December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: PLEASE HELP ME GO OUT OF THIS LIST!!!!!!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:14 PM 5/18/96, Marc Escalier wrote: >how to go out of this list. >please help me, it would be VERY NICE. Thanks to recent legal inquiries by the Church of Scientology, they have determined that Major Domo, believed to be an army officer stationed at Fort George Meade, Maryland, is the control officer for the Cypherpunks mailing list. The Scientologists have determined that Major Domo works in "Terminal Operations Access Division," or "T.O.A.D." By sending a message to majordomo(a)toad.com, with the body messsage of "unsubscribe cypherpunks" (without the quote marks), Major Domo may choose to take pity on you and remove you. Of course, his superior, Colonel Mode, may insist you remain on the list. --Klaus! von Future Prime THE X-ON CONGRESS: INDECENT COMMENT ON AN INDECENT SUBJECT, by Steve Russell, American Reporter Correspondent....You motherfuckers in Congress have dropped over the edge of the earth this time... "the sorriest bunch of cocksuckers ever to sell out the First Amendment" or suggesting that "the only reason to run for Congress these days is to suck the lobbyists' dicks and fuck the people who sent you there," ....any more than I care for the language you shitheads have forced me to use in this essay...Let's talk about this fucking indecent language bullshit.

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:06 PM 5/18/96 -0700, Dimitri Vulis wrote: >hence my comments from here from time to time that the technological >problems of anonymity are not the true obstacle to widespread use. >there are deeper problems that cpunks skirt around but fail to grasp >because of numerous prejudices. While I hate to lend support to anyone as much a twit as Vulis is, he's got a point here. I don't think most cypherpunks realize how anonymity is perceived out in the net at large. Take news.groups, a fairly important group I happen to read regularly. With the exception of Rich Graves' presence, _all_ the uses I see there are for cowardly abuse in a way that lets the poster escape having to answer for his views. I'm not talking about presenting important information where wrong-headed authorities could engage in reprisals, either, but baseless accusations of theft, child abuse, and just plain torrents of obscenity. That's _all_ it's used for (again, with the exception of Rich). There's a problem here. It's one thing to say that the benefits of anonymity outweigh the problems. I'm inclined to that view myself. But it's much harder to defend that view in a forum where anonymity is used so commonly for problematic ends, and to offer anything in the way of constructive solutions. It would be pleasing to see more cypherpunks actively dealing with these problems out there in net.land. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bottom Line: In a way, I am hoping that "Clipper III" is proposed, as it will energize us once again. Historically, the "Cypherpunks antibodies" have had their most vigorous growth when faced with a government antigen. At 8:09 PM GMT 5/18/96, Will Rodger wrote: >The White House is about to answer recent attempts to liberalize encryption >exports with a proposal of its own. > >Documents obtained by Interactive Week show the Ciinton Administration has >been lobbying key Republican committee members to compromise on encryption >through a policy that looks very much like previous commerical key escrow >efforts. ... >The URL for the complete article is: >http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/daily/960518y.html > >Will Rodger >Washington Bureau Chief >Interactive Week Many thanks to Will for passing this on the Cypherpunks list. Our opposition to Clipper I and Clipper II was strong and, I expect, will continue with CIII. A question for Will Rodger: Is this "White Paper" ("The newest proposal is contained in a 24-page White Paper, a draft of which hit Capitol Hill earlier this week") related in any way to the one being prepared by Herb Lin and a bunch of other folks? It was due out about this time, and the topic seems similar. A bunch of us gave input to Herb and his panel at the CFP in '95...if this is the same White Paper, looks like we might just as well have saved our breath. I read the stuff at the URL, and at first blush it looks to say nothing about _domestic_ (within the U.S. and Canada) encryption. I'll be anxious to see what the White Paper says about domestic encryption. (To be clear, there are currently _no_ laws whatsoever about the types of crypto a citizen (or resident alien, or, for all intents and purposes, anyone) may use, nor about the key length, nor about any form of GAK, etc. Even Clipper I did not actually mandate allowable forms of crypto, though many of us thought that this was the desired end-state, down the road. So, I am tentatively assuming that Clipper III, if passed, will not diretly impinge on domestic encryption policy, about which the government currently says nothing.) However, as with other proposed crypto laws and "trial balloons," there are several questions which arise: 1. Will there be pressures put on the browser companies (Netscape, Microsoft, etc.) and the e-mail companies (Qualcomm, Microsoft, Claris, Lotus, etc.) to produce a "world version" that meets export standards with a single shrink-wrapped package? (Recall that last fall some of the various companies stated as their goal having a single package that could be shipped worldwide. Some of them claimed having two versions, a domestic U.S. version and an international version, was too onerous. I am skeptical of this, given that they have multiple platforms to support, multiple operating systems, etc. But they claim it is.) 2. Interoperability. How will U.S. users exchange messages with international users? Will a U.S. user have to register with the Authorities to get the proper credentials, protocols, etc.? Will the U.S.-sold versions of Netscape or Explorer, for example, contain the international GAKed versions for use with international users? 3. With products like PGP, there are already international users (lots of them). Thus, no "export laws" are involved. So, will I be able to communicate with them using my existing PGP methods? (If not, then my right to use an encryption product is in fact being limited, contrary to the putative wording of what Clipper III is supposed to be. To make this clear, I'm _already_ communicating with PGP, so no "export version" is needed.) And if U.S. users can continue to interoperate with international users as they are now doing, this puts the lie to claims about how key escrow will be useful for law enforcement. 4. And of course there is always the issue of _superencryption_. How a GAKked program can detect that superencryption is being used has never been adequately explained (to my satisfaction at least). Entropy measures won't do it, and forbidding any encryption of messages already containing "BEGIN PGP" will clearly just be a klugey bandaid. 5. What about U.S.-based corporations with offshore offices? Is a company supposed to replace its entire intranet corporate network with a GAKked system if even a single user is outside the U.S.-Canada? (I fear that this is indeed the proposal. The effect will then be to make all corporations GAKked.) 6. What about U.S. persons travelling abroad? 7. What about packets zinging around the world? Lots of complications if GAK is insisted upon. And lots of new avenues for "packet laundering." 8. The issue of why other countries would insist that their citizens GAK their keys when U.S. citizens don't have to!! ("Yes, Herr Glomlutz, we are insisting that all Germans using Netscape 4.0 must deposit their keys mit der Key Authority. No, we are not requiring our own citizens to do this." I don't think this will fly too well.) I can't see how other countries will go along with this. And what about the usual problem of "rogue nations" like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Israel, and Liberia? 9. Many other issues. (They never answered the similar questions raised the last time, so I doubt they will this time.) Clipper III, if it turns out to be another worthless proposal which is laughed out of Washington, will be no real threat. If Clipper III actually outlaws or places limits on domestic use of crypto (as I think it must, else it can be too easily circumvented completely), then it will be a rallying cry which will likely see our membership increase still further, the anti-Washington rhetoric escalate, and likely some new developments in the war. In a way, I am hoping that "Clipper III" is proposed, as it will energize us once again. Historically, the "Cypherpunks antibodies" have had their most vigorous growth when faced with a government antigen. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Confusing MD5 and DSS? (was Rumor: DSS Broken?)
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 18 May 96 at 19:30, Robert Hettinga wrote: [..] > I was talking to someone who was talking to someone (have I said this is a > rumor yet?) who was solicited for comment by a Very Famous Reporter about > the fact that DSS, the Digital Signature Standard, promulgated by NIST, I > believe, had been broken. Hm. Isn't there supposed to be a "TM" after "Very Famous Reporter"? There was a recent "So..." thread on coderpunks about some collisions found for MD5... as reporters are wont to, perhaps MD5 got confused with SHS which got further confused with DSS? Just speculation upon speculation. Rob. --- No-frills sig. Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: Sendmail Question (was: SMTP Server for sending to anonymous remailers?)
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:51 PM 5/18/96, Anonymous User wrote: >lcs Mixmaster Remailer <mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> wrote: > >> > Does anyone know of an anonymous remailer that has an SMTP server >> > (hopefully unlogged) that I can specify in a special variant of the >> > "sendmail.cf" sendmail configuration file for sending mail to >> > anonymous servers? <SNIP> > >What settings do you use in sendmail.cf to accomplish this (sending >it directly)? Is that the default behavior? Specifically, what >goes on the "DR" and "DV" lines? When I send mail from my PPP >account to my work account, I always seem to end up with a "Received: >>From <my ISP's host> by <some intermediate host>" line. I'm >ass-u-ming that if the host name shows up in the headers, it's >passing through that machine and is potentially being logged. Basically, the only reason your ISP's machines would appear in your sendmail.cf is because you are using them for mail forwarding. When I was connected over PPP (24 hours) I had my Linux box send the mail directly. If you just want to avoid your ISP's logs, then replace their mail server with some other server in your sendmail.cf. You should ask the owner of the server you want to use. If you use popmail (like Eudora), then just tell it the server to use in "SMTP Host". -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by Tim Dierks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:41 PM 5/18/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >>I was talking to someone who was talking to someone (have I said this is a >>rumor yet?) who was solicited for comment by a Very Famous Reporter about >>the fact that DSS, the Digital Signature Standard, promulgated by NIST, I >>believe, had been broken. > >MD5 is at least weakened, maybe broken; there's an abstract by Hans Dobbertin >that says something about generating collisions, and gives an example DSS uses SHA, which isn't affected by the Dobbertin finding. I believe that you would have to solve the discrete logarithm problem to break DSS; this would imply being able to break Diffie-Hellman and a number of other crypto algorithms. (However, I'm not certain that it's been shown that breaking DSS is equivalent to breaking discrete logarithms.) - Tim Tim Dierks - Software Haruspex - tim(a)dierks.org "That's the trouble with technology. It attracts people who have nothing to say." - Muffey Kibbey, mother [Wall Street Journal, May 10 1996]

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RE: The Crisis with Remailers
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Bruce Baugh >hence my comments from here from time to time that the technological >problems of anonymity are not the true obstacle to widespread use. >there are deeper problems that cpunks skirt around but fail to grasp >because of numerous prejudices. While I hate to lend support to anyone as much a twit as Vulis is, he's got a point here. I don't think most cypherpunks realize how anonymity is perceived out in the net at large. ...................................................................... Bruce: Vulis is not the twit who wrote that paragraph. Vulis is not Vlad. Vulis: "Vlad" is not Vlad. You all need to go out to LD's web site and refresh your memory. .. Blanc

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Instant Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:38 AM 5/19/96, Mark M. wrote: >It is possible for someone to operate an anonymous remailer anonymously. >Just get a UNIX shell account under a fake name, pay with cash, and set up >the remailing software. The identity of the operator of such a remailer >would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover. I'm always surprised that this hasn't been happening; maybe it will when the new clients become available. (Doesn't Sameer's system offer such accounts? Couldn't there be dozens of remailers based at c2.org? Of the 16 Type-1 remailers listed in one of Raph's recent reports, only 2 were at c2.org.) Now, can a site which "offers" such accounts be held liable? If the site drops an account when presented with _appropriate_ legal papers (a court order, such as an injunction), and if it takes a "hands-off" policy with respect to what customers run in their accounts, then it ought to be safe from actual liability. (I am not a lawyer, but it seems that having no prior knowledge of acts committed, and complying with court orders, reduces the likelihood of successful suits to near zero. Note that Netcom did _not_ cancel the COS-related accounts, and so extended its legal hassles.) The advantage of "pliable" remailers (which go away when hit) is that: Cost of preparing case to stop a remailer >> cost of setting up a new remailer Thus, it might cost the Church of Scientology $10,000 in various fees to get "account42666(a)c2.org" to stop remailing, but only $20 (or even less) to create "account98410(a)c2.org." Ideally, such remailers should require no involvement at all by the account holder. Just a "start" command, by the account holder. (Not the site administrator, as this could be construed as involvement by him.) But an "instant remailer" (just add water) is needed. Recent questions here on the list about what it takes to run a remailer may mean some advice is needed. Running a remailer function should never be thought of as being the same as running a site. Most of the existing remailers are certainly not being run on machines _owned_ by those running the remailers. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

More on what is adding to the current crisis: * Fact: For _most_ people, there is no compelling (or even casual) need for remailers. (No, I'm not arguing against remailers. Just pointing out a basic economic fact, to be factored in.) * Fact: The value of having remailers goes up when certain kinds of activities (which do not yet exist in any significant form) become more available. * Fact: The danger to remailer operators goes up when these kinds of activities become more widespread. (Another way of putting these last two points is this: The more valuable a remailing function is, the more danger or liability a remailer faces.) * Fact: Most remailers are being operated in the United States, and by persons with only casual commitment to their continued operation. ("Casual" should not be construed in a derogatory way.) * Fact: There have been no definitive court rulings in the U.S. clarifying the role of remailers. (In fact, no court cases involving remailers at all, yet.) Until this is decided, remailer sites which appear to be the emanation point (the last link) for the posting of, say, copyrighted material, will find themselves ordered to cease and desist. (The Church of Scientology involvement is beside the point. Brad Templeton of Clarinet would likely do much the same thing if Clarinet-carried articles were being posted to Usenet through remailers. So would "Time," and so, probably, would "Wired." We always knew that _something_ like this would put remailers to a severe test.) Conclusions: - Remailers will continue to disappear as pressures are applied. Absent a basic court ruling that remailer operators are not responsible or liable for what is sent through their sites, they will fall under attack. Once one falls, and a new site is used, it will become the target. - Very few ordinary people use remailers. This will change as remailers continue to get easier to use, but clearly most people feel little need/threat. - Ironically, if some sort of more restrictive regime comes to the fore, and more people feel the need to use remailers (e.g., CDA is upheld and abortion information becomes illegal to send over the Net), then this will make the operators of remailers feel even more heat. Is there an "equilibrium" point in all this, a "market clearing" point at which remailers are badly enough needed, despite threats and pressures, so as to provide a market for them? An interesting question. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cheap remailers
by John Schofield 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's been much talk on this list about the need for cheap remailers, and I wanted to announce (unofficially) one of the least expensive remailer setups I've seen. The code is written by Jim Cannell, with documentation by me. It's designed as a remailer for Fidonet-technology systems. Fidonet Anonymous ReMailer runs under standard DOS, and is quite easy to install and run. The average Fidonet sysop should be able to get it up and running in about 15 minutes. With Internet gateway software and a UUCP account, it works quite well as an Internet remailer. I'm running a beta-test version at remail(a)sprawl.ktb.net. Please feel free to use it. Help files are available, but are oriented towards Fidonet users. Still, you should be able to puzzle it out. It will only be up for a month longer, because I'm leaving the country for two months, but Jim should keep you posted after the public release on what Fidonet remailers are operating. Requirements for running a Fidonet Anonymous ReMailer: 286-clone or better, with a 2400bps modem or better. Fidonet Anonymous Remailer (free) telephone line (a dedicated line is good, but not necessary) Fidonet mail tosser (free or inexpensive shareware) Fidonet Mailer (free or inexpensive shareware) Most people probably won't be running Fidonet Anonymous Remailer with quite this inexpensive a setup. I'm running on a 486-50, two dedicated phone lines, and two 28.8k bps modems. If all I was running was the remailer, I certainly wouldn't need that much hardware. The remailer will be released with full source When It's Ready, and any Fidonet node (there are more than 20,000) will be able to run the software and act as a remailer. The UUCP feed is not necessary for Internet connectivity -- any Fidonet node can send and receive e-mail from the Internet through standard gateways. However, operating your own gateway makes it much more fast and reliable. I pay $20/month for my UUCP feed. Fidonet can't compete with the Internet in terms of features, activity, or much else -- but for dirt-cheap bare-bones networking, you can't beat it. John ______________________________________________________________________________ ac086(a)lafn.org john(a)ktb.net library(a)c2.org (They're all me.) PGP Public Key available by e-mailing PGPKEY(a)sprawl.ktb.net or by fingering library(a)c2.org. Check out the Digital Library at http://www.c2.org/~library/

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DataHaven Backup and Offshore Email
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Offshore Information Services announces accounts for datahaven backup purposes. For $168/year you can have 10 MB of disk in a datahaven country to use for backup of important information. Also, we have POP email accounts for $168/year. For full details of our services check out: http://online.offshore.com.ai/services.html -- Vince

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Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:41 PM -0400 5/18/96, Bill Stewart wrote: > MD5 is at least weakened, maybe broken; there's an abstract by Hans Dobbertin > that says something about generating collisions, and gives an example > (though the abstract doesn't say how general the method is.) That's what I get for not reading the DSS stuff when it came out. I'd heard lots about the MD5 stuff, but I didn't put the two together. It also looks like I'm behind in my reading. Time to buy another edition of Applied Cryptography... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Re: crosspost re remailers
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:43 1996-05-18 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: >At 7:07 AM 5/18/96 +0200, Benjamin Brochet wrote: >>WHO IS THE MODERATOR OF THIS LIST ? >> >>I've been victim of a spoofing from a german.... he suscribed me to 2200 >>mailing list... also I'd to be unsuscribed from your list ! >> > >There is no moderator. I am just a subscriber like yourself (except I >asked for it.) Did you get a welcome message which included information >like the following? If he was indeed subscribed to 2200 mailing lists, you can assume that he didn't read all the "welcome messages." For people who are stuck with old fashioned mail systems (no filters, no macro language) this is a serious problem. It would be rude to call the victims clueless and subscribe them to even more "clueless mailing lists." Matts

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:29 1996-05-15 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > >I would really like to see a remailer that is somehow blinded. > >I don't know enough about how mail paths are generatered, but is it >impossible to conceal the origin of remailer postings? IP spoofing would do this nicely.Since SMTP doesn't require any significant responses, you can send blind and fake your IP address. To do that you need root access on your mailer machine and an ISP that doesn't sniff and filter its network for spoofing attacks. See ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:01.IP.spoofing for a good description of spoofing attacks and defenses. If you're not up to writing spoofing code into your (re-)mailer, then an easier solution is to send everything through anon.lcs.mit.edu after you have removed all headers that point at you. Matts

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News from Burma
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ASIA 'Excommunication' An anglo-Burmese businessman friendly with pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been sentenced to thre years in jail for owning unauthorized telephones and fax machines. James Leander Nichols, also known as Leo Nicholas, was punished for having two fax machines and a telephone switchboard with nine lines in his home, a spokesman for Suu Kyi's political party said. In an effort to discourage contact between Burmese citizens and the outside world, Burma's military government requires people to get permission to own a fax machine, satellite dish, or sophisticated phone system. News Services The Atlanta Constitution/The Atlanta Journal Alec -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZ9ArCKJGkNBIH7lAQFrrAQAw7g/OeEU0IbK+4haxL4r7CWez9R1MqH6 W0Zq1l59XlRDkCCPj34HqrXGchg1Wnnw6LMK7B41JMRl68jvkVLmLnZ9FHwehZ9V R2WzRM+VzHwcpxQ4Fha1pwdq4Lm5naeS+3FiTQDcbTATT7hpBSiLOXhMNSlxFcBP G2KtNA2iZAM= =g8jc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by rodger＠interramp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 5/18, Tim May wrote: >A question for Will Rodger: Is this "White Paper" ("The newest proposal is >contained in a 24-page White Paper, a draft of which hit Capitol Hill >earlier this week") related in any way to the one being prepared by Herb >Lin and a bunch of other folks? It was due out about this time, and the >topic seems similar. A bunch of us gave input to Herb and his panel at the >CFP in '95...if this is the same White Paper, looks like we might just as >well have saved our breath. Don't know. This did have full input from security agencies, however. >I read the stuff at the URL, and at first blush it looks to say nothing >about _domestic_ (within the U.S. and Canada) encryption. I'll be anxious >to see what the White Paper says about domestic encryption. > No restrictions domestically nor in Canada. Even so, these CAs and the policy body above it clearly give the govt. more of a role in controlling crypto. >However, as with other proposed crypto laws and "trial balloons," there are >several questions which arise: > >1. Will there be pressures put on the browser companies (Netscape, >Microsoft, etc.) and the e-mail companies (Qualcomm, Microsoft, Claris, >Lotus, etc.) to produce a "world version" that meets export standards with >a single shrink-wrapped package? > >(Recall that last fall some of the various companies stated as their goal >having a single package that could be shipped worldwide. Some of them >claimed having two versions, a domestic U.S. version and an international >version, was too onerous. I am skeptical of this, given that they have >multiple platforms to support, multiple operating systems, etc. But they >claim it is.) > >2. Interoperability. How will U.S. users exchange messages with >international users? Will a U.S. user have to register with the Authorities >to get the proper credentials, protocols, etc.? No indications they would. Idea is each authority could talk to the other and request escrowed keys or info. a la interpol. Of course, as today, there's no guarantee that agreements will always be in place, nor honored. > >3. With products like PGP, there are already international users (lots of >them). Thus, no "export laws" are involved. So, will I be able to >communicate with them using my existing PGP methods? Under the White Paper, yes. > >And if U.S. users can continue to interoperate with international users as >they are now doing, this puts the lie to claims about how key escrow will >be useful for law enforcement. Which makes it look a lot like the old proposal. > >4. And of course there is always the issue of _superencryption_. How a >GAKked program can detect that superencryption is being used has never been >adequately explained (to my satisfaction at least). Entropy measures won't >do it, and forbidding any encryption of messages already containing "BEGIN >PGP" will clearly just be a klugey bandaid. > >5. What about U.S.-based corporations with offshore offices? Is a company >supposed to replace its entire intranet corporate network with a GAKked >system if even a single user is outside the U.S.-Canada? If it's legal now, the paper suggests it should be legal in the future. > >6. What about U.S. persons travelling abroad? > >7. What about packets zinging around the world? Lots of complications if >GAK is insisted upon. And lots of new avenues for "packet laundering." > >8. The issue of why other countries would insist that their citizens GAK >their keys when U.S. citizens don't have to!! >("Yes, Herr Glomlutz, we are insisting that all Germans using Netscape 4.0 >must deposit their keys mit der Key Authority. No, we are not requiring our >own citizens to do this." I don't think this will fly too well.) > >I can't see how other countries will go along with this. The Paper is quite unclear on this, as well. Presumabyt other countries will have equally spiffy stuff they will require be escrowed for export under COCOM. ALl of this, of course, assumes cooperation from OECD, et al. > >And what about the usual problem of "rogue nations" like Iraq, Iran, North >Korea, Israel, and Liberia? Same as before. > >9. Many other issues. (They never answered the similar questions raised the >last time, so I doubt they will this time.) > > >Clipper III, if it turns out to be another worthless proposal which is >laughed out of Washington, will be no real threat. If Clipper III actually >outlaws or places limits on domestic use of crypto (as I think it must, >else it can be too easily circumvented completely), then it will be a >rallying cry which will likely see our membership increase still further, >the anti-Washington rhetoric escalate, and likely some new developments in >the war. Stay tuned.... Will Rodger Washington Bureau Chief Interactive Week.

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Re: Sendmail Question (was: SMTP Server for sending to anonymous remailers?)
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:09 AM 5/19/96 -0700, you wrote: >If you use popmail (like Eudora), then just tell it the server to use in >"SMTP Host". > > -Lance > I have been following this with no little interest. Using Eudora Pro when I attempt to replace host: smtp1.abraxis.com with *SMTP Host*, I receive the message *Attempting to resolve host: SMTP Host*, and dat's all until I stop the send command. Thanks Alec -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZ9PJyKJGkNBIH7lAQGamwP/e1L3bWlOxCLfcEcSCUK7L2NPyDn3lNoe n4omNWrcUUOzBpQXg2fxPgmfsBDvao84neqbnkLv4HlPdFqDT/WgbNKzaJILYazS 2W2XsuDY5fxDNizKPmv+BSiPCYCMqCdD96g+Pl52Im1F6D9oEYkbe1Kvpb+iZTOj UyQUePJKtbk= =70bm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by Dave Farber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The "White Paper" (if it exists) from the White House is different from the National Research Report. The NRC is independant from the White House and the Government. Dave >From my IP mailing list: Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 08:50:41 -0700 Reply-To: farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu (Dave Farber) To: interesting-people(a)eff.org (interesting-people mailing list) Subject: The National Research Council Study of National Cryptography Policy Please post this message widely I am writing to let interested parties know about the imminent release of the NRC's study of national cryptography policy. If all goes well, we hope to release it on May 30, 1996. However, prior to that time, we won't be able to comment on its contents. For current information on release, visit the web site http://www2.nas.edu/cstbweb/220a.html When you visit that site, you'll have the opportunity to be put onto a mailing list so that we can inform you by e-mail when the report is available in print and/or electronically, as well as any public events associated with the report (e.g., public briefings). Herb Lin Cryptography Policy Study Director Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council 202-334-2605

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Re: Why the Poor are Mostly Deserving of their Fate
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:32 PM 5/18/96, Sean Gabb wrote: >On Sat, 18 May 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > >> It was understandable to be poor when all the world was poor. It is >> understandable to be poor in those nations today that make the >> accumulation of wealth a crime for most people. It is not understandable >> to be poor (for long) in the US where one can reliably get out of poverty >> simply by doing three simple things: >> >> 1) get a high school diploma >> 2) get married >> 3) get any job >> >> Only about 2 tenths of 1% of those who satisfy those three requirements >> incomes below the official poverty line. >I've done all these things - and rather more in the way of education. But >while I don't fall on or near the poverty line, I'm still poor as a church >mouse. What am I doing wrong? * Point Number One: Sean Gabb <cea01sig(a)gold.ac.uk> ^^ * Point Number Two:"...not understandable to be poor (for long) in the US" ^^ Q.E.D. Actually, I think Duncan's "high school + marriage + any job" point is a bit simplistic, and I'm surprised about the ".02%" estimate. As someone else noted, there are a lot of folks in the rural South, Appalachia, and other places, who graduated from high school, are still married, and have some sort of job, and yet who make $6-8 an hour or less. I think more is needed. I would have added "savings/investment" and "hard work." Those who can force themselves to set money aside for investment get the compounded returns later on. And of course hard work--including taking a second job, having the extended family work, etc.--is also key. (Many immigrant Asians arrive penniless in the U.S., then get help from immigrant Asian who arrived earlier, live in crowded houses and apartments, have 4-6 wage-earners in a household, save as much as they can, and then open a small business. Success is almost inevitable. Hence the cycle continues. This tradition of the various Asian subcultures is almost completely lacking in certain other subcultures in America. More's the pity.) Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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No Subject
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. From: camcc(a)abraxis.com X-Sender: camcc(a)smtp1.abraxis.com Date: Sun, 19 May 1996 11:40:11 -0400 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: News from Burma Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ASIA 'Excommunication' An anglo-Burmese businessman friendly with pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been sentenced to thre years in jail for owning unauthorized telephones and fax machines. James Leander Nichols, also known as Leo Nicholas, was punished for having two fax machines and a telephone switchboard with nine lines in his home, a spokesman for Suu Kyi's political party said. In an effort to discourage contact between Burmese citizens and the outside world, Burma's military government requires people to get permission to own a fax machine, satellite dish, or sophisticated phone system. News Services The Atlanta Constitution/The Atlanta Journal Alec

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Re: Remailers vs Nyms - conflicting assumptions?
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:10 PM 5/18/96 -0700, Raph Levien wrote: >The fact that you can refresh nyms makes the problem you bring up much >less severe. Certainly refreshing it every few weeks/months is a good idea anyway. It's just that I (at least) seem to have this remarkable knack for having important mail try to get me immediately after a nym server goes down and before I get the news. That's happened to me three times in the last year. Refreshing deals with the long-term problem, but not with the short-term one. Maybe I need to settle for a higher level of mail loss than I'm comfortable with, but precisely because I'm not comfortable with it, I do remain interested in alternatives. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: Instant Remailers
by middle-man-admin＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 19 May 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >It is possible for someone to operate an anonymous remailer anonymously. > >Just get a UNIX shell account under a fake name, pay with cash, and set up > >the remailing software. The identity of the operator of such a remailer > >would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover. > > I'm always surprised that this hasn't been happening; maybe it will when > the new clients become available. I'm currently working on a version of Mixmaster that allows an individual to run a remailer anonymously. The idea is to set up the primary address of the remailer as a nym. That was easy. I've almost finished the modifications to Mixmaster to allow it to call Raph Levien's premail package. I've set it up to cause all outgoing mail to chain through 2 more random remailers before the message is delivered to the destination. This effectively allows me to operate as a "hidden remailer-in-the-middle". I'll provide more details when I finish the code and it's been thoroughly tested. middle-man-admin

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Cathy - Sunday, May 19
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Cathy" cartoon today has a bit of positive(?) well, at least it's not negative, PR about anonymity. Funny

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rsa2d.gif - machine readable rsa for printing in magazines etc
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I now have a cute 2 inch wide by 1 inch high graphic that is the 3 line RSA Perl program in a 2D barcode. When printed on anything (postcard, magazine, etc) you have a machine readable encryption program, or to the US government, a munition! http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/rsa2d.html Now what to do with this? Anyone want to place an add in a newspaper or magazine? How about selling munitions postcards? Another T-shirt? Should be fun for something. -- Vince

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'Excommunication'
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:54 AM 5/19/96 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. Nor was "excommunication" a political posting: There was no indication in the posting as to whether the Burmese regime was left or right or fascist or whatever. What the "Excommunication" post was about was the fact that good communications undermine the state, and repressive states fear them for that reason. This is exactly the sort of post that should be on cypherpunks. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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