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | book] - Anonymous Latin | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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[off-topic] Locating cell phones with power off?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I seem to remember that somebody once mentioned that cell phones transmit signal even with the power switch off. Supposedly, you have to take out the batteries to cut the signal. The more I am thinking about it, the less sense it makes. Can somebody here please confirm (or deny) this rumor? TIA, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: 2600 (the magazine)
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:27 AM 8/14/96 -0500, Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> wrote: >The current issue of 2600 is out. I bought mine at Barnes & Nobles. > >It has a couple of articles on cryptography as well as a port scanner >program for Linux. I browsed the article on "cryptography" briefly on Monday. I think using the term "cryptography" to describe it is a bit strong. The author is encouraging people to basically XOR data with a repeating key (a modified Vigniere) and then proclaims it forever unbreakable. I was somewhat unimpressed. "Why the hell doesn't Janet Reno outlaw this kind of irresponsible magazine? They're showing KIDS how to encrypt data, for God's sake!" Actually, one of us (he says, ducking the responsibility personally) should probably write an article for them on how to use PGP. (Maybe something that doesn't use words bigger than "warez".) I got it! A one pager. Paragraph one gives the URL to Joel's PGP QuickStart (a description and a link is on Joel's tools page at http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tools.html and the executable itself is at ftp://ftp.eskimo.com/u/j/joelm/Install.exe [plug plug]) and says, "run this program to install PGP." The rest of the page can be devoted to "how to hide your kewl viruses from your clueless teachurz". Hmm. Maybe I will write that article. After all, they give out a free subscription to authors (and since I buy the rag anyway) it might be worth it. But if someone wants to beat me to it, go for it. I feel my ambition slipping steadily away, and I haven't even got out of the e-mail phase yet... :-) John -- J. Deters "Captain's log, stardate 25970-point-5. I am nailed to the hull." +-------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'33"N by 93^16'42"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +-------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: key escrow idea from David Satelin of MIT Lincoln Labs
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:19 PM 8/13/96 -0400, Matt Blaze wrote: >My comments included below Rivest's message. >------- Forwarded Message from Rivest >Here is another MIT professor's (Dave Staelin's) suggestion for a >national crypto policy. I thought you might be interested in seeing >it; given the difficulty of the debate, any variant, even if only >slightly different from previous ones, should be considered. Feel >free to pass this note around, or to post it... > >Here is Staelin's idea: > (1) You can use any crypto you want, but you must keep a record > of the crypto keys you used. > (2) The government can ask for the crypto keys later, if they have > a court order, just as they can ask for any of your other papers > or documents. You must give the key(s) to them, just as you > must turn over your private papers in such a situation. > (There would have to be an appropriate penalty for losing the > key...) > >The attractive feature of this proposal is that it puts encrypted >communications in the same category as private papers; the government >is required to give notice to (at least one of) the affected >individual(s) _before_ the search can be undertaken. This cures what is >in my mind a defect in the current wire-tapping laws. While I agree that there is a defect in current wire-tapping laws, it's a lot more serious than this. The defect, I think, is that wiretapping is thoroughly unconstitutional. The reason I believe it's unconstitutional is that unlike any other kind of search warrant that preceeded it, a wiretap warrant authorizes a continuing violation of privacy. It also allows police to violate that privacy secretly. Indeed, as I understand it current practice is to not inform the target of the tap even once the tap is removed. It appears far more likely that the technical fact that wiretaps can be done without informing the target has allowed the cops to conveniently re-interpret the Constitution to assume that no notification is necessary. Regular search warrants simply allow police to visit a location, ONCE, and collect evidence. The police must show up, identify themselves, and do their search, and LEAVE. Once they're gone, privacy is restored. And the target is informed of the police's interest, and so the police are motivated to not engage in "shotgun wiretaps" against people who aren't likely worthy of them. I contend that there is no logical reason to believe that the current practice of wiretapping is anticipated by any other search warrant. The _reason_ wiretaps are done in a manner so hostile to privacy and the Constitution, I believe, is that when they were "legalized" in 1968, police had already had a long history of doing them illegally, but because they were illegal they couldn't be entered into evidence in court. That legalization was ostensibly a compromise to make them admissable, but also make the police obey the law. The problem is that since the police were ALREADY violating the law, any "compromise" they were likely to agree to would have been strongly weighted against a Constitutional interpretation. (If you already have 3/4s of the loaf, why give it up?) In fact, the police gave up NOTHING: If they were able to get illegal wiretaps before 1968, there is no reason to believe that they couldn't get them after 1968. If, on the other hand, the police had genuinely obeyed the law and Constitution before 1968, more effective protections against violations of privacy would have been obtainable in exchange for legalizing wiretaps. For example, they might have been forced to agree to informing the target of every wiretap when it is removed, or maybe even informing them when the tap is placed! This will appear quite odd to the police, who will claim that wiretaps won't do any good against informed targets, but then again they probably objected to being prohibited from using thumbscrews and beating confessions out of prisoners. The fact is, not every police practice which is arguably useful is bound to be Constitutional. Another problem is with item 2 above: It amounts to an obvious violation of the 5th amendment to the Constitution, because it criminalizes the refusal to provide evidence against yourself. Even worse, it requires that you maintain, effectively, all conversations done by electronic/encrypted means. It is somewhat as if you were required to carry a tape recorder around and keep a record of every conversation you ever have, to be released to the cops whenever they get a search warrant. Rivest may be an excellent cryptographer, but a constitutional scholar he ain't. >DISCUSSION >In a variant of Staelin's proposal (my twist) you could append to each >encrypted message an encrypted form of the message key. The >encryption could be with the public-key of a trusted third party who >will not (and legally may not) reveal the message key without >notifying you first (or ensuring that you have been appropriately >served with the corresponding warrant). For example, the ACLU might >be such a TTP. This protects the government's right to access and >protects the individual from the penalties (or benefits) of losing the >key. This procedure is technically simple; what is more complex is >ensuring that the TTP's are appropriately registered and protected >from undue government influence. The use of such a TTP would in any >case be optional; the communicants need not use a TTP if they >understand their obligation to keep the crypto keys around for some >period of time afterwards. What about an alternate system that takes a poll, and requires a vote of 90% or more to allow the government to get the escrowed key? If the target is REALLY a "big bad criminal" then likely they'll get approval. OTOH, if the government had just "done a Waco" and a substantial fraction of the population were seriously pissed, the government wouldn't have a prayer. (not that I'd find even this system "acceptable," but at least it would be better... The problem is, none of these proposals reflect any recognition that there may come a time where it would be far better for society to NOT give the government the evidence it wants. This "government is always right" patina is wearing mighty thin.) >In Staelin's proposal government gains access to the communications, >but does not gain "real-time access" as desired by the FBI. This loss >may be tolerable, given the benefit obtained (forcing access to be >made in accordance with the Constitutional requirements for >notification before search). It sounds like you're saying that the government must inform the target of the wiretap BEFORE doing it. ("notification before search") Right? That would at least be better than the status quo. > The use of wiretapping encrypted >communications as a preventive measure might be severely limited, but >its use as a means of gathering evidence to force a conviction would >be preserved. > >For international communications, each communicant might be required to >use a TTP that is bound to honor the laws of his country (which TTP to be >used should be the choice of the communicant). > >It may be seem a bit strange to force individuals to keep around >information (keys) that they no longer really need. However, this is >more-or-less the case for financial records right now. However, people aren't obligated to keep financial records around, or keep them in a form the cops can read. >CONCLUSION > >The fundamental idea is to give the government a right to access >encrypted communication in return for a guarantee that access may not >be obtained until there is BOTH proper legal authorization AND proper >prior notice to (at least one of) the communicants. Two giant steps backward! I genuinely don't see that I, as an ordinary citizen, am EVER likely to be a victim of a crime which could be prevented or solved by the system as Rivest describes it. OTOH, I believe that it is almost certain that my rights will continue to be abused by a government which will be able to use this system to protect itself from being removed, either by vote or by gunfire. I conclude that proposals like this will rarely be used to protect ordinary citizens, and are almost entirely intended to buttress the government. >Is this workable?? NO! >------- End of Forwarded Message > >[Matt's comments follow] [much deleted] >While Ron's twist decreases some of the burden on the user it >eliminates the main benefit of the Staelin proposal - that one >cannot obtain cleartext without the knowledge of at least one party. >The TTP could be compelled (as the phone company is now for regular >wiretaps) to keep the request secret, under court order. Which, of course, is yet another problem with the current wiretap system. Given the 1st amendment, I see NOTHING which should allow the government to prohibit a third party (the phoneco) from telling me of the police's interest. I realize that this is "assumed without question" by the various suck-ups who populate government and probably most lawyers, but it seems to me that one of the disadvantages of the government going outself itself to obtain evidence SHOULD BE that in doing so, it reveals its interests to those third parties. As far as I'm aware, if the police serve an ordinary search warrant at a particular address, they can't prohibit the targets of that warrant from telling anyone else of this. It seems to me that the main reason police have gotten used to the idea of doing search warrants secretly is that the local phonecos have been monopolies so long, and they're so used to cooperating with government and the cops (as evidenced by the fact that police regularly got illegal wiretaps before 1968), that this has soaked in as being expected. Indeed, the pre-'68 illegal wiretaps prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that government and the telephone company never have had any sort of arm's-length relationship, and strongly suggest that the Constitutionality of wiretapping (vis a vis the constitutionality of phoneco's claimed responsibility to keep the whole thing secret) has never been legitimately tested. Remember, since the phoneco has had no competition, they've never been at risk from being shunned by customers who object to this secret cooperation. A more "realistic" position, I think, would be to conclude that if there was true competition, customers would be able to negotiate varying levels of non-cooperation in order to win customers. I suspect that post-Ruby Ridge/post-Waco, there would be a substantial fraction of the public who would conclude that it cannot trust its own government. I can think of at least one suck-up lawyer who will pooh-pooh this, claiming that wiretaps are now legal, but when looked at from a pre-1968 standpoint, wiretaps were illegal, so it seems logical that customers should have been entitled to insist that telephone companies obey the law. It's hard to avoid the conclusion that the reason this kind of illegal behavior was done by the cops as well as the phonecos is the fact that no phoneco ever had to fear loss of any kind of profit as a consequence of illegal cooperation. Indeed, I doubt that any telephone company EVER _publicly_ refused an illegal wiretap request by police. (By this, I mean the phoneco informed the public of an illegal request on its own initiative.) The total or near-total absence of such practices would make it clear that nothing that occurred before 1968 could possibly be considered the norm for constitutionality, casting further doubt on the 1968 "compromise." It doesn't seem likely (from a constitutional standpoint, anyway) that the "normal" level of cooperation that police can get from a monopolized, regulated industry should, retroactively, become considered to be the "constitutional" amount of cooperation that the cops can legally expect to get from everyone else. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: WinSock Remailer Now Available By E-Mail
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would be happy to distribute it from my site, along side Mixmaster. -Lance At 3:15 PM 8/13/96, Joey Grasty wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >The first alpha release of the WinSock Remailer is now available via >e-mail. Due to problems setting up user authentication on my homepage >at > > http://www.c2.net/~winsock/ > >I have decided to distribute it via e-mail until I can get user >authentication working. > >In order for you to receive the WinSock Remailer, I have to be reasonably >sure that you are a US or Canadian citizen or permanent resident. >Therefore, you will need to review a copy of the License Agreement and >fill out the required information. Then clear-sign the agreement with PGP >and mail it to me at jgrasty(a)gate.net. Don't forget to tell me where I can >find your PGP public key so that I can check the signature. No signed >license agreement, no remailer. > >In order for me to have a good feeling that you are not a foreign national, >I need to have the following information check out: > >a. Verify that your address is within the boundaries of the US or Canada. > I will do this by checking if you are in a public address database such > as "88 Million Households Phone Book". >b. Verify that your name and e-mail address is the same as in your public > key. > >This is basically the same method that Netscape is using at: > > http://wwwus.netscape.com/eng/US-Current/ > >to verify citizenship or permanent residency, but the process is not >automated. > >I don't like having to enforce clearly unconstitutional ITAR regulations, >but I'm not ready for an extended stay at Club Fed. > >- ---------------------------cut here----------------------------------- >WinSock Remailer License Agreement > >This is the license agreement between Joey Grasty and the end user >of the WinSock Remailer. > >Name of User: <your name> >Street Address: <your street address> >Town, State, Country: <town>, <state or province>, <country> >Phone Number: <your phone number> >E-mail Address: <your e-mail address> >Where to find your PGP Public Key: <instructions> > > >1. Joey Grasty grants to you a non-exclusive, non-sublicensable, >license to use this Alpha version of the WinSock Remailer (the >"Software"), in binary executable form for evaluation and trial use >purposes only. > >2. JOEY GRASTY MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE SUITABILITY OF THIS >SOFTWARE OR ABOUT ANY CONTENT OR INFORMATION MADE ACCESSIBLE BY THE >SOFTWARE, FOR ANY PURPOSE. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED 'AS IS' WITHOUT >EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY >AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NONINFRINGEMENT. THIS SOFTWARE >IS PROVIDED GRATUITOUSLY AND, ACCORDINGLY, JOEY GRASTY SHALL NOT BE LIABLE >UNDER ANY THEORY OR ANY DAMAGES SUFFERED BY YOU OR ANY USER OF THE >SOFTWARE. JOEY GRASTY DOES NOT HAVE ANY OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THIS >SOFTWARE OR ISSUE ANY UPDATES IN THE FUTURE. > >3. While Joey Grasty intends to distribute a commercial release of the >Software, Joey Grasty reserves the right at any time not to release a >commercial release of the Software or, if released, to alter prices, >features, specifications, capabilities, functions, licensing terms, >release dates, general availability or any other characteristics of the >commercial release as he sees fit. > >4. Title, ownership rights, and intellectual property rights in and to >the Software shall remain in Joey Grasty and/or its suppliers. You agree >to abide by the copyright law and all other applicable laws of the >United States including, but not limited to, export control laws. > >5. Joey Grasty may terminate this License at any time by delivering notice >to you and you may terminate this License at any time by destroying or >erasing your copy of the Software and notifying Joey Grasty of this action >forthwith. This License is personal to you and you agree not to assign your >rights herein. This License shall be governed by and construed in accordance >with the laws of the State of Florida and, as to matters affecting copyrights, >trademarks and patents, by U.S. federal law. This License sets forth the >entire >agreement between you and Joey Grasty. > >6. Use, duplication or disclosure by the Government of any locality, state >or country, its elected officials or employees, is forbidden. > >7. You may not download or otherwise export or reexport the Software or >any underlying information or technology except in full compliance with >all United States and other applicable laws and regulations. In >particular, but without limitation, none of the Software or underlying >information or technology may be downloaded or otherwise exported or >reexported (i) into (or to a national or resident of) Cuba, Haiti, >Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia, North Korea, Iran, or Syria or (ii) to anyone >on the US Treasury Department's list of Specially Designated Nationals >or the US Commerce Department's Table of Deny Orders. By downloading >the Software, you are agreeing to the foregoing and you are >representing and warranting that you are not located in, under control >of, or a national or resident of any such country or on any such list. > >8. JOEY GRASTY OR ITS SUPPLIERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR (a) INCIDENTAL, >CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL OR INDIRECT DAMAGES OF ANY SORT, WHETHER ARISING IN >TORT, CONTRACT OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF JOEY GRASTY HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE >POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES, OR (b) FOR ANY CLAIM BY ANY OTHER PARTY. THIS >LIMITATION OF LIABILITY SHALL NOT APPLY TO LIABILITY FOR DEATH OR PERSONAL >INJURY TO THE EXTENT APPLICABLE LAW PROHIBITS SUCH LIMITATION. FURTHERMORE, >SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF INCIDENTAL OR >CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THIS LIMITATION AND EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO >YOU. > >9. HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES. The Software is not fault-tolerant and is not >designed, manufactured or intended for use or resale as on-line control >equipment in hazardous environments requiring fail-safe performance, such >as in the operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or >communication systems, air traffic control, direct life support machines, >or weapons systems, in which the failure of the Software could lead >directly to death, personal injury, or severe physical or environmental >damage ("High Risk Activities"). Joey Grasty and its suppliers specifically >disclaim any express or implied warranty of fitness for High Risk >Activities. > >Clear-sign this agreement with your PGP public key and e-mail it to >jgrasty(a)gate.net. > >- -------------------------------cut here------------------------------------ > >Thank you for your patience with this crude form of distribution. > >Regards, > > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.2 > >iQB1AwUBMhE2UsODO2V89BZZAQGOLAL9GU15R4N/6xIZCJGYaQ0Vlw4e7rqP06+d >YH5806om50v/+8P9OKrxBOECEHPJLirFQcITXsYMn/DkVAcTVTrz9rKfJdzToeyB >Bwr4vgpMqKw4oZnFGJa1PvUotSjTnETT >=Arts >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >-- >Joey Grasty >jgrasty(a)gate.net [home -- encryption, privacy, RKBA and other hopeless causes] >jgrasty(a)pts.mot.com [work -- designing pagers] >"Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, >of course, in a state of sin." -- John Von Neumann >PGP = A7 CC 31 E4 7E A3 36 13 93 F4 C9 06 89 51 F5 A7 ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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[SIGNAL] Microsoft's Internet Explorer
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry, no rants, economic theories, or chemistry questions, but... According to C-Net Radio (http://www.cnet.com/) Microsoft will be including 128-bit SSL encryption in their Internet Explorer 3.0 for Win 95 and NT 4.0. It took a bit of digging but I finally found the Microsoft press release at "http://www.microsoft.com/corpinfo/press/1996/aug96/128SECpr.htm". | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: | It always takes longer than you expect, even Frank Stuart | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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Re: PGP...
by Bjorn E. Andersson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vince Cate has written several things in the past couple of days about the situation in Anguilla; actually, I think we've learned more about the operation of his service in the last few days than we have in the past year or so. Some instructive points, and some worries. This message contains: * discussion of the situation Vince describes * what I surmise to be some of the behind the scenes realpolitik * the role of physical vs. cyberspace data havens Rather than respond point by point to one of Vince's messages, I'll first make a few general points, free-form: 1. As I have said, I admire what Vince has done. Evolutionary learning can't happen without experiments and tests, so his experiment is important. 2. If Vince ends up moving in a direction different from that of operating a traditional (!) data haven, I will not be very surprised. Were I in his position, I might well do the same thing. (Lots of reasons, issues....)\ 3. Vince seems to be a in a somewhat precarious position, awaiting renewal of a one-year work permit. In any country, this is a shaky basis for continuing a project. I certainly don't know what his relationship is to the local authorities, but I sure know I'd feel constrained if I were up for renewal like this. (Consider how the U.S. refuses to renew visas for "undesirables," including writers whose writings the establishment dislikes, AIDS activists, anarchists (!!!), etc.) 4. The small size of Anguilla--I surmise and feel--works against operating the kind of "data haven" many of us feel could exist. Given that data havens will have all sorts of unusual, undesirable, and subversive materials, this "small community" will probably react unfavorably to any publicity generated. (And it's in the nature of some of these customers to "advertise" themselves flamboyantly--unlike Swiss banking--so as to generate customers...this pretty much guarantees that there will be stories like "Anguilla--New Source for Neo-Nazi Material!") 5. In the U.S., there are 250 million people, extensive support networks for protecting free speech (much as we like to focus on the suppression cases), and a legal system that really does make it pretty hard for a bureaucrat or even the President to pick up a phone and have a business he doesn't like shut down. I surmise, given the size of Anguilla and the non-constitutional basis of its government, etc., that it _might_ be a lot easier for a bureaucrat or the Governor-General, or whomever, to seriously disrupt any business by a few phone calls. I don't know this for a fact, but I suspect it to be true. (The closest I've been to Anguilla is the Bahamas, and it is reported to be seriously corrupt. I can't imagine a data haven surviving there if the Ruling Families decided they didn't like it.) 6. So, what does this mean? It means, I believe, that small Carribbean islands are likely to be poor choices for data havens. The more "civilized" they are, ironically, the poorer a choice they are. (Think: pirate islands, where "anything goes," so long as the right payoffs are made.) 7. Multidimensionality. With banking havens, there is basically only a single degree of freedom to consider, at least insofar as deciding which policies to consider. That is, over a period of many decades a banking industry arises in some country (Switzerland, Austria, Lichtenstein, etc.), with bankers, vaults, protocols for deposit and withdrawal, etc. And with lots of fees to lubricate the whole system, provided payoffs to various officials and royals, etc. Contrast this with a small data haven (a new industry) in a small country, with operating margins that are razor-thin (given the pricing structure Vince announced, I doubt Taxbomber and other customers were paying enough to ensure a flow of payoffs to the Ruling Families of Anguilla and the various officials that need to look the other way). 8. That is, how will a data haven handle situations where diverse "threats" and "abominations" are traced to the haven? Bomb information, pornography, child porn, trade secrets, pyramid schemes, and so on? (Vince can of course say to each of these: "Not what I want," but he may find that such ad hoc declarations chase away most of his business...) 9. In summary, I applaud Vince's experiment. But I wouldn't call it a data haven, based on what I've seen. Maybe a tax haven, but even this I have yet to see much evidence for (Vince is not free to disclose who his customers are, of course, so we are somewhat isolated.). I will say that if the only goal is to avoid sales tax and/or income taxes, operating out of Anguilla may not be ideal. After all, suppose there's a dispute (a la Taxbomber): is one supposed to fly to Anguilla, hire local attorneys, and sue in the local courts? The tens of thousands of dollars this would cost would likely swamp any tax savings.....depends on a lot of factors, but I think you all see the point. Well, I've written enough. Vince asked me a few specific questions, so I'll briefly answer: >Tim, we would all be very happy if you were to locate a country that could >be the site of the ideal datahaven, and finance a couple cypherpunks to >setup there. It would be a big help to our cause. Could you do this? Yes and no. Yes, if a good business opportunity presented itself, with reasonable payback, good ideological basis, and without too many entanglements (e.g., having to fly to Country A to check on my investment too often). No, in that there is no "liquid market" in such investment opportunities. That is, I can't just say "Send me your plans and how much money you want." I might consider partly funding a venture by people well-known to me, but, so far, no such possibilities have presented themselves. >In the mean time, people may have to exist in cyberspace (like >www.taxbomber.com) without having a totally secure physical location. >This is not the end of the world, or really even that painful. If done >right you could be down for only an hour - just long enough for >nameservers to change. Taxbomber is now setup to do it very fast next >time, if the need ever comes. Tim, I think you have even advocated this >approach, not stressing the physical location, just the cyberspace >location. No? Yes, I agree. I actually wrote my "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" in mid-1988, just a month or so before reading Sterling's "Islands in the Net," which was focussed on physical data havens (he may've been the one to coin the term, actually). My thinking was already heavily influenced by Vinge's "True Names," and Chaum's work on untraceable digital cash (1985) was well-known to me (for reasons I've written about elsewhere), so I tended to view data havens as not being tied to physical communities where the local potentates could revoke work permits, visas, travel permits, business licenses, etc. The Anguilla Experiment is certainly not changing this opinion. (And Stephenson's "Snow Crash." in 1992, further popularized this vision of cyberspace havens....I can't say he devised any new forms that some of us hadn't already been thinking about, but he sure did make it a more vivid vision through his evocative fiction.) What the form of these "cyberspace data havens" might take is unclear. Several pieces of technology are missing, just as they were missing four years ago when one of the early list members contacted me to tell me how easy it would be to set up a data haven with computers. (It wasn't easy then, and it ain't easy now. The pieces that are missing are the reifications of protocols we talk about a lot....mere encryption and authentication are only the starting points, and look at how hard it's been just to get _them_ deployed.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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new type2.list/pubring.mix
by John Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Everyone, There is an updated type2.list/pubring.mix combination available for the mixmaster remailer software. You can get it via WWW from www.jpunix.com or by anonymous FTP from ftp.jpunix.com. Of note is the addition of the squirrel remailer. Welcome aboard! - -- John Perry - perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com - PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMhGxS1OTpEThrthvAQERXgP9FQJK5byJ2bXPIy1jwzZSBt6qNgMRCXph rqDRijUxehiSpmis5mq3gTtH/CcA7wAqkxLfO9izE3sC4HqWCd7B5D7KLZx9VPNG kZvUfQrZjzubLtz4ly0DtEDtnbKTEFLZ1tJL1ZUnZgsKTLEmeEIsXDc6r5zaGC0F E/U+SBe2oOg= =gYJD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re- PGP
by Bjorn E. Andersson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry for the noise, I did a Cc by mistake. Bjorn A.

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Anguilla - commercial and mailbombing policies
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> > > A while back, when Vince first started advertizing his site, I asked him >a few hypothetical questions, and he said roughly this: If client X posts >something to Usenet from Vince's site, and if Y dislikes X's article so >much that he mailbombs X, then Vince would pull X's plug. (I have the >exact quote saved.) I lost interest right then. I'm not surprised that >Vince acted dishonorably by pulling a client's plug with no warning for a >very flimsy reason. That question was about commercial ads, and I said "As long as I am not mailbombed I don't care about how you post.". I did *not* say I would pull the plug (full exchange below). From your other questions it looked like there was no chance of you being a customer so I did not fully explain. I have been mailbombed around a dozen times in the last year and never cut anyone off. Details below (I too have the exact quote)... Dimitri: > e) to spam usenet with commercial ads. Vince: >e) I think you would have to spam more than 100 groups to get my >system mail bombed. As long as I am not mailbombed I don't >care about how you post. First, yes, that 100 groups is off the wall. What I meant was you can send out commercial ads and I don't care at all. If you get mailbombed, that is another issue. If mailbombed then it goes toward your traffic. You get 100 MB/month of traffic with a domain name, and if you go over that amount of traffic the cost is $1/MB. If you have prepaid by check, and I don't know who you are, and your account goes below $0, I would cut you off till more money came in. Sorry for not explaining that. -- Vince ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Vincent Cate vince(a)offshore.com.ai http://www.offshore.com.ai/vince/ Offshore Information Services http://www.offshore.com.ai/

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Anguilla - legal action or lack thereof
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> > > "Greg Kucharo" <sophi(a)best.com> writes: > > While Tim may be right that nobility is lost when backing down to the > > authorities, the fact is that this game has little to do with noble > > purposes. ... > > Nor was there any activity from the authorities. There were activity from the authorities. They had copies of the article and were very concerned about it and calling around asking people who knew me about this. They have not started any legal action about this. However, my work permit is up for renewal. They would not ever have to take legal action to shut me down, just decide not to renew my work permit, and I would have to leave the island. My lawyer says it is illegal to sell fake passports in Anguilla. So defending this guy could easily have been a fight to my death as an Anguilla ISP. Not defending him means he relocates to another ISP. This is the Internet guys, relocating a domain is not such a big deal. Taxbomber is using it as a reason for publicity, but he lost no email and his web pages were not down long. Remember regulatory arbitrage. If one country does not want something, there are other countries. I am going to apply for a 3 year work permit next time (they only gave out 1 year ones till very recently - since I applied). Assuming I get this, I will be in a somewhat more secure position. -- Vince ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Vincent Cate vince(a)offshore.com.ai http://www.offshore.com.ai/vince/ Offshore Information Services http://www.offshore.com.ai/

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Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Joel Morgan wrote: >It seems clear that capital investment in tools will contribute to the -productivity- of workers. (Tools here meaning whatever machinery/ infrastructure is used to get work done.) Bart Croughs quotes a number of economists who seem to be saying that when capital investment leads to increased productivity (per worker) this also leads to higher wages. I'm not sure I understand -why- this should necessarily be so. It's my impression that in manufacturing industries, the more mechanized production is, the more workers will get paid. Then again, perhaps a more mechanized industry will pay more because more mechanized industries hire workers with higher skills (albeit fewer workers). It's my impression that when a company makes capital investments which increase productivity, the fruits of this increased worker productivity are shared (to some extent) with the workers. I can imagine a number of reasons why this might be done, but it's not absolutely clear to me that this would be a direct result of market forces.< Increased productivity of workers leads to higher wages for workers because of competition between employers. If a worker produces the worth of $3000 per month for his boss, and his boss is only willing to give him $2000 salary, then there are other employers who would be happy to give this man a job at a higher wage. They still profit if they give him a wage of $2100 instead of $2000. This process goes on until the salary of the worker equals his marginal productivity. Bart Croughs

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Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Arun Mehta wrote: >>Bart Croughs wrote: >I don't assume that the *total amount* of capital will be lowered in the US when US capital moves abroad. I assume that the amount of capital in the US will be *relatively lower*. So the wages will be *relatively* lower (lower than when the capital wouldn't have left the US), but not necessarily lower in any absolute sense. I thought this was obvious, but since Arun Mehta also misunderstood me, maybe I should have been more explicit here. > Henry Hazlitt in 'economics in one lesson' (p. 139): "The best way to raise wages, therefore, is to raise marginal labor productivity. This can be done by many methods: by an increase in capital accumulation - i.e. by an increase in the machines with which the workers are aided..." Pardon me, but I'm still confused. When Hazlitt talks about how many machines are employed, surely that's "absolute" capital, not relative. If US capital is invested abroad sensibly, such that it enriches the investors, they have more money to invest in machines at home and thereby increase local productivity (and wages). << If investors use their capital to invest abroad, this capital cannot at the same time be used to invest at home. Only after the investors decide not to invest abroad any more, they can invest it at home. But I was not talking about investors who decide to stop investing abroad and start investing at home. I was talking about investors who decide to invest abroad instead of at home, and the effect of such a decision on the wages in the US. Maybe in the future these investors will have more money, and will decide to stop investing abroad and start investing at home. But in the mean time, all the capital that's invested abroad diminishes the amount of capital invested at home, and so causes the wages at home to be less than they otherwise would have been (but not necessarily less in any absolute sense). Bart Croughs

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Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encr
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Chris Adams wrote: >On 12 Aug 96 19:17:00 -0800, bart.croughs(a)tip.nl wrote: >Now I will explain why the austrian economists are right. Imagine Robinson Crusoe. In the beginning, he catches fish with his bare hands. He has no capital investment, and consequently he is not very productive. His wage will be low (he will not catch much fish). If there is more capital investment - if, for example, he has a fishing rod - he will catch more fish in less time. His productivity is higher. His wage is higher (more fish). If there is still more capital investment - if, for example, he has a boat and fishing nets - he will catch even more fish. His productivity is higher. His wage is higher. Etcetera. So, it's really not difficult to see that the Robin's standard of living depends on the amount of capital available on his island. The same goes for the rest of humanity.< To a limited extent, that holds water. However, how would you explain, say, some of the construction work around here where a huge, expensive piece of equipment is being run by some guy making less than the Cal Trans worker with the flags? Or guys I know who are making low-middle class wages working on a $10,000 computer hooked up to a $1,500,000+ molding machine? Also: lawyers - You're getting charged $200 a billing hour by someone who probably doesn't even use a typewriter (After all, secretaries aren't just for oggling). Although legal references might be somewhat expensive, it doesn't compare to the money gained. Also: computers. I know people who are making an incredible amount on old machines. They might be using a few dollars in software (probably 2-3 hours worth at most) and are working on a cheesy old machine. However, because some of these $6.25/hr typists have been putting useful information into it, it is worth the trouble to pay someone $50/hr to fix it. Neither of them has invested much compared to what they're getting in return.< When economists say that wages depend on the amount of capital invested, they mean on a regional/national level, not on the level of individuals. >Your argument only works with 2 givens: 1) A larger investment will return at least a corresponding increase in productivity.< This tends to be the case. If a larger investment doesn't return a corresponding increase in productivity, the investment will generally not be made. Happily, no one wants to waste his money on investments that are not productive. >and 2) the worker is self-employed - otherwise there are too many factors involved. If #1 is true, *someone* will be making more money, but not necessarily the worker.< Yes, it's the worker who will make more money. Why? As I explained in another post on this subject: "Increased productivity of workers leads to higher wages for workers because of competition between employers. If a worker produces the worth of $3000 per month for his employer, and his employer is only willing to give him a wage of $2000 , then there are other employers who would be happy to give this man a job at a higher wage. They still profit if they give him a wage of $2100 instead of $2000. This process goes on until the salary of the worker equals his marginal productivity." Bart Croughs

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Re: National Socio-Economic Security Need for Encryption Technology
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Blanc Weber wrote: >>From: Bart Croughs > >You haven't answered this question yet. I don't claim that the U.S. is worse >off when US capital moves abroad. I only ask: how can you proof that the US >isn't worse off when US capital moves abroad? ............................................................. You have to be able to imagine the advantages, and you can only imagine them when you have the background to understand the difference between having fewer choices rather than more, a limited market base rather than an open one full of unlimited opportunity, and the increased domestic tensions from frustrated consumers who are likely to set up blackmarkets as work-arounds to the lack of desired goods & services. Essentially, you have to want to see, and work for, the difference resulting from unprotected markets. I think people who put up a lot of objections are afraid and do not want any proof of their error. You'd have to hold their nose to the figures, and even then they might close their eyes....< You are wrong. I'm not in error; I don't think the US is worse off when US capital moves abroad. I just want to know how you can proof it, so I would be able to rebut protectionist arguments. I don't know how to prove it. And, unfortunately, neither do you. Rhetoric is no proof. Bart Croughs

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Schlafly on crypto
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Clinton Is Trying to be Big Brother -- Phyllis Schlafly Column 8/8/96 Clinton Is Trying to be Big Brother August 8, 1996 by Phyllis Schlafly We hope the appropriate government agencies will soon solve the recent terrorist crimes and punish the criminals. But all Americans who care about civil liberties should vigorously resist President Clinton's attempt to use the terrorist attacks as an excuse to carry on his all-out war against the personal privacy of law-abiding Americans. This mind-set was first revealed in the Clinton health care bill, which would have given the government computer access to the medical records of all Americans. Fortunately, that totalitarian takeover of the health care industry was rejected. The Clinton Administration's education legislation now pending in Congress would put personal information about all schoolchildren -- academic, medical, attitudinal, behavioral, and family -- into an expanded Labor Market Information database available to the government, as well as to prospective employers. Now the Clinton Administration is trying to make it illegal for individual Americans to have private conversations with one another. That's the real meaning of its effort to control encryption technology, and it's a direct assault on the First Amendment. It would be downright ridiculous to assert that the First Amendment guarantees our right to speak in public but not in private. It would be just as ridiculous to say that we have freedom to speak in words that the government can understand, but not in words the government can't decipher. Americans have the right to speak to one another in private, behind closed doors, and we should likewise have the right to speak to one another in code and to put our coded messages on computer in a process called encryption. Americans would not tolerate the government opening and reading the letters we send through the mails, and we should not tolerate the government opening and reading our encrypted, or coded, messages sent via computer. Yet, Attorney General Janet Reno, FBI Director Louis Freeh, and Vice President Al Gore are all demanding the authority to read our encrypted messages. In a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California, Reno bluntly stated her demand for "ensuring law enforcement access to encrypted data.'' Reno boasted that there is "a consensus'' that the government should create a system known as "Key Escrow'' (i.e., a supposedly "neutral third party''), to which all Americans should be forced to "entrust'' the keys to their encrypted messages, and to which the government would have access. On the contrary, there is no such consensus. Do you trust Janet Reno with access to your private messages? Do you trust the FBI to keep your files confidential? The Clinton Administration is already doing 30 to 40 percent more federal telephone wiretaps and other electronic surveillance than the last year of the Bush Administration. Those figures don't even include national security wiretaps or the hundreds of extensions granting more time for wiretap orders already issued. FBI Director Freeh wrote the New York Times last November that "There is no intention to expand the number of wiretaps or the extent of wiretapping." Four months later, FBI documents revealed that the FBI does, in fact, plan to increase electronic surveillance 54 percent by 1998 and 130 percent by 2004. On July 12, Al Gore announced that the Administration will continue to push for the adoption of a massive public key infrastructure to give the government access to all encrypted communications. In a blatant bid for a police-state surveillance society, Gore warned about "the dangers of unregulated encryption technology." A neutral panel of the National Research Council was set up to make policy recommendations about encryption. The panel called on the government to abandon its efforts to restrict encryption. The NSC panel concluded that increased use of encryption would enhance our national security, not diminish it. Thirteen out of its 16 members had security clearances with access to secret information, and they saw no national security reason to justify the Clinton policy. The Clinton Administration bases its campaign to control private encryption on the alleged need to fight crime through wiretapping. However, the NSC panel concluded that the ability of the private sector to transfer confidential financial and other data over the information highway without interception is far more important. New technologies have given government awesome power to spy on individuals. The Filegate investigation accidentally uncovered the shocking news that, as soon as Bill Clinton entered the White House in 1993, he secretly spent $400,000 on software to create a highly sophisticated computer database to track detailed political, financial, attitudinal, and personal biographical information on 200,000 people, including members of Congress and the media. Known as WHODB for White House Office Data Base, the system was nicknamed Big Brother. Encryption is a First Amendment issue, not a crime issue. If the Clinton Administration is allowed to control encryption, it would be the biggest expansion of federal power since the passage of the Income Tax Amendment in 1913. EAGLE FORUM -- eagle(a)eagleforum.org PO Box 618 Alton, IL 62002 Phone: 618-462-5415 ---------------------------------------------- Are you on our E-mail list? Tell a friend about us! http://www.eagleforum.org

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Anguilla - A DataHaven?
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim: > Rather, there is an "archetype," if you will, of what a "remailer" is, what > a "data haven" is, what a "tax shelter" is, etc. While we cannot reasonably > expect a remailer to exactly match the archetype, we can point out obvious > deficiencies. 1) Anguilla has secrecy laws. Professional relationships are confidential. There are strong secrecy laws. I have not given out taxbomber's name, nor will I as I could face legal action if I did. 2) Anguilla has no sales or income taxes. A business does not need to report anything about income, sales, etc, to the government (or anyone else). If a guy wants to sell his data and keep 100% of the profits instead of 50% or 60%, then Anguilla would be a haven for him. 3) We don't have the same laws as other countries, so there are things that can be done here. For example, we can export encryption software. Also, we will have bingo.com in Anguilla. There are deficiencies from a cypherpunk or Libertarian point of view. And these are interesting. And exactly what I want to do is changing. As I said, Anguilla is not the datahaven of cypherpunks wet dreams. I am sure there are no datahavens that match the cypherpunk concept of an ideal datahaven, yet. But I think the term DataHaven applies as well to Anguilla as any other place I know of. Tim, we would all be very happy if you were to locate a country that could be the site of the ideal datahaven, and finance a couple cypherpunks to setup there. It would be a big help to our cause. Could you do this? In the mean time, people may have to exist in cyberspace (like www.taxbomber.com) without having a totally secure physical location. This is not the end of the world, or really even that painful. If done right you could be down for only an hour - just long enough for nameservers to change. Taxbomber is now setup to do it very fast next time, if the need ever comes. Tim, I think you have even advocated this approach, not stressing the physical location, just the cyberspace location. No? -- Vince ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Vincent Cate vince(a)offshore.com.ai http://www.offshore.com.ai/vince/ Offshore Information Services http://www.offshore.com.ai/

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