December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: (Fwd) RE: Noise Sphere in Java
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 18 Apr 96 at 11:13, Hal wrote: [..] > There was a post on cypherpunks a few days ago claiming that the output > of "pgp +makerandom=2000 rand.pgp", which uses the PGP internal RNG, > showed visible structure in the output of a noise sphere program. I > tried modifying Chuck's Java version and ran it with data from pgp > +makerandom, and it looked fine to me. Hm. I didn't see that post... (I wonder if he plotted an ASCII file... or I suspect a troll?) > However, that isn't very meaningful, because I find the that program > output looks fine even with Chuck's version, which is using the Java > internal RNG, a LCM from Knuth. Specifically the Java code is: [..] A lot of bad PRNGs look good with noise spheres.... but what I found while experimenting with them was data based on timer drift samplings that passed a variety of randomness tests but showed up with very clear patterns on a noise sphere... so I made the original post to the list and sci.crypt about it. Noise spheres will show certain correlations in the data. It doesn't mean that the RNG is crypto-usable if it looks good. But if it looks bad then you know to be suspicious.... a visual image makes a clear point better than analyzing a lot of numbers on a page. By no means should it be relied upon as a sole test. [..] > see it. Oh, sometimes I can almost convince myself I'm seeing structure, > but it is never repeatable from run to run. And I see as much with the > output of pgp. Particularly when the graph is sparse you can see some > clumping, but I think it is just random noise. > If the noise sphere can't even reject an LCM RNG, it doesn't sound > that useful to me for crypto purposes. If you see definite spirals and loops then it's more than random noise. It doesn't pass or reject anything. It plots data. If the data shows *definite* patterns, you can reject the RNG. If not, use more sophisticated tests. [..] > at right angles to this. Because polar coordinates are not uniform in > space, the points are clustered along the north-south axis inside the > globe. You can see this in the views, where the upper right view should [..] That's probably what the poster to c'punks wrote about... *sigh* Rob. --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

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[CDA] "Million Geek March" on Washington
by Dave Del Torto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[fwd from: Keith A. Glass <salgak(a)dcez.com>] >Friends of Free Speech on the Net: > >On June 30th, 1996, a large anti-CDA rally, the Electronic Freedom March, >is planned for the Ellipse, in front of the White House. But without your >help, it won't happen. > >We need volunteers to help us plan the EFM and the logistics required for >it, people to help us raise funds to pay the expenses (the Park Service >has required us to provide 80 porta-potties, at a cost of nearly $4500.00 >alone, and that's not our only requirement. . .), and people to help us >run the March on June 30th. Not to mention publicity, etc. > >We need your help. **I** need your help. I've posted this to the DC area >groups, as well as to a few groups that I feel might be useful in >gathering more volunteers and interested people. But I need your >committment to help NOW, or we won't be able to run the EFM, or as it's >been called, the "Million Geek March". Come on, out there: help us out!!! > >-- >* Keith A. Glass, Annandale, Virginia, USA, Filker/punster at large * >* Washington Coordinator, Electronic Freedom March * >* 30 June 1996, Washington DC URL: http://www.efm.org * >* Note: the following line is an intentional act of Civil Disobedience: * >* FUCK THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT--DEFEND THE FIRST AMENDMENT ! *

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Re: Cypherpunks Death Penalty for "take me of" messages?
by Henry Huang 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Apr 17, 21:38, Timothy C. May wrote: > >take me of your emailing list > > She (or he) can't even spell "off." > > This clown also sent me the same message privately, so anything done to her > or him is only fair.. > > The Cypherpunks Death Penalty? Someone suggested that certain people were being signed up on Cypherpunks as part of a two-fold spam attack: 1.) in order to flood victim's mailbox with Cypherpunks' Welcome messages, and list postings, 2.) to re-direct victim's ire at the Cypherpunks list, thereby killing 2 birds with 1 stone. Hence, the "Death Penalty" may be jumping the gun, so to speak. ;) Not sure how one would go about looking into this, though. -H

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e$: The CDA and Mrs. G vs. the MTB and Mr. T. -- SINless DBCs?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Comments: Authenticated sender is <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: rah(a)shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) To: "e$" <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Date: Wed, 17 Apr 1996 19:47:19 -0400 Subject: e$: The CDA and Mrs. G vs. the MTB and Mr. T. -- SINless DBCs? Reply-to: rah(a)shipwright.com CC: Priority: normal Sender: postmaster(a)thumper.vmeng.com Precedence: bulk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- e$ Robert Hettinga The CDA and Mrs. G vs. the MTB and Mr. T. -- SINless DBCs? 4/17/96 Recently, Mark Twain Bank (MTB, for short) of St. Louis, Missouri, cancelled the ecash accounts of known pornographers. We haven't heard anything about this from Frank Trotter (Mr. T, for short), the bond trader who runs MTB's ecash program, or anybody else at the bank, for that matter, and it dawns on me today that we shouldn't really expect to. MTB is completely within its rights, as any bank is, to refuse an account to anyone, for any reason whatsoever, except where required *not* to do so by statute. Now, there's a paradox, yes? Fortunately, we don't have to do too much tweaking to get an underwriting system for digital bearer certificates (DBCs, for short) which gets us around around the current unpleasantness, one which scales nicely into a totally anonymous system, and which still allows heavily regulated (and censored) banks of deposit like MTB to profit quite well from cash-settled digital commerce on the internet. An interesting thing about this particular epsiode of self-censorship is that MTB did this *before* the Communications Decency Act (CDA) made offensive discourse -- of any kind, anywhere on the net -- illegal in the United States. As an aside, the CDA reminds me of the old chestnut about politically correct Cambridge (Massachusetts) during the first convulsions of second-hand-smoke mania: "In Cambridge, it's illegal to smoke in Boston." MTB, or its antecedants, has probably *always* cancelled a pornographer's bank account upon discovery, and has been doing this since long before *computers* existed, much less geodesic public networks. Rather than excoriate Mr. Trotter and company for bobbling the future, we should remember that Robert Heinlein's famous nosy-spinster next-door neighbor, Mrs. Grundy (Mrs. G, for short), *also* lives in Missouri. I spent middle-to-late adolescence there, and believe me, having moved late one July in the mid-1970's from Anchorage, AK to Ballwin, MO -- which I once likened to going from Haight-Ashbury to Happy Days in a single plane ride - -- I have first-hand knowlege. Mrs. Grundy, god bless her whalebone corset, is a pivotal fact of the universe in Missouri, which, also from personal experience, is a great place to be, er, from. Don't get me wrong. I mean, some of my best friends are from Missouri. I just wouldn't let my daughter move there. Anyway, as a bank of deposit, MTB does *lots* of business with Mrs. Grundy, thank you very much, and, frankly, it does a *lot* more business with Mrs. Grundy than it does with the net. Frank is following the imperatives of his market, and, he is no fool. Lots of moneypunks out there would say that this only highlights the need for more issuers of ecash, in locations safe from government interference, where they can issue digital cash certificates to whomever they choose. This is, of course, the concept of jurisdiction-shopping, or, as Eric Hughes likes to call it, "regulatory arbitrage". I've been giving this some thought, lately. Advocates of jurisdiction shopping forget, of course, that there is no real bandwith, much less competitive free-market bandwidth, in places like Vanuatu, or the Cayman Islands, or probably even Leichtenstein. *.li domains are more likely to get bandwidth faster than the Small Island Nation (SIN, of course ;-)) of one's dreams. If we lived here, we'd be home now. The market, in it's current state, is efficient. Big drag. On the other hand, statists argue that nation-states should pass legislation (so, what else is new...) saying that issuers of digital cash should not be liable for the acts of people using their product. After all, we don't restrict the sale of cars to known bank-robbers, do we? Actually, I've used a straw man here, though a necessary one, as there are more f*ckingstatists out there than there are eL33t mone$ypunk d00ds. Almost by definition, there's no legislative constituency for digital cash, so legislation mandating its liberal issuance sounds more than a little silly. Ecash is under the regulatory radar for the moment, probably because the market is virtually nonexistant. Regulatory stipulation of ecash non-liability actually puts yet another's camel's nose under the tent of banking freedom, which is what we're really fighting for here, right? No need to put one nose there before its time... What moneypunks and (imaginary) statists fail to realize is something that lots of cypherpunks, particularly Eric -- and Tim May -- have been saying all along. The problem should be solved, not by laws, or even regulatory arbitrage, but by cryptographic protocol. That way, it doesn't matter *where* the bank is, or *who* its customers are. Unfortunately, even though we have Eric's great open books idea, so that we might be able to anonymously audit an anonymous bank's books, and we have good hope of location-blinding someday, with things like web-proxies and maybe even IP-spoofing, it doesn't seem like we're really there yet. There's another problem, though. What happens when a previously-secret bank is exposed for the feelthy porno-grubbing perverts that they really are? Enter Mrs. Grundy. We're back to square one, or, more properly, in a low-bandwidth SIN (heh...). Someday, when we have truly anonymous banks, probably through some combination of SINs-with-bandwidth and strong two-way anonymity, legal or not, all of what I'm about to say will be moot. In the meantime, I have a quick-and-dirty fix, using what we have now. The trick is to use the right kinds of organizational entities to do the right things, and stay under the regulatory radar as long as possible. That is, until SINs-with-bandwidth exist and force the issue. By then, the digital bearer certificate market will be too big to control by state-sanctioned force, we hope. To do this, I will, for the final time (Really. Honest to god. I'll include it by URL-reference next time. ;-)), trot out my current world-according-to-Hettinga market model for digital bearer certificates. This won't hurt a bit. Really. Well, maybe just a *little*... Remember, we're talking about a many-to-many relationship between each type of entity below. In addition, anyone who sells something is assumed to have competition. In fact, the more there are of any given entity, the more robust a given DBC market would be. Finally, there's nothing new here to anyone who knows how securities are presently issued, except that the intermediaries (like exchanges, market makers, etc.) can be much smaller and more decentralized, because lower net-borne transaction processing and distribution costs reduce barriers to entry. It ain't rocket science, folks. 1. Protocol Designers. People like Chaum, Shamir (MicroMint), etc., who develop cryptographic e$ protocols. 2. Underwriters. Markets, issues, and validates the DBCs they issue, in this case, ecash. Charges fees to ecash buyers, redeems ecash certificates at "par". Exchanges for other denominations or expired cash are probably free. In addition, underwriters should have some kind of cross-issuer clearing arrangement, so that certificates of the same type issued by different underwriters would look all the same to the user. This should be peer-to-peer, with their trustee (below) acting as trusted intermediary, settling exchanges off the net. They could also all agree to use a central clearinghouse, but that becomes a major failure-point for the entire system, and a possible target of Mrs. Grundy, or worse, her more er, avuncular, associate, the nation state, sometime in the future. Cross-issuer clearing could also be a non-issue with inter-certificate standards, enough bandwidth and the right kind of client software. 3. Trustees. Real-live banks of deposit. Each one has wire connections to SWIFT, probably to the ATM system, and holds the collateral account for the funds on the net. Responsible to the users of ecash, even though the users are anonymous. Pays seignorage (interest on the collateral account) to underwriters, maybe protocol designers. Charges account, transaction fees to same. Insert MTB, or an equivalent, here. 4. Buyers/Sellers. People who buy and sell stuff using ecash, on- or off- line. Merchants can be called a high-volume subclass of on-line users, and they probably have special software and relationships to issuers. 5. Software Developers. Develop and sell software to underwriters, trustees, buyers/sellers under license to designers, where necessary. My favorite transaction model for purchasing and redeeming ecash involves a waterb^h^h^h^h^h^h, er, secure web-page, a card-swiper, a trustee bank with a SWIFT and ATM link, and an underwriter. By the way, Goldberg, Shostack, Parekh(?), and the hardware guy who does HP-XXX crypto -- forgot your name, very sorry -- have some king-hell ideas for card-swipers that emulate floppy disks, both in hardware and software, and output an encrypted DOS-readable file to be read by whatever application needs it. They figured all this out, right there in front of me, between trips to the nosh table at the trade-show section of CFP96. I was so impressed, I bought their dinner later on. Talk to them about development rights. ;-). Anyway, the buyer goes to the underwriter's web-page, punches in the amount desired, swipes his ATM card and punches in his PIN. This information is read and encrypted by the card swiper, and is sent through the underwriter and the trustee, ala Cybercash, to the buyer's bank. The trustee gets a transaction confirmation to issue cash from the buyer's bank on the ATM network, just like an ATM machine does, to be settled on SWIFT later. The trustee then issues a confirmation to the underwriter, who issues the ecash, which is stored by the buyer until use. Redemption does the same thing in reverse. The neat thing about this business model is that it's not only robust -- Metcalfe's law talks about the value of a network being directly proportional to the numbers of nodes connected to it, and that certainly maps well to financial networks like this -- but *every one* of the players in it can eventually be anonymous on the net side. The relationship between the buyer of ecash and his off-net bank is probably biometrically identified, but that's what we have over there anyway, and it certainly that can be changed someday, SIN-wise, as soon as some fiber is pulled or the sattelites fly. The trustee bank cannot see who the buyer/redeemer is, because the transaction can be blinded through to the buyer's off-net bank. The underwriter certainly doesn't need to know anyone's identity on the net side, because of the blind signature protocol, or on the trustee side, because it can only get its financial ability to issue certificates from its trustee, who we've shown doesn't know who the money's from, either. To repeat, this can scale into a system where *nobody* has to know *anybody* to reliably transact business on a cash basis. Trustees, underwriters, protocol designers, buyers/sellers (transactants?), software developers: No one. The real beauty of this in the present environment, where Mrs. Grundy is such a "pivotal fact of the universe", is that the trustee bank, a bank of deposit like Mark Twain Bank, is abstracted completely away from transaction events. The only account Mark Twain has to deal with is a trustee account, one for each underwriter, and, if the underwriters have any sense about protecting their liability against key theft (Hello, Mr. Borenstein...), one for each underwriter's DBC issue, each issue with its own expiration date. This account sees nothing but debits and credits, irrespective of their pornographic content, for the day's traffic on and off the net. The bank can be in any current legal jurisdiction, for the time being, anyway, because it's just taking money on and off its books based on SWIFT and ATM transactions, just like any normal bank would do. The only difference is its network connections to its DBC underwriters, which are no different from it's other on-line connections, analog and digital, with all its other customers. Now, the ability to do this may change, especially if the volume of cash business on the net gets high enough for nation states to begrudge the seignorage being made by the bank and its customers this way, or, more likely, if the local Mrs. Grundy is FUDded by the media into banning cash-settled internet commerce on, heh, principal. Hopefully, by that time, maybe small island nations will have enough bandwidth. Or, better yet, utter two-way anonymity will allow banks to become invisable, at least as far their contacts with other entities on the net are concerned, which means they could again be anywhere, and functionally out of the reach of the law. Finally, as much as I'm rooting for Mr. T at MTB, he is still stuck doing business with Mrs. G, who may actually be on his board or management, and not just in his customer base. And, don't forget the legal consequences of a creatively-applied CDA. There is even a silly sod or two on the ecash email list at the moment, talking seriously about age-differentiated ecash, god help us all, not to mention the Mormon-from-hell who wants to us to include a minor-flag in IP packets, of all places. (I really suppose I *should* talk, as I'm all for sticking micromoney on packets to pay for routing them someday...) The point is, unless Mr. T can figure a way to financially unwind his underwriting role now, he's probably stuck as a combination underwriter/trustee, which actually has some advantages, one being the innecessity to report any information to the ecash userhood about actual contents of the ecash "mint" collateral account (Backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the Mark Twain Bank, of course...). But, it does him absolutely no good with regard to the aforementioned "grundiness": in his client base, on his board, or management heirarchy, or maybe even in his own moral paradigm, god bless *him*. However, it doesn't mean that somebody, or, better, lots of somebodies, can't step in and implement either side (but not both!), of the trustee / underwriter model, sidestepping the problem of Mrs. G completely. It also seems to me that doing this would be much easier if someone was a trustee exclusively, from scratch, but I may be wrong. So, I guess I'm hoping, possibly in vain, that someone at Digicash will wake up one morning and do what they did on the software side: get out of the manger with the other monopoly dogs like Microsoft, and break up the functionality of their business model some more, so that the more prosaic bovine entities of the banking world, i.e., institutional trustees (sorry, ladies...) can have their breakfast. I bet there are whole bunches of successful institutional trustee banks out there, who could hold hold the money while it's on the net, and, as long as they don't have to do much else with it except communicate electronic transaction confirmations back and forth to an underwriter, would love to do so. This kind of business is something they already understand quite thoroughly. If not, I bet there are more than a few pioneers out there who actually understand ecash and other DBC technologies, and would get into the business of being a trustee as their primary focus of business. Certainly Mr. T himself is an existence proof of that, his adventures in Grundyland notwithstanding. Also, turning scads of independent underwriters loose on the net to bash away at the problem of marketing cash-settlement digital commerce might do wonders for David Chaum's mortgage payments on that brand-new Digicash building. So, even though Mrs. Grundy currently has her bloomers in a bunch, CDA or no, and is letting Mr. T and MTB know all about it, Mr. T, or someone like him, can still save the day, for a while, anyway, with SINless DBCs. .....Which is the plaintext of the title, I believe... w5 ;-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMXWCGvgyLN8bw6ZVAQFLrQP9EDRjyYuafbzjEhLOEk/BKDRUQD+Ucf4+ oS2JYV4ooVzBDjIwQxrKH2+RH4SbEMIEpq2+pPpRMin0PJEol5XP5QxtOsYZz37I U6J1qpvk4v+LkA+8v+9oIQSuXAynN6Lagn5I8ZTLf2eZY/bWDVezEbEwKHYrmluw WKYASgw3B64= =/Ojq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- The e$ lists are brought to you by: Making Commerce Convenient (tm) - Oki Advanced Products - Marlboro, MA Value-Checker(tm) smart card reader= http://www.oki.com/products/vc.html Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk See your name here. Be a charter sponsor for e$pam, e$, and Ne$ws! See http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ or e-mail rah(a)shipwright.com for details... ------------------------------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Re: [Explanation] Re: "STOP SENDING ME THIS SHIT"
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:37 AM 4/18/96, Pat May wrote: > > Crypto relevance: This attack will be eliminated when more mail > agents support public key crypto and the mailing list software can be > modified to check signatures on subscription requests. In my ongoing quest for net.buckyness I sent a subscribe message to the synergetics-l list, and got back a password, which I had to use to actually subscribe. It looked like a majordomo hack of some kind... Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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auto-spam of c'punks list
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone or something bogusly subscribed a bunch of people to the cypherpunks list. Please don't post any more messages running down the "newbies". None of these people subscribed; they were victims of a nasty prank. I just removed 237 people from the c'punks and c'punks-announce lists who appear to have been subscribed by email forgery. I probably missed a few. For the folks who are getting this message and who don't want to be on the cypherpunks list(s), it's easy to unsubscribe. Send email to: majordomo(a)toad.com that contains these lines: unsubscribe cypherpunks unsubscribe cypherpunks-announce Sorry for any hassle, John

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Clueless Newbee Problems Fw: Re: Fw: CWD-Pool Cool
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit This included message was sent to me privately from one of your accounts. It was a reply from a message that I sent to the cypherpunks list, which resides on toad.com. Do you think that you might `instruct` your user on proper netiquette in these areas. I have included all headers for you benefit. Looking forward to your prompt action. Thanks, Lou Zirko - -----Begin Included Message ----- X-POP3-Rcpt: lzirko@rex Return-Path: dvallance(a)InfoAve.Net Received: from pacs02.infoave.net (pacs02.InfoAve.Net [165.166.0.12]) by rex.isdn.net (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id IAA01191 for <lzirko(a)isdn.net>; Thu, 18 Apr 1996 08:43:53 -0500 From: dvallance(a)InfoAve.Net Received: from dial-4.r3.scsumt.InfoAve.Net by InfoAve.Net (PMDF V5.0-5 #4800) id <01I3OJ118HTC90SSUA(a)InfoAve.Net> for lzirko(a)isdn.net; Thu, 18 Apr 1996 08:47:44 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 1996 08:47:44 -0400 (EDT) Date-warning: Date header was inserted by InfoAve.Net Subject: Re: Fw: CWD-Pool Cool X-Sender: dvallance(a)mail.infoave.net To: Lou Zirko <lzirko(a)isdn.net> Message-id: <01I3OJ11RLCY90SSUA(a)InfoAve.Net> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Version 1.4.4 Content-type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT PLEASE REMOVE ME FROM YOUR MAILING LIST. THANK YOU - ---- End of forwarded message ---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMXZuSxKvccEAmlQ9AQG28wf+KRidWaEUkakCKI+KNaCfUZa49Ftjsdb+ MO5/HlcjQ/LjaKgTKs54NOJBO5yYtkELngHUU5gLK3BlsUiCljRqTI5Fvt0ozA2B aXJNU8MVJsXZbM8D1RWFQuWhhhsl1OpVfJsZVqCVy74jhPd59iB44FaEy6bW1Oup z9OZdANyxZdtayNAWacVAjq2QT68LL1M9uPrnl3PFUQu6Hqg5RJlOh1WYWsBvyjQ 1jjxvPBuc4fV0wxJe1UQ20BpscaRQVbw6f1NhSrgPBEsXYTtGDcMi0z6dRxtJUOd xEZpsJDQt9gAGka8ysSoapL8Dh0f2xeg6TQ1r/Y3J72dPo7wIYrZbA== =i9D5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ERR_not
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

4-12-96. Science: "Error-Correcting Codes Keeps Quantum Computers on Track" Commentary by Barry Cipra on Peter Shor's error-correction scheme for quantum systems (published last year in Phys Rev A) and his subsequent work with Rob Calderbank at AT&T Research on "quantum analogs of other more powerful codes that can correct multiple errors in long strings of bits." And cites work of others who are following Shor's lead -- Seth Lloyd at MIT, IBM, LANL, Oxford: "Quantum computers may be getting closer to reality." ERR_not

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plaugue of unsubscribes
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've started sending mail to postmasters when I get one of those "take me off your list!" messages. I explain that the user is on a high volume list, that he wants off, but that he seems unwilling or unable to do it himself. He's harassing the members of the list, who don't have the ability to remove him, and he doesn't seem to be reading our replies to his "take me off!" messages, which tell him how to solve his problem. Then I ask the postmaster to explain how to get off the list to the user. These guys are abusing email, and since they don't read our mail, the postmaster is the only solution. Perhaps if a few of us start writing to the postmasters, they'll help the user figure out how to get off.

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Re: why compression doesn't perfectly even out entropy
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I suspect, that all of us, Perry included, will react the same way if we find that our one time pads read like "Hamlet", or equally likely, "The Comedy of Errors". That is, we will tear the source of the pad apart to find out why it isn't working. If we find that it IS working correctly, we will wish we had used that one truly magic[*] moment to buy tickets in as many lotteries as possible. * Probability much less than 10 ** -50 in the life of the universe. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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CDA Court Challenge: Update #8 (Last Day of Testimony)
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CDA Challenge, Update #8 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- By Declan McCullagh / declan(a)well.com / Redistribute freely ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- In this update: BYU/CMU's Olsen testifies that "-L18" won't harm the Net Judges realize Olsen is a weasel Chief Judge Sloviter's incisive questions Who is Donna Rice? A DoJ attorney can't stop laughing... Closing arguments now set for May 10 April 18, 1996 PHILADELPHIA -- The U.S. Department of Justice doesn't like the way the Communications Decency Act is written. During the the testimony that ended April 15 in Philadelphia's Federal court, we've started to see the DoJ's legal strategy emerge -- and it includes attempts to redefine the CDA. The DoJ's star witness was the amazingly prudish Dan "I'm offended by four-letter words" Olsen, who said that his plan to have service providers card users and tag 'em as adults or minors is a fabulous way to go. But this shifts the burden of protecting kids from smut onto ISPs, a proposal that Congress rejected when they included "good faith" defenses in the law. Olsen, who will fit in just fine when he takes a job this summer as an administrator at censorhappy Carnegie Mellon University, also kept pushing the other half of his plan that would require all "patently offensive" online content be tagged "-L18." On Monday, the DoJ's very own attack-ferret Jason Baron asked Olsen: "Your proposal would not have an adverse effect on the Net as a whole? Olsen deadpanned: "Absolutely not!" This isn't surprising. To Olsen, the Internet is just a bunch of geeks who want to keep everyone else out of their own little world. When U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Dolores Sloviter asked him if his "-L18" system would develop side-by-side with PICS, Olsen replied: "If technical people were left to themselves, it would be likely to happen. I don't think this is true here. Internet people don't like other people telling them what to do. They're afraid of the FCC. They don't want anyone else messing in their pond." +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ JUDGES REALIZE OLSEN IS A WEASEL +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ Even the judges could tell that Olsen is a weasel. The three judges hearing our challenge to the CDA were unsympathetic to the Brigham Young University computer scientist and pinned him down for almost an hour as he tried to slime away from direct questions. Judge Stewart Dalzell is the most net-savvy judge on the panel and the only one with young kids, so I'm guessing they're helping him to grok the Net. He asked Olsen what would happen if U.S. citizens automatically cache overseas material, including "indecent" files. Again Olsen tried to weasel away from the hypothetical, but Dalzell would have none of it: "You assumed away my question." The DoJ witness grumpily admitted: "I'd turn the cache off." Some of Dalzell's questions were stellar: "Assume a chat group is talking about the CDA -- students from 13 to 18. In the course of the chat, an 18-year-old is exasperated and types in 'Fuck the CDA.' Is it your proposal that he should tag that '-L18?'" Not hesitating, Olsen said: "Yes." On the fight-censorship mailing list I maintain, Mark Stein writes: Judge Dalzell was paraphrasing closely from Cohen v. California, a seminal case in which the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a man who was arrested for wearing a jacket with "Fuck The Draft" painted on the back. This Olsen fellow's a government witness, you say? Sounds like he's working for us. Some of Dalzell's other questions were equally fab: "If in one issue of the Economist the word 'fuck' appears, the library [putting it online] would have to go through the entire text of the issue?" Olsen replied: "Somebody would have to make this screening. Somebody would have to make this judgement." (Later he invented the idea of libraries banding together to pool resources to make these decisions. I could feel the hackles of the American Library Association folks rising. I swear, Olsen makes up these mind-fucks on the fly.) Remember Judge Buckwalter? I wrote about him in my first CDA Update, saying that he was the least comfortable with our cybersuit: In an incomprehensible decision last month, Judge Ronald Buckwalter granted us only a _partial_ restraining order preventing the Feds from enforcing the CDA. Now he's justifying his original mistake by taking a critical stance during this hearing... Buckwalter has come around. Last Friday his comments indicated he was starting to understand the issue. His questions to Olsen on Monday showed that he finally "gets it": Q: If the creator of the material doesn't buy into your system, it creates a big problem... Does this mean plaintiff's proposal makes more sense? A: No. There are different types of proposals... Q: On your declaration, determining which are adults, you don't address economic claims? A: I only address if it's technically possible. +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ CHIEF JUDGE SLOVITER'S INCISIVE QUESTIONS +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ Chief Judge Sloviter's questions were the most incisive -- like Dalzell, she admitted to doing a bit of out-of-court net surfing. She asked Olsen if "children would be blocked from accessing parts of museum collections?" Olsen admitted they would. Some other questions from Sloviter: Q: Would [your -L18 proposal] contain the seeds that the government can do the blocking? Once everything is tagged as -L18, would that facilitate any one entity saying this material should not go out on the Internet? A: Possibly. Q: Can you think of any time in our history where we have blocked material in advance? A: Yes, every editor in every newspaper does this every day. Q: But in an organized manner? A: Every editor in every newspaper does this every day. The EFF's Mike Godwin says: That Sloviter asked this question is incredibly important -- it shows that she recognizes that compliance with the Communications Decency Act would amount to a complex system of prior restraints. Even among those who disagree strongly about the scope of the First Amendment, there is little disagreement about the general prohibition of prior restraints on publication -- the only generally acknowledged exception to this prohibition is the "national security" exception (publication of troop movements during time of war and the like). In previous obscenity/indecency cases, it has long been established that prior restraints on publication are impermissible. The strangest point of the day came after Olsen testified that a PICS-style third-party rating system would "slow the flow." (This was a snide reference to Vanderbilt Professor Donna Hoffman's testimony about how uninterrupted "flow" was important while web-surfing.) Sloviter then asked him how an adult would show -L18 tagged materials to a mature child. Olsen replied that a "teacher or parent could log on." Sloviter parried: "Wouldn't that slow the flow?" At this point, Olsen began to discharge a series of short, staccato bursts of high-pitched giggles, sounding like a rabbit being tortured to death. Damnedest thing I ever saw. The audience stared in horror. Basically, the DoJ fucked up with this witness. Olsen was such a censorhappy nut and so delighted with his "-L18" scheme that the court realized it went too far -- that it was obviously unconstitutional. In other words, he was our best witness. +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ WHO IS DONNA RICE? A DOJ ATTORNEY CAN'T STOP LAUGHING... +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ I would have loved to have been in Washington, DC when Grey Flannel Suit -- AKA AFSADAFOSICCI* Howard Schmidt -- was deposed on April 1. Imagine an entire business day filled with nothing but talk of cyberporn, with everyone trying to be serious and lawyerly. Some representative samples, from page 244 of Grey Flannel's deposition: A: The next one, the same [screen] with panties.jpg reflects the image that appears on the screen after clicking on Panties. A: The next one, the same [screen] with boobs.jpg reflects the image that appears on the screen after clicking on Boobs. A: And the next one is cunnilingus.jpg, which reflects the image that comes onto the screen by clicking on Cunnilingus. But my fave part was when former party girl and ex-No Excuses jeans model Donna Rice-Hughes was mentioned. In the past year, Rice-Hughes has leveraged her fame from the Gary Hart presidential campaign into a budding career as a morality crusader at the anti-porn group "Enough is Enough!" Read on for an excerpt from page 282 of Grey Flannel's deposition... Q: Are you acquainted with Kathleen Cleaver? A: No, I'm not. Q: Have you ever heard that name? A: It does not ring a bell, no. Q: Are you acquainted with Bruce Taylor? A: Not that I'm aware of, no. Q: Are you acquainted with Donna Rice? A: The name Donna Rice rings a bell it seems, but I don't know from what. [The ACLU attorneys and Pat Russotto from the DoJ can't stop laughing.] DoJ's Tony Coppolino: "I'll explain later." ACLU's Margorie Heins: "It's a honest answer." ACLU's Chris Hansen: "Even Pat couldn't remain serious through that." DoJ's Tony Coppolino, trying again: "I'll explain later!" * AFSADAFOSICCI = Air Force Special Agent, Director of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Computer Crime Investigations +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ CLOSING ARGUMENTS NOW SET FOR MAY 10 +-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+-=-+ The closing arguments for our case now are scheduled for May 10, with April 29 as the deadline for submitting our findings of fact and conclusions of law -- a lengthy collection of documents that will include everything we believe we've proved in our case. (Closing arguments were pushed up to early May since we didn't feel a need to call any rebuttal witnesses. After all, we had Olsen!) Our attorneys and the DoJ each will present two hours of closing arguments on May 10, though the timeframe is flexible. The three-judge panel likely will issue a decision three or four weeks later, and appeals will go directly to the Supreme Court. What will the Philly court decide? Bruce Taylor, the president of the National Law Center for Children and Families, told me that he's "confident" the court will uphold the indecency portions of the CDA. However, the former Federal prosecutor said he's "worried that the court may accept some of the technical or infeasibility arguments" against the law. I'm sure we'll talk more about it on May 9, when I'll be on a panel at the University of Pennsylvania with Taylor and Cathy Cleaver. Fortunately, one of the strongest aspects of our case is that we're correct. Stay tuned for more reports. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- We're back in court on May 10 for closing arguments. Quote of the Day: "We teach them proper principles and let them govern themselves." -Prophet Joseph Smith Mentioned in this CDA update: CDA Update #6, with details on Dan Olsen's "-L18" proposal: <http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/fight-censorship/dl?num=2143> Brock Meeks on 4/12 and 4/15 hearings: <http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/96/16/index1a.html> Mark Eckenwiler's report on the recent CDA forum at Cornell University: <http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/fight-censorship/dl?num=2226> CDA forum at the University of Pennsylvania, scheduled for May 9: <http://dolphin.upenn.edu/~fatf/cda-forum.html> IETF draft of "Internet Philosophy" article: <ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-iab-principles-02.txt> Net-Guru David Reed's article: "CDA may pervert Internet architecture": <http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/fight-censorship/dl?num=2093> Censored by the CDA <http://www.iuma.com/Cyborgasm/> Dan Olsen at BYU <http://www.cs.byu.edu/info/drolsen.html> Fight-Censorship list <http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/> BYU's censorship policy <http://advance.byu.edu/pc/releases/guidelines.html> Rimm ethics critique <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/rimm/> Int'l Net-Censorship <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/zambia/> CMU net-censorship <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~kcf/censor/> University censorship <http://joc.mit.edu/> Grey Flannel Suit <howardas(a)aol.com> Carl Kadie's CAF site <http://www.eff.org/CAF/> Blue Ribbon T-Shirts <http://www.fqa.com/romana/blueribbon.html> This report and previous CDA Updates are available at: <http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/> <http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/EFF_ACLU_v_DoJ/> <http://www.epic.org/free_speech/censorship/lawsuit/> To subscribe to the fight-censorship mailing list for future CDA updates and related discussions, send "subscribe" in the body of a message addressed to: fight-censorship-request(a)andrew.cmu.edu Other relevant web sites: <http://www.eff.org/> <http://www.aclu.org/> <http://www.cdt.org/> <http://www.ala.org/> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: why compression doesn't perfectly even out entropy
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:52 AM 4/18/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > Its tiny little statistical toeholds like that which permit breaks. True, as far as it goes. But I see an even bigger threat to password security. Yesterday, I subscribed to the New York Times Net News service. It asked me to select a username, and a password. Obviously, smart people are not going to the same password on multiple systems that they expect might be exchanging information, but we all know that reality is that people DO this, especially on systems they don't initially expect a great deal of security on. The problem is that a service like that (or a BBS operator, etc) at least as a passing chance of figuring out a person's password, or the password itself is a clue as to what kind of keyspace to search. (Upper case only? mixed? Only text? Spaces used? Etc.) Besides that, the password is probably passed in the clear. I think what is needed is a system to transform a password (perhaps by hashing, then perhaps encryption) so that the BBS/other service receives no useful information as to the password, or the method used to select the password, or for that matter the length of the password. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Cybercash vs Mark Twain Digicash?
by Christian Odhner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello. I've been off the list for quite a while now, so I'm not up to date on the current ecash schemes. My company (a major internet service provider with a lot of web advertising clients) is looking into which digital cash method would be best to support for use on our customer's web pages. The head of the web department has taken a look at several, and is torn between Mark Twain's stuff and Cybercash. I was wondering if people who have looked at these systems could give me a rundown on the major differences. I know that Mark Twain is nice and secure (or at least I *think* I know that) but Cybercash is signifigantly easier to use. Any comments would be welcome, and to keep list volume down (I assume it's still as busy as ever) I'd be happy to recieve replies via direct email, and sumarize for the list. Happy Hunting, -Chris Odhner - GoodNet -

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Re: EFF/Bernstein Press Release
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Thu, 18 Apr 1996, Mark Neely wrote: > >> Well, that puts legislation making virus authoring a crime >> into a new (and difficult) position. My understanding is that it isn't illegal to author a virus, but it certainly would be to release it. Preventing someone from writing a virus would be prior restraint, which is a big no-no with lots of precedent. See the excellent page at EFF for a discussion on prior restraint: http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/sjg_neidorf_eff.summary (Oooh, how's that you net.legal.beagles, citing web pages instead of cases?) So, you'd be able to write all the viruses you wanted. Turn 'em loose? Well, then you've stepped in it. -- J. Deters >From our _1996_Conflict_of_Interest_Statement_, re: our No Gift policy: "If you receive any alcoholic beverages, for example, a bottle of wine, you must give the gift to your location Human Resources Manager." This memo is from the Senior V.P. of Human Resources. +---------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'33"N by 93^16'42"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +---------------------------------------------------------+

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RE: math patents
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:46 AM 4/16/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote various amusing paranoid conspiracy theory :-) about software patents. I tend to agree that the concept is bogus, and it's further aggavated by the Patent Office's technical incompetence in the area which has led to granting of patents for things that are well covered by prior art and obviousness to skilled practitioners. However. The first software patent, AFAIK, was Dennis Ritchie's setuid patent from Unix. I'm not sure when it was granted, but it must have been applied for a couple years before Diffie-Hellman was developed. Unlike RSA, where it's fun to talk about RSA/PKP/etc.'s evil conspiracy with the government (in spite of the foreign citizenship of one of them and some amusing uncooperativeness that's let them pull off when threatened) but it's way bogus to argue that in the case of Whit Diffie (I don't know Hellman.) While PKP did acquire the Stanford patents for a while, they weren't the ones who applied for them and didn't form for a while after they were granted. Remember that RSA was developed a couple of years after DH. >I am still mystified, however! If I understand the thrust of the legal >cases you cited, purely mathematical algorithms are still not patentable, >yet the patents on public-key cryptography are about the most purely >mathematical ones that could be imagined. They are not an element in the >process, they ARE the process. The patents are carefully written to make it clear that the process is "protecting private data" rather than "Crunching numbers in some mathematically interesting way." >Patents would not have prevented the Russians from using RSA, nor any other >foreigners, so as far as I can see the only group of people impaired by the >RSA patent were American citizens as a group. (Other than Canadians..) The reason that RSA isn't patentable in other countries isn't because the US is the only place that permits algorithm patents (many countries do, and even provide more than US; e.g. IDEA is patented in Switzerland.) It's because most other countries don't grant patents after publication, and because of the major FUD that the NSA cast over cryptographic research in the 70s and 80s, it's been necessary to publish the theory before applying for patents - if you do it the other way around, the NSA can slam patent secrecy orders on your patent applications, like they did even for a wimpy analog scrambler for CB radio in the late 70s (which _was_ clearly done to impair American access to crypto..) > # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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No Subject
by steven farr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unscribe sfarr.SAF(a)worldnet.com Steven A Farr

2 1

unscribe
by steven farr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unscribe sfarr.SAF(a)worldnet.att.net please take me off your mailing list Steven A Farr

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Re: [NOISE] Toast Fishing in America
by wulf＠horvendile.getty.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 17 Apr 1996, David K. Merriman wrote: > If Microsoft made toasters... > They'd put the slots on the side, the actuator on top, make the > cord too short, and design it to only run properly on 177V, 41Hz. Then > they'd declare the toaster to be the new industry standard. and the toasters would download your toasting habits and preferences to Microsoft HQ... --Wulf

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Announce: new Microsoft CryptoAPI mailing list
by Microsoft Internet Announcements 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CryptoAPI on listadmin(a)lists.msn.com CryptoAPI is a mailing list (discussion list) for Microsoft Cryptographic API (CryptoAPI), which provides services that enable application developers to add cryptography to their Win32 applications. For more information about CryptoAPI, see <http://www.microsoft.com/intdev/>. You can subscribe to the regular mailing list or a digest version. To subscribe, send e-mail to listAdmin(a)lists.msn.com with the following text in the message body (not subject line): subscribe CryptoAPI your(a)email.address or digest CryptoAPI your(a)email.address where <your(a)mail.address is your actual e-mail address. To unsubscribe, send e-mail to listAdmin(a)lists.msn.com with the following text in the message body (not subject line): unsubscribe CryptoAPI your(a)email.address To send a message to the subscribers of the list, send e-mail to CryptoAPI(a)lists.msn.com.

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Re: why compression doesn't perfectly even out entropy
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: daw(a)cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) > My entropy cruncher takes in random noise from a number of diverse > sources (some possibly of dubious quality). I take *all* the noise > and run it through a hash function to distill entropy. > > Now I need to have some method to estimate when I have enough entropy > in the random noise I'm crunching. First rule: be conservative. > One can never have too much entropy in the input to the hash function. > > Therefore, I suggest making a *copy* of the input noise stream, > running it through Jon Wienke's "this shouldn't happen" filter, and > feeding the result to some entropy estimator. When the entropy > estimator says "I've got 1000 bits of entropy", I stop crunching. > > This is conservative design, folks. Using Wienke's filter in this manner > can't be any weaker than not using it at all. (agreed?) I see two problems with this. The first is whether this mysterious black box, the entropy estimator, is really possible. In practice the only way to know how much entropy you've gotten is to have a model for how the data is being generated, and to deduce from that an estimate of the entropy rate. So the entropy estimator can't be a general-purpose calcluation, but it must be one which is specifically chosen, developed and tuned for the specific source of entropy you are dealing with. Given this, what is the point of filtering? You already have a model. If you want to be conservative, why not just take 50% more bits than your model says you needed? The other problem is the functioning of this filter. I haven't followed Jon's proposals closely, but at one point he was talking about histogramming the input and throwing out data which he had seen too often. Now this is an implicit model as well - it assumes that the data is supposed to be uniformly distributed on a per-byte (or whatever the data elements are) basis. Suppose your random noise from dubious sources includes some timing values which vary in the range 90-110, roughly normally distributed. You have good reason to believe that it actually is a normal distribution, and that there are 2 or 3 good bits of entropy per sample. If you didn't use Jon's filter you could just collect data, hash it, and figure that each datum gave you this much entropy. But now if you throw Jon's filter in there, it may start throwing out all the values in the range 90-110. Where are the 0-80's?, it wonders. Where are the 120's and up? There are way too many 100's here! If the filter isn't smart about the data like your model is, it could end up throwing the whole data set out. Your entropy counter would be spinning its wheels waiting for more data, and you'd think you never got enough. So I think the lesson is that there is only one way to estimate entropy, and that is to study your source. I have to agree with Perry that this filtering concept is not the way to go. It is a red herring that lures you in the direction of automatic entropy estimation, and that is really not safe. Hal Finney

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(Fwd) Re: GPS-based authentication (response)
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As many of you will remember, I wrote last week to Dorothy Denning and Peter McDoran, describing some of the reservations expressed on the cpunk list concerning their 'cyberlocator' scheme. They've both responded, but not in a terribly helpful form. Denning wrote back quickly to say that she was going out of town, and that her colleague would respond. MacDoran took 6 days to reply, and then only to say that if my employer entered into a non-disclosure agreement with ISR Inc, then all my concerns "would be addressed". I wrote back to MacDoran, suggesting that open disclosure of their techniques would build confidence in their product, and requesting permission to repost his letter to the cpunk list. He has not responded after 24 hours. Peter Trei ptrei(a)acm.org Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Re: (Fwd) RE: Noise Sphere in Java
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Deranged Mutant writes: > Noise spheres will show certain correlations in the data. It > doesn't mean that the RNG is crypto-usable if it looks good. > But if it looks bad then you know to be suspicious.... "Statistical tests cannot find good (P)RNG's, only bad ones." This has been said before in various ways on the list, but it is worth repeating... andrew

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RE: math patents
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:54 PM 4/18/96 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:

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FW: EARN $350 PER DAY!!!
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received the message below today, addressed to me. Notice the info at the bottom. I didn't follow the instructions. But this could be what some people are receving which prompts them to send "unsuvscrive messages". .. Blanc >---------- >From: communicate@earthlink.net[SMTP:communicate@earthlink.net] >Sent: Thursday, March 28, 1996 1:09 PM >Subject: EARN $350 PER DAY!!! > > If you would like to earn up to $350 per day... call >1-800-545-0341!! > > You can earn $350 per day giving away a product every business needs > and are paying up to $3,000 for. > > Help us expand our client base as the Corporation prepares to go >public > with the release of a State of the Art Software Program for the >Internet! > > This is a CAREER opportunity, not a get rich quick scheme or MLM > offer. If you are a career oriented bright professional, with a >desire to > become financially successful in the 90's, then we will provide you > with the product that No One can say no to. We Provide training; a > great support staff and average earnings of over $1,500 per week. > > Full and Part-time opportunities available! > > CALL TODAY > > 1-800-545-0341 > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- >----------------------------- > Our records indicate that you may be qualified for this dynamic >position. If not, > just reply and type REMOVE in the SUBJECT heading and your name will > promptly be deleted from any future career opportunities with our >organization. > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- >----------------------------- > >

2 1

Announce: new Microsoft CryptoAPI mailing list (fwd)
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You read it here first. Or is this not really new? I'm approving three or four more MS announcements to comp.os.ms-windows.announce now. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 18 Apr 1996 16:15:06 -0700 From: Microsoft Internet Announcements <inetannc(a)microsoft.com> To: "'Comp.os.ms-windows.announce Moderator'" <win-announce(a)metrics.com> Cc: Microsoft Internet Announcements <inetannc(a)microsoft.com> Subject: Announce: new Microsoft CryptoAPI mailing list CryptoAPI on listadmin(a)lists.msn.com CryptoAPI is a mailing list (discussion list) for Microsoft Cryptographic API (CryptoAPI), which provides services that enable application developers to add cryptography to their Win32 applications. For more information about CryptoAPI, see <http://www.microsoft.com/intdev/>. You can subscribe to the regular mailing list or a digest version. To subscribe, send e-mail to listAdmin(a)lists.msn.com with the following text in the message body (not subject line): subscribe CryptoAPI your(a)email.address or digest CryptoAPI your(a)email.address where <your(a)mail.address is your actual e-mail address. To unsubscribe, send e-mail to listAdmin(a)lists.msn.com with the following text in the message body (not subject line): unsubscribe CryptoAPI your(a)email.address To send a message to the subscribers of the list, send e-mail to CryptoAPI(a)lists.msn.com.

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