December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by John Fricker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Bill Stewart (stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com) said something about Re: WINDOWS NT ???? on or about 10/4/96 7:44 AM >At 07:47 PM 10/3/96 +1030, you wrote: >>hi, >> is Windows NT secured system ? > >Windows 4.x moves the graphics/windowing system into Ring 0, >where the "secure" parts of the kernel are. Bad. >This means graphics bugs can make the kernel insecure or crash. >I don't trust it, especially because Windows 3.1 crashes all the time >for me, and stupid bugs make Windows 3.1 behave badly for me. >So if they put the window system in the kernel, I don't trust it. >End of message Graphics bugs will not crash the system since graphics bugs still run in protected mode. (ie bugs in applications that screw up GDI). Buggy video drivers though can bring the system down. But this does not affect security, only stability. Security in NT can be defeated by any clever, out of work, bored, NT device driver author who brews up a stealth device driver replacement (perhaps a COM port improvement) that could run amok on the file system or basically do anything. Of course, any clever device driver developer is making enough money to not be bored nor even consider writing a backdoor into a driver. Right? --j

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Tietmeyer-Only banks should issue electronic money
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure they'd like to have it "applied to Internet network money.".... > FRANKFURT, Oct 3 (Reuter) - Bundesbank President Hans >Tietmeyer said on Thursday a new government policy to give only >banks the right to issue pre-paid cards, or ``electronic purses'', >should also be applied to Internet network money. > Tietmeyer said in the text of a speech to The Economic Club >of New York that G-10 central bank governors were addressing the >new payment forms because they may cause difficulties for >central banks to ensure the integrity of payments. > Tietmeyer noted European Union central bankers have agreed >that only banks should issue the pre-paid cards. The policy is >expected to be widened to include the rights to create and >maintain Internet-based electronic cash systems. > ``In our opinion, the same should definitely also apply to >network money,'' he said. > Tietmeyer said electronic forms of money tend to crowd out >currency and deposit money, which may increase the potential for >credit institutions to create money. > ``Electronic money may impair the supervisory functions of >the central bank, or, in other words, its function of ensuring >the integrity of payments,'' Tietmeyer said in a text of the >speech released in Frankfurt under embargo. > ``That would increase the risk of crises in one country >spreading out to engulf payment systems worldwide,'' he said. > Electronic purses are plastic cards with a built-in >micro-chip which stores the electronic cash value of an account >and can be reloaded at special machines. > The proposal to restrict such projects to banks is part of a >new German banking law which is still under preparation but >expected to be enforced in 1997. > Tietmeyer said it was difficult to create definitive >regulations for electronic money at ``this early stage''. > ``The evolution of electronic money is only in its infancy. >But it is a characteristic feature of today's world that >tomorrow's world will be upon us in no time,'' he said. > Electronic purses, also known as smart cards, are not yet >available in cash-dominated Germany but tests are being run on >several projects. > Internet banking is slowly gaining credence in Germany after >some of the top banks, including Dresdner Bank AG, launched >securities trading accounts via the Internet. _______________________ Regards, He who foresees calamities suffers them twice over. -? Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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[SPAM] More "fuckhead" e-mail from Timmy May and his young friends
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May has no life. >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >Message-Id: <199610050215.AA00807(a)crl5.crl.com> >Subject: Re: [VULIS] >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >Date: Fri, 4 Oct 1996 19:15:36 -0700 (PDT) >In-Reply-To: <FV67uD8w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Oct 2, 96 08:29:14 pm >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Content-Length: 7527 > >> >> I have no dog, nor any other pets. Timmy May (fart) reportedly has two cats. >> If you suspect that Timmy May (fart) sexually abuses his cats, or any other >> animals, you should promptly contact the ASPCA and also alert rec.pets.cats. >> >> (Frankly, I doubt that the old fart can get his dick up to sexually abuse >> anything, including his cats. Senility puts an end to sexual molestation.) >> >> >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >> >Message-Id: <199610021931.AA24883(a)crl11.crl.com> >> >Subject: Important >> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >> >Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 12:31:21 -0700 (PDT) >> >In-Reply-To: <gqH3uD93w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 30, 96 07:57:27 am >> >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> >Content-Length: 6226 >> > >> >Dr. Vulis sucks his dog's butt. >> > >> >> Timmy May has no life. >> >> >> >> >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >> >> >Message-Id: <199609300441.AA10704(a)crl12.crl.com> >> >> >Subject: Re: Vulis FUCKHEAD sucks Timmy's Cock >> >> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >> >> >Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 21:41:42 -0700 (PDT) >> >> >In-Reply-To: <LJV2uD91w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 29, 96 11:58:09 pm >> >> >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >> >> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> >> >Content-Length: 5298 >> >> > >> >> >Vulis sucks Timmy's boyfriend's cock. >> >> >> >> >> >> Timmy May has no life. >> >> >> >> >> >> >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >> >> >> >Message-Id: <199609300332.AA09870(a)crl12.crl.com> >> >> >> >Subject: Re: [SPAM] More "fuckhead" fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May >> >> >> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >> >> >> >Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 20:32:58 -0700 (PDT) >> >> >> >In-Reply-To: <ueP2uD86w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 29, 96 09:45:41 pm >> >> >> >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >> >> >> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >> >> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >> >> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> >> >> >Content-Length: 4378 >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> berserk >> >> >> >> Timmy May has gone . Has he been eating speed? >> >> >> >> bananas >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >From: Troy Varange <varange(a)crl.com> >> >> >> >> >Message-Id: <199609300138.AA08482(a)crl12.crl.com> >> >> >> >> >Subject: Re: [SPAM] More fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May >> >> >> >> >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) >> >> >> >> >Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 18:38:05 -0700 (PDT) >> >> >> >> >In-Reply-To: <FFi2uD82w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> from "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" at Sep 29, 96 07:14:50 pm >> >> >> >> >X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] >> >> >> >> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >> >> >> >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >> >> >> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> >> >> >> >Content-Length: 3442 >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What has Timmy been smoking? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ]From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Sun Sep 29 19:03:40 1996 >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) >> >> >> >> >> ] via UUCP; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:14:06 EDT >> >> >> >> >> ] for dlv >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: from disperse.demon.co.uk by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; >> >> >> >> >> ] id AA25790 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:03:40 -0400 >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-2.mail.demon.net id ac16129; >> >> >> >> >> ] 29 Sep 96 15:59 BST >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net >> >> >> >> >> ] id aa09441; 29 Sep 96 15:54 BST >> >> >> >> >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP >> >> >> >> >> ] id AA843903697 ; Sat, 28 Sep 96 09:41:37 +0000 >> >> >> >> >> ]Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> >> >> >> >> ]From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >> >> >> >> >> ]To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >> >> >> >> >> ]Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 09:21:37 +0000 >> >> >> >> >> ]Mime-Version: 1.0 >> >> >> >> >> ]Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >> >> >> >> >> ]Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT >> >> >> >> >> ]Subject: Re: Possible subs attack???? >> >> >> >> >> ]Priority: normal >> >> >> >> >> ]X-Pm-Encryptor: JN-PGP-P, 4 >> >> >> >> >> ]X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) >> >> >> >> >> ]Message-Id: <844008901.9441.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]> The lying sack of shit Timmy May <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> writes: >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]> The lying sack of shit Timmy May lies again, as usual. >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]Fuck you, >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]I am not Tim May, Check out the return path if you don`t believe me, >> >> >> >> >> ]if you still don`t here`s my PGP public key signed by the EFF, they >> >> >> >> >> ]don`t sign keys here and there without checking ID`s... >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID >> >> >> >> >> ]pub 1024/5BBFAEB1 1996/07/30 Paul Bradley <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >> >> >> >> >> ]Version: 2.6.3ia >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 >> >> >> >> >> ]6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 >> >> >> >> >> ]sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR >> >> >> >> >> ]tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy >> >> >> >> >> ]NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP >> >> >> >> >> ]Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b >> >> >> >> >> ]j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k >> >> >> >> >> ]C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ >> >> >> >> >> ]9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 >> >> >> >> >> ]En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 >> >> >> >> >> ]YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp >> >> >> >> >> ]put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW >> >> >> >> >> ]LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi >> >> >> >> >> ]mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= >> >> >> >> >> ]=CMZA >> >> >> >> >> ]- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> >> >> >> ]Version: 2.6.3ia >> >> >> >> >> ]Charset: cp850 >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ]iQCVAwUBMkzuH75OPIRbv66xAQHSmQQAqw0F/lIsCcQwOpiSQDx4hMqOVVUVXbyR >> >> >> >> >> ]3RMWY20ECE0TpAtJ6hkAiqphsWUSBqiFj2kGHMh+jHSHXIMPF+m1qtwVbgutJC7B >> >> >> >> >> ]8VYWj0VP+bGu5dEUisLrVHDNj5ucEIDyK2GnqObiCiKARFUbOuZnMQOp9TDJqibh >> >> >> >> >> ]2Wqa5+h8R7g= >> >> >> >> >> ]=/M2U >> >> >> >> >> ]-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> >> >> >> ] >> >> >> >> >> ] Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security >> >> >> >> >> ] Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >> >> >> >> >> ] Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org >> >> >> >> >> ] Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ >> >> >> >> >> ] Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 >> >> >> >> >> ] "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >Fuckhead. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >Fuckhead. We know your behind Vulis, Cock-sucker >> >> >> >> >> >and he swallows >> >> >> > >> >Fuckhead.

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anagrams
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fast(est?) anagram generator: ftp://suburbia.net/pub/proff/original/gan/an-0.93.tar.gz (unix source and dos executable) Some Anagrams Found Using an-0.92 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Free Software Foundation - I'd fan out tons of freeware! National Security Agency - Lusty yearning at cocaine. President Dole - Led despite Ron. Central Intelligence Agency - Langley: Inelegant, eccentric. -- "Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_ +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+ |Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union | |proff(a)suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = | |proff(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 | +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+

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Re: gack vs. key escrow vs. key recovery
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 03 Oct 1996 23:44:59 -0700, Dale Thorn wrote: >Sounds to me like there's a need for a program that can produce secure >encryption, yet the output looks like "real junk", i.e., not anything >like what one of the *better* programs would produce. Then you can >claim (with testimony of experts if necessary) that "I didn't encrypt >it, must be just garbage". And even if you got some bozo govt. person >testifying against you, you shouldn't have much problem making them look >stupid and vindictive in front of a jury. OTP anyone? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: WINDOWS NT ????
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 04 Oct 1996 22:03:17 +1030, Petr Snajdr wrote: >> > > > > is Windows NT secured system ? >> > > NT? Secured? hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahhahahahahahahaha >> > How ? >> By turning off the machine, unpluging the ethernet, moving the >> hard drive to another state... > 8-) ..and Os/2,unix .etc.etc. not ? OS/2 doesn't claim to be a secure multiuser operating system. If they have console access, they *can* get almost anything*. Unix can be secure, but most places don't run it in the most secure form. However, your average Unix box is probably going to do pretty well, especially if you've compiled Linux with an encrypting file system. Microsoft claims C2 or higher for NT and deserves any ragging they get if it's not. Ditto for any other vendor who claims one thing and sells another. BTW: Bizarre NT Quirk #15413 - The Administrator account does not have access to the entire disk. You got it - if you're the administrator you still cannot look into certain directories belonging to another user - even if you've given all access privileges to the Admin account. Got a few chuckles at work. * - The various OS/2 Servers have a new version of the High Performance File System. HPFS386 does a much better job of maintaining security. Apparently even the boot-floppy that can defeat NTFS won't work. I haven't verified this yet because I'm still waiting for my personal copy of Warp Server Advanced-SMP to arrive. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 04 Oct 1996 17:29:40 -0700, John Fricker wrote: >An NT machine running off the shelf protocols and services is certainly more secure than >your average linux install. Of course clueless administrators for either (any) platform can >leave the door wide open easily enough. If you define off-the-shelf as what comes on the CD-ROM, true. We certainly couldn't find drivers for half the protocals we use... Otherwise, I'd be tempted to point out the hazards in trusting one piece of code more than another. Particularly since that linux box would come with source code, whereas most NT services don't... Also, it came as a great shock to me that there was an "average" linux install. Is there an average Linux anything? <g> # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 04 Oct 1996 17:43:52 -0700, John Fricker wrote: >>> is Windows NT secured system ? >>Windows 4.x moves the graphics/windowing system into Ring 0, >>where the "secure" parts of the kernel are. Bad. >>This means graphics bugs can make the kernel insecure or crash. >>I don't trust it, especially because Windows 3.1 crashes all the time >>for me, and stupid bugs make Windows 3.1 behave badly for me. >>So if they put the window system in the kernel, I don't trust it. >>End of message >Buggy video drivers though can bring the system down. This is 99% of the problems with any modern operating system: drivers written by Juanito's House of Taiwanese Software. >But this does not affect security, only stability. >Security in NT can be defeated by any clever, out of work, bored, NT device driver author >who brews up a stealth device driver replacement (perhaps a COM port improvement) that >could run amok on the file system or basically do anything. Of course, any clever device >driver developer is making enough money to not be bored nor even consider writing a >backdoor into a driver. Right? Doctor Dobb's had an article (with source) that demonstrated a driver that gave full access to *EVERY* application running on an NT box. They also showed how it could be limited to a single application. I believe the source is on their web site... # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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[IMPORTANT] Blowfish
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy May's 16Kb brain's single convolution is directly wired to his rectum for input and his T1 mouth for output. That's 16K bits, not bytes. Anal intercourse has caused extensive brain damage.

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Who the heck is "CYBERPROMO" and why are they spamming me?
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I keep getting mail from an "abusebot(a)savetrees.com" ... This is getting very very annoying. Ern

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Re: ADJ_ust
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 4 Oct 1996 06:02:16 -0700 (PDT), Lucky Green wrote: >> I have strong >> doubts that someone would come up with a non-nuke that could destroy stuff >> indiscriminately within a useably large area. >Fuel/air bombs. I meant with an EMP/HIRF/Buzzword-Blaster, as hyped in the press. FAE remains a potent option. The reference to a nuke was along the lines of a nuke-pumped EMP blast. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: Electromagnetic Pulse
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:46 PM 10/4/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >The key is that the effects of near-ground-level bursts are _extremely_ >localized. Shocking so, no pun intended. The largest bomb in the U.S. >arsenal, believed to be 20 MT, might leave a crater several miles in >diameter, but would hardly be felt 30 miles away. Certainly almost no >electronic devices would be damaged, except if close to the blast center. > >--Tim May What about the neutrons? What is the effect of a neutron flux on silicon devices? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:43 PM 10/4/96 -0700, John Fricker <jfricker(a)vertexgroup.com> wrote: >Security in NT can be defeated by any clever, out of work, bored, >NT device driver author who brews up a stealth device driver replacement >(perhaps a COM port improvement) that could run amok on the file system or >basically do anything. Good point; if you can talk somebody into installing device drivers, most security guarantees go out the window, and if you can talk a system administrator (i.e. "the user") into installing unexamined code, he's lost. And on PCs, users install unexamined stuff all the time. >Of course, any clever device driver developer is making enough money to >not be bored nor even consider writing a backdoor into a driver. Right? Definitely.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com America's Open Presidential Debate - Beyond Dole and Clinton! <A href="http://gate.net/~bdcollar/bbe/debate.htm">Tuesday, Oct. 8th 8:00 PM EDT</a>

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Re: How to fight GAK by obeying the law
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 04 Oct 1996 08:02:04 -0500, Mike McNally wrote: >> First thing we definitely need is a way to determine with fairly good >> accuracy, whether a host is in the U.S. >I really don't see how that's possible, given the possibility of me >taking my laptop to Ecuador, dialing into a stateside ISP, and being >issued an IP address in the ISP's domain. In other words, anything >that bases a decision on host location by inference on the domain >will inherently be rooted in the notion that hosts in that domain are >stuck to the ground "nearby". Maybe have the option of identifying host mobility? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: Can we kill single DES?
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 4 Oct 1996 09:14:02 -0500 (CDT), Bruce M. wrote: >> A Linux port (Pentium) would be *very* good - lots of Linux people tend to by >> pro-cpunk. Ditto for OS/2. And who knows, if you hyped the business >> aspects enough you might even find IBM or some other large corp willing to >> donate some time on large system. > Maybe Deep Blue gets bored in between its chess matches. :) Or maybe they need something to test that HUGE massively parallel supercomputer they're building for DOE! # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: WINDOWS NT ????
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 04 Oct 1996 05:41:42 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >> is Windows NT secured system ? >Windows NT 3.51 is a real operating system. It is not as secure >as I would like, but it is much better than Windows 3.1, which was >totally insecure. It has some good security techniques, >but I don't know how secure the networking is, and networking >is the big technical insecurity on most machines today. >(Well, bad administration is the biggest insecurity on almost all >machines for almost all time. And physical security is also big.) >Windows 4.x moves the graphics/windowing system into Ring 0, >where the "secure" parts of the kernel are. Bad. >This means graphics bugs can make the kernel insecure or crash. I must say I like the way OS/2's Workplace Shell can crash entirely (doesn't happen here anymore; did with some really crappy video drivers for an old Trident 8900) and you can watch while it restarts it (takes about 10 seconds and didn't bother open apps). NT's shell seems to be a *little* harder to screw up, but when it does it goes bigtime. >I don't trust it, especially because Windows 3.1 crashes all the time >for me, and stupid bugs make Windows 3.1 behave badly for me. >So if they put the window system in the kernel, I don't trust it. You lose speed but gain security and stability - the continual operating sytem tradeoff. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: Can we kill single DES?
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 4 Oct 1996 06:16:44 -0700 (PDT), Lucky Green wrote: >> >1. Is this a good idea? What will happen if DES becomes perceived >> > as insecure? >> >> That's Declan's department (and other non-clueless journalists - declan is >> just the most visible). If it get's widespread and the target is something >> like Digicash, it'd get picked up by the Crime/Snoozeweek crowd. >Sorry, not a chance. The symmetric cipher used in Ecash is 3DES. Since >DigiCash has the good fortune to be located in The Netherlands, full >strength crypto can be (and is) used in all their products. I guess that was kind of ambigous. What I meant was any protocal/system where money is changing hands protected only by DES. That's what I meant by "like digicash". I don't even know if such a beast exists, but was suggesting that anything involving weakly protected money would be a good target because it highlights the vulnerability and would get media attention. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: Can we kill single DES?
by ratak 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: shamrock(a)netcom.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sat Oct 05 10:00:15 1996 > Sorry, not a chance. The symmetric cipher used in Ecash is 3DES. Since > DigiCash has the good fortune to be located in The Netherlands, full > strength crypto can be (and is) used in all their products. > > I would advise any company suffering from a loss of competitiveness due > to > US export regulations to do the logical thing and move their operation > to a more suitable location. > > --Lucky > > And which Countries would that be? I haven't seen list of what Crypto is allowed in which countries... Does anyone know for sure... And companies will be hurt by this whole situation, and I can imagine the crap that will sneak into Firewall-1's code when Sun brings it up to GAK standards.... ___________________________________________________________________ GarGoyle Securities - -Intrusion Assessment Systems - -Security Consultation/Education/Curriculum Development - -Project Management/Research/Analysis World Wide... - -Member of CITDC (Canadian International Trade Development Council) - -Email 1: <ratak(a)escape.ca> Jason E.J. Manaigre - -Email 2: <ratak(a)GargSec.mb.ca> - -Email for PGP key with phrase 'Get Public Key' as Subject - -2048 PGPKey iD E2 FA 30 E5 F5 AD EC F3 00 9A 9D 33 59 FC DF AD ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMlZ4BvqtmO8M92GRAQFRDwgA1zWSKNo9wNLI7AMguNWWC/QzDkRKJpx6 a2qZZ/AwbKCh1xClg0ZOVO0PlpRm4uH7A/fJEjh+Yp+S3YkYSge7kdOOwmUhWTYG cJYf580dNWcIBPAUkMEljXRXdVlFpTX9N0ktnvzirNLd4+KtcqU4tuluoH2a9dDq 6SV42v9P3v9P57UqxrSz7GlEoYI4NJtVmArhI486p8D4yhqVBwIGcxWGw48VArzc JT20uLZU8abqYEDR4siRBUKbey95NTuRK8GgnFTK6K5LFKpTsjcRs+Ye4NtR1+xF CzHUelzPB57FXkN8fXkVwwLnFGDF6nHlhdpULytLY70z8coq9sTLpQ== =mAmF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by John Fricker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Adamsc (Adamsc(a)io-online.com) said something about Re: WINDOWS NT ???? on or about 10/5/96 1:00 AM > >Microsoft claims C2 or higher for NT and deserves any ragging they get if >it's not. Ditto for any other vendor who claims one thing and sells >another. You ought to read about C2. DIdn't Steve Martin say something like "criticize things you don't know about". >BTW: Bizarre NT Quirk #15413 - The Administrator account does not have >access to the entire disk. You got it - if you're the administrator you >still cannot look into certain directories belonging to another user - even >if you've given all access privileges to the Admin account. Got a few >chuckles at work. > It's not rocket science to defeat this. The administrator is prevented from casually peering into user owned directories but any administrator worth a nickle can tap tap click and have access to any directory.

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Re: Who the heck is "CYBERPROMO" and why are they spamming me?
by travel23＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ernest Hua wrote: > >I keep getting mail from an "abusebot(a)savetrees.com" ... > >This is getting very very annoying. They're a company involved in mass emailing ads on behalf of their clients. They have also sued AOL because of the latter's trying to protect their subscribers by blocking Cyberpromo's ads. Cyberpromo obtained a TRO stopping AOL's block, but the TRO was set aside on appeal. Dale Thorn posted the following on this list in response to ads he was receiving from Cyberpromo, specifically: > If you would like to send a complaint about any account @cyberpromo.com > @answerme.com or @omni.cyberpromo.com that has not been terminated, >please send email to: wallace(a)cyberpromo.com I believe Cyberpromo is run by Sanford Wallace. Think he was also on 60 Minutes raising First Amendment rights along with Free Enterprise concepts. So, is it a spam or someone legitimately using the net in the ordinary course of business? T.T. ................................................................................. Just consider me an acorn who is trying to deal with the rest of the nuts .................................................................................

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Re: Who the heck is "CYBERPROMO" and why are they spamming me?
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a note I got when trying to reply to some JUNK mail I got... Version 9-30-96: Cyber Promotions has started to implement stricter Terms of Service policies WITH TEETH. We have just recently terminated several accounts for abuse of our policies. (Updated TOS at end of message). The following email accounts have been *recently TERMINATED... *changes(a)answerme.com 9-30-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses *changes(a)cyberpromo.com 9-30-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses *changes(a)savetrees.com 9-30-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses *catalog(a)savetrees.com 9-30-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses *catalog(a)cyberpromo.com 9-30-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses *catalog(a)answerme.com 9-30-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses *eleven(a)answerme.com 9-28-96: Forgeries *eleven(a)savetrees.com 9-28-96: Forgeries *eleven(a)answerme.com 9-28-96: Forgeries *tsahk(a)cyberpromo.com 9-27-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses *tsahk(a)answerme.com 9-27-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses *icssender(a)omni.cyberpromo.com 9-19-96: FORGED unsolicited email, making it appear that Cyberpromo's auto-sender was responsible. If you are in receipt of the message, please look through the headers and complain to the appropriate postmasters. networkes(a)answerme.com 9-17-96: Ignored remove requests networkes(a)cyberpromo.com 9-17-96: Ignored remove requests networkes(a)savetrees.com 9-17-96: Ignored remove requests reminders(a)answerme.com 9-17-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses reminders(a)savetrees.com 9-17-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses reminders(a)cyberpromo.com 9-17-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses salespromo(a)answerme.com 9-16-96: Unsolicited ads to INTERNET addresses salespromo(a)savetrees.com "" "" "" "" salespromo(a)cyberpromo.com "" "" "" "" promo(a)answerme.com "" "" "" "" promo(a)savetrees.com "" "" "" "" promo(a)cyberpromo.com "" "" "" "" info4free(a)answerme.com "" "" "" "" info4free(a)savetrees.com "" "" "" "" info4free(a)cyberpromo.com "" "" "" "" manda(a)cyberpromo.com 8-28: Massive abuse to INTERNET addresses / FORGERY manda(a)answerme.com 8-28: Massive abuse to INTERNET addresses / FORGERY website(a)cyberpromo.com 8-27: excessive abuse to AOL / removals ignored sevenmil(a)cyberpromo.com 8-27: excessive abuse / all removals ignored sevenmil(a)answerme.com 8-27: "" "" "" "" "" "" vera(a)cyberpromo.com vera(a)answerme.com zol(a)answerme.com website(a)answerme.com allied(a)cyberpromo.com allied(a)answerme.com lists(a)cyberpromo.com lists(a)answerme.com If you have a complaint about an account that was not listed above, please forward it to our President's personal account: wallace(a)cyberpromo.com We currently operate the following servers: answerme.com cyberpromo.com omni.cyberpromo.com gamut.cyberpromo.com We DO NOT operate the following servers: uunet interramp athens.servint cais postman.com powernet pwrsite Cyber Promotions is *not* in business to annoy people. We are in the business of sending (and assisting in sending) commercial (and noncommercial) email to people who are *not* offended by the receipt of these messages. Unfortunately, due to many experiences (many of which were out of our control) we have had some problems accomplishing our goals without upsetting some people. We are truly sorry about that fact, and we plan to "clean up the streets" as best as we can. Some people have been under the impression that all email that appears to come from cyberpromo.com, is from Cyber Promotions. That is not true. Most of the complaints that we have recently received have been in reaction to people who have "autoresponders" and "virtual email addresses" on our system. In that case, their mail would have referenced an account on our system, but originated from a different site. Unfortunately, software like Pegasus enables their mail to appear as if it came from us, driectly. But, their true origination is still evident in the headers. You can determine where it originated if you know how to decode headers. But when doing so, remember that Pegasus, for example, actually logs into *our* sendmail. At this time, the only messages that originate from Cyber Promotions, use our proprietary Cyber Sender 2.1+ protocol which will always be indicated in the organization: header. Due to these "look alikes," it could appear that recipients' remove request were being ignored. WE DO NOT IGNORE REMOVE REQUESTS. We now also maintain a "master" remove list of people who have asked to be removed from all commercial mailing lists. If you have received an email from "Cyber Sender 2.1+", our new proprietary transport agent protocol, then the remove features *do* work properly, now that all of the bugs have been fixed (uppercase and lowercase now match, too). No mail is allowed out of our system, if the recipient's address is in our master remove list. We currently have over 1.1 million email addresses in that file. If you wish to add your address to that master remove list, you can do so in two different ways. 1. You can send an email to remove(a)cyberpromo.com and type "REMOVE ALL" in the subject or message field. Our systems will automatically permanently remove from our system the email address from which you sent your request. 2. You may also send an email to manremove(a)cyberpromo.com and type as many email addresses as you wish in the body of the message, each on its own line, without any comments. The subject line is ignored. That address will also permanently remove the addresses. Please note: we have no control over mail that originates from other sites, that travel through our SMTP (relay-host) servers. We will simply terminate any accounts that we maintain, that is referred to in their abusive mail. ATTENTION PRODIGY MEMBERS: It has come to Cyber Promotions' attention, that some of you are having a major problem removing yourselves from our lists. This can be attributed to the "alias" that your outgoing mail may contain. If you are having problems, please send an email to manremove(a)cyberpromo.com and type both of your email addresses in the body of the message, each on its own line, without any comments. The subject line is ignored. You probably have one address like xazd35r(a)prodigy.com and another address like sanford(a)prodigy.com. ATTENTION PIPELINE MEMBERS: It has come to Cyber Promotions' attention, that some of you are having a major problem removing yourselves from our lists. This can be attributed to the "alias" that your outgoing mail may contain. If you are having problems, please send an email to manremove(a)cyberpromo.com and type your email addresses in the body of the message, each on its own line, without any comments. The subject line is ignored. You should type your email id followed by the following THREE domains. @usa.pipeline.com, @pipeline.com, @nyc.pipeline.com. Even if you feel that your address is definately only one of the three possibilities, you should still remove all three addresses (each on its own line). ATTENTION INTERNET USERS: It has come to Cyber Promotions' attention, that some of you are having a major problem removing yourselves from our lists. This can be attributed to the "alias" that your outgoing mail may contain. If you are having problems, please send an email to manremove(a)cyberpromo.com and type your email addresses in the body of the message, each on its own line, without any comments. The subject line is ignored. If your email address could contain an alias like mail.domain.com or if you may have more that one email address that points to another email address, you should remove them all. If you wish to remove *every* email address in your domain, please contact us, and we will "grep" out every possibility. REVISED TERMS OF SERVICE: (We are also looking into the possibility that we may be forced to adopt the policies of our backbone providers. For the time being, we are emulating their policies as best as we can while matching the needs of our operations.) 1. We do not allow postings to inappropriate newsgroups with reference to your account because such postings result in *MUCH* more negative response than positive. 2. We prohibit the advertising of offensive material (ie. pornography, weapons, etc). 3. You may not use the account to participate in illegal activities. 4. Our TOS strictly prohibits the sending of mass commercial emails to INTERNET addresses, unless expressed permission has been granted to you by the recipient. In addition, you *must* honor all requests for removal from your mailing list in a diligent manner. Our service can be used in conjunction with advertisements that you place with a bulk email company other than your own or us, as long as they follow the same guidelines. 5. Cyber Promotions reserves the right to terminate any account for any reason at any time, without notice. If you would like to send a complaint about any account @cyberpromo.com or @answerme.com or @omni.cyberpromo.com that has not been terminated, please send email to: wallace(a)cyberpromo.com ---------- : From: Ernest Hua <hua(a)chromatic.com> : To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com : Cc: hua(a)chromatic.com : Subject: Who the heck is "CYBERPROMO" and why are they spamming me? : Date: Saturday, October 05, 1996 12:25 AM : : I keep getting mail from an "abusebot(a)savetrees.com" ... : : This is getting very very annoying. : : Ern

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Paths of trust in PGP
by Aviel Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a really cool service being offered on the web. It allows users to trace the paths of trust between two keys in the PGP world. It is worth checking out: http://www.research.att.com/~reiter/PathServer/ This is a good way to find the paths you want in the web of trust. For example, you can type in your key id, and the key id of a new, candidate key, and you will find all of the signature paths from your key to the new key. You'll be surprized at how connected the graph is. Avi

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Re: Paths of trust in PGP
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On .cypherpunks, <rubin(a)usenix.ORG> writes: >There is a really cool service being offered on the web. It allows >users to trace the paths of trust between two keys in the PGP world. >It is worth checking out: > > http://www.research.att.com/~reiter/PathServer/ ^^^^^^^ Use it and help AT&T bring key escrow to your door. No thanks.

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Re: Margaret Milner Richardson loses her breakfast...
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:49 PM 10/3/96 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote: >>From the Wall Street Journal Wednesday October 2, Page 1: > >Use of the internet to attract tax-dodgers rings alarm bells at the IRS. >The rapidly expanding new worlds of the internet and electronic money are >stirring deep concern at the IRS. "We know that some foriegn banks are now >using the internet to solicit new customers with promises of complete >anonymity and a haven from all taxes," IRS commissioner Margaret Milner >Richardson said. Could someone please post a list of these banks and their ads. "http://www.eub.com/abouteub.htm" offers tax free interest. (They seem to be a genuine bank) http://www.britnet.co.uk/scope/ just sells books -- "perpetual tourist" and all that stuff. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Defusing Threats of Violence [AP?]
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL in The Economist, October 5, 1996, p. 46. Defusing Threats of Violence http://www.cmiatl.com/ Crisis Management International, Inc. CMI provides crisis management services relating to "hot" threats of violence, workplace violence prevention, and post-incident crisis intervention. In addition, CMI provides threat of violence and crisis response training, psych-claims management assistance, and SCAN analysis, which is a deception detection technique. CMI has handled such crises as the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, Hurricane Andrew, L.A. and San Francisco earthquakes, as well as multitudes of air disasters, workplace murders, and industrial accidents, among others. The president of CMI, Bruce Blythe, has appeared on ABC's 20/20, CNN's Headline News and MoneyLine, America's Most Wanted, The Discovery Channel, and the television special 48 Hours: Violence in the Workplace. Mr. Blythe has also been a forum guest on The Microsoft Network. Summary of Services "Hot" Threats of Violence: CMI assists companies in assessing and handling potentially dangerous people. On-site and telephone consultations with management and other appropriate individuals are provided by licensed Mental Health professionals and former FBI agents to defuse threats and stabilize potentially violent situations. Design Team Process for Comprehensive Workplace Violence Prevention: Utilizing our experience in helping hundreds of companies with workplace violence, CMI will consult with your internal, multi-disciplinary team to develop a comprehensive approach for preventing and managing workplace violence. This Design Team Process will identify foreseeable risks, enhance existing controls, introduce new controls, develop policies and procedures specific to the company's identified risks, and plan an implementation schedule. The end result is a prevention system, protected under attorney/client privilege, that meets or exceeds OSHA and legal standards and provides a structured management response to threats or acts of violence that is both psychologically and legally sound. Threats of Violence/Crisis Response Training: Hands-on facilitation prepares management, TOV teams, and selected employees for potentially violent situations. The program covers prediction, prevention, and defusing hot threats of violence as well as aggression management and post-crisis response. Practical case studies based on actual experience are included. Post-incident Crisis Intervention: Available 24 hours a day, CMI has the worlds largest network of crisis psychologists who are trained and experienced in corporate crisis and disaster intervention. We provide reliable and effective services to deal with any level of traumatic incident. Crisis Management International has handled hundreds of corporate crises from small to large, including the World Trade Center bombing, Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing, Hurricane Andrew, Los Angeles and San Francisco earthquakes, commercial and corporate airplane crashes, workplace murders and assaults, explosions and other industrial accidents. Psych-Claims Management: CMI offers analysis and strategy for all psychological injury litigation and workers' comp claims. CMI's affiliate company, Claims Management International, provides support services for the defense in disputing claims, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and closed-head injuries. SCAN: CMI offers a proven method of detection deception without the restrictions associated with the employee polygraph. SCAN is an extensive analysis of a person's spoken or written words. This methodology can be applied to sexual harassment cases, hot threats of violence, sabotage, shrinkage, or any situation in which deception is suspected and your company needs to know the truth. --------- SCAN: Scientific Content Analysis How SCAN Works SCAN is an established and reliable method for obtaining information and detecting deception from written or spoken statements. What distinguishes SCAN from other interrogative processes is that it first seeks to clear subjects who are exhibiting truthful linguistic behavior. Other processes usually operate on the assumption that all subjects have something to hide. In SCAN, only those subjects who exhibit inconsistencies within sentence structure, ..., and sequences of events are labeled as problematic by the analyst. When there ... a few of these inconsistencies, the analyst tallies the evidence that shows the subject ... being deceptive, or that he or she is showing sensitivity about a certain topic. This sensitivity is a sign that the subject is not giving the full story. Who uses SCAN? This methodology is employed by intelligence, investigative, and law enforcement agencies around the world. But it is also very useful in most areas of business and law. SCAN can help you any time your company needs to know the truth. SCAN is not like most interrogation techniques which are usually invasive and confrontational. This would not be suitable for a business setting. Whereas traditional techniques require that an interviewer ask questions while the subject gives short, rather uninformative answers, the collections of material for SCAN linguistic analysis requires that the subject talk or write at some length to give their side of the story. This non-threatening manner of obtaining a pure version of the subject's account yields much more material to analyze and a greater likelihood of finding any linguistic cues that indicate deception. Businesses of all kinds may find themselves experiencing threats of violence, sexual harassment cases, sabotage, internal and external theft (shrinkage), conspiracy, and white-collar crime. SCAN analysis helps to determine if a seemingly threatening individual really means what they are saying. It also helps to decide whether to believe someone when they say they had "nothing to do with it." Insurance companies process millions of fraudulent claims each year, which are often settled even though the claims adjusters have reasonable suspicions that the claims are not legitimate. While it is impossible to catch every instance of fraud, it is possible - and worthwhile - to have the largest claims examined. CMI is experienced in managing claims of all sizes and offers SCAN analysis as an adjunct service to help obtain the whole story behind the claim. Attorneys are naturally good at digging for information - but it is sometimes difficult to know exactly where to dig. A CMI analyst, present at a deposition, can discreetly indicate to counsel where a witness may be leaving out potentially important information. If a completed deposition is already on file, an analyst can check witness' statements for consistency and truthfulness, which allows for better preparation for court or for an easy settlement. For times when an insurance or claim comes to suit, SCAN can determine if CMI's Claims Management Services may benefit the case. CMI's SCAN Technology: is a comprehensive structuring of several techniques and methodologies. As utilized by CMI, SCAN serves as the foundation on which linguistic analysis can be built, supplemented by CMI-developed technologies that include linguistic "credibility" analysis, principles of logic, tenets of Neuro-linguistic Programming (NLP), and interviewing/interrogation techniques. is used in behalf of its client companies to: a. Detect deception b. Assist in dangerousness assessments c. Clear the innocent in situations where there are numerous persons who had both access and opportunity (such as sabotage, shrinkage, etc.). d. Provide a sufficient basis of "reasonable suspicion" as required for polygraph. offers benefits/advantages of SCAN over other methods; interpreting physical indicators of deception is subjective, at best. Further, body and eye movements (and most global indicators) vary among cultures, making accurate interpretation even more inexact. SCAN analyzes only the subject's words, making it completely unobtrusive and much more objective. SCAN can be conducted even more effectively through a questionnaire approach. SCAN vs. Polygraph: The use of lie detector apparatus (polygraph) on employees is controlled by the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA), Public Law 100-347. EPPA restrictions include prohibitions on polygraph use, and specific notification requirements. The EPPA does not prohibit or restrict written "pen and paper" tests or screening. Therefore, SCAN can be used as both a precursor to Polygraph or as a replacement. Further, SCAN and SCAN questionnaires can produce results comparable to (and in some instances better than) polygraph. SCAN may produce the desired results and completely replace the need for polygraph, and do so in a much less accusatory environment. --------- More detail at links to each of CMI services.

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